HEADNOTE: Mario Rodriguez Gutierrez v. State of Maryland, No. 98 ...

admitted as circumstantial evidence of guilt, during the state’s case-in-chief, as it was
material to show that the appellant had a motive to murder the rape victim’s daughter, a
possible witness in his upcoming rape trial. Id. at 483-87, 590 A.2d at 181-84. Nevertheless,
the facts of the case sub judice are not at all similar to those in Jackson. In Jackson, no one
witnessed either the fire bombing or the murder. Consequently, there was no direct evidence
of the defendant’s criminal agency, as there is in this case. Because of this lack of direct
evidence, the State could only prove its case circumstantially, including introducing evidence
tending to show the defendant’s motive to commit the crimes. By contrast, here, the State
had multiple witnesses to testify that the appellant shot and killed the victim. Not only was
motive not an element of the offense, but the evidence of gang-related motive was not, with
Quintanilla’s murder, “so linked together in point of time or circumstances that one [could
not] be fully shown without proving the other,” so as to make motive not simply a material,
but a necessary, part of the State’s case. Westpoint, 404 Md. at 489, 947 A.2d at 539
(internal citations omitted). Moreover, motive was never placed into controversy by the
defense; “lack of motive” or a defense that would generate the issue was never introduced
in the defense’s opening statement and the defense never raised any such issues during the
State’s case or at any time during the trial. Thus, no issue permitting the State to offer
evidence of motive ever materialized during trial, never mind during the State’s case.
I agree with the court in United States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1155 (5th Cir.
1974), when it explained that we must continue to recognize that the categories of exceptions
– motive, intent, identity, etc. – to the prohibition against other crimes evidence “are not
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