Crime and punishment in the wildlife trade - WWF UK

3 The UK legal framework – taking the illegal
wildlife trade seriously?
It is not in the interest of any nation state 24 to be seen as a market, repository or collaborator in
the illegal international trade in endangered species, not least because the illegal trade may have
links to other forms of (organised) crime. The UK is in a strong position to combat such trade: it
has dedicated wildlife inspectors as part of its management authority and a relatively supportive
government working within a framework of strong supranational law emanating from the EC.
However, the legal system in the UK is not as effective as it might be. It is characterised by:
• low criminal penalties;
• inconsistent and differing judicial or administrative sanctions, depending on the agency
involved in the investigation or enforcement; and
• an uninformed approach to a damaging illicit trade with far-reaching impacts on the
sustainability of species and habitats.
An example of all these problems is the case of the Renaissance Corporation 25 . This company
admitted trading in shawls made from shahtoosh wool, which is produced from the coats of the
Tibetan antelope, a critically endangered species. Up to 1,000 antelope were killed to provide
the wool for the 138 shawls which were confiscated. Despite the trader’s serious impact on an
endangered species, and the value of the confiscated shawls being £353,000, the company was
fined just £1,500.
In relation to the issue of consistency, there is a fundamental disparity between the penalties
available for those convicted at ports of entry for CEMA offences and those who trade species
in the domestic arena only and are governed by COTES. This is evident in Table 1, which
demonstrates how illegal wildlife trade cases have been prosecuted, the maximum penalties
available and those actually imposed.
Clearly, CEMA’s focus is broader than wildlife trade, encompassing as it does a range of
smuggled goods, including drugs. This accounts for the higher penalties available. But because
the maximum penalty available for an offence is often taken as a barometer of its seriousness,
there should be more consistency in penalties available under CEMA and COTES. This would
send a more consistent message regarding the seriousness of the illegal wildlife trade – whatever
statute is invoked and whatever agency enforces it (see Figure 1 opposite).
24 See for example the views of the Standing Committee in relation to trade in the United Arab Emirates, SC45 Doc
11.2, June 2001.
25
See case studies in Annex 1.
15