ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles

R E S T R I C T B D
The greatest heficiency found among; SO6 troops upgn their arrival
in the European Theaterws the lack of proflclenoy in individual defense
meaeuree. This defic$ency, for the most part, had resulted from
the xiiniwun training perltod.,available in the United States and the deoision
there to place emphasis on teahniaerl proficiency during thc time
available, Conssquently maskemanship, hasty field fortifications, defense
egafnit chemical attack, land mines and booby traps, and other 88pects
of military training bf the individual soldier had baon largely
neglected.
57. Traininn in the United Kintzdom. Beoause thera were so few SO5
troops for tho job tc be done, it proved exceedingly difficult to find
time to give then adequate .training in the British Isles. For the nost
part, theso troops "3 putting in e long hard work-day at depots and
other supply inetallations, Xn many instancoo it wes oonaintently necewry
for them to work nore than the normal numker of hours, Bedquarters,
SOS and its Chiefs of Services and Base Section Commanaarn speolfied end
attempted to execute training prograns whioh recogniied this sifuatlon
and placed heavy emphasia upon on-the-job training.
But onathe-job training. excellent for increasing technical officiencg,
accouplishcd little totiards cverconhg the lack of proficiency
in individual defense measurea. Heedquartere 608 recogniped and directed
emphr.eis on this problem as e,?rly as 1942 by Bpeci ying that all
servicecpcrsonnelr be trained for combat as infentrymen1. But by May.
this training deficiency had not been corrected to a setinfacb8zT extent.
Scchnical proficiancy, emphasized during the tf'eining period
in the United States, deveioped further through on-the-)ob training in
the British Isles, Ssrvlce schooln were &so exailable to trein key
inaivuduala, Technical profioiency of iervice troops, aa R whole, came
to be satisfactory. Moat cf the exocptiona were duo to the necessity
of consiatently using certedn unitm in the British Isles for other than
their primexy idasion.
Menwavers providsd opportunities for overall training t o such
emall numbore of service units a8 could be spesed from their normal functions.
Particiastion of Sos units was further limitcd by the high prior-
ity given to Fieid Force unit5 in the few nenauvers permitted by COnditiona
in the British Ielsa.
Rceponsibility for directing overall trnining of earvice units
was charged to f3-3 SOS. !fithin the basic directives published by 0 3
thc Baso Section Comanders WerB responsible for developing acd ccrrrying
aut both tc?ChniCF.l and tactical training. The Chiefs of Special Staff
Sections of bndquwters SOS worked Hith 0-3 in developing the overall
progran. They Ktso found it neocseary to ronaer aubetantial assiatance
to tho Snsc Section Staffs in preparing cerrylw out detailed technloel
trdning program.
58. Conolnsiona.
a. The use of service troopa for other t11m their normnl funotiOAl
invmiably results in rapid deterioration of skill nnd proficiency
in the unitla nbility to porfom its prinery funotions and often has a
bnd. cffect on morale.
b. On-the-job training, Eupplewonted by a small auount of formdl.
instruction, is tho beet practical eolutioa to the problem of trainix
noet types of wrvice units in an active theetor of operations, but
1. Hq SOS, ET0 Training iI&qorandurn No. 9, 9 IToPsnber 1542.
RE-S-%%I- C-T-E-D
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