Marine Report 236, Independent investigation into the engine room ...

3 FINDINGS
3.1 Context
At 0250 on 9 February 2007, about four hours after Baltimar Boreas sailed from
Newcastle; the ship’s fire detection system indicated a fire the engine room. The
second engineer found number three diesel generator on fire, discharged a portable
fire extinguisher towards it, then retreated and stopped the engine room ventilation
fans. The crew mustered and operated the engine room oil tank quick closing valve
system. All ventilators, except those at the top of the funnel, were closed.
At 0305, the Halon fixed fire extinguishing system for the engine room was
operated and soon after, a distress message was sent. At 0340, the fire was reported
extinguished. The ship’s electrical system was badly damaged and Baltimar Boreas
was disabled. Later that day, a tug responding to the ship’s distress call towed it
back to Newcastle for repairs.
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the
engine room fire and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any
particular organisation or individual.
3.2 Contributing safety factors
• Long term damage due to rubbing and chafing contributed to the failure of a
flexible fuel hose on Baltimar Boreas’s number three diesel generator and
provided the initial source of fuel for the fire.
• Diesel oil from the failed flexible fuel hose vaporised and then ignited on a very
hot surface on number three generator, probably near the end of the heat
shielding of the turbocharger exhaust gas inlet.
• The maintenance of the generator flexible fuel hoses was inadequate.
Inappropriate temporary repairs had been made and hoses longer than specified
by the generator manufacturer had been used in the past. As a result, some hoses
were in poor condition due to wear and this had not been noted during previous
surveys, audits and inspections. [Safety issue]
• The generator manufacturer’s instruction book provided no guidance for the
maintenance or routine replacement of the flexible fuel hoses. [Safety issue]
• Baltimar Boreas’s safety management system provided no guidance for the
maintenance or replacement of the generator flexible fuel hoses. [Safety issue]
• The design of Baltimar Boreas’s diesel generator fuel system with respect to the
length and arrangement of its flexible fuel hoses was not in accordance with
International Maritime Organization guidelines. A number of the hoses were not
as short as practicable and their use was not limited to only those positions or
locations where it was necessary to accommodate relative movement between
engine components. [Safety issue]
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