ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles

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RESTRICTED Most of the planning and persome1 officsrs engeged in the troop calculations had never seen the service dnits in operation, even -der maeuver conditions in tha United States. In fact, w v types of SOS units he.& not been in existence long enough to have been thoroughly tested. One difficulty peculiw to the situation 1w.s the fmt that the SOS would have to support n split operction - part in the United Kingdom ad part on the Oontinent. Becmse of this, the service troop requirement wfls larger then it voould othcrwise have bean, but tlrere was no pre- cedent to aid in determining the extent of tb.t difference. Another difficulty was the problem of troop reauirementa for mounting bhe invasion. Since this 1vas B. type of nounting never before undertaken, little In the wey of crystallized detailed plaza vere evolved until too leta to change substentidly the SO5 troop basis. merafore, the troop bnais did not include speciol requirenents for mantine; the opero tion2. A further planning problen was the sizeable reeponaibility for guarding SOS installatione on the Continent. The principle was eetablioked that Field Forcce would guard the linee of cmwnication and provlde aree security where SOS installationa were estnbliahed. Eight infantry regiments were included in the SOS troop besis to orovide guards for the installations theasdves, but these troops Warn-never nade available3. Thareforcl, this responslbility and the designation of personnel to meet it was a problem which ma never iolved duriw the operations on the Continent, A similar difficulty In plmning was the lack of infcrnetion concerning the emcunt of civilian and POW .labor tht would be available and could be effectively utilieed on the Continent, plus the at% tendant personnel problsu of providing guards for the POVls. Consaquently, as was later learned by experience, too many l akr unite were requested at the expenae of depriving the operation of additional 6killed personnel. !XI. Calcule.ting the SOS Troop Basis. The 505 troon basis, for the most Dart, was calculated by the fllliefs of Services on a 6trdght mathemeti& basis end was editid in the same rJRMer by the &OS General Staff Section. This nethod of ooloulating the SOS troop basis involved. little noxwU8n diSnding the rated oapaaitg of a given unit into the manpower, nunber of vollicles, and so on, to be supported. The only infornrrticn published by tho 'fer Department on mit ct.p.pacitfe8 (contained In tbe T/O1s) VJPS inconplote, and later proved to be h"Ur&te in nany inetences. Overall opnroval of the troop basis vas clwrged. to ZTO G3 UcCpt for n short pcriod when it ifas charged to &TO C-5 (Plms). Within the SOS, troop rcquirmente werc consoldiated and sditcd by C-4 I until Novcnbor 1942, vhan thcy Bcccd the iesponslbility of 01 SOS, In June 1943, 0-4 rcm-led nost of its fomcr responsibilitios, leaving wit11 0-1 thc nutlrority ovor troop aatinptcd covering headquarters instellations and the ddnlnistretlve Scrvlces, such ne Cldcm, BinenCe, Provost tfrshal, and Specie1 Sorvicss. -~ 1. Ki8toricnl Section, !Xj~'%f, mpply end Troop Build-up in the United EingdonN . 2. IBS, Scrvice Troopa Brmch to Sxec Officer, a,"SA, Woject: %TO Service Troop Suild-up For Operation "RDn, dated 3 Jul 45. 3. Hq, Cora 2. "Co~icatione !&one dotivities in hpport of the European cmwienn. - 29 -
51. Conclusions. a. Service troou requirements cannot becalculated or edited solely on a mathematical basis. Requirements are largely dependcnt updn factors mch as t b type of operation, number of POli end other foreign personnel expected to be supported, local facilities available (such as housing, rods, indigenous labor), end the nunber and charmterlstics of lines of coumnicatlon and installations. b. Directives calling for troop requirement estimates mat contain B complete planning basis in addition to overall menpower figures& SZCTIOU 14 PEASING OF SOS PWSOIUEL IiFM PES BRITISII ISLES 52. General. The desirability of uhasing SOS units into an overseas tiheater in advance of, and at a greeter ratc than, the Field Forces and A ir Forces to be eupportd tma a principle long recognieed by the War Department. QeneralPerehlng had urged it in Vorld ?Tar I, and the Conmanding General, SO6, ETOUU in lforld Var I1 repeatedly recomended that the movement of serfiae troops into the theater not be delayed1. 53. Factors DBteminiw Phasing. ?he la& of servioe units in the United States, the shortage of shipping, and other more urgent objcc- tives In the British 1111~8nade it imponsible to phase SOS troops lnto the theater on a high priority basis. %ginning with the arrival of United States Boxes in Jcrnuary 1942, there was the necessity of assiatlng in the protection of tha British Isles, especially Ireland, agsinst the threat of Oarwan invasion or raids. Almost iimediately, in addition, it was desirable to conoentrate on the hunching of B United Staths air off enaive . Brltlsh authorities were anxious for the United States to scad to the British Ides unite trnd equipment to further those objectivss. Oonsequently they d e available (io the United States Forces the m8xlmum possible number of civilinn personnel, and evan Briti6h nllitar7 peraonnel, to perform aeryice funotion for the Air Porces and Field Forces. British agencies krned over or cbnatructed nost of the Installations, both housing an& supply, required by the United States Forcea. Considerablc British civilian facillhike$, such as bakeries, laundrlea and certain types of repair ond maintenance worIc,wers uade available for EeTviC6 functions. Comodltiee - for instance, freeh neate end gaB01im- 'Mere distributed on A wholesde basis by Lhe Sritieh for the United Str.tea Forces. As EL result of this aasistance. it wad possiblc to rcterd grcatly the phasing of SOS troops into the Theater. mu., in June 19k. SOS etrength WELS lese than 44 of total Thcnter strength. Just prior to thc invnsion of Forth Africa, in Ootober, this percentage ha8 increased to 1%. AS the drth African not only drained off meh Of tho Wpower ftocuuulsted in the United Xingdoil, but also took priority on shipments throughout the irrintcr months, the SO6 troop strength showed no appreciable increase until June 1943, at which tiae its total increased aufficiantlg to neke it 225 of thc Theater Itrcingth. A year later, on D-Day, this percentegc had inorcnecd to 29%.)? 2. Letter from lfajor General J.C.B. Lae to the Secretary of 'hr, Subject: nBOLERO/SIOKLE Build-Ups, dated 22 July 1943. RE-S-l'-R I-C-I-E-D -30-
Page 1 and 2: ?'"EE GETlEIwL BOD bite6 States For
Page 3 and 4: 1 SCOPE --____ RES T R I --_- C T E
Page 5 and 6: R*E*S-T-Tc- I-C-T-E4 R-E-S-T-R-I-C-
Page 7 and 8: TE2 BRITISH ISLm 3.. Establishmnt m
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Page 20 and 21: R-E-S-T-R-1-C -T-E-D d. Duriix tlia
Page 22 and 23: RESTRICTED It was found poselble to
Page 24 and 25: RESTRICTED The last method was deci
Page 26 and 27: . It is sssectial that A unit a ful
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Page 30 and 31: naterially the long hauls clnd the
Page 34 and 35: R E S Z B I CTED 9. Results of Slow
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ETO, Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles

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