- Page 1 and 2: INTELLIGENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL DE
- Page 3 and 4: TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD 7 EXECUT
- Page 5 and 6: 8. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATION AN
- Page 7 and 8: FOREWORD BY JOE MATTHEWS, CHAIRPERS
- Page 9 and 10: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Chapter 1: Introd
- Page 11 and 12: partisan manner, any interest of a
- Page 13 and 14: The intelligence legislation should
- Page 15 and 16: unnecessary, and it detracts from N
- Page 17 and 18: search premises. Other intrusive me
- Page 19 and 20: Chapter 9: Internal Controls The in
- Page 21 and 22: we mean the widely shared or domina
- Page 23 and 24: All ministerial regulations on inte
- Page 25 and 26: CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Introdu
- Page 27 and 28: The intelligence crisis of 2005/6 w
- Page 29 and 30: seek to influence the Commissioners
- Page 31: phase we had follow-up sessions wit
- Page 35 and 36: Presidency and the Auditor-General
- Page 37 and 38: ordinator for Intelligence as the c
- Page 39 and 40: The National Intelligence Agency (N
- Page 41 and 42: The South African National Academy
- Page 43 and 44: 1.7 Acknowledgements The Commission
- Page 45 and 46: Internal controls and institutional
- Page 47 and 48: prevented in conditions of secrecy?
- Page 49 and 50: not governed by legislation (Chapte
- Page 51 and 52: Neither the security services nor a
- Page 53 and 54: One of the major implications of th
- Page 55 and 56: In Section 4.7 we highlight the pro
- Page 57 and 58: Where intelligence abuses have been
- Page 59 and 60: themselves. Internal controls, self
- Page 61 and 62: We believe that the intelligence co
- Page 63 and 64: CHAPTER 3: THE WHITE PAPER ON INTEL
- Page 65 and 66: The White Paper has two annexures t
- Page 67 and 68: The Code of Conduct for intelligenc
- Page 69 and 70: The main weakness of the White Pape
- Page 71 and 72: 3.7 An Overly Broad Domestic Intell
- Page 73 and 74: Problems of overreach. If the manda
- Page 75 and 76: 3.8 Recommendations In its 2006 rep
- Page 77 and 78: CHAPTER 4: MINISTERIAL CONTROL AND
- Page 79 and 80: Constitution, and must either assum
- Page 81 and 82: The Minister must approve the funct
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4.3.3 Intelligence Services Oversig
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of such national interests irrespec
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NICOC must disseminate intelligence
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The Minister might be unable to adv
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4.4.6 Reporting to the President Th
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extraordinary scenario, as where th
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these two statutes in this particul
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In 2007 the Minister issued the Reg
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Providing foreign intelligence serv
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4.8.2 Complaints against the Minist
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NICOC must provide the Minister wit
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If a parliamentary committee (other
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The existing regulations and those
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In this Chapter we recommend that t
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To receive and investigate complain
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The Inspector-General must serve im
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power by the intelligence services
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5.5.1 The independence of the OIGI
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If the Inspector-General uncovers c
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The Task Team insisted that this is
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Nevertheless, it seems clear from t
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Once the relevant court proceedings
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The dangers arising from NIA’s po
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the White Paper on Intelligence of
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strategic parastatals; the impact o
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associated with the broad mandate.
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The perceived role of the intellige
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6.5 The Dangers of Political Intell
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intelligence “should be practiced
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One of the clients of the intellige
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government. Instead, it would monit
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It is a matter of great concern tha
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Republic that falls within the func
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interpretation of the Agency’s ma
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We do not endorse NIA’s recommend
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forewarn and advise the Executive a
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CHAPTER 7: INTRUSIVE OPERATIONS 7.1
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Intrusive methods of intelligence c
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his or her family members, friends
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freedom that is beyond interference
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No search of premises and seizure o
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Interception of Communications and
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are reasonable grounds to believe t
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NIA’s operational directive on it
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Grounds for the Use of Intrusive Me
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should not be allowed to violate th
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officer. 46 The Court observed that
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7.7 Recommendations 7.7.1 Legislati
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effective routine and ad hoc monito
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NCC Bill and we submitted a memoran
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legislation regulating the NCC. Dra
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Bulk interceptions are not usually
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unlikely to succeed or are too dang
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The Ministry official argued furthe
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intercepts the communication of a t
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8.6.2 The subjects of the constitut
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The Bill does not indicate which or
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In assessing the constitutionality
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intelligence operations and the man
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8.9 SASS Policy on Interception of
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The Bill should provide for the dis
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The Office of the Inspector-General
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The third critical factor is the co
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The Task Team added that the integr
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The Task Team recommended that the
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9.4 A Problem of Too Much Regulatio
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ministerial control, parliamentary
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We support the recommendations of t
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The failure to publish and present
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The Intelligence Services Oversight
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Intelligence organisations througho
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Auditor-General has only undertaken
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The following qualification is thus
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that has a direct interest in the a
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ectify the practice of limited acce
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CHAPTER 11: INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 1
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This Chapter covers the following t
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Conversely, government and oppositi
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"active measures" or "covert action
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11.4 Civic Education Programme for
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Constitution within the intelligenc
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11.5 Inspector-General’s Perspect
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In the opinion of the State Law Adv
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completely gone when a totally new
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The Bill of Rights applies to all l
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danger, this duty helps to protect
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Parliament of this necessity and th
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Intelligence Services, the Inspecto
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CHAPTER 12: TRANSPARENCY, SECRECY A
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12.2 Constitutional and Governance
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take place according to criteria an
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A system of over-classifying inform
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component of national policy that e
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published some of its annual report
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and be made public, 25 the audit re
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12.4.2 PAIA manuals Section 14 of P
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or ‘top secret’. The heads of o
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“the information is sensitive inf
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NICOC and the Office of the Inspect
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Cawthra, G. and R. Luckham (eds), 2
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General’, address in the National
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South African History Archive, 2007
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Independence of the Commission The
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S.L. Mathe V.M. Ntsubane A. Roberts
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Chapter 4: Ministerial Control and
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Whether a breakdown in trust betwee
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The Inspector-General should not be
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The counter-intelligence mandate NI
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The legislation should state that t
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The determination of the level of a
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Once the Minister has finalised the