Marine Report 236, Independent investigation into the engine room ...

MR20080025
The emission of smoke, sparks and flame from Baltimar Boreas’s funnel ventilators
just after the engine room fire started effectively cut off access to their locally
operated fire dampers which prevented them from being closed. The closing
arrangements for the ship’s funnel ventilators, therefore, did not comply with the
intent of the relevant provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS).
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that Lloyd’s Register take
action to address this safety issue.
4.2 ATSB safety advisory notices
MS20080021
The maintenance of the generator flexible fuel hoses was inadequate. Inappropriate
temporary repairs had been made and hoses longer than specified by the generator
manufacturer had been used in the past. As a result, some hoses were in poor
condition due to wear and this had not been noted during previous surveys, audits
and inspections.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau advises that ship owners, operators and
managers should consider the safety implications of this safety issue and take action
when considered appropriate.
MS20080022
The generator manufacturer’s instruction book provided no guidance for the
maintenance or routine replacement of the flexible fuel hoses.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau advises that the manufacturers of marine
diesel engines should consider the safety implications of this safety issue and take
action when considered appropriate.
MS20080023
Baltimar Boreas’s safety management system provided no guidance for the
maintenance or replacement of the generator flexible fuel hoses.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau advises that ship owners, operators and
managers should consider the safety implications of this safety issue and take action
when considered appropriate.
MS20080024
While Baltimar Boreas’s Halon fixed fire extinguishing system’s instruction book
provided guidance with regard to the minimum time to allow before considering
entry into the protected space after the release of Halon, the master and crew were
not aware of the guidance and entered the engine room too soon after the Halon was
released.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau advises that ship owners, operators and
masters should consider the safety implications of this safety issue and take action
when considered appropriate.
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