intelligence in a constitutional democracy final report to the ... - Mg

Any intelligence service other than an intelligence division of the defence
force or police service may be established only by the President, as head
of the national executive, and only in terms of national legislation. 15
National legislation must regulate the objects, powers and functions of the
intelligence services. 16
In light of these provisions, we reject the view that it is legitimate for
intelligence officers to bend or break the rules when dealing with serious
threats to security (Section 11.6).
2.5 Non-Partisanship and Promotion and Respect for Rights
In the nature of their business, which includes intrusive operations and
collecting secret information, there is a risk that intelligence services might
interfere in lawful political activity, favouring some political parties,
organisations or leaders and prejudicing others. In many countries they have
done this by infiltrating organisations, spying on politicians and activists,
leaking confidential information about political leaders and spreading
malicious rumours in political and media circles.
Malpractices of this kind might be initiated by intelligence officers or by
politicians who have control or influence over the intelligence services.
Whichever is the case, such malpractices would constitute a serious breach
of trust and undermine the democratic system so severely that they can be
considered a form of subversion. If exposed publicly, they can create a longlasting
crisis of confidence in the intelligence services and the government.
The Constitution therefore insists that members of the security services must
be strictly non-partisan:
15 Section 209(1) of the Constitution.
16 Section 210 of the Constitution.
50