Crime and punishment in the wildlife trade - WWF UK

5 The law inaction in the UK
What of the UK’s role in combating the illegal wildlife trade? A review of all available relevant
research indicates that the key issues in law and its enforcement are 53 :
• a lack of resources available to those responsible for enforcing the laws protecting wildlife
which impacts on agencies’ enforcement priorities;
• problems interpreting the UK’s tripartite legislation;
• problems in identifying endangered species;
• extremely low levels of prosecution;
• difficulties in proving the very few cases that do come to court; and
• the relatively weak sanctions and penalties imposed by the law, which are insufficient
to deter wildlife criminals in general and illegal wildlife traders in particular.
The case of the Renaissance Corporation 54 is evidence that the sentences imposed by the courts
are often derisory and cannot be considered a deterrent to offending at all. Table 3 below
indicates that since 1987, the average fine for illegal traders in the UK is just £1,014, despite the
high market value of many of the species, goods and derivatives involved.
Table 3. Analysis of fines handed down in wildlife trade convictions in UK courts 55
Period Number of fines Total fines (£)* Average fine (£)*
1987-1992 22 26,330 1,197
1993-1997 12 9,950 829
1998-2002 15 14,440 963
Total 49 50,720 1,014
23
*Amounts not adjusted for inflation.
So what would work to deter those who illegally trade in endangered species? Traditional
deterrence and risk theories tell us that reducing and preventing crime involves reducing the
opportunities for offending by making the commission of the crime more difficult, more risky,
and less rewarding 56 . If we take this argument further, tackling the illegal wildlife trade means
focusing on two separate dimensions of deterrence:
• risks and rewards; and
• excuses and tolerance thresholds.
The risks of illegally trading would be increased if the basic principles of deterrence (that
punishment would follow the crime certainly and swiftly) were applied equally to all offenders.
53 See Joint Nature Conservation Committee 1999; Roberts et al (2001) supra.
54 See case studies, Annex 1.
55 Source: TRAFFIC International; HM Customs and Excise and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
56 Felson M & Clarke RV (eds.) (1997): Business and Crime Prevention. Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press.