ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles

BESTRICIED
operations on the Continent. The requirements, iacluding oils and lub
ricanta, only for BuI)port of operations on the Continent. The requirements
for vehicles operating in the United Kingdom irere SUppliOd from
common storage operated by the British.
The original program vimalized twenty depots, of which ten were
authoriaed for construction earl? in 1943. The construction of the re-
maining ten were to be authorized as tactical plans developed. By the
end of 1943, 14 depots had been complete& with a cepacity of 20,000 tons
of fusl plus 13,000 sq- feet of covered storwe for oils and lubricaats.
Ninety-five percent of the conbbmctlon we.8 done by the United
States.
This storage program was based on the assumption that two-third8
of the combat force would be engeged during the first 30 days and tho
entire force during the following 15 days, after vrhkch bulk deliveries
could be depended upon. Fuel consumption Vas baed on 1;75 gallons per
man par dkv foe combat operations. Lubricating oil8 as a percentage
of fie1 tonnage for combat operations were calculated at 45 with all
other ahlied products amounting t o less than *.
68. The Amunition Depot Proprm vrae designed to ctore four months
of Oround Force replrementn and eight months of Air Force requiregent6
for full combat operations.
The program called for space adequa€e to store 388,000 tons of
Ordnance iteme: 134 tons of Chcmical Uarfwe Items plus 8,OOO,OOO square
faet of hard standings mainly for spray tanks.
69. Conelusiozs.
a. The depot structure of bdvaice, Intermediate, and Base
Depots ae specified in 'far Department publications is not the most
dasirable under all circumstances. Rcquently the eatabliahmdj of d i
such a depot system is ettemely uneconomical in the use of trmsporta-
tlon and personnel. A depot structure should be worked out for cach
dtuation from a oomon sense point of view, based on the aost efficient
use of transportation and personnel.
b. Undcr overseas conditions vhere available rail and storage
facilities wre limitcb, QC.3QralDepot6 are usually lese desirable
than barvice Depots in supporting large oprcrtions involving substan-
tial tonnego.
c. The dcgree to which denots should 'oe exempted from Base
Seotion control is a mattor of evolution in a specific situation, but
in general Ohore should bo conplcto decontralfsaticn of operation rO1ponaibilitios
to the Basc Scction Comnandcrs, vlth the Headquarters
SOS staff concentrating on plans, pB1ici es and ooordination.
d. Staff Socfions shauld not bc pernittad to i6md dircctivcs
to installations oalling for recurring reports except an omroved
by a control section orgpnizcd on a General Staff level. Abuse of WCb
a oontrol, ospeoially undcr rcpidly changing conditions, will &most
, inevitably result in installations being burdoneb with bhc sUl"8sion
of unnecessarily largo numbers of r~ports,many of which dl.1 contain
idcntlcal Information.
e. I!& authority to impcct dcpot installations should be
specifically and strictly limited. All inspectdona and visits $0 installations
should roquire thc commrrence of eome Central WCncY.
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