ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles
ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles
ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles
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RESTRICTED<br />
It was found poselble to fuipish <strong>the</strong> above Information <strong>in</strong> general<br />
terms without divulg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> spccific geographical locntion or <strong>the</strong><br />
qeciflc date of <strong>the</strong> operation.<br />
The document omitted irfonation and asau$ptions on two factors<br />
which later proved to be of consideraole iqorbce:<br />
a. Xn evaluatio2 of necessary swly responaibllities for<br />
<strong>the</strong> civilian population. Zhis omission nay have been <strong>in</strong>evitable, as<br />
determimtion rf such rebponsibillty ma not forthcom<strong>in</strong>g from higher<br />
levels until a much lehr &ate.<br />
b. Bn evaluation of tho eupply implications of mount<strong>in</strong>g tki<br />
opcration fron <strong>the</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Isles</strong>.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g July end August 19&3,<strong>the</strong> coaptation of specie1 re-<br />
quiments wce complotcd by Supoly Services <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fon of projects, each<br />
limited to a spcciflc Item or eroup of items and each conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g c coilplete<br />
justiflcntloa. Eeyirenents fo? likc items were consoliGated by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Service hav<strong>in</strong>g promemcnt reponoibllity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United Statc6.<br />
Thesc projects, a6 supplemented end mended from time to time, f0rmCd<br />
<strong>the</strong> besls for all special supply requirements for <strong>the</strong> entire operation.<br />
They were referred to as flPROC0 Projeots", both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Suropean Theater<br />
cnd <strong>in</strong> thc UnPtod States.<br />
3. &e of Surcial projects. %hare developed a signifloant diff0IEnCe<br />
h Ou<strong>in</strong>ion betrtcen <strong>the</strong> War Dmartment and <strong>the</strong> Eurorwan Theater<br />
e6 to tile pripcr scope cf thsse Iong-iange eatime.tes.<br />
The SOS, Europeen "heater h d prepared prcjeots on <strong>the</strong> ~ssmption<br />
that thcy should Include all Itens of supuly for iqhlch <strong>the</strong> estiua-<br />
ted necd would be aubatmtially greater than <strong>the</strong> nornal coubet u-s<br />
factors. The Suropean l'beater realized th@tcombat factors, thc ocels<br />
On which <strong>the</strong> 'Iar Departnent was est<strong>in</strong>atiry procurement, did not t&e<br />
<strong>in</strong>to considcration csrtdn peculiarities of thc cantaplated operation<br />
<strong>in</strong> kropo such es ship-s<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>ce between <strong>the</strong> Sritish <strong>Isles</strong> and France.<br />
Therefore, chc <strong>in</strong>itial projccts submitted bjr <strong>the</strong> SOS, Eurqeen Theater<br />
<strong>in</strong> July and August1943 h d Included nsny cormon items (c.g., rations)<br />
as vel1 88 special items md snjor equipment.<br />
E%?Ver Dcpartnent, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, had iatendcd <strong>the</strong>ir dirrective<br />
to cdL for spccid requirements of ncjor itms only, and <strong>in</strong><br />
Septmbor 1943 it propoeeZ. tllat dl projects co-Jeer<strong>in</strong>g excess issue of<br />
nomil itcma be rithdrarm by <strong>the</strong> European Thcater and subnlttcd by<br />
normal rcquisitim<strong>in</strong>g procedure. 4<br />
There followcd an exfitCqeof cnbles <strong>in</strong> wkich <strong>the</strong> 'Yar DepmL<br />
mcnt agreed thRt projects alrerrdjr gubrdtted would 'sc processed, but<br />
epecified that additioznl projects would not <strong>in</strong>clude excess roouireacnte<br />
of common iterns.5<br />
However, <strong>in</strong> Ootobor 1943, <strong>the</strong> Var Departnent recoueldercd its<br />
previous daclsions and t-pproved <strong>the</strong> we of PROCO projects for all rcquiremcnts,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g comon items, <strong>in</strong> xcess of nomal supply as had<br />
beenlnitially recamended by 50s. Z"O.& This deolejon permitted thc<br />
immediate editihg and prochasa<strong>in</strong>p, of <strong>the</strong> projects by tho Zone of Interior<br />
4.<br />
5.<br />
6.