Over the beach - University of Oregon

logistic operations throughout the war. Most of the wartime amphibious
raids and reconnaissance missions were conducted by the United States,
Republic of Korea (ROK), and British Navy and Marine forces, but US
and ROK Army special operations forces conducted some such missions
and supported Korean partisan forces operating from off-shore islands. In
April 1951 US Army Rangers and soldiers of the 7th Cavalry Regiment
attempted a waterborne attack against the Hwacheon (Hwach’on) Dam in
central Korea. Army units in Japan planned and trained for major amphibious
operations that never took place, and the last amphibious operation
of the war, a demonstration off Gojeo (Kojo) on the east coast in October
952 by a regimental combat team of the st Cavalry Division, was an
Army–Navy operation.
In the years after the Korean War, the Army further refned its amphibious
doctrine, carried out amphibious exercises, and, during the Vietnam
War, conducted large-scale over-the-shore logistics and riverine operations.
Beginning in the 1970s, the Army gradually lost interest in amphibious
operations, but retained an over-the-shore logistic capability. Today,
the Army’s role in forcible entry4 is seen primarily as the conduct of airborne
operations, but Army interest in strategic and operational maneuver
by and from the sea and other water areas continues.
This study examines Army participation in amphibious and over-theshore
operations in the Korean War, beginning with a backward glance at
the Army’s amphibious heritage; its participation in the development of
amphibious doctrine prior to World War II; the World War II experience
that shaped the Army’s Korean War era amphibious doctrine, techniques,
and attitude; the 1945–50 inter-Service unifcation and roles and missions
struggles; and the pre-Korean War training and exercises. The study also
briefy reviews Army amphibious doctrine, units, planning, and training
following the Korean War and the current state of Army waterborne strategic
and operational maneuver capabilities.
The study concludes that, while the Marine Corps will continue to
be the nation’s amphibious warfare specialists, and future assault landings
on hostile shores are likely to be conducted by Marines, the Korean
War experience indicates that Army forces should be prepared to conduct
or participate in amphibious operations in the absence of or in conjunction
with Marines. It would be prudent for the Army to maintain a small
amphibious support element that can develop and test Army-specifc doctrine,
tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment and serve as the basis
for an Army amphibious-capable force for situations in which Marine
Corps and/or Navy amphibious forces are insuffcient or not available.
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