Hume on miracles and the Lourdes phenomenon Alexandru Anghel

Abstract
<strong>Hume</strong> on miracles and the Lourdes phenomenon
Alexandru Anghel
In this paper I provide an exposition of David <strong>Hume</strong>’s criticism of miracles from section
X of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) in order derive from his
philosophical assessment of miracles the tools useful for the critical investigation of one of the
most documented miraculous healings reported in Lourdes, France.
I intend to offer a contribution in the philosophical and scientific debate on the
fundamentals of religion, and in the more general discussions regarding the antithesis between
supernaturalism and naturalism.
Keywords: miracle, skepticism, belief, proof, probability, skepticism.
Preamble
Before I begin my exposition, I consider it is necessary to say a few words on a matter
that kindles so much debate: the conflict between religion or spirituality and science or non-
spirituality (or certain quarters of modern philosophy). The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein
and the biologist Stephen Jay Gould share in common the idea that religion and science (and
philosophy) represent some kind of compartmentalized fields or domains. Their activities are
independent and use different methods and languages. So Wittgenstein, under the later
development of D. Z. Phillips (Phillips, 1994) and others, suggested the philosophical concept of
“language-game” (Sprachspiel); according to this concept, we use different languages, i.e. the
language of religion and the language of science, which participate in different “forms of life”
that have an internal order impervious to outside criticism. Alongside Wittgenstein’s
philosophical concept we can place, with certain qualifications, Stephen Jay Gould’s NOMA
principle, which stands for “non-overlapping magisteria”. Gould (1999:45) defines the term
“magisterium” as “a domain where one form of teaching holds the appropriate tools for

meaningful discourse and resolution", and concerning the NOMA principle, “the magisterium of
science covers the empirical realm: what the Universe is made of (fact) and why does it work in
this way (theory). The magisterium of religion extends over questions of ultimate meaning and
moral value. These two magisteria do not overlap, nor do they encompass all inquiry (consider,
for example, the magisterium of art and the meaning of beauty).”
These philosophical and methodological positions are, in my opinion, mistaken, and, for
them to work, you have to disregard or to minimize a very important aspect of religion: its
cosmological claims. Yes, religion, like science, has a lot to say about the origin of the world and
the appearance of man, about morality, about the origin and workings of phenomena… about
“miracles”. Science and religion are two (most of the time conflicting) kinds of explanation
about the world; their methods differ in many respects and the outcome of one proves sometimes
damaging to the other. 1
My scope in this paper is to critically discuss a very cherished and very controversial and
ambiguous element in religion in particular and spirituality in general: the miracle. I will discuss
a case that is closer to our days in comparison, for example, with the New Testament reports of
miracles. For my assessment I will use David <strong>Hume</strong>’s evaluation of miracle reports and
reliability of witness, taken from his (skeptical) philosophy of religion, in order to observe in
what degree <strong>Hume</strong>’s arguments are tenable. I will also take into consideration some
contemporary philosophical and scientific investigations that can be applied to the case in
question in order to complement or update certain aspects of <strong>Hume</strong>’s evaluation.
The article is divided in three sections. In the first section I will talk about the idea of
miracle and what it means in religion and in philosophy in general and about <strong>Hume</strong>’s
interpretation of miracles in particular. In the second I will present what I call the Lourdes
phenomenon, one of the places of pilgrimage in the Christian world where, every year, there are
reported new miracles performed by the Virgin Mary. In the last section I will assess the Lourdes
phenomenon using <strong>Hume</strong>’s critical methods presented in the second section.
1. <strong>Hume</strong> on miracles
1 By now, science proved to have a corrosive effect on religion, the latter changing some of its claims about the
universe, the most notorious one being the shift from the Ptolemaic earth-centered to the Copernican sun-centered
planetary system.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “miracle” as follows: “A marvelous
event occurring within human experience, which cannot have been brought about by human
power or by the operation of any natural agency, and must therefore be ascribed to the special
intervention of the Deity or of some supernatural being; chiefly, an act (e.g. of healing)
exhibiting control over the laws of nature, and serving as evidence that the agent is either divine
or is specially favoured by God.” (OED, 1989; italics added) Another dictionary, form <strong>Hume</strong>’s
period, compiled by N. Bailey states the following about the word “miracles”: “Works effected
in a manner unusual or different from the common and regular method of the Almighty
Providence, by the Interposition either of himself or of some intelligent Agent, superior to Man,
for the Evidence and proving of some particular Doctrine, or in Attestation to the Authority of
some particular Person or Persons.” (Bailey, 1730; italics added) I chose these two definitions,
one from the eighteen century and the other from our time, to point the similarities and the
dissimilarities between the two approaches. As it can be seen, in contrast to the Oxford
definition, Bailey says that a miracle is “unusual or different from the common and regular
method of the Almighty Providence”. This statement is a reflection of the thinking and the
debates happening in his period, between deists and fidests or between reason (natural religion)
and faith. As J. M. Suderman observes, “Eighteenth-century miracle definitions included three
common but distinct elements: (1) reference to an event contrary to the ordinary course of nature,
and (2) ascription of agency to some supernatural power, (3) for the purpose of proving a divine
truth or favor.” (Suderman, 2001:129) As it will be seen, <strong>Hume</strong> placed his emphasis upon the
first element, which constitutes the exact aspect of the definition observable in experience.
<strong>Hume</strong>’s critique of miracles is mainly concentrated in section X of his Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding ([1748]2007). His argument is divided into two sections or
stages. (a) In the first, he discusses the conditions that a report about a miracle should meet in
order to be accepted by a person who “proportions his belief to the evidence” (2007:110). (b) In
the second stage, he examines whether the testimony for presumed miracles, in fact, fulfill the
conditions expressed in the first stage, this fulfillment making the testimony a kind of evidence
for the truth of religion 2 .
2 Some scholars (Paluch 1966-1967 and Mckinnon 1967) concluded that <strong>Hume</strong>, in considering that miracles are
“violations of the laws of nature”, did not believe that miracles are, in principle, possible. This conclusion is
supported by the idea that <strong>Hume</strong> didn’t believe that the laws of nature can be broken and on passages such as this:

easoning:
(a) <strong>Hume</strong> begins his argument by a cautionary remark considering the fallibility of causal
Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be
acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into
errors. . . . All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are
found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: Others are
found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our
reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the
highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:110).
The “degrees o assurance” mentioned by <strong>Hume</strong> in this passage refer to events in our
experience that have a higher or the highest degree of certainty, for example the fact that the
chair I sat on a few minutes ago will not break down if I sit on it now (an event with a high
degree of probability) and the fact that sun will rise tomorrow morning (an event with the highest
degree of probability); and events which “represent the lowest species of moral evidence”, moral
evidence referring here to undetectable human motivations. The latter category comprehends
different testimonies and the kind of experience that is contrary to the order of things observed,
for example the sightings of an UFO.
So, for <strong>Hume</strong> there is no absolute certainty that the chair will not broke down or even that
the sun will rise tomorrow. There is no rational guarantee that the world as we know it now will
be the same way in the next minute. All our beliefs about our mind, our body and the world are
based on past experience, our own past experience – though this last idea in not quite exact,
considering the fact that not all our understanding of the world is derived only from our
experience: we learn also form the experiences of others (for example, if we didn’t learn from
“And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of
the events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a
sufficient refutation.” (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007: 125) According to this interpretation, we must either discard the law and
admit that such a law of nature is inexistent since it was falsified, or reformulate it to include the new facts
discovered. Or we could simply deny the possibility of the alleged miracle (see Flew 1961:186-187, 200-209). This
interpretation totally discards <strong>Hume</strong>’s enterprise in section X of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in
which, as we shall see, he tries to probe and asses the trustworthiness of the particular sort of testimony which is
invoked in favor of miracles.

others that if we throw ourselves of a building we will die, we would start experimenting by
ourselves).
Because of these degrees of certainty, <strong>Hume</strong> says that “A wise man, therefore,
proportions his belief to the evidence” (<strong>Hume</strong> [1748]2007:110], and then shows the way this
proportioning is to be realized:
In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with
the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future
existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite
experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: To
that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he exceeds his judgment, the
evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes an
opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the
other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority (<strong>Hume</strong>,
[1748]2007:110-111].
The evidence adduced by a testimony can be considered a proof or a probability
depending on the regularity or irregularity it has in experience: “There are a number of
circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate
standard, by which we determine all disputes, that may arise concerning them, is always derived
from experience and observation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side, it is
attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with the same opposition.”
(<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:112)
In consequence, <strong>Hume</strong> establishes two ways 3 in which the evaluation of a testimony can
be undertaken. (1) We have to focus on the quality of the reports themselves and on the
credibility of the witnesses:
We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses contradict
each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what
they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent
asseverations. There are many other particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy
the force of any argument, derived from human testimony (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:112-113).
3 See Fogelin, 2003.

We must pay attention to the human factor of this equation, the subjective filter of the
testimony being an extreme important one. The objectivity of the witnesses is present in different
degrees and, in contrast with subjectivity, it is never entirely present. Witnesses tend to be biased
by different factors that pertain to education, beliefs (religious or otherwise), prejudices, group
pressure, perceptual impairment, etc.
reported:
(2) The second method suggested by <strong>Hume</strong> is concerned with the nature of the event
Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish,
partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that case, the evidence, resulting from the
testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less
unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any
connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are
accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has
seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the
one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by
the force, which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree
of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of
assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there
necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority (<strong>Hume</strong>,
[1748]2007:113).
Thus, the certainty of the testimony will vary proportionally to the degree of probability
of the event that the testimony attempts to establish. The higher the degree of improbability the
more extraordinary or marvelous the event is. In this situation we don’t take into account the
testimony given in behalf of the reported event; we don’t consider the person or the written text
that testifies. We only evaluate the claim in itself.
An event can be extraordinary or marvelous, but that doesn’t make it a miraculous event.
The latter is not conformable to our past experience, which represents a proof in itself: A miracle
is a violation of the laws of nature (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:114) 4 . A miraculous event, in order to be
4 It seems that <strong>Hume</strong>’s argument could be avoided if we refused to accept this definition, and say that God or any
other agent could perform miracles without having to breach any natural law; that a miracle is worked out by purely
natural laws which are yet unknown to us and that a miracle is a very normal happening. But this perspective

so, must be contradicted by a general law which is supported by or “founded upon a firm and
unalterable experience” (idem), which is exactly contrary to it.
To make this point more clear, I will give an example of a possible testimony about the
president of Romania coming from, let’s say, a generally reliable source. That person could
come to you and tell you that the Romanian president has been observed walking on his hands
for half a kilometer. Your prior experience of people walking on their hands is already existent,
but you don’t have any prior experience regarding the president’s ability for such a feat. The
bizarreness of the event makes it highly improbable and throws it along with other events that we
consider marvelous or extremely rare. But if the same person comes to you and says that the
president has been observed walking on water for half a kilometer, you will face a whole new
type of testimony. This testimony will not be able to be corroborated with prior experience: in
your past experience, you didn’t see people walking on water and you didn’t meet people usually
reporting about other people strides on water. So such a report “is a violation of the laws of
nature” which we establish on prior experience, it refers to a miraculous event.
All these considerations make up an a priori type of argument, which, using Gaskin’s
scheme (see Gaskin, 1988:152-153), I will summarize as follows:
(1) A weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger.
(2) A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.
(3) Some things happen invariably in our experience, e.g. that all men die. In matters of
fact these invariable experiences constitute certainties and are all called laws of nature – “a firm
and unalterable experience has established these laws”.
(4) Other things happen less than always in our experience, e.g. that a day in June is
warmer than a day in December. In matters of fact these constitute probabilities which admit of
degrees ranging from strong (almost always happens) to weak (very seldom happens).
(5) The veracity of human testimony is, from experience, normally a strong probability
and as such amounts to a proof that what is reported took place.
(6) But sometimes the veracity of testimony is a weak probability as when “the witnesses
contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an
interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary,
amounts to no explanation and can make a miracle out of any event, which defies the whole idea of a miracle – its
uniqueness.

with too violent asseverations” etc. Therefore (from 3 and 4) when testimony is given which is
contrary to our invariable experience, a probability, whether strong or weak, is opposing a
certainty and (from 1 and 2) the wise man will believe the certainty.
With this summary and my explanation in mind, I will quote <strong>Hume</strong> at length to establish
the explanation given above and to discuss further the ideas he introduces:
But in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose,
that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and
suppose also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in
that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a
diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the
laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof
against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience
can possibly be imagined. . . . There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every
miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform
experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact,
against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered
credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior. The plain consequence is (and it is a
general maxim worthy of our attention),‘That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle,
unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the
fact, which it endeavours to establish: And even in that case there is a mutual destruction of
arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which
remains, after deducting the inferior.’” (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:114-116; emphasis added)
A very important progress in <strong>Hume</strong>’s argument is represented by the last proposition I
emphasized in the above quote: “No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the
testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it
endeavours to establish”. The point is that a testimony which reports a miracle must be supported
by an even stronger proof than that of the law which the presumed miracle violates. This
situation arises from the fact that <strong>Hume</strong> considers that the testimony, by itself, amounts to a
proof. In other words, if we take the testimony of the Old Testament, we will have to ask
ourselves: What is more probable, that the events reported in the Old Testament are true or that
the people who reported them are susceptible to mistake or misinterpretation? If the probability

that the Old Testament authors are mistaken is more miraculous than the miracles they report,
then we can start to trust their writings 5 .
(b) The second part of <strong>Hume</strong>’s argument moves from theory to reality, from the a priori
to a posteriori considerations. <strong>Hume</strong> tries to demonstrate that the evidence upon which the
testimony for miracles is based has never amounted to a complete proof. He backs his claim with
four considerations or a posteriori arguments. I will only dwell on the second consideration,
considering the fact that it is of some importance to our investigation. In the second
consideration, <strong>Hume</strong> says the following:
We may observe in human nature a principle which, if strictly examined, will be found to
diminish extremely the assurance, which we might, from human testimony, have in any kind of
prodigy. The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, that the
objects, of which we have no experience, resemble those, of which we have; that what we have
found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an opposition of
arguments, we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of
past observations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact which is
unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not
always the same rule; but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather the
more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very circumstance, which ought to
destroy all its authority. The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an
agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it is
derived (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:117; emphasis added).
The words quoted above offer a psychological account of human propensity towards and
credulity regarding the strange and the marvelous, the human “passion of surprise and wonder”,
which stands against the use of reason. Our propensity towards the strange and the miraculous
makes us disregard automatically our entire past experience in order to accept the incredible
testimonies.
5 Cf. “I desire any one to lay his hand upon his heart, and after a serious consideration declare, whether he thinks
that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than
all the miracles it relates; which is, however, necessary to make it be received, according to the measures of
probability above established” (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748] 2007:130).

The four a posteriori arguments <strong>Hume</strong> employs (plus the use of the criteria from the first
part of the general argument) are meant to establish his conclusion that “a miracle can never be
proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion” (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:127).
We arrived now to the second section of this article, concerning the Lourdes
phenomenon, after which we will try to extract a methodological investigation from the above
consideration of <strong>Hume</strong>’s arguments, in order to analyze one claim of miraculous healing chosen
from a multitude of other cases reported in Lourdes.
2. The Lourdes phenomenon 6
It all started in 1858 7 , in the town of Lourdes, France, when Bernadette Soubirous, an
illiterate peasant girl, had a series of eighteen visions of the Virgin Mary, which she called “the
lady” 8 . A shrine was established in 1876 to which some six million pilgrims and visitors flock
each year, occupying around 400 hotels built for them. The number of healings reported each
year amount to about 30.000, if we take into consideration the word of the public relations
persons who sell Lourdes as a business. The church representatives took more caution and in
1883 a body called Bureau des Constatations Médicales was established by the Church, which,
in fact, is the forerunner of the current Medical Bureau. The latter was established by Pope Pius
X in 1905, who declared that the miraculous cures at Lourdes should be submitted “to a proper
process”. The Bureau is led by a single doctor, the current head being Dr. Alessandro de
Franciscis. The medical board that meets annually to establish the occurrence of miracle(s) is not
formed by the same body of doctors, but any doctors practicing in or visiting may apply to
become members of the Medical Bureau.
The Lourdes Medical Bureau now boasts itself with the 67th person declared (on 9th of
November 2005) to be miraculously cured 9 : an Italian woman named Anna Santaniello. Each
alleged cure passes through a definite procedure of investigation 10 :
6 I use the word “phenomenon” mostly for the sake of brevity and not in a philosophical or scientific sense, but as
“something very notable or extraordinary; a highly exceptional or unaccountable fact or occurrence” (Oxford
English Dictionary, 1989; italics added)
7 See Randi, 1989 and Harris, 2000.
8 The Catholic Church was the one that named the mysterious “lady” from Bernadette’s visions the Virgin Mary.
9 See website www.lourdes-france.org (last visit 2/27/2012).
10 Apud Martin, 1990:203.

(1) A person whose health is dramatically altered by a trip to Lourdes may come before
the medical bureau at Lourdes. The bureau has one full-time physician, who is joined in
examining and interrogating the pilgrims by other doctors who happen to be visiting Lourdes at
the time.
(2) If a dossier (an official medical file) is to be started, the person alleged to be cured
must have a “complete” medical record confirming the nature of the illness and dates of recent
treatments. In order to rule out the possibility that the alleged cure was brought about by ordinary
medical treatment the pilgrim has undergone, the effectiveness of the treatment must be known.
(3) Special criteria of recovery must be met. The illness must be life-threatening and must
be a distinct organic disorder. The recovery must be sudden and unforeseen, and it must occur
“without convalescence.” There must be “objective evidence” – X-rays, blood tests, biopsies –
that the pilgrim had the disease before becoming cured. No disease for which there is effective
treatment is considered as a possible miracle. Further, the pilgrim must stay cured and is
therefore required to return several times for reexamination.
(4) Cures that meet all these tests are submitted to an international medical committee,
appointed by the bishop of the adjacent towns of Tarbes and Lourdes, that meets annually in
Paris. The committee votes on one issue: Is the cure medically inexplicable?
(5) If the majority of the committee decides that the cure is inexplicable, the patient’s
dossier is given to the canonical commission headed by the bishop of the diocese in which the
allegedly cured person lives. Only the church can make the final decision as to whether the event
is a miracle – that is, whether God has intervened in the natural course of events.
I’ve submitted this procedure because it shows the presumption that a medical board can,
somehow, establish where and when “a violation of the laws of nature” occurs. In principle, a
body of medics can establish if a cure is inexplicable within the framework of the present
scientific knowledge, or within the experience of the world gathered so far which advances
exponentially with every decade. On these criteria, the cure would be simply “uncaused” or
without any known cause. But then, the Church, which has the final word, steps in and makes the
final judgment that (1) the cure was a miracle and (2) the miracle was caused by God, without
taking into consideration the possibility of an alternative explanation.

From the 67 cases of “confirmed” miracles, I selected the 63rd and the most documented
case, that of Vittorio Micheli 11 . Micheli, a soldier in the Alpine Corps, entered a military hospital
on April 16, 1962, accusing a strong pain due to a large mass on his buttock that immobilized
him. He was X-rayed two times, the second investigation (which was two months apart from the
first one) revealing a severe deterioration of the hip area. The bone structure there had been eaten
away by cancer. As things got worse, on May 24, 1963, Micheli decided to visit Lourdes as a last
resort, and after a month he reported that he felt much better and that the pain subsided. After its
usual investigation, the Lourdes Medical Bureau said:
A remarkable reconstruction of the iliac bone and cotyloid cavity has taken place. The
stereotypes [X-rays] made in 1964, 1965, 1968, 1969 confirm categorically and without doubt
that an unforeseen and even overwhelming bone reconstruction has taken place of a type
unknown in the annals of world medicine. We ourselves ... have never encountered a single
spontaneous bone reconstruction of such a nature (Randi, 1989:25).
On May 26, 1976, the case of Vittorio Micheli was officially recognized as miracle No. 63 at the
shrine of Loudres. His medical dossier has been published and was submitted to a different group
of doctors who were incredulous regarding the medical treatment Micheli was reported to have
received. This matter sheds doubt with regard to the application of procedures by the Medical
Bureau. Further, James Randi, who investigated this case closely, notes that a case virtually
identical to Micheli’s was reported in 1978 in the Acta Orthopaedica Scandinavica, which reads
as follows:
Spontaneous regression of a malignant primary bone tumour. A histologically confirmed
malignant, primary bone tumour in the [left] pelvis, presumably an osteosarcoma, underwent
spontaneous regression. The large tumour was inoperable and gave rise to severe pain as well
as difficulty in walking. After 2 years of progression, with increasing destruction of the pelvic
bones, the clinical and radiological condition improved spontaneously, and at present the patient
is alive, almost symptom-free, after 6 years follow-up (Randi, 1989:28).
In both instances, no medical treatment was reported, the recovery took place in the same
way, and the results were the same – with the exception that in the second case no claim was
made of a miracle occurring.
11 See Marnham, 1980 and Randi, 1989.

3. Case assessment
In order to be able to evaluate the case referred to above, we have to determine the exact
“tools” we will derive from <strong>Hume</strong>’s argument. First, we have to establish if the testimony
amounts to a proof or a probability, to see what degree of certainty it presupposes 12 , and also to
establish the nature of the event reported; second, we have to assess the quality of the reports
and the credibility of the witnesses. And, in turn, these two steps should be guided by two
crucial principles: (1) A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature and (2) no testimony is
sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood
would be more miraculous than the fact, which it endeavours to establish.
Considering the criteria established above, we can see now if <strong>Hume</strong>’s argument will
accept as fact the “confirmed” miracle No. 63 discussed in the second section of this article. The
investigation is structured into questions.
(a) Is the testimony concerning Micheli’s alleged miraculous cure a proof or a
probability of the existence of a miraculous event? According to <strong>Hume</strong>, the ultimate standard, by
which we determine all disputes . . . is always derived from experience and observation” 13 . If we
take our personal experience and observation as a criterion, we will see that the event is certainly
not common, and we can consider it truly exceptional. So the event might be considered a
“prodigy”. This a priori aspect of <strong>Hume</strong>’s assumes that our evidence for the laws of nature is
based not on testimony but on personal experience. But, as I said above, this is impossible, since
we don’t learn everything by ourselves, but we gather information from the testimony of others.
In the case in point, the testimony regarding a similar event comes from the Acta Orthopaedica
Scandinavica, which raises the probability that the event is a natural occurring phenomenon, not
a “violation of the laws of nature”.
(b) Were the reports accurate and the witnesses credible and unbiased?
There is the possibility that the report concerning Micheli’s miraculous cure is a fraud or
that it has a vitiated procedure. Further, the alleged miracle(s) reported may be due to a religious
12 This should be connected with “the maxim” cited above which <strong>Hume</strong> says we employ: “that the objects, of which
we have no experience, resemble those, of which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most
probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such as are founded
on the greatest number of past observations” (<strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:117).
13 <strong>Hume</strong>, [1748]2007:112.

or spiritualistic expectation: the doctors (that compose the ad hoc annual committees) who visit
Lourdes may well get caught up in the awe and excitement of the pilgrimage. It is a known fact
that eyewitness testimony is often unreliable 14 . Moreover, the medical report published by the
Bureau has been criticized by other medical specialists as being unreliable and defective. Given
these factors and mostly the last observation, if we apply the second crucial principle from
above, we can conclude that the falsehood or unreliability of the testimony is “not more
miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish”. In other words, extraordinary claims
require extraordinary evidence, in this case the evidence being incomplete and dubious 15 .
In conclusion, we can admit, using <strong>Hume</strong>’s a priori argument, that the testimony given in
the Micheli case does not constitute a proof, but has only a low probability, due to the fact that
the occurrence of the same event took place at least once before, and so it does not violate the
laws of nature; and also that the report in itself suffers from a defective procedure and is
probably highly biased by personal expectations and perceptual limits 16 . So there is a high
probability that the event reported is not a miracle.
This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme
for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under
the project number POSDRU/107/1.5/S/77946 with the title „Doctorate: an Attractive Research
Career ”.
14 See E. F. Loftus, “Eyewitnesses: Essential but Unreliable,” Psychology Today (Feb 1984), apud Kurtz, 1991.
15 This doesn’t mean that we have to reject on a priori grounds a report of an event considered miraculous.
Anomalous events do occur in nature all the time and is not practical to reject them out of hand.
16 The fact that the Church called it a “miracle” is immaterial to our question. The Church only gave its own
explanation, on the basis of a doctrine, which doesn’t mean that this is the explanation. The fact that we don’t
understand a phenomenon now is not only an indication of the possibility that it is a miracle, but it is at least an
indication of the fact that our present scientific knowledge has no way to or didn’t establish the causes.

Press.
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www.lourdes-france.org (last visit 2/27/2012)