ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles

80s Chiefa of Supnly Services, on the other hand, point aut that
the great majority of depots contain portions of ihe Theater Reserves
which cannot be evenly dividcd among Base Section@; in many other ways,
dnoat every depot is an integral part of'the overall Nppiy system. They
consider it impoiitnnt to be able to exercisc complek operational control
vrlthout rosorting to the time-consuming process of using command channels
or obtaining concurrences of Base Seotion staffs. W s is especially
necessary in a new and rapidly changing eltuntion where semi-permanent
unifonn procedure# and polioiee are difficult to sstabllsh.
Therefore, although the Commanding General, SOS, van in accord4
wlth Army Regulations giving SO5 CUofs of Supply Services complete con-
trol over depots5 and had originally organlied the SOS rrirhh depcts aa
exempted stations, it was not feasible for him to continue rwh a system
of centralized control after depofa became more numerous and the overall
situation complex and fast-moving.
In May 1943, Bare Scction Comndcrs were made responsible for
bhs "internal msmgemcntu of depots, leaving technicd operations still
under direct contal of the Chiefs of Services concerned. This division
of responsibility was srtrcmemly difficult to interpret or apply.
Therefore, in August 1943, Base Section Comr~~andera were made
ltrc~ponaiblofor tho operation of all General and Branch Depots" and
the "recolpt, storsge, ntenance, sZlvage and lsiue an directed of
supplies and equlpmentn? The directives setting forlthe this division
of authority between the Base Section Commanders and the SOS Chiefs of
Services were somewhat ambigmar, perhapa intentionally, and the E&
hral division of authority wan evolved in dealing8 fetween the key
individuals conoerned. The solutiona reached were dependent bn an important
degree on tha persomlitics concerned. In the final endpis
the SO6 Chiefs of Supply Servioes, empeciaLly the Ohief Cpmterrrraster,
Nho was charged with staff supervision of General Depots, aatually Wercised
almost complete control over all importat aspects of depot:
operations. This control was exercised more or leas fnforrsally through
taohnioal channels which, although in many instances theoretically inoori-ect,
was a workable eolutlon to the problem.
Consequently the depot eystem worked smoothly with perhaps two
deficienokee worthy of apeoiel note:
a. Dcpots were hlndered in their operation by too many inspections,
by too m ~ people y from too many different eohelona of command.
lphcy were inapected by rspreaentatives of General and Spacial Staff 6.30tione
of Kcadquarters SOS and the appropriate Bsee Seofion, and even
by representatives of Headquarters E'N) and District Headquarters within
thc Base 6oction.
b. Depots vera required to submit too many reports to#Base
Scotion Headquarters and t o Headquarter. SOS. of those reports
were unnocassery, wore to so010 extent duplicates, or had mtlived their
usofulnesa .
67. The POL Denot PronRm was denigned to eo~omodato packaged
fuel requircmente, including o ils and lubricants, oaly for rupport Of
4. Ltr, Brig Gen. R. ti. Littlejohn, 11 Feb 43, Subj: %lationships
Between Base Section Commanders and h qly Installations." 90:
MnJ.Gan.John C.H. Lee with Gan. Leela note of 8yprov.d written
thereon 26 Beb 1943.
9. 88 700-10, 24 October 1942.
6. Hq 60s Circular a@, 24 August 1943.
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