HEADNOTE: Mario Rodriguez Gutierrez v. State of Maryland, No. 98 ...

that the appellant, because of this association, would be more likely to kill, or use a handgun
in the commission of a felony. It is clear that the probative value of Sgt. Norris’ testimony
simply does not outweigh the prejudicial impact it would have on the jury.
B.
While I disagree with the conclusion of the majority in regards to the relevancy of any
of the expert witness’ gang-related testimony, I agree that the majority is correct when it
states, that “the trial court erred when allowing [the expert witness] to testify that MS-13 is
the gang that law enforcement ‘had seen the most violence with recently for the past four,
four and a half years in this region.’” Gutierrez, __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __ [slip op. at 22].
Certainly, the fact that MS-13 or any gang is more violent than others has no bearing on
whether this particular defendant committed this particular crime. I do not agree that the
error was harmless.
The test that controls the resolution of this issue was pronounced in Dorsey v. State,
276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976):
“[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing
court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a
belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the
verdict, such error cannot be deemed ‘harmless’ and a reversal is mandated.
Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of – whether erroneously admitted or
excluded – may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict.”
(footnote omitted)
Id. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678. The test focuses on the effect of evidence, admitted or excluded
in error, on the verdict delivered by the trier of fact. When a reviewing court determines that
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