Hume on miracles and the Lourdes phenomenon Alexandru Anghel

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We must pay attention to the human factor of this equation, the subjective filter of the testimony being an extreme important one. The objectivity of the witnesses is present in different degrees and, in contrast with subjectivity, it is never entirely present. Witnesses tend to be biased by different factors that pertain to education, beliefs (religious or otherwise), prejudices, group pressure, perceptual impairment, etc. reported: (2) The second method suggested by <strong>Hume</strong> is concerned with the nature of the event Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:113). Thus, the certainty of the testimony will vary proportionally to the degree of probability of the event that the testimony attempts to establish. The higher the degree of improbability the more extraordinary or marvelous the event is. In this situation we don’t take into account the testimony given in behalf of the reported event; we don’t consider the person or the written text that testifies. We only evaluate the claim in itself. An event can be extraordinary or marvelous, but that doesn’t make it a miraculous event. The latter is not conformable to our past experience, which represents a proof in itself: A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:114) 4 . A miraculous event, in order to be 4 It seems that <strong>Hume</strong>’s argument could be avoided if we refused to accept this definition, and say that God or any other agent could perform miracles without having to breach any natural law; that a miracle is worked out by purely natural laws which are yet unknown to us and that a miracle is a very normal happening. But this perspective
so, must be contradicted by a general law which is supported by or “founded upon a firm and unalterable experience” (idem), which is exactly contrary to it. To make this point more clear, I will give an example of a possible testimony about the president of Romania coming from, let’s say, a generally reliable source. That person could come to you and tell you that the Romanian president has been observed walking on his hands for half a kilometer. Your prior experience of people walking on their hands is already existent, but you don’t have any prior experience regarding the president’s ability for such a feat. The bizarreness of the event makes it highly improbable and throws it along with other events that we consider marvelous or extremely rare. But if the same person comes to you and says that the president has been observed walking on water for half a kilometer, you will face a whole new type of testimony. This testimony will not be able to be corroborated with prior experience: in your past experience, you didn’t see people walking on water and you didn’t meet people usually reporting about other people strides on water. So such a report “is a violation of the laws of nature” which we establish on prior experience, it refers to a miraculous event. All these considerations make up an a priori type of argument, which, using Gaskin’s scheme (see Gaskin, 1988:152-153), I will summarize as follows: (1) A weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger. (2) A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. (3) Some things happen invariably in our experience, e.g. that all men die. In matters of fact these invariable experiences constitute certainties and are all called laws of nature – “a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws”. (4) Other things happen less than always in our experience, e.g. that a day in June is warmer than a day in December. In matters of fact these constitute probabilities which admit of degrees ranging from strong (almost always happens) to weak (very seldom happens). (5) The veracity of human testimony is, from experience, normally a strong probability and as such amounts to a proof that what is reported took place. (6) But sometimes the veracity of testimony is a weak probability as when “the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, amounts to no explanation and can make a miracle out of any event, which defies the whole idea of a miracle – its uniqueness.
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Page 15: Press. Bibliography BAILEY, Nathan

Hume on miracles and the Lourdes phenomenon Alexandru Anghel

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