Marine Report 236, Independent investigation into the engine room ...

3.3 Other safety factors
• While Baltimar Boreas’s Halon fixed fire extinguishing system’s instruction
book provided guidance with regard to the minimum time to allow before
considering entry into the protected space after the release of Halon, the master
and crew were not aware of the guidance and entered the engine room too soon
after the Halon was released. [Safety issue]
• The emission of smoke, sparks and flame from Baltimar Boreas’s funnel
ventilators just after the engine room fire started effectively cut off access to
their locally operated fire dampers which prevented them from being closed.
The closing arrangements for the ship’s funnel ventilators, therefore, did not
comply with the intent of the relevant provisions of the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). [Safety issue]
• At the time of the fire, Baltimar Boreas did not have a dedicated lookout on the
bridge during the hours of darkness. The high navigational risks that the ship
was exposed to at night while navigating coastal waters were further increased
when the second mate left the bridge unattended to investigate the fire alarm.
This was inconsistent with sound bridge watch-keeping practice prescribed in
the Seafarer’s Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code and it
was also in contravention of the international regulations for preventing
collisions at sea. [Safety issue]
3.4 Other key findings
• The timely and correct initial response of Baltimar Boreas’s master and crew,
and the actions of the second engineer in particular, resulted in the fire being
successfully extinguished.
• The Australian Maritime Safety Authority’s response to, and management of,
the incident from ashore was timely, well managed and appropriate.
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