intelligence in a constitutional democracy final report to the ... - Mg

4. MINISTERIAL CONTROL AND RESPONSIBILITY 77
4.1 Introduction 77
4.2 Constitutional provisions 78
4.3 Powers and functions of the Minister 79
4.4 The supply of intelligence to the Minister and the President 84
4.5 Authority for tasking the intelligence services 93
4.6 Dismissal, suspension and transfer of a Director-General 94
4.7 Adequacy of ministerial regulations and directives 96
4.8 Ministerial accountability and ministerial abuse of power 99
4.9 Recommendations 102
5. THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE 108
5.1 Introduction 108
5.2 Functions and powers of the Inspector-General 109
5.3 Refining the mandate of the Inspector-General 113
5.4 Increasing the budget of the OIGI 116
5.5 Recommendations of the Legislative Review Task Team 116
5.6 The Inspector-General’s role in the intelligence crisis of
2005/6 121
5.7 Recommendations 123
6. MANDATE OF NIA 126
6.1 Introduction 126
6.2 The domestic intelligence function as defined in law 127
6.3 NIA’s policy on its intelligence mandate 128
6.4 The problems with an overly broad intelligence mandate 132
6.5 The dangers of political intelligence 137
6.6 NIA’s counter-intelligence function as defined in law 143
6.7 Departmental intelligence 146
6.8 NIA’s recommendations on its mandate 147
6.9 Recommendations 150
7. INTRUSIVE OPERATIONS 155
7.1 Introduction 155
7.2 The constitutional necessity for legislation and safeguards 156
7.3 Constitutional Court judgements on infringements of the
right to privacy 160
7.4 The grounds for permitting the use of intrusive measures 164
7.5 Judicial authorisation for intrusive methods 174
7.6 Ministerial approval of intrusive methods 176
7.7 Recommendations 177
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