intelligence in a constitutional democracy final report to the ... - Mg
intelligence in a constitutional democracy final report to the ... - Mg
intelligence in a constitutional democracy final report to the ... - Mg
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Despite focus<strong>in</strong>g on serious crimes, NIA’s mandate would be completely<br />
different from that of <strong>the</strong> police. Whereas <strong>the</strong> police are responsible for law<br />
enforcement and crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>vestigation lead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> prosecution, <strong>the</strong> emphasis<br />
of <strong>the</strong> domestic <strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> agency should be on detection, analysis,<br />
prediction, prevention, forewarn<strong>in</strong>g and advice <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive.<br />
Counter-<strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> mandate<br />
In terms of <strong>the</strong> Act, NIA’s counter-<strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> mandate entails four functions,<br />
two of which are clear and regulated: <strong>to</strong> protect <strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> and classified<br />
<strong>in</strong>formation, and <strong>to</strong> conduct security screen<strong>in</strong>g operations. The o<strong>the</strong>r two<br />
functions – <strong>to</strong> impede and neutralise <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of foreign or hostile<br />
<strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> operations, and <strong>to</strong> counter subversion, treason, sabotage and<br />
terrorism – are not described precisely and are not regulated.<br />
The absence of legal rules and executive policy on <strong>the</strong>se countermeasures is<br />
extremely dangerous as it might lead <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>terference <strong>in</strong> politics and <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g<br />
rights without sufficient cause. The Act should def<strong>in</strong>e counter-measures more<br />
precisely and should regulate <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong>se measures.<br />
The Act should prohibit <strong>the</strong> <strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> services from dissem<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g false or<br />
mislead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation and from <strong>in</strong>terfer<strong>in</strong>g with lawful political and social<br />
activities <strong>in</strong> South Africa and o<strong>the</strong>r countries.<br />
Departmental <strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong><br />
The def<strong>in</strong>ition of departmental <strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act should be narrowed <strong>in</strong><br />
l<strong>in</strong>e with <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g proposals on narrow<strong>in</strong>g NIA’s <strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> mandate.<br />
The M<strong>in</strong>ister should issue guidel<strong>in</strong>es that regulate and expedite <strong>the</strong> provision<br />
of departmental <strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong>.<br />
A request for NIA <strong>to</strong> provide departmental <strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> must be made by <strong>the</strong><br />
responsible m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of a national department and by <strong>the</strong><br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial Premier <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of a prov<strong>in</strong>cial department, and <strong>the</strong> request<br />
must be made <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister for Intelligence Services.<br />
Chapter 7: Intrusive Operations<br />
Intrusive methods of <strong>in</strong>vestigation by <strong>the</strong> <strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> services, such as spy<strong>in</strong>g<br />
on people and tapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir phones, are a matter of great <strong>constitutional</strong> and<br />
political importance s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>ge <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>to</strong> privacy and dignity. They<br />
might also breach <strong>the</strong> political rights that are enshr<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
Because <strong>in</strong>trusive methods <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>ge rights, <strong>the</strong>y are un<strong>constitutional</strong> unless<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are employed <strong>in</strong> terms of law of general application. Legislation currently<br />
permits <strong>the</strong> <strong><strong>in</strong>telligence</strong> services <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>tercept communication and enter and<br />
16