HEADNOTE: Mario Rodriguez Gutierrez v. State of Maryland, No. 98 ...

excluded if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
. . . .” Md. Rule 5-403; see also Faulkner, 314 Md. at 641, 552 A.2d at 901. The trial court
adopted the State’s reasons for admitting the testimony, specifically that the shooting’s strong
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A few examples are particularly striking: [the expert’s]
testimony that the FBI gang task force had seized “[p]robably
between 15 and 25” firearms, as well as ammunition, from
MS-13 members; his statement that MS-13 members on Long
Island had been arrested for dealing narcotics; and his statement
that MS-13 had committed “between 18 and 22, 23” murders on
Long Island between June 2000 and the trial. No expertise is
required to understand any of these facts. Had the Government
introduced lay witness testimony, arrest records, death
certificates, and other competent evidence of these highly
specific facts, the jury could have “intelligently” interpreted and
understood it.
Id. at 194–95. The court stated that, despite the need and utility of expert testimony on
gangs, such evidence must be limited to issues where “sociological knowledge is
appropriate.” Id. at 190. It reasoned that a distinction should be made between the legitimate
role of an expert in translating slang or explaining the hierarchical structure within a
particular gang and the impermissible substitution of an expert for factual evidence. Id. at
190–91.
Here, Gutierrez attempts to draw similarities between Norris’s testimony and evidence
supplied by the expert in Mejia: “When [Norris] described the gang’s violent tendencies, acts
of retribution, and the like, the jury was potentially influenced that the Defendant formed his
intent for premeditated murder simply by being a member and not from the facts and
circumstances of the crime.” We disagree with Gutierrez’s characterization of Norris’s
statements, and believe that Meja is distinguishable from the case at hand. Here, Norris
described the gang-specific rituals of MS-13, such as “jumping in,” and the expected level
of retribution for insults and “false flagging.” This is exactly the type of sociological
knowledge that, if relevant to an issue in the case, Mejia considered appropriate. Norris did
not detail specific criminal acts that could have been better established through fact evidence,
including arrest records or death certificates. He limited his opinion to the particular customs
and generalized background of MS-13, such as its rivalries with other gangs and the
significance of the letters and number composing the gang’s name. This is well within the
province of proper expert testimony.
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