Contents - Constitutional Court of Georgia
Contents - Constitutional Court of Georgia
Contents - Constitutional Court of Georgia
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<strong>Constitutional</strong>ism and Secularism: the Need for Public Reason<br />
THE CONSEQUENTIALIST OBJECTION<br />
<strong>Constitutional</strong> policies that would replace liberal constitutionalism with democratic or non-democratic<br />
theocracy stand for a social organization that is based on the intense emotional identification<br />
<strong>of</strong> the believers. The political regime that is in denial <strong>of</strong> divine commands cannot be accepted<br />
for the community <strong>of</strong> the strongly religious because “People do not feel whole if they try to divorce<br />
their deepest sources <strong>of</strong> insight from their political stances.” 42 Accepting non-secular grounds for<br />
legislation runs the risk <strong>of</strong> accommodating the above position.<br />
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the Trojan horses that would bring religious ground into democratic justification is misconstrued<br />
pluralism. Strong religions insist on the accommodation <strong>of</strong> their practices. By this logic,<br />
religion-dictated public and private conduct should be accommodated in the name <strong>of</strong> equality <strong>of</strong><br />
individuals and their religions without further secular scrutiny (i.e., without asking if the conduct<br />
satisfies the neutral criteria <strong>of</strong> generally applicable valid law). This seems to me a misconstruction<br />
<strong>of</strong> pluralism. After all,<br />
[p]luralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks <strong>of</strong> a “democratic society.” Although<br />
individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those <strong>of</strong> a group, democracy does not<br />
simply mean that the views <strong>of</strong> a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which<br />
ensures the fair and proper treatment <strong>of</strong> people from minorities and avoids any abuse <strong>of</strong> a dominant<br />
position. 43<br />
But it does not follow from the requirement <strong>of</strong> the proper treatment <strong>of</strong> people from minorities<br />
that their respect means recognition <strong>of</strong> religious minority (or majority) practices and viewpoints 44<br />
that dictate practices that disregard tolerance or violate gender equality, or are simply harmful in the<br />
sense J. S. Mill understood harm to be the ground for restrictive governmental action, or which limit<br />
and deny social integration chances to members <strong>of</strong> the minority into communities <strong>of</strong> their choice.<br />
A specific version <strong>of</strong> pluralism is localism, modeled partly on Yoder 45 : a tolerant society should<br />
allow a local community to live according to its religious tenets, especially if there are no spillover<br />
42 GREENAWALT, SUPRA NOTE 20, AT 406.<br />
43 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., 108 (2004).<br />
44 Viewpoints as such are <strong>of</strong> course protected as speech and belief.<br />
45 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).<br />
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