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FUNCTIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS - Intercollegiate Studies Institute

FUNCTIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS - Intercollegiate Studies Institute

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<strong>FUNCTIONALISM</strong> <strong>AND</strong> <strong>ITS</strong> <strong>CRITICS</strong> 275<br />

elite. 94<br />

Such predictions and explanations, deriving as they do from<br />

functional and structural imperatives, seem rather more reasonable<br />

than the simplistic notions of betrayal by which some utopians, at<br />

least, attempt to explain the failure of all past efforts to usher in<br />

the millenium.<br />

If one, then, is to convince reasonable men that transcendence<br />

is more than merely possible, one must develop a conceptual framework<br />

and theories which stand the test of all empirical theories. The<br />

creators of such frameworks and theories will have to demonstrate<br />

that they enable us to organize data about the present and past<br />

roughly as efficiently as alternate models, and that they are more<br />

fruitful with regard to new discoveries. Marx certainly realized<br />

this. Most of his adult life was dedicated to the attempt to construct<br />

a model of man and history which would demonstrate, on<br />

just these grounds, the probability of a future society which<br />

would maximize human freedom. Those who would make use of<br />

the philosophic " existential " Marx, while ignoring or rejecting the<br />

mature theory would have received little sympathy from him. Very<br />

few radical theorists have attempted anything like a comparable<br />

task, and the efforts of those who have tried, such as Marcuse, Bay,<br />

Gouldner or Moore seem less than convincing. 95<br />

At least some of the new set of radical critics would refuse to<br />

accept this task. The argument seems to be as follows: All social<br />

science begins with value assumptions, in Gouldner's terms " background<br />

" and " domain " assumptions. We, then, are free to choose<br />

our own and proceed from there. The only requirement is that we<br />

must be aware of the assumptions from which we start. 99<br />

I would assert the contrary. Unless we assume that disagreements<br />

about political-moral questions stem from constitutional<br />

94<br />

Stanley Rothman, "One Party Regimes ..., op. cit.<br />

95<br />

Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization ( Boston, 1955), One Dimensional<br />

Man ( Boston, 1964), Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (New York,<br />

1965), and other works cited above; Gouldner, op. cit., and Barrington Moore,<br />

Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966). For<br />

critiques, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse ( New York, 1970), Stanley<br />

Rothman, "Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution: An Essay<br />

Review, " The American Political Science Review 64 (March, 1970), pp.<br />

" "<br />

Objectivity, Commentary 50 (December, 1970),<br />

61-82. Stanley Rothman,<br />

pp. 95-97 represents a critique of Gouldner, and R. S. Peters, The Concept<br />

of Motivation (London, 1958) offers a short but devastating critique of<br />

Abraham Maslow, upon whom Bay builds much of his theorizing.<br />

"Gouldner, op. cit.

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