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ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles

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SEGTIOW 19<br />

SOBTIXG SHEDS<br />

70. Sasis of Rcsuircncnt. As soon as substmtid quantities of<br />

Uritcd Statcs S<strong>Up</strong>Dlica began wriv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Britisb Islea, <strong>the</strong> ~ lan<br />

for gctt<strong>in</strong>g this ratcriel fron ship-aid0 to <strong>the</strong> proper depots was found<br />

to be un.rorkabla.<br />

me orig<strong>in</strong>al plan had bccn for SOS Supply 5orvicss to designate<br />

<strong>the</strong> deet<strong>in</strong>ntions of e.11 aupclies on each ship prior to <strong>the</strong> arrival of<br />

<strong>the</strong> dip.' The baais of this action was to be RZvance copies of <strong>the</strong> shipla<br />

wonifeat, prcceded by lod<strong>in</strong>g cableo. However, lhipsl manifests and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

advicce vcrc found to be not <strong>in</strong> sufficient dotail to permit <strong>the</strong> pre-<br />

dceignation of cargo to tho cxtont nccessary to make <strong>the</strong> plan workable.<br />

A contributiig factor <strong>in</strong> thc failure of <strong>the</strong> plan was <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ability,<br />

espcciallp <strong>in</strong> 19k2 tud early 1943, of <strong>British</strong> dock workera, unfamiliar<br />

with United Statza aupnlica and mark<strong>in</strong>gs, to follow aamrrately<br />

such detailed shipp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stivctions BB could be given.<br />

Ano<strong>the</strong>r factor contribut<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> coofusion was tho relatively<br />

largo percentago a i contc<strong>in</strong>ers that were <strong>in</strong>adequately markod os to contents,<br />

or were not marlecd e.$ all. An <strong>in</strong>dication of tne extant of this<br />

fail<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>in</strong> 1942 <strong>the</strong> New York Port viaa receiv<strong>in</strong>g for<br />

ahiprant approximatdy 24,000 pieces of unmarlced cargo daily.<br />

Thc remilt vas:<strong>the</strong> shipp<strong>in</strong>g of unaortcd mp9lics fron dooks to<br />

such depots ea at thc t<strong>in</strong>c had capacity to reccive <strong>the</strong>m. Those depots,<br />

after eort<strong>in</strong>e thc mp2lics And plac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>ventoqj, were<br />

frequently directed to ship large quantities of <strong>the</strong>m to o<strong>the</strong>r depots<br />

to.BeLa~~ stock6 or to mcet immediate requirements. Phis <strong>in</strong>tsr-dapot<br />

shipment of wpliae gray to bo a scrioua burden on <strong>the</strong> dapot and tramportation<br />

systama which werc already work<strong>in</strong>g to capacity.<br />

Thcre werc threc possible solutions to this problem, a31 of<br />

whhiah wcrc cxploitcd: first, better documcntotlon by <strong>the</strong> Zone of <strong>the</strong><br />

Interior; second, iacrsas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Gfficibnoy of cargo identification by<br />

dock workers; thtrd, thc use of sort<strong>in</strong>g ahode with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> port area.<br />

(mc uno of sort<strong>in</strong>g sheds had not provioualy been coaptmplrrtad).<br />

71: Function of Sort<strong>in</strong>n Sheds. Tliia vas described by SOS a@<br />

roll.ow: IISort<strong>in</strong>g ahcde at or ncar ports &e used to clessi?., identify<br />

and Bort iiicom<strong>in</strong>g supplies, particularly sizad ltcms of Clotk<strong>in</strong>g and<br />

peckqcs which cannot -09 clcnrly idontificd from <strong>the</strong> manifsate. The<br />

purpoec is to assurc groper dfatribution of supplica to <strong>in</strong>land dopots,<br />

end to cl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>atc trannhipneit between depots, thcmby rodw<strong>in</strong>& thc nubcr<br />

of rail wagons <strong>in</strong> uec.111<br />

As <strong>in</strong>dicctcd by thc c,borc 8te.tcmcr.t; sort<strong>in</strong>g shods wcrc used<br />

Ol!lY for such itcas as could not bc idcntiflcd and scgrogatod at Bhipaidc.<br />

Never morn than 3$ of U.S. tonnago hpndlod monthly by <strong>British</strong><br />

railweye m a fron sort<strong>in</strong>g sheds2.<br />

The rout<strong>in</strong>g of aupplics through sortiw shcds <strong>in</strong>volvcd a camplctc<br />

edditiocd handl<strong>in</strong>g an oaupmed with supplice that could be dire+<br />

1. SWr2rr:r cntitlcd t'dpprooiation of Installetions PrOgra", fWe 1943,<br />

by Chicf of Servicc, SOS. Smary publiahcd <strong>in</strong> 50s ET0 lf0verall<br />

Plan", dated x) June 1943.<br />

2. krious (monthly) Progcese Reports md Statistical SU"ariC8 published<br />

by SOS, <strong>ETO</strong>.<br />

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