History in the new South Africa: an introduction - Det danske ...
History in the new South Africa: an introduction - Det danske ...
History in the new South Africa: an introduction - Det danske ...
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At <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> ra<strong>in</strong>bow? Social identity <strong>an</strong>d welfare state <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
Editors: Gorm Gunnarsen, Patrick Mac M<strong>an</strong>us, Morten Nielsen, <strong>an</strong>d H<strong>an</strong>s Erik Stolten<br />
(This e-book is <strong>the</strong> full English version of a pr<strong>in</strong>ted book published <strong>in</strong> D<strong>an</strong>ish by Sou<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
<strong>Africa</strong> Contact: For enden af regnbuen? Social identitet og velfærd i det nye Sydafrika,<br />
København, november 2006).<br />
Contents<br />
1 Just <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r country? <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Denmark <strong>in</strong> a globalised world<br />
By Gorm Gunnarsen, Patrick Mac M<strong>an</strong>us, Morten Nielsen, <strong>an</strong>d H<strong>an</strong>s Erik Stolten<br />
2 Rhetoric <strong>an</strong>d reality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n reconciliation<br />
By Fred Hendricks<br />
3 Macroeconomic policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. From RDP through GEAR to ASGISA<br />
By Stephen Gelb<br />
4 Who are <strong>the</strong> poor? The size <strong>an</strong>d structure of <strong>the</strong> poverty problem<br />
By David Everatt<br />
5 ‘Tomorrow will be better th<strong>an</strong> today’: delivery <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> age of hope<br />
By David Hemson<br />
6 From apar<strong>the</strong>id to neo-liberalism. What happened to <strong>the</strong> ideals of <strong>the</strong> freedom struggle?<br />
By Patrick Bond<br />
7 Black Economic Empowerment: politically correct capitalism or social problem?<br />
By Neva Seidm<strong>an</strong> Makgetla<br />
8 The ANC <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s political l<strong>an</strong>dscape. From underground freedom movement to<br />
govern<strong>in</strong>g party<br />
By Pallo Jord<strong>an</strong><br />
9 The tr<strong>an</strong>sformation of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n trade union movement <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> challenges<br />
By John Appolis<br />
10 The grassroots. The rise of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> social movements <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The role of <strong>the</strong><br />
opposition<br />
By Eddie Cottle<br />
11 L<strong>an</strong>d redistribution <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: <strong>the</strong> property clause revisited<br />
By Lungisile Ntsebeza<br />
12 Learn<strong>in</strong>g, liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d lead<strong>in</strong>g: education <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
By Jonath<strong>an</strong> J<strong>an</strong>sen<br />
1
13 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s <strong>new</strong> education system: great <strong>in</strong>tentions – harsh realities<br />
By L<strong>in</strong>da Chisholm<br />
14 The media picture: mapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> contemporary media scene <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
By Se<strong>an</strong> Jacobs<br />
15 The l<strong>an</strong>guage question. The struggle between English <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r official <strong>an</strong>d unofficial<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages<br />
By Kwesi Kwaa Prah<br />
16 The impact of <strong>the</strong> AIDS epidemic <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
By He<strong>in</strong> Marais<br />
17 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: trends <strong>an</strong>d forecasts <strong>in</strong> a ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Africa</strong>n political economy<br />
By John D<strong>an</strong>iel<br />
18 List of authors<br />
2
1 Just <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r country? <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Denmark <strong>in</strong> a<br />
globalised world<br />
By Gorm Gunnarsen, Patrick Mac M<strong>an</strong>us, Morten Nielsen, <strong>an</strong>d H<strong>an</strong>s Erik Stolten<br />
The <strong>in</strong>troduction chapter was written <strong>in</strong> D<strong>an</strong>ish <strong>an</strong>d has not yet been tr<strong>an</strong>slated <strong>in</strong>to English<br />
for this web-based version of <strong>the</strong> book. Never<strong>the</strong>less, here are a few <strong>in</strong>troductory remarks on<br />
<strong>the</strong> book.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> List of Authors shows, <strong>the</strong> articles <strong>in</strong> this collection are written by some of <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>’s best social scientists, academic debaters, <strong>an</strong>d trade union <strong>an</strong>d grassroots activists,<br />
who present <strong>the</strong>ir views on <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id tr<strong>an</strong>sformation of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society <strong>an</strong>d<br />
offer <strong>the</strong>ir op<strong>in</strong>ions on <strong>the</strong> status of social conditions. The divergent outlooks <strong>in</strong> this book<br />
provide a broad <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>clusive picture of <strong>the</strong> country’s overall situation, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> authors do<br />
not agree completely.<br />
The first part of <strong>the</strong> book describes <strong>the</strong> social situation through articles measur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
magnitude of <strong>the</strong> poverty problem <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> signific<strong>an</strong>ce of poverty for decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
popular participation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> democratic process. The lack of justice <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>an</strong>d<br />
reconciliation process is problematised. The economic policy <strong>an</strong>d macro-economic models of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ANC-government are scrut<strong>in</strong>ised <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> ideological debate on <strong>the</strong> lost ideals of <strong>the</strong><br />
freedom struggle is revisited. Also <strong>the</strong> latest strategy for racial justice, BEE, Black Economic<br />
Empowerment, is discussed here.<br />
The present <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n M<strong>in</strong>ister of Arts <strong>an</strong>d Culture, Pallo Jord<strong>an</strong>, describes <strong>the</strong><br />
development of <strong>the</strong> ANC from liberation movement to dom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g govern<strong>in</strong>g party, while<br />
<strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r article is dedicated to <strong>the</strong> build-up of <strong>the</strong> grassroots movements of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> left<br />
opposition.<br />
Two of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s most well-known researchers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> area of education have provided<br />
very different articles on <strong>the</strong> problems confront<strong>in</strong>g SA youth <strong>in</strong> schools, high schools <strong>an</strong>d<br />
universities.<br />
In this English version, <strong>the</strong> book also conta<strong>in</strong>s statistical <strong>an</strong>alyses of poverty <strong>in</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
rural sett<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> different prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d a mapp<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> government’s delivery problems<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g electricity, water, <strong>an</strong>d hous<strong>in</strong>g. The freedom of <strong>the</strong> press <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> persist<strong>in</strong>g racism<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s liberalised media l<strong>an</strong>dscape are <strong>in</strong>vestigated. The development of <strong>the</strong> trade<br />
unions from mass mobilisation aga<strong>in</strong>st apar<strong>the</strong>id to team player <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> formulation of<br />
government policy is expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> exp<strong>an</strong>sive <strong>in</strong>vestment policy of <strong>the</strong> big <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
conglomerates towards <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>Africa</strong> is dealt with.<br />
The work with this book has developed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> collective spirit that characterised <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational solidarity of <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-apar<strong>the</strong>id movement. Beside <strong>the</strong> authors, who were paid<br />
only a symbolic fee for <strong>the</strong>ir efforts, <strong>the</strong> editors wish to th<strong>an</strong>k <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Hum<strong>an</strong><br />
Sciences Research Council (HSRC), <strong>the</strong> Review of <strong>Africa</strong>n Political Economy (ROAPE), <strong>an</strong>d<br />
New Agenda for <strong>the</strong>ir cooperation <strong>an</strong>d active participation <strong>in</strong> this book project.<br />
Through generations of exploitation, buttressed by massive political suppression, values <strong>an</strong>d<br />
wealth <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society were distributed extremely uneven, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y respects, this<br />
3
situation rema<strong>in</strong>s unch<strong>an</strong>ged. More th<strong>an</strong> half of <strong>the</strong> black population probably lives under <strong>the</strong><br />
poverty limit. 1<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> belongs to <strong>the</strong> group of higher middle <strong>in</strong>come countries <strong>an</strong>d is among <strong>the</strong> richest<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, however <strong>the</strong> average <strong>in</strong>come are still several times as high for whites th<strong>an</strong> for<br />
blacks. 2 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to UN’s Hum<strong>an</strong> Development Index, white <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with<br />
Spa<strong>in</strong>, while black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s at <strong>the</strong> absolute bottom, <strong>an</strong>d when it comes to spread<br />
of property, polarisation has not ch<strong>an</strong>ged signific<strong>an</strong>tly ei<strong>the</strong>r, even if a black elite has been<br />
fostered, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> black middle class cont<strong>in</strong>ues to grow. 3<br />
With BNP growth rates only at a few percent until very recently, <strong>the</strong> economy still shows<br />
serious lacunas. Unemployment has <strong>in</strong>creased, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest for <strong>in</strong>vestment is modest, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
currency has been weakened. Never<strong>the</strong>less, everybody seems to assume that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> also<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> future will be able to play <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d respected role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. 4<br />
The ANC has prioritised national reconciliation <strong>an</strong>d economic stability as most necessary, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
has been will<strong>in</strong>g to almost <strong>an</strong>y compromise to avoid national disruption. A relatively tight<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial course with a limited deficit will most likely be upheld. 5<br />
Through five hundred years of colonialism, <strong>the</strong> Western World has appropriated <strong>the</strong> riches of<br />
Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong>. Never<strong>the</strong>less, a ra<strong>the</strong>r discourag<strong>in</strong>g picture of stagnat<strong>in</strong>g aid from <strong>the</strong> EUstates<br />
to <strong>the</strong> region c<strong>an</strong> be drawn, which only makes <strong>the</strong> question of more just trade relations<br />
so much more press<strong>in</strong>g. So far, trade <strong>an</strong>d custom agreements between <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d EU<br />
have not given <strong>the</strong> country <strong>an</strong> especially favourable status, ei<strong>the</strong>r regard<strong>in</strong>g access to <strong>the</strong><br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> market or concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> protection of its own import sensitive areas.<br />
On this background, <strong>the</strong>re is a profound need for some k<strong>in</strong>d of cont<strong>in</strong>uation of <strong>the</strong> solidarity<br />
<strong>an</strong>d for a cont<strong>in</strong>ued engagement to uphold <strong>the</strong> pressure for a fulfilment of <strong>the</strong> ideals of <strong>the</strong><br />
liberation struggle.<br />
It is <strong>in</strong> this spirit that Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong> Contact, <strong>the</strong> former D<strong>an</strong>ish <strong>an</strong>ti-apar<strong>the</strong>id movement,<br />
has decided to publish this book <strong>in</strong> a D<strong>an</strong>ish version.<br />
1<br />
May, Juli<strong>an</strong> (ed.), Poverty <strong>an</strong>d Inequality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Challenge, Cape Town, David philip / Zed<br />
Books, 2000; Sampie Terrebl<strong>an</strong>che, A <strong>History</strong> of Inequality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 1652 - 2002, University of Natal Press,<br />
2003.<br />
2<br />
Bhorat, Haroon / Murray Leibbr<strong>an</strong>dt / Muzi Maziya / Servaas v<strong>an</strong> der Berg / Ingrid Woolard, Fight<strong>in</strong>g Poverty.<br />
Labour Markets <strong>an</strong>d Inequalily <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, Cape Town, UCT Press, 2001; Carolyn Jenk<strong>in</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d Lynne Thomas:<br />
The Ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g Nature of Inequality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, UNU/WIDER, F<strong>in</strong>l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
3<br />
Ashw<strong>in</strong> Desai, We Are <strong>the</strong> Poors: Community Struggles <strong>in</strong> Post-Apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, Monthly Review Press,<br />
2002.<br />
4<br />
The assesment of <strong>the</strong> present situation depends from where you choose to see it of course. There are m<strong>an</strong>y examples<br />
of success stories too. Se for exsample <strong>the</strong> bestseller: Brett Bowes <strong>an</strong>d Steuart Penn<strong>in</strong>gton (eds.), <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The<br />
Good News. 27 chapters on <strong>the</strong> remarkable progress achieved s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> - The Good News (Pty) Ltd.,<br />
2002 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> follow up More Good News.<br />
5<br />
Budget 2004: National Budget Review: Foreward <strong>an</strong>d Table of Contents (February 2004), Government of <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>, 2004 (Feb.), http://www.polity.org.za/pol/budget/ http://www.polity.org.za/pol/budget/; Estimates of National<br />
Expenditure / Budget Review / Budget Speak, RSA, National Treasury, 2001.<br />
4
2 Rhetoric <strong>an</strong>d reality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n reconciliation<br />
By Fred Hendricks<br />
Introduction<br />
The tr<strong>an</strong>sition from apar<strong>the</strong>id to democracy <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has been feted <strong>in</strong>ternationally as a<br />
model of reconciliation <strong>in</strong>spired by <strong>the</strong> magical powers of <strong>the</strong> charismatic Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> realism of <strong>the</strong> outgo<strong>in</strong>g president of <strong>the</strong> last racially exclusive government, FW De<br />
Klerk. This chapter subjects this <strong>in</strong>terpretation of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s democratic process to<br />
critical scrut<strong>in</strong>y by focus<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> nature of justice under conditions of political compromise.<br />
In particular, <strong>the</strong> chapter is concerned with <strong>the</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ner <strong>in</strong> which political deals affect <strong>the</strong><br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration of justice <strong>an</strong>d how <strong>the</strong>y imp<strong>in</strong>ge upon <strong>the</strong> nature of democracy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> postauthoritari<strong>an</strong><br />
phase. Beyond <strong>the</strong> obviously repugn<strong>an</strong>t current reality that m<strong>an</strong>y former<br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id murderers, o<strong>the</strong>r crim<strong>in</strong>als <strong>an</strong>d perpetrators of gross hum<strong>an</strong> rights violations are scot<br />
free, lie <strong>the</strong> broader necessities of creat<strong>in</strong>g conditions for a legitimate polity which respects<br />
<strong>the</strong> rule of law. In addition, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r reality embedded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> very fabric of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
society is <strong>the</strong> extreme level of <strong>in</strong>equality which co<strong>in</strong>cides very much with <strong>the</strong> racist<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>ctions left <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake of apar<strong>the</strong>id.<br />
The fact that so very m<strong>an</strong>y wrongdoers have not been prosecuted cultivates <strong>the</strong> impression of<br />
impunity even if <strong>the</strong> formal trapp<strong>in</strong>gs of democracy may be firmly <strong>in</strong> place <strong>in</strong> contemporary<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. In this respect, it does not help to argue that broad-based, restorative or social<br />
justice c<strong>an</strong> replace <strong>in</strong>dividual accountability for wrongdo<strong>in</strong>g. Instead, <strong>the</strong> two are <strong>in</strong>timately<br />
connected. When <strong>the</strong> nature of political compromise provides amnesty for perpetrators, or<br />
constra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> possibility for prosecutions on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r fails to create<br />
conditions for material delivery for <strong>the</strong> vast majority of <strong>the</strong> previously disenfr<strong>an</strong>chised<br />
masses, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>coherence becomes built <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> circumst<strong>an</strong>ces. This chapter tries to<br />
highlight some of <strong>the</strong>se contradictions by focuss<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> difficulties <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
democracy <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. It concentrates on a number of fault-l<strong>in</strong>es as major challenges to<br />
<strong>the</strong> democratic order <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hope that urgent attention c<strong>an</strong> deal with <strong>the</strong> impend<strong>in</strong>g crises. The<br />
chapter suggests some prelim<strong>in</strong>ary l<strong>in</strong>kages between <strong>the</strong> amnesty process of <strong>the</strong> Truth <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Reconciliation Commission <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> broader problems of material delivery to <strong>the</strong> previously<br />
disenfr<strong>an</strong>chised masses. Its ma<strong>in</strong> conclusion is that <strong>the</strong> long term legitimacy <strong>an</strong>d hence<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability of democracy <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> depend upon a resolution of <strong>the</strong> problem of black<br />
poverty.<br />
The survival of apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
Formal apar<strong>the</strong>id is dead. It was buried <strong>in</strong> 1994 by <strong>the</strong> first democratic elections based on<br />
universal fr<strong>an</strong>chise <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. At a legal level, <strong>the</strong>se swept away centuries of black<br />
political exclusion br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> end to <strong>the</strong> oppressive apar<strong>the</strong>id system. The elections were a<br />
major milestone <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> struggle for citizenship <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> ANC, <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t<br />
liberation movement aga<strong>in</strong>st apar<strong>the</strong>id, won by <strong>an</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority. Subsequent<br />
elections, held <strong>in</strong> 1999 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n <strong>in</strong> 2004, confirmed <strong>the</strong> ANC as <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g party by <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g majority. Politically, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is a very different place today th<strong>an</strong> it was before<br />
1994. Yet, as much as it has ch<strong>an</strong>ged <strong>in</strong> some respects, it has rema<strong>in</strong>ed almost exactly <strong>the</strong><br />
same <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. The legacy of apar<strong>the</strong>id lives on <strong>in</strong> structural <strong>in</strong>equalities, systemic<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d palpable <strong>in</strong>justice. Apar<strong>the</strong>id has cast a long shadow over <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong><br />
democratic society. Its divisions did not miraculously disappear with <strong>the</strong> advent of<br />
democracy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> rhetoric of reconciliation was a feeble attempt to paper over <strong>the</strong> deep<br />
5
discrep<strong>an</strong>cies. The disparities are daunt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>y cont<strong>in</strong>ue to fracture <strong>the</strong> nation <strong>in</strong>to<br />
separate <strong>an</strong>d often oppos<strong>in</strong>g camps of racialised identities of white wealth <strong>an</strong>d ownership <strong>an</strong>d<br />
black poverty <strong>an</strong>d dispossession. The limited access to l<strong>an</strong>d amongst blacks <strong>an</strong>d even more,<br />
<strong>the</strong> severely constricted ownership of l<strong>an</strong>d by freehold title are major <strong>in</strong>dicators of <strong>the</strong> uneven<br />
distribution of wealth <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Whites own <strong>the</strong> bulk of <strong>the</strong> country, <strong>an</strong>d, not<br />
surpris<strong>in</strong>gly, very few of <strong>the</strong>m are poor. But l<strong>an</strong>d is merely one <strong>in</strong>dicator of <strong>the</strong> divisions<br />
which pervade virtually every aspect of democratic <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Apar<strong>the</strong>id lives happily on<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unreformed crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system which struggles to secure convictions aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
violators of hum<strong>an</strong> rights dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id era. It survives <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> slums <strong>an</strong>d rural<br />
degradation, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> workplace, <strong>in</strong> schools <strong>an</strong>d universities <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hospitals. There is a<br />
direct thread which l<strong>in</strong>ks <strong>the</strong> survival of apar<strong>the</strong>id to <strong>the</strong> amnesty process of <strong>the</strong> Truth <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Reconciliation Commission <strong>an</strong>d to <strong>the</strong> apparent <strong>in</strong>ability of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> democratic government<br />
to make subst<strong>an</strong>tial <strong>in</strong>roads on <strong>the</strong> pervasive predicament of black poverty. There c<strong>an</strong> be little<br />
doubt that <strong>the</strong> most import<strong>an</strong>t cleavage <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> divide between<br />
white wealth <strong>an</strong>d black poverty <strong>an</strong>d race cont<strong>in</strong>ues <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y ways to co<strong>in</strong>cide with class.<br />
Problems around <strong>the</strong> uneven distribution of resources between blacks <strong>an</strong>d whites today pose<br />
<strong>the</strong> most threaten<strong>in</strong>g challenge to <strong>the</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability of democracy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> long term. Realiz<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> social <strong>an</strong>d economic rights of <strong>the</strong> majority lies at <strong>the</strong> centre of this discourse. This chapter<br />
argues that structural racism is so firmly embedded <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society that its reversal<br />
requires <strong>an</strong> all-encompass<strong>in</strong>g state-directed approach. It also tries to <strong>an</strong>alyze <strong>the</strong> attempt at<br />
reconstruct<strong>in</strong>g a fractured society through <strong>the</strong> mech<strong>an</strong>ism of a Truth <strong>an</strong>d Reconciliation<br />
Commission <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of political compromises which left <strong>the</strong> victims of hum<strong>an</strong> rights<br />
violations with no recourse to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir constitutional rights to claim compensation aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
both <strong>the</strong> state <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> perpetrators.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tractable problems <strong>in</strong> all democracies is how to deal with <strong>the</strong> paradox of political<br />
equality alongside economic <strong>in</strong>equality. All democracies uphold political <strong>an</strong>d civil equality,<br />
yet <strong>the</strong>y all ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> material <strong>in</strong>equality. A host of constitutional rights <strong>an</strong>d liberties makes<br />
everybody <strong>in</strong> a democracy equal <strong>in</strong> a formal-legal way. Simult<strong>an</strong>eously, all democracies<br />
protect private property. S<strong>in</strong>ce property is always unequally distributed it follows that<br />
constitutional guar<strong>an</strong>tees of property rights constra<strong>in</strong> efforts to ensure material equality. If, as<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, l<strong>an</strong>d is acquired by settlers through colonialism, <strong>the</strong>n constitutional<br />
protection merely provides a legal s<strong>an</strong>ction for colonial l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ft.<br />
The constitution of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> government enshr<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>an</strong>d rights of all<br />
democracies. In m<strong>an</strong>y ways, <strong>the</strong>se are not merely paper rights. The full fr<strong>an</strong>chise, freedom of<br />
movement, freedom of association, freedom of expression <strong>an</strong>d a r<strong>an</strong>ge of civil liberties are<br />
enjoyed by <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns who are now all equal before <strong>the</strong> law. Yet, this political <strong>an</strong>d civil<br />
equality exists side by side with enormous disparities <strong>in</strong> wealth <strong>an</strong>d poverty. To make matters<br />
worse, <strong>the</strong> division between rich <strong>an</strong>d poor still co<strong>in</strong>cides very largely with <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction<br />
between black <strong>an</strong>d white <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>se cleavages constitute <strong>the</strong> fault-l<strong>in</strong>es of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
democracy. The lack of material delivery is poign<strong>an</strong>tly reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> policy <strong>an</strong>d practice <strong>in</strong><br />
respect of reparations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Truth <strong>an</strong>d Reconciliation Commission dealt with later <strong>in</strong> this<br />
chapter.<br />
Thabo Mbeki, <strong>the</strong>n deputy president, made a speech at <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> 1998 debate on<br />
reconciliation <strong>an</strong>d nation build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n National Assembly <strong>in</strong> Cape Town,<br />
which graphically captures <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> disparities:<br />
6
…<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is a country of two nations. One of <strong>the</strong>se nations is white, relatively<br />
prosperous, regardless of gender or geographical dispersal. It has ready access to a developed<br />
economic, physical, educational, communication <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>frastructure…The second <strong>an</strong>d<br />
larger nation of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is black <strong>an</strong>d poor, with <strong>the</strong> worst affected be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> women <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> rural areas, <strong>the</strong> black rural population <strong>in</strong> general <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> disabled. This nation lives under<br />
conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication <strong>an</strong>d<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />
But we have to be careful to ensure that <strong>the</strong> discourse of race is used to illum<strong>in</strong>ate ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong><br />
mask <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uation of class <strong>in</strong>equalities. There c<strong>an</strong> be little doubt that structural<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ation on a racial basis under apar<strong>the</strong>id is <strong>the</strong> most immediate determ<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t of black<br />
poverty. Irrespective of whe<strong>the</strong>r race was merely used as a convenient tool for <strong>the</strong> super<br />
exploitation of blacks, <strong>the</strong> consequences of differential racist treatment are palpably obvious<br />
<strong>in</strong> a variety of ways <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Besides <strong>the</strong> violence visited upon <strong>the</strong> mass of <strong>the</strong><br />
population by gr<strong>an</strong>d apar<strong>the</strong>id, victims of ord<strong>in</strong>ary, everyday racism have to negotiate <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
way through a myriad of racist assumptions <strong>an</strong>d taken-for-gr<strong>an</strong>ted ideas about <strong>the</strong> connection<br />
between worth<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>an</strong>d whiteness. Such hierarchies of superiority <strong>an</strong>d dom<strong>in</strong>ation are<br />
reproduced <strong>an</strong>d re<strong>in</strong>forced <strong>in</strong> everyday life by m<strong>an</strong>ners, postures <strong>an</strong>d ways of speak<strong>in</strong>g. Every<br />
mund<strong>an</strong>e hum<strong>an</strong> activity was structured <strong>in</strong> a racialised m<strong>an</strong>ner by apar<strong>the</strong>id - be<strong>in</strong>g born,<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g nurtured <strong>in</strong> youth, go<strong>in</strong>g to school, travell<strong>in</strong>g by bus or tra<strong>in</strong>, mak<strong>in</strong>g love, gett<strong>in</strong>g<br />
married, eat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d dr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, hav<strong>in</strong>g a haircut, go<strong>in</strong>g to parties, greet<strong>in</strong>g, dy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
buried <strong>an</strong>d so on. Gr<strong>an</strong>d apar<strong>the</strong>id was mediated through <strong>the</strong> racism of everyday life, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong>se racist habits may have ch<strong>an</strong>ged but <strong>the</strong>y have not disappeared with <strong>the</strong> demise of<br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id.<br />
Mbeki’s speech makes <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t that <strong>the</strong> rich-poor, black-white dualism is still vitally<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> contemporary <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. There c<strong>an</strong> be little disagreement with this forceful<br />
statement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> metaphor of two separate nations. Yet, this dualism does not fully capture<br />
<strong>the</strong> complex mosaic of social relations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. A wide r<strong>an</strong>ge of identities has emerged<br />
both with<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d outside of this broad racism <strong>an</strong>d class framework. It is import<strong>an</strong>t to take<br />
cognis<strong>an</strong>ce of this diversity for a full picture of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n reality. However, <strong>the</strong><br />
problem with focus<strong>in</strong>g on identity only is that <strong>the</strong>re is a tendency of eras<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> signific<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of class, produc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stead a textured <strong>an</strong>alysis of difference without <strong>an</strong> expl<strong>an</strong>ation for <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>an</strong>ner <strong>in</strong> which that difference is perpetuated.<br />
There are some outward signs that <strong>the</strong> extreme racial polarisation of apar<strong>the</strong>id is giv<strong>in</strong>g way<br />
to class differentiation. More <strong>an</strong>d more blacks are purchas<strong>in</strong>g houses <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> formerly elite<br />
whites-only suburbs, m<strong>an</strong>y now roam around <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> expensive malls <strong>an</strong>d drive f<strong>an</strong>cy cars.<br />
The G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient, second only to that of Brazil, is about <strong>the</strong> same between blacks<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves as it is between blacks <strong>an</strong>d whites. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>an</strong>d, white begg<strong>in</strong>g is now not<br />
uncommon <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> larger cities. The racist protection which gave whites better education,<br />
health care, social security, employment opportunities, easy credit terms comb<strong>in</strong>ed to make<br />
<strong>the</strong> sight of whites begg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> impossibility under apar<strong>the</strong>id. While <strong>the</strong>re are a few blacks like<br />
Cyril Ramaphosa <strong>an</strong>d Tokyo Sexwale who have m<strong>an</strong>aged to get <strong>the</strong>ir pieces of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n economic pie, <strong>the</strong> vast majority of blacks rema<strong>in</strong> excluded from <strong>the</strong> benefits of black<br />
empowerment, <strong>an</strong>d marg<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownership structure of <strong>the</strong> society. Race still <strong>in</strong>tersects<br />
with class <strong>in</strong> very real ways <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. For example, Patrice Motsepe is <strong>the</strong> only black<br />
person to make it to <strong>the</strong> top ten based <strong>the</strong> value of hold<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg Stock<br />
Exch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>re are no blacks amongst <strong>the</strong> top ten earners <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
7
The social reality of racial <strong>in</strong>equality is reflected <strong>in</strong> a wide r<strong>an</strong>ge of areas depict<strong>in</strong>g a grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
contrast between fulfilment <strong>an</strong>d deprivation. All whites benefited materially from apar<strong>the</strong>id.<br />
Their life ch<strong>an</strong>ces facilitated a realisation of <strong>the</strong>ir potential <strong>an</strong>d even promotion beyond <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
capabilities as <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id state <strong>in</strong>tervened on <strong>the</strong>ir behalf with a policy of affirmative action<br />
<strong>in</strong> order to solve <strong>the</strong> poor-white problem. It was a massive protectionist scam <strong>an</strong>d its dividend<br />
is that m<strong>an</strong>y whites have acquired positions of power <strong>an</strong>d wealth <strong>an</strong>d very few of <strong>the</strong>m are<br />
poor.<br />
A report prepared for <strong>the</strong> deputy president <strong>an</strong>d for <strong>the</strong> Inter-M<strong>in</strong>isterial Committee for Poverty<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Inequality found that 61% of all <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>an</strong>d only 1% of whites could be regarded as<br />
liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> poverty. There are m<strong>an</strong>y detailed pieces of evidence on how gender has become<br />
entw<strong>in</strong>ed with race <strong>an</strong>d class push<strong>in</strong>g rural <strong>Africa</strong>n women to <strong>the</strong> very bottom of <strong>the</strong><br />
economic pile. Besides <strong>the</strong> fact that whites dom<strong>in</strong>ate virtually all aspects of higher education<br />
<strong>an</strong>d specifically <strong>the</strong> area of knowledge production, <strong>the</strong> structure of separate education systems<br />
for different apar<strong>the</strong>id def<strong>in</strong>ed race groups has resulted <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ifest <strong>in</strong>equalities. For example,<br />
at <strong>the</strong> end of apar<strong>the</strong>id rule, <strong>the</strong> per capita expenditure on pupils at white schools was R5 400<br />
<strong>an</strong>d about R1 000 for black pupils.<br />
The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Commission recently released its <strong>an</strong>nual Economic <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Social Rights Report cover<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> period from April 1999 to March 2000. One of <strong>the</strong> most<br />
depress<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> report is that about 20 million people, or 50% of <strong>the</strong> population,<br />
live below <strong>the</strong> poverty datum l<strong>in</strong>e, measured as a monthly <strong>in</strong>come of R390 (about $40).<br />
While everybody has a constitutional right to receive social security, government efforts<br />
driven by <strong>the</strong> Department of Social Development have reached only 3 million people. There<br />
are <strong>an</strong>y number of o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>dications of racial disparities - <strong>the</strong> dual labour market <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
legacy of job reservation, <strong>the</strong> fact that blacks are far more likely to be unemployed th<strong>an</strong><br />
whites, <strong>the</strong> fact that blacks are far less likely to use <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternet th<strong>an</strong> whites, blacks tend to<br />
have a shorter lifesp<strong>an</strong> th<strong>an</strong> whites, blacks are far more likely to be liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV/AIDS<br />
th<strong>an</strong> whites, far more blacks will not have access to cle<strong>an</strong> water th<strong>an</strong> whites, far more blacks<br />
are likely to be <strong>in</strong> prison th<strong>an</strong> whites <strong>an</strong>d so on. Yet, <strong>the</strong> widest gap lies <strong>in</strong> access to l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
Unlike T<strong>an</strong>z<strong>an</strong>ia, where white settlers seized less th<strong>an</strong> 1% of <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d surface of <strong>the</strong> entire<br />
country, or Malawi where <strong>the</strong>y took 5%, or Namibia where <strong>the</strong>y grabbed 43%, or Zimbabwe<br />
where <strong>the</strong>y acquired about 50%, <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, settlers appropriated more th<strong>an</strong> 90% of <strong>the</strong><br />
l<strong>an</strong>d surface. The effect of this dispossession is a grossly unequal distribution of access to <strong>an</strong>d<br />
ownership over l<strong>an</strong>d between blacks <strong>an</strong>d whites. The me<strong>an</strong> amount of l<strong>an</strong>d held per person is<br />
slightly more th<strong>an</strong> one hectare for blacks <strong>an</strong>d 1 570 for whites. White privilege, borne out of<br />
colonial l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ft has become firmly entrenched <strong>an</strong>d enjoys <strong>the</strong> s<strong>an</strong>ction of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong><br />
democratic constitution. Fundamental l<strong>an</strong>d redistribution which shifts subst<strong>an</strong>tial ownership<br />
of l<strong>an</strong>d from whites to previously dispossessed blacks is virtually impossible under <strong>the</strong> present<br />
constitutional framework because of <strong>the</strong> contradictory objectives of safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
property holders <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir l<strong>an</strong>d rights on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d attempt<strong>in</strong>g to redistribute l<strong>an</strong>d to<br />
blacks on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
It is not surpris<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d reform policies of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> government have been dismal<br />
failures. The Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme promised to redistribute 30% of<br />
agricultural l<strong>an</strong>d with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first five years of democratic rule. In reality, after twelve years of<br />
democracy less th<strong>an</strong> 3% has been redistributed. In fact, this proportion would be worse if we<br />
calculate <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased number of evictions of blacks from white –owned farms s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994.<br />
The problems of urb<strong>an</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d occupations, violence, murders <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>vasions <strong>in</strong> some rural<br />
8
areas have to be seen aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> background of <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> population cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
be squeezed <strong>in</strong>to t<strong>in</strong>y allotments <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rural areas <strong>an</strong>d little hovels <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> townships.<br />
It is clear that <strong>the</strong> level of <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong> so very m<strong>an</strong>y spheres requires urgent <strong>an</strong>d drastic<br />
measures. To be sure, <strong>the</strong>re have been some successes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> provision of electricity <strong>an</strong>d<br />
extend<strong>in</strong>g access to cle<strong>an</strong> water, but <strong>the</strong>se dwarf <strong>the</strong> monumental problems of unemployment,<br />
illiteracy, ill-health <strong>an</strong>d homelessness which toge<strong>the</strong>r embrace <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g poverty of <strong>the</strong><br />
mass of <strong>the</strong> population. In <strong>the</strong> face of this glar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equality, <strong>the</strong> country’s model of<br />
reconciliation appears qua<strong>in</strong>tly irrelev<strong>an</strong>t.<br />
The rhetoric of reconciliation<br />
The Truth <strong>an</strong>d Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established <strong>in</strong> 1995. It emerged out of<br />
<strong>the</strong> compromises of <strong>the</strong> negotiated settlement which ultimately filtered down <strong>in</strong>to three ma<strong>in</strong><br />
issues. Firstly, <strong>an</strong> amnesty process was set <strong>in</strong> motion for <strong>the</strong> perpetrators of gross violations of<br />
hum<strong>an</strong> rights <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r crimes. Secondly, victims <strong>an</strong>d survivors of <strong>the</strong>se violations were<br />
given <strong>the</strong> opportunity to publicly recount <strong>the</strong>ir stories of abuse <strong>an</strong>d thirdly <strong>the</strong> state agreed to<br />
accept responsibility for <strong>the</strong> payment of reparations to <strong>the</strong> victims because <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
amnesty effectively expunged <strong>the</strong> right to civil redress.<br />
Three committees were set up to deal with each of <strong>the</strong>se broad issues; <strong>the</strong> Amnesty<br />
Committee which enjoyed autonomy <strong>in</strong> its function<strong>in</strong>g as a quasi judicial process, <strong>the</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong><br />
Rights Violations Committee <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Reparations <strong>an</strong>d Rehabilitation Committee. In addition,<br />
<strong>the</strong> commission established <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigative unit as well as a research division. The purpose<br />
of <strong>the</strong> TRC was to promote reconciliation by reveal<strong>in</strong>g as much of <strong>the</strong> truth about past abuses<br />
as possible. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> former apar<strong>the</strong>id rulers were reluct<strong>an</strong>t to rel<strong>in</strong>quish power without a<br />
deal which <strong>in</strong>demnified <strong>the</strong>m from <strong>the</strong>ir crimes <strong>an</strong>d protected <strong>the</strong>m from prosecution, <strong>the</strong><br />
amnesty process was designed to exch<strong>an</strong>ge justice for truth. While <strong>the</strong> National Party <strong>an</strong>d<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r apar<strong>the</strong>id functionaries called for a bl<strong>an</strong>ket amnesty, <strong>the</strong> negotiated process agreed on<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual accountability <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that amnesty would only be gr<strong>an</strong>ted if <strong>the</strong> crimes were<br />
proven to be politically motivated <strong>an</strong>d on <strong>the</strong> basis of a full disclosure of all <strong>the</strong> facts<br />
surround<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> wrongdo<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Extensive state <strong>in</strong>spired violence had underm<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> very basis of a democratic order. The<br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id state had a monopoly over <strong>the</strong> use of force <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>struments of repression were<br />
systematically used aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> mass of <strong>the</strong> population so as to perpetuate <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
disfr<strong>an</strong>chisement. This is not to suggest that Apar<strong>the</strong>id was dist<strong>in</strong>guished by violence only.<br />
There were a variety of o<strong>the</strong>r mech<strong>an</strong>isms of subjection which allowed a white m<strong>in</strong>ority to<br />
rule over a subord<strong>in</strong>ate black majority. Yet, despite <strong>the</strong> very broad prec<strong>in</strong>cts of apar<strong>the</strong>id rule,<br />
crimes of violence were committed by its functionaries. Over <strong>an</strong>d above <strong>the</strong> endemic<br />
violence of apar<strong>the</strong>id, it had a security system which acted with impunity aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> mass of<br />
<strong>the</strong> population. Hidden <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wide variety of responses of <strong>the</strong> victims <strong>an</strong>d survivors are<br />
broader concerns about how to forge a normative framework with respect for hum<strong>an</strong> rights<br />
<strong>an</strong>d, at <strong>the</strong> same time, deal with <strong>the</strong> perpetrators of crimes both <strong>in</strong> defence of Apar<strong>the</strong>id as<br />
well as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st it. There are always difficulties when <strong>an</strong> authoritari<strong>an</strong> regime<br />
makes way for a democratic order based on universal fr<strong>an</strong>chise with a bill of rights. One of<br />
<strong>the</strong> gravest of <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is how to <strong>in</strong>itiate respect for <strong>the</strong> legislative process, <strong>the</strong><br />
rule of law <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions responsible for implement<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se laws. Simult<strong>an</strong>eously, we<br />
have to guard aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> temptation of rel<strong>in</strong>quish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se democratic processes for political<br />
ends. Sicken<strong>in</strong>g as it is for m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns to be foot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> exorbit<strong>an</strong>t legal bills of<br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id crim<strong>in</strong>als, <strong>the</strong>re is no alternative to due process <strong>an</strong>d proper prosecutions <strong>in</strong> a<br />
9
democratic society. Thus far, <strong>the</strong> prosecutional authority has faired very badly <strong>in</strong> try<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
br<strong>in</strong>g apar<strong>the</strong>id operatives to book for <strong>the</strong>ir wrongdo<strong>in</strong>g. The disaster of <strong>the</strong> Magnus Mal<strong>an</strong><br />
trial, <strong>the</strong> fiasco of <strong>the</strong> judgement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> Bisho massacre <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> failure to convict<br />
Wouter Basson have not given <strong>the</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d of reputation needed for<br />
genu<strong>in</strong>e respect for <strong>the</strong> rule of law. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> very m<strong>an</strong>y unsolved murders especially<br />
<strong>in</strong> Kwa-Zulu Natal, suggests that partial impunity is <strong>the</strong> order of <strong>the</strong> day.<br />
The TRC’s m<strong>an</strong>date covered crimes <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r violations of hum<strong>an</strong> rights between 1960 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
1994. In <strong>the</strong> decade lead<strong>in</strong>g up to <strong>the</strong> first democratic elections <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1994, more<br />
th<strong>an</strong> twenty thous<strong>an</strong>d people died <strong>in</strong> political violence. About seven thous<strong>an</strong>d application for<br />
amnesty were received <strong>in</strong> total <strong>an</strong>d about one thous<strong>an</strong>d were gr<strong>an</strong>ted. The overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g<br />
majority of cases rema<strong>in</strong> unsolved. Reconciliation was supposed to emerge from <strong>the</strong> truth.<br />
However, when <strong>the</strong> truth lies hidden under so very m<strong>an</strong>y crimes <strong>the</strong>n it is difficult to envisage<br />
a last<strong>in</strong>g peace. The vast majority of <strong>the</strong> foot soldiers <strong>an</strong>d very m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong> ideologues <strong>an</strong>d<br />
senior perpetrators of apar<strong>the</strong>id violence, have not been held accountable for <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
wrongdo<strong>in</strong>g. What k<strong>in</strong>d of reconciliation allows crim<strong>in</strong>als to live normal lives <strong>in</strong> a democratic<br />
society? More import<strong>an</strong>tly, when <strong>the</strong> levels of material <strong>in</strong>equality rema<strong>in</strong> so desperately high,<br />
<strong>the</strong>n reconciliation becomes part of <strong>the</strong> ideological balm designed to create <strong>the</strong> impression of<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge where <strong>the</strong>re is none. The really big question is whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re c<strong>an</strong> be reconciliation<br />
between unequal partners. The formerly disenfr<strong>an</strong>chised masses rema<strong>in</strong> excluded from <strong>the</strong><br />
economic ma<strong>in</strong>stream of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society <strong>an</strong>d marg<strong>in</strong>alised from its ownership structure.<br />
They are expected to reconcile <strong>the</strong>mselves to <strong>the</strong>ir own poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> midst of white wealth.<br />
In this respect, reconciliation s<strong>an</strong>ctions <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equalities without a programme for<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sformation <strong>an</strong>d without a solution to black poverty.<br />
Both <strong>the</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Truth <strong>an</strong>d Reconciliation Commission were<br />
ostensibly engaged <strong>in</strong> a search for <strong>the</strong> truth. Their ways part immediately beyond this<br />
superficially common objective. While <strong>the</strong> TRC tried to reach <strong>the</strong> truth by promis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
perpetrators amnesty <strong>in</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge for a public (or private) admission of <strong>the</strong>ir guilt, <strong>the</strong><br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system seeks truth through <strong>the</strong> forensic mech<strong>an</strong>ism of <strong>the</strong> courts, receiv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
evidence by me<strong>an</strong>s of <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>an</strong>d cross-exam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d pass<strong>in</strong>g sentences on <strong>the</strong><br />
wrongdoers. The aim is clearly retributive ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> reconciliatory. Crim<strong>in</strong>als have to be<br />
prosecuted for <strong>the</strong>ir offences <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hope that <strong>the</strong>ir punishment will somehow act as a deterrent<br />
<strong>an</strong>d prevent future wrongdo<strong>in</strong>g by both offenders <strong>in</strong> particular cases as well as o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
prospective offenders. Prosecution <strong>an</strong>d punishment are legal processes. Amnesty, on <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>an</strong>d, was <strong>an</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrative procedure follow<strong>in</strong>g a set of criteria as laid down by law,<br />
although <strong>the</strong> amnesty process may have displayed all <strong>the</strong> trapp<strong>in</strong>gs of a juristic process with<br />
<strong>in</strong>cumbent judges to <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>the</strong> act. The legal process on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>an</strong>d is contested by a<br />
wide variety of actors, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g police <strong>in</strong>vestigators, prosecutors, defence lawyers,<br />
magistrates <strong>an</strong>d judges. In contrast, <strong>the</strong> Amnesty Committee takes weighty decisions on <strong>the</strong><br />
basis of <strong>the</strong> evidence presented without <strong>the</strong> benefit of cross-exam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d contestation,<br />
certa<strong>in</strong>ly not of <strong>the</strong> sort that would be needed to prosecute wrongdoers <strong>in</strong> a court of law.<br />
While <strong>the</strong>se decisions may be legally challenged <strong>in</strong> a court of law, this only marg<strong>in</strong>ally affects<br />
<strong>the</strong> overall work<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> amnesty committee.<br />
In his judgement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of AZAPO <strong>an</strong>d O<strong>the</strong>rs v The President of <strong>the</strong> Republic of <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d O<strong>the</strong>rs, deputy president of <strong>the</strong> Constitutional Court, Justice Mahomed made <strong>the</strong><br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g statement:<br />
10
Central to <strong>the</strong> justification of amnesty <strong>in</strong> respect of crim<strong>in</strong>al prosecution for offences<br />
committed dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> prescribed period with political objectives, is <strong>the</strong> appreciation that truth<br />
will not effectively be revealed by <strong>the</strong> wrongdoers if <strong>the</strong>y are to be prosecuted for such acts.<br />
That justification must necessarily <strong>an</strong>d unavoidably apply to <strong>the</strong> need to <strong>in</strong>demnify such<br />
wrongdoers aga<strong>in</strong>st civil claims for payment of damages. Without that <strong>in</strong>centive <strong>the</strong><br />
wrongdoer c<strong>an</strong>not be encouraged to reveal <strong>the</strong> whole truth which might <strong>in</strong>herently be aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
his or her material or proprietary <strong>in</strong>terests.<br />
The decisions of <strong>the</strong> committee did not <strong>in</strong>volve a great deal of detailed evidence at all -<br />
certa<strong>in</strong>ly not of <strong>the</strong> sort that usually accomp<strong>an</strong>ies crim<strong>in</strong>al prosecution <strong>in</strong> a court of law. This<br />
is not surpris<strong>in</strong>g. Amnesty was used as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>centive for <strong>the</strong> perpetrators to tell <strong>the</strong> truth, to<br />
reveal <strong>the</strong> full horror of past violations of hum<strong>an</strong> rights. It did not make much sense to offer<br />
such <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ducement to political crim<strong>in</strong>als only to remove it if <strong>the</strong>y do not meet <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
requirements of <strong>the</strong> Act. This would have defeated <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial purpose of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>centive. It was<br />
far more expedient to simply apply amnesty by <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e of least resist<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> so do<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
deviate from <strong>the</strong> Act itself. Amnesty had to appear to be work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> order to act as <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>centive to perpetrators <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> only way this could happen is if state crim<strong>in</strong>als <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
perpetrators were actually allowed to (literally) get away with murder. Cynically stated, s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
we were <strong>in</strong>capable of adm<strong>in</strong>ister<strong>in</strong>g justice, of prosecut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>als, we had to attempt to<br />
lure <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong>to reveal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir crimes <strong>an</strong>d expos<strong>in</strong>g what <strong>the</strong>ir roles were <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> violence of <strong>the</strong><br />
past. These very same perpetrators may <strong>the</strong>n walk free without even show<strong>in</strong>g remorse for<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir actions. Bishop Desmond Tutu (1996) thus appealed to perpetrators to apply for<br />
amnesty, “(T)he law doesn’t require that <strong>the</strong>y should express remorse: <strong>the</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> come to <strong>the</strong><br />
Amnesty Committee <strong>an</strong>d say, for example, that <strong>the</strong>y fought a noble struggle for liberation, but<br />
that because <strong>the</strong>y opened <strong>the</strong>mselves to prosecution or civil actions as a result, <strong>the</strong>y are ask<strong>in</strong>g<br />
for amnesty.” This is cynical because remorse is supposedly one of <strong>the</strong> imperatives for<br />
genu<strong>in</strong>e reconciliation. If remorse is jettisoned, what m<strong>an</strong>ner of reconciliation c<strong>an</strong> be<br />
accomplished?<br />
The <strong>in</strong>stitutional conflict between <strong>the</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Truth <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Reconciliation Commission raises broader questions about <strong>the</strong> nature of democracy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
possibilities for establish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rule of law <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. There were clearly ample<br />
opportunities for perpetrators to avoid civil or crim<strong>in</strong>al prosecution by simply apply<strong>in</strong>g for<br />
amnesty. On <strong>the</strong> face of it, <strong>the</strong> deal appears ludicrous. Crim<strong>in</strong>als simply need to tell <strong>the</strong> truth<br />
before <strong>the</strong> Amnesty Committee <strong>in</strong> order for justice not take its course. The wider social<br />
implications of not prosecut<strong>in</strong>g crim<strong>in</strong>als needs to be seriously considered <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>the</strong><br />
impact of impunity on <strong>the</strong> fragile democratic order <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Amnesty sends a<br />
message to future state crim<strong>in</strong>als that <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ce that <strong>the</strong>y may be exonerated<br />
especially if <strong>the</strong>y rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> power long enough to ensure that <strong>the</strong>y are not easily dislodged, or<br />
that some compromise may be necessary to remove <strong>the</strong>m from power. Needless to say, it is a<br />
message with grave consequences for democracy.<br />
Altoge<strong>the</strong>r 7124 amnesty applications were received by <strong>the</strong> Committee on Amnesty, only 849<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se were successful, <strong>the</strong> vast majority were rejected. Cynics may ask whe<strong>the</strong>r it is worth<br />
all <strong>the</strong> trouble - <strong>the</strong> enormous public <strong>in</strong>terest, <strong>the</strong> media exposure, <strong>the</strong> state expenditure, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> endless debates - for merely one thous<strong>an</strong>d amnesties. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights<br />
Commission’s submission to <strong>the</strong> Truth <strong>an</strong>d Reconciliation Commission, about 15 000 people<br />
died <strong>in</strong> politically-<strong>in</strong>spired violence between 1990 <strong>an</strong>d 1994 - hardly a peaceful tr<strong>an</strong>sition.<br />
Ny<strong>an</strong>isile Jack, a former TRC researcher, takes this argument somewhat fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> suggest<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that <strong>the</strong> underly<strong>in</strong>g reason for <strong>the</strong> conception of a peaceful tr<strong>an</strong>sition is <strong>the</strong> fact that relatively<br />
11
few whites died <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict. On this perspective, it is quite easy to erase <strong>the</strong>se deaths as<br />
irrelev<strong>an</strong>t to <strong>the</strong> democratisation of <strong>the</strong> country, <strong>in</strong> order to arrive at <strong>the</strong> bli<strong>the</strong> conclusion that<br />
<strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition was peaceful or even miraculous.<br />
In Kwa Zulu-Natal alone, Ari Sitas, po<strong>in</strong>ts out that nearly 17 00 people lost <strong>the</strong>ir lives <strong>in</strong><br />
political violence. If so very few people have been officially pardoned for <strong>the</strong>se murders does<br />
this imply that <strong>the</strong> rest have been prosecuted. Sadly not. Especially <strong>in</strong> KwaZulu-Natal, <strong>the</strong><br />
TRC has been spectacularly unsuccessful <strong>in</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g people to come forward to testify before<br />
<strong>the</strong> Committee on Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Violations or to apply for amnesty. Similarly, <strong>the</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
justice system has left thous<strong>an</strong>ds of cases unsolved. How is democracy to survive <strong>in</strong> a<br />
situation of such monumental impunity? There is no respect for <strong>the</strong> rule of law <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> three<br />
agencies of <strong>the</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al justice system, <strong>the</strong> police, <strong>the</strong> courts <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> prisons, are simply<br />
<strong>in</strong>capable of cop<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> crisis, <strong>the</strong>mselves fraught with problems of legitimacy, be<strong>in</strong>g so<br />
firmly rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past.<br />
Conclusion: delivery, reparations <strong>an</strong>d equality<br />
The most serious challenge to <strong>the</strong> amnesty process came from <strong>the</strong> case brought before <strong>the</strong><br />
constitutional court <strong>in</strong> 1996 by AZAPO, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> families of well-known <strong>an</strong>ti-apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
notables, Biko, Mxenge <strong>an</strong>d Ribiero. The case was premised on <strong>the</strong> constitutional rights of<br />
redress <strong>in</strong> case of harm or <strong>in</strong>jury. If amnesty is gr<strong>an</strong>ted, <strong>the</strong> pardon is valid at both crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
<strong>an</strong>d civil levels. It is as if <strong>the</strong> crime was not committed at all, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> perpetrator will not<br />
have a crim<strong>in</strong>al record. The TRC was supposed to reveal <strong>the</strong> truth. In fact, <strong>the</strong> truth was<br />
supposed to be traded for justice. However, <strong>the</strong> truth is clearly be<strong>in</strong>g compromised by<br />
pretend<strong>in</strong>g that crim<strong>in</strong>als do not have crim<strong>in</strong>al records. The gr<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g of amnesty expunges <strong>the</strong><br />
constitutionally-enshr<strong>in</strong>ed rights of <strong>the</strong> victim to claim compensation for damages aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
wrongdoers.<br />
The constitutional court rejected <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> applic<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d re-affirmed <strong>the</strong><br />
constitutionality of amnesty on <strong>the</strong> proviso that <strong>the</strong> state assumes responsibility for<br />
reparations for <strong>the</strong> victims <strong>an</strong>d survivors. The TRC’s Committee on Reparations <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Rehabilitation was charged with <strong>the</strong> responsibility of mak<strong>in</strong>g recommendations <strong>in</strong> this regard.<br />
In effect, <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> thrust of <strong>the</strong> committee’s work revolved around how to def<strong>in</strong>e various<br />
categories of victims <strong>an</strong>d how to decide on appropriate reparations. The committee proposed<br />
five different classes of reparations; <strong>in</strong>terim reparations, <strong>in</strong>dividual reparation gr<strong>an</strong>ts,<br />
symbolic reparation, community rehabilitation programmes <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutional reform. The<br />
committee also identified 22 000 victims <strong>an</strong>d proposed that each be paid a sum of R17 000 to<br />
R23 000 <strong>an</strong>nually for six years. The total reparations budget proposed by <strong>the</strong> TRC was<br />
R3billion. In response, <strong>the</strong> government promised R800million for reparations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> February<br />
2001 budget which amounted to a once-off payment of R30 000 per victim as f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial<br />
compensation for harm <strong>the</strong>y experienced under apar<strong>the</strong>id, far less th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> TRC proposals.<br />
Irrespective of <strong>the</strong> fact that all blacks were victims of apar<strong>the</strong>id dispossession,<br />
disenfr<strong>an</strong>chisement <strong>an</strong>d exclusion, <strong>the</strong> TRC arrived at a narrow def<strong>in</strong>ition of a victim. Yet,<br />
despite this truncated view, <strong>the</strong> delays <strong>an</strong>d severe limits <strong>in</strong> payment of reparations to assist<br />
victims <strong>in</strong> overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> harm <strong>the</strong>y suffered, appear to parallel <strong>the</strong> overall lack of material<br />
delivery to <strong>the</strong> previously disenfr<strong>an</strong>chised.<br />
The repression of pre-1994 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is still fresh <strong>in</strong> very m<strong>an</strong>y people’s memories <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><br />
this sense <strong>the</strong>re has been a fundamental tr<strong>an</strong>sformation of <strong>the</strong> country. It is a moot po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r this open<strong>in</strong>g up of <strong>the</strong> society <strong>an</strong>d especially <strong>the</strong> accomplishment of <strong>the</strong> fr<strong>an</strong>chise<br />
without subst<strong>an</strong>tial improvements <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> material level of liv<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> majority is sufficient to<br />
12
safeguard democracy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> long run. My contention is that it is not. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> evidence<br />
suggestions that present government lacks <strong>the</strong> political will to make <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d of ch<strong>an</strong>ges that<br />
would be necessary for allow<strong>in</strong>g society to become as materially <strong>in</strong>clusive as possible <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
all c<strong>an</strong> share equally <strong>in</strong> its wealth.<br />
The gravest threat to <strong>the</strong> process of reconciliation <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> cleavages<br />
between <strong>the</strong> wealthy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> poor <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>se co<strong>in</strong>cide, by <strong>an</strong>d large, with <strong>the</strong><br />
dist<strong>in</strong>ction between black <strong>an</strong>d white. As long as <strong>the</strong> society is fractured by <strong>the</strong>se same<br />
<strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ces for reconciliation are <strong>in</strong>deed very slim. Democracy has to me<strong>an</strong><br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g materially for <strong>the</strong> mass of people, ma<strong>in</strong>ly through a recognition of <strong>the</strong>ir second<br />
generation rights. This does not imply a certa<strong>in</strong> entitlement, but that <strong>the</strong> opportunity for<br />
success should be equalised. This is <strong>the</strong> surest m<strong>an</strong>ner to broaden <strong>the</strong> basis of consent <strong>an</strong>d to<br />
protect <strong>the</strong> democratic order.<br />
13
3 Macroeconomic policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. From RDP<br />
through GEAR to ASGISA<br />
By Stephen Gelb<br />
The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n economy performed very poorly from <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s. GDP growth<br />
averaged only 3.3 percent per <strong>an</strong>num <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>an</strong>d 1.2 percent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s, <strong>an</strong>d a fierce<br />
policy-<strong>in</strong>duced recession <strong>in</strong>tended to cut <strong>in</strong>flation me<strong>an</strong>t that growth between 1990 <strong>an</strong>d 1993<br />
was -0.6 percent per <strong>an</strong>num. When <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id era beg<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1994, <strong>the</strong> expectation was<br />
that economic growth would improve, but a decade later, <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition’s optimism has been<br />
unfulfilled: only limited progress has been made <strong>in</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g growth while distributional<br />
equality has rema<strong>in</strong>ed stagn<strong>an</strong>t at best. GDP growth averaged only 2.9 percent per <strong>an</strong>num<br />
between 1994 <strong>an</strong>d 2004; with population growth of 2 percent per <strong>an</strong>num, per capita <strong>in</strong>come<br />
has barely <strong>in</strong>creased at 0.9 percent per <strong>an</strong>num. In September 2005, <strong>the</strong> official unemployment<br />
rate was 26.7 percent, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> broad rate (which <strong>in</strong>cludes those no longer look<strong>in</strong>g for work)<br />
was 38.8 percent. Poverty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>equality rema<strong>in</strong> extreme. 32 percent of <strong>the</strong> population were<br />
liv<strong>in</strong>g on less th<strong>an</strong> $2 per day <strong>in</strong> 1995, <strong>an</strong>d this rose to 34 percent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> subsequent five years.<br />
The G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient measur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equality was 0.56 <strong>in</strong> 1995 <strong>an</strong>d it <strong>in</strong>creased to 0.58 <strong>in</strong> 2000<br />
(Hoogeveen <strong>an</strong>d Ozler, 2004). In 2000, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>come share of <strong>the</strong> highest decile was 45.2<br />
percent, while <strong>the</strong> lowest decile’s share was only 0.4 percent.<br />
To be sure, <strong>the</strong>re has been f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial stability: consumer price <strong>in</strong>flation has been held below 8<br />
percent almost perm<strong>an</strong>ently s<strong>in</strong>ce 1996 compared with 15.3 percent <strong>in</strong> 1991 <strong>an</strong>d 9 percent <strong>in</strong><br />
1994, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> fiscal deficit reduced from 7.3 percent of GDP <strong>in</strong> 1993 to below 3 percent s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
1999. Yet it is fair to ask, first, whe<strong>the</strong>r this represents macroeconomic success, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong><br />
external f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial position has been extremely volatile, with currency crises <strong>an</strong>d capital<br />
<strong>in</strong>flows <strong>an</strong>d outflows. Second, even if overall perform<strong>an</strong>ce is regarded as successful, has <strong>the</strong><br />
price been too high, given <strong>the</strong> poor perform<strong>an</strong>ce of output <strong>an</strong>d employment growth.<br />
This chapter exam<strong>in</strong>es macroeconomic policy <strong>an</strong>d perform<strong>an</strong>ce dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1990s. It starts<br />
with a discussion of <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition period because this shaped <strong>the</strong> policy choices of <strong>the</strong><br />
democratic government. The next section describes macroeconomic policy s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, which<br />
has been articulated through <strong>the</strong> successive frameworks called <strong>the</strong> Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Development Programme (RDP) <strong>an</strong>d Growth Employment <strong>an</strong>d Redistribution (GEAR). The<br />
section looks first at fiscal policies <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n turns to monetary <strong>an</strong>d exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate policies. The<br />
third section exam<strong>in</strong>es macroeconomic perform<strong>an</strong>ce, look<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>in</strong>vestment, sav<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
bal<strong>an</strong>ce of payments. The f<strong>in</strong>al section concludes by assess<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> government’s <strong>new</strong><br />
economic framework, <strong>the</strong> Accelerated <strong>an</strong>d Shared Growth Initiative for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (ASGI-<br />
SA), adopted <strong>in</strong> 2005.<br />
The political economy of crisis <strong>an</strong>d tr<strong>an</strong>sition<br />
The orig<strong>in</strong>s of post-apar<strong>the</strong>id policies are found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘economic crisis’ which started dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> 1970s, characterised by a structural slowdown <strong>in</strong> economic growth re<strong>in</strong>forced by political<br />
problems. The slowdown was triggered by <strong>the</strong> global recession follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> collapse of <strong>the</strong><br />
Bretton Woods monetary system <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> 1973 ‘oil shock’. In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, spont<strong>an</strong>eous wage<br />
strikes from 1973 <strong>an</strong>d student upris<strong>in</strong>gs from 1976 added to slower growth by caus<strong>in</strong>g capital<br />
flight, while also forc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> government to relax m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong> restrictions on <strong>the</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> black<br />
population. The growth slowdown cont<strong>in</strong>ued dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1980s despite a brief respite when <strong>the</strong><br />
15
gold price rose over $800 <strong>in</strong> 1980/1. Fixed <strong>in</strong>vestment dropped from more th<strong>an</strong> 25% of GDP<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s to about 18% <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s <strong>an</strong>d productivity growth <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g from<br />
2.3% per <strong>an</strong>num <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1960s to 0.5% <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>an</strong>d -2.9% dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first half of <strong>the</strong><br />
1980s. despite slower growth overall, some sectors prospered while o<strong>the</strong>rs decl<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
Macroeconomic policy favoured m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g exports, but raised m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g import costs <strong>an</strong>d<br />
lowered profitability. F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>in</strong>stitutions enjoyed a short-term profit boom as mergers <strong>an</strong>d<br />
acquisitions rose <strong>an</strong>d foreign corporations dis<strong>in</strong>vested. Ownership concentration, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
economic power of white big bus<strong>in</strong>ess, <strong>in</strong>creased: by 1990, six conglomerates centred on<br />
m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce controlled comp<strong>an</strong>ies with 80% of <strong>the</strong> market capitalisation on <strong>the</strong><br />
Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg Stock Exch<strong>an</strong>ge.<br />
An <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>an</strong>ti-apar<strong>the</strong>id campaign call<strong>in</strong>g for trade s<strong>an</strong>ctions <strong>an</strong>d dis<strong>in</strong>vestment ga<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
momentum as political upheaval <strong>in</strong>creased dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> early 1980s. In 1985 <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
creditors recalled <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n public sector debt after <strong>the</strong> government declared a state of<br />
emergency. The capital outflows required for debt repayment fur<strong>the</strong>r tightened <strong>the</strong> bal<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
payments constra<strong>in</strong>t on growth, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>vestment depended on imports of capital equipment<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>termediate goods. These economic pressures helped to shift <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n bus<strong>in</strong>ess by<br />
1989 to support democratisation, as <strong>the</strong>y realised that higher growth depended on access to<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational capital flows which <strong>in</strong> turn depended on <strong>an</strong> acceptable political settlement<br />
end<strong>in</strong>g apar<strong>the</strong>id.<br />
The crisis re-shaped <strong>the</strong> black class structure <strong>an</strong>d civil society as well. Extreme <strong>in</strong>equality<br />
between races which was characteristic of <strong>the</strong> ‘gr<strong>an</strong>d apar<strong>the</strong>id’ period from 1948 to <strong>the</strong> end<br />
of <strong>the</strong> 1960s was moderated dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1970s, as more blacks with education <strong>an</strong>d skills found<br />
work: employment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> services sectors grew, <strong>an</strong>d technical <strong>an</strong>d white-collar occupations<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased <strong>the</strong>ir share of <strong>the</strong> labour force <strong>in</strong> all sectors. The number of <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>in</strong> ‘middle<br />
class’ occupations grew at more th<strong>an</strong> 6% per <strong>an</strong>num, nearly trebl<strong>in</strong>g between 1970 <strong>an</strong>d 1987<br />
when 19% of employed <strong>Africa</strong>ns were <strong>in</strong> middle class jobs <strong>an</strong>d <strong>Africa</strong>ns comprised nearly<br />
25% of <strong>the</strong> middle class, with Coloureds <strong>an</strong>d Indi<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r 18%. But <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
class differentiation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>equality with<strong>in</strong> race groups after 1975, as layoffs rose <strong>an</strong>d job<br />
creation amongst low-skill blacks was non-existent. <strong>Africa</strong>n unemployment was unofficially<br />
estimated at 11.8% <strong>in</strong> 1970 <strong>an</strong>d 20.8% <strong>in</strong> 1980, with job losses primarily amongst unskilled<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n workers <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d construction.<br />
The grow<strong>in</strong>g urb<strong>an</strong> black professional middle class org<strong>an</strong>ised politically <strong>an</strong>d socially through<br />
professional <strong>an</strong>d bus<strong>in</strong>ess bodies, media <strong>an</strong>d cultural associations, while a powerful trade<br />
union movement emerged, org<strong>an</strong>is<strong>in</strong>g semi-skilled <strong>an</strong>d unskilled black workers both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
workplace <strong>an</strong>d outside it, work<strong>in</strong>g with community org<strong>an</strong>isations <strong>an</strong>d women’s <strong>an</strong>d students’<br />
groups. The exiled nationalist movement, <strong>the</strong> ANC, provided strategic focus to support<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal political opposition, while also mount<strong>in</strong>g low-key armed struggle <strong>an</strong>d lead<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational boycott pressures. As <strong>the</strong> 1980s proceeded, both black org<strong>an</strong>isations <strong>an</strong>d white<br />
power holders outside <strong>the</strong> state came <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly recognised <strong>the</strong>ir common <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong><br />
establish<strong>in</strong>g non-racial democracy. In 1989, black trade unions <strong>an</strong>d white big bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
campaigned toge<strong>the</strong>r for <strong>the</strong> first time aga<strong>in</strong>st state repression <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustrial relations, which<br />
was a major step not only towards non-racial democracy but also a tr<strong>an</strong>sition via negotiations,<br />
<strong>in</strong>stead of <strong>the</strong> h<strong>an</strong>dover of power by a defeated apar<strong>the</strong>id state.<br />
The form of <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition reflected <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g bal<strong>an</strong>ce of class power at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>an</strong>d<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> possibilities <strong>an</strong>d limits of <strong>the</strong> negotiated outcome. The start of formal political<br />
negotiations gave impetus to <strong>an</strong> already-lively debate about post-apar<strong>the</strong>id economic policy,<br />
16
which took place <strong>in</strong> a proliferation of conferences, workshops <strong>an</strong>d meet<strong>in</strong>gs. Negotiations<br />
propelled <strong>the</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g black middle class to <strong>the</strong> forefront of <strong>the</strong> black opposition by<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g this group with subst<strong>an</strong>tial <strong>new</strong> political resources, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g much-enh<strong>an</strong>ced space<br />
to engage <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> economic policy process.<br />
The economic debate was not a tabula rasa from which <strong>an</strong>y outcome could emerge, <strong>the</strong><br />
w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g policy to be decided simply by political contestation amongst <strong>the</strong> contend<strong>in</strong>g parties,<br />
<strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> National Party government. In fact <strong>the</strong>re were certa<strong>in</strong> ‘structural<br />
imperatives’ reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> economic context <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition took place <strong>an</strong>d which all<br />
sides had to address. The foremost issue was <strong>the</strong> urgent revival of growth, which would<br />
require <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> both foreign capital <strong>in</strong>flows <strong>an</strong>d domestic fixed <strong>in</strong>vestment. Antiapar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
forces had argued dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1980s that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s exclusion from <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
trade <strong>an</strong>d capital flows was necessary to reduce growth <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>reby force whites to <strong>the</strong><br />
barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g table. The effectiveness of this strategy made it impossible to argue just a few<br />
years later that growth could now be re<strong>in</strong>vigorated without foreign capital <strong>in</strong>flows or re-entry<br />
to rapidly globalis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d trade markets. Similarly, even if a major<br />
economic role for <strong>the</strong> state was desirable, this would be possible only as a longer-term goal;<br />
rais<strong>in</strong>g domestic <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> short term required establish<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>ess confidence<br />
amongst domestic <strong>an</strong>d foreign private <strong>in</strong>vestors.<br />
Very soon after <strong>the</strong>ir unb<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, black opposition leaders acknowledged <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment imperatives fac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d moved to reassure domestic <strong>an</strong>d foreign<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestors while <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> need to address apar<strong>the</strong>id’s distributive legacy for reasons of<br />
social <strong>an</strong>d political legitimation. A redistributive priority articulated early on by <strong>the</strong> ANC<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved deracialis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ownership <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>agement of <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g large corporate sector,<br />
notwithst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g that this affected “<strong>the</strong> s<strong>an</strong>ctity of private property” (M<strong>an</strong>dela, 1990). The<br />
ANC was also m<strong>in</strong>dful of <strong>the</strong> threat posed by ‘macroeconomic populism’ to <strong>the</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
of its own long-term project, as illustrated by <strong>the</strong> fate of <strong>the</strong> Unidad Popular government of<br />
Chile <strong>in</strong> 1973 <strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong> S<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>ista government of Nicaragua <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1980s, two<br />
progressive governments with popular support which had fallen at least <strong>in</strong> part as a<br />
consequence of <strong>the</strong> problems result<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong>ir very government expenditure.<br />
The process of <strong>the</strong> economic policy debate was also crucial to <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which specific<br />
reforms were <strong>in</strong>troduced. The tr<strong>an</strong>sition was long (four years) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> debate was<br />
decentralised, unco-ord<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>an</strong>d unofficial. There was no centralised political or technical<br />
co-ord<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>refore considerable space <strong>an</strong>d autonomy for policy <strong>in</strong>itiatives to<br />
proliferate, promoted by small <strong>in</strong>terest groups. The ANC <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly behaved like a<br />
‘government <strong>in</strong> wait<strong>in</strong>g’, while <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g state became <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>in</strong>coherent <strong>an</strong>d<br />
disorg<strong>an</strong>ised, even though m<strong>an</strong>y officials actively participated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process.<br />
A third import<strong>an</strong>t factor was <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>herited capital stock. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s tr<strong>an</strong>sition was<br />
different from o<strong>the</strong>rs where capital assets <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir owners were ei<strong>the</strong>r physically destroyed<br />
by war, or politically defeated by revolution, or forced to evacuate <strong>the</strong> economy by<br />
decolonisation. The exist<strong>in</strong>g capital stock was very large <strong>an</strong>d diverse, with m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ated by capital-<strong>in</strong>tensive resource-based materials process<strong>in</strong>g (basic metals, chemicals,<br />
pulp <strong>an</strong>d paper), <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>se sectors would be <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> beneficiaries of a shift towards exportled<br />
growth. An overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g proportion of <strong>the</strong> private capital stock was still owned by white<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>ess, a group which thus reta<strong>in</strong>ed subst<strong>an</strong>tial power. As a result, <strong>the</strong>re were limits on <strong>the</strong><br />
scope <strong>an</strong>d pace of shift<strong>in</strong>g output <strong>an</strong>d technology to more labour-<strong>in</strong>tensive paths <strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong><br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sform<strong>in</strong>g capital asset ownership away from a white monopoly.<br />
17
A ‘basic needs’ policy with wide support amongst <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d its trade union allies was<br />
elaborated as <strong>the</strong> RDP, <strong>the</strong> ANC’s 1994 election m<strong>an</strong>ifesto (ANC, 1994). Despite its great<br />
attractiveness <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple based on its directly attack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equality, this approach was not<br />
feasible <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> economic <strong>an</strong>d political circumst<strong>an</strong>ces of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> democracy. The policy<br />
centred on small <strong>an</strong>d medium producers, especially <strong>new</strong> black entrepreneurs, sell<strong>in</strong>g labour<strong>in</strong>tensive<br />
consumer goods <strong>in</strong>to low-<strong>in</strong>come domestic markets. But <strong>the</strong> set of technology,<br />
labour <strong>an</strong>d output choices <strong>in</strong> production which this implied could not be <strong>in</strong>troduced overnight,<br />
while even far-reach<strong>in</strong>g positive discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id capital market could<br />
only impact on racial distribution of assets <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> longer-term. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> basic needs policy<br />
was unlikely to avoid signific<strong>an</strong>t macroeconomic <strong>in</strong>stability even though it did not address <strong>the</strong><br />
import dependence <strong>an</strong>d export failure of m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
An accommodation – or ‘implicit barga<strong>in</strong>’ – soon emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>formal economic<br />
negotiations, reflect<strong>in</strong>g a consensus over three policy objectives: ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g macroeconomic<br />
stability (particularly <strong>in</strong> regard to low <strong>in</strong>flation <strong>an</strong>d fiscal deficits); re-<strong>in</strong>tegration of <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n trade <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>ternational markets; <strong>an</strong>d ‘capital reform’ to deracialise<br />
ownership <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>agement <strong>in</strong> private <strong>an</strong>d public sectors. Large differences rema<strong>in</strong>ed over<br />
specific policies to achieve <strong>the</strong>se goals, <strong>an</strong>d detailed discussion was signific<strong>an</strong>tly <strong>in</strong>fluenced<br />
by <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational conventional wisdom. In <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, for example, trade<br />
<strong>an</strong>d capital account liberalisation <strong>an</strong>d low fiscal deficits were a s<strong>in</strong>e qua non for <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
capital <strong>in</strong>flows. But <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> elements of <strong>the</strong> barga<strong>in</strong> have shaped economic policy s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
1990.<br />
Economic policy shifts<br />
In <strong>the</strong> constitutional negotiations, <strong>the</strong> ANC’s strategy emphasised stability, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
reassur<strong>in</strong>g whites to prevent a flights of capital <strong>an</strong>d skills. The approach to economic issues<br />
reflected <strong>the</strong> same considerations, with <strong>the</strong> central b<strong>an</strong>k governor <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>ister of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce from<br />
<strong>the</strong> pre-1994 government reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir positions. <strong>Det</strong>ailed policy formulation to implement<br />
<strong>the</strong> ‘implicit barga<strong>in</strong>’ started well before <strong>the</strong> 1994 elections, with ANC officials <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
<strong>in</strong>cluded as constitutional agreement was reached. As noted though, <strong>the</strong>re was little policy coord<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
across issues relat<strong>in</strong>g to trade, f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial markets <strong>an</strong>d labour markets. By <strong>the</strong> end of<br />
1994 when <strong>the</strong> ANC had been <strong>in</strong> government for just 6 months <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> RDP was official<br />
policy, numerous reforms had already been <strong>in</strong>troduced. Contractionary monetary policy had<br />
lowered <strong>in</strong>flation (which had been around 15 percent between 1973 <strong>an</strong>d 1993) to s<strong>in</strong>gle digits,<br />
fiscal deficit target<strong>in</strong>g had been explicitly adopted, central b<strong>an</strong>k <strong>in</strong>dependence was enshr<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, commitments on trade liberalisation had been formally agreed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
GATT, legislation had been passed open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g sector <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg Stock<br />
Exch<strong>an</strong>ge to foreign participation <strong>an</strong>d capital controls on non-residents had been scrapped.<br />
‘Capital reform’ had started <strong>in</strong> 1993 with <strong>the</strong> first tr<strong>an</strong>sfer of equity of a major <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y to selected black beneficiaries, with o<strong>the</strong>r firms soon follow<strong>in</strong>g. The economic<br />
policy shift was not just underway but effectively ‘locked <strong>in</strong>’, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> reversal of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
policy reforms would have resulted <strong>in</strong> a massive loss of confidence, capital flight <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased costs of access to external capital.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g 1995, disappo<strong>in</strong>tment rose about <strong>the</strong> RDP’s growth <strong>an</strong>d employment impact, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
government came to <strong>the</strong> view that a macroeconomic stimulus was necessary, possible via<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r currency devaluation or fiscal exp<strong>an</strong>sion. While policy discussion was still underway <strong>in</strong><br />
February 1996, <strong>the</strong> first of three post-apar<strong>the</strong>id foreign exch<strong>an</strong>ge crises hit, <strong>an</strong>d net capital<br />
<strong>in</strong>flows dropped from R11.2 billion <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second half of 1995 to R2.7 billion <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first half<br />
of 1996 while <strong>the</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>al exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate’s depreciation of 18 percent made devaluation<br />
18
edund<strong>an</strong>t. This shifted <strong>the</strong> priorities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> macroeconomic policy, <strong>an</strong>d when this was<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>in</strong> June 1996 – named <strong>the</strong> Growth, Employment <strong>an</strong>d Redistribution (GEAR)<br />
strategy – its immediate goal was to stabilise <strong>the</strong> foreign exch<strong>an</strong>ge market. Growth was to be<br />
achieved by rais<strong>in</strong>g both foreign direct <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>an</strong>d domestic fixed <strong>in</strong>vestment through<br />
more ‘credible’ (with <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>vestors) macroeconomic policy, especially tighter fiscal<br />
<strong>an</strong>d monetary policy. Fur<strong>the</strong>r objectives <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong>creased exports through a stable real<br />
exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate toge<strong>the</strong>r with enh<strong>an</strong>ced competitiveness from labour market reform, skills<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d accelerated tariff reform.<br />
But, as m<strong>an</strong>y emerg<strong>in</strong>g markets have discovered s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, adopt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d stick<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to <strong>the</strong> ‘right’ policies – often restrict<strong>in</strong>g economic activity even when domestic conditions<br />
support relaxation – has not avoided external volatility <strong>an</strong>d destabilisation. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
macroeconomic conditions have been dom<strong>in</strong>ated by foreign exch<strong>an</strong>ge crises <strong>in</strong> 1996, 1998<br />
<strong>an</strong>d 2001, each <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g a capital flow reversal <strong>an</strong>d exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate collapse. Growth, fixed<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment, sav<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> bal<strong>an</strong>ce of payments have been adversely affected by <strong>in</strong>consistent<br />
signals from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest rate <strong>an</strong>d exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate, offsett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tended boost from lower<br />
fiscal deficits <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>flation rate.<br />
(i) Fiscal policy.<br />
This is <strong>the</strong> economic policy success story s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994. The <strong>new</strong> government had <strong>in</strong>herited a<br />
difficult fiscal position due to vast spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dy<strong>in</strong>g days of apar<strong>the</strong>id, when <strong>the</strong> old<br />
government tried to buy support from blacks <strong>an</strong>d ensure whites’ supporters future well-be<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The deficit rose from 1.4 percent of GDP <strong>in</strong> 1991 to 7.3 percent <strong>in</strong> 1993 <strong>an</strong>d government debt<br />
from 29 percent of GDP <strong>in</strong> 1990/1 to 47 percent <strong>in</strong> 1994/5. S<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, <strong>the</strong> government has<br />
completely reconstructed <strong>the</strong> budgetary <strong>an</strong>d expenditure processes <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>troduced improved<br />
systems of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, expenditure m<strong>an</strong>agement, report<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d accountability.<br />
Toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> adoption of strict fiscal deficit targets from 1994, <strong>the</strong>se reforms have<br />
contributed to <strong>the</strong> deficit’s steady decl<strong>in</strong>e to below 3 percent of GDP <strong>in</strong> 1999. The fiscal<br />
deficit has been one of <strong>the</strong> few GEAR targets actually achieved, perhaps because a powerful<br />
m<strong>in</strong>istry – <strong>the</strong> National Treasury – has direct control over <strong>the</strong> policy <strong>in</strong>strument. However,<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>dicators, such as <strong>the</strong> primary surplus (revenue less non-<strong>in</strong>terest expenditure), suggest<br />
fiscal policy has been erratic. Real non-<strong>in</strong>terest expenditure grew 7.8 percent p.a. between<br />
2001 <strong>an</strong>d 2004, after real cuts of almost 2 percent p.a. <strong>the</strong> previous three years. But <strong>the</strong><br />
primary surplus has actually decl<strong>in</strong>ed s<strong>in</strong>ce 2001, suggest<strong>in</strong>g policy has rema<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
contractionary. This underl<strong>in</strong>es that fiscal policy c<strong>an</strong>not easily be used to stabilise economic<br />
activity when capital flows suddenly reverse <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate decl<strong>in</strong>es.<br />
Lower <strong>in</strong>terest rates <strong>an</strong>d fiscal deficits have cut public debt from close to 50 percent of GDP<br />
to below 40 percent s<strong>in</strong>ce 1999/2000, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g down <strong>in</strong>terest expenditure. This made room <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> budget for <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased share of social spend<strong>in</strong>g, which rose by 23.8 percent <strong>in</strong> real per<br />
capita terms between 1993 <strong>an</strong>d 1997, with signific<strong>an</strong>t redistribution across <strong>in</strong>come <strong>an</strong>d racial<br />
categories: per capita spend<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> lowest <strong>in</strong>come qu<strong>in</strong>tile <strong>in</strong>creased by 28 percent <strong>an</strong>d on<br />
<strong>the</strong> next two qu<strong>in</strong>tiles 56 percent <strong>an</strong>d 31 percent respectively (V<strong>an</strong> der Berg, 2001). The<br />
distribution of spend<strong>in</strong>g rema<strong>in</strong>ed stable between 1995 <strong>an</strong>d 2004 with social service spend<strong>in</strong>g<br />
close to three-fifths of government current non-<strong>in</strong>terest spend<strong>in</strong>g. Education accounts for 40 –<br />
45 percent of social service spend<strong>in</strong>g, with health <strong>an</strong>d welfare each receiv<strong>in</strong>g about one-fifth,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>der go<strong>in</strong>g to hous<strong>in</strong>g, l<strong>an</strong>d reform <strong>an</strong>d water <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation programmes.<br />
To address <strong>in</strong>equality, <strong>the</strong> outcome of government spend<strong>in</strong>g is critical. We c<strong>an</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>guish<br />
between programmes which distribute money to poor people to supplement current <strong>in</strong>comes<br />
19
or provide public goods <strong>an</strong>d services which supplement current consumption, where<br />
government has been reasonably effective, from programmes which require asset tr<strong>an</strong>sfers to<br />
<strong>the</strong> poor for hous<strong>in</strong>g or l<strong>an</strong>d reform, or ongo<strong>in</strong>g service delivery to enable poor people to<br />
build assets, such as <strong>in</strong> education, where success has been limited. In <strong>the</strong> first category, social<br />
assist<strong>an</strong>ce programmes have wide coverage <strong>an</strong>d are import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> alleviat<strong>in</strong>g poverty especially<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rural areas. Between 2000 <strong>an</strong>d 2002, 91% of eligible pensioners received <strong>the</strong>ir pensions,<br />
though only 44% of eligible recipients got child gr<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d 59% disability gr<strong>an</strong>ts (Hum<strong>an</strong><br />
Rights Commission, 2003, p 29). 6 The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n social assist<strong>an</strong>ce system amounted to<br />
2.1% of GDP <strong>in</strong> 1999, well above <strong>the</strong> 1980 Western Europe<strong>an</strong> average of 1.54%. In 2004,<br />
nearly 21 percent of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns received some form of social assist<strong>an</strong>ce from <strong>the</strong> state,<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r directly or <strong>in</strong>directly as a member of a household where assist<strong>an</strong>ce was received.<br />
(World B<strong>an</strong>k) By 2002, a free water gr<strong>an</strong>t to poor households was available <strong>in</strong> 69 percent of<br />
municipalities with 57% of <strong>the</strong> population. Outside <strong>the</strong> OECD, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has perhaps <strong>the</strong><br />
highest proportion of its population covered by social assist<strong>an</strong>ce, a signific<strong>an</strong>t achievement<br />
which helps poor people to cope with poverty.<br />
In contrast, <strong>in</strong> programmes to create jobs <strong>an</strong>d to enable poor people to build assets – two<br />
approaches to susta<strong>in</strong>able poverty reduction – outcomes have been less successful, even<br />
where expenditure shifts have been signific<strong>an</strong>t. Education spend<strong>in</strong>g per pupil is now equal<br />
across races, but a strong correlation rema<strong>in</strong>s between pass rates <strong>an</strong>d pupils’ race. The<br />
‘apar<strong>the</strong>id backlog’ is unaddressed: forty percent of schools are <strong>in</strong>adequately supplied with<br />
classrooms <strong>an</strong>d/or electricity, while 49% are without textbooks. Hous<strong>in</strong>g was a key RDP<br />
programme, <strong>an</strong>d by 2003 1.48 million houses had been built, <strong>an</strong> average of 470 per day over<br />
eight years. But hous<strong>in</strong>g experts criticise government for a narrow focus on qu<strong>an</strong>titative<br />
targets, undervalu<strong>in</strong>g hous<strong>in</strong>g quality, physical durability <strong>an</strong>d also <strong>the</strong> diversity of hous<strong>in</strong>g<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d broader community development. L<strong>an</strong>d reform budgets have fallen well short of<br />
needs. By 2002, only 1% of farml<strong>an</strong>d had been tr<strong>an</strong>sferred compared to a 30% target (Aliber<br />
& Mokoena, 2003, p331).<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, public <strong>in</strong>vestment has grown faster <strong>in</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> economic<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure. Between 1994 <strong>an</strong>d 1997 overall public <strong>in</strong>vestment rose <strong>in</strong> real terms by 9<br />
percent per <strong>an</strong>num <strong>an</strong>d from 3.7 percent to 4.7 percent of GDP, but <strong>the</strong>n decl<strong>in</strong>ed from 1998,<br />
given <strong>the</strong> broad fiscal st<strong>an</strong>ce. After <strong>the</strong> 2001 Budget, it grew by close to 10 percent <strong>an</strong>nually<br />
for two years. None<strong>the</strong>less, public capital spend<strong>in</strong>g has rema<strong>in</strong>ed below 5 percent of GDP<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce 1992 compared with 10 percent dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1980s.<br />
Fiscal policy success has been helped signific<strong>an</strong>tly by <strong>the</strong> huge improvement <strong>in</strong> tax collection.<br />
The SA Revenue Service was modernised, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> greater efficiency, a wider tax base as<br />
more people were drawn <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> tax base, <strong>an</strong>d greater taxpayer compli<strong>an</strong>ce. From 1998/99 to<br />
2002/3, <strong>the</strong> number of <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>an</strong>d comp<strong>an</strong>y taxpayers each grew about 12 percent p.a. Tax<br />
revenue rose from a low of 22.6 percent of GDP <strong>in</strong> 1995/96, <strong>an</strong>d has rema<strong>in</strong>ed just below <strong>the</strong><br />
GEAR-specified ceil<strong>in</strong>g of 25 percent s<strong>in</strong>ce 2001/2. Improved revenue has enabled reduction<br />
of tax rates, but 86 percent of <strong>the</strong> R72.8 billion of forgone taxes s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994/95 has been<br />
allocated to personal <strong>in</strong>come tax cuts for <strong>the</strong> middle classes, support<strong>in</strong>g higher consumption<br />
spend<strong>in</strong>g, ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> alternatives such as public spend<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> poor or lower bus<strong>in</strong>ess taxes<br />
6<br />
These numbers may be <strong>an</strong> overestimate. V<strong>an</strong> der Berg estimates 75-80% coverage (v<strong>an</strong> der Berg &<br />
Bredenkamp, 2002).<br />
20
to support job creation. The <strong>in</strong>come tax burden – <strong>the</strong> share of aggregate personal <strong>in</strong>come paid<br />
<strong>in</strong> tax – fell from almost 15 percent to below 12 percent.<br />
(ii) Monetary <strong>an</strong>d exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate policy<br />
In <strong>an</strong>y economy, <strong>the</strong> monetary authorities would choose, if <strong>the</strong>y could, to have <strong>an</strong> open capital<br />
market to enable access to external f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong>d a stable nom<strong>in</strong>al exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate to support<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational trade <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> freedom to adjust <strong>in</strong>terest rates to meet domestic objectives such as<br />
output growth <strong>an</strong>d price stability. But <strong>the</strong>se three goals constitute a ‘trilemma’: only two c<strong>an</strong><br />
be pursued simult<strong>an</strong>eously, at least <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> medium-term, so policy authorities must decide<br />
which one to ab<strong>an</strong>don.<br />
Until 1994, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s capital account was closed, with exch<strong>an</strong>ge controls <strong>an</strong>d a dual<br />
exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate (commercial <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial r<strong>an</strong>d rates) to discourage capital outflows <strong>an</strong>d<br />
dis<strong>in</strong>vestment. Domestic bus<strong>in</strong>ess strongly favoured liberalisation to allow capital outflows,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k was committed to this by 1994. The two-tier currency was abolished <strong>in</strong><br />
March 1995 remov<strong>in</strong>g restrictions on foreign owners of capital, <strong>an</strong>d three-quarters of <strong>the</strong><br />
foreign exch<strong>an</strong>ge control regulations on domestic <strong>in</strong>vestors were elim<strong>in</strong>ated by 1998. In 1995,<br />
br<strong>an</strong>ches of foreign b<strong>an</strong>ks were allowed to operate <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg Stock Exch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
admitted foreign brokers. By 2000, <strong>the</strong>re were 12 foreign b<strong>an</strong>k br<strong>an</strong>ches <strong>an</strong>d 61 representative<br />
offices <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Inflows of direct foreign <strong>in</strong>vestment have also been encouraged by <strong>the</strong><br />
establishment of promotion agencies to woo foreign mult<strong>in</strong>ationals <strong>an</strong>d more liberal<br />
regulatory regimes <strong>in</strong> most <strong>in</strong>frastructural services.<br />
After open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> capital markets, <strong>the</strong> Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k <strong>in</strong>itially tried to avoid <strong>the</strong> trilemma <strong>an</strong>d<br />
pursue all three objectives. The B<strong>an</strong>k was <strong>an</strong>xious about excessive <strong>in</strong>flows, which c<strong>an</strong> cause<br />
price <strong>in</strong>flation <strong>an</strong>d exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate appreciation damag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational competitiveness.<br />
Between July 1994 <strong>an</strong>d June 1995, <strong>the</strong>re was a net <strong>in</strong>flow of R18.6 billion (about 3.8 percent<br />
of GDP), compared with <strong>the</strong> accumulated net outflow of R50 billion between <strong>the</strong> debt<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dstill <strong>in</strong> 1985 <strong>an</strong>d 1993. Capital account liberalisation <strong>in</strong> March 1995 was also <strong>in</strong>tended to<br />
reduce net short-term <strong>in</strong>flows by offsett<strong>in</strong>g large gross <strong>in</strong>flows with capital outflows. Capital<br />
<strong>in</strong>flows were used to <strong>in</strong>crease foreign exch<strong>an</strong>ge reserves, enabl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k to reduce<br />
its large ‘cont<strong>in</strong>gent liabilities’ of US$25.8 billion <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> forward foreign currency market,<br />
which were a source of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial weakness.<br />
Up till August 1998, <strong>the</strong> Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k raised real <strong>in</strong>terest rates to hold back <strong>in</strong>flation, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
‘sterilised’ net capital <strong>in</strong>flows, keep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m offshore to limit money supply growth, also to<br />
restrict <strong>in</strong>flation. <strong>the</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>al exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate was slowly depreciated to enh<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
competitiveness while avoid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>flation. Try<strong>in</strong>g to avoid <strong>the</strong> trilemma was <strong>an</strong> optimistic<br />
strategy, <strong>an</strong>d possible only if net capital <strong>in</strong>flows were large <strong>an</strong>d had long-term maturities. This<br />
was <strong>the</strong> case between March 1995 <strong>an</strong>d J<strong>an</strong>uary 1996, <strong>an</strong>d aga<strong>in</strong> between September 1996 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
April 1998. But <strong>an</strong> open capital market me<strong>an</strong>t that net <strong>in</strong>flows were susceptible to abrupt<br />
reversal, which occurred <strong>in</strong> both February 1996 <strong>an</strong>d May 1998, <strong>the</strong> first triggered by domestic<br />
political uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> second <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake of <strong>the</strong> Asi<strong>an</strong> crisis. Expect<strong>in</strong>g a r<strong>an</strong>d<br />
depreciation, foreign portfolio <strong>in</strong>vestors’ herd-like behaviour – rush<strong>in</strong>g to sell r<strong>an</strong>ddenom<strong>in</strong>ated<br />
assets to avoid losses <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own currency – produced a self-fulfill<strong>in</strong>g<br />
prophecy. In both episodes, <strong>the</strong> Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k tried to stem <strong>the</strong> outflow by sell<strong>in</strong>g dollars <strong>in</strong>to<br />
<strong>the</strong> market <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g its future commitments to buy dollars, a costly <strong>an</strong>d ultimately<br />
wasteful exercise. In September 1998, <strong>the</strong>se commitments were roughly <strong>the</strong> same as <strong>in</strong> March<br />
1995, but billions had been wasted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terim. At <strong>the</strong> same time, real <strong>in</strong>terest rates were<br />
hiked – about 2.5 percent <strong>in</strong> 1996 <strong>an</strong>d a full 7 percent <strong>in</strong> 1998 – <strong>in</strong> a va<strong>in</strong> effort to attract<br />
21
foreign portfolio capital back to <strong>the</strong> economy. In both crises, <strong>the</strong> r<strong>an</strong>d eventually re-stabilised<br />
at levels about 20 percent below <strong>the</strong> pre-crisis level <strong>an</strong>d net capital <strong>in</strong>flows rose.<br />
Late <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996 crisis, <strong>the</strong> GEAR policy statement was issued to address (portfolio) <strong>in</strong>vestor<br />
credibility. GEAR explicitly committed government to all three ‘trilemma’ objectives. But <strong>in</strong><br />
September 1998, <strong>the</strong> B<strong>an</strong>k decided <strong>the</strong> costs of try<strong>in</strong>g to achieve all three objectives were too<br />
high, <strong>an</strong>d policy entered a <strong>new</strong> phase. Capital account liberalisation was not put <strong>in</strong> question,<br />
but <strong>the</strong> priority on low <strong>in</strong>flation me<strong>an</strong>t that exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate stability was ab<strong>an</strong>doned <strong>in</strong> favour of<br />
monetary policy autonomy. This was formalised with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of <strong>in</strong>flation target<strong>in</strong>g<br />
from February 2000. The target is set by <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce while <strong>the</strong> Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k uses<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest rate adjustments to meet it. The <strong>in</strong>itial target was 3-6 percent by April 2002. Although<br />
<strong>in</strong>flation <strong>in</strong>ertia had broken by 1993 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> CPI dropped steadily from 10 percent until 2000<br />
(helped by tariff liberalisation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creased product market competition after 1994), <strong>the</strong><br />
r<strong>an</strong>d’s nom<strong>in</strong>al depreciation of 25 percent <strong>in</strong> late 2001 pushed up prices <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>flation<br />
target was missed. Nom<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>terest rates had dropped after 1998 but <strong>the</strong> Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k raised<br />
<strong>the</strong>m dur<strong>in</strong>g 2002 to restore price stability; by late 2003, it had met <strong>the</strong> target <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terest<br />
rates beg<strong>an</strong> dropp<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>. As <strong>in</strong> 2002-3, <strong>in</strong>terest rate <strong>in</strong>creases are often appropriate with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>flation target<strong>in</strong>g regime but <strong>the</strong>ir tim<strong>in</strong>g is often at odds with <strong>the</strong> stage of <strong>the</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
cycle. This underl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> rigidity of <strong>in</strong>flation target<strong>in</strong>g which focuses on a s<strong>in</strong>gle objective,<br />
<strong>the</strong> price level, ignor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> need for output stability <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> real economy.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce mid-2001, <strong>the</strong> r<strong>an</strong>d has been possibly <strong>the</strong> most volatile currency <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
markets, which fur<strong>the</strong>r re<strong>in</strong>forced <strong>the</strong> negative impact of higher <strong>in</strong>terest rates. In 2001, a third<br />
r<strong>an</strong>d crisis occurred, <strong>the</strong> causes of which rema<strong>in</strong> unclear despite <strong>an</strong> official <strong>in</strong>quiry. In real<br />
trade-weighted terms, a slow 25 percent depreciation between late 1998 <strong>an</strong>d August 2001 was<br />
followed by a sudden depreciation of <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r 25 percent <strong>in</strong> three months, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n by a 45<br />
percent appreciation over 18 months to mid-2003. Capital flows have been equally unstable,<br />
with five abrupt <strong>an</strong>d large reversals <strong>in</strong> two years from mid-2001, a period of <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
turbulence on <strong>in</strong>ternational f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial markets, with <strong>the</strong> dotcom bubble burst<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> 9/11<br />
attacks, ris<strong>in</strong>g commodity prices, <strong>the</strong> Iraq war, <strong>an</strong>d dollar weaken<strong>in</strong>g. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>an</strong>d,<br />
float<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate has enabled <strong>the</strong> Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k to elim<strong>in</strong>ate its forward exch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
rate cont<strong>in</strong>gent liabilities <strong>an</strong>d rebuild its bal<strong>an</strong>ce sheet, with <strong>the</strong> additional help of foreign<br />
borrow<strong>in</strong>g by government. This has streng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial health <strong>an</strong>d led to <strong>an</strong><br />
upgraded rat<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>in</strong>ternational credit agencies. A drop <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> long-term bond yield <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
narrower differential between US <strong>an</strong>d <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n yields also reflect a stronger f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial<br />
position.<br />
But <strong>the</strong> positive f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial impact must be counterbal<strong>an</strong>ced by <strong>the</strong> conclusion that policy has,<br />
<strong>in</strong>tentionally or not, privileged f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial concerns over production <strong>an</strong>d portfolio <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />
over fixed <strong>in</strong>vestment. Throughout <strong>the</strong> decade, exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate volatility has me<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>consistent<br />
signals from <strong>the</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate to producers of tradables, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>an</strong>d<br />
encourag<strong>in</strong>g ‘wait<strong>in</strong>g’ <strong>in</strong> production <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>vestment decisions. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>in</strong>terest rate<br />
policy has been concerned narrowly with lower<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>flation, so that it is hard not to conclude<br />
that domestic price <strong>an</strong>d fiscal stability have been achieved only at <strong>the</strong> expense of external<br />
<strong>in</strong>stability, giv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> lie to <strong>the</strong> repeated claims by <strong>the</strong> monetary <strong>an</strong>d fiscal authorities that<br />
‘macroeconomic stability has been achieved.’<br />
Macroeconomic perform<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
Fixed <strong>in</strong>vestment has fluctuated markedly s<strong>in</strong>ce 1993, first ris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> response to GDP<br />
<strong>in</strong>creases, <strong>the</strong>n slow<strong>in</strong>g from 1996 through 2001, probably due to external volatility. More<br />
22
apid <strong>in</strong>vestment from 2002 may be due to currency appreciation which has lowered <strong>the</strong> cost<br />
of imported mach<strong>in</strong>ery. In longer-run perspective, even though profitability <strong>an</strong>d productivity<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> private sector have improved signific<strong>an</strong>tly dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1990s, private <strong>in</strong>vestment has<br />
averaged only 12.1 percent of GDP between 1994 <strong>an</strong>d 2003, compared with more th<strong>an</strong> 13<br />
percent <strong>in</strong> 1982 <strong>an</strong>d 14 percent <strong>in</strong> 1988 (after <strong>the</strong> foreign debt st<strong>an</strong>dstill), <strong>an</strong>d 10.6 percent<br />
average between 1990 <strong>an</strong>d 1993, when <strong>the</strong> economy was <strong>in</strong> deep recession <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> political<br />
situation <strong>in</strong> deep uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty.<br />
Poor private sector <strong>in</strong>vestment has been partly due to sluggish aggregate dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face<br />
of contractionary fiscal policies, exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate volatility <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terest rate fluctuations. But<br />
low confidence is also related to uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty about <strong>the</strong> ‘socio-political environment’, <strong>an</strong>d this<br />
may <strong>in</strong> turn reflect reluct<strong>an</strong>ce to make long-term f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial commitments because of <strong>an</strong>xiety<br />
that <strong>the</strong> future operat<strong>in</strong>g environment may be affected by <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s high <strong>in</strong>equality. As<br />
noted above, <strong>the</strong> ‘gap’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment dem<strong>an</strong>d has not been filled by a subst<strong>an</strong>tial <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong><br />
public sector <strong>in</strong>vestment, which, though ris<strong>in</strong>g, rema<strong>in</strong>s well below 1980s levels as a share of<br />
GDP.<br />
National sav<strong>in</strong>gs s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994 have r<strong>an</strong>ged from 14.5 to 17 percent of GDP, well below 1980s<br />
levels. Policy s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994 has been premised on <strong>the</strong> neo-classical economic view that sav<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
are a constra<strong>in</strong>t on <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>an</strong>d growth: <strong>the</strong> tight fiscal st<strong>an</strong>ce from 1993 was justified by<br />
<strong>the</strong> need to raise government sav<strong>in</strong>gs. These were negative dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> early 1990s spend<strong>in</strong>g<br />
spree, but have been above 2.5 percent of GDP s<strong>in</strong>ce 1999. More generally it does not appear<br />
that <strong>in</strong>vestment has been held back by low sav<strong>in</strong>gs, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> latter have exceeded <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />
<strong>in</strong> all but two years s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, <strong>an</strong>d corporate sav<strong>in</strong>gs have been sufficient to f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce<br />
corporate <strong>in</strong>vestment.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> propensity of corporations <strong>an</strong>d households to save from <strong>in</strong>come may<br />
have dropped, so that <strong>in</strong>come growth would yield a smaller volume of sav<strong>in</strong>gs th<strong>an</strong> before.<br />
Corporate sav<strong>in</strong>gs have decl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> real terms <strong>an</strong>d as a share of GDP s<strong>in</strong>ce 1996,<br />
notwithst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g a rise <strong>in</strong> net profit from 24.7 percent of GDP <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s to 31.1 percent<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, suggest<strong>in</strong>g higher dividend payouts <strong>in</strong> preference to reta<strong>in</strong>ed earn<strong>in</strong>gs to fund<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment. Households have been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g consumption out of <strong>in</strong>come: <strong>the</strong>ir sav<strong>in</strong>gs have<br />
fallen from <strong>the</strong> very low level of just over 1 percent of GDP <strong>in</strong> 1995, compared with a 1980s<br />
average of 2.8 percent. Consumption growth of 3.33 percent per <strong>an</strong>num s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994 has been<br />
faster th<strong>an</strong> growth of both GDP <strong>an</strong>d of household disposable <strong>in</strong>come per capita, which grew at<br />
only 0.83 percent per <strong>an</strong>num. After 1993, household wealth rose with dropp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>flation <strong>an</strong>d<br />
ris<strong>in</strong>g asset values (especially hous<strong>in</strong>g), enabl<strong>in</strong>g a consumption spurt <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s which<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ued as <strong>in</strong>terest rates decl<strong>in</strong>ed from 1998 <strong>an</strong>d lowered household debt levels.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> bal<strong>an</strong>ce of payments, re-opened access to <strong>in</strong>ternational borrow<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce 1993 has<br />
enabled <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> to return to <strong>the</strong> ‘normal’ develop<strong>in</strong>g economy position with a current<br />
account deficit <strong>an</strong>d net capital <strong>in</strong>flows. The current account deficit has rema<strong>in</strong>ed small s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
1994, never ris<strong>in</strong>g above 2 percent of GDP, <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>in</strong>ce 1999 has been very close to zero. Both<br />
imports <strong>an</strong>d non-gold exports have risen by around 50 percent s<strong>in</strong>ce 1993 (measured as a<br />
share of GDP). Volume <strong>in</strong>dices show that imports grew very rapidly until 1997 with trade<br />
liberalisation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n levelled off. Higher exports – partly driven by currency depreciation –<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude a much larger share for m<strong>an</strong>ufactured goods particularly materials processed from<br />
natural resources. Gold exports have decl<strong>in</strong>ed: <strong>the</strong> gold production <strong>in</strong>dex dropped from 120.7<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1986 to 86.6 <strong>in</strong> 1999. with a very small deficit <strong>in</strong> non-factor services (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g tourism<br />
<strong>an</strong>d tr<strong>an</strong>sport), <strong>the</strong> overall trade bal<strong>an</strong>ce has consistently been <strong>in</strong> surplus, averag<strong>in</strong>g just over<br />
23
1 percent of GDP between 1995 <strong>an</strong>d 1998 but <strong>the</strong>n ris<strong>in</strong>g to 3 percent s<strong>in</strong>ce 1999. A deficit <strong>in</strong><br />
factor services (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational wage, <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>an</strong>d dividend payments) has been a<br />
problem for decades, but s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994 has been below its 1980s levels (20 percent lower <strong>in</strong> US<br />
dollar terms), even though it rose from 1.9 percent of GDP <strong>in</strong> 1995 to 2.6 percent <strong>in</strong> 2000, <strong>in</strong><br />
part due to <strong>the</strong> relocation to <strong>the</strong> UK <strong>an</strong>d US of major corporations.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> capital account, net capital <strong>in</strong>flows have exceeded <strong>the</strong> current account deficit <strong>an</strong>d would<br />
have been sufficient to f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce higher domestic fixed <strong>in</strong>vestment, had this been required.<br />
Instead, capital <strong>in</strong>flows have been used to build foreign exch<strong>an</strong>ge reserve stocks. Because<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has highly-developed f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial markets, volatile portfolio <strong>in</strong>flows have been <strong>the</strong><br />
largest component, much larger th<strong>an</strong> more stable <strong>in</strong>flows such as direct <strong>in</strong>vestment or b<strong>an</strong>k<br />
lo<strong>an</strong>s. By 2000, gross non-resident tr<strong>an</strong>sactions (purchases plus sales) represented 52 percent<br />
of turnover on <strong>the</strong> equity market, <strong>an</strong>d 23 percent on <strong>the</strong> bond market. Between 1995 <strong>an</strong>d 2002,<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> received two-thirds of gross market-based capital flows to Sub-Sahar<strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d 101% of net portfolio equity flows. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s share of all develop<strong>in</strong>g country<br />
<strong>in</strong>flows were 3.3% <strong>an</strong>d 22% respectively. By contrast, <strong>in</strong>flows of foreign direct <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994 have been disappo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, with gross <strong>in</strong>flows averag<strong>in</strong>g $1.86 billion per <strong>an</strong>num<br />
between 1994 <strong>an</strong>d 2002. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> differs from o<strong>the</strong>r middle-<strong>in</strong>come countries <strong>in</strong> receiv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
far smaller direct <strong>in</strong>vestment th<strong>an</strong> portfolio <strong>in</strong>flows. Firm surveys confirm that FDI <strong>in</strong>flows<br />
have been small: <strong>the</strong> medi<strong>an</strong> capital stock of foreign firms which entered after 1990 was only<br />
US$ 2 million <strong>in</strong> 2000.<br />
Towards <strong>the</strong> future: Will ASGI-SA make a difference?<br />
Not only has growth <strong>in</strong> recent decades been low, but <strong>the</strong> pattern of growth has been<br />
‘unequalis<strong>in</strong>g’. Signific<strong>an</strong>t shifts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sectoral composition of output <strong>an</strong>d of trade between<br />
1990 <strong>an</strong>d 2003 have led to a ‘skills twist’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> labour force, where jobs have been created for<br />
highly-skilled workers at a relatively rapid rate but unemployment amongst low-skilled<br />
workers has grown. Output shares of m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g have decl<strong>in</strong>ed while that of<br />
services <strong>in</strong>creased, with tr<strong>an</strong>sport <strong>an</strong>d communications <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial services grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
particularly strongly. With<strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g, labour-<strong>in</strong>tensive sectors (food <strong>an</strong>d beverages,<br />
textiles <strong>an</strong>d cloth<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d footwear) grew far slower th<strong>an</strong> capital-<strong>in</strong>tensive materialsprocess<strong>in</strong>g<br />
sub-sectors like basic metals, wood products <strong>an</strong>d chemicals. The shift to more<br />
capital-<strong>in</strong>tensive sectors was l<strong>in</strong>ked <strong>in</strong> part to <strong>in</strong>ternational trade. Between 1993 <strong>an</strong>d 1997,<br />
import penetration <strong>in</strong> labour-<strong>in</strong>tensive sectors rose from 55.5 percent to 67.5 percent, driven<br />
by trade liberalisation <strong>an</strong>d squeez<strong>in</strong>g domestic production <strong>an</strong>d employment. At <strong>the</strong> same time,<br />
<strong>the</strong> share of exports from capital-<strong>in</strong>tensive sectors rose from 56.1 percent to 60.8 percent.<br />
Overall, <strong>the</strong> composition of merch<strong>an</strong>dise exports shifted from m<strong>in</strong>erals to basic processed<br />
goods (chemicals <strong>an</strong>d plastics, wood products <strong>an</strong>d basic metals) <strong>an</strong>d mach<strong>in</strong>ery <strong>an</strong>d<br />
equipment after 1990, reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creased domestic process<strong>in</strong>g of natural resources.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 2003, <strong>the</strong> government has acknowledged that <strong>in</strong>equality & poverty have not been<br />
successfully addressed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id era. President Mbeki has argued that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
comprises ‘two economies’:<br />
The ‘third world economy’ exists side by side with <strong>the</strong> modern ‘first world economy’ …[but<br />
is] structurally disconnected from [it]…. [To] end <strong>the</strong> ‘third world economy’s’<br />
underdevelopment <strong>an</strong>d marg<strong>in</strong>alisation…will require susta<strong>in</strong>ed government <strong>in</strong>tervention [<strong>an</strong>d]<br />
resource tr<strong>an</strong>sfers … <strong>in</strong>clud[<strong>in</strong>g] education <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, capital for bus<strong>in</strong>ess development <strong>an</strong>d<br />
…social <strong>an</strong>d economic <strong>in</strong>frastructure, market<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>an</strong>d appropriate technology.”<br />
(Mbeki, 2003a)<br />
24
Government policymakers talk of ‘build<strong>in</strong>g a staircase’ from <strong>the</strong> second economy to <strong>the</strong> first,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d suggest that <strong>the</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> Union’s ‘structural funds’ to address regional disparities offer a<br />
useful model for first economy resources to be ch<strong>an</strong>nelled to <strong>the</strong> second economy.<br />
The <strong>new</strong> ASGI-SA policy framework aim<strong>in</strong>g to halve <strong>the</strong> share of <strong>the</strong> population which is <strong>in</strong><br />
poverty by 2014 is based on <strong>the</strong> ‘two economies’ concept. It targets massive exp<strong>an</strong>sion of<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>an</strong>d skills: pl<strong>an</strong>ned spend<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong>frastructure amounts to nearly five percent of<br />
GDP per <strong>an</strong>num over <strong>the</strong> next 5 years, with a parallel <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> scale of hum<strong>an</strong> resources<br />
allocated to skills development <strong>an</strong>d education. ASGISA aims to boost employment by<br />
prioritis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> tourism <strong>an</strong>d bus<strong>in</strong>ess process outsourc<strong>in</strong>g sectors, both labour-<strong>in</strong>tensive export<br />
sectors with opportunities for small <strong>an</strong>d medium-sized bus<strong>in</strong>esses.<br />
From a poverty-reduction perspective, ASGI-SA has several difficulties. The ‘two economies’<br />
concept explicitly assumes <strong>the</strong>re are no l<strong>in</strong>kages between <strong>the</strong> first <strong>an</strong>d second economies,<br />
ignor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>teractions between growth <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>equality. But not only does ‘first economy’<br />
growth widen <strong>the</strong> gap between <strong>the</strong> ‘two economies’, <strong>in</strong> addition <strong>the</strong> social consequences of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ‘second economy’ lower growth, for example by damag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestor confidence. This<br />
suggests that uplift<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> second economy may require signific<strong>an</strong>t restructur<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> first<br />
economy, which could <strong>in</strong>volve challeng<strong>in</strong>g established <strong>in</strong>terests. Second, almost all <strong>the</strong><br />
massive <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure spend<strong>in</strong>g is aimed at reduc<strong>in</strong>g ‘<strong>the</strong> costs of do<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>ess’<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first economy, ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> extend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure services to those <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second<br />
economy. Third, much greater policy priority will have to be given to SMMEs th<strong>an</strong> has been<br />
true s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, despite oft-stated <strong>in</strong>tentions. A concern here is that <strong>the</strong> ratio of risk to reward<br />
fac<strong>in</strong>g potential black entrepreneurs is much less favourable th<strong>an</strong> for <strong>the</strong>ir alternative,<br />
opportunities for black economic empowerment (affirmative action) positions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> (formerly<br />
white) corporate sector. Fourth, <strong>the</strong> proposed ‘staircase’ <strong>in</strong>volves programmes like skills<br />
development <strong>in</strong>tended to tr<strong>an</strong>sfer assets to <strong>the</strong> poor. But government needs to learn how to<br />
successfully implement such asset-based programmes, which will take time, so that <strong>the</strong> 2014<br />
targets may be over-ambitious.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial resources may be <strong>in</strong>adequate. The current gr<strong>an</strong>ts systems already commits a<br />
high level of resources to poverty alleviation via <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>t system, <strong>an</strong>d this expenditure c<strong>an</strong>not<br />
be simply redirected to f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce asset-based programmes, even if <strong>the</strong>re is scope to do so over<br />
time. In <strong>the</strong> short-term, additional f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce will be necessary. On one h<strong>an</strong>d, ‘first economy’<br />
growth may be unable to provide extra resources. The current <strong>in</strong>ternational macroeconomic<br />
environment faces numerous challenges, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> disequilibrium between <strong>the</strong> US <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Ch<strong>in</strong>ese bal<strong>an</strong>ce of payments <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> effects of Middle East <strong>in</strong>stability on oil prices <strong>an</strong>d<br />
currencies. ASGI-SA acknowledges macroeconomic volatility as a major potential constra<strong>in</strong>t<br />
but offers no policy to m<strong>an</strong>age it. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> SA Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k has argued that volatility is ‘a<br />
fact of life beyond its control’. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>an</strong>d, even with adequate growth, fiscal resources<br />
may be constra<strong>in</strong>ed. ‘Easy’ fiscal ga<strong>in</strong>s from tax <strong>an</strong>d revenue collection reform are levell<strong>in</strong>g<br />
off, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>re appears to be limited political will amongst <strong>the</strong> middle classes, black <strong>an</strong>d white,<br />
who comprise <strong>the</strong> bulk of taxpayers, to accept higher taxes to support tr<strong>an</strong>sfers to <strong>the</strong> poor, as<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> debate on proposals to <strong>in</strong>troduce a basic <strong>in</strong>come gr<strong>an</strong>t (BIG).<br />
Conclusion<br />
We asked at <strong>the</strong> outset whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> reductions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fiscal deficit <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>flation rate dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> past decade c<strong>an</strong> be taken to represent macroeconomic ‘success’, given <strong>the</strong> volatility <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
external accounts over <strong>the</strong> same period, <strong>an</strong>d asked also whe<strong>the</strong>r this ‘success’, if it be so<br />
judged, came at too high a price <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of low growth of output <strong>an</strong>d employment. The<br />
25
paper has <strong>an</strong>swered <strong>the</strong> first question <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> negative <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> second <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> affirmative, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
ASGI-SA framework suggests that <strong>the</strong> government has reached similar conclusions.<br />
None<strong>the</strong>less, m<strong>an</strong>y believe that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n economy has ‘turned <strong>the</strong> corner’ <strong>an</strong>d<br />
established itself on a higher growth path, after growth of 4.5 percent <strong>in</strong> 2004 <strong>an</strong>d 4.9 percent<br />
<strong>in</strong> 2005. The currency has steadily but slowly appreciated s<strong>in</strong>ce early 2002, <strong>the</strong> risk premium<br />
on <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n bonds has decl<strong>in</strong>ed signific<strong>an</strong>tly, <strong>an</strong>d domestic <strong>in</strong>terest rates dropped from<br />
17% at end-2002 to 10.5% <strong>in</strong> mid-2005. The global commodity price boom driven by Ch<strong>in</strong>ese<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Indi<strong>an</strong> growth pushed up <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s export earn<strong>in</strong>gs dur<strong>in</strong>g this period, while <strong>the</strong><br />
rapid growth of <strong>the</strong> black middle class due to ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ (BEE) 7<br />
released pent-up dem<strong>an</strong>d for hous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d consumer durables <strong>an</strong>d raised overall household<br />
consumption expenditure. But consumption-fuelled growth has sucked <strong>in</strong> imports, which<br />
grew nearly 10 percent <strong>in</strong> 2003 <strong>an</strong>d 15 percent <strong>in</strong> 2004. In early 2006, <strong>the</strong> current account<br />
deficit had reached 6.4 percent of GDP, <strong>the</strong> worst level s<strong>in</strong>ce 1982. As noted above, <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational economy is also unstable, so that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> could experience yet <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
foreign exch<strong>an</strong>ge shock <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> next two to three years, if global pressures draw ‘hot money’<br />
capital flows out of relatively risky emerg<strong>in</strong>g markets. It is too early for a def<strong>in</strong>itively<br />
optimistic conclusion.<br />
References<br />
Aliber, M & R Mokoena. The l<strong>an</strong>d question <strong>in</strong> contemporary <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. In J D<strong>an</strong>iel, A<br />
Habib & R <strong>South</strong>all (eds), The State of <strong>the</strong> Nation: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, 2003-2004. HSRC Press,<br />
Pretoria, 2003.<br />
ANC, The Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme (RDP). Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg, 1994<br />
Hoogeveen, J & B Özler, Not separate, not equal? Poverty & <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. World B<strong>an</strong>k Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton DC, 2004<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Commission. 4 th Annual Economic <strong>an</strong>d Social Rights Report: 2000 – 2002.<br />
Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg, 2003.<br />
M<strong>an</strong>dela, N. Options for Build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> Economic Future. Investment Analysts Journal<br />
(Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg), 33, Summer, 1990.<br />
Mbeki, T. Letter from <strong>the</strong> President: Bold steps to end <strong>the</strong> ‘two nations’ divide. ANC Today,<br />
3(33), 22 August 2003.<br />
V<strong>an</strong> der Berg, S. Trends <strong>in</strong> Racial Fiscal Incidence <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Journal of<br />
Economics, 69:2. 2001.<br />
In addition, this paper draws heavily from some of my earlier work:<br />
“Address<strong>in</strong>g Inequality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>”, Paper prepared for SID Conference on Creat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Wealth through Growth & Equity, Nairobi, May 22-23 2006 www.<strong>the</strong>-edge.org.za.<br />
“Inequality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Nature, causes <strong>an</strong>d responses”, Paper prepared for DfID Policy<br />
Initiative on Address<strong>in</strong>g Inequality <strong>in</strong> Middle-<strong>in</strong>come Countries, November 2003 www.<strong>the</strong>edge.org.za.<br />
“The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Economy: An overview, 1994 – 2004”, <strong>in</strong> J. D<strong>an</strong>iel, J. Lutchm<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d R.<br />
<strong>South</strong>all, (eds), The State of <strong>the</strong> Nation: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2004-05, Cape Town; HSRC Press <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Michig<strong>an</strong>; Michig<strong>an</strong> State University Press, 2004.<br />
7<br />
The share of black people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> middle class is now estimated as 55 percent, compared with 25 percent 15<br />
years ago.<br />
26
4 Who are <strong>the</strong> poor? The size <strong>an</strong>d structure of <strong>the</strong><br />
poverty problem<br />
By David Everatt<br />
Tables<br />
Table 1: Different models for def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g poverty<br />
Table 2: Indicators used to construct <strong>the</strong> poverty <strong>in</strong>dex<br />
Table 3: Poverty by prov<strong>in</strong>ce 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001<br />
Table 4: Poverty <strong>in</strong>dex scores for all nodes <strong>an</strong>d <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001<br />
Table 5: Indicator <strong>an</strong>d overall poverty scores for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, 1996 & 2001<br />
Table 6: Indicators by node, 2001 (ISRDP)<br />
Table 7: Indicators by node, 2001 (URP)<br />
Graphs<br />
Figure 1: ISRDP nodes (Source: www.dplg.gov.za)<br />
Figure 2: The URP nodes (Source: www.dplg.gov.za)<br />
Figure 3: Poverty scores for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, ISRDP & URP, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001<br />
Figure 4: Poverty by prov<strong>in</strong>ce, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001<br />
Introduction 8<br />
Tackl<strong>in</strong>g poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is probably one of <strong>the</strong> very few areas where consensus<br />
exists across political, racial <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r l<strong>in</strong>es of division. But <strong>the</strong> agreement stops right<br />
<strong>the</strong>re – it does not cover how poverty is understood, how it is def<strong>in</strong>ed, who is <strong>an</strong>d who<br />
isn’t poor, what to do to about poverty, <strong>an</strong>d so on. This is true with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g tripartite<br />
alli<strong>an</strong>ce (compris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n National Congress (ANC), <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Communist<br />
party (SACP) <strong>an</strong>d Congress of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Trade unions (COSATU)), as well as<br />
beyond it.<br />
Our concern here is less with <strong>the</strong> debates <strong>an</strong>d disputes over poverty, which have been<br />
<strong>an</strong>alysed elsewhere 9 , th<strong>an</strong> with <strong>an</strong> attempt to outl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> scale <strong>an</strong>d nature of poverty <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. To do so, <strong>the</strong> chapter uses data from <strong>the</strong> 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001 censuses, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
focuses on <strong>the</strong> 21 poorest ‘nodes’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: 13 <strong>in</strong> rural areas compris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> focus<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Integrated Susta<strong>in</strong>able Rural Development Programme (ISRDP)<strong>an</strong>d 8 do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
same for <strong>the</strong> Urb<strong>an</strong> Re<strong>new</strong>al Programme (URP).<br />
The chapter is based on work done for <strong>the</strong> Department of Social Development (DSD),<br />
which has commissioned socio-economic <strong>an</strong>d demographic basel<strong>in</strong>e studies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 21<br />
nodes. The views presented <strong>in</strong> this paper are those of <strong>the</strong> author <strong>an</strong>d do not represent<br />
positions of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Department of Social Development. These nodes were<br />
selected because of <strong>the</strong> deep poverty <strong>in</strong> which m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong>ir citizens live, though it is<br />
unclear what variables were used to identify <strong>the</strong> nodes. The ISRDP <strong>an</strong>d URP aim to<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sform <strong>the</strong>ir respective nodes <strong>in</strong>to economically vibr<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d socially cohesive areas<br />
8 Th<strong>an</strong>ks to Ross Jenn<strong>in</strong>gs for master<strong>in</strong>g census data <strong>an</strong>d extract<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> statistics used here.<br />
9 These issues are discussed <strong>in</strong> detail <strong>in</strong> Everatt D. (2004) ‘The politics of poverty’ <strong>in</strong> Everatt D. <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Maphai V. (ed.s) The (real) state of <strong>the</strong> nation: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce 1990 (Interfund, Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg).<br />
27
<strong>in</strong>itially through <strong>an</strong>chor projects to kick-start <strong>the</strong> programmes, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n through better<br />
co-ord<strong>in</strong>ation between departments geared to provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrated suite of services to<br />
all citizens, especially those liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> poverty.<br />
The chapter uses 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001 census data to map poverty <strong>in</strong> all 21 nodes, provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />
time-series <strong>an</strong>alysis of socio-economic <strong>an</strong>d demographic <strong>in</strong>dicators as well <strong>an</strong> overall<br />
poverty matrix constructed from variables used <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> census. Poverty is <strong>an</strong>alysed <strong>in</strong><br />
space (across all 21 nodes) <strong>an</strong>d across time (<strong>in</strong> 1996 to 2001). Predictably, though still<br />
shock<strong>in</strong>g, rural poverty emerges as considerably worse th<strong>an</strong> poverty <strong>in</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> areas, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
poverty scores for <strong>the</strong> ISRDP nodes are almost twice as high as those for <strong>the</strong> URP.<br />
These poverty scores are also <strong>an</strong>alysed <strong>in</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d national context, by us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
same poverty matrix for all prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> country as a whole <strong>an</strong>d compar<strong>in</strong>g results<br />
with <strong>the</strong> ISRDP <strong>an</strong>d URP nodes.<br />
Us<strong>in</strong>g census data has both positives <strong>an</strong>d negatives, most of which are well known. Our<br />
approach is to use a poverty matrix proposed by Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 10 - though,<br />
curiously, not applied by <strong>the</strong> agency to its own census (or o<strong>the</strong>r) data – to measure<br />
poverty. The census has far greater reliability th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>y sample survey, particularly <strong>in</strong><br />
allow<strong>in</strong>g us to focus on specific spatial areas <strong>an</strong>d reta<strong>in</strong> reliability. It also <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong><br />
variables later suggested by Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> as a poverty measur<strong>in</strong>g tool. But it<br />
has all <strong>the</strong> rigidities of censuses, a limited number of expl<strong>an</strong>atory variables <strong>an</strong>d thus of<br />
cross-tabulations, <strong>an</strong>d of course only takes us to 2001. But <strong>the</strong>se are not confound<strong>in</strong>g<br />
problems, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> chapter outl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> scale of poverty – us<strong>in</strong>g a more broad-based<br />
approach th<strong>an</strong> merely unemployment statistics, as frequently done by commentators – as<br />
well as government’s successes, failures of current challenges <strong>in</strong> eradicat<strong>in</strong>g poverty <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
10 Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Measur<strong>in</strong>g Poverty (Pretoria, 2000).<br />
28
Figure 1: ISRDP nodes (Source: www.dplg.gov.za)<br />
Methodology<br />
The data <strong>in</strong> this report have been extracted from Census 1996 <strong>an</strong>d Census 2001. For <strong>the</strong><br />
ISRDP (district municipalities) <strong>an</strong>d URP (suburbs or townships) nodes, <strong>the</strong> data relate to<br />
<strong>the</strong> entire population of <strong>in</strong>dividuals or households <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> respective geographic areas as<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> two censuses. The construction of a detailed poverty matrix allows us to<br />
<strong>an</strong>alyse poverty with<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d across <strong>in</strong>dividual nodes, for all URP <strong>an</strong>d ISRDP nodes<br />
(programme level), for prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d for <strong>the</strong> country as a whole. Us<strong>in</strong>g census data<br />
requires <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicator-based method for both nodal <strong>an</strong>d poverty profil<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Our underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is partly <strong>in</strong>fluenced by <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
<strong>in</strong>dices, such as <strong>the</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Development Index produced by <strong>the</strong> United Nations<br />
Development Programme (UNDP), or <strong>the</strong> competitiveness <strong>in</strong>dex produced by <strong>the</strong> World<br />
Economic Forum. These reports use particular <strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>an</strong>d assess countries <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
totality. What <strong>the</strong>se reports often fail to reflect (because <strong>the</strong>y are work<strong>in</strong>g at national<br />
level) is <strong>the</strong> deep <strong>in</strong>equality that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong>herited from its past; or <strong>the</strong> pockets of<br />
poverty that mark urb<strong>an</strong> areas <strong>an</strong>d disappear when assessed at aggregate level.<br />
This chapter seeks to avoid <strong>the</strong>se problems by work<strong>in</strong>g from nodes upwards to<br />
programme, prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d national levels. Data for <strong>the</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> nodes are specific to <strong>the</strong><br />
nodal site, with some possible <strong>in</strong>accuracies with <strong>the</strong> 1996 data because of <strong>the</strong> various<br />
demarcation processes that subsequently have occurred. That said, we have been able to<br />
isolate <strong>the</strong> specific nodes for <strong>an</strong>alysis: data for Alex<strong>an</strong>dra, for example, do not <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
nearby (<strong>an</strong>d far wealthier) S<strong>an</strong>dton; <strong>the</strong> same goes for o<strong>the</strong>r URP nodes. Most URP<br />
29
nodes are fairly specific areas such as Md<strong>an</strong>ts<strong>an</strong>e, In<strong>an</strong>da, Mitchell’s Pla<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d so on.<br />
However, most ISRDP nodes are larger adm<strong>in</strong>istrative units – district or local<br />
municipalities such as Zulul<strong>an</strong>d, Alfred Nzo, Central Karoo <strong>an</strong>d so on – <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
automatically <strong>in</strong>clude larger spatial areas <strong>an</strong>d populations th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir urb<strong>an</strong> counterparts.<br />
Even so, as we demonstrate below, <strong>the</strong> poverty of <strong>the</strong> rural nodes is stagger<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d at <strong>an</strong><br />
aggregate level is twice that of <strong>the</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> nodes. There may be small peri-urb<strong>an</strong> pockets<br />
of <strong>the</strong> better off, such as Port St Johns <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> midst of O R Tambo, but <strong>the</strong>se make little<br />
impact on <strong>the</strong> overall levels of poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 13 rural nodes, highlight<strong>in</strong>g how acute<br />
poverty is <strong>an</strong>d how urgently it needs to be addressed.<br />
There is considerable debate about <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition of poverty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> appropriate<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicators to measure it 11 , some examples of which are shown <strong>in</strong> Table 1 below.<br />
World B<strong>an</strong>k UNDP (Hum<strong>an</strong> Poverty Index) Statistics SA<br />
Income per capita Education Education<br />
Life expect<strong>an</strong>cy Unemployment<br />
Health services Dwell<strong>in</strong>g type<br />
Water Household composition<br />
Malnourishment Household expenditure<br />
Household size<br />
Water<br />
Refuse removal<br />
S<strong>an</strong>itation<br />
Electricity<br />
Telephone<br />
Table 1: Different models for def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g poverty<br />
Although not to be conflated with poverty, <strong>the</strong>re are also a number of measures of<br />
development that bear not<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
• UNDP’s Hum<strong>an</strong> Development Index – consists of education, GDP per capita <strong>an</strong>d<br />
life expect<strong>an</strong>cy;<br />
• <strong>the</strong> UN Millennium Development Goals – Goal 1 is to eradicate extreme poverty<br />
<strong>an</strong>d hunger <strong>an</strong>d consists of <strong>in</strong>come per capita, child malnutrition, primary school<br />
completion, gender equality <strong>in</strong> schools, child mortality, maternal mortality <strong>an</strong>d<br />
HIV/AIDS prevalence (<strong>an</strong>d will be covered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> basel<strong>in</strong>e survey);<br />
• <strong>an</strong>d so on.<br />
Evidence across different countries shows that poverty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dard of liv<strong>in</strong>g are<br />
directly related to resource availability <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>come – <strong>the</strong>se resources often <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
access to water, s<strong>an</strong>itation, electricity, hous<strong>in</strong>g, education, health care <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>d. When<br />
us<strong>in</strong>g a composite def<strong>in</strong>ition, poverty measures c<strong>an</strong> generally be grouped <strong>in</strong>to four major<br />
categories:<br />
• Economic – <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g monetary <strong>in</strong>dicators of household well-be<strong>in</strong>g, ownership of<br />
assets, etc.<br />
11 See Everatt D. (2004) ‘The politics of poverty’ <strong>in</strong> Everatt D. <strong>an</strong>d Maphai V. (ed.s) The (real) state of <strong>the</strong><br />
nation: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce 1990 (Interfund, Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg).<br />
30
• Social – <strong>in</strong>clude non-monetary <strong>in</strong>dicators of household well-be<strong>in</strong>g, such as access<br />
to education, health <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r basic services.<br />
• Demographic – focus on structure <strong>an</strong>d size of households.<br />
• Vulnerability – focus on issues such as physical <strong>in</strong>security <strong>an</strong>d environmental<br />
hazards.<br />
Choos<strong>in</strong>g which <strong>in</strong>dicators to use <strong>in</strong> def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g poverty matters – different <strong>in</strong>dicators c<strong>an</strong><br />
lead to different poverty r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gs, priority target groups <strong>an</strong>d areas, different target<strong>in</strong>g<br />
strategies, <strong>an</strong>d so on. This has import<strong>an</strong>t implications <strong>in</strong> terms of determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g who <strong>the</strong><br />
poor are <strong>an</strong>d where <strong>the</strong>y are located as well as design<strong>in</strong>g programmatic responses to<br />
poverty – i.e. what is needed to move people out of poverty.<br />
The poverty <strong>in</strong>dex<br />
This chapter uses <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicator-based method of def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g poverty, unavoidable given use<br />
of census data. The selection of <strong>in</strong>dicators was <strong>in</strong>fluenced by current <strong>in</strong>ternational trends<br />
<strong>an</strong>d local conditions, as well as reflect<strong>in</strong>g key service delivery areas of government –<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure, services, health, education <strong>an</strong>d job creation. To measure poverty with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> limitations of census data, <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g ten <strong>in</strong>dicators, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir correspond<strong>in</strong>g<br />
def<strong>in</strong>itions, were used:<br />
Indicator Def<strong>in</strong>ition<br />
Female-headed<br />
households<br />
Proportion of households headed by women<br />
Illiteracy Proportion of population (15+) who have not completed<br />
Std 5/Grade 7<br />
Rate of unemployment Proportion of <strong>the</strong> economically available population who<br />
are unemployed (regardless of whe<strong>the</strong>r or not <strong>the</strong>y<br />
recently sought work)<br />
Household <strong>in</strong>come Proportion of households with no <strong>an</strong>nual <strong>in</strong>come<br />
Over-crowd<strong>in</strong>g Proportion of households shar<strong>in</strong>g a room with at least<br />
one o<strong>the</strong>r household<br />
Dwell<strong>in</strong>g type Proportion<br />
traditional<br />
of households classified <strong>in</strong>formal or<br />
S<strong>an</strong>itation Proportion of households who do not have a flush or<br />
chemical toilet<br />
Water Proportion of households who have no tap water <strong>in</strong>side<br />
dwell<strong>in</strong>g or on site<br />
Electricity Proportion of households who do not have electricity for<br />
light<strong>in</strong>g purposes<br />
Refuse removal Proportion of households whose refuse is not removed by<br />
local authority<br />
Table 2: Indicators used to construct <strong>the</strong> poverty <strong>in</strong>dex<br />
For each <strong>in</strong>dicator, <strong>the</strong> relev<strong>an</strong>t proportion (as a score out of a 100) was calculated. The<br />
poverty <strong>in</strong>dex was <strong>the</strong>n calculated by add<strong>in</strong>g all <strong>the</strong> scores for each <strong>in</strong>dicator <strong>an</strong>d<br />
divid<strong>in</strong>g by 10 to obta<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> average overall score out of 100. A score of 100 would<br />
reflect <strong>an</strong> extremely high level of poverty while a score of 0 would reflect <strong>an</strong> extremely<br />
low level.<br />
31
To make sense of <strong>the</strong> data, just remember that a high score is bad <strong>new</strong>s, because it<br />
me<strong>an</strong>s high levels of poverty. So, for example, if we f<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> 1996 Central Karoo<br />
scored 28.3 on <strong>the</strong> refuse removal <strong>in</strong>dicator, this me<strong>an</strong>s that 28.3% of households <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
node did not have <strong>the</strong>ir refuse removed by <strong>the</strong>ir local authority. The same applies to <strong>the</strong><br />
composite poverty score. For example, <strong>in</strong> 2001, Sekhukhune scored 54.0 while<br />
Alex<strong>an</strong>dra scored 24.4: this me<strong>an</strong>s that over half (54%) of <strong>the</strong> Sekhukhune population<br />
lived <strong>in</strong> high poverty <strong>in</strong> 2001, true of a quarter (24.4%) of <strong>the</strong> population of Alex<strong>an</strong>dra.<br />
The scores are proportions; <strong>an</strong>d high scores are bad <strong>new</strong>s.<br />
Limitations<br />
The master sample for <strong>the</strong> 1996 Census <strong>an</strong>d 2001 Census were different. In addition,<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g municipal demarcations will have affected some of <strong>the</strong> ISRDP nodes between<br />
<strong>the</strong> two census out<strong>in</strong>gs (<strong>the</strong> process has cont<strong>in</strong>ued with recent demarcations remov<strong>in</strong>g<br />
cross-border nodes). Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> URP nodes were not easily extracted from <strong>the</strong><br />
1996 census us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> data made available to <strong>the</strong> public. Two specific nodes where<br />
caution should be exercised for <strong>the</strong> 1996 census data due to potentially different<br />
geographic boundaries are Mitchell's Pla<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d In<strong>an</strong>da. These problems did not recur<br />
when re-<strong>an</strong>alys<strong>in</strong>g data from <strong>the</strong> 2001 census.<br />
Figure 2: The URP nodes (Source: www.dplg.gov.za)<br />
As a result of <strong>the</strong> above <strong>the</strong>re may be slight population variations from 1996 to 2001,<br />
which c<strong>an</strong> be expla<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong>se adm<strong>in</strong>istrative ch<strong>an</strong>ges ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> actual ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
life circumst<strong>an</strong>ces of <strong>the</strong> populations of <strong>the</strong>se nodes. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> similarities <strong>in</strong><br />
population size across <strong>the</strong> two censuses strongly suggest that only slight ch<strong>an</strong>ges result<br />
from ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g geographic boundaries; <strong>an</strong>d that one should look at <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> life<br />
circumst<strong>an</strong>ces across time with confidence.<br />
32
Analys<strong>in</strong>g poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 21 nodes<br />
A poverty matrix was constructed based on variables <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> censuses of both<br />
1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001. The variables <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> matrix <strong>in</strong>clude both household <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividual-level<br />
data, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
• Female-headed households<br />
• Illiteracy (<strong>the</strong> proportion of population aged 15 <strong>an</strong>d above who have not completed<br />
Std 5/Grade 7)<br />
• Rate of unemployment<br />
• Household <strong>in</strong>come (<strong>the</strong> proportion of households with no <strong>an</strong>nual <strong>in</strong>come)<br />
• Crowd<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>the</strong> proportion of households shar<strong>in</strong>g a room with at least one o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
household)<br />
• Dwell<strong>in</strong>g type (households classified <strong>in</strong>formal or traditional)<br />
• S<strong>an</strong>itation (households without flush or chemical toilet)<br />
• Water (households without tap water <strong>in</strong>side dwell<strong>in</strong>g or on site)<br />
• Electricity (households without electricity for light<strong>in</strong>g purposes)<br />
• Refuse removal (households whose refuse is not removed by local authority)<br />
We are not seek<strong>in</strong>g to defend this as <strong>the</strong> ‘best’ or most robust def<strong>in</strong>ition of poverty – it<br />
lacks a subst<strong>an</strong>tial gender <strong>an</strong>gle, has noth<strong>in</strong>g to cover security/vulnerability, ‘voice’, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
so on. But <strong>the</strong> censuses are a uniquely powerful dataset deserv<strong>in</strong>g rigorous <strong>an</strong>alysis for<br />
what <strong>the</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> tell us about poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d avoid much of <strong>the</strong> sampl<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
question phras<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r disputation attend<strong>an</strong>t on sample surveys. Census data are a<br />
key national resource that c<strong>an</strong> be <strong>an</strong>alysed nationally <strong>an</strong>d at lower levels – such as <strong>the</strong> 21<br />
nodes – th<strong>an</strong> virtually <strong>an</strong>y national sample survey. In o<strong>the</strong>r words <strong>the</strong>re is a trade-off<br />
between <strong>the</strong> reliability of <strong>the</strong> data at nodal level <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> breadth of poverty-related<br />
variables.<br />
We have also had to draw divid<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>es, which may be disputed. For example, some<br />
may feel that households with VIP pit latr<strong>in</strong>es should be excluded from <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition of<br />
poor households, not <strong>in</strong>cluded as we have done; that traditional dwell<strong>in</strong>gs should<br />
similarly be excluded; <strong>an</strong>d so on. More import<strong>an</strong>tly, it c<strong>an</strong> be argued that this or that<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicator should be weighted more th<strong>an</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. For example, unemployment may be<br />
seen as more import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> measur<strong>in</strong>g poverty th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicator for over-crowd<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
households - that it should not merely count as 1 of 10 but should carry more weight <strong>an</strong>d<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rs less.<br />
These are fair po<strong>in</strong>ts; but we have decided to take <strong>the</strong> route of construct<strong>in</strong>g this matrix<br />
from <strong>the</strong> censuses, thus restrict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>alysis to available variables, <strong>an</strong>d preferr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
simplicity of 10 variables without weight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y above <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r. Every def<strong>in</strong>ition is open<br />
to dispute, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g this one. Ultimately, however, poverty has to be def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>es<br />
have to be drawn somewhere, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>se are <strong>the</strong> choices we have made <strong>in</strong> compil<strong>in</strong>g this<br />
chapter.<br />
33
Poverty levels 1996 to 2001<br />
Look<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong> results <strong>in</strong> Figure 3 below, we see that poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 13 ISRDP nodes is<br />
far higher th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> URP nodes, predictably. Moreover, levels of poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> URP<br />
nodes are on average lower th<strong>an</strong> those for <strong>the</strong> country as a whole, reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> scale of<br />
rural poverty <strong>an</strong>d its impact on poverty levels <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Urb<strong>an</strong> nodes are poor, but<br />
far less poor th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir rural counterparts. Even poor urb<strong>an</strong> areas act as magnets<br />
attract<strong>in</strong>g those capable of migrat<strong>in</strong>g out of <strong>the</strong> depth of poverty <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y rural areas.<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
33.6<br />
33.4<br />
56.2<br />
53.7<br />
29.2<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> ISRDP URP<br />
1996 2001<br />
27.1<br />
Figure 3: Poverty scores for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, ISRDP & URP, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001<br />
But – far less predictably – we see that poverty dropped between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
country as a whole (very slightly) between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001, by 0.2%; <strong>an</strong>d did so by<br />
greater marg<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> (2.1% down) <strong>an</strong>d rural nodes (2.5%); this may seem slow<br />
<strong>an</strong>d steady ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> spectacular, but is a considerable achievement.<br />
A third of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns lived <strong>in</strong> poverty <strong>in</strong> both 1996 (33.6%) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> 2001 (33.4%),<br />
with a slender 0.2% drop <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terven<strong>in</strong>g 5 years. This is similar to some poverty<br />
estimates that use $1 or $2/day measures 12 , but far lower th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> 45% - 55% cited by<br />
government commissions <strong>an</strong>d widely used by <strong>an</strong>alysts <strong>an</strong>d critics. 13 It is presumably <strong>the</strong><br />
same group referred to <strong>in</strong> government’s Accelerated <strong>an</strong>d Shared Growth <strong>in</strong>itiative for<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (AsgiSA) document:<br />
12 See May J. (2006) ‘Construct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> social policy agenda: conceptual debates around poverty <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>equality’ <strong>in</strong> Padayachee V. (ed.) The development decade? Economic <strong>an</strong>d social ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>,<br />
1994-2004 (HSRC Press, Pretoria), pp.144-145.<br />
13 Department of Social Development: Tr<strong>an</strong>sform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> present: Protect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> future (Pretoria, 2002),<br />
report of <strong>the</strong> Committee of Inquiry <strong>in</strong>to a Comprehensive System of Social Security for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (‘<strong>the</strong><br />
Taylor Commission’), p.276.<br />
34
…although <strong>the</strong> social gr<strong>an</strong>t programme has given signific<strong>an</strong>t impetus to poverty<br />
reduction <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>come redistribution, <strong>the</strong>re rema<strong>in</strong> about a third of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
households not yet able to benefit directly from our economic adv<strong>an</strong>ces. Br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g this<br />
sector of <strong>the</strong> population <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream economy will considerably enh<strong>an</strong>ce our<br />
growth potential. 14<br />
The fact that levels of poverty dropped <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> poorest urb<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d rural nodes <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> is <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g. This is particularly true given <strong>the</strong> heated attacks on<br />
government for worsen<strong>in</strong>g poverty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> very high levels of poverty cited by m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
authors. 15 It emerges from a matrix that deliberately moves away from reli<strong>an</strong>ce on s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />
variables – commonly unemployment – as a measure of poverty <strong>an</strong>d seeks to measure<br />
poverty on a more nu<strong>an</strong>ced basis. It is generally accepted that poverty is multifaceted,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d a reductionist approach that <strong>in</strong>sists on equat<strong>in</strong>g poverty with unemployment fails to<br />
allow a sufficiently nu<strong>an</strong>ced underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, or of how to<br />
tackle it.<br />
This should not be taken to dim<strong>in</strong>ish <strong>the</strong> job crisis fac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> country. Unemployment<br />
rocketed from 37.6% <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996 census to 48.2% five years later – far higher th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
figure commonly cited by politici<strong>an</strong>s who focus on ‘active work-seekers’ <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
weary statistical m<strong>an</strong>ipulations. Incidence of households without <strong>an</strong>y regular <strong>in</strong>come<br />
also shot up from 14.3% to 23.2%. To be without employment or <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong> a marketoriented<br />
economy where user fees are levied for m<strong>an</strong>y services is a terrible plight, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> results presented here do not dim<strong>in</strong>ish this at all. But <strong>the</strong> enormity of <strong>the</strong><br />
(un)employment crisis should not lead us away from attempt<strong>in</strong>g more accurately to<br />
measure poverty.<br />
Poverty measures broad <strong>an</strong>d narrow<br />
The poverty <strong>in</strong>dex <strong>in</strong>cludes elements of <strong>the</strong> basic needs approach that <strong>in</strong>formed <strong>the</strong><br />
ANC’s Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme of 1994 (RDP 16 ) alongside o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
socio-economic <strong>in</strong>dicators such as female-headed households, over-crowd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
like. The results generated by <strong>the</strong> matrix demonstrate that measur<strong>in</strong>g poverty across<br />
multiple <strong>in</strong>dicators reveals a more complex picture th<strong>an</strong> that suggested by those who<br />
commonly cite unemployment levels (which are appall<strong>in</strong>g) as a direct proxy for poverty<br />
<strong>an</strong>d conclude that 45% - 55% of <strong>the</strong> population live <strong>in</strong> poverty. 17<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 1960s poverty was def<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>in</strong>come but has consistently been broadened. In <strong>the</strong><br />
1970s, relative deprivation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> basic needs approach were dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t, followed with<br />
non-monetary concepts <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g powerlessness, vulnerability, livelihoods, capabilities<br />
<strong>an</strong>d gender <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s; well-be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d ‘voice’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1990s; <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> rights-based<br />
approach has dom<strong>in</strong>ated s<strong>in</strong>ce. Different def<strong>in</strong>itions produce different results. 18 K<strong>an</strong>bur<br />
14<br />
Government of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (2006) Accelerated <strong>an</strong>d Shared Growth <strong>in</strong>itiative for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (AsgiSA)<br />
p.3; http://www.<strong>in</strong>fo.gov.za/asgisa<br />
15<br />
See Everatt The politics of poverty op cit. for examples.<br />
16<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n National Congress (1994, Rav<strong>an</strong> press): The Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme.<br />
17<br />
See May J. (2006) ‘Construct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> social policy agenda: conceptual debates around poverty <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>equality’ <strong>in</strong> Padayachee V. (ed.) The development decade? Economic <strong>an</strong>d social ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>,<br />
1994-2004 (HSRC Press, Pretoria), pp.144-145.<br />
18<br />
Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Measur<strong>in</strong>g Poverty (Pretoria, 2000), p.2.<br />
35
<strong>an</strong>d Squire argued that “broaden<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition of poverty does not ch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
signific<strong>an</strong>tly who is counted as poor” 19 : this report soundly contradicts <strong>the</strong>ir assertion.<br />
Our <strong>in</strong>dex moves beyond employment status <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>come to <strong>in</strong>clude a r<strong>an</strong>ge of o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
variables, although it still has gaps <strong>in</strong> areas such as security, rights, ‘voice’ <strong>an</strong>d so on.<br />
The results show that us<strong>in</strong>g a broader set of <strong>in</strong>dicators reveals a drop <strong>in</strong> levels of poverty<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ISRDP <strong>an</strong>d URP nodes. This should not <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>y way obscure <strong>the</strong> terrible fact that a<br />
third of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns lived <strong>in</strong> poverty <strong>in</strong> 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001; but this is a signific<strong>an</strong>tly<br />
smaller portion th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> often-cited half <strong>the</strong> populace; <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> poorest nodes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
country saw signific<strong>an</strong>t poverty reduction suggest<strong>in</strong>g that pro-poor programmes were<br />
hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> impact.<br />
This flies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of much received wisdom <strong>in</strong> academic <strong>an</strong>d political circles, where<br />
(to crudify <strong>the</strong> argument) government is accused of reject<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> social-democratic ethos<br />
of <strong>the</strong> 1994 Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme <strong>in</strong> favour of str<strong>in</strong>gent neoliberal<br />
economics enshr<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996 Growth Redistribution <strong>an</strong>d Employment<br />
(GEAR) strategy. This is characterised as emphasis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>an</strong>d enrichment of <strong>the</strong><br />
nascent black bourgeoisie at <strong>the</strong> expense of <strong>the</strong> poor, with resource allocation follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
suit <strong>an</strong>d mov<strong>in</strong>g away from social spend<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>an</strong>ti-poverty) to favour<strong>in</strong>g private sector<br />
growth. These debates are discussed elsewhere <strong>in</strong> this book.<br />
As part of its neo-liberal economic strategy, government is accused by critics of forc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
market-based solutions onto developmental challenges such as water <strong>an</strong>d electricity<br />
provision, ‘commodify<strong>in</strong>g’ rights <strong>in</strong>to products, <strong>an</strong>d result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> as m<strong>an</strong>y disconnections<br />
as connections; cutt<strong>in</strong>g social spend<strong>in</strong>g as part of fiscal austerity; <strong>an</strong>d privileg<strong>in</strong>g private<br />
enterprise above redistribution. There is a lot of truth <strong>in</strong> this, but as with m<strong>an</strong>y oftrepeated<br />
<strong>an</strong>d self-styled totalis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ories of ch<strong>an</strong>ge, m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>accuracies as well.<br />
For example, Swill<strong>in</strong>g et al have noted that government expenditure on key social<br />
services rema<strong>in</strong>ed high <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creased over time after <strong>the</strong> adoption of GEAR, despite<br />
some year-on-year fluctuations. 20 This contradicts <strong>the</strong> assumption that fiscal austerity<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ded (<strong>an</strong>d received) social expenditure cuts <strong>an</strong>d that ‘GEAR caused poverty’. The<br />
data <strong>an</strong>alysed here also suggest a somewhat different picture, namely that <strong>in</strong> ‘<strong>the</strong> GEAR<br />
phase’, poverty levels largely stayed const<strong>an</strong>t across <strong>the</strong> country as a whole <strong>an</strong>d dropped<br />
<strong>in</strong> areas identified by government as amongst <strong>the</strong> poorest <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
There are powerful arguments about <strong>the</strong> rate of disconnections <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> impact of<br />
commodify<strong>in</strong>g services <strong>an</strong>d tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m beyond <strong>the</strong> reach of <strong>the</strong> poor. McDonald <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Pape argued that “cost recovery is a threat to <strong>the</strong> poor <strong>an</strong>d, ultimately, to <strong>the</strong> whole<br />
notion of a democratic tr<strong>an</strong>sformation <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>”. 21 But <strong>the</strong>re rema<strong>in</strong>s little<br />
19 R. K<strong>an</strong>bur <strong>an</strong>d L. Squire, ‘The evolution of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g about poverty: Explor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>teractions’, paper<br />
presented to <strong>the</strong> symposium on <strong>the</strong> Future of Development Economics <strong>in</strong> Perspective, 1999, p.1.<br />
20 Swill<strong>in</strong>g M., V<strong>an</strong> Breda J., V<strong>an</strong> Zyl A., Kh<strong>an</strong> F. (2005) ‘Economic Policy-Mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a Developmental<br />
State: Review of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Government’s Poverty <strong>an</strong>d Development Approaches, 1994-2004’,<br />
paper written for <strong>the</strong> ‘Social Giv<strong>in</strong>g’ project of <strong>the</strong> Centre for Civil Society, National Development<br />
Association, SA Gr<strong>an</strong>tmakers’ Association.<br />
21 McDonald D. <strong>an</strong>d Pape J (2002) Cost recovery <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> crisis of service delivery <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (HSRC<br />
Publishers, Zed Books, Pretoria), p.13.<br />
36
eliable national data on <strong>the</strong> issue, at least none that are publicly available (it does appear<br />
a considerable amount of data has been collected but not released). McDonald notes that<br />
<strong>the</strong> issue is not simply privatisation per se but publicly-owned <strong>an</strong>d operated service<br />
providers that are commodify<strong>in</strong>g services with negative results for <strong>the</strong> poor. He notes<br />
that cut-offs are now less of a concern “because <strong>the</strong>y became such a political hot potato”<br />
that municipalities feared <strong>the</strong> political backlash of cutt<strong>in</strong>g off basic services, choos<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>stead to <strong>in</strong>troduce service ‘restrictions’ (such as small devices to limit <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>an</strong>d<br />
amount of water flow) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g prepaid meters which – <strong>in</strong> his view – have forced<br />
“people to cut <strong>the</strong>mselves off by limit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir purchases, <strong>the</strong>reby personaliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> cutoff<br />
situation <strong>an</strong>d hid<strong>in</strong>g it beh<strong>in</strong>d closed doors”. 22<br />
The census is not a vehicle for measur<strong>in</strong>g cut-offs, certa<strong>in</strong>ly, <strong>an</strong>d does not help us<br />
engage with <strong>the</strong> debate <strong>in</strong> a specific m<strong>an</strong>ner; but it is not without value. For example, <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> 2001 census, 29.8% of households did not use electricity as <strong>the</strong>ir ma<strong>in</strong> source of<br />
energy for light<strong>in</strong>g purposes – <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r 70.2% did use it. The census questionnaire did<br />
explicitly not ask if <strong>the</strong> service was operational, but certa<strong>in</strong>ly implied it by ask<strong>in</strong>g<br />
respondents ‘What type of energy/fuel does this household MAINLY use for cook<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
heat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d for light<strong>in</strong>g?’ (emphasis <strong>in</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al). The census data <strong>in</strong>dicate that between<br />
1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001, those without electricity for light<strong>in</strong>g purposes dropped from 4 <strong>in</strong> 10<br />
households (41.8%) to less th<strong>an</strong> 1 <strong>in</strong> 3 (29.8%). It is unlikely that hundreds of thous<strong>an</strong>ds<br />
of people replied ‘electricity’ while me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g ‘electricity that I would be us<strong>in</strong>g if it hadn’t<br />
been cut off’.<br />
The situation may have worsened s<strong>in</strong>ce 2001, which our data do not show; but between<br />
1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001 <strong>the</strong> picture is one of exp<strong>an</strong>sion of both connectivity to <strong>the</strong> grid <strong>an</strong>d<br />
utilisation of electricity. The same is true on a smaller scale where water is concerned,<br />
for example. Access to a tap <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> household or <strong>the</strong> yard <strong>in</strong>creased by 1.6% for <strong>the</strong><br />
country as a whole, <strong>an</strong>d by 11.1% <strong>in</strong> ISRDP nodes – but not <strong>in</strong> URP nodes where <strong>the</strong><br />
situation worsened slightly by 0.3%.<br />
While rates of poverty for <strong>the</strong> ISRDP <strong>an</strong>d URP nodes dropped between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001,<br />
this occurred even through nei<strong>the</strong>r ISRDP nor URP were <strong>in</strong> place. (The ISRDP was still<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> design stage when <strong>the</strong> census was <strong>in</strong> field.) This c<strong>an</strong> largely be expla<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong><br />
fact that government’s policy orientation s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994 has been to target <strong>the</strong> ‘poorest of<br />
<strong>the</strong> poor’ particularly <strong>in</strong> rural areas, <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>y of government’s target<strong>in</strong>g mech<strong>an</strong>isms<br />
(such as that used for <strong>the</strong> Community Based Public Works Programme) identified <strong>the</strong><br />
same areas for <strong>in</strong>frastructure provision that later became ISRDP/URP nodes, for <strong>the</strong><br />
same reasons – <strong>the</strong>ir high levels of poverty. 23 Moreover, m<strong>an</strong>y redistributive programmes<br />
that beg<strong>an</strong> life under <strong>the</strong> RDP cont<strong>in</strong>ued to be implemented after <strong>the</strong> GEAR strategy had<br />
been adopted by government, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>se very poor areas cont<strong>in</strong>ued to benefit from<br />
delivery. The real test for <strong>the</strong> two programmes – <strong>an</strong>d for <strong>an</strong>ti-GEAR critics - will be to<br />
22 Communication from David McDonald 23 rd June 2006.<br />
23 See for example Everatt D. (1998) Target<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> public works programmes (Department of Public Works<br />
Policy Series, Vol. 1/1); David Everatt, Moagi Ntsime <strong>an</strong>d Lucy Stevens (1998) Monitor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Evaluation (Pre-Implementation Task Team of <strong>the</strong> Community Based Public Works Programme); David<br />
Everatt (1998) Target<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d budget allocation (Pre-Implementation Task Team of <strong>the</strong> Community Based<br />
Public Works Programme)<br />
37
see whe<strong>the</strong>r a more accelerated drop <strong>in</strong> poverty has occurred s<strong>in</strong>ce 2001, or if <strong>the</strong> reverse<br />
is true.<br />
Poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces 1996 - 2001<br />
The data <strong>in</strong> Figure 4 show poverty levels (as measured by <strong>the</strong> matrix) by prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong><br />
1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001. Limpopo, Eastern Cape <strong>an</strong>d KwaZulu-Natal rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> 3 poorest<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces - <strong>the</strong>y had been identified as such <strong>in</strong> 1995 by <strong>the</strong> RDP office <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first postapar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
national target<strong>in</strong>g exercise 24 - but poverty levels dropped <strong>in</strong> all 3. This was<br />
most evident <strong>in</strong> Limpopo, where poverty levels dropped by 3.3%; <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern Cape it<br />
dropped by 0.9% <strong>an</strong>d by 0.2% <strong>in</strong> KwaZulu-Natal.<br />
As a result, by 2001 Limpopo had swapped places with Eastern Cape as <strong>the</strong> poorest<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. Quite remarkably, <strong>the</strong> 3 poorest prov<strong>in</strong>ces were <strong>the</strong> only<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces to record a drop <strong>in</strong> poverty levels. Poverty jumped by 5% <strong>in</strong> North West,<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed static <strong>in</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Cape <strong>an</strong>d rose (less steeply th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> North West) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
5 prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
50.4<br />
47.1<br />
Limpopo<br />
48.547.6<br />
E Cape<br />
39.539.3<br />
KZN<br />
Mpumal<strong>an</strong>ga<br />
37.137.2<br />
Figure 4: Poverty by prov<strong>in</strong>ce, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001<br />
33<br />
N West<br />
38<br />
31.5<br />
32.8<br />
F State<br />
24.3 24.3<br />
N Cape<br />
20.120.8<br />
Gauteng<br />
1996 2001<br />
16.7<br />
14.6<br />
W Cape<br />
SA<br />
33.633.4<br />
The wealthiest prov<strong>in</strong>ces saw poverty levels <strong>in</strong>crease, by a fairly small 0.7% <strong>in</strong> Gauteng<br />
<strong>an</strong>d a more subst<strong>an</strong>tial 2.1% <strong>in</strong> Western Cape; both prov<strong>in</strong>ces also acted as magnets for<br />
<strong>in</strong>-migration from o<strong>the</strong>r prov<strong>in</strong>ces. The prov<strong>in</strong>ces fall<strong>in</strong>g between <strong>the</strong> poorest <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
wealthiest saw <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> poverty r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g from a t<strong>in</strong>y 0.1% <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> Mpumal<strong>an</strong>ga to<br />
a considerably larger 5% <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> North West <strong>an</strong>d 1.3% <strong>in</strong> Free State. These<br />
C<strong>in</strong>derella prov<strong>in</strong>ces exhibit high levels of poverty; but smaller populations <strong>an</strong>d smaller<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial economies lead to lower fiscal allocations, less ‘profile’ <strong>in</strong> discussions about<br />
poverty <strong>an</strong>d limited outputs from target<strong>in</strong>g exercises.<br />
1996 2001 % ch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
Limpopo 50.4 47.1 Down 3.3%<br />
Eastern Cape 48.5 47.6 Down 0.9%<br />
24 SALDRU/World B<strong>an</strong>k: Key <strong>in</strong>dicators of poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (RDP Office, Pretoria, 1995).<br />
38
KwaZulu-Natal 39.5 39.3 Down 0.2%<br />
Mpumal<strong>an</strong>ga 37.1 37.2 Up 0.1%<br />
North West 33 38 Up 5.0%<br />
Free State 31.5 32.8 Up 1.3%<br />
Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Cape 24.3 24.3 No ch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
Gauteng 20.1 20.8 Up 0.7%<br />
Western Cape 14.6 16.7 Up 2.1%<br />
Table 3: Poverty by prov<strong>in</strong>ce 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001<br />
Poverty levels also rose, though less steeply, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wealthiest <strong>an</strong>d most urb<strong>an</strong>ised<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces of Gauteng (up by 0.7%) <strong>an</strong>d Western Cape (2.1%). In <strong>the</strong> latter two cases<br />
poverty was also <strong>in</strong>fluenced by <strong>in</strong>-migration from o<strong>the</strong>r prov<strong>in</strong>ces. For example, <strong>the</strong><br />
2001 census enumerated 8.8 million people <strong>in</strong> Gauteng, almost a fifth of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
total population of 44.8 million, <strong>an</strong>d show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> largest <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> population of all<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> 1996 census. Relative to o<strong>the</strong>r prov<strong>in</strong>ces, Gauteng grew by 1.6% to<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude a fifth (19.7%) of <strong>the</strong> national population.<br />
It is also import<strong>an</strong>t to note <strong>the</strong> startl<strong>in</strong>g differences <strong>in</strong> poverty levels – for both 1996 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
2001 – between <strong>the</strong> wealthiest <strong>an</strong>d poorest prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. For example, <strong>in</strong><br />
1996 poverty <strong>in</strong> Limpopo was more th<strong>an</strong> 3 times higher th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Western Cape. In<br />
2001, poverty levels <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Western Cape were less th<strong>an</strong> half those <strong>in</strong> Mpumal<strong>an</strong>ga <strong>an</strong>d<br />
just more th<strong>an</strong> a third of those <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern Cape. Relative poverty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>equality are<br />
starkly apparent rem<strong>in</strong>ders of our past; <strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong> imperatives that need to shape our<br />
future.<br />
Poverty seemed to be dropp<strong>in</strong>g or steady<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 3 poorest prov<strong>in</strong>ces, rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g steady<br />
<strong>in</strong> a couple more while ris<strong>in</strong>g more or less steeply <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>der. The expectation is<br />
that target<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ISRDP <strong>an</strong>d URP have accounted for <strong>the</strong>se trends, which were<br />
occurr<strong>in</strong>g before ei<strong>the</strong>r programme beg<strong>an</strong> to be implemented, <strong>an</strong>d which dem<strong>an</strong>d more<br />
careful resource allocation decisions th<strong>an</strong> merely target<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 3 poorest prov<strong>in</strong>ces. The<br />
same applies to <strong>in</strong>dividual government departments: are resource allocation decisions<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ISRDP <strong>an</strong>d URP reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g patterns of poverty, or is it still <strong>the</strong><br />
case of <strong>the</strong> bulk of resources go<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> 3 poorest <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>der fight over what is<br />
left?<br />
Poverty <strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>in</strong> nodes <strong>an</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>ces<br />
In Table 4 <strong>the</strong> 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001 poverty scores for each node are set out. In some of <strong>the</strong><br />
URP nodes (marked with *), demarcation made extract<strong>in</strong>g data for <strong>the</strong> node particularly<br />
complex <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> data should be treated with circumspection for 1996; <strong>the</strong> 2001 figures<br />
are accurate. In<strong>an</strong>da, for example, is <strong>an</strong> extremely poor urb<strong>an</strong> node; but extract<strong>in</strong>g<br />
locale-specific data from Census 1996 proved very challeng<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>an</strong>d thus <strong>the</strong> % ch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
<strong>in</strong> poverty levels <strong>in</strong> In<strong>an</strong>da should be treated with caution.<br />
Node 1996 2001 % ch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
ISRDP<br />
OR Tambo 65.4 64.3 Down 1.1%<br />
Umkh<strong>an</strong>yakude 63.8 60.6 Down 3.2%<br />
Alfred Nzo 63.5 65.6 Up 2.1%<br />
Umz<strong>in</strong>yathi 59.7 58.3 Down 1.4%<br />
39
Sekhukhune 56.6 54 Down 2.6%<br />
Zulul<strong>an</strong>d 55.7 53.9 Down 1.8%<br />
Ukhahlamba 55.2 52.8 Down 2.4%<br />
Chris H<strong>an</strong>i 53.8 51.6 Down 2.2%<br />
Bohlabela 53.3 49.6 Down 4.0%<br />
Ugu 50.0 50.7 Up 0.7%<br />
Kgalagadi 50 47.6 Down 2.4%<br />
Thabo Mofuts<strong>an</strong>y<strong>an</strong>e 41.8 40.7 Down 1.1%<br />
Central Karoo 19.2 18.5 Down 0.7%<br />
All ISRDP nodes 56.2 53.7 Down 2.5%<br />
URP<br />
In<strong>an</strong>da* 55.4 40.5 Down 14.9%<br />
Md<strong>an</strong>ts<strong>an</strong>e 32.8 28.6 Down 4.2%<br />
Khayelitsha 31.8 31.5 Down 0.3%<br />
Alex<strong>an</strong>dra 26.5 24.4 Down 2.1%<br />
Galeshewe 23.2 23.4 Up 0.2%<br />
Mitchell's Pla<strong>in</strong>* 22.6 20.3 Down 2.3%<br />
Mo<strong>the</strong>rwell 22.4 30.7 Up 8.3%<br />
KwaMashu* 18.2 24.5 Up 6.3%<br />
All URP nodes 29.2 27.1 Down 2.1%<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 33.6 33.4 Down 0.2%<br />
* Demarcation impact<strong>in</strong>g on data<br />
Table 4: Poverty <strong>in</strong>dex scores for all nodes <strong>an</strong>d <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001<br />
What is immediately apparent is that poverty levels rose <strong>in</strong> just 5 of <strong>the</strong> 21 nodes of <strong>the</strong><br />
ISRDP <strong>an</strong>d URP. This is a quite remarkable f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, given that <strong>the</strong>se are 21 of <strong>the</strong><br />
poorest locales <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country, m<strong>an</strong>y of which are located <strong>in</strong> former homel<strong>an</strong>ds or areas<br />
to which black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns were forcibly removed <strong>an</strong>d which enjoy little economic<br />
growth or prospects of growth.<br />
There are also differential movements among nodes with<strong>in</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces. Measured at<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial level, we saw poverty levels ris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 5 of <strong>the</strong> 9 prov<strong>in</strong>ces, steady <strong>in</strong> 1 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
dropp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 3. Measured at nodal level, however, poverty rose <strong>in</strong> a quarter (5) of <strong>the</strong> 21<br />
nodes, compared with over half of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces. For example, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern Cape,<br />
poverty levels rose <strong>in</strong> Alfred Nzo by 2.1% but dropped <strong>in</strong> O R Tambo by 1.1%,<br />
suggest<strong>in</strong>g that local govern<strong>an</strong>ce is a key variable affect<strong>in</strong>g nodal development, <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
<strong>an</strong>alysis should not be restricted to or even dom<strong>in</strong>ated by what happens <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
or national spheres.<br />
There is also <strong>an</strong> urb<strong>an</strong>/rural difference: poverty rose <strong>in</strong> 3 of 8 urb<strong>an</strong> nodes, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> just 2<br />
of 13 rural ones. This is counter-<strong>in</strong>tuitive, given <strong>the</strong> emphasis on rural poverty <strong>in</strong><br />
political <strong>an</strong>d development discourses <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. It is <strong>the</strong> result of a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />
factors, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g ris<strong>in</strong>g unemployment <strong>an</strong>d ‘jobless growth’ <strong>in</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> centres as well as<br />
migration from rural to urb<strong>an</strong> areas. These trends are <strong>an</strong>alysed <strong>in</strong> greater detail for each<br />
node <strong>in</strong> part II of this report.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong> 2001 poverty levels suggest that with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> URP <strong>an</strong>d ISRDP, some nodes are<br />
worse off th<strong>an</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. In <strong>the</strong> ISRDP, Alfred Nzo, O R Tambo, Umkh<strong>an</strong>yakude,<br />
40
Umz<strong>in</strong>yathi, Sekhukhune <strong>an</strong>d Zulul<strong>an</strong>d all have poverty levels above <strong>the</strong> ISRDP average<br />
of 53.7%. And <strong>the</strong> relative poverty among ISRDP n odes is marked: poverty levels <strong>in</strong><br />
Central Karoo are 3 times lower th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> poorest 4 nodes.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> URP, poverty levels are above <strong>the</strong> programme average <strong>in</strong> In<strong>an</strong>da, Md<strong>an</strong>ts<strong>an</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Khayelitsha. In In<strong>an</strong>da (us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 2001 node-specific data which is more reliable th<strong>an</strong><br />
that of 1996, as we have noted), 4 <strong>in</strong> 10 residents live <strong>in</strong> high poverty, well above o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
urb<strong>an</strong> nodes <strong>an</strong>d mak<strong>in</strong>g it looks far more like a rural th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> node. The 2001 data<br />
suggest that In<strong>an</strong>da should be a priority node with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> URP.<br />
1996 2001 % ch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
Female-headed households 37.8 41.9 Up 4.1%<br />
Illiteracy 33.6 31.5 Down 2.1%<br />
Unemployment 37.6 48.2 Up 10.6%<br />
Income 14.3 23.2 Up 8.9%<br />
Over-crowd<strong>in</strong>g 1.6 2.8 Up 1.2%<br />
Dwell<strong>in</strong>g type 34.5 31.2 Down 3.3%<br />
S<strong>an</strong>itation 49.4 45.2 Down 4.2%<br />
Water 39.3 37.7 Down 1.6%<br />
Light<strong>in</strong>g 41.8 29.8 Down 12.0%<br />
Refuse 45.7 42.8 Down 2.9%<br />
Poverty score 33.6 33.4 Down 0.2%<br />
Table 5: Indicator <strong>an</strong>d overall poverty scores for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, 1996 & 2001<br />
Turn<strong>in</strong>g to look at <strong>the</strong> 10 <strong>in</strong>dicators that make up <strong>the</strong> poverty matrix (<strong>an</strong>d recall<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
high scores are bad <strong>new</strong>s), we see <strong>in</strong> Table 5 that unemployment, lack of regular<br />
household <strong>in</strong>come, <strong>in</strong>cidence of female-headed households <strong>an</strong>d over-crowd<strong>in</strong>g all rose<br />
between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001. These data reflect <strong>the</strong> situation nationally, not just <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 21<br />
nodes. Some of <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>dicators have reached stagger<strong>in</strong>gly high levels – half of<br />
economically active citizens are unemployed, for example – <strong>an</strong>d are key contours of <strong>the</strong><br />
crisis fac<strong>in</strong>g nodes as well as <strong>the</strong> country more broadly. But <strong>the</strong>y must be seen <strong>in</strong><br />
context: o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>dicators show considerable improvement.<br />
Unemployment is a critical national concern. Us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> exp<strong>an</strong>ded def<strong>in</strong>ition of<br />
unemployment – which does not require people to have actively sought work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
period immediately prior to <strong>the</strong> census <strong>in</strong>terview – we f<strong>in</strong>d that unemployment <strong>in</strong> 2001<br />
stood at 48.2% for <strong>the</strong> country as a whole, dramatically up from (<strong>the</strong> already high)<br />
37.6% <strong>in</strong> 1996. Incidence of households with no regular <strong>in</strong>come had also <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
subst<strong>an</strong>tially, from 14.3% <strong>in</strong> 1996 to 23.2% <strong>in</strong> 2001, leav<strong>in</strong>g a quarter of households<br />
without a regular <strong>in</strong>come. Female-headed households – often poorer <strong>an</strong>d more<br />
vulnerable th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir male-headed counterparts – also <strong>in</strong>creased between <strong>the</strong> two<br />
censuses, from 37.8% <strong>in</strong> 1996 to 41.9% <strong>in</strong> 2001. So did <strong>in</strong>cidence of over-crowd<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Taken toge<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>dicate a bleak socio-economic picture for 1 <strong>in</strong> 3 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>dicators give cause for concern but also show evidence of progress <strong>an</strong>d<br />
improvement. Non-removal of refuse (with health <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r implications) by local<br />
authorities rema<strong>in</strong>ed high, but dropped from 45.7% <strong>in</strong> 1996 to 42.8% <strong>in</strong> 2001.<br />
Households without tapped water dropped slowly, down 1.6% over <strong>the</strong> 5 years.<br />
S<strong>an</strong>itation has long been a cause for concern, <strong>an</strong>d showed a 4.2% improvement over <strong>the</strong><br />
5-year period – but still 45% of households lacked proper s<strong>an</strong>itation <strong>in</strong> 2001. These<br />
41
<strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>in</strong>dicators show slow movement – but <strong>the</strong> movement is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> right<br />
direction. So are <strong>in</strong>dicators for illiteracy (down 2.1%) <strong>an</strong>d those for households liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>formal or traditional dwell<strong>in</strong>gs (down 3.3%). Taken toge<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>se are successes for a<br />
government that espouses a basic needs approach <strong>an</strong>d prioritises <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestments.<br />
But <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicators need to be seen toge<strong>the</strong>r. Infrastructure improvements have occurred<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st a backdrop of spirall<strong>in</strong>g unemployment <strong>an</strong>d lack of regular household <strong>in</strong>comes.<br />
Free basic services provided by government are <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t deliverable – although <strong>the</strong><br />
households without water access or connections to <strong>the</strong> grid c<strong>an</strong>not benefit – <strong>an</strong>d need to<br />
be seen from <strong>the</strong> perspective not simply of availability but affordability. It is critical that<br />
all <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns enjoy a better life that <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> government services previously<br />
refused or denied <strong>the</strong>m; but <strong>the</strong>y must be able to access <strong>an</strong>d afford those services as well.<br />
In Table 6 <strong>an</strong>d Table 7 we show <strong>the</strong> scores for each <strong>in</strong>dicator across all 21 nodes. This<br />
data is <strong>an</strong>alysed for each node <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> situation <strong>an</strong>alysis, <strong>an</strong>d is not discussed <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>y detail<br />
here. The po<strong>in</strong>t is that <strong>the</strong> poverty priorities <strong>in</strong> all nodes are visible. For example, refuse<br />
removal is a massive problem <strong>in</strong> every ISRDP node barr<strong>in</strong>g perhaps Thabo<br />
Mofuts<strong>an</strong>y<strong>an</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d Central Karoo – but not a major problem (at least by comparison) <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> nodes. Unemployment is more severe <strong>in</strong> rural th<strong>an</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> nodes – but it is a<br />
massive challenge for all nodes, ISRDP <strong>an</strong>d URP, requir<strong>in</strong>g national not just local<br />
solutions.<br />
42
Fem<br />
ale<br />
Dwelli<br />
Pove<br />
head Illitera Unempl Inco Crowd ng S<strong>an</strong>itat Wat Lighti Refu rty<br />
ISRDP ed cy oy-ment me <strong>in</strong>g type ion er ng se <strong>in</strong>dex<br />
Alfred Nzo 61.2 47.6 77.3 39.3 2.2 72.4 92.8 91.1 77.1 95.2 65.6<br />
O R Tambo 60.9 53.5 76.0 37.6 2.7 69.9 88.9 89.9 71.9 91.5 64.3<br />
Umkh<strong>an</strong>yakude 50.6 54.1 73.9 35.5 5.2 52.4 81.1 82.4 78.9 91.9 60.6<br />
Umz<strong>in</strong>yathi 59.9 54.6 70.5 33.9 3.1 58.0 74.6 74.8 74.1 79.6 58.3<br />
Sekhukhune 58.7 46.4 71.6 39.4 2.5 21.3 91.9 77.7 36.5 93.9 54.0<br />
Zulul<strong>an</strong>d 53.6 47.8 70.3 33.0 3.0 46.2 75.0 70.4 61.2 78.8 53.9<br />
Ukhahlamba 51.4 49.7 63.2 32.3 3.0 39.5 82.5 72.8 57.0 76.5 52.8<br />
Chris H<strong>an</strong>i 53.4 48.5 68.0 32.1 2.2 46.7 74.9 67.6 49.3 72.9 51.6<br />
Ugu 52.4 45.4 60.6 26.7 4.0 43.6 69.2 74.0 51.3 79.4 50.7<br />
Bohlabela 54.8 46.5 68.0 37.7 3.0 16.2 88.5 64.6 24.5 92.2 49.6<br />
Kgalagadi<br />
Thabo<br />
48.2 45.9 57.4 30.4 3.1 27.1 74.5 70.0 41.1 77.9 47.6<br />
Mofuts<strong>an</strong>y<strong>an</strong>e 44.7 38.6 54.7 26.9 2.3 38.6 69.6 38.9 36.4 55.9 40.7<br />
Central Karoo 34.8 36.7 42.1 7.6 1.1 4.2 14.4 6.7 16.2 21.5 18.5<br />
Table 6: Indicators by node, 2001 (ISRDP)<br />
Urb<strong>an</strong><br />
Fema<br />
le<br />
Dwelli<br />
Pover<br />
Re<strong>new</strong>al head Illitera Unempl Inco Crowdi ng S<strong>an</strong>itati Wat Lighti Refu ty<br />
Programme ed cy oy-ment me ng type on er ng se <strong>in</strong>dex<br />
In<strong>an</strong>da 45.1 29.7 66.2 36.4 3.6 50.5 71.7 68.3 29.7 3.9 40.5<br />
Khayelitsha 41.6 22.5 54.1 25.0 2.8 66.6 35.0 38.5 23.9 5.0 31.5<br />
Mo<strong>the</strong>rwell 40.8 23.6 64.5 35.1 2.1 32.0 28.1 29.0 36.6 15.2 30.7<br />
Md<strong>an</strong>ts<strong>an</strong>e 53.3 18.8 66.0 33.0 0.9 25.6 18.6 23.2 41.8 4.6 28.6<br />
KwaMashu 35.8 24.5 61.4 33.4 2.8 24.0 13.7 30.2 15.9 2.9 24.5<br />
Alex<strong>an</strong>dra 32.6 22.1 48.3 26.4 12.7 32.3 12.6 27.3 27.9 1.4 24.4<br />
Galeshewe 45.0 29.1 58.5<br />
Mitchell's<br />
21.6 2.1 21.5 15.7 13.0 20.9 6.2 23.4<br />
Pla<strong>in</strong> 33.8 16.9 39.9 18.5 3.7 23.2 17.8 19.7 18.2 10.9 20.3<br />
Table 7: Indicators by node, 2001 (URP)<br />
43
Conclusion<br />
The data <strong>in</strong> Table 6 <strong>an</strong>d Table 7 highlight <strong>the</strong> priority needs of all ISRDP <strong>an</strong>d URP nodes, at<br />
least those that c<strong>an</strong> be extracted from <strong>the</strong> census (issues such as security, voice, empowerment<br />
<strong>an</strong>d so on are beyond <strong>the</strong> census). It is vital that <strong>the</strong>se priorities underp<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Integrated<br />
Development Pl<strong>an</strong> (IDP) developed for nodes; <strong>an</strong>d that <strong>the</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Growth <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Development Strategy <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r key pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g tools are aligned with <strong>the</strong>se key socioeconomic<br />
priorities (not <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r way round), on <strong>the</strong> assumption that alignment starts from<br />
what is needed on <strong>the</strong> ground to alleviate poverty <strong>an</strong>d works upwards from <strong>the</strong>re.<br />
The data <strong>in</strong> this chapter have highlighted which issues have node-specific characteristics,<br />
which are programme-specific (i.e. urb<strong>an</strong> or rural), which are prov<strong>in</strong>ce-specific, <strong>an</strong>d which<br />
are national challenges requir<strong>in</strong>g national policies, strategies <strong>an</strong>d/or programmes. This is a<br />
key step – to ensure that although URP <strong>an</strong>d ISRDP are both programmes, <strong>the</strong>y do not<br />
automatically <strong>the</strong>refore require programme-wide <strong>in</strong>terventions. Poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 21 nodes will<br />
not be eradicated through a one-size-fits-all set of responses, but based on local needs,<br />
capacities <strong>an</strong>d livelihood strategies that respond to local problems <strong>in</strong> appropriate ways.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, some key questions issue rema<strong>in</strong>. Where are <strong>the</strong> limits of meet<strong>in</strong>g basic needs<br />
through <strong>in</strong>frastructure provision? C<strong>an</strong> poverty eradication focus so strongly on service<br />
provision while <strong>the</strong> redistribution of wealth rema<strong>in</strong>s a policy taboo o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> via ‘free’<br />
marketism or <strong>the</strong> supposed benefits of trickle-down? Who will susta<strong>in</strong>, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d use <strong>the</strong><br />
massive amounts of <strong>in</strong>frastructure that are be<strong>in</strong>g provided, if unemployment <strong>an</strong>d attend<strong>an</strong>t<br />
lack of <strong>in</strong>come cont<strong>in</strong>ues to account for 1 <strong>in</strong> 2 adults? At what po<strong>in</strong>t will this beg<strong>in</strong> to<br />
question <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> young <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n democracy? For some, this is <strong>an</strong>d has been<br />
occurr<strong>in</strong>g for some time; o<strong>the</strong>rs disregard <strong>the</strong> issue entirely. Most thoughtful observers accept<br />
that popular <strong>an</strong>ger is flar<strong>in</strong>g up patchily across <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> – sometimes over evictions,<br />
sometimes aga<strong>in</strong>st ‘foreigners’, sometimes aga<strong>in</strong>st demarcation mov<strong>in</strong>g areas from one<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce to <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r – not so much <strong>in</strong>choate as lack<strong>in</strong>g a coher<strong>in</strong>g focus. But at some po<strong>in</strong>t a<br />
comb<strong>in</strong>ation of social movement activism <strong>an</strong>d local <strong>an</strong>ger will take more concrete <strong>an</strong>d<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ed form th<strong>an</strong> a brief conflagration. When that happens, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which it<br />
<strong>in</strong>tersects with org<strong>an</strong>ised politics <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g call for <strong>an</strong> electable leftw<strong>in</strong>g party to split<br />
off from <strong>the</strong> ANC, will be of profound import<strong>an</strong>ce to <strong>the</strong> entire post-apar<strong>the</strong>id project.<br />
45
5 ‘Tomorrow will be better th<strong>an</strong> today’: delivery <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> age<br />
of hope<br />
By David Hemson<br />
Recent developments <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> have aga<strong>in</strong> highlighted <strong>the</strong> vital import<strong>an</strong>ce of service<br />
delivery; of provid<strong>in</strong>g hous<strong>in</strong>g, water, s<strong>an</strong>itation <strong>an</strong>d electricity to <strong>the</strong> poor. Under apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
<strong>the</strong> black majority was largely excluded from basic services, welfare, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> benefits flow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
from economic growth, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> expectation of freedom has been closely associated with <strong>the</strong><br />
hope that <strong>the</strong>re will be def<strong>in</strong>ite ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir lives. There has been dramatic political<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge with <strong>the</strong> replacement of autocratic rule by <strong>the</strong> white majority by democratic<br />
government by <strong>the</strong> majority, but <strong>the</strong> benefits of power <strong>in</strong> jobs, hous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d basic services<br />
have flowed unevenly. There is even evidence that <strong>the</strong> fundamental <strong>in</strong>equalities which<br />
characterised apar<strong>the</strong>id have deepened dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> period of freedom even as <strong>the</strong>re has been<br />
consistent, although slow, economic growth.<br />
Freedom has come with promises by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n National Congress government of job<br />
creation, water <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation for all, improved delivery of hous<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d exp<strong>an</strong>ded welfare.<br />
Apart from <strong>the</strong> Millennium Development Goals, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imum of social objectives to be met<br />
by <strong>the</strong> poorest countries by 2015, fairly far-reach<strong>in</strong>g promises on <strong>the</strong>se fronts have been made<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Presidency such as halv<strong>in</strong>g unemployment by 2014. These coupled with economic<br />
growth <strong>an</strong>d ris<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>ess confidence, has led <strong>the</strong> President to declare: "Our people are<br />
firmly conv<strong>in</strong>ced that our country has entered its age of hope" (Mbeki, 2006).<br />
aaaaaaaa<br />
In capitalist society as <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, improved hum<strong>an</strong> development is closely associated with<br />
paid employment. Unfortunately <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id period <strong>the</strong>re has been retrenchment <strong>an</strong>d<br />
a decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> employment even as <strong>new</strong> jobs are open<strong>in</strong>g for those black people with adv<strong>an</strong>ced<br />
education <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. For <strong>the</strong> subst<strong>an</strong>tial numbers who had poor education <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id years, conditions have worsened with decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g employment <strong>in</strong> unskilled<br />
work <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g casualisation of <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g jobs. For workers such as <strong>the</strong> dockers of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> port of Durb<strong>an</strong>, for example, <strong>the</strong> years of freedom have been associated with<br />
retrenchment <strong>an</strong>d casualisation <strong>an</strong>d provided few opportunities for tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. These conditions<br />
have been confirmed <strong>in</strong> a recent book by Seek<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d Nattrass (2006) which discusses ris<strong>in</strong>g<br />
differentiation <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> terms of ‘<strong>in</strong>siders’ who have skills <strong>an</strong>d have formal<br />
employment <strong>an</strong>d ‘outsiders’ who lack skills <strong>an</strong>d employment.<br />
The uncerta<strong>in</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>ce of employment <strong>in</strong> jobs has focused political attention on service<br />
delivery to <strong>an</strong> extraord<strong>in</strong>ary extent <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The post-apar<strong>the</strong>id Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Development Programme (RDP) set out a number of promises of ris<strong>in</strong>g levels of services to<br />
<strong>the</strong> poor. If <strong>the</strong>se had been implemented to <strong>the</strong> full this would have compensated to some<br />
extent for <strong>the</strong> harsh socio-economic conditions faced by <strong>the</strong> poorest. The RDP has a vision of<br />
neat houses, electrification, cle<strong>an</strong> water, <strong>an</strong>d toilets as <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>an</strong> improved level of<br />
liv<strong>in</strong>g. Although <strong>the</strong>re has been much improved delivery, <strong>the</strong>re have been two fundamental<br />
problems: first that <strong>the</strong>re has been a considerable <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> number of households <strong>an</strong>d<br />
second that cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g poverty has me<strong>an</strong>t that <strong>the</strong> poor have found it difficult to pay. The<br />
social movements which have raged nation-wide <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> period 2004-05 have had at <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
epicentre <strong>the</strong> problems of cost recovery; <strong>in</strong> particular of resist<strong>an</strong>ce by <strong>the</strong> poorest to be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
disconnected from water services <strong>an</strong>d electricity.<br />
47
One of <strong>the</strong> most signific<strong>an</strong>t developments <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-liberation period is undoubtedly <strong>the</strong><br />
mobilization of communities around <strong>the</strong> issues of service delivery. In m<strong>an</strong>y towns <strong>an</strong>d cities<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Free State, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal <strong>an</strong>d Mpumal<strong>an</strong>ga <strong>in</strong> places<br />
<strong>an</strong>d municipalities familiar <strong>an</strong>d unfamiliar <strong>the</strong>re has been, <strong>an</strong>d often still is, a state of ferment.<br />
People are tak<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> streets dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong>ir immediate needs <strong>in</strong> hous<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d essential services.<br />
Despite a h<strong>an</strong>dsome victory for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n National Congress dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> local government<br />
elections on 1 March 2006, dur<strong>in</strong>g which <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g party was largely uncontested <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
poorest communities, <strong>the</strong> celebrations are of expectations for effective delivery. The poor are<br />
expect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majorities for <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>in</strong> power <strong>in</strong> municipalities to turn to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
adv<strong>an</strong>tage. This has led to <strong>the</strong> problems of delivery dom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g political debate.<br />
The politics of delivery<br />
To <strong>an</strong> extent unparalleled <strong>in</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> politics where service delivery relates to <strong>the</strong> speed at<br />
which telephones are <strong>an</strong>swered <strong>an</strong>d civil serv<strong>an</strong>ts respond to compla<strong>in</strong>ts, <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
service delivery relates to <strong>the</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g of basic needs. In <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id period <strong>the</strong>re has<br />
been a subst<strong>an</strong>tial belief that <strong>the</strong>re has been outst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g progress; government reports on<br />
social progress state confidently that targets will be met <strong>an</strong>d celebrate 10 years of adv<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
This confidence has had <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence on professionals <strong>an</strong>d academics who have reviewed <strong>the</strong><br />
period <strong>an</strong>d concluded that <strong>the</strong> ship of state has forged ahead. In a book which has just<br />
appeared, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> expert concludes that <strong>the</strong> promises of <strong>the</strong> RDP have been<br />
met:<br />
“Most of <strong>the</strong>se targets have now been met <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong>deed, exceeded, although this did not happen<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first five years.” (v<strong>an</strong> Ryneveld, 2006: 171).<br />
Such <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation is, however, underm<strong>in</strong>ed by close exam<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>the</strong> data, <strong>in</strong><br />
unpublicized official documents, <strong>an</strong>d by politici<strong>an</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g party <strong>the</strong>mselves. Just how<br />
far <strong>the</strong> social targets of <strong>the</strong> RDP have fallen short of promises will be taken up below, but<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is evidence of grow<strong>in</strong>g concern with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congress Alli<strong>an</strong>ce that social adv<strong>an</strong>ce is<br />
uneven <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>equality grow<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The upsurge <strong>in</strong> community mobilization comes at a time when government is becom<strong>in</strong>g aware<br />
of just how much more is needed. In <strong>the</strong> State of <strong>the</strong> Nation of February 2005, President<br />
Mbeki added a <strong>new</strong> sense of urgency, to meet objectives he stated: “We need massively to<br />
improve capacities of government.” (Mbeki, February 2005).<br />
In <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> period follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re are two somewhat contradictory sides evident <strong>in</strong><br />
government; a will<strong>in</strong>gness to debate delivery with greater fr<strong>an</strong>kness comb<strong>in</strong>ed with<br />
defensiveness <strong>an</strong>d often repudiation of critical assessments. There has also been discussion of<br />
a revival of <strong>the</strong> RDP whose social objectives are argued to be<strong>in</strong>g facilitated by conservative<br />
macro-economic pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. The revival is, however, largely one of ideas <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>spiration such<br />
as advocacy of <strong>the</strong> “RDP of <strong>the</strong> soul” ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> a repetition of its concrete goals. A detailed<br />
review of <strong>the</strong> precise targets <strong>an</strong>d achievements of <strong>the</strong> RDP shows that <strong>in</strong> key sectors targets<br />
most have yet to be met (Hemson <strong>an</strong>d O’Donov<strong>an</strong>, 2005).<br />
A <strong>new</strong> urgency has been given to implementation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equalities. The<br />
President has said that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> escape from poverty <strong>the</strong> message be<strong>in</strong>g put out by liberated<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is: “at all costs, get rich!” In his concern for <strong>the</strong> goals of social cohesion <strong>an</strong>d<br />
hum<strong>an</strong> solidarity he argued that <strong>the</strong> “revolution of 1994” should not lead to <strong>the</strong> message that<br />
wealth def<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> “worthy citizens” of <strong>the</strong> “liberated <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>” (Mbeki, 2006b).<br />
48
The President was speak<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> elite, <strong>the</strong> top civil serv<strong>an</strong>ts, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong>ly rich <strong>an</strong>d very rich;<br />
this <strong>in</strong>spiration is crucial to a re<strong>new</strong>al of state <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of a majority of <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns who still live <strong>in</strong> poverty. There is a grow<strong>in</strong>g political awareness of <strong>the</strong> contradiction<br />
between <strong>the</strong> enriched elite <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> impoverished members <strong>an</strong>d supporters with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC.<br />
Mbeki has launched <strong>the</strong> Mvuselelo programme to revive <strong>the</strong> ANC br<strong>an</strong>ch structures.<br />
Evidently he feels delivery is be<strong>in</strong>g neglected. Recently, <strong>in</strong> his political review, he said: “If I<br />
were to ask ANC regions <strong>an</strong>d br<strong>an</strong>ches <strong>the</strong> programmes of <strong>the</strong>ir municipalities to eradicate <strong>the</strong><br />
bucket system <strong>an</strong>d ensure access to cle<strong>an</strong> water, I wonder how m<strong>an</strong>y would be able to give a<br />
clear <strong>an</strong>swer as to what <strong>the</strong> pl<strong>an</strong>s are <strong>in</strong> this regard.” (Nyati, August 2006). The debate about<br />
enrichment is evidently <strong>an</strong> attempt to refocus <strong>the</strong> attention of those <strong>in</strong> power on <strong>the</strong> priorities<br />
of <strong>the</strong> poor.<br />
The additional funds available for public <strong>in</strong>vestment have both revived <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> RDP as<br />
well as contribut<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> defence of economic austerity. In a recent publication <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce has strongly defended <strong>the</strong> str<strong>in</strong>gent GEAR policy as contribut<strong>in</strong>g “towards a<br />
culture of social solidarity <strong>an</strong>d of shared responsibility”. In response to <strong>the</strong> critics of GEAR,<br />
he mentioned that “both <strong>the</strong> letter <strong>an</strong>d spirit of <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong> RDP <strong>an</strong>d GEAR<br />
has served <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong>credibly well”. He feels <strong>the</strong>re are, <strong>an</strong>d have been, no contradictions<br />
between GEAR <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> RDP.<br />
The question is whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> greater attention to delivery will help meet ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> promised<br />
targets for a disench<strong>an</strong>ted populace which largely voted for <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g party.<br />
Achievement or under-achievement?<br />
Just where does <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> st<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> terms of delivery <strong>in</strong> houses, water, <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r basic<br />
needs after a decade of GEAR? There are three difficulties <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>swer<strong>in</strong>g this simple question;<br />
firstly <strong>the</strong> right data, secondly demographic ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>an</strong>d thirdly somewhat different sets of<br />
commitments.<br />
Firstly while <strong>the</strong>re are extensive reviews <strong>the</strong> appropriate statistics are not always to h<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
People are <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> actual houses delivered ra<strong>the</strong>r, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>put’ figures of<br />
hous<strong>in</strong>g budgets.<br />
Secondly, one of <strong>the</strong> greatest controversies relates to <strong>the</strong> growth of households which is<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g at a faster pace th<strong>an</strong> population. Between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001, <strong>the</strong> number of <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
households, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>in</strong>creased by 32% from 6,5m to 8,6m over <strong>the</strong> period, <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease of<br />
over 2 million households (Hemson <strong>an</strong>d O’Donov<strong>an</strong>). This is not a small matter as a ris<strong>in</strong>g<br />
number of households put extra dem<strong>an</strong>d on <strong>the</strong> level of service delivery not least with<br />
hous<strong>in</strong>g. The question is whe<strong>the</strong>r this trend is cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g or taper<strong>in</strong>g off.<br />
Thirdly commitments are made <strong>in</strong> different texts: <strong>the</strong> Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development<br />
Program, <strong>the</strong> State of <strong>the</strong> Nation, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Millennium Development Goals (MDG). O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
commitments arise from engagement such as <strong>the</strong> exceptional commitment by M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
Hous<strong>in</strong>g L<strong>in</strong>diwe Sisulu to end slums by 2010. These are variously phrased, have different<br />
deadl<strong>in</strong>es, <strong>an</strong>d are not always directly comparable. O<strong>the</strong>rs are vitally import<strong>an</strong>t, such as <strong>the</strong><br />
MDG target of halv<strong>in</strong>g poverty by 2015 but are not reported on <strong>an</strong>nually by <strong>the</strong> Presidency.<br />
These difficulties apart, where is delivery <strong>in</strong> terms of targets? A bal<strong>an</strong>ce sheet of <strong>the</strong> sectors of<br />
service delivery shows a mixture of progress <strong>in</strong> some sectors <strong>an</strong>d poor delivery <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. In<br />
general <strong>the</strong> data confirms <strong>the</strong> picture of adv<strong>an</strong>ce be<strong>in</strong>g made <strong>in</strong> access to basic services dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> past decade among <strong>the</strong> poorest of <strong>the</strong> poor. Taken by percentages <strong>the</strong>re is evidence of<br />
49
considerable <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> service delivery to <strong>the</strong> poor; <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of electricity by 578%.by <strong>the</strong><br />
poorest <strong>an</strong>d by lesser figures <strong>in</strong> water (Bhorat et al, 2006: 9).<br />
Electricity is a service provision which has been implemented faster th<strong>an</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to social surveys over <strong>the</strong> past 8 years 664 000 households were be<strong>in</strong>g connected<br />
<strong>an</strong>nually, a subst<strong>an</strong>tial <strong>in</strong>crease over <strong>an</strong> earlier period (Hemson <strong>an</strong>d O’Donov<strong>an</strong>, 2005). This<br />
c<strong>an</strong> be contrasted to <strong>the</strong> official delivery target of 300 000 <strong>in</strong> s<strong>an</strong>itation. Where <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
accelerated delivery, targets come with<strong>in</strong> grasp.<br />
In a frequently quoted study provid<strong>in</strong>g data on <strong>the</strong> sharp <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> delivery to <strong>the</strong> poorest,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is evidence that <strong>the</strong> general access to hous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creased by 8% while <strong>the</strong> growth by <strong>the</strong><br />
poorest <strong>in</strong>creased by 28% (Bhorat et al, 2006: 6). Similar statistics are provided for piped<br />
water, electricity, <strong>an</strong>d flush toilets. Certa<strong>in</strong>ly those access<strong>in</strong>g hous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> settlements for<br />
<strong>the</strong> first time <strong>an</strong>d also <strong>the</strong> rural poor, both who would be <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> poor segments of<br />
society have benefited from delivery to a far greater extent th<strong>an</strong> whites <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
suburbs.<br />
Such is <strong>the</strong> good <strong>new</strong>s which needs to be taken <strong>in</strong>to account. Elsewhere unless trends <strong>in</strong><br />
delivery subst<strong>an</strong>tially ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>the</strong> targets <strong>in</strong> hous<strong>in</strong>g, water, s<strong>an</strong>itation, school facilities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
under o<strong>the</strong>r head<strong>in</strong>gs will not be met.<br />
Apart from be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> focus for essential services, hous<strong>in</strong>g is possibly <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gle most<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t factor <strong>in</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g health <strong>an</strong>d well be<strong>in</strong>g. The government states that houses built or<br />
under construction over <strong>the</strong> past 11 years amount to 1.7m, although estimates about those<br />
actually completed appear to be lower. The current backlog, however exceeds this figure. In<br />
2001 <strong>the</strong>re were 1,9m liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>formal settlements while <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister said at <strong>the</strong> Hous<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Indaba that <strong>the</strong> backlog <strong>in</strong> hous<strong>in</strong>g is now 2,4m (Sisulu, 2005). More funds have been voted,<br />
but <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister acknowledges that <strong>the</strong>se will be <strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>an</strong>d a nervous private f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce<br />
sector should make a real commitment.<br />
The statistics demonstrat<strong>in</strong>g high percentage <strong>in</strong>creases of <strong>the</strong> poor access<strong>in</strong>g improved<br />
delivery , however, have to be carefully assessed.<br />
A more critical eye from below <strong>an</strong>d above is be<strong>in</strong>g cast on delivery; <strong>the</strong> question is whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
municipal officials have <strong>the</strong> focus, capacity <strong>an</strong>d resources. Studies have shown that those<br />
municipalities where protests have been most vigorous are also those which have spent more<br />
on salaries <strong>an</strong>d less on capital expenditure <strong>an</strong>d ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce. This is one side of <strong>the</strong> situation,<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r that some competent municipalities are compla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g that sufficient capital fund<strong>in</strong>g is<br />
not be<strong>in</strong>g made available to meet targets.<br />
The protests also show <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g concern about <strong>the</strong> quality as well as <strong>the</strong> qu<strong>an</strong>tity of<br />
delivery; about size of houses as well as <strong>the</strong>ir number, about <strong>the</strong> quality of water as well as<br />
piped water be<strong>in</strong>g available.<br />
The research also shows that progress <strong>in</strong> various sectors has been uneven <strong>an</strong>d has slowed<br />
down over time ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> speeded up. Although <strong>the</strong> ‘pro-poor’ element of delivery is<br />
demonstrated it is also true that <strong>the</strong> phenomenal percentage <strong>in</strong>creases c<strong>an</strong> also be expla<strong>in</strong>ed by<br />
<strong>the</strong> extraord<strong>in</strong>arily low numbers of <strong>the</strong> poorest of black people accessed <strong>the</strong>se services <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
early 1990s; percentages measure rises above very low numbers. Surpris<strong>in</strong>gly for <strong>the</strong> high<br />
level of publicity given to water <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation, <strong>the</strong>re is considerable evidence of a slow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
delivery.<br />
50
The <strong>an</strong>alysis is confirmed by two features. Firstly <strong>the</strong> evidence is that it is also true that<br />
“household services grew at a much faster rate between 1993 to 1999 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n slowed down<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> period 1999 to 2004 (Bhorat et al, 2006: 11). The much criticized GEAR policy came<br />
on stream effectively <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second period, a feature which will be commented on fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
below. Secondly <strong>the</strong> figures show that <strong>the</strong> backlogs <strong>in</strong> services are also disproportionally<br />
represented by <strong>the</strong>se poorest. Among <strong>the</strong> poorest, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, more th<strong>an</strong> 70 per cent lacked<br />
access to a flush toilet <strong>an</strong>d 60 per cent of households did not have access to piped water <strong>in</strong><br />
2004 (Bhorat et al, 2006: 14). The most pro-poor service delivery (unexpectedly because it is<br />
probably <strong>the</strong> most costly to poor people as prepaid meters are extensively used) is <strong>in</strong><br />
electricity which is fairly evenly spread among <strong>the</strong> poor <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> poorest.<br />
The lags <strong>in</strong> delivery evidenced by slower delivery over time <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g backlogs help<br />
confirm that <strong>the</strong> phenomenal percentage <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> delivery have to be measured aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
actual numbers. Although <strong>the</strong> percentage of people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> backlogs has decl<strong>in</strong>ed over time, <strong>in</strong><br />
a number of sectors <strong>the</strong> number has <strong>in</strong>creased. The lags <strong>in</strong> delivery particularly focus on <strong>the</strong><br />
problems <strong>in</strong> effectively upgrad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> lives of <strong>the</strong> poorest <strong>an</strong>d challenge <strong>the</strong> assertion that<br />
targets <strong>in</strong> delivery will be met.<br />
While <strong>the</strong>re cont<strong>in</strong>ues to be general reports of social progress based on uncerta<strong>in</strong> statistics<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is also <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g disclosure, partial <strong>an</strong>d slow, but disclosure none<strong>the</strong>less of difficulties<br />
<strong>in</strong> delivery which po<strong>in</strong>t to subst<strong>an</strong>tial problems. The M<strong>in</strong>ister of Hous<strong>in</strong>g, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, speaks<br />
of ris<strong>in</strong>g delivery but at <strong>the</strong> same time acknowledges that shack hous<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g at a faster pace th<strong>an</strong> before.<br />
Probably more import<strong>an</strong>tly official data on delivery <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> water sector po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />
both <strong>the</strong> modest goals of <strong>the</strong> RDP <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> bolder targets of <strong>the</strong> State of <strong>the</strong> Nation address are<br />
not to be met. At <strong>the</strong> Water Summit held <strong>in</strong> May this year for <strong>the</strong> first time projections were<br />
made of <strong>the</strong> targeted l<strong>in</strong>e of delivery to meet <strong>the</strong> promise of water for all by 2008 <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
projected l<strong>in</strong>e of delivery which shows that <strong>the</strong> target of delivery to 9 million people is only<br />
likely to be met <strong>in</strong> 2013-14.<br />
‘Water for all by 2008’<br />
Target l<strong>in</strong>e of delivery<br />
Source: DWAF, National Water Summit, 2006, p71.<br />
Projected delivery<br />
The divergence between <strong>the</strong> two l<strong>in</strong>es represents <strong>the</strong> gap between promise <strong>an</strong>d delivery <strong>an</strong>d<br />
although it appears not to be enormous, <strong>the</strong>re are doubts whe<strong>the</strong>r delivery at <strong>the</strong> projected date<br />
of 2013-14 will be made if <strong>the</strong>re not considerably greater resources put <strong>in</strong>to delivery <strong>an</strong>d<br />
greater accountability achieved <strong>in</strong> local government. The DWAF document from which <strong>the</strong><br />
51
graph is drawn speaks of entire turnaround to reach <strong>the</strong> 2008 target: a 250% <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong><br />
fund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d 300% <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rate of implementation.<br />
The graph on s<strong>an</strong>itation shows that <strong>the</strong>re are 3.9 million households which still lack adequate<br />
s<strong>an</strong>itation. The target is very unlikely to be met; although <strong>the</strong> target is for delivery to all by<br />
2010, <strong>the</strong> projection on <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g basis of delivery is for this target to be reached by 2015-<br />
16.<br />
‘S<strong>an</strong>itation for all by 2010’<br />
Target l<strong>in</strong>e of delivery<br />
Projected delivery<br />
In <strong>the</strong> high profile water services sector <strong>the</strong>re is a commitment to provide piped water for all<br />
by 2008 <strong>an</strong>d improved s<strong>an</strong>itation for all by 2010. The water target is only three years away;<br />
<strong>an</strong>d needs <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r 2.6m households to be connected or upgraded to reach basic st<strong>an</strong>dards. In<br />
s<strong>an</strong>itation <strong>the</strong> numbers are 4.3m households <strong>in</strong> five years.<br />
The acknowledgement that all is not well <strong>in</strong> water services <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r areas of service delivery<br />
also comes from o<strong>the</strong>r sources. In <strong>the</strong> State of <strong>the</strong> Cities report, (SACN, 2004, p79) it is<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ted out that <strong>the</strong> total access to some levels of service has decl<strong>in</strong>ed. Tak<strong>in</strong>g direct house<br />
connections <strong>the</strong> actual number of households at this level decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> all but two of <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>e<br />
cities surveyed; while 66% of all households <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>e cities had water connected to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
dwell<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong> 2001 this had been reduced to 50%. Delivery has <strong>in</strong>creased but numbers without<br />
basic services have also <strong>in</strong>creased. In some areas “<strong>the</strong> numbers of households without services<br />
has <strong>in</strong>creased at a rate equivalent to, or even faster rate th<strong>an</strong>, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> households<br />
served” (SACN, 2004, 78-79). In short, delivery is tak<strong>in</strong>g place <strong>an</strong>d even speed<strong>in</strong>g up but is<br />
not fast enough to meet dem<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
Recent surveys 25 <strong>in</strong>dicate that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cities, which is where <strong>the</strong> greatest expertise <strong>an</strong>d resources<br />
c<strong>an</strong> be found, <strong>the</strong>re has been a general <strong>in</strong>crease, ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> a decl<strong>in</strong>e, <strong>in</strong> backlogs. This is a<br />
surpris<strong>in</strong>g conclusion as it <strong>in</strong>dicates that <strong>the</strong> municipalities which are best resourced <strong>an</strong>d<br />
m<strong>an</strong>aged are not reach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> targets shortly before <strong>the</strong> national targets are to be met.<br />
An import<strong>an</strong>t example confirms <strong>the</strong> trend. The city m<strong>an</strong>ager of eThekw<strong>in</strong>i Municipality,<br />
regarded as <strong>the</strong> best m<strong>an</strong>aged city <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, recently stated that <strong>the</strong> challenge is to reduce<br />
25 <strong>Det</strong>ailed <strong>an</strong>alysis of population trends <strong>an</strong>d service delivery recently conducted by <strong>the</strong> HSRC on lead<strong>in</strong>g cities <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
52
acklogs to ‘negligible levels’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> next few years (Sutcliffe, 2006, p7) but admitted that this<br />
was not happen<strong>in</strong>g. In <strong>the</strong> period 2003-05 some 27 000 ‘service po<strong>in</strong>ts’ (groups of households<br />
shar<strong>in</strong>g services) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> backlog for services were removed but <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r 31 000 were added;<br />
<strong>the</strong> backlog was not be<strong>in</strong>g reduced.<br />
This is a surpris<strong>in</strong>g development <strong>in</strong> a city usually described with superlatives but apparently<br />
this is not <strong>an</strong> isolated phenomenon as <strong>the</strong> general <strong>an</strong>alysis of cities shows. If <strong>the</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g city is<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g backlogs grow<strong>in</strong>g, what c<strong>an</strong> be <strong>the</strong> experience among <strong>the</strong> less well adm<strong>in</strong>istered?<br />
Slipp<strong>in</strong>g delivery: <strong>the</strong> impact on schools <strong>an</strong>d children<br />
There is a tendency for monitor<strong>in</strong>g of targets to be less rigorous <strong>an</strong>d precise over time; <strong>in</strong> a<br />
sense targets become ‘lost’ ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> ‘missed’. Although <strong>the</strong> RDP is now aga<strong>in</strong> celebrated,<br />
<strong>the</strong> goal of <strong>the</strong> RDP, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce “decent, well-located <strong>an</strong>d affordable shelter for all by <strong>the</strong><br />
year 2003” (ANC, 1994: Hous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d services) are not be<strong>in</strong>g repeated. Similarly, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
unfortunately, targets which formed part of <strong>the</strong> State of <strong>the</strong> Nation are slid<strong>in</strong>g away <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
same way.<br />
The water sector, somewhat similarly to hous<strong>in</strong>g, has set a r<strong>an</strong>ge of targets for delivery which<br />
focus on <strong>the</strong> all-round improvement <strong>in</strong> water services Strategic Framework for Water Serices<br />
(DWAF, 2003). In addition to <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>d targets for delivery <strong>the</strong>re are a multiple set of<br />
concrete <strong>an</strong>d immediate goals for <strong>the</strong> sector. The follow<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong>se are dated:<br />
• All schools have adequate <strong>an</strong>d safe water supply <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation services by 2005<br />
• Hygiene education <strong>an</strong>d wise use of water taught <strong>in</strong> all schools by 2005<br />
• All cl<strong>in</strong>ics have adequate <strong>an</strong>d safe water supply <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation services by 2007<br />
Po<strong>in</strong>ts will be made <strong>in</strong> relation to both <strong>the</strong> first <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> second group. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has<br />
adopted, <strong>in</strong> general, child focused policies <strong>in</strong> health, education, <strong>an</strong>d welfare; <strong>the</strong> difficulty is<br />
<strong>in</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>se are met. In <strong>the</strong> school health area, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>me is ‘healthpromot<strong>in</strong>g<br />
schools’. The difficulty is, firstly, to ensure that schools have sufficient <strong>an</strong>d<br />
operat<strong>in</strong>g services to provide <strong>an</strong> environment which will not end<strong>an</strong>ger children’s health. A<br />
school which does not, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, have adequate water <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation c<strong>an</strong> be argued not to<br />
be health-promot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>deed to be putt<strong>in</strong>g children’s health at risk.<br />
The goals outl<strong>in</strong>ed above certa<strong>in</strong>ly had this <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d. A more immediate target is that every<br />
school should have water <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation by March 2006. Unfortunately <strong>the</strong> goals have not<br />
been met; <strong>in</strong> March 2006, 2 688 schools were identified as hav<strong>in</strong>g no water facilities <strong>an</strong>d 2<br />
238 schools had no s<strong>an</strong>itation. 26 There are <strong>in</strong> addition thous<strong>an</strong>ds of schools which lack<br />
‘adequate’ <strong>an</strong>d ‘safe’ water <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation as <strong>the</strong> number of toilets <strong>an</strong>d water facilities are<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> a state of disrepair or too limited. Similar assessments have been made of adequate<br />
provision of water to cl<strong>in</strong>ics, but unfortunately <strong>the</strong> government website no longer carries<br />
<strong>in</strong>formation on progress <strong>in</strong> this area. 27<br />
26 M<strong>in</strong>ister of Social Development Zola Skweyiya: Social Sector Cluster media brief<strong>in</strong>g, 7 July 2006.<br />
http://www.<strong>in</strong>fo.gov.za/speeches/2006/06071109151002.htm<br />
27 In <strong>the</strong> reports on from <strong>the</strong> Social Cluster <strong>the</strong>re is no longer mention of <strong>the</strong> provision of water to cl<strong>in</strong>ics; <strong>the</strong><br />
evidence is that conditions are improv<strong>in</strong>g but <strong>the</strong> target is not be<strong>in</strong>g met. See<br />
http://www.<strong>in</strong>fo.gov.za/aboutgovt/poa/report/social.htm<br />
53
The legacy of GEAR<br />
In <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> period of economic policy marked by <strong>the</strong> launch of ASGISA <strong>the</strong>re is a tendency<br />
for government m<strong>in</strong>isters to take a st<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly defensive of conservative economic<br />
policies which followed GEAR <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>deed stat<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>se provided <strong>the</strong> surplus for<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> current period.<br />
In <strong>an</strong> article <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC Today M<strong>in</strong>ister M<strong>an</strong>uel wrote: “From 1996 to 2000, spend<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
public services fell by 4.5 per cent <strong>in</strong> real terms. S<strong>in</strong>ce 2000, public spend<strong>in</strong>g has <strong>in</strong>creased by<br />
over 60 percent <strong>in</strong> real terms. The fiscal consolidation of <strong>the</strong> late 1990s has provided <strong>the</strong><br />
resources to accelerate <strong>the</strong> implementation of <strong>the</strong> RDP at a pace even <strong>the</strong> authors could not<br />
have forecast.” (M<strong>an</strong>uel, 2006).<br />
There is evidence from research <strong>an</strong>d from government statements <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> earlier period that <strong>the</strong><br />
cuts <strong>in</strong> public expenditure slowed down delivery <strong>an</strong>d have left a legacy which has been<br />
difficult to turn around.<br />
Firstly from <strong>the</strong> research <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> question it appears that <strong>the</strong>re has been a slow<strong>in</strong>g down of<br />
delivery <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> period 1999-2004 which has allowed backlogs to accumulate. In a number of<br />
government <strong>an</strong>d municipal reports it appears that backlogs have been ris<strong>in</strong>g or, at least, not<br />
decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g as <strong>an</strong>ticipated.<br />
Secondly conservative policies, tended to disrupt <strong>the</strong> momentum of delivery. In short<br />
cutbacks <strong>in</strong> public expenditure both reduced resources available <strong>an</strong>d made <strong>the</strong> implementation<br />
of exist<strong>in</strong>g projects more difficult. A previous M<strong>in</strong>ister of Water Affairs made <strong>the</strong>se follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> 1998:<br />
“Up to now, we have been able to take <strong>the</strong> allocations from previous years <strong>an</strong>d roll <strong>the</strong>m<br />
forward. The tr<strong>an</strong>sition from RDP to MTEF (Medium Term Expenditure Framework) has<br />
now forced government to look at its commitments…I need to state that, at this moment, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
is not enough money on <strong>the</strong> budget to start <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> projects needed to ensure <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uity of<br />
<strong>the</strong> programme <strong>an</strong>d, more import<strong>an</strong>t, to ensure that we achieve <strong>the</strong> objective of hav<strong>in</strong>g all<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns with adequate access to basic water supply by <strong>the</strong> year 2004”. (Asmal, 1998).<br />
The departmental budget, <strong>in</strong>creased slightly <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n more subst<strong>an</strong>tially <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> period up to<br />
1996, <strong>in</strong> accord<strong>an</strong>ce with <strong>the</strong> RDP-related objective of rais<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> DWAF share from 1,28 per<br />
cent to 2,24 per cent of <strong>the</strong> national budget (Schmitz, 1999).<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> larger water projects <strong>in</strong>evitably took longer th<strong>an</strong> a f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial year to complete but<br />
allocations could not be ‘rolled over’, fund<strong>in</strong>g was often not available to keep up <strong>the</strong> impetus.<br />
Reports from <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ces at <strong>the</strong> time spoke of projects hav<strong>in</strong>g to be ab<strong>an</strong>doned before be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
begun or stopped <strong>in</strong> midstream. Certa<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>the</strong> government’s goal, conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> RDP, of<br />
safe water for all <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘medium term’ (2004) was not met.<br />
The ‘stop/start’ process of implementation, start<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of every f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial year<br />
<strong>an</strong>d stopp<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>in</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty, has characterized delivery <strong>in</strong> a number of sectors. This<br />
has tended to disrupt <strong>the</strong> accumulation of capacity over time, particularly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> weaker<br />
municipalities which f<strong>in</strong>d it difficult to m<strong>an</strong>age uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty.<br />
Thirdly, although it is difficult to get a precise estimation of public <strong>in</strong>vestment such as <strong>in</strong><br />
water delivery, it appears <strong>the</strong>re has not been a subst<strong>an</strong>tial <strong>in</strong>crease over time. Expenditure <strong>in</strong><br />
water services does not appear to have risen <strong>in</strong> real terms over <strong>the</strong> past 10 years. As <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister has said, each department or sector provid<strong>in</strong>g services to <strong>the</strong> poor still faces obstacles<br />
<strong>in</strong> rais<strong>in</strong>g expenditure. The <strong>new</strong> period of public f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ces which promises <strong>in</strong>creased public<br />
expenditure seems to have uncerta<strong>in</strong> results.<br />
54
In her speech to <strong>the</strong> Hous<strong>in</strong>g Indaba, M<strong>in</strong>ister Sisulu spelt out <strong>the</strong> “stark reality” that hous<strong>in</strong>g<br />
competes with o<strong>the</strong>r equally press<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>an</strong>ds for fund<strong>in</strong>g. Service delivery is at a turn<strong>in</strong>g<br />
po<strong>in</strong>t; to take <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r example from her speech; if current rates of fund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d urb<strong>an</strong>ization<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>the</strong> backlog will be <strong>the</strong> same <strong>in</strong> ten years time (Sisulu, 2005).<br />
The problem does come back to <strong>the</strong> budgetary allocations <strong>an</strong>d improved delivery systems; is<br />
National Treasury prepared to subst<strong>an</strong>tially <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>the</strong> fund<strong>in</strong>g of service delivery <strong>an</strong>d<br />
municipalities become more responsive to ris<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>an</strong>ds?<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally it does not appear that national pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g budget<strong>in</strong>g is directly l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong> statements<br />
made about targets <strong>in</strong> service delivery. If targets were tied to targets on a year-to-year basis, it<br />
would be clear from <strong>the</strong> budgetary reviews what fund<strong>in</strong>g was available for <strong>an</strong>nual delivery<br />
lead<strong>in</strong>g, step by step, to <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al goal. At present it is not possible to work out what <strong>an</strong>nual<br />
targets exist.<br />
Indeed <strong>in</strong>ternal reviews such as <strong>the</strong> documents provided at <strong>the</strong> National Water Summit note<br />
that dramatic <strong>in</strong>creases of expenditure (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of water from R1.8 billion a year to at least<br />
R4 billion a year) are needed to reach targets. Noth<strong>in</strong>g like this <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> expenditure is<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g discussed. Unfortunately <strong>the</strong> budget<strong>in</strong>g process appears to be piecemeal <strong>an</strong>d opaque,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d it is not possible to see a curve lead<strong>in</strong>g to comprehensive delivery.<br />
Where do <strong>the</strong> problems lie? Government policy sets <strong>the</strong> overall framework for delivery <strong>an</strong>d<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d ris<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong> people <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> targets for delivery requires greater attention<br />
to be paid to budget allocations <strong>an</strong>d oversight.<br />
‘New realism’ or a turn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t?<br />
In a recent review of targets <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> water sector, <strong>the</strong> Water Affairs <strong>an</strong>d Forestry Portfolio<br />
Committee spelt out its <strong>an</strong>xiety that targets would be met. The <strong>in</strong>formation provided by <strong>the</strong><br />
Department tended to confirm <strong>the</strong> arguments made above: that budgets were <strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>an</strong>d<br />
that a number of targets had not been met. The targets were described as “very ambitious <strong>an</strong>d<br />
had sometimes been criticized as too ambitious” but <strong>the</strong> purpose of targets was to “focus <strong>an</strong>d<br />
prioritise”. “Without targets, people would not take water <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation seriously” (PMG,<br />
2006). The implications of <strong>the</strong> statements <strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong> statistics provided is that <strong>the</strong> targets will<br />
not be met; <strong>the</strong>re was discussion of sett<strong>in</strong>g ‘<strong>new</strong> targets’.<br />
The meet<strong>in</strong>g did however, make a reasonably critical exam<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>the</strong> reports <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals concluded that <strong>in</strong> a number of <strong>the</strong> municipalities <strong>an</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>ces targets would not<br />
be met. The Department was, however, not forthcom<strong>in</strong>g about which ones were <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e to<br />
meet targets <strong>an</strong>d which not. As was demonstrated <strong>in</strong> reports from <strong>the</strong> E<strong>the</strong>kw<strong>in</strong>i Municipality,<br />
even <strong>the</strong> best adm<strong>in</strong>istered of <strong>the</strong> cities (<strong>an</strong>d particularly those with rural areas <strong>in</strong>corporated<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>new</strong> boundaries) are fail<strong>in</strong>g to progress towards end<strong>in</strong>g backlogs <strong>an</strong>d meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
national deadl<strong>in</strong>es. If this is <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> best adm<strong>in</strong>istered municipalities, what c<strong>an</strong><br />
be expected from those which are said to lack commitment <strong>an</strong>d capacity?<br />
Unfortunately DWAF did not provide <strong>the</strong> Portfolio Committee with <strong>the</strong> same material which<br />
was circulated at <strong>the</strong> National Water Summit. From <strong>the</strong>ir website it is clear that that <strong>the</strong><br />
skepticism of members of <strong>the</strong> Portfolio Committee about entire prov<strong>in</strong>ces miss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
deadl<strong>in</strong>e appear justified.<br />
The backlogs (DWAF statistics)<br />
55
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce Backlog Backlog as % of<br />
population<br />
KwaZulu-Natal 2,501,360 24<br />
Eastern Cape 1,661,822 25<br />
Limpopo 1,593,963 28<br />
Source: August 2006 figures, DWAF website, Demographics: <strong>Det</strong>ailed National - Population<br />
perspective; accessed 25 August 2006.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> table above KwaZulu-Natal is identified as <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce with <strong>the</strong> largest backlog with<br />
2,5m people, followed by <strong>the</strong> Eastern Cape (1.7m) <strong>an</strong>d Limpopo (1,6m). This is, <strong>in</strong> a sense,<br />
<strong>the</strong> hardcore of <strong>the</strong> backlog reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> graphs above <strong>an</strong>d none of <strong>the</strong>se prov<strong>in</strong>ces c<strong>an</strong> be<br />
expected to reach <strong>the</strong> target of water for all by 2008.<br />
There are two perspectives raised by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g attention be<strong>in</strong>g given to <strong>the</strong> detail of<br />
delivery. The first is that <strong>the</strong> systems of accountability are just beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to start to work –<br />
<strong>an</strong>d face difficulties <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g detailed assessment from <strong>the</strong> Department which is, <strong>in</strong> a sense,<br />
<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terested party. There may be a turn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that more facts will be<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ded <strong>an</strong>d a more thorough exam<strong>in</strong>ation made promise <strong>an</strong>d achievements.<br />
The second is that urg<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>new</strong> targets” before thoroughly exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> reasons why targets<br />
were not met <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>an</strong> opposite tendency; towards blurr<strong>in</strong>g responsibility for <strong>the</strong> delivery.<br />
This approach tends also to be accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by “<strong>new</strong> realism”, that is <strong>an</strong> argument that <strong>the</strong><br />
orig<strong>in</strong>al targets to overcome <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id legacy were too ambitious.<br />
The strongest argument for improved service delivery is to roll back <strong>the</strong> deprivation of<br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id, provide <strong>the</strong> basic services necessary for a decent life, <strong>an</strong>d to reduce poverty. There<br />
are sectors <strong>in</strong> which fairly comprehensive services have been provided, such as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of<br />
child gr<strong>an</strong>ts which have been extended widely throughout <strong>the</strong> country <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>to deep rural<br />
areas.<br />
Access to modern services <strong>in</strong> water, s<strong>an</strong>itation <strong>an</strong>d electricity has subst<strong>an</strong>tially benefited <strong>the</strong><br />
poorest who have seen, for <strong>the</strong> first time, some of <strong>the</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>ces of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> democratic order,<br />
<strong>the</strong> argument here is that this is not complete <strong>an</strong>d that officially prepared data is,<br />
unfortunately, generally not provid<strong>in</strong>g clarity about <strong>the</strong> tasks ahead.<br />
M<strong>an</strong>ag<strong>in</strong>g delivery (as outl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Integrated Development Pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g) should be a process<br />
of identify<strong>in</strong>g needs, draw<strong>in</strong>g up strategies to meet goals, pl<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d budgets, <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>an</strong>d<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ally draft pl<strong>an</strong>s for discussion. The l<strong>in</strong>k between sett<strong>in</strong>g targets, pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g projects <strong>an</strong>d<br />
committ<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce appears to be weak as <strong>the</strong> fund<strong>in</strong>g has often been criticized from outside<br />
government as quite <strong>in</strong>adequate to <strong>the</strong> task. In a number of official reports <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>adequacies<br />
have been confirmed. Unfortunately political oversight has not yet developed to <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
where <strong>the</strong> facts are emerg<strong>in</strong>g clearly <strong>an</strong>d diagnosed through parliamentary committees. At <strong>the</strong><br />
local level public systems of accountability are not as yet ensur<strong>in</strong>g full local report<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
review.<br />
Insufficient political oversight has me<strong>an</strong>t <strong>the</strong>re has not been <strong>an</strong> adequate review of where <strong>the</strong><br />
difficulties were <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past; a lack of sufficient fund<strong>in</strong>g, commitment with<strong>in</strong> those direct<strong>in</strong>g<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrative systems, adequate local capacity, or a lack of public participation. All <strong>the</strong>se<br />
issues have been raised <strong>in</strong> some way or o<strong>the</strong>r from without <strong>an</strong>d with<strong>in</strong> official structures, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
need to be <strong>an</strong>swered.<br />
Increas<strong>in</strong>gly, however, one po<strong>in</strong>t is appears certa<strong>in</strong>. The limits to public expenditure <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
past have focused on work<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> broad medium term expenditure framework <strong>an</strong>d not<br />
on socially necessary expenditure <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> basic service delivery. These limits <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g<br />
problems as evidenced by <strong>the</strong> ‘stop-start’ nature of budget<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial years ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
56
th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> completed projects, po<strong>in</strong>t to just some of <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>swers to <strong>the</strong> question of unrealized<br />
targets.<br />
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57
6 From apar<strong>the</strong>id to neo-liberalism. What happened to <strong>the</strong><br />
ideals of <strong>the</strong> freedom struggle?<br />
By Patrick Bond<br />
Consider <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g way that black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns celebrated <strong>the</strong> tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir freedom: unprecedented <strong>an</strong>ti-government protest. In 2004-05 (over a twelve month<br />
period), roughly 5800 protests were held <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s cities <strong>an</strong>d towns, accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Safety <strong>an</strong>d Security M<strong>in</strong>ister Charles Nqakula (Madlala 2005). Of those, 13 percent were<br />
deemed ‘illegal’. No one has a clear sense of exactly what drives <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>in</strong> various<br />
sett<strong>in</strong>gs to protest 16 times each day every day on average, but griev<strong>an</strong>ces over miserable<br />
lives due to state failure at municipal, prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d national scales are presumably a large<br />
part of <strong>the</strong> story.<br />
The view from Luthuli House is, naturally, very different. React<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>an</strong> unusually strong SA<br />
Communist Party critique of <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id government <strong>in</strong> mid-2006, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n National<br />
Congress claimed,<br />
“The victory of <strong>the</strong> democratic revolution has enabled us radically to alter <strong>the</strong> conditions<br />
affect<strong>in</strong>g capitalist accumulation. It is patently untrue that ‘<strong>the</strong> key features’ of ‘<strong>the</strong> persist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
capitalist accumulation path (<strong>in</strong> our country)... rema<strong>in</strong> those set <strong>in</strong> place over <strong>the</strong> past<br />
century.’ Such import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>terventions as <strong>the</strong> full protection of trade union rights, health <strong>an</strong>d<br />
safety regulations, m<strong>in</strong>imum wages, employment equity <strong>an</strong>d basic conditions of employment,<br />
<strong>the</strong> abolition of migr<strong>an</strong>t labour, <strong>the</strong> various Charters, <strong>the</strong> National Economic Development<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Labour Council (Nedlac) process, <strong>the</strong> system of taxation, etc, me<strong>an</strong> that today’s<br />
conditions for <strong>the</strong> accumulation of capital are radically different from ‘those set <strong>in</strong> place over<br />
<strong>the</strong> past century.’” (ANC 2006).<br />
In reality,<br />
• <strong>the</strong> ‘full protection of trade union rights’ was so tenuous <strong>in</strong> 2006 that <strong>the</strong> Congress of<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Trade Unions warned that <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g party exhibited ‘dictatorial’<br />
tendencies, as police regularly beat workers <strong>an</strong>d community activists <strong>an</strong>d denied <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
rights to demonstrate;<br />
• health <strong>an</strong>d safety regulations may have streng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory but <strong>in</strong> practice<br />
understaff<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d captive regulation denuded <strong>the</strong>m of me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g;<br />
• m<strong>in</strong>imum wages were so m<strong>in</strong>imal as to fall m<strong>an</strong>y times below a liv<strong>in</strong>g wage;<br />
• <strong>the</strong> migr<strong>an</strong>t labour system, far from be<strong>in</strong>g abolished, was a way of life for <strong>an</strong> estimated<br />
fifth of <strong>the</strong> workforce;<br />
• to <strong>the</strong>ir critics, <strong>the</strong> various summits, Charters <strong>an</strong>d Nedlac declarations me<strong>an</strong>t little if<br />
<strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d simply wasted <strong>the</strong> time of particip<strong>an</strong>ts, coopt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong>to long<br />
corporatist negotiations with nonsubst<strong>an</strong>tive results;<br />
• <strong>the</strong> tax code became much more capital-friendly th<strong>an</strong> under apar<strong>the</strong>id, with primary<br />
corporate taxes cut dramatically (from 48 percent <strong>in</strong> 1994 to 30 percent <strong>in</strong> 1999,<br />
although a dividends tax was added), <strong>an</strong>d Pretoria also offered tax concessions ma<strong>in</strong>ly<br />
to higher-<strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns worth R75 billion <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first ten years of<br />
liberation (offsett<strong>in</strong>g by m<strong>an</strong>y times a <strong>new</strong> capital ga<strong>in</strong>s tax), while <strong>the</strong> regressive,<br />
controversial Value Added Tax – which catalysed a massive 1991 strike - was also<br />
reta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id era <strong>an</strong>d repeated popular dem<strong>an</strong>ds for a tiered system to<br />
redress <strong>in</strong>equity <strong>in</strong> that tax or to zero-rate essential commodities were ignored.<br />
59
An extended critique along <strong>the</strong>se l<strong>in</strong>es came recently from John Pilger’s (2006) <strong>an</strong>alysis of<br />
post-apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (<strong>an</strong> excerpt from his book Freedom Next Time):<br />
“Almost half <strong>the</strong> population lives <strong>in</strong> poverty, with 22 million people described as ‘desperate’<br />
<strong>an</strong>d ‘5,3 million <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n children … suffer<strong>in</strong>g from hunger’. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> United<br />
Nations Development Programme, all <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicators of poverty <strong>an</strong>d unemployment have<br />
shown signific<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>creases s<strong>in</strong>ce 1995.<br />
It is often quite surreal. Driv<strong>in</strong>g away from <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong> very poor you arrive <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d of<br />
<strong>the</strong> very rich. In <strong>the</strong> Cape, as <strong>in</strong> KwaZulu-Natal, hunched, scabrous terra<strong>in</strong> gives way to a vast<br />
white-owned garden, as if you have been spirited to <strong>the</strong> lush green fields of sou<strong>the</strong>rn Engl<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
In September 2005, a comprehensive study was presented to <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n parliament<br />
that compared <strong>the</strong> treatment of l<strong>an</strong>dless black farmers under apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>an</strong>d today. Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
f<strong>in</strong>al decade of apar<strong>the</strong>id, 737 000 people were evicted from white-owned farml<strong>an</strong>d. In <strong>the</strong><br />
first decade of democracy, 942 000 were evicted. Almost half of those forcibly removed were<br />
children <strong>an</strong>d almost a third were women.<br />
A law me<strong>an</strong>t to protect <strong>the</strong>se people <strong>an</strong>d put <strong>an</strong> end to peonage, <strong>the</strong> Security of Tenure Act,<br />
was enacted by <strong>the</strong> M<strong>an</strong>dela government <strong>in</strong> 1997. That year, Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela told me: ‘We<br />
have done someth<strong>in</strong>g revolutionary, for which we have received no credit at all. There is no<br />
country where labour ten<strong>an</strong>ts have been given <strong>the</strong> security we have given <strong>the</strong>m. A farmer<br />
c<strong>an</strong>not just dismiss <strong>the</strong>m.’ The law proved a sham. N<strong>in</strong>ety-n<strong>in</strong>e percent of evictions never<br />
reached <strong>the</strong> courts…<br />
‘We seek to establish,’ said Trevor M<strong>an</strong>uel, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ister of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce, ‘<strong>an</strong> environment <strong>in</strong> which<br />
w<strong>in</strong>ners flourish.’ Hav<strong>in</strong>g metamorphosed from long-haired biker <strong>an</strong>d Cape Flats activist to<br />
<strong>the</strong> very model of a born-aga<strong>in</strong> capitalist, M<strong>an</strong>uel boasted of a deficit so low it had fallen<br />
almost to <strong>the</strong> level of Europe<strong>an</strong> economies, with m<strong>in</strong>imal public spend<strong>in</strong>g to match <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
dedication to ‘economic growth’, <strong>the</strong> euphemism for a profit-<strong>in</strong>spired economy.<br />
There was someth<strong>in</strong>g very str<strong>an</strong>ge about all this. Was this a country of corporate hustlers<br />
celebrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir arc<strong>an</strong>e deals <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> volum<strong>in</strong>ous bus<strong>in</strong>ess pages: of Harvard-tra<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
technocrats break<strong>in</strong>g open <strong>the</strong> champagne at <strong>the</strong> latest credit rat<strong>in</strong>g from Duff & Phelps <strong>in</strong><br />
New York? Or was it a country of deeply impoverished men, women <strong>an</strong>d children without<br />
cle<strong>an</strong> water <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation, whose <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite hum<strong>an</strong> resource was be<strong>in</strong>g repressed <strong>an</strong>d wasted yet<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>? How did this happen?...<br />
The question begs: what exactly was <strong>the</strong> deal struck between <strong>the</strong> ANC leadership <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
fascist Broederbond that stood beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id regime? What had M<strong>an</strong>dela <strong>an</strong>d Mbeki<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r exiles <strong>in</strong> Zambia offered? What role had <strong>the</strong> Americ<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational capital<br />
played?<br />
In 1985, apar<strong>the</strong>id suffered two disasters: <strong>the</strong> Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg stock market crashed <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
regime defaulted on its mount<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational debt. The chiefta<strong>in</strong>s of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n capital<br />
took fright; <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> September that year a group led by Gav<strong>in</strong> Relly, chairm<strong>an</strong> of <strong>the</strong> Anglo<br />
Americ<strong>an</strong> Corporation, met Oliver Tambo, <strong>the</strong> ANC president, <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r resist<strong>an</strong>ce officials,<br />
<strong>in</strong> Zambia.<br />
Their message was that a ‘tr<strong>an</strong>sition’ from apar<strong>the</strong>id to a black-governed liberal democracy<br />
was possible if ‘order’ <strong>an</strong>d ‘stability’ were guar<strong>an</strong>teed… The unspoken deal was that whites<br />
would reta<strong>in</strong> economic control <strong>in</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge for black majority rule: <strong>the</strong> ‘crown of political<br />
power’ for <strong>the</strong> ‘jewel of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n economy’, as Professor Ali Mazrui put it.<br />
Over <strong>the</strong> course of three years, half a dozen critical decisions were made by a small group<br />
around Thabo Mbeki (who was advis<strong>in</strong>g M<strong>an</strong>dela), M<strong>an</strong>uel <strong>an</strong>d Alec Erw<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> trade<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ister.<br />
These were: <strong>in</strong> 1992, to drop nationalisation, which had been <strong>an</strong> ANC pledge reiterated by<br />
M<strong>an</strong>dela; <strong>in</strong> 1993, to endorse <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id regime’s agreement to jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> General Agreement<br />
on Tariffs <strong>an</strong>d Trade (GATT), which effectively surrendered economic <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong><br />
60
<strong>the</strong> same year, to repay <strong>the</strong> $25 billion of apar<strong>the</strong>id-era <strong>in</strong>herited foreign debt, gr<strong>an</strong>t <strong>the</strong><br />
Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k formal <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>an</strong>d accept lo<strong>an</strong>s from <strong>the</strong> International Monetary Fund;<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> 1995, to abolish exch<strong>an</strong>ge controls, which allowed wealthy whites to take <strong>the</strong>ir capital<br />
overseas. Economic apar<strong>the</strong>id was solidified.<br />
When I met FW de Klerk <strong>in</strong> London <strong>in</strong> 1998, I said: ‘You ensured <strong>the</strong> white population had to<br />
make no subst<strong>an</strong>tial ch<strong>an</strong>ges; <strong>in</strong> fact, m<strong>an</strong>y are better off. Didn’t you really w<strong>in</strong>?’<br />
It was as if a secret truth had been put to him. Wav<strong>in</strong>g away <strong>the</strong> smoke of <strong>an</strong> ever-present<br />
cigarette, he said: ‘It is true that our lives have not fundamentally ch<strong>an</strong>ged. We c<strong>an</strong> still go to<br />
<strong>the</strong> cricket at Newl<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>an</strong>d watch <strong>the</strong> rugby. We are do<strong>in</strong>g okay.’<br />
‘For <strong>the</strong> majority, <strong>the</strong> poverty has not ch<strong>an</strong>ged, has it?’ I said.<br />
Warm<strong>in</strong>g to this implied criticism of <strong>the</strong> ANC, he agreed that his most endur<strong>in</strong>g achievement<br />
was to have h<strong>an</strong>ded on his regime’s economic policies, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> same corporate<br />
bro<strong>the</strong>rhood. He spoke about blacks who ‘now live <strong>in</strong> big houses’ as <strong>the</strong> beneficiaries of<br />
‘affirmative action’.<br />
‘Isn’t that <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uation of apar<strong>the</strong>id by o<strong>the</strong>r me<strong>an</strong>s?’<br />
At this, he beamed. ‘You must underst<strong>an</strong>d, we’ve achieved a broad consensus on m<strong>an</strong>y th<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
now.’”<br />
One lead<strong>in</strong>g politici<strong>an</strong> wrote back a fortnight later: Pilger loses plot <strong>in</strong> quest for drama (Sunday<br />
Independent, August 13, 2006) From: Trevor M<strong>an</strong>uel, M<strong>in</strong>ister of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce:<br />
“John Pilger, <strong>in</strong> his article, ‘Reich is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shadows, but still <strong>in</strong> control’ (Sunday Independent,<br />
July 30), draws exaggerated <strong>an</strong>d flawed conclusions which c<strong>an</strong>not go unchallenged.<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns opted for a negotiated settlement, ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> vortex of civil war, <strong>an</strong>d for<br />
redistribution through reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d development, ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> through conquest. Hence<br />
<strong>the</strong> great disillusion<strong>in</strong>g of Pilger, for whom democracy was apparently expected to br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong><br />
end to capitalism, <strong>an</strong>d who sees conspiracy <strong>an</strong>d fascism beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g suggestive of<br />
compromise or tr<strong>an</strong>sition. But <strong>the</strong> reality for ord<strong>in</strong>ary people is that <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong> hous<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
water, electrification, tr<strong>an</strong>sport <strong>an</strong>d communication, ris<strong>in</strong>g spend<strong>in</strong>g on social services <strong>an</strong>d<br />
broaden<strong>in</strong>g participation <strong>in</strong> a grow<strong>in</strong>g economy, are steadily br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g dignity <strong>an</strong>d opportunity,<br />
where <strong>the</strong>re was formerly misery <strong>an</strong>d vulnerability. His claim that <strong>the</strong> ANC government has<br />
opted for ‘m<strong>in</strong>imal public spend<strong>in</strong>g’ c<strong>an</strong>not go unchallenged. Here are <strong>the</strong> facts Pilger<br />
chooses to ignore:<br />
• Non-<strong>in</strong>terest government spend<strong>in</strong>g is a larger share of gross domestic product th<strong>an</strong> it<br />
was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, while social services <strong>an</strong>d hous<strong>in</strong>g have <strong>in</strong>creased from 50<br />
percent of <strong>the</strong> total to 60 percent currently.<br />
• More th<strong>an</strong> 700 <strong>new</strong> health cl<strong>in</strong>ics have been constructed, 215 mobile cl<strong>in</strong>ics established<br />
<strong>an</strong>d charges for public health services have largely been removed for poor people.<br />
• The child-support gr<strong>an</strong>t programme has added about 7 million <strong>new</strong> beneficiaries to <strong>the</strong><br />
social security system.<br />
• Water has been supplied to 10 million people, s<strong>an</strong>itation facilities to more th<strong>an</strong> 6 million<br />
people, electricity to about 16 million - f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced by <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
• More th<strong>an</strong> 3 million hectares of l<strong>an</strong>d has been redistributed, benefit<strong>in</strong>g about 700 000<br />
households, <strong>an</strong>d budget allocations for l<strong>an</strong>d now run well ahead of spend<strong>in</strong>g capacity.<br />
• School education is now near universal, <strong>the</strong> literacy rate of 15- to 24-year-olds has<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased from 83 percent a decade ago to more th<strong>an</strong> 96 percent now, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> extensive<br />
<strong>new</strong> skills-development fund<strong>in</strong>g programme has been established.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 2002/03, spend<strong>in</strong>g on public services has <strong>in</strong>creased by more th<strong>an</strong> 8 percent a year <strong>in</strong><br />
real terms (adjusted for <strong>in</strong>flation), <strong>an</strong>d this year’s budget provides for 9,7 percent real growth.<br />
The largest <strong>in</strong>creases are <strong>in</strong> social security <strong>an</strong>d welfare, hous<strong>in</strong>g, community development,<br />
health <strong>an</strong>d education. These spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creases have been made possible by improved<br />
61
economic growth <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> steadily decreas<strong>in</strong>g burden of debt costs. Yet Pilger disparages <strong>the</strong>se<br />
policies as reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> ANC leadership that is ‘ashamed that most of <strong>the</strong>ir people live <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Third World’. The ANC has opted for growth, supported by pragmatic fiscal <strong>an</strong>d monetary<br />
policies, precisely because <strong>the</strong>se are necessary strategies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> war aga<strong>in</strong>st poverty <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>dignity. For <strong>the</strong> record, I was nei<strong>the</strong>r a ‘long-haired biker’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s, nor am I a ‘bornaga<strong>in</strong><br />
capitalist’ now. But why quibble at <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ces of Pilger’s unbounded<br />
<strong>in</strong>ventiveness.”<br />
The po<strong>in</strong>ts above are repeatedly made <strong>in</strong> defense of liberation ideals, e.g. <strong>in</strong> most detail <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
government’s Towards a Ten-Year Review document produced shortly before <strong>the</strong> 2004<br />
election. Here are a few reality checks.<br />
First, as even Statistics SA admits, what was amongst <strong>the</strong> world’s worst <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong>equality<br />
r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gs actually got worse after 1994. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>an</strong> October 2002 report, <strong>in</strong> real terms,<br />
average black ‘<strong>Africa</strong>n’ household <strong>in</strong>come fell 19 percent from 1995-2000 (to <strong>the</strong> purchas<strong>in</strong>gpower<br />
parity level of $3,714/year), while white household <strong>in</strong>come was up 15 percent (to<br />
$22,600/year). For <strong>the</strong> entire 1994-2004 period, <strong>the</strong> fall <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>in</strong>come was no doubt much<br />
greater th<strong>an</strong> 19 percent; <strong>an</strong>d, no doubt, whites received far more th<strong>an</strong> a 15 percent <strong>in</strong>come<br />
boost dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> full decade of ‘liberation’. Not just relative but absolute poverty <strong>in</strong>tensified,<br />
as households earn<strong>in</strong>g less th<strong>an</strong> $90 of real <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong>creased from 20 percent of <strong>the</strong><br />
population <strong>in</strong> 1995 to 28 percent <strong>in</strong> 2000. Across <strong>the</strong> racial divides, <strong>the</strong> poorest half of all<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns earned just 9.7 percent of national <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong> 2000, down from 11.4 percent <strong>in</strong><br />
1995. The richest 20 percent earned 65 percent of all <strong>in</strong>come (Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2002).<br />
In late 2003, Pretoria decided to tackle critics who argued that <strong>the</strong> ANC government was<br />
creat<strong>in</strong>g poverty through its macroeconomic policies. Government ideologue Joel<br />
Netshitenzhe <strong>an</strong>d policy <strong>an</strong>alyst Andrew Merrifield relied upon Stellenbosch University<br />
professor Servaas v<strong>an</strong> der Berg, who also consulted to <strong>the</strong> World B<strong>an</strong>k. V<strong>an</strong> der Berg tweaked<br />
<strong>the</strong> ‘G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient’ (<strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> measure of <strong>in</strong>equality) by measur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> impact of state<br />
spend<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> ‘social wage’ <strong>an</strong>d draw<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ferences for <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake of<br />
government redistribution. Before this exercise, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> UNDP, <strong>the</strong> G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient<br />
had risen from 0.59 to 0.64, with <strong>the</strong> Eastern Cape <strong>an</strong>d Free State record<strong>in</strong>g levels above 0.65<br />
(United Nations Development Programme 2003). In contrast, V<strong>an</strong> der Berg determ<strong>in</strong>ed that<br />
between 1993 <strong>an</strong>d 1997, social spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creased for <strong>the</strong> poorest 60 percent of households,<br />
especially <strong>the</strong> poorest 20 percent <strong>an</strong>d especially <strong>the</strong> rural poor, <strong>an</strong>d decreased for <strong>the</strong> 40<br />
percent who were better off, lead<strong>in</strong>g to a one-third improvement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient.<br />
Merrifield borrowed <strong>the</strong> methodology <strong>an</strong>d updated it, arriv<strong>in</strong>g at a 41 percent improvement <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> G<strong>in</strong>i from <strong>the</strong> 1994 base year.<br />
In addition, v<strong>an</strong> der Berg <strong>an</strong>d Merrifield neglected to measure <strong>the</strong> non-social spend<strong>in</strong>g<br />
patterns of <strong>the</strong> state; m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong>se were directed <strong>in</strong>to ‘corporate welfare’ such as foregone<br />
revenues th<strong>an</strong>ks to generous tax cuts to <strong>the</strong> rich <strong>an</strong>d corporations, a <strong>new</strong> generation of costly<br />
export-<strong>in</strong>centive subsidy schemes (especially for <strong>the</strong> motor <strong>in</strong>dustry), <strong>an</strong>d vast <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong><br />
mega-projects such as Coega or <strong>the</strong> Lesotho Highl<strong>an</strong>ds Water Project whose merits for <strong>the</strong><br />
poor are more negative th<strong>an</strong> positive (Bond 2002). Indeed, as a share of total state capital<br />
expenditure, <strong>the</strong> categories economic <strong>in</strong>frastructure (roads, bridges, dams, electricity <strong>an</strong>d<br />
water supply), <strong>an</strong>d economic services (bus<strong>in</strong>ess enterprises not <strong>in</strong>cluded above) rose dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
1995-2002 from 61.3 percent to 67.6 percent (approximately R16 billion <strong>in</strong> 2002), while<br />
social <strong>in</strong>frastructure (schools, hospitals <strong>an</strong>d adm<strong>in</strong>istrative services) fell from 38.7 percent to<br />
33.4 percent (R8 billion) (UNDP 2003, Appendix 12). S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> subcategories of electricity<br />
<strong>an</strong>d water were fall<strong>in</strong>g as a share of national output dur<strong>in</strong>g this period, that <strong>the</strong> major ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong><br />
‘economic <strong>in</strong>frastructure’ were based upon mega-project <strong>in</strong>vestments. By <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g not just<br />
capital <strong>in</strong>vestment but also non-capital spend<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> category ‘economic services’ rose from<br />
62
9 percent of <strong>the</strong> state budget <strong>in</strong> 1998/99 to 13 percent <strong>in</strong> 2003/04, while welfare rose from 12<br />
percent to 15 percent dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> same years. O<strong>the</strong>r major (non-<strong>in</strong>terest) budget categories <strong>in</strong><br />
2003/04 were education at 20 percent, ‘protection’ (police <strong>an</strong>d army) at 17 percent, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
healthcare at 11 percent - all of which experienced negligible ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> spend<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>the</strong><br />
prior five years.<br />
Data <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>an</strong>d measur<strong>in</strong>g biases aside, <strong>an</strong> even larger methodological question arises<br />
about <strong>the</strong> merits of adjust<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong>dex with state social-services subsidies.<br />
As Cosatu economist Neva Makgetla (2003) put it, ‘We have to ask ourselves whe<strong>the</strong>r this is<br />
a useful way to underst<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> redistributive function of <strong>the</strong> state. After all, <strong>in</strong> most countries,<br />
government plays a signific<strong>an</strong>t redistributive function. But that is not all <strong>the</strong> same, <strong>in</strong> social or<br />
economic terms as improv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>come distribution. For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, suppose a household’s<br />
monthly <strong>in</strong>come is R1,000, or R12,000 for <strong>the</strong> year. If <strong>the</strong> family has four children <strong>in</strong> school<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are gett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> extra R12,000 from <strong>the</strong> state, doubl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>come. But does that help us<br />
underst<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> economic difficulties <strong>the</strong>y face <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> short run? After all, it won’t put food on<br />
<strong>the</strong> table. ’ This is no mere sem<strong>an</strong>tic quibble, for <strong>the</strong> G<strong>in</strong>i is one of only two widely accepted<br />
comparison po<strong>in</strong>ts for countries, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity of <strong>the</strong> base data should be beyond dispute.<br />
Regardless of whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> v<strong>an</strong> der Berg/Merrifield adjustment comb<strong>in</strong>es apples <strong>an</strong>d or<strong>an</strong>ges,<br />
<strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r profound question emerges: were <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id state social subsidies do<strong>in</strong>g what<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong>tended to do, namely lift<strong>in</strong>g lower-<strong>in</strong>come people out of poverty? In ask<strong>in</strong>g this<br />
question, a variety of o<strong>the</strong>r problems associated with <strong>the</strong> Ten-Year Review c<strong>an</strong> be tested:<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r social gr<strong>an</strong>ts are satisfactory; whe<strong>the</strong>r cost-recovery is be<strong>in</strong>g imposed, by stealth, on<br />
recipients of state services; whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> state’s potentially vast job-creat<strong>in</strong>g capacity is be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
utilised; whe<strong>the</strong>r hous<strong>in</strong>g, l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d services are <strong>in</strong>deed be<strong>in</strong>g delivered at <strong>the</strong> rates claimed;<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r women’s status is improv<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>an</strong>d whe<strong>the</strong>r sufficient funds are be<strong>in</strong>g spent on social<br />
services. We c<strong>an</strong> consider each of <strong>the</strong>se questions <strong>in</strong> turn.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Ten-Year Review, recipients of social gr<strong>an</strong>ts rose from 2.6 million to 6.8<br />
million, with a result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> spend<strong>in</strong>g from R10 billion to R34.8 billion: ‘The poorest<br />
20 percent of households receive <strong>the</strong> largest amount from gr<strong>an</strong>ts. The difference <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>ts<br />
make on <strong>the</strong> lives of <strong>the</strong>se people is profound. It is estimated that without <strong>the</strong> social gr<strong>an</strong>ts<br />
almost 56 percent of <strong>the</strong> elderly would be liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> poverty <strong>an</strong>d 38 percent <strong>in</strong> what is known<br />
as ‘ultra-poverty’. With <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>ts, this falls to 23 percent <strong>an</strong>d 2.5 percent respectively’ (<strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Presidency 2003, p.18).<br />
The figures are impressive, but rife with difficulties once we consider <strong>the</strong> practicalities of<br />
state delivery systems, as po<strong>in</strong>ted out by <strong>the</strong> Committee of Inquiry <strong>in</strong>to a Comprehensive<br />
Social Security System (2002) chaired by Vivien Taylor. Thus, accord<strong>in</strong>g to University of<br />
KwaZulu-Natal researchers N<strong>in</strong>a Hunter, Juli<strong>an</strong> May <strong>an</strong>d Vishnu Padayachee (2003, p.20),<br />
“The uptake of some of <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>ts is hampered by complicated adm<strong>in</strong>istrative processes that<br />
may prevent m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong> eligible from access<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>ts. In order to access <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>ts<br />
identity documents <strong>an</strong>d birth certificates <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of children are amongst <strong>the</strong> documents<br />
required by district level welfare offices. However, m<strong>an</strong>y of those liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> rural areas do not<br />
have <strong>the</strong>se documents, which are obta<strong>in</strong>able from <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r Government department that is<br />
experienc<strong>in</strong>g efficiency <strong>an</strong>d capacity problems, <strong>the</strong> Department of Home Affairs. Unlike <strong>the</strong><br />
welfare offices, <strong>the</strong> Department of Home Affairs is not decentralised, although more recently<br />
efforts are be<strong>in</strong>g made to reach rural areas through <strong>the</strong> use of mobile units.”<br />
As Hunter, May <strong>an</strong>d Padayachee (2003, p.20) remark, <strong>the</strong> ability of <strong>the</strong>se me<strong>an</strong>s-tested<br />
programmes to target <strong>the</strong>ir beneficiaries is impossible given <strong>the</strong> desperation faced by so m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
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low-<strong>in</strong>come rural people: ‘The old age pension <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has become a safety net for<br />
non-target groups, [<strong>an</strong>d is] particularly… import<strong>an</strong>t for <strong>the</strong> well-be<strong>in</strong>g of children <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
pension-receiv<strong>in</strong>g households.’ In general, <strong>the</strong>y summarise,<br />
“The gr<strong>an</strong>ts do not provide comprehensive coverage for those <strong>in</strong> need. Unless <strong>the</strong>y are able to<br />
access <strong>the</strong> disability gr<strong>an</strong>t, adults are largely excluded from this framework of assist<strong>an</strong>ce. It is<br />
only possible for <strong>the</strong> UIF to be received by <strong>the</strong> unemployed for a maximum of six months <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong>n only by those who were registered with <strong>the</strong> Fund, for <strong>the</strong> most part <strong>the</strong> formally<br />
employed. In fact, some of <strong>the</strong> poorest households are those conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g adults <strong>an</strong>d children <strong>in</strong><br />
which no one receives a gr<strong>an</strong>t. The Taylor Committee describes <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s social security<br />
system as nei<strong>the</strong>r adequate nor comprehensive. At present, <strong>the</strong>re is no <strong>in</strong>come support<br />
programme for children between <strong>the</strong> ages of n<strong>in</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d 18, adults between 18 <strong>an</strong>d 59 <strong>an</strong>d no<br />
general assist<strong>an</strong>ce for households where no one is employed. In addition, <strong>the</strong> Taylor<br />
Committee found that much of what is referred to as social security derives from <strong>the</strong><br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> concept which has as its fundamental assumption that social security would develop<br />
around formal sector employment.”<br />
A project not yet attempted would be to dissect each of <strong>the</strong> social spend<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>e items <strong>an</strong>d<br />
determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> biases associated with state policy <strong>an</strong>d budget<strong>in</strong>g. For example, accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Hunter, May <strong>an</strong>d Padayachee (2003, p.25), Pretoria’s spend<strong>in</strong>g on public education is<br />
def<strong>in</strong>itely not,<br />
“pro-poor, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> share go<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> poor <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> ultra-poor is subst<strong>an</strong>tially smaller th<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ir share of <strong>the</strong> population. In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> education should be free, but <strong>in</strong> practice schools<br />
require school fees <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r costs (such as uniforms, school books <strong>an</strong>d stationery, tr<strong>an</strong>sport<br />
to school) are mak<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly more difficult for <strong>the</strong> poorest to access basic education.<br />
A clear strategy from Government is required <strong>in</strong> this regard, as it is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly evident from<br />
<strong>the</strong> delivery of o<strong>the</strong>r services, particularly health care, that user fees <strong>an</strong>d tr<strong>an</strong>sport costs are<br />
hamper<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> access to <strong>the</strong>se services of those most <strong>in</strong> need.”<br />
If <strong>in</strong> education <strong>an</strong>d healthcare <strong>the</strong> problem of user-fees reduces <strong>the</strong> benefits of state spend<strong>in</strong>g<br />
for very poor people, <strong>the</strong> same is even more true <strong>in</strong> consumables such as water, electricity <strong>an</strong>d<br />
telephone, as shown below.<br />
More of <strong>the</strong> Review’s claims relate to specific state programmes. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> ANC Today<br />
website version, “Ano<strong>the</strong>r government <strong>in</strong>tervention that has helped to address poverty is <strong>the</strong><br />
public works programme. Expenditure on this programme has <strong>in</strong>creased almost tenfold <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
last five years, employ<strong>in</strong>g a total of 124,000 people” (http://www.<strong>an</strong>c.org.za, 7 November<br />
2003). It is not clear how <strong>the</strong> claim was arrived at, given <strong>the</strong> static (<strong>an</strong>d paltry) R200-300<br />
million per <strong>an</strong>num spent on Community Based Public Works programmes dur<strong>in</strong>g most of <strong>the</strong><br />
post-apar<strong>the</strong>id era. Still, <strong>the</strong>se jobs are below m<strong>in</strong>imum wage <strong>in</strong> pay, have no benefits, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
typically last only six months. The t<strong>in</strong>y number of people temporarily hired – even if<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased eight-fold, as 2004 ANC campaigners suggested was possible – made no dent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
vast unemployment problem.<br />
Indeed, <strong>the</strong> ANC’s long-st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g failure to engage <strong>in</strong> a more serious roll-out of public works<br />
opportunities was a function of simple ideology, which Trevor M<strong>an</strong>uel has described as<br />
follows: “I w<strong>an</strong>t someone to tell me how <strong>the</strong> government is go<strong>in</strong>g to create jobs. It’s a terrible<br />
admission, but governments around <strong>the</strong> world are impotent when it comes to creat<strong>in</strong>g jobs”<br />
(Sunday Independent, 9 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2000). Ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>terpretation was that M<strong>an</strong>uel’s impotence<br />
was limited to allocat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> resources required to seriously tackle problems of poverty, for he<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Cab<strong>in</strong>et made far more fund<strong>in</strong>g available for <strong>the</strong> purchase of high-tech weaponry th<strong>an</strong><br />
for job creation.<br />
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The Review makes o<strong>the</strong>r claims about hous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>d:<br />
“About R50 billion of assets have been tr<strong>an</strong>sferred to poor households s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994. Nearly two<br />
million hous<strong>in</strong>g subsidies have been approved over this period, with over six million <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns hav<strong>in</strong>g received hous<strong>in</strong>g as a result. Just less th<strong>an</strong> half of all subsidies approved were<br />
gr<strong>an</strong>ted to women. S<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, 1.8 million hectares have been tr<strong>an</strong>sferred under <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d<br />
redistribution programme to almost 140,000 households.”<br />
What has to be said, first, about hous<strong>in</strong>g, is that <strong>the</strong> claim of two million subsidies delivered<br />
has never been conclusively confirmed or even properly audited. It is extremely doubtful that<br />
<strong>the</strong> subsidies gr<strong>an</strong>ted towards ‘hous<strong>in</strong>g starts’ led to two million completed hous<strong>in</strong>g units.<br />
M<strong>an</strong>y developers issued tender bids but failed to actually deliver <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ished product. The<br />
primary reason is that for most of <strong>the</strong> period s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> ANC adopted a market-oriented<br />
hous<strong>in</strong>g policy <strong>in</strong> November 1994, <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>t level – R16,000 on a once-off ‘capital subsidy’<br />
basis – was far too small to pay for more th<strong>an</strong> a poorly-located site <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>adequate<br />
structure. That problem, <strong>in</strong> turn, stemmed not only from <strong>the</strong> ideologically-motivated decision<br />
to adopt a developer-driven, b<strong>an</strong>k-centred hous<strong>in</strong>g policy, but also reflected <strong>the</strong> national fiscal<br />
squeeze: <strong>in</strong>stead of spend<strong>in</strong>g 5 percent of <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>nual state budget on hous<strong>in</strong>g, as was promised<br />
by <strong>the</strong> RDP <strong>an</strong>d Hous<strong>in</strong>g White Paper, <strong>the</strong> figure was well below 2 percent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> decade<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g liberation.<br />
In <strong>an</strong>y case, compared to <strong>the</strong> hated matchbox houses of <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id era, <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> postapar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
houses were typically only half as large, <strong>an</strong>d constructed with flimsier materials<br />
th<strong>an</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g apar<strong>the</strong>id; located even fur<strong>the</strong>r from jobs <strong>an</strong>d community amenities; characterised<br />
by regular disconnections of water <strong>an</strong>d electricity; with lower-grade state services <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
rare rubbish collection, <strong>in</strong>hum<strong>an</strong>e s<strong>an</strong>itation, dirt roads <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>adequate storm-water dra<strong>in</strong>age.<br />
Whereas hundreds of thous<strong>an</strong>ds were me<strong>an</strong>t to receive ‘top-up’ f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g from b<strong>an</strong>ks so that a<br />
proper house could be constructed, <strong>the</strong> b<strong>an</strong>ks only f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced a t<strong>in</strong>y fraction (less th<strong>an</strong> 100,000<br />
– far fewer bonds th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong>y had gr<strong>an</strong>ted dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> late 1980s). Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, some of <strong>the</strong><br />
assets tr<strong>an</strong>sferred as part of <strong>the</strong> R50 billion claimed, were actually <strong>new</strong>ly-privatised public<br />
hous<strong>in</strong>g units, which only exacerbated <strong>the</strong> ghettoisation of poor people, m<strong>an</strong>y of whom <strong>in</strong> turn<br />
found it impossible to f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d repair costs for which <strong>the</strong> state had<br />
previously assumed responsibility (Bond 2000).<br />
As for l<strong>an</strong>d redistribution, a J<strong>an</strong>uary 2004 press statement from <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>dless People’s<br />
Movement (2004) observed that <strong>in</strong> nearly a decade s<strong>in</strong>ce liberation, Pretoria failed to deliver<br />
on its promise to ‘redistribute 30 percent of <strong>the</strong> country’s agricultural l<strong>an</strong>d from 60,000 white<br />
farmers to more th<strong>an</strong> 19 million poor <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>dless rural black people <strong>an</strong>d more th<strong>an</strong> 7-million<br />
poor <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>dless urb<strong>an</strong> black people with<strong>in</strong> five years… Studies show that just over 2.3<br />
percent of <strong>the</strong> country’s l<strong>an</strong>d has ch<strong>an</strong>ged h<strong>an</strong>ds through l<strong>an</strong>d reform.’ The problem was that<br />
Pretoria adopted a World B<strong>an</strong>k-<strong>in</strong>spired, market-oriented, will<strong>in</strong>g-seller/will<strong>in</strong>g-buyer<br />
programme that limited <strong>the</strong> state function to provid<strong>in</strong>g a t<strong>in</strong>y once-off capital subsidy<br />
(R15,000) far too small to acquire a decent plot of l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
Mov<strong>in</strong>g to service delivery, yet more gr<strong>an</strong>diose claims are made about water <strong>an</strong>d electricity:<br />
‘About n<strong>in</strong>e million additional people have ga<strong>in</strong>ed access to safe water between 1995 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
2003. The proportion of households hav<strong>in</strong>g access to s<strong>an</strong>itation has <strong>in</strong>creased from 49 percent<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1994 to 63 percent <strong>in</strong> 2003… There have been around 3.8 million <strong>new</strong> electricity grid<br />
connections s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994. This me<strong>an</strong>s that <strong>the</strong> number of households with electricity had<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased from 32 percent to 70 percent by 2001.’ Yet disconnections of water <strong>an</strong>d electricity<br />
were one of <strong>the</strong> most extreme problems of <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id era for poor people, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Pretoria’s statistics simply ignored that millions of people were cut off for more th<strong>an</strong> 45 days.<br />
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Indeed, <strong>the</strong> ANC’s mid-2006 reply to <strong>the</strong> SACP was surpris<strong>in</strong>gly aggressive on this po<strong>in</strong>t, for<br />
<strong>the</strong> ANC claims great adv<strong>an</strong>ces notwithst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> barrage of citizen protests:<br />
“Measur<strong>in</strong>g household usage of water, through water-meters, is discouraged [<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> SACP<br />
critique] because it atomises work<strong>in</strong>g class communities: no reference is made to <strong>the</strong> fact that,<br />
<strong>in</strong> actual practice, m<strong>an</strong>y households do not use much more th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> free basic water provided,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that this campaign is encourag<strong>in</strong>g sav<strong>in</strong>g of this resource!” (ANC, 2006)<br />
‘Sav<strong>in</strong>g’ water – often a counterproductive policy for households at a time of <strong>the</strong> AIDS<br />
p<strong>an</strong>demic - is also encouraged by <strong>the</strong> mass disconnection of low-<strong>in</strong>come people, m<strong>an</strong>y of<br />
whom c<strong>an</strong>not afford <strong>the</strong> utility bills which are much higher th<strong>an</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g apar<strong>the</strong>id. Accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to Joel Netshitenzhe, <strong>the</strong> government’s lead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tellectual: “rigour <strong>in</strong> research does matter:<br />
… 10 million people [were] connected to water which c<strong>an</strong>not by <strong>an</strong>y stretch of <strong>the</strong><br />
imag<strong>in</strong>ation be compared with <strong>the</strong> few households occasionally cut off.” (Sunday Times, 4<br />
April 2004.)<br />
Unfortunately for Netshitenzhe, <strong>the</strong> truth soon emerged. The government’s chief water<br />
bureaucrat, Mike Muller (2004), conceded that <strong>in</strong> 2003, ‘275,000 of all households attributed<br />
<strong>in</strong>terruptions to cut-offs for non-payment’, which extrapolates to <strong>in</strong> excess of 1.5 million<br />
people affected that year alone (<strong>in</strong> 2003, Muller’s boss Ronnie Kasrils had threatened a ‘name<br />
<strong>an</strong>d shame’ campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st municipalities which disconnected residents without provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong><br />
alternative source of <strong>the</strong>ir free monthly lifel<strong>in</strong>e supply). Over <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> prior year, Muller<br />
had resound<strong>in</strong>gly rejected f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs from reports issued by both <strong>the</strong> Department of Prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Local Government, <strong>an</strong>d by <strong>the</strong> Municipal Services Project, that ten million or more <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns had suffered services cuts, but his <strong>new</strong> figures showed <strong>the</strong> problem was even worse<br />
th<strong>an</strong> critics had earlier estimated.<br />
The reason for <strong>the</strong> disconnection epidemic was obvious. Notwithst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g deeper poverty, <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n government – r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g from municipalities to water catchment agencies to<br />
Eskom - raised water <strong>an</strong>d electricity prices dramatically from <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s. By 2002, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
accounted for 30 percent of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>come of those households earn<strong>in</strong>g less th<strong>an</strong> R400 per<br />
month. One cause of higher municipal utility prices was that central-local state subsidies<br />
designed to cover operat<strong>in</strong>g/ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce expenses suffered dramatic decl<strong>in</strong>es dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
1990s (85 percent <strong>in</strong> real terms, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d Fiscal Commission).<br />
As a result, Pretoria’s national record of municipal ‘credit control’ statistics showed that, <strong>in</strong><br />
one typical quarter-year period (late 2001), 60 percent of <strong>the</strong> disconnections were not resolved<br />
with<strong>in</strong> six weeks. That, <strong>in</strong> turn, confirmed that <strong>the</strong> blame lay with genu<strong>in</strong>e poverty, not <strong>the</strong><br />
oft-alleged ‘culture of non-payment’ as a h<strong>an</strong>gover of <strong>an</strong>ti-apar<strong>the</strong>id activism. Likewise, of 13<br />
million given access to a fixed telephone l<strong>in</strong>e for <strong>the</strong> first time, ten million were disconnected<br />
(www.hellkom.co.za). Naturally, <strong>the</strong> bulk of suffer<strong>in</strong>g caused by <strong>the</strong> resc<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of vital state<br />
services was felt by women, <strong>the</strong> elderly <strong>an</strong>d children.<br />
More generally, <strong>the</strong> status of women progressed unevenly. There were some improvements,<br />
especially <strong>in</strong> reproductive rights, albeit with low levels of access to abortion facilities. Women<br />
are certa<strong>in</strong>ly empowered through <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>an</strong>d laws such as <strong>the</strong> Employment Equity<br />
Act, as well as <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Gender M<strong>an</strong>agement System, <strong>the</strong> Office of <strong>the</strong> Status<br />
of Women, <strong>the</strong> Commission on Gender Equality <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Women’s Budget Initiative. But<br />
subst<strong>an</strong>tive, not merely formal equality will require a major upsurge <strong>in</strong> women’s struggles,<br />
given <strong>the</strong> enormous gap between state rhetoric <strong>an</strong>d reality.<br />
Indeed, one of <strong>the</strong> most strik<strong>in</strong>g reflections of backslid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> spite of rhetorical adv<strong>an</strong>ce was<br />
<strong>in</strong> women’s pay. Barely <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir share of total jobs dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> late 1990s, women<br />
66
experienced a massive decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> relative pay, from 78 percent of male wages <strong>in</strong> 1995 to just<br />
66 percent <strong>in</strong> 1999 (Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2002, p.147). Although subsequent data on gender<br />
<strong>in</strong>equity are mixed, <strong>the</strong> UNDP’s Hum<strong>an</strong> Development Report does present disturb<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>formation about durable poverty <strong>in</strong> households characterised as s<strong>in</strong>gle-parent (6.7 million<br />
poor people) <strong>an</strong>d couple-parent (8.5 million poor people): ‘Relative to <strong>the</strong> number of poor <strong>in</strong><br />
each gender category, <strong>the</strong> proportions of poor males <strong>an</strong>d poor females liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> couple with<br />
children families are almost <strong>the</strong> same, but a signific<strong>an</strong>tly larger proportion of poor females<br />
live <strong>in</strong> poor s<strong>in</strong>gle parent families (35.3 percent) compared to males <strong>in</strong> this category (24.9<br />
percent)’ (UNDP 2003, p.42). The extent of women’s unemployment was still vast <strong>in</strong> 2001, at<br />
46 percent (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those who had given up look<strong>in</strong>g for work, but not <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
former homel<strong>an</strong>ds considered ‘economically <strong>in</strong>active’), far worse th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> male rate of 35<br />
percent.<br />
The most impressive ga<strong>in</strong> for women with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> state might have been <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g party’s quota<br />
on political representation <strong>in</strong> parliament (30 percent women) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> number of strong women<br />
members of Cab<strong>in</strong>et, albeit with overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>an</strong>ti-labour, <strong>an</strong>ti-fem<strong>in</strong>ist, <strong>an</strong>tienvironmental<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-democratic credentials. Witness m<strong>in</strong>ister of public adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />
Gerald<strong>in</strong>e Fraser-Moleketi’s har<strong>an</strong>gues of strik<strong>in</strong>g civil serv<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir unions; health<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ister Tshabalala-Msim<strong>in</strong>g’s hostility to <strong>an</strong>ti-retroviral medic<strong>in</strong>es for victims of rape <strong>an</strong>d<br />
for pregn<strong>an</strong>t women to prevent HIV tr<strong>an</strong>smission; m<strong>in</strong>erals <strong>an</strong>d energy m<strong>in</strong>ister Phumzile<br />
Mlambo-Ngcuka’s attacks on environmentalists concerned about <strong>the</strong> harm done by extractive<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustries; <strong>an</strong>d foreign m<strong>in</strong>ister Nkosaz<strong>an</strong>a Dlam<strong>in</strong>i-Zuma’s blunt refusal to criticise Robert<br />
Mugabe’s tyr<strong>an</strong>nical regime, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g its systematic sexual violence aga<strong>in</strong>st women.<br />
Aside from legalis<strong>in</strong>g reproductive rights, <strong>the</strong> most import<strong>an</strong>t post-apar<strong>the</strong>id ga<strong>in</strong> for<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>stream<strong>in</strong>g gender concerns was probably <strong>the</strong> women’s budget. In early 2004, however,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Mail & Guardi<strong>an</strong> <strong>new</strong>spaper (20 February 2004) reported,<br />
“When former MP Pregs Govender first proposed a gender-responsive budget a decade ago,<br />
she warned that without ongo<strong>in</strong>g political commitment to this <strong>in</strong>itiative, it would be wiped out<br />
as yet <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r “public relations exercise”. Govender’s prescience was spot on. M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce Trevor M<strong>an</strong>uel’s Budget speech on Wednesday - although it doesn’t spell doomsday<br />
for women - spelt <strong>the</strong> death knell for a women’s budget.”<br />
Perhaps most import<strong>an</strong>tly <strong>in</strong> structural-economic terms, contemporary <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> reta<strong>in</strong>s<br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id’s patriarchal modes of surplus extraction, th<strong>an</strong>ks to both residual sex discrim<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> migr<strong>an</strong>t (rural-urb<strong>an</strong>) labour system, which is still subsidised by women stuck <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
ex-B<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong> homel<strong>an</strong>ds. Aside from a small state gr<strong>an</strong>t to old-age pensioners, <strong>the</strong>se women<br />
are still not paid for <strong>the</strong>ir role <strong>in</strong> social reproduction, which <strong>in</strong> a normal labour market would<br />
be h<strong>an</strong>dled by state school<strong>in</strong>g, health <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d pensions. While remitt<strong>an</strong>ces from urb<strong>an</strong><br />
workers <strong>an</strong>d pensions rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> form of support <strong>in</strong> rural areas, along with <strong>an</strong> exp<strong>an</strong>ded<br />
child support gr<strong>an</strong>t, <strong>the</strong>se are far below <strong>the</strong> levels required for a dignified life. Given <strong>the</strong><br />
durability of migr<strong>an</strong>t labour <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> overall failure of rural development, it is fair to condemn<br />
<strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id government for deepen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>herited, structured superexploitation.<br />
This structured superexploitation is exacerbated by <strong>an</strong> apparent <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> domestic sexual<br />
violence associated with ris<strong>in</strong>g male unemployment <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> fem<strong>in</strong>isation of poverty. Even<br />
Mbeki was quoted at <strong>an</strong> ANC campaign rally by <strong>the</strong> SA Press Association on March 22,<br />
2004, just after Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Day: ‘He said if ever his sister was to arrive home <strong>an</strong>d tell him<br />
that she was <strong>in</strong> love with <strong>Africa</strong>n Christi<strong>an</strong> Democratic Party leader Kenneth Meshoe, he<br />
would have to beat her.’ Mbeki’s spokesperson said he was only ‘jok<strong>in</strong>g’. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
SAPA, ‘The ANC supporters reportedly laughed with delight at <strong>the</strong> quip,’ while no estimates<br />
67
were made of how m<strong>an</strong>y victims of domestic violence that night resulted from <strong>the</strong> president’s<br />
care-free attitude (SAPA, 22 <strong>an</strong>d 23 March 2004).<br />
Women are also <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> caregivers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> home, <strong>an</strong>d this entails bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> highest burden<br />
associated with degraded health. With <strong>the</strong> public healthcare services <strong>in</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e due to<br />
underfund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g penetration of private providers, <strong>in</strong>fectious diseases such as<br />
TB, cholera, malaria <strong>an</strong>d AIDS are rife, all far higher th<strong>an</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g apar<strong>the</strong>id. Diarrhoea kills<br />
43,000 children a year, as a result ma<strong>in</strong>ly of <strong>in</strong>adequate potable water provision. Most <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns with HIV have little prospect of receiv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>ti-retroviral medic<strong>in</strong>es to extend <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
lives (half a million urgently require drugs at present), th<strong>an</strong>ks to ‘denialist’ policies of Mbeki<br />
<strong>an</strong>d his health m<strong>in</strong>ister, as discussed below.<br />
Overall, it is hard to make sense of Pretoria’s gr<strong>an</strong>diose claims of delivery, given how flat <strong>the</strong><br />
spend<strong>in</strong>g on social services was dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first ten years of liberation, a bit less th<strong>an</strong> half of<br />
state spend<strong>in</strong>g, with a decl<strong>in</strong>e from 1998 onwards. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Hunter, May <strong>an</strong>d Padayachee<br />
(2003, p.19), <strong>the</strong> percentage of <strong>the</strong> state budget allocated to social spend<strong>in</strong>g rose from 46.7<br />
percent <strong>in</strong> 1995/96 to a high of 49.2 percent <strong>in</strong> 1998/99 before fall<strong>in</strong>g to 47.7 percent <strong>in</strong><br />
2001/02, th<strong>an</strong>ks ma<strong>in</strong>ly to a drop <strong>in</strong> education spend<strong>in</strong>g. The ma<strong>in</strong> rebuttal made <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Review <strong>an</strong>d especially by v<strong>an</strong> der Berg/Merrifield, is that those funds were redistributed from<br />
white, Indi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d coloured beneficiaries dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id era, to black <strong>Africa</strong>ns. But nonracial<br />
distribution is surely <strong>the</strong> very least that would be expected.<br />
What <strong>the</strong> pro-ANC commentators simply fail to grapple with is <strong>the</strong> overarch<strong>in</strong>g criticism of<br />
neoliberal social policy made by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent left. In short, <strong>in</strong>stead of exp<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
state’s social safety net apparatus <strong>an</strong>d conferr<strong>in</strong>g universal rights, as m<strong>an</strong>dated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> RDP <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Constitution, <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id strategy was <strong>the</strong> opposite: deny<strong>in</strong>g access <strong>an</strong>d shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
state’s obligation. Me<strong>an</strong>s-test<strong>in</strong>g, meager gr<strong>an</strong>ts, bureaucratic obstacles <strong>an</strong>d detailed policy<br />
sabotage were <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> techniques. The most cruel <strong>in</strong>itial example was probably Fraser-<br />
Moleketi’s attempt <strong>in</strong> 1996 to cut <strong>the</strong> dependent children’s gr<strong>an</strong>t from R135 to R75 (when she<br />
was welfare m<strong>in</strong>ister), so as to spread <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>t more widely to <strong>Africa</strong>n beneficiaries. In <strong>the</strong><br />
same neoliberal spirit, by 1997 <strong>the</strong> ANC - <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>deed all political parties runn<strong>in</strong>g<br />
municipalities - made mockery of <strong>the</strong> constitutional right to water by engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> large-scale<br />
disconnections, as noted above.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> ANC might well rebut, at least <strong>in</strong> cases such as water <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r municipal<br />
services, <strong>the</strong> government corrected its neoliberal policy orientation when it made <strong>the</strong> ‘free<br />
basic water’ promise prior to <strong>the</strong> December 2000 municipal elections, a promise based on<br />
universal access <strong>an</strong>d punishment of large-volume users through a cross-subsidy system.<br />
Certa<strong>in</strong>ly, <strong>the</strong> promise itself is exemplary, <strong>an</strong>d reflected not only a fear of apathy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
municipal elections, <strong>the</strong> August 2000 cholera epidemic (catalysed by rural KwaZulu-Natal<br />
disconnections), <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> forthcom<strong>in</strong>g Constitutional Court ‘Grootboom’ decision aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong><br />
government. Also play<strong>in</strong>g a role was <strong>the</strong> critical mass of protests aga<strong>in</strong>st water apar<strong>the</strong>id.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> follow-up to <strong>the</strong> free water promise reveals a great deal. Dur<strong>in</strong>g early 2001, <strong>the</strong><br />
national water department discouraged municipalities from <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g water charges to<br />
commercial/<strong>in</strong>dustrial users. By July, <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> tariffs unveiled a sophisticated sabotage<br />
technique, entail<strong>in</strong>g a very small free lifel<strong>in</strong>e (6,000 litres per household per month), followed<br />
by very steep <strong>in</strong>creases (along a convex tariff curve), such that <strong>the</strong> next consumption block<br />
became unaffordable. The free 6,000 litres represent just two toilet flushes a day for a<br />
household of eight, for those lucky enough to have flush toilets. It leaves no additional water<br />
to dr<strong>in</strong>k, to wash with, or to cle<strong>an</strong> clo<strong>the</strong>s or <strong>the</strong> house.<br />
68
A government genu<strong>in</strong>ely committed to water as a hum<strong>an</strong> right would have provided a larger<br />
free lifel<strong>in</strong>e tariff, ideally on a per-person, not per-household basis, which <strong>the</strong>n rises gradually<br />
<strong>in</strong> a concave m<strong>an</strong>ner, but with steep penalties aga<strong>in</strong>st luxury consumption. A water m<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
genu<strong>in</strong>ely committed to us<strong>in</strong>g central state power on behalf of <strong>the</strong> poor would not merely<br />
posture with <strong>the</strong> threat of ‘nam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d sham<strong>in</strong>g’ those municipalities engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> massive<br />
disconnections, but would actually do so, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process declare a water emergency, as<br />
water legislation permits, so as to reconnect those whose rights were violated. Such a m<strong>in</strong>ster<br />
would, when consider<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> drive to <strong>in</strong>stall pre-paid water meters, take <strong>the</strong> lead of <strong>the</strong> British<br />
government. Even under <strong>the</strong> neoliberal Tony Blair dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> late 1990s, this technology was<br />
considered such a threat to <strong>the</strong> public health that it was b<strong>an</strong>ned, along with trickler devices.<br />
Instead, <strong>the</strong>n water m<strong>in</strong>ister Ronnie Kasrils – ironically, a lead<strong>in</strong>g communist – endorsed <strong>an</strong>d<br />
actively promoted <strong>the</strong> pre-paid, self-disconnect<strong>in</strong>g meters.<br />
Mov<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> environment, it is fair to assess <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n ecology as today <strong>in</strong> worse<br />
condition, <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y crucial respects - e.g., water <strong>an</strong>d soil resources m<strong>an</strong>agement, local<br />
contributions to global warm<strong>in</strong>g, fisheries, <strong>in</strong>dustrial toxics, genetic modification - th<strong>an</strong><br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g apar<strong>the</strong>id (Bond 2002). For example, <strong>in</strong> spite of water scarcity, major dam projects –<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 15 <strong>new</strong> large dams pl<strong>an</strong>ned to start after <strong>the</strong> ANC’s 2004 election victory – cause<br />
destructive environmental consequences downriver. Moreover, as discussed below regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> Lesotho Highl<strong>an</strong>ds Water Project, <strong>the</strong> high costs of water tr<strong>an</strong>sfer – made yet<br />
higher by ramp<strong>an</strong>t corporate/state corruption - deter consumption by poor people. <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
highest dam, Katse, supplies Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg water across <strong>the</strong> Lesotho mounta<strong>in</strong>s, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> next<br />
mega-dam <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> scheme, Mohale, was begun <strong>in</strong> 1998 even though even government officials<br />
admitted it was unnecessary.<br />
The wealthiest urb<strong>an</strong> (ma<strong>in</strong>ly white) families <strong>in</strong> Gauteng Prov<strong>in</strong>ce enjoy swimm<strong>in</strong>g pools <strong>an</strong>d<br />
English gardens, which me<strong>an</strong>s that <strong>in</strong> some of <strong>the</strong> most hedonistic suburbs, water<br />
consumption is 30 times greater each day th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> low-<strong>in</strong>come townships, some of whose<br />
residents do <strong>the</strong> garden<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d domestic work for whites. Me<strong>an</strong>while, rural (black) women<br />
queue at communal taps <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> parched former b<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong> areas for hours. The location of<br />
natural surface <strong>an</strong>d groundwater rema<strong>in</strong>s skewed towards white farmers due to apar<strong>the</strong>id l<strong>an</strong>d<br />
dispossession <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id government’s failure to redistribute l<strong>an</strong>d to black <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns.<br />
As for <strong>the</strong> air, on a per capita basis, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> also contributes more to global warm<strong>in</strong>g<br />
th<strong>an</strong> nearly <strong>an</strong>y economy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, if CO2 emissions are corrected for both <strong>in</strong>come <strong>an</strong>d<br />
population. Such greenhouse gas emissions are 20 times higher th<strong>an</strong> even <strong>the</strong> United States by<br />
that measure, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> ratio is worsen<strong>in</strong>g because Pretoria is promot<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>an</strong>d subsidis<strong>in</strong>g) vast<br />
<strong>new</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> metals smelters, led by <strong>the</strong> Coega alum<strong>in</strong>ium project whose repeated false<br />
starts led to grow<strong>in</strong>g desperation by <strong>the</strong> state to recruit a foreign firm. Notwithst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g good<br />
solar, w<strong>in</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d tides potential, re<strong>new</strong>able energy is sc<strong>an</strong>dalously underfunded. Instead, vast<br />
resources cont<strong>in</strong>ue to be devoted to nuclear energy R&D, especially irrational <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong><br />
next-generation pebble-bed nuclear reactors, which <strong>in</strong>ternal documents admit are dubious<br />
from a f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial st<strong>an</strong>dpo<strong>in</strong>t. Pretoria also allowed <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> to become a World B<strong>an</strong>k<br />
gu<strong>in</strong>ea pig for a carbon trad<strong>in</strong>g pilot project; meth<strong>an</strong>e gas will be extracted from a Durb<strong>an</strong><br />
toxic waste dump which is spread<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>an</strong>cer <strong>in</strong> neighbour<strong>in</strong>g black neighbourhoods, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
which would <strong>in</strong> a just world be closed down. The pro-corporate carbon-trad<strong>in</strong>g strategy will<br />
not reduce overall emissions, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stead fur<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>the</strong> commodification <strong>an</strong>d privatisation of<br />
<strong>the</strong> air.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r examples of residual apar<strong>the</strong>id ecology could be cited, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g numerous unresolved<br />
conflicts over natural l<strong>an</strong>d reserves (displacement of <strong>in</strong>digenous people cont<strong>in</strong>ues), deleterious<br />
69
impacts of <strong>in</strong>dustrialisation on biodiversity, <strong>in</strong>sufficient protection of end<strong>an</strong>gered species, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
generous state policies favor<strong>in</strong>g genetic modification for commercial agriculture. Mar<strong>in</strong>e<br />
regulatory systems are overstressed <strong>an</strong>d hotly contested by Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d East Asi<strong>an</strong> fish<strong>in</strong>g<br />
trawlers, as well as by local medium-scale commercial fish<strong>in</strong>g firms fend<strong>in</strong>g off <strong>new</strong> waves of<br />
small-scale black rivals. Exp<strong>an</strong>sion of gum <strong>an</strong>d p<strong>in</strong>e timber pl<strong>an</strong>tations, largely for pulp<br />
exports to East Asia, rema<strong>in</strong>s extremely damag<strong>in</strong>g, not only because of grassl<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>ic<br />
forest destruction - lead<strong>in</strong>g to soil adulteration <strong>an</strong>d far worse flood damage downriver, as<br />
Mozambique suffered <strong>in</strong> two recent years - but also due to <strong>the</strong> spread of alien-<strong>in</strong>vasive pl<strong>an</strong>ts<br />
<strong>in</strong>to water catchments across <strong>the</strong> country. One constructive, high-profile state programme,<br />
‘Work<strong>in</strong>g for Water’, has so far slowed but not reversed <strong>the</strong> growth of alien <strong>in</strong>vasives.<br />
Me<strong>an</strong>while, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n commercial agriculture rema<strong>in</strong>s extremely reli<strong>an</strong>t upon fertilisers<br />
<strong>an</strong>d pesticides, with virtually no attention given to potential org<strong>an</strong>ic farm<strong>in</strong>g markets. Pretoria<br />
is also foster<strong>in</strong>g a d<strong>an</strong>gerous Genetically Modified Org<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>in</strong>dustry, while regional<br />
neighbours like Zimbabwe, Zambia <strong>an</strong>d Angola have imposed b<strong>an</strong>s on <strong>the</strong> d<strong>an</strong>gerous<br />
technology. The government’s failure to prevent toxic dump<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>eration has led to a<br />
nascent but portentous group of mass tort (class action) lawsuits that may graduate from<br />
asbestos victims to residents who suffer persistent pollution <strong>in</strong> several extremely toxic pockets<br />
(<strong>South</strong> Durb<strong>an</strong>, Sasolburg, Steel Valley). In <strong>the</strong>se efforts, <strong>the</strong> environmental justice movement<br />
nearly <strong>in</strong>variably fights both corporations <strong>an</strong>d Pretoria. A few <strong>new</strong> environmental laws <strong>an</strong>d<br />
regulations have tackled high-profile problems like plastic bag litter <strong>an</strong>d destruction of<br />
beaches by recreational 4x4 drivers, but me<strong>an</strong>while <strong>the</strong> problems above ma<strong>in</strong>ly worsened<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first decade of liberation.<br />
There is, of course, resist<strong>an</strong>ce. From <strong>the</strong> early 2000s, org<strong>an</strong>isations repeatedly challeng<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
ANC <strong>an</strong>d capital from <strong>the</strong> left <strong>in</strong>clude social movement <strong>an</strong>d community activist coalitions<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg Anti-Privatisation Forum, <strong>the</strong> network of Durb<strong>an</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> residents<br />
stretch<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> Abahlali baseMjondolo shacks to <strong>South</strong> Durb<strong>an</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g-class<br />
communities <strong>an</strong>d beyond, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Western Cape Anti-Evictions Committee, as well as a<br />
variety of sectorally-specific groups: <strong>the</strong> Education Rights Project, Environmental Justice<br />
Network<strong>in</strong>g Forum, Jubilee SA, Keep-Left, L<strong>an</strong>dless Peoples Movement, Palest<strong>in</strong>e Solidarity<br />
Committee, Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, Treatment Action Campaign, Youth for<br />
Work, <strong>an</strong>d sometimes <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>consistent SA NonGovernmental Org<strong>an</strong>isations Coalition. O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
left <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>in</strong>cludes th<strong>in</strong>k-t<strong>an</strong>ks <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stitutes such as <strong>the</strong> Alternative<br />
Information <strong>an</strong>d Development Centre, <strong>the</strong> Centre for Economic Justice, groundWork, <strong>the</strong><br />
International Labour Research <strong>an</strong>d Information Group, Kh<strong>an</strong>ya College, Research, Education<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Development, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society, most of<br />
which have useful websites. There are, as well, some milit<strong>an</strong>t sections of <strong>the</strong> trade union<br />
movement, especially municipal workers. It is only when <strong>the</strong> Congress of SA Trade Unions<br />
<strong>an</strong>d SA Communist Party break <strong>the</strong>ir alli<strong>an</strong>ce with <strong>the</strong> neoliberal ANC that a serious electoral<br />
<strong>an</strong>d non-electoral left c<strong>an</strong> consolidate, by most <strong>an</strong>alysts’ reckon<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> me<strong>an</strong>time, however, divisive conflicts have emerged with<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent left movements (nearly destroy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>dless <strong>an</strong>d Jubilee movements). Some<br />
disputes cont<strong>in</strong>ue over how to relate to <strong>the</strong> SACP <strong>an</strong>d Cosatu, with some groups enter<strong>in</strong>g<br />
selective conjunctural alli<strong>an</strong>ces particularly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake of much stronger criticism of <strong>the</strong><br />
ANC from <strong>the</strong> SACP (‘Bonapartist’) <strong>an</strong>d Cosatu (‘dictatorial’). How far to attack <strong>the</strong> ANC<br />
carries <strong>in</strong>to debates over whe<strong>the</strong>r (<strong>an</strong>d when) to form a left political party. In addition, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
rema<strong>in</strong> traditional <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n problems with sectari<strong>an</strong>ism amongst small political parties<br />
<strong>an</strong>d factions.<br />
70
But what is clear is that <strong>the</strong> ANC’s turn from liberation to liberalism has generated a<br />
resist<strong>an</strong>ce that is argu<strong>in</strong>g concretely on issues <strong>an</strong>d mak<strong>in</strong>g small but import<strong>an</strong>t steps towards a<br />
future that reflects, ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> rejects, those long-held ideals of non-racialism, non-sexism<br />
<strong>an</strong>d economic justice.<br />
71
7 Black Economic Empowerment: politically correct<br />
capitalism or social problem?<br />
By Neva Seidm<strong>an</strong> Makgetla<br />
Suppose we could come back to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> twenty years from now <strong>an</strong>d visit nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg. In one vision of BEE, we would expect to see a boom around S<strong>an</strong>dton, with<br />
young black executives <strong>an</strong>d entrepreneurs jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g or perhaps even displac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> well-off<br />
whites who now crowd <strong>the</strong> cafes <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Stock Exch<strong>an</strong>ge. But <strong>the</strong> bustl<strong>in</strong>g, luxurious scene<br />
would still rema<strong>in</strong> a world away from <strong>the</strong> poverty <strong>in</strong> Alex<strong>an</strong>dra township just down <strong>the</strong> road.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> contest<strong>in</strong>g vision of BEE, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s future lies, not <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g S<strong>an</strong>dton, but <strong>in</strong><br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g places like Alex<strong>an</strong>dra <strong>in</strong>to prosperous work<strong>in</strong>g-class communities with skills,<br />
jobs, decent hous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>frastructure, <strong>an</strong>d – through <strong>the</strong>ir pension funds, ESOPs <strong>an</strong>d<br />
community trusts – a share <strong>in</strong> major enterprises across <strong>the</strong> economy. In this vision, S<strong>an</strong>dton<br />
itself, even if more representative, should no longer st<strong>an</strong>d out as a bastion of wealth <strong>in</strong> a sea of<br />
poverty.<br />
The contestation over BEE is rooted <strong>in</strong> a conceptual confusion that <strong>in</strong> turn reflects grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
class differentiation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> black population. Everyone agrees that BEE <strong>in</strong>volves shift<strong>in</strong>g<br />
economic power to black people. But does that primarily me<strong>an</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g black entrepreneurs<br />
<strong>in</strong>to exist<strong>in</strong>g structures of ownership, or broaden<strong>in</strong>g ownership <strong>an</strong>d undertak<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
measures, such as skills development <strong>an</strong>d provision of basic services, that will empower <strong>the</strong><br />
majority?<br />
To date, <strong>the</strong> government has responded to this contestation by requir<strong>in</strong>g that comp<strong>an</strong>ies both<br />
support <strong>new</strong> black <strong>in</strong>vestors <strong>an</strong>d entrepreneurs <strong>an</strong>d undertake skills development <strong>an</strong>d<br />
employment equity. This package is supplemented by assur<strong>an</strong>ces that more representative<br />
capital should lead to greater domestic <strong>in</strong>vestment, <strong>in</strong>novation <strong>an</strong>d diversification, ultimately<br />
creat<strong>in</strong>g more employment <strong>an</strong>d services for <strong>the</strong> poor.<br />
But <strong>the</strong> compromise is cont<strong>in</strong>ually under attack. In particular, m<strong>an</strong>y government officials <strong>an</strong>d<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>esspeople to try to bolster <strong>the</strong> share of <strong>in</strong>centives for black ownership at <strong>the</strong> cost of more<br />
broad-based elements such as employment equity <strong>an</strong>d improved services for <strong>the</strong> poor. This<br />
emerged clearly <strong>in</strong> engagements over <strong>the</strong> draft Codes of Good Practice under <strong>the</strong> Broad-Based<br />
BEE Act (2005).<br />
This paper <strong>an</strong>alyses how government strategies have sought to address <strong>the</strong> racial <strong>in</strong>equalities<br />
left by apar<strong>the</strong>id s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994. For each strategy, it briefly evaluates <strong>the</strong> impact on overall<br />
<strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>an</strong>d on <strong>the</strong> formation of a black capitalist class. Despite some improvements,<br />
progress rema<strong>in</strong>ed disappo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gly slow <strong>in</strong> terms of both overall economic <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>an</strong>d for<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly vociferous black upper class. In this context, <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al section explores<br />
government’s regulations on broad-based BEE as <strong>an</strong> uneasy compromise between us<strong>in</strong>g state<br />
power to improve conditions for <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>an</strong>d us<strong>in</strong>g it to entrench a black capitalist class<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g, exclusionary economic structure.<br />
BEE <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id legacy<br />
State action to support black economic empowerment responded to <strong>the</strong> very slow progress <strong>in</strong><br />
overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> economic <strong>in</strong>equalities imposed under apar<strong>the</strong>id, despite <strong>the</strong> elim<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />
racial laws. On <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>an</strong>d, despite extraord<strong>in</strong>ary social <strong>an</strong>d political adv<strong>an</strong>ces after 1994,<br />
most black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns faced ris<strong>in</strong>g unemployment, fall<strong>in</strong>g real wages <strong>an</strong>d relatively slow<br />
73
growth <strong>in</strong> basic services, especially <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> former homel<strong>an</strong>d regions. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>the</strong><br />
lead<strong>in</strong>g comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> private sector rema<strong>in</strong>ed predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>tly white, with virtually no<br />
exp<strong>an</strong>sion <strong>in</strong> black ownership or m<strong>an</strong>agement outside <strong>the</strong> public sector.<br />
A series of measures under colonial rule <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n apar<strong>the</strong>id aimed explicitly to disempower<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns, compell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m to accept low wages from white employers. These measures had<br />
several dimensions.<br />
• The apar<strong>the</strong>id state purposefully limited <strong>Africa</strong>n households’ access to capital <strong>an</strong>d<br />
wealth. Most obviously, a series of laws dat<strong>in</strong>g back over a century pushed people off<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir l<strong>an</strong>d. But <strong>the</strong> state also constra<strong>in</strong>ed black people’s access to capital, commercial<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dustrial sites, <strong>an</strong>d credit. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> state used subsidised credit <strong>an</strong>d<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r services as well as procurement to support white entrepreneurs.<br />
• The state neglected household <strong>in</strong>frastructure like water <strong>an</strong>d electricity as well as<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sport <strong>in</strong> black communities, mak<strong>in</strong>g it virtually impossible for <strong>Africa</strong>ns to set up<br />
viable small enterprises.<br />
• The state established effective obstacles to <strong>Africa</strong>n participation <strong>in</strong> education <strong>an</strong>d formal<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, as well as some types of work <strong>an</strong>d most m<strong>an</strong>agerial positions.<br />
• In m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>dustries, notably agriculture <strong>an</strong>d domestic work, <strong>the</strong> labour laws let<br />
employers fire black workers without giv<strong>in</strong>g reasons <strong>an</strong>d suppress union org<strong>an</strong>isation.<br />
• The state constra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>Africa</strong>ns’ access to <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d relationships needed for<br />
formal economic activity, such as <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial sector, market<strong>in</strong>g firms, state<br />
procurement, <strong>an</strong>d so on.<br />
This complex of measures – some dictated by <strong>the</strong> law, some <strong>in</strong>stitutionalised but <strong>in</strong>formal –<br />
entrenched deprivation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n communities. At <strong>the</strong> same time, it ensured that whites<br />
owned <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>aged most enterprises <strong>in</strong> both <strong>the</strong> state <strong>an</strong>d private sector.<br />
Between 1994 <strong>an</strong>d 2005, <strong>the</strong> democratic government aimed to address <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>equalities left by<br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id. But except for limited efforts at l<strong>an</strong>d reform <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> general tax system,<br />
it did not actively redistribute assets. Nor did it dem<strong>an</strong>d that <strong>the</strong> private sector do much to<br />
support economic equity.<br />
The democratic government adopted four core strategies to enh<strong>an</strong>ce equality.<br />
1) It ended discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> public services, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g social services, welfare gr<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>the</strong> share of spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> black communities.<br />
2) It undertook to improve skills development <strong>an</strong>d supported employment equity as well as<br />
workers’ right to org<strong>an</strong>ise unions <strong>an</strong>d strike.<br />
3) It prohibited legal discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> economic activity, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g lend<strong>in</strong>g, market<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
employment.<br />
4) It <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>the</strong> representation of black people <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>agement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public service <strong>an</strong>d<br />
parastatals.<br />
5) It established various programmes to support small <strong>an</strong>d micro enterprise.<br />
Taken toge<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>se strategies proved <strong>in</strong>adequate to br<strong>in</strong>g about fundamental ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
deep-seated <strong>in</strong>equalities left by apar<strong>the</strong>id, especially given very high unemployment from <strong>the</strong><br />
mid-1990s. As far as <strong>the</strong> data allow, we here first summarise trends <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> distribution of<br />
<strong>in</strong>come <strong>an</strong>d assets between 1994 <strong>an</strong>d 2004. The follow<strong>in</strong>g sections look at implementation of<br />
<strong>the</strong> strategies aimed at improv<strong>in</strong>g equity.<br />
74
Trends <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>equality<br />
In 2005, a debate emerged about <strong>the</strong> extent of poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. That debate tended to<br />
obscure <strong>the</strong> agreement amongst most <strong>an</strong>alysts (see v<strong>an</strong> den Berg et al., 2005; Ard<strong>in</strong>gton et al.,<br />
2005) that between 1994 <strong>an</strong>d 2004 overall economic <strong>in</strong>equality showed very little<br />
improvement <strong>an</strong>d Black people subst<strong>an</strong>tially <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>the</strong>ir share <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> higher-<strong>in</strong>come group,<br />
without com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>ywhere close to representivity.<br />
We here first exam<strong>in</strong>e overall <strong>in</strong>equality, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> representation of black people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
economic rul<strong>in</strong>g class.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> early 2000s, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>ed one of <strong>the</strong> most <strong>in</strong>equitable countries <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.<br />
The top 10% of <strong>the</strong> population received 45% of <strong>the</strong> national <strong>in</strong>come, while <strong>the</strong> poorest 20%<br />
got 2%. (Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2002).<br />
As <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g table shows, between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2004 unemployment (us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> broader<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ition that counts as unemployed people who w<strong>an</strong>t a pay<strong>in</strong>g job but have given up<br />
actively look<strong>in</strong>g for one) hovered persistently around 40%. Me<strong>an</strong>while, <strong>the</strong> share of employed<br />
people earn<strong>in</strong>g under R1000 a month <strong>in</strong> const<strong>an</strong>t 2000 r<strong>an</strong>d rema<strong>in</strong>ed almost unch<strong>an</strong>ged at<br />
around 45%.<br />
Table 1. Exp<strong>an</strong>ded unemployment rate <strong>an</strong>d share of employed people earn<strong>in</strong>g under R1000 <strong>in</strong><br />
const<strong>an</strong>t r<strong>an</strong>d a<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
exp<strong>an</strong>ded unemployment rate share of employed earn<strong>in</strong>g under R1000 <strong>in</strong> const<strong>an</strong>t 2000 r<strong>an</strong>d<br />
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004<br />
(Note: The broader def<strong>in</strong>ition of unemployment counts as unemployed people who would<br />
take a job immediately, but who are too discouraged to cont<strong>in</strong>ue to search for paid<br />
employment. R1000 is calculated <strong>in</strong> const<strong>an</strong>t 2000 r<strong>an</strong>d. The LFS gives <strong>in</strong>comes <strong>in</strong> b<strong>an</strong>ds.<br />
Where <strong>the</strong> value of R1000 <strong>in</strong> 2000 r<strong>an</strong>d falls <strong>in</strong>side a b<strong>an</strong>d, a l<strong>in</strong>ear proportion is used.<br />
Source: Data for 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 1998 calculated from, Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. October Household<br />
Survey. Relev<strong>an</strong>t years. Databases on CD-ROM. Pretoria. Data for 2000 to 2004 calculated<br />
from, Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Labourforce Survey. September of relev<strong>an</strong>t years. Databases on<br />
CD-ROM. Pretoria. Const<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>comes calculated us<strong>in</strong>g CPI.)<br />
75
Unemployment <strong>an</strong>d low <strong>in</strong>comes rema<strong>in</strong>ed concentrated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n population, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
especially amongst <strong>Africa</strong>n women. In 2004, unemployment for <strong>Africa</strong>ns, us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> broad<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ition, was 48%, compared to 28% for Coloureds <strong>an</strong>d Asi<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d 8% for whites. Two<br />
thirds of <strong>the</strong> unemployed were <strong>Africa</strong>ns under <strong>the</strong> age of 30, who faced <strong>an</strong> unemployment rate<br />
of 60%. For <strong>Africa</strong>n women, <strong>the</strong> overall unemployment rate was 56%, compared to 7% for<br />
white men. Almost three quarters of <strong>Africa</strong>n women under 30 were unemployed. (Calculated<br />
from Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2004).<br />
The black population also cont<strong>in</strong>ued to suffer <strong>the</strong> lowest <strong>in</strong>comes. In 2004, estimates suggest<br />
that 40% of <strong>Africa</strong>n employed people earned under R1000 a month <strong>in</strong> 2000 r<strong>an</strong>d, compared to<br />
20% of Coloureds <strong>an</strong>d Asi<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>an</strong>d 5% of whites. Aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>Africa</strong>n women were <strong>the</strong> worst off,<br />
with well over half earn<strong>in</strong>g under R1000 a month. Moreover, only 60% of <strong>Africa</strong>n families<br />
reported wages, salaries or profits as <strong>the</strong>ir ma<strong>in</strong> source of <strong>in</strong>come, compared to 80% of<br />
whites, Coloureds <strong>an</strong>d Asi<strong>an</strong>s. The o<strong>the</strong>r households relied on social gr<strong>an</strong>ts, family<br />
remitt<strong>an</strong>ces, charity <strong>an</strong>d pensions. (Calculated from Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2004).<br />
The fall<strong>in</strong>g share of remuneration <strong>in</strong> national <strong>in</strong>come after 1994 also <strong>in</strong>dicated persistent<br />
<strong>in</strong>equalities. Between 1994 <strong>an</strong>d 2004, remuneration fell from 50% to 45% of <strong>the</strong> national<br />
<strong>in</strong>come, while net operat<strong>in</strong>g surplus climbed from 26% to 32%. (TIPS 2006) Studies<br />
suggested, too, that with<strong>in</strong> remuneration, <strong>the</strong> gap between <strong>the</strong> highest <strong>an</strong>d lowest salaries<br />
beg<strong>an</strong> to widen <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 2000s. (See Crotty 2006).<br />
Data on <strong>the</strong> distribution of assets is harder to come by, although very <strong>in</strong>equitable distribution<br />
of <strong>in</strong>come generally <strong>in</strong>dicates even more <strong>in</strong>equitable ownership of capital <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>d. (See<br />
UNDP 2004, pp 70 ff) Indicators of asset <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong>cluded:<br />
• Small <strong>an</strong>d micro enterprise rema<strong>in</strong>ed stunted, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> country had only a rudimentary<br />
co-operative movement. These sectors lagged far beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> norm for develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />
countries. (See Orford et al., 2004)<br />
• Income from property was far more unequally distributed th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>come from wages <strong>an</strong>d<br />
salaries. In 2004, 4% of <strong>the</strong> self-employed earned over R11 000 a month, compared to<br />
2% of <strong>the</strong> employed. But 40% of <strong>the</strong> self-employed – virtually all <strong>Africa</strong>n - got under<br />
R500 a month. In contrast, only 15% of wage earners fell <strong>in</strong>to this <strong>in</strong>come category.<br />
(Calculated from Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2004).<br />
In short, ten years after <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition to democracy, <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> population rema<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
heavily disempowered <strong>in</strong> economic terms. Their disempowerment emerged <strong>in</strong> lack of capital<br />
<strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r assets, high unemployment <strong>an</strong>d low pay. Poverty <strong>an</strong>d joblessness hit hardest at<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns, <strong>an</strong>d especially <strong>Africa</strong>n women.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> same time, potential black entrepreneurs – effectively me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g black people with<br />
formal qualifications <strong>an</strong>d/or political experience plus some capital – still found <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
largely shut out of <strong>the</strong> economy, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> particular <strong>the</strong> private sector. This emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
subst<strong>an</strong>tial under-representation of black people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> high-<strong>in</strong>come group, m<strong>an</strong>agement, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> top end of <strong>the</strong> self-employed.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g table shows, <strong>in</strong> 2004 <strong>Africa</strong>ns constituted only a quarter of <strong>the</strong> top 10% of<br />
<strong>in</strong>come earners <strong>an</strong>d about a seventh of <strong>the</strong> highest-earn<strong>in</strong>g 2%. This was <strong>an</strong> improvement on<br />
1996, but not by much. In contrast to <strong>the</strong>ir small share amongst high-<strong>in</strong>come earners, <strong>Africa</strong>ns<br />
made up almost three quarters of all paid employees <strong>in</strong> 2004.<br />
Table 2. Representivity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> high-<strong>in</strong>come group by race, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2004<br />
76
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Coloured/Asi<strong>an</strong> White<br />
1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004<br />
top 10% of <strong>in</strong>come earners top 5% of <strong>in</strong>come earners top 2% of <strong>in</strong>come earners<br />
(Source: Calculated from, Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, October Household Survey for 1996, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Labourforce Survey for September 2004. Databases on CD-ROM. Pretoria).<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n women, who constituted just under a third of all work<strong>in</strong>g people, comprised only one<br />
<strong>in</strong> 15 of <strong>the</strong> top 10% of <strong>in</strong>come earners. In contrast, white men accounted for under a tenth of<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g people, <strong>an</strong>d almost half of <strong>the</strong> 10% with <strong>the</strong> highest <strong>in</strong>comes.<br />
The cont<strong>in</strong>ued under-representation of black people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> high-<strong>in</strong>come group was matched by<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir low share <strong>in</strong> senior m<strong>an</strong>agement, especially <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> private sector. In both <strong>the</strong> public <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> private sector, white m<strong>an</strong>agers rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority. Between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2004, <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
reported share of private m<strong>an</strong>agement positions reportedly grew slightly, although black<br />
m<strong>an</strong>agers ga<strong>in</strong>ed ground <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public service, local government <strong>an</strong>d parastatals.<br />
Table 3. Senior m<strong>an</strong>agement by race, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2004<br />
77
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Coloured/Asi<strong>an</strong> White<br />
1996 2004 1996 2004<br />
public sector private except<strong>in</strong>g self employed<br />
(Source: Calculated from, Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, October Household Survey for 1996, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Labourforce Survey for September 2004. Databases on CD-ROM. Pretoria).<br />
Aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> position of <strong>Africa</strong>n women was particularly poor. Just over one senior m<strong>an</strong>ager <strong>in</strong><br />
20 was <strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n wom<strong>an</strong>, while two out of five were white men. Moreover, over a quarter of<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n women <strong>in</strong> senior m<strong>an</strong>agement worked <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sector, compared to <strong>an</strong> average of<br />
10% for all senior m<strong>an</strong>agers.<br />
In short, <strong>the</strong> shift to democracy nei<strong>the</strong>r improved overall economic <strong>in</strong>equality subst<strong>an</strong>tially,<br />
nor opened doors to economic power for <strong>the</strong> black elite, especially <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> private sector. The<br />
rest of this section exam<strong>in</strong>es how <strong>an</strong>d why <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> government strategies to promote greater<br />
equity fell short.<br />
Government services<br />
The RDP expected <strong>the</strong> extension of government services to historically deprived black<br />
communities to provide a central <strong>in</strong>strument <strong>in</strong> empower<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> majority. It argued that<br />
improvements <strong>in</strong> basic <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>an</strong>d social services would establish <strong>the</strong> basis for black<br />
people to engage with <strong>the</strong> economy, as workers <strong>an</strong>d through home-based enterprise. Yet<br />
subst<strong>an</strong>tial growth <strong>in</strong> basic services <strong>in</strong> black communities after 1994 did not have much<br />
apparent impact on <strong>in</strong>come generation. The ma<strong>in</strong> reasons appeared to have been <strong>the</strong><br />
contractionary fiscal policy of <strong>the</strong> late 1990s comb<strong>in</strong>ed with programmes that made no effort<br />
to maximise economic benefits.<br />
The most accessible <strong>in</strong>dicator of growth <strong>in</strong> government services was household <strong>in</strong>frastructure,<br />
which was assessed from 1995 by regular household surveys. As <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g table shows,<br />
virtually every aspect of household <strong>in</strong>frastructure improved, with electricity mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
greatest adv<strong>an</strong>ces toward equity. Still, even <strong>in</strong> 2004, less th<strong>an</strong> two thirds of <strong>Africa</strong>ns had<br />
piped water on site, under half had a flush toilet, <strong>an</strong>d about three quarters had electricity for<br />
light<strong>in</strong>g. In contrast, even before 1994 more th<strong>an</strong> 90% of white, Coloured <strong>an</strong>d Asi<strong>an</strong><br />
households had access to improved water, electricity <strong>an</strong>d refuse removal.<br />
Chart 1. Access to household <strong>in</strong>frastructure by race, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2004<br />
78
100%<br />
80%<br />
60%<br />
40%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
piped water<br />
on site<br />
unimproved<br />
water<br />
flush toilet<br />
on site<br />
pit toilet<br />
no toilet<br />
1996 2004<br />
electricity<br />
for light<strong>in</strong>g<br />
electricity<br />
for cook<strong>in</strong>g<br />
municipal<br />
refuse<br />
removal<br />
piped water<br />
on site<br />
flush toilet<br />
on site<br />
electricity<br />
for light<strong>in</strong>g<br />
electricity<br />
for cook<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n White, Coloured <strong>an</strong>d Asi<strong>an</strong><br />
municipal<br />
refuse<br />
removal<br />
(Source: Calculated from, Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. 1996. October Household Survey. Database<br />
on CD-ROM. Pretoria; <strong>an</strong>d, Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. 2004. Labourforce Survey. September.<br />
Database on CD-ROM. Pretoria).<br />
It is more difficult to qu<strong>an</strong>tify improvements <strong>in</strong> education, health, polic<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d welfare.<br />
Formally, all <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se sectors were b<strong>an</strong>ned from discrim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>in</strong> practice, <strong>the</strong><br />
historic distribution of <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>an</strong>d personnel heavily me<strong>an</strong>t subst<strong>an</strong>tial <strong>in</strong>equalities<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
The follow<strong>in</strong>g section <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> persistent <strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>in</strong> education, which were equalled<br />
<strong>in</strong> polic<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d health. The ma<strong>in</strong> exception was welfare gr<strong>an</strong>ts, which represented <strong>the</strong> most<br />
redistributive form of government spend<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
After 1994, <strong>the</strong> government equalised gr<strong>an</strong>ts to <strong>Africa</strong>ns – who had previously lagged far<br />
beh<strong>in</strong>d white <strong>an</strong>d Coloured beneficiaries – <strong>an</strong>d extended <strong>the</strong>m to virtually all older people<br />
without a private pension, as well as m<strong>an</strong>y children. The share of <strong>Africa</strong>n households gett<strong>in</strong>g<br />
some k<strong>in</strong>d of gr<strong>an</strong>t rose from 17% to 45% between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2004. (Calculated from Statistics<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2004) At <strong>the</strong> same time, however, <strong>the</strong> state reduced <strong>the</strong> amount of <strong>the</strong><br />
gr<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> real terms. Through <strong>the</strong> late 1990s, <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual gr<strong>an</strong>t categories did not<br />
keep up with <strong>in</strong>flation. Thereafter, while <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>the</strong>mselves rose at <strong>in</strong>flation rate, <strong>the</strong> bulk<br />
of <strong>new</strong> take up came from <strong>the</strong> child gr<strong>an</strong>t, which provided under R200 a month compared to<br />
over R900 for <strong>the</strong> old-age pension.<br />
In sum, government spend<strong>in</strong>g was subst<strong>an</strong>tially redistributive after 1994. None<strong>the</strong>less, it did<br />
not come close to overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> huge <strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>an</strong>d services left by<br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id. Moreover, <strong>in</strong> contrast to <strong>the</strong> hopes of <strong>the</strong> RDP, it did not lead to a subst<strong>an</strong>tial<br />
upsurge <strong>in</strong> employment <strong>an</strong>d economic engagement by <strong>the</strong> black population.<br />
Three <strong>in</strong>ter-related factors contributed to this outcome:<br />
79
• First, mass unemployment <strong>an</strong>d poverty amongst <strong>the</strong> black population limited <strong>the</strong> scope<br />
for redistribution. Most <strong>Africa</strong>n households earned too little to contribute to <strong>the</strong> cost of<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g services, must less <strong>in</strong>stall<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m. This situation vastly <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>the</strong> fiscal<br />
burden of government services.<br />
• Second, <strong>the</strong> budget cuts under GEAR me<strong>an</strong>t that through <strong>the</strong> late 1990s redistribution<br />
took place <strong>in</strong> a very constra<strong>in</strong>ed envelope. In real terms, government spend<strong>in</strong>g per<br />
person dropped by 1% a year from 1997 to 2000. Thereafter, it <strong>in</strong>creased fairly rapidly,<br />
at between 5% <strong>an</strong>d 10% a year. Still, <strong>the</strong> fiscal restra<strong>in</strong>ts of <strong>the</strong> late 1990s ruled out <strong>the</strong><br />
massive extension <strong>in</strong> government services required for <strong>the</strong> RDP strategy.<br />
• Third, faced with limited budgets, government service departments focused on shortterm<br />
improvements <strong>in</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>an</strong>dards ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> exp<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g economic opportunities.<br />
For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, houses were built very far from employment opportunities, to save on <strong>the</strong><br />
cost of l<strong>an</strong>d; to get public health care often me<strong>an</strong>t st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> day-long queues, mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
it almost <strong>in</strong>accessible for work<strong>in</strong>g people; <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> supply of basic free water <strong>an</strong>d<br />
electricity rema<strong>in</strong>ed far too low to support home-based enterprises. Moreover, <strong>the</strong><br />
Treasury consistently refused to adopt a policy of local procurement, which would have<br />
streng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>the</strong> economic stimulus from government spend<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
In <strong>the</strong>se circumst<strong>an</strong>ces, improvements <strong>in</strong> government services could not achieve <strong>the</strong> aims set<br />
under <strong>the</strong> RDP. They certa<strong>in</strong>ly enh<strong>an</strong>ced <strong>the</strong> quality of life for m<strong>an</strong>y black households <strong>an</strong>d<br />
went far toward cushion<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> impact of massive unemployment. But <strong>the</strong>y did not br<strong>in</strong>g<br />
about equity or strongly enh<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> capacity of poor households to engage with <strong>the</strong><br />
economy. These shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs did not, however, affect <strong>the</strong> black high-<strong>in</strong>come group, which<br />
mostly moved <strong>in</strong>to historically white suburbs or <strong>the</strong> better-served areas of <strong>the</strong> townships.<br />
Education <strong>an</strong>d skills development<br />
Education is particularly import<strong>an</strong>t for economic empowerment, s<strong>in</strong>ce it lays <strong>the</strong> basis for<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals’ engagement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy. But ch<strong>an</strong>ges after 1994 probably did more to<br />
improve representation <strong>in</strong> elite <strong>in</strong>stitutions th<strong>an</strong> to ensure more equitable, quality education<br />
overall.<br />
Three sets of data <strong>in</strong>dicated distress<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>in</strong> education through <strong>the</strong> mid-2000s.<br />
To start with, resourc<strong>in</strong>g rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>equitable, with <strong>the</strong> historically white schools – now, <strong>in</strong><br />
m<strong>an</strong>y cases, attended predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>tly by black learners – enjoy<strong>in</strong>g better <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>an</strong>d<br />
more educators. In part, this reflected <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>y could charge higher fees, both<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir revenues <strong>an</strong>d effectively exclud<strong>in</strong>g poorer students. As <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g table<br />
shows, progress <strong>in</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g school <strong>in</strong>frastructure rema<strong>in</strong>ed slow. Virtually all <strong>the</strong><br />
disadv<strong>an</strong>taged schools were <strong>Africa</strong>n; <strong>the</strong> worst off were almost exclusively primary schools <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> former homel<strong>an</strong>d areas. The pace of improvements may have picked up s<strong>in</strong>ce 2000, but no<br />
<strong>new</strong> data have been published.<br />
Table 4. School <strong>in</strong>frastructure, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2000<br />
Indicator 1996 2000<br />
learner:classroom ratio 43:1 39:1<br />
Percentage of schools with:<br />
No toilets 55% 17%<br />
No telecommunications 60% 36%<br />
No water 35% 28%<br />
No electricity 68% 43%<br />
Poor build<strong>in</strong>gs 16% 35%<br />
80
(Source: Brochures for <strong>the</strong> School Register of Needs Surveys, 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2000. Downloaded<br />
from www.education.gov.za <strong>in</strong> March 2005).<br />
In contrast, <strong>the</strong> government equalised educators between schools, based on <strong>the</strong> teacher-learner<br />
ratio, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1990s. Even <strong>the</strong>n, historically white schools were able to employ additional<br />
educators privately. In 2004, private educators made up 10 per cent of all teachers <strong>in</strong> Gauteng<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Western Cape, which held <strong>the</strong> majority of historically white schools, but hardly<br />
featured <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r prov<strong>in</strong>ces.<br />
In <strong>the</strong>se circumst<strong>an</strong>ces, <strong>the</strong> matric pass rate rema<strong>in</strong>ed much higher for learners from<br />
historically white schools th<strong>an</strong> for those from <strong>Africa</strong>n areas, <strong>an</strong>d particularly <strong>the</strong> former<br />
homel<strong>an</strong>d regions. As <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g table shows, <strong>in</strong> 2003 over half of white c<strong>an</strong>didates passed<br />
matric with exemption, compared to just over one <strong>in</strong> ten <strong>Africa</strong>ns.<br />
Table 5. Matric pass rate by race, 2003<br />
passed with passed without pass rate with<br />
wrote endorsement endorsement endorsement<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n 349,900 42,100 186,800 12%<br />
Coloured/Asi<strong>an</strong> 48,600 14,200 28,700 29%<br />
White 46,900 23,800 22,000 51%<br />
(Source: Answer by National Department of Education to Parliamentary question from H.<br />
Zille <strong>in</strong> May 2005. I am grateful to James Myburgh for send<strong>in</strong>g me <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation).<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, tertiary education, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> particular <strong>the</strong> professional schools <strong>an</strong>d elite universities,<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed disproportionately white. This situation resulted from <strong>the</strong> higher matric rate for<br />
traditionally white schools as well as <strong>the</strong> imposition of fees. In 2004, <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>nual university fee<br />
at Wits or UCT was well over twice <strong>the</strong> medi<strong>an</strong> expenditure for <strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n household.<br />
Table 6. University graduations by race <strong>an</strong>d type of <strong>in</strong>stitution, 2002<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Coloured Indi<strong>an</strong> White Total<br />
Historically Adv<strong>an</strong>taged University 37% 4% 7% 51% 100%<br />
Historically Disadv<strong>an</strong>taged<br />
University 88% 6% 6% 1% 100%<br />
UNISA 43% 4% 9% 45% 100%<br />
Total 49% 4% 7% 40% 100%<br />
(Source: Altm<strong>an</strong>, Miriam. 2004. Meet<strong>in</strong>g Equity Targets: Are <strong>the</strong>re enough graduates?<br />
Pretoria. HSRC).<br />
The government adopted a national skills strategy from <strong>the</strong> late 1990s that sought to<br />
overcome historic <strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>in</strong> access to education. The skills strategy had three pillars:<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduction of a skills levy at 1,5% of wage costs for larger comp<strong>an</strong>ies; establishment of<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustry-wide tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g schemes; <strong>an</strong>d a system to certify skills ga<strong>in</strong>ed through experience,<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce so m<strong>an</strong>y black people had been barred from formal learn<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g table shows, despite <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> system, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 2000s black people, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
especially lower-level workers <strong>an</strong>d women, were still less likely th<strong>an</strong> whites to enjoy tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
opportunities. Only senior m<strong>an</strong>agement proved <strong>an</strong> exception.<br />
Table 7. Access to skills development by occupation, race <strong>an</strong>d gender, September 2003<br />
Coloured/Asia<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n n White<br />
% of total<br />
Ma<strong>in</strong> occupation men women men women men women employment<br />
81
Legislators, senior<br />
officials <strong>an</strong>d<br />
m<strong>an</strong>agers 16% 38% 21% 34% 26% 30% 7%<br />
Professionals 19% 27% 24% 28% 24% 30% 5%<br />
Technical <strong>an</strong>d<br />
associate<br />
professionals 22% 21% 25% 26% 31% 26% 10%<br />
Clerks 15% 19% 16% 20% 27% 24% 10%<br />
Craft <strong>an</strong>d related<br />
trades workers 16% 17% 20% 12% 32% 23% 12%<br />
Service workers <strong>an</strong>d<br />
shop <strong>an</strong>d market sales<br />
workers 35% 13% 24% 16% 30% 25% 12%<br />
Pl<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d mach<strong>in</strong>e<br />
operators <strong>an</strong>d<br />
assemblers 8% 8% 10% 6% 26% 17% 10%<br />
Elementary<br />
Occupation 6% 5% 8% 6% 27% 23% 22%<br />
Skilled agricultural<br />
<strong>an</strong>d fishery workers 5% 3% 11% 23% 19% 26% 3%<br />
Domestic workers 5% 2% 0% 3% n.a. 0% 9%<br />
Total 14% 10% 16% 15% 28% 26% 100%<br />
(Note: Figures show percentage of respondents <strong>in</strong> each group who said <strong>the</strong>y had access to<br />
skills development, without giv<strong>in</strong>g a time frame. Source: Calculated from, Statistics <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>. Labourforce Survey September 2003. Pretoria. Database on CD-ROM).<br />
A fur<strong>the</strong>r problem emerged around recognition of prior learn<strong>in</strong>g, which was crucial for<br />
overcom<strong>in</strong>g past discrim<strong>in</strong>ation. In most <strong>in</strong>dustries, it proved practically impossible for<br />
workers to ga<strong>in</strong> formal qualifications, no matter how great <strong>the</strong>ir experience. For one th<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y were required to add <strong>the</strong>oretical components, at considerable cost <strong>in</strong> terms of time <strong>an</strong>d<br />
resources. For <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r, most employers still did not give time off for tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. And m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustries simply never set up systems to evaluate <strong>an</strong>d certify <strong>the</strong> skills of workers below <strong>the</strong><br />
professional level.<br />
In sum, access to education, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d formal qualifications rema<strong>in</strong>ed racially biased even a<br />
decade after democracy. Well-off black families could get <strong>the</strong>ir children <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> best schools,<br />
but <strong>the</strong> majority rema<strong>in</strong>ed relegated to underresourced <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d barred from university<br />
by poor secondary results <strong>an</strong>d high fees. This outcome <strong>in</strong> itself me<strong>an</strong>t that, absent state<br />
<strong>in</strong>tervention, <strong>the</strong> economy would largely replicate historic <strong>in</strong>equalities for <strong>the</strong> foreseeable<br />
future.<br />
Employment equity <strong>an</strong>d labour rights<br />
A fur<strong>the</strong>r strategy to enh<strong>an</strong>ce equity was to require employment equity <strong>an</strong>d protect labour<br />
rights. The Employment Equity Act had little visible impact at all, however. In contrast, <strong>the</strong><br />
union movement succeeded <strong>in</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>in</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ised <strong>in</strong>dustries. Still, <strong>the</strong>se<br />
measures could not br<strong>in</strong>g about more equitable access to wealth or <strong>in</strong>creased employment<br />
opportunities.<br />
The Employment Equity Act was passed <strong>in</strong> 1998. It went beyond a simple b<strong>an</strong> on<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ation to require employers to address systemic obstacles to adv<strong>an</strong>cement by<br />
historically disadv<strong>an</strong>taged groups. The Act sought explicitly to ensure greater equity <strong>in</strong> all<br />
skilled occupations, not just amongst senior m<strong>an</strong>agers <strong>an</strong>d professionals. In this, it sought to<br />
82
address <strong>the</strong> near-absolute lack of career mobility for elementary <strong>an</strong>d semi-skilled <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
workers, which had been entrenched under apar<strong>the</strong>id.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>in</strong> section 1.1 <strong>in</strong>dicates, despite <strong>the</strong> Act, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-2000s senior m<strong>an</strong>agers<br />
<strong>an</strong>d professionals rema<strong>in</strong>ed highly unrepresentative. Indeed, as <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g table <strong>in</strong>dicates,<br />
<strong>the</strong> structure of employment by race showed virtually no ch<strong>an</strong>ges after <strong>the</strong> Act was passed.<br />
Table 8. Occupations by race, 2000 <strong>an</strong>d 2004<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Coloured/Asi<strong>an</strong> White<br />
Men Women Men Women Men Women<br />
2000<br />
senior m<strong>an</strong>agement <strong>an</strong>d<br />
professionals 18% 11% 10% 5% 37% 19%<br />
technici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d clerical workers<br />
skilled production <strong>an</strong>d service<br />
20% 26% 6% 12% 12% 23%<br />
workers 52% 25% 9% 4% 8% 2%<br />
elementary 41% 39% 10% 7% 2% 1%<br />
domestic 4% 86% 0% 10% 0% 0%<br />
total<br />
2004<br />
37% 32% 8% 7% 9% 7%<br />
senior m<strong>an</strong>agement <strong>an</strong>d<br />
professionals 20% 11% 10% 4% 37% 17%<br />
technici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d clerical workers<br />
skilled production <strong>an</strong>d service<br />
20% 27% 8% 12% 12% 21%<br />
workers 57% 20% 9% 4% 8% 2%<br />
elementary 51% 32% 9% 5% 2% 1%<br />
domestic 4% 86% 0% 9% 0% 1%<br />
total 40% 28% 8% 6% 10% 7%<br />
(Source: Calculated from, Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Labourforce Surveys for September 2000<br />
<strong>an</strong>d 2004. Pretoria. Databases on CD-ROM).<br />
In contrast, <strong>the</strong> passage of a suite of laws to protect labour rights led to a subst<strong>an</strong>tial <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
<strong>in</strong> union density <strong>an</strong>d much greater protection for <strong>Africa</strong>n workers. Union members generally<br />
enjoyed higher pay th<strong>an</strong> non-members, as well as benefits like pensions <strong>an</strong>d health pl<strong>an</strong>s. But<br />
<strong>in</strong> major sectors – notably retail, agriculture <strong>an</strong>d construction – unionisation rema<strong>in</strong>ed low. In<br />
<strong>the</strong>se sectors, employers often ignored laws sett<strong>in</strong>g basic conditions, such as provid<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
written contract or paid leave.<br />
Chart 2. Adherence to labour laws by sector<br />
83
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
no written<br />
contract<br />
domestic formal agriculture <strong>in</strong>formal total formal<br />
no paid leave earn<strong>in</strong>g under<br />
R1000<br />
no tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 2000 2004<br />
% of workers <strong>in</strong> September 2003 % of total employment<br />
(Source: Calculated from Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, Labourforce Surveys, September 2000,<br />
2003 <strong>an</strong>d 2004. Databases on CD-ROM).<br />
The labour laws may not have helped <strong>the</strong> unemployed directly, but <strong>the</strong>y did have <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
<strong>in</strong>direct effect. In 2004, 12% of <strong>the</strong> poorest 50% of households, measured by expenditure,<br />
survived primarily on remitt<strong>an</strong>ces by family members. (Calculated from Statistics <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> 2004).<br />
The labour laws <strong>an</strong>d employment equity sought to provide career mobility <strong>an</strong>d rights to<br />
workers that had been historically denied under apar<strong>the</strong>id. The labour laws, <strong>in</strong> particular, did a<br />
great deal to give <strong>Africa</strong>n workers a voice <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> power to improve pay <strong>an</strong>d work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
conditions. But <strong>the</strong>y did reach <strong>the</strong> unemployed, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>y generally did not address <strong>the</strong> needs<br />
of <strong>new</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n entrepreneurs.<br />
SMMEs<br />
The state <strong>in</strong>troduced a r<strong>an</strong>ge of measures to support SMMEs, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d reform, dedicated<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial schemes, <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. These strategies had <strong>the</strong> potential for shift<strong>in</strong>g asset<br />
distribution, develop<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>new</strong> class of small black capitalists <strong>an</strong>d perhaps even a co-operative<br />
movement. As <strong>the</strong> Presidency’s <strong>in</strong>itial ten-year review document po<strong>in</strong>ted out, however, <strong>the</strong>se<br />
programmes all proved largely <strong>in</strong>effective. (PCAS 2003, p. 40).<br />
L<strong>an</strong>d reform had perhaps <strong>the</strong> greatest potential to improve <strong>the</strong> asset base of <strong>the</strong> poorest<br />
households, which had been left by apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> overcrowded <strong>an</strong>d destitute homel<strong>an</strong>ds. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> mid-2000s, government officially kept <strong>the</strong> RDP target of gett<strong>in</strong>g 30% of arable l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>to<br />
black h<strong>an</strong>ds. The extent of l<strong>an</strong>d reform <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 2000s suggested that this target would not<br />
be reached for <strong>the</strong> next 50 years, however.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> first decade of democracy, well under 5% of l<strong>an</strong>d ch<strong>an</strong>ged h<strong>an</strong>ds under l<strong>an</strong>d reform<br />
programmes. Estimates suggested that <strong>the</strong> budget for l<strong>an</strong>d reform would have to multiply at<br />
least by five to achieve <strong>the</strong> official aim. (People’s Budget 2005, p 19 ff) In addition, postsettlement<br />
support rema<strong>in</strong>ed limited <strong>an</strong>d ra<strong>the</strong>r chaotic, as responsibilities fell between<br />
different tiers of government. (Hall et al., 2003).<br />
84
O<strong>the</strong>r government programmes to support small <strong>an</strong>d micro enterprise fell similarly short of<br />
<strong>the</strong> mark.<br />
The shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> government programmes to support small <strong>an</strong>d micro enterprise reflected,<br />
above all, <strong>the</strong> overall hostile environment. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s production structure rema<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
geared primarily toward m<strong>in</strong>erals <strong>an</strong>d beneficiation – sectors that do not generally provide<br />
fertile ground for small-scale operators. F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d retail networks developed over<br />
centuries to support large-scale (white-owned) comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>an</strong>d small groups of rich (white)<br />
people. They did not easily extend services <strong>an</strong>d support to <strong>new</strong>, small (black) entrepreneurs.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>new</strong> black entrepreneurs had been left by apar<strong>the</strong>id largely without capital, formal<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>ess connections <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y cases, experience.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> mid-2000s, small <strong>an</strong>d micro enterprise <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> still lagged far beh<strong>in</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
middle-<strong>in</strong>come countries. (Orford et al, 2005) Most small black entrepreneurs r<strong>an</strong> only<br />
survival strategies, generally hawk<strong>in</strong>g, with two out of five earn<strong>in</strong>g under R500 a month.<br />
(Calculated from Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2004) Me<strong>an</strong>while, <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y years, government<br />
fund<strong>in</strong>g for small enterprise showed subst<strong>an</strong>tial roll overs.<br />
Public sector employment<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> weakness of o<strong>the</strong>r strategies <strong>in</strong> promot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> black elite <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> private sector, <strong>the</strong><br />
public sector proved <strong>the</strong> crucial route for adv<strong>an</strong>cement. By <strong>the</strong> mid-2000s, black people had<br />
made considerable progress <strong>in</strong>to m<strong>an</strong>agement <strong>in</strong> both <strong>the</strong> public service <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> parastatals. In<br />
effect, state capital became <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> form of black capital.<br />
Black representation <strong>in</strong> senior m<strong>an</strong>agement <strong>an</strong>d professionals <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sector rose from<br />
53% to 61% between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2004. In <strong>the</strong> latter year, 19% of all <strong>Africa</strong>n senior m<strong>an</strong>agers<br />
were <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sector, compared to 7% of all whites <strong>in</strong> top m<strong>an</strong>agement. (Calculated from<br />
Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2004).<br />
The major national parastatals – especially Tr<strong>an</strong>snet, Eskom <strong>an</strong>d Telkom – proved particularly<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t for <strong>new</strong> black capital. They accounted for <strong>the</strong> lion’s share of parastatal <strong>in</strong>vestment,<br />
which comprised 12,5% of national gross fixed capital formation <strong>in</strong> 2005. (Calculated from<br />
SARB 2006, p S-122).<br />
Although <strong>the</strong>y reta<strong>in</strong>ed some social responsibilities, <strong>the</strong> government sought to commercialise<br />
<strong>the</strong> parastatals <strong>an</strong>d to privatise <strong>the</strong>m at least partially. This approach both opened <strong>the</strong> door to<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment by black consortia, <strong>an</strong>d gave black executives control over subst<strong>an</strong>tial sections of<br />
<strong>the</strong> economy.<br />
Employment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> state supported <strong>the</strong> creation of a black capitalist class <strong>in</strong> two ways. First, it<br />
gave m<strong>an</strong>y educated black people a ch<strong>an</strong>ce at a high-level, well-paid job, while doors<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed firmly shut <strong>in</strong> most of <strong>the</strong> private sector. Second, experience <strong>an</strong>d connections <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
state sector made black c<strong>an</strong>didates more attractive to white-run comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal<br />
sector. In <strong>the</strong> mid-2000s, almost all lead<strong>in</strong>g black capitalists had started with a position <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
state.<br />
The role of <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong> form<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>new</strong> elite did little to address overall <strong>in</strong>equality. The public<br />
sector was disproportionately represented amongst <strong>the</strong> highest <strong>in</strong>come earners, with a quarter<br />
of those <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> top 10% but only a seventh of total employment. (Calculated from Statistics<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2004) The wage gap <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public service <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> parastatals tended to rise from<br />
<strong>the</strong> late 1990s, after <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial effort to raise <strong>in</strong>comes for <strong>the</strong> worst-paid workers.<br />
85
The move to Broad-Based BEE<br />
Analysis of government strategies to address <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id legacy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy<br />
demonstrates that <strong>the</strong>y failed ei<strong>the</strong>r to achieve a qualitative ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> economic <strong>in</strong>equality or<br />
to open a path for most potential black entrepreneurs. The question becomes how current<br />
proposals for broad-based BEE will likely affect <strong>the</strong>se outcomes. To <strong>an</strong>swer that question, this<br />
section exam<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> Broad-based BEE Act <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> regulations issued under it, which will<br />
probably not be f<strong>in</strong>alised until <strong>the</strong> end of 2006.<br />
The Act itself reflected contestation over <strong>the</strong> concept of BEE. The concept itself only came to<br />
<strong>the</strong> fore with <strong>the</strong> publication of <strong>the</strong> report of <strong>the</strong> BEE Commission, a group<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>tly black bus<strong>in</strong>esspeople. (Before that, it hardly existed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> policy discourse<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC or <strong>the</strong> state.) The Commission report <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>the</strong> strategy of def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g BEE<br />
as both improvements <strong>in</strong> overall equity (without <strong>an</strong>y qu<strong>an</strong>tification) <strong>an</strong>d specific targets for<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased black participation <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>agement <strong>an</strong>d ownership. (BEEComm 2000).<br />
This dual strategy was adopted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC’s resolutions on BEE at its 51 st National<br />
Conference <strong>in</strong> Stellenbosch <strong>in</strong> 2002, with <strong>an</strong> added emphasis on collective ownership by<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g people <strong>an</strong>d communities. The ANC resolved:<br />
“... <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicators for success [of BEE] are overall equity <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>comes, wealth, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g levels<br />
of black participation - <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g black women <strong>an</strong>d youth - <strong>in</strong> ownership, <strong>the</strong> extent to which<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is operational participation <strong>an</strong>d control of <strong>the</strong> economy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> extent to which <strong>the</strong>re has<br />
been tr<strong>an</strong>sfer <strong>an</strong>d possession of skills <strong>an</strong>d a retention of assets by <strong>the</strong> BEE beneficiaries.<br />
To ensure that BEE is broad based, supportive of collective ownership programmes by<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g people <strong>an</strong>d communities, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of collective enterprises <strong>an</strong>d cooperatives,<br />
supportive of <strong>the</strong> creation of <strong>an</strong> entrepreneurial class, <strong>the</strong> accumulation of assets by <strong>the</strong> poor<br />
<strong>an</strong>d with a focus on <strong>the</strong> development of rural economies...”<br />
“…That <strong>an</strong> essential component of BEE is <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvement of black bus<strong>in</strong>ess people,<br />
especially women, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownership, control <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>agement of productive capital <strong>in</strong> all<br />
sectors of <strong>the</strong> economy as well as skilled occupations. In pursu<strong>in</strong>g this objective <strong>the</strong> ANC will<br />
work with <strong>the</strong> emergent black capitalist class to ensure jo<strong>in</strong>t commitment <strong>an</strong>d practical action<br />
to atta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>in</strong>vestment, job creation, employment equity <strong>an</strong>d poverty alleviation…”<br />
(ANC 2002).<br />
The government’s policy document on broad-based BEE responded to <strong>the</strong> ANC resolutions<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> BEE Commission report <strong>an</strong>d laid <strong>the</strong> basis for legislation. It argued that <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong><br />
policy would add:<br />
“…a comprehensive black economic empowerment strategy that draws toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> various<br />
elements of government’s tr<strong>an</strong>sformation programme <strong>in</strong> a more coherent <strong>an</strong>d focused way…”<br />
(dti 2003 p 11).<br />
The policy identified three ma<strong>in</strong> elements <strong>in</strong> broad-based BEE:<br />
1) Increased black ownership <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal sector,<br />
2) Development of <strong>new</strong> small <strong>an</strong>d micro enterprises, effectively mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> economy as a<br />
whole more equitable <strong>an</strong>d competitive, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
3) Skills development <strong>an</strong>d employment equity, which would me<strong>an</strong> formal workers generally<br />
benefited as well.<br />
86
Despite <strong>the</strong>se three pillars, <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> emphasis cont<strong>in</strong>ued to be on <strong>in</strong>creased black ownership<br />
<strong>an</strong>d control, with little mention of improv<strong>in</strong>g overall <strong>in</strong>come distribution or support<strong>in</strong>g<br />
collective ownership. (dti 2003 pp 12-13). Entirely miss<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> policy framework were:<br />
• Any discussion of how BEE should support formal employment creation, except as a<br />
function of support for <strong>new</strong> enterprise. Yet unemployment formed <strong>the</strong> critical cause of<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alisation for most black people. This gap has led to considerable contestation<br />
about BEE measures that could destroy jobs. This c<strong>an</strong> happen, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, where black<br />
importers ga<strong>in</strong> precedence over local producers. Similarly, when privatisation or<br />
outsourc<strong>in</strong>g is used to set up <strong>new</strong> black-owned enterprises, it often leads to <strong>the</strong> loss<br />
<strong>an</strong>d/or downgrad<strong>in</strong>g of exist<strong>in</strong>g jobs.<br />
• Specific measures to support <strong>the</strong> provision of goods <strong>an</strong>d services for <strong>the</strong> black<br />
community where relev<strong>an</strong>t, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d health sectors. This has<br />
hampered efforts to negotiate improvements <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se areas with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> relev<strong>an</strong>t<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustries.<br />
The Broad-Based BEE Act formalised <strong>the</strong> policy document by list<strong>in</strong>g as its objectives:<br />
(a) promot<strong>in</strong>g economic tr<strong>an</strong>sformation <strong>in</strong> order to enable me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gful participation of black<br />
people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy;<br />
(b) achiev<strong>in</strong>g a subst<strong>an</strong>tial ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> racial composition of ownership <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>agement<br />
structures <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> skilled occupations of exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong> enterprises;<br />
(c) <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> extent to which communities, workers, cooperatives <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r collective<br />
enterprises own <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>age exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong> enterprises <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir access to<br />
economic activities, <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>an</strong>d skills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g;<br />
(d) <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> extent to which black women own <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>age exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong><br />
enterprises, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir access to economic activities, <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>an</strong>d skills<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g;<br />
(e) promot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestment programmes that lead to broad-based <strong>an</strong>d me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gful participation<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy by black people <strong>in</strong> order to achieve susta<strong>in</strong>able development <strong>an</strong>d general<br />
prosperity;<br />
(f) empower<strong>in</strong>g rural <strong>an</strong>d local communities by enabl<strong>in</strong>g access to economic activities, l<strong>an</strong>d,<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure, ownership <strong>an</strong>d skills; <strong>an</strong>d<br />
(g) promot<strong>in</strong>g access to f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce for black economic empowerment.<br />
As a result of engagement at NEDLAC <strong>an</strong>d Parliament, <strong>the</strong> Act laid more emphasis th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
orig<strong>in</strong>al dti policy on overall economic tr<strong>an</strong>sformation, broad-based ownership <strong>an</strong>d skills<br />
development. In addition, it required that sectoral BEE charters <strong>in</strong>clude all stakeholders,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g workers <strong>an</strong>d consumers.<br />
The Act provided that every department should “as far as reasonably possible” take <strong>in</strong>to<br />
account <strong>an</strong> enterprise’s BEE status <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g licences, procurement, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>y o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>ess. This obviously lent <strong>the</strong> BEE process great clout. It also opened government<br />
processes up to considerable uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> extent to which a department had to take<br />
BEE <strong>in</strong>to account seemed quite unclear.<br />
Based on <strong>the</strong> Act, <strong>in</strong> 2005/6 <strong>the</strong> dti circulated draft Codes of Good Practice to def<strong>in</strong>e precisely<br />
how a comp<strong>an</strong>y’s BEE perform<strong>an</strong>ce would be judged. These codes were extensively<br />
negotiated with bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>an</strong>d, at NEDLAC, with labour <strong>an</strong>d community representatives.<br />
Often, <strong>in</strong> this context, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of labour <strong>an</strong>d black bus<strong>in</strong>ess came <strong>in</strong>to open conflict.<br />
Four examples illustrate <strong>the</strong> contestation:<br />
87
1) The special codes on small enterprise effectively <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>the</strong> import<strong>an</strong>ce of black<br />
ownership <strong>an</strong>d limited targets for employment equity <strong>an</strong>d skills development for lowerlevel<br />
workers. Under <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition of small enterprise, however, almost half of all formal<br />
employees would work <strong>in</strong> this sector.<br />
2) The draft Codes gave only limited bonus po<strong>in</strong>ts for collective ownership, despite <strong>the</strong><br />
strong support from <strong>the</strong> ANC resolutions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Act itself. Moreover, dti officials argued<br />
that collective ownership should take second place to development of <strong>an</strong> entrepreneurial<br />
class. They <strong>in</strong>itially w<strong>an</strong>ted to exclude retirement funds – <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> form of capital owned<br />
by work<strong>in</strong>g people – from <strong>an</strong>y BEE <strong>in</strong>centives, <strong>an</strong>d only agreed to reconsider <strong>the</strong> issue<br />
after direct pressure from <strong>the</strong> labour movement.<br />
3) Although <strong>the</strong> Codes gave po<strong>in</strong>ts for employment equity, most of <strong>the</strong>m rewarded greater<br />
representivity amongst senior m<strong>an</strong>agement <strong>an</strong>d professionals th<strong>an</strong> amongst skilled<br />
professions. That contradicted <strong>the</strong> explicit effort of <strong>the</strong> Employment Equity Act to foster<br />
career mobility for <strong>the</strong> majority of black employees.<br />
4) The bal<strong>an</strong>ce between po<strong>in</strong>ts for black enterprise <strong>an</strong>d for local production cont<strong>in</strong>ued to<br />
form a po<strong>in</strong>t of contestation. The dti was unwill<strong>in</strong>g to give po<strong>in</strong>ts simply for local<br />
production – <strong>an</strong>d job creation – by white enterprise, although it did try to <strong>in</strong>troduce limits<br />
on imports for qualify<strong>in</strong>g comp<strong>an</strong>ies.<br />
Conclusions<br />
The contestation over broad-based BEE reflected <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>adequate response of <strong>the</strong> private sector<br />
to persistent <strong>in</strong>equalities, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> difficulty of prioritis<strong>in</strong>g state action <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of<br />
grow<strong>in</strong>g class differentiation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> black community. The government’s explicit policy was<br />
that it could not support empowerment for black capital alone. But <strong>the</strong> extent to which it<br />
broadened <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition of empowerment rema<strong>in</strong>ed hotly contested.<br />
In effect, government has a fixed amount of <strong>in</strong>fluence over <strong>the</strong> private sector. If it imposed<br />
subst<strong>an</strong>tial costs to br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> black owners, it could not push as hard for <strong>new</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment,<br />
employment creation, or skills development for <strong>the</strong> majority of employees.<br />
From this st<strong>an</strong>dpo<strong>in</strong>t, a major concern rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> failure to <strong>in</strong>tegrate BEE with broader<br />
economic <strong>in</strong>itiatives. From <strong>the</strong> national budget to <strong>the</strong> State of <strong>the</strong> Nation Address to ASGI-<br />
SA, BEE rema<strong>in</strong>ed at best a marg<strong>in</strong>al consideration <strong>an</strong>d at worst was mis<strong>in</strong>terpreted.<br />
Generally, it appeared as a fur<strong>the</strong>r measure to support small enterprise <strong>an</strong>d low-<strong>in</strong>come<br />
hous<strong>in</strong>g. (See National Treasury 2006; President Mbeki 2006; Presidency 2006) Major policy<br />
documents seemed studiously to ignore <strong>the</strong> implications for ownership – probably <strong>the</strong> most<br />
expensive effect of <strong>the</strong> BEE exercise.<br />
References<br />
Altm<strong>an</strong>, Miriam. 2004. Meet<strong>in</strong>g Equity Targets: Are <strong>the</strong>re enough graduates? Pretoria. HSRC.<br />
ANC. 1994. Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg. Downloaded from<br />
www.<strong>an</strong>c.org.za. 2001.<br />
ANC. 2002. Resolutions of <strong>the</strong> 51 st National Conference. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg. Downloaded from<br />
www.<strong>an</strong>c.org.za <strong>in</strong> March 2006.<br />
Ard<strong>in</strong>gton, Cally, David Lam, Murray Leibbr<strong>an</strong>dt <strong>an</strong>d Mat<strong>the</strong>w Welch. 2005. “The<br />
Sensitivity Of Estimates Of Post-Apar<strong>the</strong>id Ch<strong>an</strong>ges In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Poverty And Inequality<br />
To Key Data Imputations.” Pretoria. CSSR Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper No. 106. Downloaded from<br />
www.sarpn.org.za <strong>in</strong> July 2005.<br />
Department of Education. 2000. Brochure for <strong>the</strong> 2000 School Register of Needs Report.<br />
www.education.pwv.gov.za. Downloaded <strong>in</strong> 2002.<br />
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Hall, Ruth, Peter Jacobs <strong>an</strong>d Edward Lahiff. 2003. Evaluat<strong>in</strong>g L<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d Agricultural Reform<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: F<strong>in</strong>al Report. PLAAS/UCT. Cape Town. Downloaded from<br />
www.sarpn.org.za <strong>in</strong> September 2005.<br />
Mbeki, Thabo. 2006. “State of <strong>the</strong> Nation Address 2006.” Downloaded from www.gov.za <strong>in</strong><br />
March 2006.<br />
Mlambo-Ngcuka, Phumzile. 2006. “Background document on a Catalyst for Accelerated <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Shared Growth <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.” Media brief<strong>in</strong>g. Pretoria.<br />
National Treasury. 2006. Budget Review 2006. Downloaded from www.treasury.gov.za <strong>in</strong><br />
February 2006.<br />
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People’s Budget Coalition. 2005. The People’s Budget 2006/7. Downloaded from<br />
www.naledi.org.za <strong>in</strong> March 2006.<br />
SARB. 2003. Long-term data series on national accounts <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational tr<strong>an</strong>sactions.<br />
Downloaded from www.resb<strong>an</strong>k.gov.za. August 2003<br />
SARB. 2006. Quarterly Economic Bullet<strong>in</strong> March 2006 . Pretoria. Downloaded<br />
from www.reserveb<strong>an</strong>k.co.za <strong>in</strong> April 2006.<br />
Simk<strong>in</strong>s, Charles. 2004. “What Happened To The Distribution Of Income In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
Between 1995 And 2001?” Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg. University of <strong>the</strong> Witwatersr<strong>an</strong>d. Downloaded<br />
from www.sarpn.org.za <strong>in</strong> July 2005.<br />
Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. 1996. October Household Survey 1996. Database on CD-ROM.<br />
Pretoria.<br />
Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. 2000. Labourforce Survey, September. Electronic database. CD-Rom.<br />
Pretoria.<br />
Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. 2002. Earn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d Spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Pretoria. www.Statistics<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.gov.za. Downloaded <strong>in</strong> December 2002.<br />
Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. 2004. Labourforce Survey September 2004. Database on CD-ROM.<br />
Pretoria.<br />
Terrebl<strong>an</strong>che, S. 2002. A <strong>History</strong> of Inequality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 1652-2002. University of Natal<br />
Press. Pietermaritzburg.<br />
The dti. 2003. A Strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment. Pretoria.<br />
TIPS. 2006. TIPS EasyData. Electronic database. Downloaded from www.tips.org.za.<br />
UNDP. 2004. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Hum<strong>an</strong> Development Report. Oxford: OUP.<br />
V<strong>an</strong> den Berg, Servaas, Ronelle Burger, Rulof Burger, Meg<strong>an</strong> Louw <strong>an</strong>d Derek Yu. 2005.<br />
“Trends <strong>in</strong> poverty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>equality s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> political tr<strong>an</strong>sition.” Stellenbosch. University of<br />
Stellenbosch.<br />
V<strong>an</strong> den Berg, Servaas. 2005. “Fiscal expenditure <strong>in</strong>cidence <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, 1995 <strong>an</strong>d 2000.”<br />
Pretoria. National Treasury. Downloaded from www.sarpn.org.za <strong>in</strong> March 2006<br />
* A previous version of this article was published <strong>in</strong> New Agenda.<br />
89
8 The ANC <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s political l<strong>an</strong>dscape. From<br />
underground freedom movement to govern<strong>in</strong>g party<br />
By Pallo Jord<strong>an</strong><br />
Prepar<strong>in</strong>g for power<br />
The paths pursued by a reformist National Party (NP) leadership <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n National<br />
Congress (ANC) <strong>in</strong>tersected at <strong>an</strong> awkward historic moment. J<strong>an</strong>uary 1990 arrived with <strong>the</strong><br />
ANC at <strong>the</strong> head of a huge mass movement that had drawn <strong>in</strong>to its slipstream noted public<br />
figures. Though it was still illegal, dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1980s <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>in</strong>spired a signific<strong>an</strong>t network of<br />
civil society formations, a front of democratic org<strong>an</strong>isations <strong>an</strong>d activists who accepted its<br />
leadership. After 1976 <strong>the</strong> ANC succeeded <strong>in</strong> plac<strong>in</strong>g itself at <strong>the</strong> head of org<strong>an</strong>ised radical<br />
opposition <strong>in</strong>side <strong>the</strong> country. It had won <strong>in</strong>ternational legitimacy while isolat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
regime politically from actual <strong>an</strong>d potential sources of support <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community.<br />
It succeeded <strong>in</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g limited economic s<strong>an</strong>ctions imposed on <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d at <strong>the</strong> end of<br />
1989 <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>in</strong>stitutions refused to extend apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
credit. The ANC’s programme, <strong>the</strong> Freedom Charter, had won widespread support from black<br />
(<strong>an</strong>d some white) <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>an</strong>d been adopted by both <strong>the</strong> United Democratic Front<br />
(UDF) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Congress of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Trade Unions (COSATU). A susta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
<strong>in</strong>surrectionary climate <strong>in</strong>side <strong>the</strong> country <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s <strong>in</strong>spired <strong>the</strong> ANC leadership to adopt a<br />
strategy implemented at <strong>the</strong> time as Operation Vul<strong>in</strong>dlela.<br />
Expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g his government’s decision to legalise <strong>the</strong> ANC, <strong>the</strong> P<strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Congress (PAC),<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Communist Party (SACP) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r political movements <strong>an</strong>d parties<br />
that <strong>the</strong> NP had b<strong>an</strong>ned over <strong>the</strong> previous four decades, F.W. De Klerk has told numerous<br />
audiences that he felt comfortable about it because <strong>the</strong> collapse of communism <strong>in</strong> Eastern<br />
Europe implied that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> would not be overrun by communist states. De Klerk, <strong>the</strong><br />
constituency of white voters <strong>an</strong>d op<strong>in</strong>ion-makers he represented doubtless took comfort <strong>in</strong><br />
that. But it is evident that <strong>the</strong> Afrik<strong>an</strong>er political elite had grasped <strong>the</strong> nettle of reform some<br />
years prior to December 1989.<br />
Address<strong>in</strong>g a meet<strong>in</strong>g of apar<strong>the</strong>id-regime strategists dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> early 1980s, Samuel<br />
Hunt<strong>in</strong>gton of Harvard University decried <strong>the</strong> absence of ‘a Len<strong>in</strong> of reform’ who would give<br />
as ‘<strong>in</strong>tense attention’ to <strong>the</strong> strategy <strong>an</strong>d tactics of reform as that which ‘Len<strong>in</strong> devoted to <strong>the</strong><br />
strategy <strong>an</strong>d tactics of revolution’. Reform <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, Hunt<strong>in</strong>gton advised his audience,<br />
would be <strong>the</strong> most effective me<strong>an</strong>s of preempt<strong>in</strong>g revolution. The explicit purpose of reform<br />
should be counter-revolutionary, <strong>an</strong>d if properly m<strong>an</strong>aged, would place <strong>the</strong> white m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong><br />
a position to codeterm<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> with its perceived revolutionary enemies.<br />
In Paris, <strong>in</strong> November 1989, <strong>an</strong> Afrik<strong>an</strong>er <strong>in</strong>tellectual with l<strong>in</strong>ks to <strong>the</strong> Broederbond<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced that it was De Klerk’s <strong>in</strong>tention to challenge <strong>the</strong> ANC on <strong>the</strong> political terra<strong>in</strong>.<br />
Legalisation, he implied, would create <strong>an</strong> environment <strong>in</strong> which credible negotiations could<br />
unfold, with De Klerk’s prospective <strong>in</strong>terlocutors given <strong>the</strong> political space to <strong>in</strong>teract with <strong>an</strong>d<br />
receive m<strong>an</strong>dates from <strong>the</strong>ir constituency. De Klerk’s 2 February 1990 speech did not come<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore, as a complete surprise to <strong>the</strong> ANC leadership. Of greater concern was <strong>the</strong> limited<br />
character of <strong>the</strong> reforms he had <strong>an</strong>nounced. But <strong>the</strong> ball was now clearly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC’s court<br />
<strong>an</strong>d it had to respond.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> first post-unb<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g summit at Groote Schuur, <strong>the</strong> ANC determ<strong>in</strong>ed that its key<br />
strategic goal was to have power tr<strong>an</strong>sferred from <strong>the</strong> NP government as swiftly as possible.<br />
Consequently, <strong>the</strong> strategic debate with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC quickly came to centre on <strong>the</strong> confidencebuild<strong>in</strong>g<br />
steps required for negotiations. Shortly after M<strong>an</strong>dela’s return from a tour of <strong>the</strong> US,<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Executive Committee (NEC) took <strong>the</strong> decision to suspend all armed actions<br />
unilaterally. Matters might have moved very quickly to discussion of <strong>the</strong> repatriation of<br />
91
efugees <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong>ed combat<strong>an</strong>ts but for <strong>the</strong> Security Police’s arrest of Mac Maharaj, <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal coord<strong>in</strong>ator of Operation Vul<strong>in</strong>dlela. Shortly <strong>the</strong>reafter De Klerk advised M<strong>an</strong>dela<br />
that he had pl<strong>an</strong>s to arrest Jacob Zuma <strong>an</strong>d was resc<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>demnities gr<strong>an</strong>ted to Chris<br />
H<strong>an</strong>i <strong>an</strong>d Ronnie Kasrils. In brief<strong>in</strong>gs to <strong>the</strong> media Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister ‘Pik’ Botha tried to<br />
expla<strong>in</strong> De Klerk’s actions as a response to a communist conspiracy with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC’s<br />
alli<strong>an</strong>ce which had not embraced negotiations but were <strong>in</strong>tent on <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>surrection.<br />
The ANC leadership read this as <strong>an</strong> attempt to sow division between it <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> SACP. For its<br />
part, once aga<strong>in</strong> a legal org<strong>an</strong>isation, <strong>the</strong> SACP proceeded with pl<strong>an</strong>s for its first mass rally <strong>in</strong><br />
40 years. (In 1950 when it was b<strong>an</strong>ned, <strong>the</strong> Communist Party of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (CPSA) became<br />
<strong>the</strong> first communist party ever to disb<strong>an</strong>d when it was proscribed.) At <strong>the</strong> SACP’s first mass<br />
rally, held on 29 July 1990, it became clear that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> had <strong>in</strong>scribed yet <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
unprecedented occurrence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>nals of communism; at least 50% of <strong>the</strong> members of <strong>the</strong><br />
Central Committee it had elected a year previously had resigned from <strong>the</strong> party once it<br />
became legal. With three of its leaders declared virtual outlaws so soon after return<strong>in</strong>g home,<br />
it became clear that <strong>the</strong> course <strong>the</strong> ANC sought to pursue would not be <strong>an</strong> easy one. But after<br />
that <strong>in</strong>itial hiccup, by June 1991 it appeared that all <strong>the</strong> hurdles had been cleared <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
negotiations could beg<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> earnest. Both sides had taken <strong>the</strong> lessons of that first year to heart.<br />
There were evidently powerful pockets of opposition to De Klerk’s course among both <strong>the</strong><br />
white electorate <strong>an</strong>d with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> security services. The next three years witnessed a wave of<br />
unprecedented violence, orchestrated by <strong>the</strong> die-hard element <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id regime’s<br />
security services who hoped to derail <strong>the</strong> negotiation process or precipitate all-out war. In<br />
December 1991 <strong>the</strong> Convention for a Democratic <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (CODESA) held its first<br />
session. Negotiations stumbled along for <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g two years. The ANC suspended talks<br />
twice <strong>in</strong> response to <strong>the</strong> violence. Even after <strong>the</strong>y resumed as CODESA II, scepticism that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y could stay on course cont<strong>in</strong>ued to dog <strong>the</strong>m. The assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Chris H<strong>an</strong>i <strong>in</strong> April<br />
1993 concentrated <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ds of all <strong>the</strong> key players on <strong>the</strong> d<strong>an</strong>gers that could arise from<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ued uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty. The ANC was able to demonstrate its immense moral authority <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
tense week that ensued by keep<strong>in</strong>g a firm grip on <strong>the</strong> seeth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>ger gripp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
townships. For a short while it appeared that a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>the</strong> Inkatha Freedom Party<br />
(IFP), <strong>the</strong> Bophuthatsw<strong>an</strong>a homel<strong>an</strong>d government <strong>an</strong>d far-right white formations might<br />
prevent a p<strong>an</strong>-<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n general election. But Bophuthatsw<strong>an</strong>a collapsed ignom<strong>in</strong>iously<br />
when <strong>the</strong> people of Mafek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d MmaBatho rebelled, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> IFP agreed to participate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
elections at <strong>the</strong> eleventh hour.<br />
27 April 1994 was <strong>the</strong> outcome of tough-m<strong>in</strong>ded decision mak<strong>in</strong>g on both sides of <strong>the</strong><br />
conflict. In order to take on <strong>the</strong> ANC on <strong>the</strong> political terra<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Party (NP) had to<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge or re<strong>in</strong>vent itself. Towards <strong>the</strong> end of 1990, <strong>the</strong> NP <strong>an</strong>nounced that it would open its<br />
membership to persons o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> whites. As negotiations progressed, <strong>the</strong> NP also revised its<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dpo<strong>in</strong>t on two issues. Hav<strong>in</strong>g amassed power over <strong>the</strong> years by ruthlessly wield<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>struments of a unitary state, by <strong>the</strong> 1980s <strong>the</strong> NP’s strategists were express<strong>in</strong>g a preference<br />
for consociationalism. This option, <strong>the</strong>y argued, was particularly attractive for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> as<br />
it took account of <strong>the</strong> deeply fractured character of <strong>the</strong> society <strong>an</strong>d its multi-racial features. In<br />
1990 <strong>the</strong> NP positioned itself as <strong>the</strong> champion of group rights. By 1994 it had ab<strong>an</strong>doned that<br />
platform.<br />
On its side, after heated <strong>in</strong>ternal debates, <strong>the</strong> ANC had accepted <strong>the</strong> idea of a convention of all<br />
political parties, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those from <strong>the</strong> homel<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> tricameral parliament. To<br />
improve its own representation at CODESA it connived at <strong>the</strong> farcical resurrection of <strong>the</strong><br />
Natal <strong>an</strong>d Tr<strong>an</strong>svaal Indi<strong>an</strong> Congresses (NIC-TIC), all of whose members were card-carry<strong>in</strong>g<br />
members of <strong>the</strong> ANC. It had also made a major concession to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cumbent state<br />
bureaucracy, a key NP constituency, by adopt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ‘Sunset Clauses’ guar<strong>an</strong>tee<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir jobs<br />
for <strong>the</strong> immediate future. The compromise on <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terim constitution was <strong>the</strong> most signific<strong>an</strong>t<br />
consider<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ANC’s prior <strong>in</strong>sistence on a constitution legitimated by <strong>an</strong> elected Constituent<br />
Assembly. A remarkable consensus emerged quite early <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> negotiations about mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
92
electoral system as <strong>in</strong>clusive as possible <strong>an</strong>d on <strong>the</strong> need for a Constitutional Court. By 1994,<br />
a successful tr<strong>an</strong>sition of power had been achieved <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> trapp<strong>in</strong>gs of a democratic order put<br />
<strong>in</strong> place.<br />
The ANC <strong>in</strong> power<br />
For over 90 years, <strong>the</strong> ANC as a political movement has demonstrated a capacity to adapt to,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d rema<strong>in</strong> relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of, sweep<strong>in</strong>g ch<strong>an</strong>ges that have taken place not only <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>,<br />
but also <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> world. Orig<strong>in</strong>ally founded <strong>in</strong> 1912 as a body of respectable <strong>an</strong>d very<br />
respectful black subjects, who regarded <strong>the</strong>ir org<strong>an</strong>isation as a loyal opposition designed to<br />
give ‘… expression to representative op<strong>in</strong>ion …’ <strong>an</strong>d to assist <strong>the</strong> government ‘… formulate a<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dard policy on Native Affairs …’, <strong>the</strong> ANC had evolved by <strong>the</strong> 1980s <strong>in</strong>to a revolutionary<br />
national movement whose pr<strong>in</strong>cipal objective was <strong>the</strong> seizure of political power. The 1990s<br />
required of <strong>the</strong> ANC that it tr<strong>an</strong>sform itself aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>to a party of government able to<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>Africa</strong>’s wealthiest economy but also one of its most diverse societies. To arrive at<br />
that po<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>the</strong> ANC underwent repeated redef<strong>in</strong>ition <strong>an</strong>d a profound metamorphosis.<br />
The ANC was shaped by <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s 20 th<br />
century history as much as it helped shape it.<br />
Born <strong>in</strong> response to <strong>the</strong> racist constitution of <strong>the</strong> Union of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> that excluded<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns, Coloureds <strong>an</strong>d Indi<strong>an</strong>s from <strong>the</strong> country’s political <strong>in</strong>stitutions, <strong>the</strong> ANC at first<br />
regarded itself as a movement of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n people, pursu<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Africa</strong>n objectives. In <strong>the</strong><br />
course of <strong>the</strong> struggle for democracy, <strong>the</strong> need for alli<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d pacts became evident,<br />
persuad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ANC leadership to seek allies <strong>an</strong>d establish ties with like-m<strong>in</strong>ded bodies<br />
among Whites, Coloureds <strong>an</strong>d Indi<strong>an</strong>s; thus was forged <strong>the</strong> Congress movement of <strong>the</strong> 1950s.<br />
Over <strong>an</strong>d above specifically <strong>Africa</strong>n aspirations, <strong>the</strong> ANC repositioned itself as a movement<br />
striv<strong>in</strong>g for democracy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> end to white racial dom<strong>in</strong>ation. By 1990, it had become a nonracial<br />
movement for all <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n democrats, count<strong>in</strong>g amongst its leadership <strong>an</strong>d r<strong>an</strong>ks<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns of all races.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>in</strong> 1960 of Nimrod Mkele’s The Emergent <strong>Africa</strong>n Middle Class, it was<br />
generally accepted that, despite differences <strong>in</strong> lifestyle, life ch<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>comes, <strong>the</strong> shared<br />
burden of national oppression would persuade <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n petty bourgeoisie <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> majority<br />
of <strong>Africa</strong>n work<strong>in</strong>g people to make common cause. By extension, <strong>the</strong> same was assumed to<br />
apply among Coloureds <strong>an</strong>d Indi<strong>an</strong>s, as well as between <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> two black m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
groups. These assumptions were <strong>the</strong> cornerstones of liberation movement strategy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
gravamen of Joe Slovo’s 1977 <strong>the</strong>sis which argued aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> likelihood of <strong>an</strong>y<br />
accommodation because <strong>the</strong> disabilities of <strong>the</strong> black elite would oblige it to seek radical<br />
solutions. When <strong>the</strong> ANC assumed political office <strong>in</strong> May 1994, <strong>the</strong> negotiation process had<br />
already disproved one leg of Slovo’s <strong>the</strong>sis. In 1992, Slovo himself had proposed a middle<br />
course, <strong>the</strong> so-called ‘sunset clauses’, that envisaged <strong>the</strong> exit of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cumbent civil service by<br />
attrition. The elections too, had established that <strong>the</strong> disenfr<strong>an</strong>chised black population was far<br />
more heterogeneous th<strong>an</strong> ANC strategists had realised. Signific<strong>an</strong>t segments of <strong>the</strong> Coloured<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Indi<strong>an</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g classes had voted for <strong>the</strong> party of apar<strong>the</strong>id, <strong>an</strong>d though <strong>the</strong> majority of<br />
Indi<strong>an</strong>s had been prepared to follow <strong>the</strong> ANC’s lead by boycott<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> tri-cameral elections,<br />
that did not tr<strong>an</strong>slate <strong>in</strong>to electoral support for <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>in</strong> 1994. The election results<br />
confirmed <strong>the</strong> ethnic-regional character of <strong>the</strong> Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) but had also<br />
demonstrated its strength <strong>in</strong> rural KwaZulu-Natal.<br />
The ANC-led government was constituted to take account of a number of tough realities.<br />
Though it had won <strong>the</strong> elections by a l<strong>an</strong>dslide, <strong>the</strong> ANC assumed political office with little<br />
power o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> control of <strong>the</strong> majority of m<strong>in</strong>istries. The upper reaches of <strong>the</strong> security<br />
services were still <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> h<strong>an</strong>ds of apar<strong>the</strong>id appo<strong>in</strong>tees, as was <strong>the</strong> civil service. M<strong>an</strong>dela<br />
deliberately appo<strong>in</strong>ted Derek Keys, a former NP M<strong>in</strong>ister, as M<strong>in</strong>ister of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce to reassure<br />
<strong>an</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>an</strong>d corporate sector. Carefully measured actions <strong>an</strong>d studied<br />
moderation, <strong>in</strong> both rhetoric <strong>an</strong>d action, helped reassure skittish <strong>in</strong>vestors <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
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markets. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> experienced a decade of social peace underp<strong>in</strong>ned by political stability<br />
th<strong>an</strong>ks to such circumspection.<br />
Govern<strong>in</strong>g toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> NP <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> IFP <strong>in</strong> a Government of National Unity (GNU), <strong>the</strong><br />
ANC confounded its detractors with its pragmatism. Dur<strong>in</strong>g his <strong>in</strong>augural address to<br />
Parliament, Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela set <strong>the</strong> tone for his government by quot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Afrika<strong>an</strong>s poetess,<br />
Ingrid Jonker. The symbolism of that action was not lost on observers; she had <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s<br />
committed suicide <strong>in</strong> despair about apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. M<strong>an</strong>dela was<br />
call<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> country to put <strong>the</strong> past beh<strong>in</strong>d it, seize <strong>the</strong> moment of hope <strong>an</strong>d focus on <strong>the</strong><br />
future.<br />
The ANC had <strong>an</strong>ticipated <strong>the</strong> challenges of govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d had drawn up <strong>an</strong> elaborate<br />
Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme (RDP) based on <strong>an</strong> assessment of what would<br />
be required to address huge apar<strong>the</strong>id-created social deficits. The realities of political office<br />
soon made it clear that leverag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> resources for reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d growth would not be<br />
easy. The post-Cold War environment brought with it a demonisation of state <strong>in</strong>tervention.<br />
The state sector was concentrated <strong>in</strong> key delivery areas – utilities, posts <strong>an</strong>d<br />
telecommunications, <strong>an</strong>d public tr<strong>an</strong>sport. Though <strong>the</strong> RDP had called for ‘right siz<strong>in</strong>g’ of<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s hugely <strong>in</strong>flated state-owned sector, ANC policy makers soon discovered that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y were expected to dismember it. The restructur<strong>in</strong>g of state assets thus became a crucial<br />
aspect of government policy.<br />
Motivated by <strong>an</strong> ambitious White Paper, telecommunications is <strong>the</strong> only sector that has been<br />
successfully restructured by <strong>in</strong>vit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> participation of two strategic equity partners. Dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> last six years, SA Telkom has carried out <strong>an</strong> impressive rollout of telephone l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong>to<br />
previously deprived <strong>an</strong>d neglected areas. Op<strong>in</strong>ion surveys <strong>in</strong> 1998 <strong>an</strong>d 2003 <strong>in</strong>dicate that <strong>the</strong><br />
improvement of communications is recognised as one of <strong>the</strong> ANC government’s most notable<br />
achievements.<br />
After two years as part of <strong>the</strong> GNU <strong>an</strong>d shortly after <strong>the</strong> adoption of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> Constitution, <strong>the</strong><br />
NP decided <strong>in</strong> June 1996 to withdraw from it. The NP’s decision signalled a desire to mark<br />
out a position to <strong>the</strong> right of <strong>the</strong> ANC-led government <strong>an</strong>d its hope to profit from oftexpressed<br />
white <strong>an</strong>xieties about <strong>the</strong> consequences of democracy. In less th<strong>an</strong> two months, <strong>the</strong><br />
NP ch<strong>an</strong>ged both its leader <strong>an</strong>d its name when Marth<strong>in</strong>us v<strong>an</strong> Schalkwyk was elected leader<br />
of <strong>the</strong> New National Party.<br />
The remak<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> ANC as a party of government<br />
Hegel once wrote that a political party becomes real only when it divides. That profoundly<br />
dialectical statement will strike m<strong>an</strong>y as odd. But, its profundity lies precisely <strong>in</strong> its<br />
paradoxical nature. Provided that it is not bra<strong>in</strong> dead, as a political movement grows, its <strong>in</strong>ner<br />
contradictions <strong>in</strong>evitably beg<strong>in</strong> to unfold. But as <strong>the</strong>se unfold, so too are <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
ideas enriched <strong>an</strong>d its political <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tellectual life made more vital.<br />
Members of <strong>the</strong> ANC should take comfort from Hegel’s view because it so closely<br />
approximates <strong>the</strong>ir lived political experience. The tired <strong>an</strong>alogy of <strong>the</strong> ANC as a broad church<br />
c<strong>an</strong> prove useful here <strong>in</strong> try<strong>in</strong>g to underst<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> ironies of <strong>the</strong> debates that have so often<br />
taken place <strong>in</strong> recent years with<strong>in</strong> it <strong>an</strong>d among its alli<strong>an</strong>ce partners.<br />
A corpus of religious values holds a church toge<strong>the</strong>r much as a common programme is <strong>the</strong><br />
st<strong>an</strong>dard beneath which <strong>the</strong> political faithful are rallied. That programme def<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong><br />
boundaries of <strong>in</strong>tra-movement debate. Contenders <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>y dispute each seek legitimacy by <strong>an</strong><br />
appeal to its authority, but each is expected to respect <strong>the</strong> bona fides of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. Episcopates<br />
<strong>in</strong> both <strong>the</strong> Catholic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Protest<strong>an</strong>t churches have been prepared to accommodate<br />
heterodox thought with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir folds, provided it could be conta<strong>in</strong>ed or co-opted. Thus was<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y a potential heresy tamed. In <strong>the</strong> ANC, <strong>in</strong> contrast, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g memory of m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
veter<strong>an</strong>s, heterodoxy has regularly become <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> orthodoxy. The dissident voice, <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>novative strategy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> critical ideas have won <strong>the</strong> argument <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement on several<br />
94
occasions. While this offers conservatives little comfort, it would be a rash radical who sought<br />
to employ it as justification for reckless behaviour.<br />
Any serious political movement necessarily requires its adherents to act collectively on <strong>the</strong><br />
decisive issues. The whips <strong>in</strong> a parliamentary party are assigned precisely that role.<br />
Movements that have been forced to operate illegally place greater emphasis on discipl<strong>in</strong>e,<br />
because <strong>an</strong>y breach c<strong>an</strong> result <strong>in</strong> arrests <strong>an</strong>d even <strong>the</strong> suppression of <strong>the</strong> movement itself.<br />
Theoretically, such discipl<strong>in</strong>e does not extend to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner political life of <strong>the</strong> movement, but<br />
<strong>the</strong>re have been numerous <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ces when <strong>the</strong> requirements of discipl<strong>in</strong>e have been abused to<br />
repress debate <strong>an</strong>d critical thought. Prior to March 1960 when it was b<strong>an</strong>ned, ANC practice,<br />
as <strong>the</strong> reams of paper used up <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner-ANC debates will testify, was to encourage optimal<br />
debate with<strong>in</strong> its structures until a collective decision had been arrived at. After that, <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority view was expected to submit to <strong>the</strong> majority. Highly vocal dissent<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>orities, like<br />
<strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>Africa</strong>nists’ of <strong>the</strong> 1950s, survived for years as g<strong>in</strong>ger groups with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC before <strong>the</strong>y<br />
walked out <strong>in</strong> frustration. The communist movement co<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> term ‘democratic centralism’<br />
to describe this practice, which recognised <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>evitability of a diversity of viewpo<strong>in</strong>ts, but<br />
also <strong>in</strong>sisted that <strong>the</strong>y should not impair <strong>the</strong> movement’s capacity for united action.<br />
Security considerations, dist<strong>an</strong>ces between centres <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> dispersal of its membership across<br />
<strong>the</strong> globe severely underm<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> ANC’s ability to operate <strong>in</strong> this way dur<strong>in</strong>g its 30 years of<br />
illegal operations. The militarisation of <strong>the</strong> movement as a result of <strong>the</strong> armed struggle also<br />
tilted <strong>the</strong> bal<strong>an</strong>ce away from consultative practices. But even with<strong>in</strong> those limitations, <strong>the</strong><br />
movement sought to keep alive a tradition of <strong>in</strong>ternal debate <strong>an</strong>d discussion that found<br />
expression <strong>in</strong> its publications, conference documents <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r records. Fem<strong>in</strong>ism, for<br />
example, was disda<strong>in</strong>ed or derided <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC of <strong>the</strong> late 1960s. But it is firmly rooted with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> movement today. Accept<strong>an</strong>ce of same-sex relationships had to be fought for <strong>in</strong> heated<br />
debates. No strategic shifts came as a surprise to ANC members <strong>an</strong>d supporters because, <strong>in</strong><br />
most cases, <strong>the</strong>ir views had been widely c<strong>an</strong>vassed beforeh<strong>an</strong>d. The relative absence of<br />
destabilis<strong>in</strong>g upheavals that might have led to dis<strong>in</strong>tegration attests to <strong>the</strong> skill with which<br />
such issues were m<strong>an</strong>aged. While unity was never conflated with uniformity, <strong>the</strong><br />
crystallisation of factions was also firmly resisted.<br />
Achiev<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> delicate bal<strong>an</strong>ce that enables a movement to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uity while<br />
rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g open to <strong>new</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiatives <strong>an</strong>d even heretic ideas is a challenge even at <strong>the</strong> best of<br />
times. Strong leaders are often tempted to assert <strong>the</strong>ir wills. There were two occasions post-<br />
1990 when even Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela was unable to muster <strong>the</strong> necessary support among <strong>the</strong><br />
ANC’s leadership for his views to prevail. There were numerous o<strong>the</strong>r, less publicised,<br />
occasions when he was over-ruled by <strong>the</strong> executive. Thabo Mbeki <strong>in</strong>itially tabled <strong>the</strong> central<br />
ideas <strong>in</strong> Joe Slovo’s strategic <strong>in</strong>itiative, <strong>the</strong> ‘sunset clauses’. Mbeki lost <strong>the</strong> argument on that<br />
occasion. Despite Slovo’s prestige, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative he authored was hotly contested <strong>an</strong>d<br />
radically amended before it was adopted by <strong>the</strong> ANC. After its legalisation, <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
key strategic partners, <strong>the</strong> SACP <strong>an</strong>d COSATU, have often appeared as bodies seeth<strong>in</strong>g with<br />
fractious <strong>in</strong>ternal conflicts. But perhaps this capacity, even will<strong>in</strong>gness, to enter <strong>in</strong>to robust<br />
debate is a quality to be cherished ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> sneered at. Devot<strong>in</strong>g time <strong>an</strong>d resources to <strong>in</strong>tramovement<br />
debates, arguments <strong>an</strong>d ideological polemics often looks messy <strong>an</strong>d even divisive.<br />
But after a decision is taken, most members are confident that every possible option has been<br />
exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>y also feel a sense of ownership of <strong>the</strong> policy positions adopted. The ANC <strong>in</strong><br />
government sought to reaffirm this aspect of its org<strong>an</strong>isational culture. It reformed <strong>the</strong><br />
work<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> national parliament by open<strong>in</strong>g up all its plenaries <strong>an</strong>d committee meet<strong>in</strong>gs to<br />
members of <strong>the</strong> public <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> media. Stress<strong>in</strong>g accountability <strong>an</strong>d tr<strong>an</strong>sparency, it piloted <strong>the</strong><br />
adoption of codes of ethics for both parliamentari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d members of <strong>the</strong> executive. But<br />
govern<strong>in</strong>g a country has re<strong>in</strong>forced <strong>the</strong> centripetal tendencies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement’s culture,<br />
giv<strong>in</strong>g countervail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> impression of power centralised <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> presidency. Powerful trends<br />
are, however, also evident. The NEC meets once every two months, usually accord<strong>in</strong>g to a<br />
pre-determ<strong>in</strong>ed schedule which permits members to pl<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir attend<strong>an</strong>ce with greater<br />
95
certa<strong>in</strong>ty. Participation <strong>in</strong> its plenaries has also been exp<strong>an</strong>ded to <strong>in</strong>clude non-elected national<br />
government M<strong>in</strong>isters <strong>an</strong>d Deputy M<strong>in</strong>isters.<br />
Participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> two general elections <strong>an</strong>d a host of local government elections <strong>the</strong> ANC has<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduced m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>new</strong> concepts to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n electioneer<strong>in</strong>g. Compelled to master <strong>the</strong><br />
skills of modern elections very quickly <strong>in</strong> 1994, <strong>the</strong> ANC learnt <strong>the</strong> use of op<strong>in</strong>ion surveys<br />
<strong>an</strong>d focus groups. Borrow<strong>in</strong>g from its own past experience, specifically dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> campaign<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Congress of <strong>the</strong> People <strong>in</strong> 1955, <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>the</strong> People’s Forum dur<strong>in</strong>g its<br />
1994 election campaign. Such forums were conceived as town hall meet<strong>in</strong>gs which would<br />
afford members of <strong>the</strong> general public <strong>the</strong> opportunity to question ANC leaders on <strong>an</strong>y aspect<br />
of its election platform. They proved hugely successful <strong>in</strong> bridg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> social dist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
between politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> citizen. The degree of <strong>in</strong>teraction at such forums <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>the</strong><br />
sense of identification with a party that was prepared to listen <strong>an</strong>d did not <strong>in</strong>sist on talk<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
<strong>the</strong> electorate all <strong>the</strong> time. The People’s Forum has now become part of <strong>the</strong> ANC’s elections<br />
repertoire <strong>an</strong>d has been adopted also by <strong>the</strong> Presidency which refers to its ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>gs as<br />
imbizo.<br />
But as a party of government, ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong> illegal liberation movement, membership of<br />
which entailed risks of imprisonment or even death, membership of <strong>the</strong> ANC today could<br />
open up career opportunities. Apart from <strong>the</strong> activists who surfaced <strong>in</strong> 1990 <strong>an</strong>d could now<br />
openly affiliate to <strong>the</strong> ANC, <strong>the</strong> movement is attract<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to its r<strong>an</strong>ks m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong> search of<br />
political careers. The appetites of m<strong>an</strong>y old milit<strong>an</strong>ts for <strong>the</strong> good th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> life have also been<br />
whetted after decades of denial. A measure of <strong>the</strong> problem is repeated allegations of <strong>the</strong><br />
misuse of state funds levelled aga<strong>in</strong>st ANC local councillors <strong>an</strong>d government officials. The<br />
need to fill civil service posts with personnel loyal to <strong>the</strong> ANC’s vision has <strong>in</strong>evitably<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sformed m<strong>an</strong>y capable grassroots’ activists <strong>in</strong>to state bureaucrats, depriv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> movement<br />
of <strong>the</strong> calibre of membership who were <strong>the</strong> driv<strong>in</strong>g force <strong>in</strong> its local structures.<br />
Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> power is visibly ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> character of <strong>the</strong> ANC. Whereas <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past ANC<br />
networks l<strong>in</strong>ked one to <strong>the</strong> movers <strong>an</strong>d shakers among org<strong>an</strong>isations represent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
disadv<strong>an</strong>taged, <strong>the</strong> poor <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> dis<strong>in</strong>herited, today <strong>the</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> also give you access to <strong>the</strong><br />
lead<strong>in</strong>g corporate boardrooms, <strong>the</strong> cab<strong>in</strong>et, top civil serv<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d members of <strong>the</strong> political<br />
elite. This was reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC’s own recast<strong>in</strong>g of its strategy <strong>an</strong>d tactics at its 1997<br />
national conference, that marked <strong>the</strong> pass<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> baton from M<strong>an</strong>dela to Mbeki. On that<br />
occasion, <strong>the</strong> black middle strata, who had received sc<strong>an</strong>t attention <strong>in</strong> previous strategy <strong>an</strong>d<br />
tactics documents, were elevated to <strong>the</strong> status of one of <strong>the</strong> motive forces of <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Democratic Revolution. A ra<strong>the</strong>r vague Black Economic Empowerment project was also<br />
flagged at that conference.<br />
The flesh<strong>in</strong>g out of <strong>the</strong> project s<strong>in</strong>ce 1997 has given rise to fears amongst m<strong>an</strong>y that <strong>the</strong> ANC<br />
has adopted <strong>the</strong> creation of a black bourgeoisie as one of its pr<strong>in</strong>cipal objectives for <strong>the</strong><br />
medium term.<br />
The ANC’s second term<br />
The ANC went to <strong>the</strong> hust<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> 1999 very confident of w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g by a l<strong>an</strong>dslide. The upshot<br />
was that it won just one percentage po<strong>in</strong>t shy of a two-thirds majority. The most salient<br />
feature of <strong>the</strong> 1999 elections, however, was <strong>the</strong> collapse of <strong>the</strong> New National Party, despite its<br />
make-over as <strong>the</strong> New National Party after it walked out of <strong>the</strong> GNU <strong>in</strong> 1996. The Democratic<br />
Party, under Tony Leon’s leadership, emerged as <strong>the</strong> party of white discontent.<br />
Thabo Mbeki assumed <strong>the</strong> presidency hav<strong>in</strong>g acted as de facto President for some years as<br />
Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela gradually disengaged himself from day-to-day government bus<strong>in</strong>ess. He led<br />
<strong>the</strong> ANC to a magnificent electoral victory that left <strong>the</strong> opposition <strong>in</strong> disarray. No o<strong>the</strong>r party<br />
m<strong>an</strong>aged to garner more th<strong>an</strong> ten per cent of <strong>the</strong> poll <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stead of <strong>the</strong> six opposition parties<br />
of <strong>the</strong> first democratic parliament, <strong>the</strong>re are now ten even smaller group<strong>in</strong>gs. The ANC aga<strong>in</strong><br />
offered <strong>the</strong> IFP seats <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> executive though its majority did not require it to f<strong>in</strong>d coalition<br />
partners. A portent of what has become a feature of Mbeki’s <strong>in</strong>cumbency raised its head <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
96
NEC of <strong>the</strong> ANC dur<strong>in</strong>g 1994. React<strong>in</strong>g ra<strong>the</strong>r testily to <strong>an</strong> editorial <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> SACP’s <strong>new</strong>ssheet<br />
Umsebenzi, Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela castigated <strong>the</strong> SACP as <strong>an</strong> unworthy org<strong>an</strong>isation, which<br />
owed its place <strong>in</strong> democratic <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> to <strong>the</strong> ANC. Instead of defend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> SACP, its<br />
former Chairm<strong>an</strong>, Joe Slovo, <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>the</strong>n General Secretary, Charles Nqakula, retreated<br />
before M<strong>an</strong>dela’s attack <strong>an</strong>d apologised for <strong>the</strong> offend<strong>in</strong>g article.<br />
Relations between <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d its communist ally have deteriorated even fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>an</strong>d faster<br />
under Mbeki’s presidency. Nei<strong>the</strong>r COSATU nor <strong>the</strong> SACP had become reconciled to <strong>the</strong><br />
adoption <strong>the</strong> Growth <strong>an</strong>d Redistribution (GEAR) strategy piloted through Cab<strong>in</strong>et dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
M<strong>an</strong>dela’s <strong>in</strong>cumbency. As <strong>the</strong> ANC government proceeded with its speedier implementation<br />
after 1999, repeated exch<strong>an</strong>ges between <strong>the</strong> ANC leadership <strong>an</strong>d its allies ensued. These<br />
escalated as <strong>the</strong> policy areas of difference between <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d its allies seemed to multiply.<br />
By 2001, <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>cluded not only <strong>the</strong> restructur<strong>in</strong>g of state assets, but also <strong>the</strong> HIV/AIDS<br />
p<strong>an</strong>demic.<br />
Perhaps over-confident that it could w<strong>in</strong> over <strong>the</strong> r<strong>an</strong>k-<strong>an</strong>d-file members of COSATU<br />
affiliates, <strong>the</strong> ANC leadership took <strong>the</strong> issues that divided <strong>the</strong> alli<strong>an</strong>ce partners to both<br />
COSATU <strong>an</strong>d SACP conferences. The SACP came <strong>in</strong> for particularly harsh criticism <strong>an</strong>d was<br />
repeatedly warned that it was stray<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> course pioneered by its previous leaders, J.B.<br />
Marks <strong>an</strong>d Moses Kot<strong>an</strong>e, who had been content to allow <strong>the</strong> SACP to survive as a secret<br />
communist network operat<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC, but with no <strong>in</strong>dependent profile. When <strong>the</strong><br />
SACP was legalised <strong>in</strong> 1990, it shed a fair number of its erstwhile members. Consequently<br />
<strong>the</strong>re was a massive <strong>in</strong>take of <strong>new</strong> members, drawn from <strong>the</strong> trade unions, <strong>the</strong> civics <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
mass org<strong>an</strong>isations after <strong>the</strong> SACP’s first <strong>in</strong>ternal congress <strong>in</strong> 1992. Buoyed by <strong>the</strong> popularity<br />
of its General Secretary, Chris H<strong>an</strong>i, <strong>the</strong> SACP grew fast, reach<strong>in</strong>g a high po<strong>in</strong>t of 89,000<br />
paid-up members <strong>in</strong> 2002. It also underwent a period of <strong>in</strong>tense <strong>in</strong>ternal discussion about its<br />
future role, especially <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light of <strong>the</strong> collapse of Soviet socialism <strong>in</strong> Eastern Europe <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. The outcome of <strong>the</strong>se discussions was a decision that, as <strong>the</strong> party of<br />
socialism, it should beg<strong>in</strong> to carve out <strong>an</strong> identity dist<strong>in</strong>ct from both <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> failed<br />
socialist projects <strong>in</strong> Eastern Europe. To achieve <strong>the</strong> former, it did not project itself as <strong>the</strong><br />
v<strong>an</strong>guard of <strong>the</strong> second phase of <strong>the</strong> revolution but <strong>in</strong>stead, spoke boldly about <strong>the</strong> particular<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> alli<strong>an</strong>ce. It appealed to <strong>the</strong> rich ve<strong>in</strong> of <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n radicalism to which <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s communists had made a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive<br />
contribution. Unaccustomed to <strong>an</strong> SACP that not only differed with, but publicly criticised,<br />
positions adopted by <strong>the</strong> leadership, m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC reacted very negatively to <strong>the</strong> positions<br />
<strong>the</strong> SACP pronounced. By J<strong>an</strong>uary 2002 it was not uncommon to hear <strong>the</strong> epi<strong>the</strong>t ‘ultraleftist’<br />
applied to <strong>the</strong> SACP’s leadership. This reached its nadir when two fairly senior ANC<br />
leaders, Josiah Jele <strong>an</strong>d Jabu Moleketi, penned a polemic directed aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> SACP’s<br />
leadership. Both sides to this acrimonious quarrel pulled back from <strong>the</strong> br<strong>in</strong>k towards mid-<br />
2002. An ANC policy conference, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>ticipation of <strong>the</strong> national conference, resulted <strong>in</strong> a<br />
wide-r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g consensus on most issues. At <strong>the</strong> national conference that December, all <strong>the</strong><br />
delegates from <strong>the</strong> president down reaffirmed <strong>the</strong> import<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> tripartite alli<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
There is little dissent with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC over <strong>the</strong> area of foreign affairs where <strong>the</strong> Mbeki-led<br />
government has made its most decisive mark. With <strong>an</strong> energetic Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
person of Dr Nkosaz<strong>an</strong>a Dlam<strong>in</strong>i-Zuma, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has been punch<strong>in</strong>g way above its<br />
weight. Mbeki’s presidency, or ra<strong>the</strong>r his foreign-policy profile, has been facilitated by <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>’s assumption of <strong>the</strong> headship of <strong>the</strong> Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) <strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong><br />
Commonwealth. When <strong>the</strong> OAU ch<strong>an</strong>ged itself <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Union (AU) <strong>in</strong> 2002, <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> also became chair of that cont<strong>in</strong>ental body. In addition, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first three years of<br />
Mbeki’s tenure, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has hosted four major <strong>in</strong>ternational conferences – that of <strong>the</strong><br />
Commonwealth, <strong>the</strong> World Conference Aga<strong>in</strong>st Racism, <strong>the</strong> World Summit on Susta<strong>in</strong>able<br />
Development <strong>an</strong>d lastly <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Union.<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n foreign policy has as its central pl<strong>an</strong>k <strong>the</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g of space for <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
people to def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong>ir own future by explor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d offer<strong>in</strong>g viable, <strong>in</strong>digenously-evolved,<br />
97
alternative agendas to those imposed on our cont<strong>in</strong>ent by former colonial powers <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
allies. <strong>Africa</strong> has also adopted <strong>new</strong> <strong>an</strong>d far-reach<strong>in</strong>g hum<strong>an</strong> rights <strong>in</strong>struments dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> past<br />
four years. Though <strong>the</strong> rights conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se charters are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> aspirational, <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicative of <strong>an</strong>d will re<strong>in</strong>force <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g trend toward democratic govern<strong>an</strong>ce on <strong>the</strong><br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ent. Progress towards democratisation on <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent is still very uneven but <strong>the</strong><br />
struggles of ord<strong>in</strong>ary citizens <strong>an</strong>d political activists have ga<strong>in</strong>ed momentum dur<strong>in</strong>g this time<br />
<strong>an</strong>d could result <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>an</strong>d extension of democratic space <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n societies.<br />
The ANC’s second term started with a bold foreign-policy <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congo when<br />
Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela attempted to arr<strong>an</strong>ge a relatively peaceful tr<strong>an</strong>sfer of power. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
became even more deeply ent<strong>an</strong>gled after Mobutu fled, <strong>an</strong>d Laurent Kabila assumed power <strong>in</strong><br />
K<strong>in</strong>shasa, backed by Ug<strong>an</strong>da <strong>an</strong>d Rw<strong>an</strong>da. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n diplomacy at first sought to<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imise <strong>the</strong> capacity of non-<strong>Africa</strong>n powers to <strong>in</strong>terfere <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congo so as to give <strong>the</strong><br />
Congolese <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir neighbours a ch<strong>an</strong>ce to resolve <strong>the</strong>ir problems. The upshot was ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
different from what had been hoped for. Ug<strong>an</strong>da <strong>an</strong>d Rw<strong>an</strong>da had been drawn <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> effort<br />
to get rid of Mobutu <strong>in</strong> pursu<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong>ir own <strong>in</strong>terests. Unable to secure <strong>the</strong>se from Laurent<br />
Kabilia, whom <strong>the</strong>y had assisted to power, both countries sought to use armed Congolese<br />
factions close to <strong>the</strong>m to overthrow Kabila’s government. That had <strong>in</strong>spired President Mugabe<br />
of Zimbabwe to seek a multi-state SADC <strong>in</strong>tervention, <strong>in</strong> support of Laurent Kabila’s<br />
beleagured government. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, Botsw<strong>an</strong>a, Mozambique <strong>an</strong>d Malawi refused to<br />
become <strong>in</strong>volved, but Namibia <strong>an</strong>d Angola sent troops <strong>an</strong>d equipment.<br />
From day one of his presidency, Mbeki tried to f<strong>in</strong>d a solution to <strong>the</strong> Congo crisis. After three<br />
years of talks, <strong>in</strong>terrupted by outbreaks of terrible bloodlett<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> Congo factions agreed to<br />
constitute a government of national unity <strong>in</strong> December 2002. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> had <strong>in</strong>vested<br />
millions of r<strong>an</strong>ds to keep <strong>the</strong> negotiations afloat but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end was unable to exclude non-<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n powers. When <strong>the</strong> fragile peace <strong>in</strong> Eastern Congo threatened to unravel <strong>in</strong> 2003,<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> was compelled to accept <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of French troops to keep <strong>the</strong> warr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
factions apart.<br />
As Deputy President, Mbeki had nailed his colours to <strong>the</strong> mast of <strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Renaiss<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
When he assumed <strong>the</strong> presidency it was expected that this vision would be fur<strong>the</strong>r fleshed out.<br />
The arrival of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> millennium, six months after he became president, offered a golden<br />
opportunity. Work<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> Presidents of Algeria <strong>an</strong>d Nigeria, he crafted what was at first<br />
named <strong>the</strong> Millennium <strong>Africa</strong>n Project or MAP. This was conceived as <strong>an</strong> ambitious<br />
programme for <strong>Africa</strong>n economic development premised on good govern<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d rapid<br />
economic growth driven by massive <strong>in</strong>flows of direct foreign <strong>in</strong>vestment. The Presidents of<br />
Egypt <strong>an</strong>d Senegal were subsequently also drawn <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> projects were redesigned to take<br />
account of <strong>the</strong>ir contributions. It was <strong>the</strong>n renamed <strong>the</strong> New Partnership for <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
Development (NEPAD) with roughly <strong>the</strong> same features. Mbeki took <strong>the</strong> lead <strong>in</strong> c<strong>an</strong>vass<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g support for NEPAD among <strong>the</strong> political leaders of <strong>the</strong> developed world. Despite<br />
extremely parsimonious commitments from G8 summits <strong>in</strong> C<strong>an</strong>ada <strong>an</strong>d Fr<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>the</strong>re is still<br />
optimism that <strong>the</strong> developed economies will come to <strong>the</strong> party.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g its first five years under M<strong>an</strong>dela’s presidency, <strong>the</strong> ANC’s ma<strong>in</strong> aim was <strong>the</strong><br />
consolidation of <strong>the</strong> democratic breakthrough <strong>an</strong>d ensur<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns bought <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>new</strong>ly-won democracy. The 1999 elections seemed to confirm that<br />
it achieved that objective.<br />
27 April 1994 completely tr<strong>an</strong>sformed <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n political l<strong>an</strong>dscape. The <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
majority – some 77% of <strong>the</strong> total population at last count – are now <strong>the</strong> decisive factor <strong>in</strong><br />
electoral politics. No political party c<strong>an</strong> hope to prosper except by address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>an</strong>d<br />
aspirations of that majority. Reduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> gap between rich <strong>an</strong>d poor rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> priority<br />
issue on <strong>the</strong> national agenda. Apar<strong>the</strong>id, <strong>an</strong>d not <strong>the</strong> ANC’s rhetoric, has determ<strong>in</strong>ed that this<br />
98
l<strong>in</strong>e of cleavage will <strong>in</strong> large measure co<strong>in</strong>cide with race. Address<strong>in</strong>g a graduat<strong>in</strong>g class at<br />
Howard University <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, DC, <strong>in</strong> June 1965, President Lyndon Johnson, declared:<br />
But freedom is not enough. You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by<br />
cha<strong>in</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d liberate him, br<strong>in</strong>g him up to <strong>the</strong> start<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> race <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n say, you are free<br />
to compete with all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>an</strong>d still justly believe that you have been completely fair. Thus<br />
it is not enough just to open <strong>the</strong> gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have <strong>the</strong> ability to<br />
walk through those gates.<br />
The extent to which it succeeds <strong>in</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> previously disadv<strong>an</strong>taged <strong>the</strong> capacity to walk<br />
through those gates is <strong>the</strong> measur<strong>in</strong>g rod <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> will use to judge <strong>the</strong> ANC’s ten-year<br />
stewardship.<br />
* A previous version of this article, titled “The <strong>Africa</strong>n National Congress: From<br />
Illegality to <strong>the</strong> Corridors of Power”, was published <strong>in</strong> Review of <strong>Africa</strong>n Political Economy<br />
Vol. 31, No. 100 (June 2004).<br />
99
9 The tr<strong>an</strong>sformation of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n trade union<br />
movement <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> challenges<br />
By John Appolis<br />
Introduction<br />
In m<strong>an</strong>y quarters of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, except of course <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> official trade unions, <strong>the</strong>re is a<br />
general recognition that <strong>the</strong> ‘forward march’ of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n trade union movement<br />
(SATUM ) 28 has been halted. The official SATUM is <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> unfortunate state of denial that it is<br />
presently unable to fulfil <strong>the</strong> traditional role of defender of <strong>the</strong> immediate political, economic<br />
<strong>an</strong>d social <strong>in</strong>terests of its members <strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong> broader work<strong>in</strong>g class. In import<strong>an</strong>t spheres of<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence tremendous ground has been lost over <strong>the</strong> past ten years. This is <strong>in</strong> stark contrast to<br />
<strong>the</strong> situation a decade ago when unions were viewed as <strong>the</strong> champions of <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> poor, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> bearers of <strong>an</strong> alternative society.<br />
We have today still boisterous claims that <strong>the</strong> SATUM has adapted well to <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> political<br />
dispensation <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. As recent as June 2006 <strong>the</strong> SATUM <strong>in</strong> its Discussion<br />
Document, drafted for debate at its up-com<strong>in</strong>g 9 th National Congress <strong>in</strong> September of this<br />
year, has this to say:<br />
COSATU … has prepared well for democracy. It has adapted fairly well to <strong>the</strong> democratic<br />
dispensation but faces <strong>new</strong> challenges. It reta<strong>in</strong>s its vision of tr<strong>an</strong>sformative unionism <strong>an</strong>d has<br />
played <strong>an</strong> active role to shape <strong>the</strong> democratic dispensation. It also reta<strong>in</strong>s a high degree of<br />
milit<strong>an</strong>cy which it has deployed aga<strong>in</strong>st employers <strong>an</strong>d elements of state policy.<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong>se lofty claims, reality pa<strong>in</strong>ts a different picture where, under <strong>the</strong> cover of<br />
democracy, <strong>the</strong> SATUM has suffered a reversal of fortunes of historic proportions. It is <strong>the</strong><br />
contention of this article that, presently <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, capital, with <strong>the</strong> conscious assist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of <strong>the</strong> ANC government, has eng<strong>in</strong>eered <strong>in</strong> its favour a fundamental shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> bal<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
power. Two major contribut<strong>in</strong>g factors have brought about this unfortunate scenario where <strong>the</strong><br />
once mighty SATUM has been halted <strong>in</strong> its tracks. Firstly, <strong>the</strong> unrelent<strong>in</strong>g neo-liberal<br />
offensive from <strong>the</strong> side of <strong>the</strong> capitalist class <strong>an</strong>d its national state agency, <strong>the</strong> ANC<br />
government, was, <strong>an</strong>d fr<strong>an</strong>kly still is today, <strong>the</strong> chief destroyer of <strong>the</strong> fortunes of <strong>the</strong><br />
movement. Secondly, <strong>the</strong> impotency of <strong>the</strong> SATUM to mount a serious defence to this neoliberal<br />
offensive has paradoxically compounded <strong>the</strong> problems of <strong>the</strong> movement. In fact, it c<strong>an</strong><br />
be said, <strong>an</strong>d as this article will attempt to demonstrate, that, by <strong>an</strong>d large, <strong>the</strong> response of <strong>the</strong><br />
trade union movement has contributed to <strong>the</strong> entrenchment of <strong>the</strong> hegemonic position of <strong>the</strong><br />
neo-liberal paradigm <strong>in</strong> our country.<br />
The neo-liberal offensive<br />
After only two years of be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> political office, <strong>the</strong> ANC government unceremoniously<br />
discarded <strong>the</strong> mild social democratic Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme (RDP), <strong>the</strong><br />
political m<strong>an</strong>date on which it assumed office. In its stead, <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> political elite hastily<br />
unwrapped <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal programme ironically named <strong>the</strong> Growth, Employment <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Redistribution Programme (GEAR), <strong>an</strong>d imposed it onto <strong>the</strong> rest of society, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g its own<br />
allies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> trade union movement. Literally with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> space of two years <strong>the</strong> ANC<br />
28<br />
Reference is here made to <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t federation of trade unions: The Congress of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Trade<br />
Unions (COSATU)<br />
101
government re-<strong>in</strong>vented itself as a long-st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g advocate of neo-liberalism <strong>an</strong>d moved<br />
irreversibly away from be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> champions of <strong>the</strong> people to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> defenders of big<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>ess.<br />
As <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> all cases worldwide where neo-liberalism took root, <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n vari<strong>an</strong>t had<br />
all <strong>the</strong> familiar <strong>in</strong>gredients:<br />
• That economic development <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> must be led by <strong>the</strong> capitalist class ( <strong>the</strong><br />
private sector )<br />
• The state must play a smaller <strong>an</strong>d smaller role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> economy. The state’s role must be<br />
one of creat<strong>in</strong>g a play<strong>in</strong>g field <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> capitalists c<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>an</strong>d make money.<br />
• The state-owned enterprises must be privatised<br />
• The government spend<strong>in</strong>g must be cut so that <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id debt is paid.<br />
• The economy must become <strong>in</strong>ternationally competitive <strong>an</strong>d be based on <strong>an</strong> exportorientated<br />
strategy. This me<strong>an</strong>s that tariffs <strong>an</strong>d duties that protected <strong>in</strong>dustries <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past<br />
must be removed.<br />
• The laws that prevented capitalists from tak<strong>in</strong>g money out of <strong>the</strong> country – exch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
control regulations – must be removed.<br />
• There must be wage restra<strong>in</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d deregulation of <strong>the</strong> labour market.<br />
We are now <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tenth year of <strong>an</strong> unrelent<strong>in</strong>g bombardment of neo-liberalism <strong>an</strong>d reality<br />
speaks for itself. To its credit <strong>the</strong> SATUM, <strong>in</strong> its Discussion Document, has this to say of <strong>the</strong><br />
past decade:<br />
Contrast <strong>the</strong> optimistic picture of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n economy punted by <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream media<br />
with <strong>the</strong> reality confronted by millions of poor <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns. Unemployment rema<strong>in</strong>s<br />
stubbornly high by both <strong>the</strong> strict <strong>an</strong>d narrow def<strong>in</strong>ition. Some four million people, or about<br />
27% of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n adults, are unemployed, us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> narrow def<strong>in</strong>ition that counts as<br />
unemployed only those people who searched for a job <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> week before <strong>the</strong> survey. The<br />
figure doubles to eight million or 41% if <strong>the</strong> exp<strong>an</strong>ded def<strong>in</strong>ition of unemployment is used.<br />
This def<strong>in</strong>ition counts as unemployed workers that have given up look<strong>in</strong>g for work but who<br />
w<strong>an</strong>t a paid job. It is probably a better <strong>in</strong>dicator of structural, long term unemployment.<br />
Unemployment is highly racialised, gendered <strong>an</strong>d unevenly distributed by region. Of <strong>the</strong><br />
unemployed over 70% are under <strong>the</strong> age of 35. <strong>Africa</strong>n women <strong>an</strong>d rural areas fare worse <strong>in</strong><br />
comparison to men <strong>an</strong>d urb<strong>an</strong> areas. The quality of jobs is also decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g as perm<strong>an</strong>ent secure<br />
employment is replaced by precarious <strong>an</strong>d vulnerable forms of employment. On paper,<br />
workers have ga<strong>in</strong>ed rights that <strong>in</strong> practice are be<strong>in</strong>g “hollowed out” as employers use various<br />
strategies to circumvent <strong>the</strong> labour law. At a micro-enterprise level <strong>the</strong> promise of democracy<br />
has been thwarted. The apar<strong>the</strong>id world order <strong>an</strong>d discipl<strong>in</strong>e have been re-imposed <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n workplaces. (See Bezuidenhout <strong>an</strong>d Fakier 2006 <strong>an</strong>d von Holdt <strong>an</strong>d Webster<br />
2005)<br />
Income <strong>in</strong>equality is also high, <strong>an</strong>d worsened at least <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1990s. (Gelb <strong>an</strong>d Simk<strong>in</strong>s)<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> UNDP Hum<strong>an</strong> Development Report (2003) <strong>the</strong> G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient was 0.596 <strong>in</strong><br />
1995 <strong>an</strong>d rose to 0.635 <strong>in</strong> 2001 suggest<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong>equality was worsen<strong>in</strong>g. This is of<br />
concern not only from ethical perspective of <strong>the</strong> National Democratic Revolution that seeks to<br />
make society more equitable, but also from <strong>an</strong> economic perspective. Today, <strong>the</strong>re is wide<br />
consensus that reduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equality is necessary for susta<strong>in</strong>able economic growth.<br />
In short, <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id socio-economic order c<strong>an</strong> be characterised as one <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
positive economic growth <strong>an</strong>d opportunities for amass<strong>in</strong>g wealth for a few. This growth is not<br />
equitably shared <strong>an</strong>d does not trickle down much to <strong>the</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y that are desperately poor. While<br />
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<strong>the</strong>re is a formal break with <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id racial order<strong>in</strong>g of society, <strong>the</strong> dualistic development<br />
path cont<strong>in</strong>ues, albeit with <strong>new</strong> features. Fundamentally <strong>the</strong> accumulation regime has not<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ged, so that development <strong>an</strong>d under-development cont<strong>in</strong>ues to coexist. Cheap labour is<br />
reproduced under different circumst<strong>an</strong>ces, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g through sub-contract<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
use of women labour <strong>an</strong>d through exploitation of undocumented migr<strong>an</strong>t workers, especially<br />
Zimbabwe<strong>an</strong>s.<br />
The ma<strong>in</strong> driver of <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal offensive has been, <strong>an</strong>d still is, <strong>the</strong> democratically elected<br />
ANC government. Contrary to <strong>the</strong> general wisdom <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> political circles of <strong>the</strong> liberation<br />
movement, <strong>the</strong> ANC was not a victim of outside imperial forces that imposed <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal<br />
paradigm onto <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong>ly elected <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>experienced government, but ra<strong>the</strong>r it had choices, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
it opted for <strong>the</strong> path of neo-liberalism.<br />
Giv<strong>in</strong>g credence to its <strong>new</strong> identity, <strong>the</strong> ANC government, over <strong>the</strong> past decade, adopted<br />
policies putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> place <strong>the</strong> fundamentals of neo-liberalism – a favourable tax regime for<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>ess where tax on bus<strong>in</strong>ess has progressively been reduced, relaxation of exch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
controls, remov<strong>in</strong>g of trade barriers, <strong>the</strong> privatisation of <strong>the</strong> productive assets of <strong>the</strong> economy<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> progressive reduction <strong>in</strong> social expenditure.<br />
As if <strong>the</strong>se policies were not creat<strong>in</strong>g enough social <strong>in</strong>equalities, <strong>the</strong> social wage has also been<br />
converted <strong>in</strong>to a terra<strong>in</strong> for capitalist profit-mak<strong>in</strong>g through <strong>the</strong> commodification of <strong>the</strong><br />
provision of basic services. The latter – hous<strong>in</strong>g, education, water, electricity <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>itation –<br />
c<strong>an</strong> only be accessed <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> if <strong>the</strong> citizens have <strong>the</strong> necessary monetary me<strong>an</strong>s to<br />
acquire <strong>the</strong>m. Bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that this policy of commodification is be<strong>in</strong>g applied <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context<br />
of chronic unemployment.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> process of spearhead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal offensive <strong>the</strong> ANC government itself underwent<br />
a tr<strong>an</strong>sformation <strong>an</strong>d has become closely associated with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of big capital. The quote<br />
above from COSATU’s document highlights <strong>the</strong> fact that a redistribution of wealth has taken<br />
place but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction of <strong>the</strong> capitalist class, which appropriated <strong>the</strong> largest share of <strong>the</strong><br />
national surplus.<br />
Unsurpris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>n is <strong>the</strong> presence of strong tendencies empty<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> state of its<br />
democratic content. More <strong>an</strong>d more, <strong>the</strong> executive arm of <strong>the</strong> state – <strong>the</strong> Thabo Mbeki<br />
presidency <strong>an</strong>d its cab<strong>in</strong>et – is <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> decision-makers of policies <strong>an</strong>d laws with parliament<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g reduced to a rubber stamp. Parliamentary deputies are elected on <strong>the</strong> basis of<br />
proportional representation on a political party ticket <strong>an</strong>d are <strong>the</strong>refore chosen by <strong>the</strong> party<br />
bosses. The result of this electoral system is to ensure <strong>the</strong> acquiescence of <strong>the</strong> deputies to <strong>the</strong><br />
party bosses. Consequently <strong>the</strong> democratically elected parliament has, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> eyes of millions<br />
of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns, lost its lofty status as <strong>the</strong> representative of <strong>the</strong> people. And <strong>the</strong> result has<br />
been widespread dissatisfaction with <strong>the</strong> centralisation of power <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> h<strong>an</strong>ds of <strong>the</strong> Thabo<br />
Mbeki presidency.<br />
All <strong>the</strong>se decisions comb<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>the</strong> power of <strong>the</strong> Presidency. They po<strong>in</strong>t to a highly<br />
centralised position, <strong>an</strong>d expla<strong>in</strong>s why <strong>the</strong> price of <strong>the</strong> Presidency, <strong>an</strong>d its potential for<br />
extended patronage, is so very high. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> state is weak <strong>in</strong> deliberately driv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
a development agenda <strong>an</strong>d has no central <strong>in</strong>stitution with such a m<strong>an</strong>date. Prior to <strong>the</strong> creation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Policy Advisory Service <strong>an</strong>d Cab<strong>in</strong>et clusters, government was <strong>in</strong>coherent <strong>an</strong>d<br />
compartmentalised. It is, however, committed to driv<strong>in</strong>g a neo-liberal economic programme<br />
concerned primarily with stabilisation ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sformation.<br />
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What should be recognised that it is no accident that <strong>the</strong> centralisation of power is tak<strong>in</strong>g root<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> political <strong>in</strong>stitutions because <strong>the</strong> more <strong>the</strong> nation state rules <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>the</strong><br />
capitalist class <strong>the</strong> more removed <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sulated it must become from <strong>the</strong> people. It c<strong>an</strong>not<br />
afford to be subjected to popular pressure. Contrary <strong>the</strong>refore to COSATU’s view, <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n state is not a weak state but ra<strong>the</strong>r a state that is strongly committed to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest of<br />
big capital.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r target of <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal offensive, <strong>an</strong>d one vital to <strong>the</strong> prospects of capital<br />
accumulation, was <strong>the</strong> traditional power base of <strong>the</strong> trade union movement. What is not really<br />
understood by <strong>the</strong> SATUM is that <strong>the</strong> successful implementation of <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal<br />
programme was dependent on <strong>the</strong> weaken<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> power base of <strong>the</strong> movement. Ironically<br />
COSATU’s political ally, <strong>the</strong> ANC, had to effect a demobilisation <strong>an</strong>d depoliticization of <strong>the</strong><br />
membership base of <strong>the</strong> trade unions. How was this executed?<br />
Historically <strong>the</strong> power of <strong>the</strong> trade unions rested on <strong>the</strong> blue-collar workers who led milit<strong>an</strong>t<br />
struggles aga<strong>in</strong>st both <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id regime <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> capitalist class. It built <strong>the</strong> movement<br />
through its stubborn resist<strong>an</strong>ce of more th<strong>an</strong> two decades start<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1970s.<br />
It is at <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of production, <strong>the</strong> world of work, that, it must be said, <strong>the</strong> reversal of fortunes<br />
of <strong>the</strong> trade unions effected by <strong>the</strong> SA rul<strong>in</strong>g elite is acutely felt. This is what <strong>the</strong> SATUM has<br />
to say about <strong>the</strong> workplace:<br />
COSATU has also retreated from <strong>the</strong> workplace as a site of contestation <strong>an</strong>d mass activism. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> 1980s COSATU successfully beg<strong>an</strong> to challenge <strong>the</strong> prerogative of m<strong>an</strong>agement, but<br />
bosses have begun to recapture this space post-1994….. Outside of wage struggles, <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
coherent strategy to challenge m<strong>an</strong>agement prerogatives <strong>an</strong>d to democratise <strong>the</strong> workplace.<br />
COSATU has rejected <strong>the</strong> workplace forums but has not necessarily used o<strong>the</strong>r strategies to<br />
challenge ‘m<strong>an</strong>agement prerogative’. Workers have been reduced to spectators <strong>an</strong>d a reserve<br />
army wait<strong>in</strong>g for mobilisation.<br />
The pr<strong>in</strong>cipal me<strong>an</strong>s by which <strong>the</strong> reversal of fortunes has been orchestrated was <strong>the</strong> recast<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of blue-collar worker <strong>in</strong>to labour brokers, outsourced work <strong>an</strong>d temporary <strong>an</strong>d casual<br />
labour. The workplace of today is unrecognisable from that of <strong>the</strong> previous decade. This<br />
reconstitution of <strong>the</strong> workforce brought <strong>in</strong> its wake structural divisions with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> employed<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g class where <strong>the</strong>re is now a const<strong>an</strong>tly shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g pool of perm<strong>an</strong>ently employed<br />
encircled by <strong>an</strong> ever-grow<strong>in</strong>g pool of atypical employed workers. The employment<br />
relationships of <strong>the</strong> atypical workers are characterised by ultra-exploitative conditions. They<br />
are vulnerable <strong>an</strong>d subjected to a work regime of const<strong>an</strong>t job <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong>security.<br />
Import<strong>an</strong>tly with labour broker<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> compensation of <strong>the</strong> worker is no longer <strong>the</strong><br />
responsibility of <strong>the</strong> employer extract<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d appropriat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> surplus value but that of a<br />
third party. The latter generally falls fall outside <strong>the</strong> scope of collective barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. The upshot<br />
of <strong>the</strong> re-org<strong>an</strong>isation of work is a structurally divided work<strong>in</strong>g class with workers locked<br />
<strong>in</strong> a competitive battle for survival aga<strong>in</strong>st each o<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
What should be noted is that <strong>the</strong> re-assertion of <strong>the</strong> power of m<strong>an</strong>agement over <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n workforce was largely achieved at great cost <strong>in</strong> jobs where thous<strong>an</strong>ds upon thous<strong>an</strong>ds<br />
of workers were removed from <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of production through <strong>the</strong> process of retrenchments.<br />
It is common knowledge that s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> advent of democracy more th<strong>an</strong> a million workers have<br />
lost <strong>the</strong>ir jobs <strong>in</strong> SA <strong>an</strong>d, as mentioned earlier, unemployment is currently runn<strong>in</strong>g at 40%.<br />
Unemployment has become a major political <strong>an</strong>d economic weapon <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> h<strong>an</strong>ds of <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
class <strong>an</strong>d is a dead weight on <strong>the</strong> employed work<strong>in</strong>g class.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> era of neo-liberalism <strong>the</strong>re are no prospects of a physical re<strong>new</strong>al of <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class<br />
at <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of production. It has been shown that under neo-liberalism <strong>the</strong>re is tendency for<br />
104
low or no growth. In 2005 SA achieved a growth rate of 4,3% but this has been jobless<br />
growth. No susta<strong>in</strong>able economic growth is possible under neo-liberalism <strong>an</strong>d we have come<br />
to realise that economic booms are <strong>the</strong> exception ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> rule. If <strong>the</strong>re is growth <strong>the</strong>n it<br />
is ma<strong>in</strong>ly premised on <strong>in</strong>creased speculative activity.<br />
Previously under capitalism, jobs <strong>in</strong> times of boom were always expected. Historically<br />
unemployment was considered temporary – a phenomenon of <strong>the</strong> times of bust or recession.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> hegemony of neo-liberalism unemployment is structural <strong>an</strong>d perm<strong>an</strong>ent. This is <strong>in</strong><br />
direct contrast with earlier periods of <strong>the</strong> revival of <strong>the</strong> trade union movement. In <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustrial exp<strong>an</strong>sion from <strong>the</strong> mid-1930s through to <strong>the</strong> war years led<br />
to a massive <strong>in</strong>flux of black workers <strong>in</strong>to semi-skilled work provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong> revival<br />
of <strong>Africa</strong>n trade unionism dur<strong>in</strong>g that period. The next phase of <strong>the</strong> revival of <strong>the</strong> trade union<br />
movement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1970s came <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake of <strong>the</strong> second period of exp<strong>an</strong>sion of <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g base dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1960s. The decade saw hundreds of thous<strong>an</strong>ds of workers<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g absorbed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> factories <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>es. This dramatic exp<strong>an</strong>sion <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> physical<br />
composition of <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class gave it confidence to org<strong>an</strong>ise, resist <strong>an</strong>d form trade unions.<br />
In this sense <strong>the</strong> regeneration of <strong>the</strong> trade union movement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s was directly premised<br />
on major <strong>in</strong>dustrial <strong>an</strong>d economic growth – under <strong>the</strong> era of racial social democracy. Neoliberalism<br />
holds no such prospects.<br />
The two <strong>in</strong>terrelated processes of retrenchments <strong>an</strong>d re-org<strong>an</strong>isation of work have led to <strong>the</strong><br />
heighten<strong>in</strong>g of competition between <strong>the</strong> different layers of <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class for jobs, <strong>in</strong>come<br />
<strong>an</strong>d survival. Any trade unionist c<strong>an</strong> confirm that competition between workers is fatal for<br />
strong org<strong>an</strong>isation <strong>an</strong>d radical politics. Not only <strong>in</strong>creased competition arose as a result of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se processes, but retrenchments <strong>in</strong> particular have caused <strong>the</strong> lost of a whole generation of<br />
trade union <strong>an</strong>d socialist milit<strong>an</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong> trade union movement. These two processes have<br />
thus wreaked havoc with <strong>the</strong> power base of <strong>the</strong> SATUM <strong>an</strong>d directly led to <strong>the</strong> progressive<br />
weaken<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> movement.<br />
The impact <strong>an</strong>d response of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n trade union movement<br />
The membership base<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> first casualties of <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal offensive has been <strong>the</strong> membership base of <strong>the</strong><br />
trade union movement. The traditional base of <strong>the</strong> trade unions has contracted <strong>an</strong>d, for <strong>the</strong><br />
first time <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history of <strong>the</strong> SATUM, it has entered a phase of decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g membership.<br />
Statistically <strong>the</strong> picture is as follows:<br />
In 1997, <strong>the</strong> traditional strong holds of <strong>the</strong> trade unions, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
membership stood at 1 247 600 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> 2002 it stood at 1 033 000 reflect<strong>in</strong>g a decl<strong>in</strong>e of 214<br />
600, tr<strong>an</strong>slat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to 17%. Partially off-sett<strong>in</strong>g this decl<strong>in</strong>e was <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sector.<br />
Comparable over <strong>the</strong> same period <strong>the</strong> membership <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sector stood at 543 400<br />
(1997) <strong>an</strong>d 734 100 (2002) represent<strong>in</strong>g a growth of 190 700, a signific<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>crease of 35%.<br />
But <strong>the</strong> cycle of growth <strong>in</strong> public sector members has come to <strong>an</strong> end <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> 2003 decl<strong>in</strong>ed by<br />
5 800. Even though <strong>the</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e is m<strong>in</strong>uscule, <strong>the</strong> signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>reof is that it co<strong>in</strong>cides with<br />
a general decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> total membership of <strong>the</strong> federation.<br />
Of more signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> trade union membership base largely still consists of <strong>the</strong><br />
perm<strong>an</strong>ently employed (92%), a decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g section of <strong>the</strong> employed work<strong>in</strong>g class. Though<br />
attempts are made to draw <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> atypical workers <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> unions, no major <strong>in</strong>roads have been<br />
achieved. On <strong>the</strong> side of <strong>the</strong> unemployed <strong>the</strong>re is total neglect <strong>an</strong>d no attempts whatsoever are<br />
made.<br />
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COSATU <strong>an</strong>d its affiliates are fail<strong>in</strong>g to effectively org<strong>an</strong>ise atypical workers <strong>an</strong>d to make<br />
large enough <strong>in</strong>roads <strong>in</strong>to sections of <strong>the</strong> unorg<strong>an</strong>ised <strong>an</strong>d vulnerable. Org<strong>an</strong>is<strong>in</strong>g atypical<br />
workers poses a challenge to unions <strong>in</strong>ternationally. It must be po<strong>in</strong>ted out that COSATU<br />
unions are try<strong>in</strong>g to grapple with <strong>the</strong>se issues but on aggregate <strong>the</strong> movement is not<br />
succeed<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
This me<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> effect that COSATU has not succeeded to unify <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
2015 Pl<strong>an</strong>. Internally we have failed to consolidate our strength because of <strong>the</strong> failure to form<br />
strong cartels <strong>an</strong>d merge unions as envisaged by <strong>the</strong> previous congresses <strong>an</strong>d 2015<br />
programme.<br />
This situation is d<strong>an</strong>gerous <strong>an</strong>d may prove to be <strong>the</strong> soft underbelly of COSATU. If COSATU<br />
represents a shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g pool of workers with perm<strong>an</strong>ent jobs surrounded by a sea of poorly<br />
paid <strong>an</strong>d temporary workers, it will be vulnerable to attacks by employers <strong>an</strong>d conservatives.<br />
The ga<strong>in</strong>s it makes for its members will be eroded.<br />
As compared to <strong>the</strong> previous decade <strong>the</strong> profile of <strong>the</strong> union member has also undergone a<br />
very fundamental tr<strong>an</strong>sformation with serious ramifications for workplace activism. The<br />
Discussion Document shows that <strong>the</strong> trade union members are fast becom<strong>in</strong>g more educated<br />
<strong>an</strong>d possible more well off relatively to o<strong>the</strong>r sections of <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class:<br />
• The membership profile is ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g: COSATU seems to be represent<strong>in</strong>g mostly<br />
workers <strong>in</strong> perm<strong>an</strong>ent occupations; older th<strong>an</strong> 35 years; predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>tly <strong>Africa</strong>n males;<br />
grow<strong>in</strong>g number of semi-skilled <strong>an</strong>d skilled; <strong>an</strong>d more <strong>an</strong>d more <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sector.<br />
• The membership is largely <strong>new</strong> with little org<strong>an</strong>isational memory. The SWOP survey<br />
conducted <strong>in</strong> 2004 revealed 80% of current COSATU members jo<strong>in</strong>ed after its creation<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1985. Fur<strong>the</strong>r 35% jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> federation after 1991 <strong>an</strong>d 13% jo<strong>in</strong>ed over <strong>the</strong> past two<br />
years. This me<strong>an</strong>s only 20% have <strong>the</strong> pre 1985 experience <strong>an</strong>d even lesser number were<br />
part of <strong>the</strong> great revival of <strong>the</strong> democratic movement sparked by <strong>the</strong> 1973 Durb<strong>an</strong><br />
strikes.<br />
• The education levels of COSATU members have improved. The same SWOP survey<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicates that 64% have matric <strong>an</strong>d forms of formal education qualifications. Some 7%<br />
of COSATU members have a university degree, a fur<strong>the</strong>r 13% have a technikon<br />
diploma, 38% have matric <strong>an</strong>d 6% have post school qualification. This me<strong>an</strong>s COSATU<br />
membership on average has a better education level th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> average work<strong>in</strong>g class.<br />
• Class formation: M<strong>an</strong>y former leaders <strong>an</strong>d members have moved up <strong>the</strong> social hierarchy<br />
<strong>in</strong>to middle class positions. In this context, <strong>the</strong> movement c<strong>an</strong> be used as a ladder if <strong>new</strong><br />
members perceive it to be <strong>the</strong> route to ga<strong>in</strong> promotion <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> work place or deployment<br />
to senior political positions.<br />
Evidently SA unions have not understood <strong>the</strong> political <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>isational implications of<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world of work. Their strategies <strong>an</strong>d forms are not adapted to <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong><br />
conditions. Historically a direct correlation exists between <strong>the</strong> forms of trade unionism <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> org<strong>an</strong>isation of <strong>the</strong> labour process. Look<strong>in</strong>g back at <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g forms of trade unionism<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>the</strong>re emerged a variety of forms r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g from crafts unions <strong>an</strong>d general<br />
unions to <strong>in</strong>dustrial based unions.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r fact not be<strong>in</strong>g confronted by <strong>the</strong> trade unions is that <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g profile of <strong>the</strong><br />
membership base is hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> impact on its ability to mount <strong>an</strong> effective defence.<br />
But at <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> day, <strong>the</strong> strategies employed by <strong>the</strong> trade unions are political choices<br />
reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of its lead<strong>in</strong>g bodies <strong>an</strong>d its base. Tragically <strong>the</strong> policies <strong>an</strong>d responses<br />
of <strong>the</strong> SATUM to <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal offensive have not caused <strong>an</strong>y reth<strong>in</strong>k on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong><br />
rul<strong>in</strong>g elite but ra<strong>the</strong>r led to <strong>the</strong>ir entrenchment.<br />
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Political <strong>an</strong>d ideological adaptation to <strong>the</strong> capitalist framework<br />
Accept<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> capitalist logic<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r notable feature of <strong>the</strong> movement is that <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>an</strong> accept<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> capitalist logic.<br />
For one, <strong>the</strong> proliferation of <strong>in</strong>vestment comp<strong>an</strong>ies owned by trade unions bears testament to<br />
this accept<strong>an</strong>ce. More th<strong>an</strong> 90% of <strong>the</strong> affiliates of COSATU have <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment comp<strong>an</strong>y<br />
<strong>an</strong>d consequently <strong>the</strong> unions are caught up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fall-out of be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> profit-mak<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Instructive is <strong>the</strong> statement of <strong>the</strong> Discussion Document on this matter:<br />
Unions have also failed to assert <strong>the</strong>mselves relative to <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>vestment comp<strong>an</strong>ies. Outside<br />
of few exceptions, union <strong>in</strong>vestment comp<strong>an</strong>ies are a law unto <strong>the</strong>mselves. They are also not<br />
pursu<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> strategic aims to tr<strong>an</strong>sform <strong>the</strong> economy as espoused <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Central Committee.<br />
Govern<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong>se comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> some cases leaves a lot to be desired. If we fail to assert<br />
control over <strong>the</strong>se assets, we will live to regret this. Signs are show<strong>in</strong>g that union <strong>in</strong>vestments<br />
are beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to sow divisions with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> org<strong>an</strong>isation – which tells you what happens when<br />
<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative detracts from its orig<strong>in</strong>al aims <strong>an</strong>d when <strong>the</strong>re is poor worker control.<br />
The accept<strong>an</strong>ce of capitalist logic is not only conf<strong>in</strong>ed to union <strong>in</strong>vestment comp<strong>an</strong>ies but<br />
prevalent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ner <strong>the</strong> movement problematized <strong>the</strong> root causes of <strong>the</strong> problems fac<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> SA work<strong>in</strong>g class. Capitalism is no longer regarded as <strong>the</strong> prime cause of poverty.<br />
Narrowly <strong>the</strong> legacy of apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>an</strong>d bad m<strong>an</strong>agement of <strong>the</strong> economy are put forward as <strong>the</strong><br />
culprits. Though emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g social democratic solutions COSATU has gradually embraced<br />
elements of neo-liberalism – <strong>the</strong> endorsement of <strong>in</strong>ternational competitiveness, export<br />
orientation strategy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> support for SA comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>an</strong>d products. For <strong>the</strong>m what we have<br />
is bad capitalism; we need good capitalism, good m<strong>an</strong>agers <strong>an</strong>d less greedy ones.<br />
In l<strong>in</strong>e with <strong>the</strong> reformulation of <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>the</strong> preferred method of struggle is social<br />
dialogue <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> accomp<strong>an</strong>y<strong>in</strong>g social partnership. For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t message<br />
com<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> trade unions <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>the</strong> Growth <strong>an</strong>d Development Summit <strong>in</strong> 2003,<br />
me<strong>an</strong>t to address <strong>the</strong> problem of joblessness <strong>an</strong>d poverty, was that all social forces must work<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r to tackle <strong>the</strong> problems of poverty <strong>an</strong>d unemployment. If <strong>the</strong>re was doubt about this<br />
warm<strong>in</strong>g up to capitalism <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> endorsement of <strong>the</strong> Proudly SA Campaign settles it. This<br />
campaign has as its aim <strong>the</strong> promotion of <strong>the</strong> products of SA comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>an</strong>d citizens are<br />
called upon to buy locally <strong>an</strong>d to reject imported goods. The political message is simple:<br />
labour <strong>an</strong>d capital are work<strong>in</strong>g toge<strong>the</strong>r for <strong>the</strong> good of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Occasionally social dialogue is coupled with moral <strong>in</strong>dignation <strong>an</strong>d mass pressure. General<br />
strikes called by COSATU periodically punctuated <strong>the</strong> political l<strong>an</strong>dscape. What it is evident<br />
however is that <strong>the</strong>se actions <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>rs by <strong>the</strong> movement have no longer as <strong>the</strong>ir key premise<br />
<strong>the</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g of alternative work<strong>in</strong>g class power. They are merely utilised as pressure po<strong>in</strong>ts to<br />
secure a more hum<strong>an</strong>e form of neo-liberalism. The self-constra<strong>in</strong>t general strikes had no real<br />
impact on <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t neo-liberal hegemony <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> failure to exact <strong>an</strong>y signific<strong>an</strong>t<br />
compromises from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side has <strong>in</strong> turn led to more ground be<strong>in</strong>g ceded to <strong>the</strong>se forces.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>stitutionalisation of <strong>the</strong> trade union movement<br />
The trade unions participate <strong>an</strong>d are <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> a wide r<strong>an</strong>ge of <strong>in</strong>stitutions – r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g from<br />
tripartite bodies like NEDLAC to barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g councils, education bodies <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>y o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
Participation <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions is not problematic as such but ra<strong>the</strong>r how participation is viewed<br />
<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of COSATU, it is <strong>in</strong>tegrally l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong> notion of social dialogue <strong>an</strong>d<br />
partnership. Participation <strong>in</strong> bourgeois <strong>in</strong>stitution is treated as a norm, a pr<strong>in</strong>ciple. This varies<br />
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<strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y respects to <strong>the</strong> approaches on participation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>an</strong>d 80s where such matters<br />
were hotly debated <strong>an</strong>d a variety of responses pursued. The present uncritical accept<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d<br />
participation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se bourgeois <strong>in</strong>stitutions is a consequence of <strong>the</strong> neglect of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois<br />
character of <strong>the</strong> present <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n state on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> SA trade unions. The form of<br />
political rule (democratic) is elevated over <strong>the</strong> subst<strong>an</strong>ce of state power (<strong>the</strong> capitalist nature<br />
of <strong>the</strong> ANC state) <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> approach to its <strong>in</strong>stitutions. What is ignored is that <strong>the</strong><br />
fundamental factor determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> character of <strong>the</strong> state is not its form of rule, which varies<br />
greatly at different times, but <strong>the</strong> type of property <strong>an</strong>d productive relations that its <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
protect <strong>an</strong>d promote.<br />
Moreover, <strong>an</strong>d notwithst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> claims of COSATU, <strong>the</strong> political <strong>in</strong>dependence of <strong>the</strong><br />
trade union movement is be<strong>in</strong>g compromised. COSATU is persist<strong>in</strong>g with its alli<strong>an</strong>ce with <strong>the</strong><br />
govern<strong>in</strong>g political party, <strong>the</strong> ANC who has, as shown earlier, become <strong>the</strong> party of neoliberalism<br />
<strong>an</strong>d big bus<strong>in</strong>ess. The Tri-partite Alli<strong>an</strong>ce with <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d SACP has a<br />
constra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g impact on <strong>the</strong> ability of <strong>the</strong> movement to mount <strong>an</strong> effective challenge to <strong>the</strong><br />
neo-liberal agenda. This is reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ner <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> ANC is characterised by <strong>the</strong><br />
union as a way of justify<strong>in</strong>g its cont<strong>in</strong>ued association with <strong>the</strong> ANC. Politically <strong>the</strong> trade<br />
unions characterised <strong>the</strong> ANC government as a democratic left le<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g government <strong>an</strong>d not as<br />
a neo-liberal government with a democratic cover. Such a characterisation sidesteps <strong>the</strong><br />
capitalist character of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cumbent government <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> only result is ideological<br />
disorientation amongst union members.<br />
Flow<strong>in</strong>g from its alli<strong>an</strong>ce with <strong>the</strong> govern<strong>in</strong>g party COSATU has become <strong>the</strong> election<br />
mach<strong>in</strong>ery of <strong>the</strong> SA state. When <strong>the</strong>re are national <strong>an</strong>d local government elections <strong>the</strong> trade<br />
union movement puts at <strong>the</strong> disposal of <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g party its org<strong>an</strong>isational <strong>an</strong>d political<br />
resources but <strong>in</strong> return is rewarded with fur<strong>the</strong>r doses of <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal prescription.<br />
Though <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n state regards <strong>the</strong> alli<strong>an</strong>ce with COSATU as a useful <strong>in</strong>corporation<br />
strategy of <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>the</strong>re are differences on <strong>the</strong> form of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>corporation. COSATU<br />
w<strong>an</strong>ts a more equal status <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g government policies <strong>an</strong>d emphasises <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong><br />
alli<strong>an</strong>ce as <strong>the</strong> medium for this. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> ANC has attempted to craft out a far<br />
junior role for <strong>the</strong> trade unions <strong>in</strong> government policies. One of <strong>the</strong> consequences has been <strong>the</strong><br />
overshadow<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> Tri-partite Alli<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong><br />
unions <strong>an</strong>d ANC is mediated through <strong>the</strong> state th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> party. Instructive was <strong>the</strong> process<br />
lead<strong>in</strong>g up to <strong>the</strong> Growth <strong>an</strong>d Development Summit <strong>in</strong> 2003. In prepar<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> Growth <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Development Summit <strong>the</strong> trade union movement had to go through <strong>the</strong> Presidential Labour<br />
Group, a body established by <strong>the</strong> president of <strong>the</strong> country, <strong>in</strong>stead of <strong>the</strong> Tri-partite Alli<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
The contestation over <strong>the</strong> form of <strong>in</strong>corporation of <strong>the</strong> trade union is at <strong>the</strong> centre of <strong>the</strong><br />
present tensions between <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d COSATU. The present conflict over <strong>the</strong> succession<br />
issue with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC is a m<strong>an</strong>ifestation of <strong>the</strong> differences over <strong>in</strong>corporation. It is <strong>the</strong> view of<br />
COSATU that a Jacob Zuma presidency, <strong>in</strong> contrast to <strong>the</strong> Thabo Mbeki presidency, will be<br />
<strong>an</strong> Alli<strong>an</strong>ce-friendly one <strong>an</strong>d will accord greater prom<strong>in</strong>ence to <strong>the</strong> role of unions <strong>in</strong> policy<br />
formulation.<br />
Bureaucratisation of <strong>the</strong> trade unions<br />
The unsurpris<strong>in</strong>g consequence of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutionalisation of <strong>the</strong> unions has been <strong>the</strong><br />
bureaucratisation of <strong>the</strong>se unions. This is reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> centralisation of power <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><br />
h<strong>an</strong>ds of <strong>the</strong> unions’ national bodies. Michel’s law of oligarchy has taken root with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n trade union <strong>an</strong>d permeates <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal regime of <strong>the</strong> unions. The space <strong>an</strong>d<br />
power for self-<strong>in</strong>itiative on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> local <strong>an</strong>d regional arms of unions have been<br />
obliterated. Every aspect of <strong>the</strong> union requires <strong>the</strong> s<strong>an</strong>ction of national leadership. Struggles,<br />
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campaigns, f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ces, hir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d fir<strong>in</strong>g, alli<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d policy mak<strong>in</strong>g are centralised <strong>an</strong>d,<br />
nowadays, <strong>the</strong> prerogative of national leadership. A culture of <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong> centre<br />
permeates <strong>the</strong> SATUM. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, noth<strong>in</strong>g moves <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unions without <strong>the</strong> bless<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>the</strong> national leadership. This power over <strong>the</strong> apparatus is be<strong>in</strong>g used to stifle <strong>an</strong>d root out <strong>an</strong>y<br />
critical voices. No org<strong>an</strong>isational or political space exists for <strong>the</strong> contestation of ideas. There<br />
are numerous examples where critical voices have been purged from <strong>the</strong> trade unions.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> past, <strong>the</strong> locals, br<strong>an</strong>ches <strong>an</strong>d regions of <strong>the</strong> SATUM had <strong>the</strong> latitude to <strong>in</strong>itiate<br />
struggles <strong>an</strong>d campaigns. They were <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t counterweight to bureaucracy.<br />
The close association with <strong>the</strong> state <strong>an</strong>d bus<strong>in</strong>ess has given rise not only to bureaucratic<br />
tendencies but also <strong>the</strong> co-option of trade unionists is regular occurrence. The trade union<br />
movement is not unaware of <strong>the</strong> bureaucratic tendencies besieg<strong>in</strong>g its <strong>in</strong>ternal apparatus but it<br />
is not locat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se developments <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of its own particular tr<strong>an</strong>sformation from<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g a milit<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>ti-capitalist movement to one that is attempt<strong>in</strong>g to make <strong>the</strong> system work<br />
better.<br />
This is a <strong>new</strong> <strong>an</strong>d d<strong>an</strong>gerous culture that is <strong>in</strong>formed by charlat<strong>an</strong>ism <strong>an</strong>d dishonesty that has<br />
taken hold. Clearly some leaders have no guts to articulate <strong>the</strong>ir personal op<strong>in</strong>ions with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
structures for a r<strong>an</strong>ge of reasons <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>ir op<strong>in</strong>ions are not consistent with <strong>the</strong><br />
positions of <strong>the</strong> constituencies <strong>the</strong>y represent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitutional structures. They use <strong>the</strong><br />
media to dissociate <strong>the</strong>mselves from decisions of <strong>the</strong> federation <strong>an</strong>d present <strong>the</strong>mselves as <strong>the</strong><br />
rational group <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>isation presented by <strong>the</strong> media <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> conservatives as a madhouse.<br />
There is a phenomenon that we must also openly confront. The culture of leak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation<br />
basically underm<strong>in</strong>es confidence leaders should have on one <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r. It kills trust <strong>an</strong>d leads to<br />
witch hunts. Eventually it will kill <strong>in</strong>ternal democracy as leadership feel justified <strong>in</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
report f<strong>in</strong>er details to <strong>the</strong> constituency <strong>in</strong> fear that <strong>the</strong> charlat<strong>an</strong>s would <strong>the</strong>n leak <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>formation <strong>an</strong>d embarrass <strong>the</strong> org<strong>an</strong>isation. …<br />
The comb<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>in</strong>dividual lobby<strong>in</strong>g of trade union leaders by elements with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
liberation movement <strong>an</strong>d even capital comb<strong>in</strong>ed with <strong>the</strong> ramp<strong>an</strong>t culture of careerism <strong>an</strong>d<br />
consumerism is prov<strong>in</strong>g to be a threat to <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>an</strong>d cohesion of COSATU. We have seen<br />
<strong>the</strong> effects of this throughout <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition.<br />
L<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong> above paragraph, <strong>the</strong> syndrome of some leaders negotiat<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong>ir CVs<br />
under <strong>the</strong>ir armpits must be confronted before it is too late. In this case positions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unions<br />
are used to cultivate ch<strong>an</strong>ces to adv<strong>an</strong>ce personal careers <strong>in</strong> both government <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
private sector. Positions are held not to serve but to act as <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>strument to distribute<br />
patronage to factions with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement. This happens more so as leaders sit <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>terview<strong>in</strong>g p<strong>an</strong>els or <strong>in</strong>fluenc<strong>in</strong>g employment practises of government <strong>an</strong>d private firms.<br />
Nepotism <strong>an</strong>d downright corruption on occasions are reported, lead<strong>in</strong>g to huge divisions.<br />
In this situation leadership with eyes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> horizons <strong>an</strong>d firmly on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side for<br />
opportunities after serv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir terms beg<strong>in</strong>s to be <strong>in</strong>consistent <strong>in</strong> its articulation of <strong>the</strong> trade<br />
union movement's positions blow<strong>in</strong>g hot <strong>an</strong>d cold.<br />
Though not <strong>in</strong>evitable, this bureaucratisation <strong>an</strong>d careerism should be no surprise. Basically,<br />
<strong>the</strong> accept<strong>an</strong>ce of capitalist logic requires <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sulation of <strong>the</strong> trade union from <strong>the</strong> pressures<br />
of membership.<br />
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The ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g attitude of <strong>the</strong> member to <strong>the</strong> union<br />
All of <strong>the</strong> above - <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal offensive, re-org<strong>an</strong>isation of work, <strong>the</strong> accept<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
capitalism, ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g profile of <strong>the</strong> union member, <strong>the</strong> bureaucratisation of <strong>the</strong> unions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ability to mount <strong>an</strong> effective counter-defence - have brought about a fundamental shift <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> way members <strong>an</strong>d workers generally perceived unions.<br />
Members no longer view <strong>the</strong> unions as schools of socialism. They ra<strong>the</strong>r feel alienated from<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own org<strong>an</strong>isations. In fact, workers generally see unions as <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r form of <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce, a<br />
service provider. There exist amongst union members <strong>the</strong> “just-<strong>in</strong>-case” phenomenon where<br />
union members jo<strong>in</strong> legal agencies like Legal Wise <strong>in</strong> case <strong>the</strong> union fails to defend <strong>the</strong>m<br />
adequately <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>y <strong>the</strong>n have a legal back up.<br />
This does not me<strong>an</strong> that workers are leav<strong>in</strong>g unions. Not at all. In <strong>the</strong> context of massive job<br />
losses, job <strong>in</strong>security, poverty <strong>an</strong>d unemployment, unions are <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t form of protection.<br />
By be<strong>in</strong>g a union member <strong>the</strong>re is always <strong>the</strong> stability of <strong>in</strong>come <strong>an</strong>d some form of security of<br />
conditions of employment. In addition, for <strong>the</strong> COSATU member <strong>the</strong> Tri-partite Alli<strong>an</strong>ce also<br />
holds <strong>the</strong> prospect of social mobility by hav<strong>in</strong>g access to state power. In this sense <strong>the</strong><br />
Alli<strong>an</strong>ce holds possible material adv<strong>an</strong>ces.<br />
The result has been a dramatic decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> strike activity, notwithst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g high profile strikes<br />
like <strong>the</strong> security strike at <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of 2006. Aga<strong>in</strong> this is not to say that union members<br />
will not engage <strong>in</strong> milit<strong>an</strong>t wage struggles. To defend <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>the</strong>y will do so. But it<br />
should be understood that struggles with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unions have become <strong>in</strong>stitutionalised <strong>an</strong>d<br />
ritualised.<br />
The ossification of <strong>the</strong> movement permeates collective barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> occupation of <strong>the</strong><br />
unions. Collective barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g is highly centralised <strong>an</strong>d removed from <strong>the</strong> membership. M<strong>an</strong>y<br />
of <strong>the</strong> major wage barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g processes take place <strong>in</strong> national <strong>in</strong>stitutions like Barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
Councils. The r<strong>an</strong>k-<strong>an</strong>d-file members are mere spectators on this terra<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>y are<br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g disillusioned with this form of barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Deadlocks, strikes <strong>an</strong>d settlements are<br />
stage m<strong>an</strong>aged <strong>an</strong>d choreographed. Occasionally <strong>the</strong> r<strong>an</strong>k-<strong>an</strong>d-file is called to share <strong>the</strong> centre<br />
stage but under strict directorial supervision. And where someth<strong>in</strong>g lacks spont<strong>an</strong>eity, self<strong>in</strong>itiative<br />
<strong>an</strong>d is under strict bureaucratic control it ends up dull, bor<strong>in</strong>g, comical <strong>an</strong>d tragic.<br />
In contrast to <strong>the</strong> past – where issues of wages were a matter of <strong>the</strong> factory <strong>an</strong>d under direct<br />
control of <strong>the</strong> workers – decentralised - we saw <strong>the</strong> r<strong>an</strong>ge of creative forms of struggle – <strong>the</strong><br />
wire-wire strike, <strong>the</strong> “siyalala” (<strong>the</strong> sleep-<strong>in</strong> strike). The wage strikes of <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>an</strong>d 1980s<br />
were <strong>the</strong> bedrock of <strong>the</strong> trade union movement – <strong>the</strong>y solidified <strong>the</strong> movement at <strong>the</strong> factory<br />
<strong>an</strong>d threw up layer upon layer of milit<strong>an</strong>t worker leaders who susta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> movement over<br />
<strong>the</strong> decades.<br />
What to do?<br />
What are <strong>the</strong> elements of a progressive trade union strategy?<br />
The first aspect of a progressive strategy should be <strong>the</strong> accept<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> SATUM has suffered a<br />
historical reversal of fortunes <strong>an</strong>d that <strong>the</strong>re is a need to fundamentally re-<strong>in</strong>vent <strong>the</strong> trade<br />
union movement <strong>in</strong> SA, both <strong>in</strong> political <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>isational terms. Politically <strong>the</strong> movement<br />
must put at its core <strong>the</strong> struggle for political <strong>in</strong>dependence.<br />
Secondly, <strong>the</strong> structural re-composition of <strong>the</strong> workforce necessitates <strong>the</strong> creative<br />
experimentation with <strong>new</strong> forms of trade unionism, appropriate forms for <strong>the</strong>se times. It c<strong>an</strong><br />
no longer only be <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustrial org<strong>an</strong>isation of <strong>the</strong> perm<strong>an</strong>ently employed. The <strong>in</strong>novative<br />
org<strong>an</strong>is<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sertion of <strong>the</strong> strata of atypical workers, casuals, <strong>the</strong> labour brokers <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
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unemployed c<strong>an</strong>not be neglected. This has implications for barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, for structures, tim<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d location of org<strong>an</strong>is<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Thirdly, this <strong>new</strong> situation has necessitated a re-exam<strong>in</strong>ation of old alli<strong>an</strong>ces. Some of <strong>the</strong> old<br />
allies have re-<strong>in</strong>vented <strong>the</strong>mselves as advocates of a free market capitalist system. But <strong>the</strong><br />
situation has thrown up potential <strong>new</strong> allies. For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> movements – social<br />
movements – both here <strong>an</strong>d abroad – are largely <strong>an</strong>ti-capitalist <strong>an</strong>d milit<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d, import<strong>an</strong>tly,<br />
based on <strong>the</strong> unemployed.<br />
Quite clearly this radical reconstruction is not go<strong>in</strong>g to happen of itself. For this reradicalisation<br />
to materialise, <strong>the</strong> movement needs a <strong>new</strong> burst of energy with<strong>in</strong> its r<strong>an</strong>ks – a<br />
<strong>new</strong> spark of <strong>in</strong>spiration, a <strong>new</strong> mass of energy. Partly this spark of <strong>in</strong>spiration will come<br />
from <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> social movements. Through <strong>the</strong>ir struggles, dem<strong>an</strong>ds, <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>isational <strong>an</strong>d<br />
political cultures <strong>the</strong>y will <strong>in</strong>spire <strong>the</strong> unionised worker to take up <strong>the</strong> spear of radical<br />
struggle. This will be <strong>the</strong> case as long as <strong>the</strong> social movements avoid all <strong>the</strong> problematic<br />
features of <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g unions.<br />
But this process would not be sufficient <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>ic for at present <strong>the</strong> two movements share<br />
different social bases. Their compositions are different, <strong>the</strong> unions are composed of <strong>the</strong><br />
employed <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> social movements <strong>the</strong> unemployed. Hence it is found that <strong>the</strong> struggles of<br />
<strong>the</strong> social movements are not register<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>side <strong>the</strong> unions, nor do we see unionised workers<br />
<strong>in</strong>side <strong>the</strong> social movements.<br />
Therefore part of <strong>the</strong> challenge is to create <strong>the</strong> space <strong>in</strong>side <strong>the</strong> unions for this <strong>new</strong> mass of<br />
energy, <strong>new</strong> spark of resist<strong>an</strong>ce to emerge. Tak<strong>in</strong>g our cue from <strong>the</strong> past, <strong>the</strong> rebirth of <strong>the</strong><br />
trade union movement came as a result of <strong>the</strong> thous<strong>an</strong>ds of struggles undertaken by workers.<br />
The self-<strong>in</strong>itiatives of workers are what led to <strong>the</strong> rebirth <strong>an</strong>d here<strong>in</strong> lies <strong>the</strong> key to its<br />
regeneration.<br />
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10 The grassroots. The rise of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> social movements <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The role of <strong>the</strong> opposition<br />
By Eddie Cottle<br />
Introduction<br />
The <strong>Africa</strong>n National Congress government <strong>an</strong>d its allies believed that <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> challenge of<br />
post-apar<strong>the</strong>id was to move from “Resist<strong>an</strong>ce to Reconstruction.” They ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that <strong>the</strong><br />
end of apar<strong>the</strong>id signaled <strong>the</strong> end of mass struggle politics <strong>an</strong>d “resist<strong>an</strong>ce.” That it was now<br />
time to “reconstruct” <strong>the</strong> social, economic <strong>an</strong>d cultural life <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d build a <strong>new</strong><br />
nation.<br />
The ma<strong>in</strong> problem with <strong>the</strong> above <strong>the</strong>sis was that <strong>the</strong> movements before 1994 had believed<br />
that <strong>in</strong> order to overcome <strong>the</strong> social, economic <strong>an</strong>d cultural challenges posed by Apar<strong>the</strong>id we<br />
had to also struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st capitalism <strong>an</strong>d build socialism. While apar<strong>the</strong>id was abolished <strong>the</strong><br />
system of capitalism rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>tact <strong>an</strong>d streng<strong>the</strong>n through <strong>the</strong> official adoption of ‘free<br />
enterprise” by <strong>the</strong> ANC led government. Through ‘reconstruction’ <strong>the</strong> millions of workers <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> poor who sacrificed so much through <strong>the</strong>ir resist<strong>an</strong>ce struggles were be<strong>in</strong>g told that <strong>the</strong>y<br />
had to ‘tighten <strong>the</strong>ir belts’ <strong>an</strong>d participate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> free market <strong>in</strong> order to build <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> nation.<br />
However, not long after <strong>the</strong> first democratic elections <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1994, <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> social<br />
movements emerged as a response to a lack of service delivery <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>d reform challeng<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> very ‘reconstruction’ <strong>the</strong>y were supposed to participate <strong>in</strong>.<br />
From resist<strong>an</strong>ce to reconstruction<br />
The tr<strong>an</strong>sition to a democratic <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> was not <strong>the</strong> peaceful miracle that most<br />
commentators make out to be. The apar<strong>the</strong>id state unleashed a wave of violence that<br />
ultimately led to <strong>the</strong> death of over 15 000 people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> period between 1990 <strong>an</strong>d 1994. The<br />
aim of this violence was to weaken <strong>the</strong> ‘old’ social movements, which had been led by <strong>the</strong><br />
United Democratic Front (UDF) a co-coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g body compos<strong>in</strong>g of different social<br />
movements. It is <strong>the</strong> struggles that were led by <strong>the</strong> UDF that led to <strong>the</strong> unb<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> ANC<br />
<strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r b<strong>an</strong>ned political parties.<br />
The revolutionary movements <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> were engaged <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tense debates after <strong>the</strong><br />
unb<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of org<strong>an</strong>isations of <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class. The masses of workers <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
org<strong>an</strong>isations were <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> a r<strong>an</strong>ge of <strong>in</strong>tense discussions r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> tactics <strong>an</strong>d<br />
strategy of <strong>in</strong>surrection versus negotiation; <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> state,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d whe<strong>the</strong>r to disb<strong>an</strong>d or not to disb<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> United Democratic Front (UDF). The sharp<br />
differences <strong>in</strong> debate <strong>an</strong>d divisions with<strong>in</strong> revolutionary movements emerged on <strong>the</strong> way<br />
forward. At this time <strong>the</strong> capitalist classes worldwide celebrated <strong>the</strong> collapse of ‘socialism’<br />
<strong>an</strong>d launched a major ideological attack on <strong>the</strong> ‘authoritari<strong>an</strong> nature of socialism’. Even<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC-led alli<strong>an</strong>ce, divisions between <strong>the</strong> doves (moderates) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> hawks<br />
(milit<strong>an</strong>ts) came to a head with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement over issues like <strong>the</strong> suspension of <strong>the</strong> armed<br />
struggle <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> demobilisation of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), <strong>the</strong> armed w<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> ANC.<br />
Thous<strong>an</strong>ds of workers <strong>an</strong>d community activists were <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> discussions on <strong>the</strong> nature of<br />
<strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition; <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terim constitution, <strong>the</strong> Government of National Unity (GNU); <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme (RDP).<br />
In <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong>se political processes, a wholesale retreat of <strong>the</strong> revolutionary <strong>in</strong>tellectuals<br />
over to <strong>the</strong> camp of reformism <strong>an</strong>d neo-liberalism took place. At a time when <strong>the</strong> capitalist<br />
class was engaged <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> ideological offensive aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class, major left<br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectuals of <strong>the</strong> movement such as Steven Gelb, Al<strong>an</strong> Hirsh, Alec Erw<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Marcel<br />
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Gold<strong>in</strong>g came to promote <strong>the</strong> very same policies of <strong>the</strong> capitalists, such as ‘competitiveness’,<br />
‘export-led growth’, ‘tight fiscal policy’ <strong>an</strong>d so on. The ma<strong>in</strong> reason for <strong>the</strong> capitulation of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>tellectuals c<strong>an</strong> be expla<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> retreat of <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class locally <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternationally, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g to power of neo-liberal governments <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> collapse of <strong>the</strong><br />
Stal<strong>in</strong>ist states. These conditions made possible <strong>the</strong> retreat of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tellectuals.<br />
Through <strong>the</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed impact of <strong>the</strong> violence unleashed by <strong>the</strong> Apar<strong>the</strong>id government <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
reformism of <strong>the</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tellectuals <strong>an</strong>d leaders with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> revolutionary movements,<br />
effectively weakened <strong>the</strong> mass movements of non-party org<strong>an</strong>isations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>reby made it<br />
possible for <strong>the</strong> shift from “resist<strong>an</strong>ce to reconstruction” politics to take place. The platform of<br />
“reconstruction” politics was codified <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> election platform of <strong>the</strong> ANC called, <strong>the</strong><br />
reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d development programme (RDP). The <strong>in</strong>itial RDP was based on <strong>the</strong> welfare<br />
state model. The “reconstruction” of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society implied that <strong>the</strong> state, civil society<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> capitalist class had to work toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> a common programme to rebuild <strong>the</strong> nation.<br />
With <strong>the</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g to power of <strong>the</strong> ANC as <strong>the</strong> representative of <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g class <strong>in</strong> power with a<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g class base a <strong>new</strong> hegemonic rule had to be constructed. The <strong>new</strong> state set out to<br />
‘reconstruct’ <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society <strong>an</strong>d called for <strong>an</strong> ideological turn from ‘resist<strong>an</strong>ce’ to<br />
‘reconstruction.’ By <strong>the</strong> mid-1990’s non-party structures such as civics, women’s <strong>an</strong>d youth<br />
groups, religious bodies <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r entities org<strong>an</strong>ized under <strong>the</strong> b<strong>an</strong>ner of <strong>the</strong> UDF, were ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
absorbed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> party structures or dissolved as <strong>the</strong> party-state took control. The<br />
compromise of <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d its alli<strong>an</strong>ce partners, <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Communist Party <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
Congress of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Trade Union (COSATU) with <strong>the</strong> Apar<strong>the</strong>id government to<br />
preserve capitalism ultimately me<strong>an</strong>t <strong>the</strong> centralisation of political power with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mass<br />
movement, <strong>the</strong> suppression of milit<strong>an</strong>cy, de-politicisation <strong>an</strong>d ultimately reduc<strong>in</strong>g mass<br />
org<strong>an</strong>isations to recipients of <strong>in</strong>formation ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>s of power at <strong>the</strong> grassroots level.<br />
This expla<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> collapse of <strong>the</strong> UDF, <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n National Civic Org<strong>an</strong>isation<br />
(SANCO), as a once ‘popular, democratic union of community org<strong>an</strong>isations.’ The<br />
ab<strong>an</strong>donment of <strong>the</strong> grassroots movements <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> movement of m<strong>an</strong>y lead<strong>in</strong>g skilled<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals from civil society <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> state, created <strong>the</strong> conditions for <strong>the</strong> politics of<br />
“reconstruction” to take root. Reconstruction politics <strong>the</strong>refore emerged when <strong>the</strong> ‘old’<br />
movements were at <strong>the</strong>ir weakest or have completely disb<strong>an</strong>ded.<br />
Hav<strong>in</strong>g succeeded <strong>in</strong> demobalis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> masses it successfully <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>the</strong> unions, <strong>the</strong><br />
SACP, universities, remn<strong>an</strong>ts of <strong>the</strong> civic movement <strong>an</strong>d a large layer of NGO’s through<br />
SANGOCO to extend this hegemonic project. The <strong>in</strong>tellectual attack on class <strong>an</strong>alysis ensured<br />
that civil society became <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> states hegemonic programme of reconstruction<br />
<strong>an</strong>d development. The dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t discourse of developmentalism is essentially a discourse<br />
developed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> US to me<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> restructur<strong>in</strong>g of global economic relations with liberal<br />
democracy <strong>an</strong>d welfarism as a me<strong>an</strong>s to ward off <strong>the</strong> communist threat. As we c<strong>an</strong> see <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, development is seen as a re-<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> global economy <strong>an</strong>d deflat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
mass struggle through a bit of welfarism <strong>an</strong>d market discipl<strong>in</strong>e. The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
Communist party <strong>in</strong> particular developed <strong>the</strong> notion of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n state be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
characterized as a ‘developmental state’ depict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> state as a ‘peoples state’ <strong>an</strong>d without<br />
class content. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) was also very import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong><br />
spread<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> notion of a developmental state with <strong>the</strong> RDP provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> proof. Of course, it<br />
was not long before <strong>the</strong> true class character of <strong>the</strong> state raised its head <strong>an</strong>d unilaterally<br />
implemented GEAR, a neo-liberal macro-economic framework for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The<br />
redistribution of <strong>the</strong> wealth of <strong>the</strong> nation through neo-liberal measures ultimately me<strong>an</strong>t that a<br />
greater share was to be spread between <strong>the</strong> ‘old’ white bourgeoisie <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> black<br />
bourgeoisie. Though <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong>corporated civil society <strong>in</strong>to its hegemonic bloc this did not<br />
me<strong>an</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re were no contradictions with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> bloc:<br />
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“The SACP accepts <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>evitability <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> well-def<strong>in</strong>ed circumst<strong>an</strong>ces, even <strong>the</strong><br />
potential adv<strong>an</strong>tages, of <strong>an</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g black capitalist strata.” (SACP Press Statement on <strong>the</strong><br />
Telkom Share Offer <strong>an</strong>d Black Economic Empowerment, 22 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2003).<br />
‘Reconstruction’ politics created widespread ideological confusion as <strong>the</strong> once socialist<br />
oriented mass movements now had to work with<strong>in</strong> a class collaborationist framework.<br />
Ironically, <strong>the</strong> SACP was tak<strong>in</strong>g a lead <strong>in</strong> sow<strong>in</strong>g this ideological confusion for its tacit<br />
support for a black bourgeoisie, as if sk<strong>in</strong> colour could ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>the</strong> nature of exploitation.<br />
Reality proved different, as we will see later. The extent of <strong>the</strong> slide to <strong>the</strong> right even with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> trade union movement could be seen by <strong>the</strong> widespread establishment of trade union<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment comp<strong>an</strong>ies, act<strong>in</strong>g as a spr<strong>in</strong>gboard for a section of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> aspir<strong>an</strong>t black<br />
bourgeois.<br />
Expos<strong>in</strong>g of a myth<br />
The democratic triumph over apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>in</strong> 1994 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> entry of <strong>an</strong> ideological attack on<br />
socialism by <strong>the</strong> ANC, a susta<strong>in</strong>ed effort was made to <strong>in</strong>corporate civil society ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><br />
state apparatus or <strong>in</strong> partnership to rebuild <strong>the</strong> nation through a reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d<br />
development programme (RDP).<br />
The uncritical adoption of <strong>the</strong> reconstruction agenda with<strong>in</strong> civil society, especially <strong>the</strong> trade<br />
union movement forestalled <strong>an</strong>y formidable <strong>in</strong>dependent response to <strong>the</strong> more clearly<br />
articulated capitalist agenda, <strong>the</strong> Growth, Employment <strong>an</strong>d Redistribution Strategy (GEAR)<br />
that was unilaterally implemented by <strong>the</strong> ANC government.<br />
With<strong>in</strong> two years, GEAR <strong>the</strong> overtly neo-liberal macroeconomic strategy was implemented<br />
to: cut government expenditure; provide tax holidays <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>centives for bus<strong>in</strong>ess; phase<br />
out exch<strong>an</strong>ge controls; create a flexible labour market <strong>an</strong>d encourage wage restra<strong>in</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
privatization of state assets. The impact of this strategy has been devastat<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
class <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> poor. It has been reported that <strong>the</strong>re is a 180% <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> number of<br />
households without <strong>an</strong>y measurable <strong>in</strong>come; <strong>the</strong> 2005 United Nations Development Index<br />
placed <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> at 120 th of 177 countries compared. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> United Nations<br />
Development Programme Report of 2003 found that <strong>the</strong> number of households deprived of<br />
‘good’ basic services <strong>in</strong>creased from 5.68 million to 7.24 million between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d 2001<br />
census. It is also reported that besides a 40% unemployment rate (with over a million jobs lost<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994) that <strong>the</strong> number of shack dwell<strong>in</strong>gs have <strong>in</strong>creased so much that <strong>the</strong>y are almost<br />
equal to <strong>the</strong> total number of houses built between 1996-2001.<br />
The gap between <strong>the</strong> rich <strong>an</strong>d poor is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g. But spiral<strong>in</strong>g poverty of <strong>the</strong> vast majority of<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns must me<strong>an</strong> that <strong>the</strong> wealth of <strong>the</strong> country is be<strong>in</strong>g redistributed elsewhere.<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has experienced a phenomenal 15.9% growth of (mostly black) dollar<br />
millionaires <strong>in</strong> 2005, well above <strong>the</strong> global rate of 6.5%. M<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong>se <strong>new</strong> dollar<br />
millionaires are high-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g ANC members <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>clude Tokyo Sexwale, former<br />
Communications Department Director-General Andile Ncgaba, head of <strong>the</strong> ANC presidency<br />
Smuts Ngonyama, former Environment <strong>an</strong>d Tourism M<strong>in</strong>ister Valli Moosa <strong>an</strong>d former North<br />
West Premier Popo Molefe, former chief prosecutor Bulel<strong>an</strong>i Ngcuka <strong>an</strong>d former Justice<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Penuell Maduna, former Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Cape Premier M<strong>an</strong>ne Dipico, former ANC deputy<br />
secretary-general Cheryl Carolus <strong>an</strong>d former Spoornet chief executive Dolly Mokgatle to<br />
mention a few. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is also r<strong>an</strong>ked fourth among <strong>the</strong> countries with <strong>the</strong> fastestgrow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
dollar-millionaire populations, beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>South</strong> Korea, India <strong>an</strong>d Russia. We c<strong>an</strong> see <strong>the</strong><br />
fusion of state – capitalist relations. The politics of ‘reconstruction’ was <strong>the</strong>refore a myth to<br />
mask <strong>the</strong> true class character of <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d that tr<strong>an</strong>sformation of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society<br />
could take place <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> common <strong>in</strong>terest of all <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns.<br />
115
The nation-wide protests mark <strong>the</strong> awaken<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns who have begun to see that<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>terests are not compatible with <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g classes of <strong>the</strong> old <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong> capitalist<br />
state. The failure on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> strongest civil society formations, <strong>the</strong> labour movement to<br />
respond to <strong>the</strong> neo-liberal policies of <strong>the</strong> ANC led to <strong>the</strong> formation of a r<strong>an</strong>ge of <strong>in</strong>dependent<br />
civil society formations - <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> social movements.<br />
Enter <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> social movements<br />
The social movements - as <strong>the</strong> offspr<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> former revolutionary movements - have<br />
recently been formally established <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> through <strong>in</strong>terventions by different<br />
org<strong>an</strong>isations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals from various ideological backgrounds. Over <strong>the</strong> last few years,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d at least s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> run-up to <strong>the</strong> 1999 general elections, a r<strong>an</strong>ge of <strong>new</strong> org<strong>an</strong>isations has<br />
emerged, usually categorized <strong>an</strong>d sometimes self-def<strong>in</strong>ed as <strong>the</strong> ‘New Social Movements’.<br />
They <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong>ly formed 20,000 strong shack dwellers movement Abahlali base<br />
Mjondolo <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Concerned Citizens’ Forum (CCF) based <strong>in</strong> Durb<strong>an</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Anti Eviction<br />
Campaign (AEC) <strong>in</strong> Cape Town, <strong>the</strong> Anti Privatisation Forum (APF) <strong>in</strong> Gauteng <strong>an</strong>d Cape<br />
Town, <strong>the</strong> Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>dless People’s Movement (LPM).<br />
Most of <strong>the</strong>se <strong>new</strong> movements have come toge<strong>the</strong>r to form a <strong>new</strong> national co-ord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g<br />
structure, <strong>the</strong> Social Movements Indaba (SMI). But s<strong>in</strong>ce, <strong>the</strong>se <strong>new</strong> movements took <strong>the</strong><br />
center stage, m<strong>an</strong>y o<strong>the</strong>r community movements have emerged <strong>an</strong>d some have collapsed <strong>in</strong> a<br />
short space of time. These movements, on <strong>the</strong> whole, largely consist of members who were,<br />
until recently, supporters of <strong>the</strong> ANC, or are still ANC members. The composition of <strong>the</strong><br />
social movements has been determ<strong>in</strong>ed as a response to neo-liberal policies such as evictions<br />
from homes, squatter settlements <strong>an</strong>d farms, electricity <strong>an</strong>d water disconnections, access to<br />
l<strong>an</strong>d, unemployment, health issues, hous<strong>in</strong>g, general lack of services <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> need for<br />
communities to provide immediate defence of <strong>the</strong>ir livelihoods.<br />
A closer look at <strong>the</strong> movements<br />
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)<br />
The TAC is <strong>the</strong> most well known of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s social movements <strong>an</strong>d is <strong>the</strong> oldest of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>new</strong> social movements. The TAC was launched <strong>in</strong> December 1998 <strong>in</strong> Cape Town <strong>an</strong>d<br />
campaigns for <strong>the</strong> affordable treatment for people liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV <strong>an</strong>d AIDS. The<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization has a card-carry<strong>in</strong>g membership of over 10,000 members. The TAC consists of<br />
local br<strong>an</strong>ches, which report to a district structure. The district elects delegates to <strong>the</strong><br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial executive council, which <strong>in</strong> turn sends <strong>an</strong> ex-officio member to <strong>the</strong> national<br />
executive committee. The NEC also, has representation from social sectors such as, children,<br />
youth, faith-based org<strong>an</strong>izations, health care professionals <strong>an</strong>d labour. There is currently no<br />
representation from social movements. The TAC has a full-time staff of forty people <strong>an</strong>d<br />
received large amounts of donor fund<strong>in</strong>g. The TAC has structured itself very much on <strong>the</strong> old<br />
UDF sectoral <strong>an</strong>d executive format.<br />
Anti Privatisation Forum (APF)<br />
The APF was formed as a response to <strong>the</strong> states privatization of services. S<strong>in</strong>ce its formation<br />
<strong>in</strong> 2000, <strong>the</strong> APF, located ma<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gauteng Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, has broadened its social base <strong>an</strong>d<br />
extended far-reach<strong>in</strong>g roots <strong>in</strong>to work<strong>in</strong>g class communities. Today, <strong>the</strong> APF has 22 affiliates<br />
<strong>in</strong> communities on <strong>the</strong> East R<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>the</strong> Vaal, Potchefstroom <strong>an</strong>d Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Soweto, Alex<strong>an</strong>dra <strong>an</strong>d Or<strong>an</strong>ge Farm) as well as <strong>the</strong> West R<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Tshw<strong>an</strong>e Metro area.<br />
The affiliates have evolved <strong>in</strong> different ways depend<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong>ir specific social circumst<strong>an</strong>ces,<br />
for example, a response to electricity cut-offs led to <strong>the</strong> formation of <strong>the</strong> Soweto Electricity<br />
Crisis committee (SECC) <strong>an</strong>d struggles over access to, <strong>an</strong>d affordability of, water led to <strong>the</strong><br />
formation of <strong>the</strong> Or<strong>an</strong>ge Farm Water Crisis Committee (OWCC).<br />
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The APF is both org<strong>an</strong>ised <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> old methods <strong>an</strong>d has also broken with past methods. It has<br />
various st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g committees <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> executive, with affiliates be<strong>in</strong>g represented on each<br />
committee. It does not have membership cards <strong>an</strong>d this makes it difficult to determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong><br />
support base. The APF has two full-time employed activists <strong>an</strong>d receives limited donor<br />
support.<br />
A completely <strong>new</strong> form of org<strong>an</strong>isation that is be<strong>in</strong>g developed is one that recognises <strong>the</strong> right<br />
of political currents <strong>an</strong>d political parties to jo<strong>in</strong> community org<strong>an</strong>isations. APF affiliates <strong>in</strong><br />
this category <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> Socialist Group, Keep Left <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Democratic Socialist Movement<br />
(DSM), which are all Trotskyist <strong>in</strong> orientation, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Bikisha Media Collective, which is<br />
Anarchist. While, as part of <strong>the</strong> natural process of political development of <strong>the</strong> APF,<br />
difficulties <strong>in</strong> def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g limitations <strong>an</strong>d possibilities of org<strong>an</strong>isation <strong>an</strong>d political expression<br />
will unfold, <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t is that <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>an</strong> acknowledgement that <strong>the</strong> class struggle produces<br />
different ideas <strong>an</strong>d ideologies with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> movements <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>an</strong>d that <strong>the</strong> size or <strong>in</strong>fluence<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se currents or sects does not constitute a basis for exclusion. Indeed, this factor was<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g that was not respected with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past Stal<strong>in</strong>ised revolutionary movements.<br />
Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC)<br />
The AEC was formed <strong>in</strong> 2000 as a response to <strong>the</strong> eviction of people from <strong>the</strong>ir homes <strong>in</strong><br />
Tafelsig, a largely so-called colored township <strong>in</strong> Cape Town. Like <strong>the</strong> APF <strong>the</strong> AEC consists<br />
of community-based formations that are composed largely of wom<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d unemployed youth.<br />
The AEC has a co-ord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g structure with <strong>an</strong> executive structure. They <strong>in</strong>sist that <strong>the</strong><br />
executives are not leaders but facilitators <strong>an</strong>d resist hierarchical structures.<br />
L<strong>an</strong>dless Peoples Movement (LPM)<br />
The LPM was formed <strong>in</strong> June 2001 to deal with <strong>the</strong> slow pace of l<strong>an</strong>d reform, l<strong>an</strong>d restitution<br />
<strong>an</strong>d as a result of <strong>the</strong> widespread evictions of farm workers <strong>an</strong>d ten<strong>an</strong>ts. The LPM had about<br />
20 br<strong>an</strong>ches at a local level <strong>an</strong>d operated at <strong>an</strong> autonomous level. The LPM elected a national<br />
executive committee <strong>in</strong> 2002. Prov<strong>in</strong>cial executives also, have representation on <strong>the</strong> NEC.<br />
The highest decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g body of <strong>the</strong> LPM is <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.<br />
Abahlali base Ujondolo<br />
The Abahlali base Ujondolo, me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g shack dwellers were formed <strong>in</strong> February 2005 as a<br />
response to lack of formal hous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d serviced l<strong>an</strong>d for squatter settlements. The movement<br />
consists of 16 settlements with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> formally Indi<strong>an</strong> middle class <strong>an</strong>d elite suburbs of<br />
Durb<strong>an</strong>. Although <strong>the</strong>re is no membership cards issued this movement claims a 20,000membership<br />
base. Settlements meet once a week <strong>an</strong>d elected leaders of <strong>the</strong> settlement who<br />
meet once a week as well.<br />
The Social Movements Indaba (SMI)<br />
The SMI was formed dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> UN World Summit on Susta<strong>in</strong>able Development <strong>in</strong><br />
Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg <strong>in</strong> 2002. The SMI rejected <strong>the</strong> UN led summit <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> ANC governments<br />
GEAR policies as detrimental to susta<strong>in</strong>able development. The SMI was <strong>in</strong>itiated by NGO’s<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> Rural Development Services Network (RDSN) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Environmental Justice<br />
Network<strong>in</strong>g Forum (EJNF). The SMI has a very loose coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g structure with a national<br />
secretariat located <strong>in</strong> Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg but has no full-time staff. It has members based <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Gauteng, Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal <strong>an</strong>d Free State prov<strong>in</strong>ces. It org<strong>an</strong>ises national<br />
solidarity meet<strong>in</strong>gs where it <strong>in</strong>vites exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong> org<strong>an</strong>isations to jo<strong>in</strong>. Org<strong>an</strong>isations such<br />
as <strong>the</strong> APF, AEC, LPM, Abahlali base Ujondolo, Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee,<br />
Umzabalazo we Jubilee, Anti-War Coalition <strong>an</strong>d some progressive NGO’s form part of <strong>the</strong><br />
SMI.<br />
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The state, NGO’s, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> social movements<br />
Due to <strong>the</strong> demobalisation <strong>an</strong>d disb<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> ‘old’ social movements, one of <strong>the</strong> most<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t developments after 1994 was <strong>the</strong> mushroom<strong>in</strong>g of NGO’s, which led to <strong>the</strong><br />
formation of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) <strong>in</strong> 1995. This body worked<br />
closely with <strong>the</strong> state to fulfill on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>an</strong>d a lever to access development funds <strong>an</strong>d on <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r to <strong>in</strong>corporate large sections of civil society <strong>in</strong>to participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutionalized<br />
parliamentary <strong>an</strong>d state programme implementation processes. Through mak<strong>in</strong>g written <strong>an</strong>d<br />
oral submissions on almost all aspects of social <strong>an</strong>d economic policy <strong>an</strong>d legislation, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
implementation of social projects, SANGOCO played a powerful role <strong>in</strong> fulfill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ds of <strong>the</strong> hegemonic power - participation <strong>in</strong> ‘reconstruction’. A similar development<br />
took place with <strong>the</strong> National L<strong>an</strong>d Committee (NLC), <strong>an</strong> umbrella org<strong>an</strong>ization look<strong>in</strong>g at<br />
l<strong>an</strong>d reform, l<strong>an</strong>d restitution <strong>an</strong>d security of tenure. While <strong>the</strong>re were those <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> NGO’s who<br />
were content to participate <strong>in</strong> official government programmes <strong>the</strong>re was a m<strong>in</strong>ority that<br />
emphasised <strong>the</strong> need for a radical approach as government delivery of services <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>d<br />
reform was slow <strong>an</strong>d based upon <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest of <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g classes, right to property.<br />
The legitimacy of those NGO’s that were critical of <strong>the</strong> government was <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
questioned by <strong>the</strong> state that argued that <strong>the</strong>se NGO’s were not represent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ‘poor’ but<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves. This <strong>in</strong> turn led some NGO’s orientat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir programmes <strong>in</strong> such a way to ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
build or support <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ization with a mass base. A good example of such <strong>an</strong> orientation to<br />
form a mass base is <strong>the</strong> NLC who participated <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>the</strong> form<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>dless<br />
People’s Movement (LPM), which took various actions <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d occupations,<br />
demonstration <strong>an</strong>d seriously questioned <strong>the</strong> private property clause <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
constitution as <strong>the</strong> major stumbl<strong>in</strong>g block to l<strong>an</strong>d reform. But it had been argued that this <strong>new</strong><br />
orientation was at best a mobilisation of <strong>the</strong> grassroots <strong>in</strong> order to access government<br />
programmes.<br />
It was almost <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same time that <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> social movements were be<strong>in</strong>g formed that<br />
SANGOCO rejected GEAR <strong>in</strong> 2000. The honeymoon period of ‘reconstruction’ politics were<br />
beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to show stra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>y lead<strong>in</strong>g NGO’s were quietly disaffiliat<strong>in</strong>g from<br />
SANGOCO <strong>in</strong> view of its recent positions. The relationship between <strong>the</strong> state <strong>an</strong>d<br />
SANGOCO also became stra<strong>in</strong>ed. But difference with<strong>in</strong> civil society were not that polarized<br />
as yet but came shortly with <strong>the</strong> UN World Conference on Susta<strong>in</strong>able Development (WSSD)<br />
held <strong>in</strong> Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg <strong>in</strong> 2002.<br />
SANGOCO positions zigzagged <strong>an</strong>d ultimately it formulated a position with COSATU <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> SACP that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n civil society had to engage with <strong>the</strong> UN <strong>in</strong>stitutionalized process<br />
<strong>an</strong>d called for more power for <strong>the</strong> UN to enforce resolutions <strong>an</strong>d conventions on member<br />
states. The SANGOCO/COSATU/SACP alli<strong>an</strong>ce also, led to <strong>an</strong> adoption of a position that<br />
sought to not to raise <strong>an</strong>y criticism of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n governments GEAR policy as lead<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to unsusta<strong>in</strong>able development. Social movements <strong>an</strong>d radical NGO’s stood <strong>in</strong> opposition to<br />
<strong>the</strong> UN conference as a façade, as real power vested with a few capitalist states dom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> agenda <strong>an</strong>d corporate <strong>in</strong>fluence dom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>the</strong> conferences. The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n social<br />
movements beg<strong>an</strong> to mobalise extensive support from <strong>an</strong>ti-globalisation activists <strong>an</strong>d<br />
org<strong>an</strong>isations <strong>in</strong> opposition to <strong>the</strong> UN conference <strong>an</strong>d <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n government.<br />
SANGOGO, toge<strong>the</strong>r with COSATU tried everyth<strong>in</strong>g to marg<strong>in</strong>alize or purge <strong>an</strong>y<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization that did not tow <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> umbrella body, <strong>the</strong> Civil Society Indaba (CSI).<br />
The tensions with<strong>in</strong> civil society <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>the</strong> attitude <strong>an</strong>d dem<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n state <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> UN sponsored conference led to a split with<strong>in</strong> civil society <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
Social Movement United (later became <strong>the</strong> Social Movements Indaba) was formed<br />
compris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> more radical component of civil society.<br />
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The SACP <strong>an</strong>d COSATU, while pay<strong>in</strong>g lip service to support<strong>in</strong>g social movements, not only<br />
attempted to break <strong>the</strong> unity of <strong>the</strong> social movements but act as a (left) ideological cover for<br />
<strong>the</strong> rightward shift of <strong>the</strong> ANC. This was demonstrated dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> WSSD when <strong>the</strong> alli<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
partners refused to acknowledge <strong>the</strong> Social Movements United march through Alex<strong>an</strong>dra<br />
Township towards <strong>the</strong> UN Conference <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>dton <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stead staged a march <strong>in</strong> opposition to<br />
<strong>the</strong> social movements. For <strong>the</strong> first time, <strong>the</strong> ANC/SACP/COSATU Alli<strong>an</strong>ce (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
SANGOCO failed to draw mass support <strong>an</strong>d was sidel<strong>in</strong>ed by a march of 25 000 people with<br />
‘red’ t-shirts, head b<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>an</strong>d red flags mobilised by <strong>the</strong> Social Movements United. The<br />
Alli<strong>an</strong>ce partners only m<strong>an</strong>aged to mobalise 5000 people dressed <strong>in</strong> ‘white’ t-shirts for <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
march. The two marches were symbolic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> battle l<strong>in</strong>es of class struggle were drawn. For<br />
<strong>the</strong> first time, <strong>the</strong> ANC was beaten <strong>in</strong> its own backyard <strong>an</strong>d support base of Alex<strong>an</strong>dra<br />
Township. This was <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d historic event, not only <strong>in</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> ANC Alli<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
tak<strong>in</strong>g a beat<strong>in</strong>g, but it showed <strong>new</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> possibility of creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> alternative<br />
<strong>an</strong>ti-capitalist movement based upon <strong>the</strong> development of a <strong>new</strong>, mass-based social<br />
movements. It fur<strong>the</strong>r signaled <strong>the</strong> end of eight years of ‘reconstruction’ politics <strong>an</strong>d that <strong>the</strong><br />
hegemonic project of <strong>the</strong> state had to be redrawn <strong>an</strong>d re<strong>in</strong>vented. Construct<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>new</strong><br />
hegemonic politics <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>struments for its realization proved more difficult post – WSSD.<br />
From ‘reconstruction’ to ‘resist<strong>an</strong>ce’<br />
By 2005 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> experienced a nation-wide spate of community unrest specifically <strong>in</strong><br />
relation to a lack of service delivery <strong>an</strong>d hous<strong>in</strong>g. The M<strong>in</strong>ister of Intelligence, Ronnie Kasrils<br />
was quick to charge that <strong>the</strong> unrest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country was due to a third force that was try<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
underm<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> democracy <strong>an</strong>d destabilize <strong>the</strong> country. The National Intelligence Agency<br />
(NIA) probe <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> social unrest drew large-scale condemnation by social movements,<br />
COSATU <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ted media. Cosatu Western Cape secretary Tony Ehrenreich said that<br />
<strong>the</strong> “current state action harks back to old apar<strong>the</strong>id tactics or is <strong>an</strong> attempt to underm<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong><br />
right to legitimate protest.” The crim<strong>in</strong>alisation of dissent became widespread practice at all<br />
levels of government.<br />
There was <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased feel<strong>in</strong>g by communities <strong>an</strong>d social movements that <strong>the</strong> more <strong>the</strong>y had<br />
dialogue with state structures (reconstruction politics) <strong>the</strong> more <strong>the</strong>se were merely tactics to<br />
delay progress.<br />
“We have learnt from our experience that when you w<strong>an</strong>t to achieve what you w<strong>an</strong>t you w<strong>an</strong>t,<br />
when you w<strong>an</strong>t to achieve what is legitimate by peaceful negotiations, by humbleness, by<br />
respect<strong>in</strong>g those <strong>in</strong> authority your plea becomes crim<strong>in</strong>al. You will be deceived for more th<strong>an</strong><br />
10 years; you will be fooled <strong>an</strong>d underm<strong>in</strong>ed. This is why we have resorted to <strong>the</strong> streets.<br />
When we st<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> our thous<strong>an</strong>ds we are taken seriously.” But “We are driven by <strong>the</strong> Third<br />
Force, <strong>the</strong> suffer<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> poor.”<br />
S’bu Zikode, Chairperson of <strong>the</strong> Abahlali base Mjondolo<br />
Like <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r social movements <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country, Abahlali base Mjondolo, had discussions with<br />
government representatives <strong>in</strong> this case <strong>the</strong> chair of <strong>the</strong> hous<strong>in</strong>g portfolio of <strong>the</strong> executive<br />
committee of <strong>the</strong> Durb<strong>an</strong> municipality, <strong>the</strong> director of hous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> council of <strong>the</strong> area.<br />
There was a promise of houses <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>d. But a month later <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d identified was be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
developed for commercial purposes. Protest resulted <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> police arrested 14 of <strong>the</strong> 5000<br />
protesters. The protesters were br<strong>an</strong>ded crim<strong>in</strong>als by <strong>the</strong> local ANC councilor for illegally<br />
occupy<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
The state has <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly used repressive measures to quell <strong>the</strong> mood of discontent <strong>an</strong>d<br />
protest. The TAC protest to dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> roll out of <strong>an</strong>tiretroviral drugs at state hospitals saw<br />
<strong>the</strong> police brutally beat protesters but also, use live ammunition. The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n police<br />
119
have killed a number of young activists dur<strong>in</strong>g protest actions. Nhl<strong>an</strong>hla Masuku (15) <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Dennis Mathibithi (17) were killed by <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n police while tak<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>in</strong> resist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st forced evictions of poor people <strong>in</strong> Katlehong. A young Nomth<strong>an</strong>dazo Ngcobo was<br />
shot dead by police for participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a small protest aga<strong>in</strong>st alleged municipal electoral<br />
fraud <strong>in</strong> Umlazi Township. The more publicized death concerns a 17-year-old student,<br />
Thebogo Moloi, who died of gunshot wounds susta<strong>in</strong>ed dur<strong>in</strong>g a protest org<strong>an</strong>ised by <strong>the</strong><br />
Greater Harrismith Concerned Residents Org<strong>an</strong>isation. Journalists of THIS DAY <strong>new</strong>spaper<br />
on 1 September 2004 described <strong>the</strong> protest as:<br />
… scenes rem<strong>in</strong>iscent of <strong>the</strong> violent 1976 student upris<strong>in</strong>gs erupted near Harrismith yesterday<br />
when police riot squad opened fire on thous<strong>an</strong>ds of high schools children who barricaded <strong>the</strong><br />
busy N3 highway.<br />
This protest was largely caused by compla<strong>in</strong>ts of poor municipal services, outst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d<br />
claims, hous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>frastructure. Ano<strong>the</strong>r example of a spont<strong>an</strong>eous response was seen <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> community of Diepsloot, which embarked upon a three-day riot, burn<strong>in</strong>g down municipal<br />
offices <strong>an</strong>d fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> police <strong>in</strong> response to <strong>in</strong>formation that had circulated about <strong>the</strong> forced<br />
relocation of <strong>the</strong> community. The squatter settlements, are burst<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong>ir seems as ruralurb<strong>an</strong><br />
migration implodes <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s ma<strong>in</strong> cities, Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg, Durb<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Cape<br />
Town. As <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> experienced <strong>in</strong>creased property speculation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>reby <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> sell<strong>in</strong>g price of l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d houses, large scale eviction are tak<strong>in</strong>g place with<strong>in</strong> major urb<strong>an</strong><br />
centers <strong>an</strong>d rural areas mak<strong>in</strong>g way for tourism accommodation, <strong>new</strong> homes <strong>an</strong>d holiday<br />
houses. New established resist<strong>an</strong>ce aga<strong>in</strong>st evictions is also tak<strong>in</strong>g place from farm workers<br />
with <strong>new</strong> community org<strong>an</strong>izations be<strong>in</strong>g formed.<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s social movements are be<strong>in</strong>g formed <strong>in</strong> response to <strong>the</strong> crisis of capitalism that<br />
has spurred on <strong>the</strong> class struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st neo-liberal policies. The movements are, <strong>the</strong>refore,<br />
not a result of some third force or a result of someone’s great idea but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>an</strong> outcome of<br />
spont<strong>an</strong>eous action on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g class, to defend its liv<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>an</strong>d its right<br />
to security of tenure. These movements are also emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> light of <strong>the</strong> failure of traditional<br />
org<strong>an</strong>isations to defend <strong>the</strong>m aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> impact of neo-liberal policies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir daily lives. The<br />
nature of community responses <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>ds of milit<strong>an</strong>t action such as roadblocks, <strong>an</strong>tievictions<br />
struggles, riots, community mass mobilisation, <strong>an</strong>d direct action aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> security<br />
establishment are <strong>in</strong>herited from past movements.<br />
Challenges of <strong>the</strong> social movements<br />
The rise of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> social movements represents <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ic response to <strong>the</strong> crisis of<br />
capitalism <strong>in</strong> a post-apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The reconstruction of <strong>new</strong> class relations with <strong>the</strong><br />
emergence of a black bourgeoisie <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> redistribution of <strong>the</strong> wealth of <strong>the</strong> country to <strong>the</strong><br />
rich has objectively fed <strong>the</strong> crisis, as welfare to <strong>the</strong> majority is reduced or largely <strong>in</strong>effective.<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is experienc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> dual effect of object enrichment <strong>an</strong>d object impoverishment<br />
<strong>an</strong>d unemployment.<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong> spate of spont<strong>an</strong>eous struggles by social movements throughout <strong>the</strong> country we<br />
have not seen a repeat of <strong>the</strong> ‘red march’ of WSSD. The social movements are by <strong>an</strong>d large a<br />
spont<strong>an</strong>eous occurrence with m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong>se movements collaps<strong>in</strong>g some time after <strong>the</strong>y have<br />
taken to <strong>the</strong> streets or leaders easily co-opted <strong>in</strong>to state structures. The labour movements<br />
while pay<strong>in</strong>g lip service have largely dist<strong>an</strong>ced <strong>the</strong>mselves from <strong>the</strong> social movements. This is<br />
largely because of <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-state position <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> social movements not display<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y loyalty<br />
to <strong>the</strong> ANC or <strong>the</strong> Alli<strong>an</strong>ce. Traditional labour <strong>the</strong>refore recognises <strong>the</strong> potential political<br />
implications if it provided org<strong>an</strong>izational <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial resources to assist <strong>the</strong> struggles of <strong>the</strong><br />
social movements – <strong>the</strong>y see <strong>the</strong> seeds of <strong>an</strong> alternative radical movement! The fact that<br />
120
traditional labour has failed to org<strong>an</strong>ise <strong>the</strong> unemployed, <strong>the</strong> casuals <strong>an</strong>d those that fall outside<br />
<strong>the</strong> formal economy places a huge challenge for <strong>the</strong> movements to org<strong>an</strong>ise <strong>the</strong>se sections <strong>in</strong>to<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir r<strong>an</strong>ks. This process has started but <strong>the</strong> movements are struggl<strong>in</strong>g with a situation that is<br />
embryonic <strong>an</strong>d not flexible enough to take on <strong>the</strong> org<strong>an</strong>izational <strong>an</strong>d political challenges.<br />
The struggles of <strong>the</strong> social movements are defensive <strong>in</strong> character <strong>an</strong>d do not have <strong>an</strong>y<br />
ideological cohesion, which is necessary if <strong>the</strong>re is to be a national offense aga<strong>in</strong>st neoliberalism<br />
<strong>an</strong>d capitalism. A major challenge for <strong>the</strong> social movements is to encourage open<br />
political debate with <strong>the</strong> aim of develop<strong>in</strong>g a more vigorous <strong>an</strong>d thorough go<strong>in</strong>g class <strong>an</strong>alysis<br />
of poverty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. While this is happen<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> ideas of socialism<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g raised once more <strong>an</strong>d some social movements adopt<strong>in</strong>g socialism as <strong>the</strong>ir ideological<br />
outlook <strong>the</strong> majority are parochial <strong>in</strong> outlook. There exists <strong>the</strong> challenge to form a national<br />
social movement with a <strong>new</strong> national identity. Then we c<strong>an</strong> truly say that ‘resist<strong>an</strong>ce’ politics<br />
is back on <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n agenda aga<strong>in</strong>!<br />
References<br />
APF. 2003. M<strong>in</strong>utes of <strong>the</strong> Trade Union Workshop, 16 August 2003<br />
Arrighi, G. Hegemony <strong>an</strong>d Antisystemic Movements, Rosa Luxemberg Foundation,<br />
Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg, Policy Paper 1/2004<br />
Barchiesi, F. ‘March<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> Left: Before <strong>an</strong>d After August 31’, Kh<strong>an</strong>ya: A Journal for<br />
Activists, No 2. (2002), p13-16<br />
Desai, A. <strong>an</strong>d R. Pithouse, Dispossession, Resist<strong>an</strong>ce, Repossession <strong>an</strong>d Repression <strong>in</strong><br />
M<strong>an</strong>dela Park. (University of KwaZulu-Natal, Centre for Civil Society Research Report. No.<br />
9, 2003)<br />
Development Update. Mobalis<strong>in</strong>g for Ch<strong>an</strong>ge: The rise of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> social movements <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>. Vol.5 No.2 November 2004<br />
F<strong>in</strong>e, B. 1992. Civil Society Theory <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Politics of Tr<strong>an</strong>sition <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. In<br />
Searchlight <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, No. 9 August 1992. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg<br />
Greenberg, S. Post Apar<strong>the</strong>id Development, L<strong>an</strong>dlessness <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Reproduction of Exclusion<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. (University of KwaZulu-Natal, Centre for Civil Society Research Report, No.<br />
17, 2004)<br />
Greenberg, S. ‘The L<strong>an</strong>d Movement after WSSD – Where to now?’ KHANYA: a journal for<br />
activists, issue no.2 (2002)<br />
Jord<strong>an</strong>, P. ‘The Crisis of Conscience <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> SACP - A Critical Review of Slovo's 'Has<br />
Socialism Failed’, <strong>Africa</strong>n Communist, September (1990)<br />
Kakaza, A. <strong>an</strong>d Russouw, S. ‘Police fire on protest<strong>in</strong>g school kids: Free State march turns<br />
violent’, THISDAY Newspaper, 1 September 2004. p1<br />
Lehulere, O. ‘The Political Signific<strong>an</strong>ce of GEAR’. Debate, No.3.1997<br />
Mail & Guardi<strong>an</strong> Onl<strong>in</strong>e, ‘M<strong>in</strong>ister promises houses to Protea Glen residents’, 19 Jul 2004<br />
http:/www.mg.co.za<br />
Mail & Guardi<strong>an</strong> Onl<strong>in</strong>e, ‘Tr<strong>an</strong>sparently full of holes’, 02 Sep 2004. http:/www.mg.co.za<br />
Mazzetti, G. 2003. Where do <strong>the</strong> Anti-Globalisation Movements Come From? Gloves Off.<br />
http://glovesoff.org/features/mazzetti_1003.html<br />
McK<strong>in</strong>ley, D. 2003. Beware Ideological Absolutism: A reply to Barchiesi. Email<br />
correspondence, IMC-SA.<br />
McK<strong>in</strong>ley, D. 2002. M<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>new</strong>’ enemy. Unpublished paper.<br />
Naidoo, P. <strong>an</strong>d Veriava, A. Re-member<strong>in</strong>g Movements: Trade Union Movements <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
New Social Movements <strong>in</strong> Neo-liberal <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Mauritius. (University of KwaZulu-<br />
Natal,Centre for Civil Society, 2003)<br />
SALB, Social Movements: Rebels with a clue? <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Labour Bullet<strong>in</strong>. Vol. 27 No. 6.<br />
(2003.)<br />
S’bu Zidode (2005). The Third Force. Star Newspaper.<br />
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Xali, M<strong>the</strong>tho. (2003) Seek<strong>in</strong>g Trade Union <strong>an</strong>d Community Org<strong>an</strong>isation l<strong>in</strong>kages <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Cape Town Metropolit<strong>an</strong> area: Possibilities for <strong>new</strong> trade unionism <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong> social<br />
movements. ILRIG research report compiled for <strong>the</strong> Centre for Civil Society. Cape Town<br />
122
11 L<strong>an</strong>d redistribution <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: <strong>the</strong> property<br />
clause revisited 29<br />
By Lungisile Ntsebeza<br />
After be<strong>in</strong>g marg<strong>in</strong>alized for most of <strong>the</strong> 12 years of our democracy, <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d question seems<br />
to be gett<strong>in</strong>g some attention from <strong>the</strong> democratic state. In his State of <strong>the</strong> Nation address<br />
delivered on 3 February 2006, President Thabo Mbeki <strong>an</strong>nounced that <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
Agriculture <strong>an</strong>d L<strong>an</strong>d Affairs would, dur<strong>in</strong>g this year (2006), review <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
• The will<strong>in</strong>g seller, will<strong>in</strong>g buyer pr<strong>in</strong>ciple;<br />
• The l<strong>an</strong>d acquisition models <strong>an</strong>d possible m<strong>an</strong>ipulation of l<strong>an</strong>d prices; <strong>an</strong>d<br />
• The conditions under which foreigners buy l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
However, he did not elaborate, save to state <strong>in</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r ambiguous <strong>an</strong>d vague terms that <strong>the</strong><br />
above will be done <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with <strong>in</strong>ternational norms <strong>an</strong>d practices.<br />
The President also made <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t po<strong>in</strong>t about <strong>the</strong> import<strong>an</strong>ce of align<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
Growth <strong>an</strong>d Development Strategies (PGDS) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Integrated Development Pl<strong>an</strong>s (IDP) of<br />
municipalities to <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d redistribution component of <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d reform programme. He fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ted to <strong>the</strong> proper use of <strong>the</strong> funds that have been made available for <strong>the</strong> productive use of<br />
<strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
It is worth recall<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> above statements by <strong>the</strong> President come barely seven months<br />
after <strong>the</strong> historic four-day L<strong>an</strong>d Summit which was held <strong>in</strong> Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg <strong>in</strong> July last year<br />
(2005). In one import<strong>an</strong>t respect, <strong>the</strong> State President’s pronouncements were reflective of<br />
some of <strong>the</strong> key resolutions of <strong>the</strong> summit. The summit was org<strong>an</strong>ised by <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />
L<strong>an</strong>d Affairs with limited <strong>in</strong>volvement of various civil society org<strong>an</strong>isations <strong>an</strong>d some lead<strong>in</strong>g<br />
academics <strong>an</strong>d researchers. The event was attended by more th<strong>an</strong> a thous<strong>an</strong>d people. I was<br />
greatly privileged not only to attend <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>d Summit, but to facilitate <strong>an</strong>d report back on one<br />
of <strong>the</strong> five commissions, <strong>the</strong> commission deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> vexed issue of l<strong>an</strong>d redistribution <strong>in</strong><br />
this country. In this role, I ga<strong>in</strong>ed access to some <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g documentation <strong>an</strong>d engaged <strong>in</strong><br />
facilitat<strong>in</strong>g debates <strong>an</strong>d discussions around some of <strong>the</strong> key challenges to l<strong>an</strong>d redistribution<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> from a wide spectrum of often emotionally charged particip<strong>an</strong>ts: from<br />
representatives of org<strong>an</strong>ised white commercial farmers, AgriSA to particip<strong>an</strong>ts from <strong>the</strong><br />
Young Communists <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>dless People’s Movement (LPM).<br />
At this Summit, far reach<strong>in</strong>g resolutions were taken, <strong>an</strong>d later adopted. For example, <strong>in</strong> my<br />
commission on l<strong>an</strong>d redistribution, <strong>the</strong>re was overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g support that:<br />
• <strong>the</strong> state should be proactive <strong>an</strong>d be <strong>the</strong> driv<strong>in</strong>g force beh<strong>in</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>d redistribution;<br />
• <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g seller, will<strong>in</strong>g buyer pr<strong>in</strong>ciple should be rejected;<br />
• <strong>the</strong> state should have <strong>the</strong> right of first refusal on all l<strong>an</strong>d sales;<br />
• l<strong>an</strong>d reform should benefit <strong>the</strong> poor, particularly women, farm workers <strong>an</strong>d youth; <strong>an</strong>d<br />
• l<strong>an</strong>d should be expropriated.<br />
Similar radical resolutions from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r four commissions were adopted.<br />
In m<strong>an</strong>y ways, <strong>the</strong> state is respond<strong>in</strong>g to a r<strong>an</strong>ge of criticism <strong>an</strong>d pressures. From <strong>the</strong> late<br />
1990s civil society org<strong>an</strong>isations consistently criticised <strong>the</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g policy direction, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
29 This is <strong>an</strong> adaptation of a lecture presented <strong>in</strong> August 2005 as part of <strong>the</strong> Harold Wolpe Lecture Series<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ised by <strong>the</strong> Centre for Civil Society at <strong>the</strong> University of KwaZulu Natal <strong>in</strong> Durb<strong>an</strong>. I’m very grateful to<br />
Patrick Bond, <strong>the</strong> Director of <strong>the</strong> Centre for permission to publish aspects of <strong>the</strong> lecture.<br />
123
NGOs work<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> government framework <strong>an</strong>d help<strong>in</strong>g government <strong>in</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g<br />
its policy were <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly able to articulate this criticism based on <strong>the</strong>ir experiences on <strong>the</strong><br />
ground. The establishment of <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>dless People’s Movement (LPM) <strong>in</strong> 2001, strategic<br />
shifts on <strong>the</strong> part of long-established org<strong>an</strong>isations such as <strong>the</strong> Trust for Community Outreach<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Education (TCOE) towards l<strong>an</strong>d issues, not forgett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> People’s Tribunal on<br />
L<strong>an</strong>dlessness that this org<strong>an</strong>isation staged <strong>in</strong> Port Elizabeth <strong>in</strong> December 2003, all contributed<br />
to <strong>the</strong>se pressures. Over <strong>an</strong>d above <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>ternal pressures from below, developments <strong>in</strong><br />
neighbour<strong>in</strong>g Zimbabwe were a const<strong>an</strong>t rem<strong>in</strong>der of what could happen to this country.<br />
By 2003, senior government officials were acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> very serious challenges of<br />
redistribut<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to unwill<strong>in</strong>gness of white farmers to sell l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d<br />
sharply ris<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d prices. It is aga<strong>in</strong>st this background that <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>d Summit <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
statements by <strong>the</strong> President <strong>in</strong> his State of <strong>the</strong> Nation address should be viewed.<br />
The L<strong>an</strong>d Summit was built around <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>me: “A Partnership to Fast Track L<strong>an</strong>d Reform: A<br />
New Trajectory, Forward to 2014”. The year 2014 is <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> target set by government for <strong>the</strong><br />
redistribution of 30 percent of white owned farml<strong>an</strong>d to blacks. At <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d<br />
summit, eleven years after <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s democracy, just over three per cent of <strong>the</strong><br />
agricultural l<strong>an</strong>d had been tr<strong>an</strong>sferred. The <strong>the</strong>me <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> term “fast track” which<br />
most would immediately associate with <strong>the</strong> current l<strong>an</strong>d reform <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>in</strong> Zimbabwe, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>deed <strong>the</strong> resolutions of <strong>the</strong> summit, demonstrated this urgency.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>d Summit <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> President’s address, critics are wonder<strong>in</strong>g how <strong>the</strong> resolutions<br />
of <strong>the</strong> summit <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> statements by <strong>the</strong> President will be taken forward. In particular, critics<br />
are ask<strong>in</strong>g whe<strong>the</strong>r a review of <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g seller, will<strong>in</strong>g buyer pr<strong>in</strong>ciple constitute a more<br />
active <strong>in</strong>volvement of <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d reform process, albeit with<strong>in</strong> a capitalist <strong>an</strong>d market<br />
framework, or what. Radical critics of current government l<strong>an</strong>d policy lament that <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d<br />
summit <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> President’s address did not address constitutional issues such as <strong>the</strong> protection<br />
of exist<strong>in</strong>g property rights whose history is traceable to colonial conquest, l<strong>an</strong>d dispossession<br />
<strong>an</strong>d naked exploitation of black labour.<br />
In this paper, I would like to consider <strong>the</strong> radical critics’ argument that <strong>the</strong> property clause <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Constitution is <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> obstacle to large scale l<strong>an</strong>d redistribution <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. This is<br />
not <strong>the</strong> first time concerns on <strong>the</strong> entrenchment of <strong>the</strong> property clause <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitution are<br />
articulated. The matter received some degree of discussion dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> political negotiations<br />
period <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, a process which led to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>clusion of <strong>the</strong> clause <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Interim Constitution. The central question here is whe<strong>the</strong>r it is possible to embark on a<br />
comprehensive l<strong>an</strong>d redistribution programme while recognis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d entrench<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d rights<br />
acquired through colonialism <strong>an</strong>d apar<strong>the</strong>id, as <strong>the</strong> property clause does.<br />
L<strong>an</strong>d reform <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: <strong>the</strong> property clause debate <strong>in</strong> context<br />
It is import<strong>an</strong>t that <strong>the</strong> wider context with<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> property clause debate is occurr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
should not be forgotten. A lot has been written <strong>an</strong>d said about <strong>the</strong> broader historical context,<br />
but it is worth highlight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g: Historically, white settlers <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
appropriated more th<strong>an</strong> 90 per cent of <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d surface under <strong>the</strong> 1913 Natives L<strong>an</strong>d Act,<br />
conf<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous people to reserves <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g marg<strong>in</strong>al portions of l<strong>an</strong>d. This<br />
process forced a large number of rural residents to leave <strong>the</strong> rural areas for urb<strong>an</strong> areas <strong>an</strong>d<br />
farms <strong>in</strong> search of work. A signific<strong>an</strong>t number of rural people became fully proletari<strong>an</strong>ised,<br />
while o<strong>the</strong>rs became migr<strong>an</strong>t workers with a tenuous l<strong>in</strong>k to l<strong>an</strong>d. It is import<strong>an</strong>t to note,<br />
though, that this process of proletari<strong>an</strong>isation should not be viewed <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>ear <strong>an</strong>d teleological<br />
terms. Whenever colonialists got <strong>the</strong> upper h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>troduced commodity farm<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
challeng<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>digenous agricultural systems which were not geared for <strong>the</strong> market. However,<br />
prior to <strong>the</strong> discovery of m<strong>in</strong>erals from <strong>the</strong> 1860s, <strong>Africa</strong>ns adapted quite remarkably to<br />
commodity farm<strong>in</strong>g. As Mafeje (1988:100) puts it, <strong>the</strong>y were “<strong>the</strong> most dynamic agricultural<br />
producers <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>”. Radical scholars of <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>an</strong>d 1980s have documented this<br />
124
phenomenon, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> best known of <strong>the</strong>se studies is Bundy’s The Rise <strong>an</strong>d Fall of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>Africa</strong>n Peas<strong>an</strong>try. In <strong>the</strong> Cape, <strong>the</strong> colonial government <strong>an</strong>d missionaries went<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>an</strong>d attempted to establish a class of <strong>Africa</strong>n farmers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir bid to marg<strong>in</strong>alise chiefs<br />
who were associated with <strong>an</strong>ti-colonial wars.<br />
The discovery of m<strong>in</strong>erals, particularly gold <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1880s led, amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs, to a dem<strong>an</strong>d for<br />
cheap labour. The obvious target was black <strong>Africa</strong>n labour. The colonial strategy, even <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Cape, shifted from promot<strong>in</strong>g a class of <strong>Africa</strong>n farmers to compell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Africa</strong>ns to becom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
wage labourers. The first legislative measure <strong>in</strong> this regard was <strong>the</strong> promulgation under <strong>the</strong><br />
premiership of Cecil John Rhodes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cape parliament of <strong>the</strong> notorious Glen Grey Act <strong>in</strong><br />
1894. After <strong>the</strong> Union of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1910, some of <strong>the</strong> provisions of <strong>the</strong> Glen Grey Act<br />
were <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Natives L<strong>an</strong>d Act of 1913. This Act forbade <strong>Africa</strong>ns from buy<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d own<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d outside <strong>the</strong> seven percent of <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d that was reserved for <strong>the</strong>ir occupation.<br />
It also abolished <strong>the</strong> sharecropp<strong>in</strong>g system <strong>an</strong>d labour ten<strong>an</strong>cies. These developments,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to Bundy, by <strong>an</strong>d large accounted for <strong>the</strong> fall of <strong>the</strong> peas<strong>an</strong>try <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
While colonialism <strong>an</strong>d apar<strong>the</strong>id systematically underm<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>Africa</strong>n agriculture, white<br />
farmers, through subst<strong>an</strong>tial state subsidies <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> availability of cheap black labour,<br />
developed a model of large-scale commercial farm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. This has led some<br />
commentators to argue that <strong>the</strong>re existed two forms of agriculture <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: so-called<br />
subsistence farm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> communal areas, <strong>an</strong>d white commercial farm<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> liberation struggle <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> was not overtly fought around <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d<br />
question, as was <strong>the</strong> case <strong>in</strong> Zimbabwe for example, <strong>the</strong>re was always <strong>the</strong> expectation that<br />
unravell<strong>in</strong>g centuries of l<strong>an</strong>d dispossession <strong>an</strong>d oppression would be among <strong>the</strong> priorities of a<br />
democratic <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> ANC’s Freedom Charter, drafted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1950s when<br />
decolonization <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> was on <strong>the</strong> agenda, had promised that “(t)he l<strong>an</strong>d shall be shared<br />
among those who work it” <strong>an</strong>d will be “re-divided among those who work it, to b<strong>an</strong>ish fam<strong>in</strong>e<br />
<strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>d hunger”.<br />
However, dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> political negotiation process which led to <strong>the</strong> advent of democracy <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>the</strong> rhetoric of <strong>the</strong> Freedom Charter <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly became difficult to susta<strong>in</strong>.<br />
There are a number of reasons why this was <strong>the</strong> case which c<strong>an</strong>not be dealt with <strong>in</strong> full <strong>in</strong> this<br />
paper. Suffice it to say that <strong>the</strong> fall of Soviet Communism was arguably one of <strong>the</strong> most<br />
critical. Discussions with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congress Alli<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ANC, SACP <strong>an</strong>d<br />
COSATU, <strong>the</strong> trade union federation show deep divisions on what <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id system<br />
would be replaced with <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> event <strong>the</strong> ANC came to power. The <strong>in</strong>ternational climate,<br />
though, clearly favoured <strong>the</strong> pro-capitalist forces with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> ANC launched its election m<strong>an</strong>ifesto <strong>in</strong> 1994 <strong>the</strong>re was a fundamental reversal of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Freedom Charter’s call for <strong>the</strong> nationalization of l<strong>an</strong>d. Although <strong>the</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ifesto had some<br />
redistributive elements <strong>in</strong> it, <strong>the</strong>re was equally a commitment to market forces. This tendency<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> market became clearly pronounced when two years after <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of<br />
democracy, <strong>an</strong> ANC-led government formally embraced <strong>in</strong> 1996, conservative neo-liberal<br />
economic policies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of GEAR (Growth, Employment <strong>an</strong>d Redistribution).<br />
With regard to <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d reform programme <strong>an</strong>d its implementation, not only did government<br />
commit itself to a market-led programme, l<strong>an</strong>d reform policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> was to be based<br />
on a will<strong>in</strong>g-seller-will<strong>in</strong>g-buyer condition. This was despite <strong>the</strong> fact that this pr<strong>in</strong>ciple had<br />
by <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s proved to be a failure <strong>in</strong>, for example, neighbour<strong>in</strong>g Zimbabwe. Over <strong>an</strong>d<br />
above this, <strong>the</strong> property clause was entrenchment <strong>in</strong> both <strong>the</strong> Interim <strong>an</strong>d F<strong>in</strong>al Constitutions.<br />
Analysts such as Marais (1998) have commented that this shift marked a victory for <strong>the</strong> more<br />
conservative, capitalist <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed forces with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ANC, thus suggest<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> ANC <strong>an</strong>d<br />
most def<strong>in</strong>itely <strong>the</strong> Tri-partite Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> ANC/ SACP/ COSATU are not un<strong>an</strong>imous on<br />
this issue. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> shift to GEAR <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> endorsement of <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g-seller-will<strong>in</strong>g-buyer<br />
condition must have dealt a serious blow to <strong>the</strong> “l<strong>an</strong>d lobby” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> negotiation process which<br />
had hoped for at least a “mixed economy” <strong>an</strong>d radical reform <strong>in</strong> a democratic <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
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The property clause debate<br />
As already po<strong>in</strong>ted out from <strong>the</strong> outset, except for hardboiled party loyalists, <strong>the</strong>re is wide<br />
accept<strong>an</strong>ce today that <strong>the</strong> pace of l<strong>an</strong>d reform <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is pa<strong>in</strong>fully slow. I will not, <strong>in</strong><br />
this paper, assess <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d reform programme <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first 10 years of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
democracy. M<strong>in</strong>e is to ask why <strong>the</strong> slow pace.<br />
Various reasons have been offered <strong>in</strong> attempts to expla<strong>in</strong> slow delivery <strong>in</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d reform. The<br />
bone of contention <strong>in</strong> current debates, it seems, is around <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation of section 25 of<br />
<strong>the</strong> constitution. There seem to be broadly two streams to <strong>the</strong> debate. On <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
are those who argue that <strong>the</strong> fundamentals <strong>in</strong> terms of policy are <strong>in</strong> place <strong>an</strong>d that what is now<br />
miss<strong>in</strong>g is commitment from <strong>the</strong> government to ensure that <strong>the</strong> policies are implemented.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>rs, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>an</strong>d, argue that <strong>the</strong> problem is with policy, <strong>in</strong> particular <strong>the</strong><br />
entrenchment of <strong>the</strong> property clause <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution which, <strong>in</strong>ter alia, protects exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
property rights, as well as <strong>the</strong> endorsement <strong>in</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g-seller-will<strong>in</strong>g-buyer<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple. Let us consider each of <strong>the</strong>se arguments.<br />
Government representatives at a L<strong>an</strong>d Tribunal which was held <strong>in</strong> Port Elizabeth <strong>in</strong> December<br />
2003 <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>ised by <strong>the</strong> Trust for Community Outreach <strong>an</strong>d Education (TCOE) provide one<br />
example of <strong>the</strong> argument that <strong>the</strong> fundamentals are <strong>in</strong> place. Both Glen Thomas, <strong>the</strong> former<br />
Deputy Director-General of L<strong>an</strong>d Affairs, now Director General of <strong>the</strong> same department, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
M<strong>an</strong>ie Schoem<strong>an</strong>, member of <strong>the</strong> Parliament Portfolio Committee on L<strong>an</strong>d Affairs agreed that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y had no problem with policy, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g-seller-will<strong>in</strong>g-buyer condition. The<br />
issue, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Thomas was ‘whe<strong>the</strong>r government has sufficient resources to buy l<strong>an</strong>d<br />
when <strong>the</strong>re is a will<strong>in</strong>g seller at a price at which <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g seller w<strong>an</strong>ts to sell <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d’. He<br />
was adam<strong>an</strong>t that <strong>the</strong> ‘l<strong>an</strong>d market is <strong>the</strong>re. There’s no scarcity of l<strong>an</strong>d that could be bought,<br />
but <strong>the</strong> question is at what cost, at what price? That’s <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t’.<br />
A more nu<strong>an</strong>ced <strong>an</strong>d coherent version of <strong>the</strong> above argument that <strong>the</strong> fundamentals are <strong>in</strong><br />
place has recently been made by Ruth Hall (2004), <strong>an</strong>d some of her colleagues <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Programme for L<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d Agrari<strong>an</strong> Studies (PLAAS). She does not query <strong>the</strong> fact that Section<br />
25(1) protects exist<strong>in</strong>g property rights (2004:5). Her po<strong>in</strong>t is that although <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d reform<br />
policy is based on a ‘will<strong>in</strong>g seller, will<strong>in</strong>g buyer’ condition, <strong>the</strong> state c<strong>an</strong> expropriate l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
She argues that a far-reach<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d reform is possible with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g constitutional<br />
framework. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to her: ‘While protect<strong>in</strong>g rights, <strong>the</strong> constitution also explicitly<br />
empowers <strong>the</strong> state to expropriate property <strong>an</strong>d specifies that property may be expropriated <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> public <strong>in</strong>terest, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>the</strong> nation’s commitment to l<strong>an</strong>d reform”’ (2004:6).<br />
In m<strong>an</strong>y ways, Hall was respond<strong>in</strong>g to arguments raised <strong>in</strong> a paper authored by Fred<br />
Hendricks <strong>an</strong>d I <strong>in</strong> (2000) <strong>an</strong>d Hendricks (2004). The ma<strong>in</strong> argument <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se writ<strong>in</strong>gs is that<br />
<strong>the</strong> provisions of section 25 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution are contradictory <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that on <strong>the</strong> one<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Constitution protects exist<strong>in</strong>g property rights, while at <strong>the</strong> same time mak<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
commitment to redistribut<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d to <strong>the</strong> dispossessed majority.<br />
Hall, though, has a po<strong>in</strong>t. We have never really addressed <strong>the</strong> issue of expropriation. Indeed,<br />
it may be mislead<strong>in</strong>g to suggest that <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>d reform programme is exclusively<br />
market-led. The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n market-led approach to l<strong>an</strong>d reform is much more nu<strong>an</strong>ced.<br />
For example, <strong>the</strong>re is a sense <strong>in</strong> which it could be said that <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Constitution<br />
places <strong>an</strong> obligation on <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n state to take steps to ensure that citizens who are <strong>in</strong><br />
need of l<strong>an</strong>d should access it. This me<strong>an</strong>s that <strong>the</strong> state would not be passive <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process of<br />
redistribut<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
Secondly, <strong>the</strong> protection of private property <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> entrenchment of <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g seller, will<strong>in</strong>g<br />
buyer condition <strong>in</strong> policy should be bal<strong>an</strong>ced with <strong>the</strong> Constitutional provision which gives<br />
<strong>the</strong> state <strong>the</strong> power to expropriate l<strong>an</strong>d with compensation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public <strong>in</strong>terest, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g, as<br />
Hall notes, ‘<strong>the</strong> nation’s commitment to l<strong>an</strong>d reform’. However, I argue <strong>in</strong> this paper that<br />
126
despite <strong>the</strong>se provisions, <strong>the</strong>re are still enormous problems with <strong>the</strong> entrenchment of <strong>the</strong><br />
property clause <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution.<br />
Import<strong>an</strong>t to remember here is that expropriation goes with compensation. It should not, as<br />
Thomas rem<strong>in</strong>ded those attend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>d Tribunal, be confused with confiscation. This<br />
<strong>the</strong>n raises <strong>the</strong> question of how compensation is determ<strong>in</strong>ed. Sub-section 3 of section 25 of<br />
<strong>the</strong> constitution is supposed to guide <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ation of compensation.<br />
However, it is widely accepted that this sub-section is extremely vague. It merely states that<br />
‘<strong>the</strong> amount of compensation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> time <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>ner of payment must be just <strong>an</strong>d<br />
equitable’. But what precisely counts as a ‘just <strong>an</strong>d equitable’ dispensation is not clearly spelt<br />
out, except that <strong>the</strong> subsection goes on to state that compensation should reflect ‘<strong>an</strong> equitable<br />
bal<strong>an</strong>ce between <strong>the</strong> public <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of those affected’. In this respect, regard<br />
would be accorded to ‘all relev<strong>an</strong>t circumst<strong>an</strong>ces’. The pert<strong>in</strong>ent ones for our purposes<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> history of <strong>the</strong> acquisition <strong>an</strong>d use of <strong>the</strong> property; <strong>the</strong> market value of <strong>the</strong> property;<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> extent of direct state <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>an</strong>d subsidy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> acquisition <strong>an</strong>d beneficial capital<br />
improvement of <strong>the</strong> property.<br />
In recognition of <strong>the</strong> vagueness of some of <strong>the</strong>se provisions, a so-called ‘Geldenhuys formula’<br />
is used to determ<strong>in</strong>e compensation. Justice Geldenhuys is a L<strong>an</strong>d Claims Court judge who<br />
worked out a formula for <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ation of compensation <strong>in</strong> cases <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g expropriation<br />
<strong>in</strong> restitution cases. In essence, <strong>the</strong> formula takes <strong>in</strong>to account two of <strong>the</strong> circumst<strong>an</strong>ces<br />
mentioned <strong>in</strong> sub-section 3 of section 25 of <strong>the</strong> Constitution: <strong>the</strong> market value of <strong>the</strong> property<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> extent of direct state <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>an</strong>d subsidy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> acquisition <strong>an</strong>d beneficial capital<br />
improvement of <strong>the</strong> property. In a nutshell, <strong>the</strong> amount of compensation is <strong>the</strong> market value<br />
of <strong>the</strong> property m<strong>in</strong>us <strong>the</strong> current value of past subsidies.<br />
The question that confronts us is whe<strong>the</strong>r a consideration of <strong>the</strong> expropriation measure <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
clarity that <strong>the</strong> Geldenhuys formula has brought underm<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> argument that <strong>the</strong> property<br />
clause is a major obstacle to fundamental l<strong>an</strong>d reform <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. I contend that <strong>the</strong><br />
expropriation clause does not affect <strong>the</strong> conclusion about <strong>the</strong> limits imposed by <strong>the</strong> property<br />
clause.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> first <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, government has itself shown great reluct<strong>an</strong>ce to <strong>in</strong>voke <strong>the</strong> expropriation<br />
clause. Thomas conceded <strong>in</strong> his testimony that although <strong>the</strong> government has expropriated<br />
l<strong>an</strong>d for l<strong>an</strong>d reform purposes, this is not <strong>the</strong> norm. In his response to a question from <strong>the</strong><br />
President of <strong>the</strong> PAC on <strong>the</strong> 2005 State of <strong>the</strong> Nation address, President Mbeki has also<br />
shown great reluct<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g expropriation as a mech<strong>an</strong>ism to redistribute l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
Let me po<strong>in</strong>t out that I’m aware of <strong>the</strong> recent pronouncements s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>d Summit that <strong>the</strong><br />
government is committed to us<strong>in</strong>g expropriation as a tool <strong>in</strong> cases of resist<strong>in</strong>g farmers.<br />
However, my contention is that <strong>the</strong> devil is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> detail <strong>an</strong>d time will tell whe<strong>the</strong>r government<br />
will this time be prepared to st<strong>an</strong>d its ground <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> event of a legal challenge from white<br />
commercial farmers <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir org<strong>an</strong>ised bodies.<br />
Secondly, although <strong>the</strong> Geldenhuys formula takes <strong>in</strong>to account <strong>the</strong> critical issue of subsidies,<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that compensation is based on <strong>the</strong> market price makes it almost impossible for <strong>the</strong><br />
government to budget for l<strong>an</strong>d reform for <strong>the</strong> simple reason that <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong><br />
determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> price of l<strong>an</strong>d is very limited, if at all. Thomas <strong>in</strong> his testimony conceded that<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that l<strong>an</strong>d owners were <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to <strong>in</strong>flate <strong>the</strong>ir prices was a potential problem. Once<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> question of <strong>the</strong> price of l<strong>an</strong>d seems most likely to feature <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> latest possible case<br />
of expropriation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North West Prov<strong>in</strong>ce.<br />
A po<strong>in</strong>t worth mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this regard is how <strong>the</strong> Geldenhuys formula has severely called to<br />
question some <strong>an</strong>alysts’ optimism that <strong>the</strong> compensation amount <strong>in</strong> cases of expropriation<br />
could be determ<strong>in</strong>ed without necessarily tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> market value <strong>in</strong>to account. The judgement<br />
by Geldenhuys has created a precedent that pours cold water over this optimistic position.<br />
Lastly, <strong>an</strong>d equally critical, it is <strong>in</strong>trigu<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> history of l<strong>an</strong>d acquisition is not receiv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
prom<strong>in</strong>ence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ation of compensation. In so far as reference is made to it, <strong>the</strong><br />
127
suggestion is that this refers to <strong>the</strong> history of l<strong>an</strong>d acquisition by <strong>the</strong> affected l<strong>an</strong>d owner. Yet,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> history of colonial conquest <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>d dispossession that lies at <strong>the</strong> heart of <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d<br />
question <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. A serious attempt to embark on a radical l<strong>an</strong>d reform programme<br />
c<strong>an</strong>not afford to downplay <strong>the</strong> import<strong>an</strong>ce of this history. It is this history, I argue, that gives<br />
legitimacy to <strong>the</strong> claims of those who were robbed of <strong>the</strong>ir l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
Closely l<strong>in</strong>ked to this is that <strong>the</strong> naked exploitation of black labour which was central to <strong>the</strong><br />
success of white commercial farm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>gly not considered to be one<br />
of <strong>the</strong> crucial factors that must to be taken <strong>in</strong>to account when <strong>the</strong> amount of compensation is<br />
calculated.<br />
The l<strong>an</strong>d summit <strong>an</strong>d way forward<br />
It must be regretted that <strong>the</strong> above issues <strong>an</strong>d complexities have not received <strong>the</strong> attention that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y deserve. Although <strong>the</strong> issues were raised at <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d summit, that particular event was<br />
not <strong>the</strong> right platform to afford <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>-depth discussion <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alysis of <strong>the</strong> issues at stake.<br />
However, two critical observations must be highlighted.<br />
First, it is clear from <strong>the</strong> discussions throughout <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d summit, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g discussions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
various commissions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> reports back where resolutions were adopted that <strong>the</strong><br />
overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority of people agreed that extraord<strong>in</strong>ary measures needed to be taken to<br />
accelerate l<strong>an</strong>d delivery. S<strong>in</strong>gled out for special condemnation were <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g seller,<br />
will<strong>in</strong>g buyer pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>flated prices that were charged by white farmers for <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
Even government officials, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka,<br />
appeared to be endors<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> need to scrap <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g seller, will<strong>in</strong>g buyer condition.<br />
It must be noted, though, that a t<strong>in</strong>y, albeit vocal m<strong>in</strong>ority of white commercial farmers who<br />
were delegates from AgriSA, were <strong>in</strong> vehement opposition to both <strong>the</strong> scrapp<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong><br />
will<strong>in</strong>g seller, will<strong>in</strong>g buyer pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>an</strong>d what <strong>the</strong>y argued was <strong>in</strong>terference with “<strong>the</strong><br />
market” when it came to determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> price of l<strong>an</strong>d. They threatened that if <strong>the</strong>re was<br />
<strong>in</strong>terference with <strong>the</strong> market, <strong>the</strong>re would be consequences far beyond <strong>the</strong> imag<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />
those at <strong>the</strong> summit. They po<strong>in</strong>ted to Zimbabwe as <strong>an</strong> example, threaten<strong>in</strong>g that those who<br />
defy <strong>the</strong> world, currently dom<strong>in</strong>ated by a neo-liberal agenda, will f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>in</strong> a<br />
position where this world will boycott <strong>the</strong>m, with dire consequences. In this regard, it was<br />
quite clear that <strong>the</strong> delegates from AgriSA were conscious that <strong>the</strong>y represented broader,<br />
global neo-liberal capitalist <strong>in</strong>terests.<br />
However, whatever pressures <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational situation exerts, <strong>the</strong>re is no doubt that <strong>the</strong><br />
market-led approach to l<strong>an</strong>d reform, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> property clause <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g-buyerwill<strong>in</strong>g-seller<br />
condition will not unravel years of colonial <strong>an</strong>d apar<strong>the</strong>id dispossession.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> claims that <strong>the</strong> poor are lay<strong>in</strong>g are legitimate. No one c<strong>an</strong> dispute <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />
colonialism <strong>an</strong>d capitalism <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> led to <strong>the</strong> dispossession of <strong>in</strong>digenous people, <strong>the</strong><br />
development of racial capitalism <strong>an</strong>d white dom<strong>in</strong>ated commercial farm<strong>in</strong>g which triumphed<br />
largely as a result of <strong>the</strong> naked exploitation of black labour. The m<strong>in</strong>imum that <strong>the</strong> poor <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir allies expect is that <strong>the</strong>se past imbal<strong>an</strong>ces be redressed.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> short-term, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>an</strong> urgent need to challenge <strong>the</strong> so-called Geldenhuys formula,<br />
especially its fundamental notion that <strong>the</strong> market should determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> price of l<strong>an</strong>d,<br />
expropriated or not. The issue of how <strong>the</strong> price of l<strong>an</strong>d is determ<strong>in</strong>ed is very crucial <strong>in</strong><br />
pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g for effective l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d agrari<strong>an</strong> reform <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d elsewhere. As I<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated, it is impossible to budget for l<strong>an</strong>d acquisition where <strong>the</strong> market rules supreme.<br />
L<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong> above is <strong>the</strong> urgent need to re-visit <strong>the</strong> property clause <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. This<br />
is particularly <strong>the</strong> case with regard to <strong>the</strong> sub-section which protects exist<strong>in</strong>g property rights.<br />
No me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gful l<strong>an</strong>d reform programme is go<strong>in</strong>g to take place for as long as this clause is<br />
entrenched <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, especially <strong>in</strong> its current, I dare say, ambivalent form.<br />
Although not debated <strong>in</strong> greater detail, it became clear at <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d summit that <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>an</strong><br />
urgent need to br<strong>in</strong>g clarity on <strong>the</strong> me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> property clause for <strong>the</strong> poor. The m<strong>an</strong>ner <strong>in</strong><br />
128
which <strong>the</strong> property clause has so far been <strong>in</strong>terpreted, if <strong>the</strong> Geldenhuys formula is <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to go by, appears to be favour<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> propertied <strong>an</strong>d rich.<br />
It is worth remember<strong>in</strong>g that this is not <strong>the</strong> first time <strong>the</strong> property clause is be<strong>in</strong>g debated <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> recent history of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The issue came up as early as <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s when <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns beg<strong>an</strong> to reflect about how a future democratic <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> would look like.<br />
Although not occupy<strong>in</strong>g centre stage, <strong>the</strong> vital question of how <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>d question would be<br />
resolved became part of this discussion. This was raised <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of discuss<strong>in</strong>g a Bill of<br />
Rights for a future <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. It is strik<strong>in</strong>g to note that two <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n judges, <strong>an</strong>d this<br />
is dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id era, took a progressive st<strong>an</strong>ce on <strong>the</strong> question of property rights. The<br />
dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t <strong>the</strong>me <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir reason<strong>in</strong>g was that a last<strong>in</strong>g resolution of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n problem<br />
would be threatened if exist<strong>in</strong>g property rights were protected. For example, Judge Leon, a<br />
fairly conservative judge who sentenced <strong>an</strong> ANC guerrilla, Andrew Masondo to death <strong>in</strong><br />
1985, warned, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same year he sentenced Masondo, that a constitutional protection of<br />
property rights could cause serious problems for <strong>the</strong> accept<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> bill of rights. Ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
more progressive <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Judge, Didcott expressed similar sentiments <strong>in</strong> 1988:<br />
What a Bill of Rights c<strong>an</strong>not afford to do here … is to protect private property with such zeal<br />
that it entrenches privilege. A major problem which <strong>an</strong>y future <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n government is<br />
bound to face will be <strong>the</strong> problem of poverty, of its alleviation <strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong> need for <strong>the</strong><br />
country’s wealth to be shared more equitably …<br />
Should a bill of rights obstruct <strong>the</strong> government of <strong>the</strong> day when that direction is taken, should<br />
it make <strong>the</strong> urgent task of social or economic reform impossible or difficult to undertake, we<br />
shall have on our h<strong>an</strong>ds a crisis of <strong>the</strong> first order, end<strong>an</strong>ger<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> bill of rights as a whole <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> survival of constitutional government itself (quoted <strong>in</strong> Chalskalson 1993:73-4)<br />
The two judges seem to have perfectly understood that tr<strong>an</strong>sformation <strong>in</strong> terms of property<br />
rights <strong>an</strong>d redress<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> imbal<strong>an</strong>ces caused by colonialism <strong>an</strong>d apar<strong>the</strong>id were not likely to<br />
be possible if exist<strong>in</strong>g property rights were recognised <strong>an</strong>d entrenched. It is not clear, though,<br />
what alternative measures <strong>the</strong>y had <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>an</strong>d, some white farmers had, by <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, come to accept that for <strong>the</strong><br />
sake of stability, <strong>the</strong>y would have to part with portions of “<strong>the</strong>ir” l<strong>an</strong>d for tr<strong>an</strong>sfer to <strong>the</strong><br />
historically dispossessed. From my personal experiences work<strong>in</strong>g on l<strong>an</strong>d occupations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Queenstown area of <strong>the</strong> Eastern Cape <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s, <strong>the</strong> question of buy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d sell<strong>in</strong>g<br />
l<strong>an</strong>d was hardly discussed: a signific<strong>an</strong>t amount of l<strong>an</strong>d had been grabbed <strong>an</strong>d occupied by<br />
l<strong>an</strong>d hungry black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns. Beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong>se l<strong>an</strong>d occupations was <strong>the</strong> conviction on <strong>the</strong><br />
one h<strong>an</strong>d, by <strong>the</strong> historically dispossessed <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir allies that exist<strong>in</strong>g white property rights<br />
were illegitimate. On <strong>the</strong>ir part, white farmers had come to accept that <strong>the</strong>y would have to<br />
share l<strong>an</strong>d with <strong>the</strong>ir black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns.<br />
Unless <strong>the</strong> property clause were to be <strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong> such a way that it unambiguously<br />
identified with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>the</strong> poor <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>dless, conditions might well be created which<br />
make a Zimbabwe-style political <strong>an</strong>d economic breakdown possible <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
129
12 Learn<strong>in</strong>g, liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d lead<strong>in</strong>g: education <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
By Jonath<strong>an</strong> J<strong>an</strong>sen<br />
Introduction<br />
What is it like to live <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> after apar<strong>the</strong>id? How do ord<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns deal<br />
with <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs that once divided <strong>the</strong>m—like race, religion, <strong>an</strong>d resources? Have black<br />
schools, long disadv<strong>an</strong>taged under racially oppressive policies, started to improve? To what<br />
extent have white schools desegregated? Do more children now have access to school<strong>in</strong>g?<br />
And if so, what do <strong>the</strong>y actually have access to? Who really benefits from <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition to<br />
democracy? And what does it me<strong>an</strong> to lead <strong>in</strong> ways that satisfy <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>an</strong>ds of both<br />
conciliation (versoen<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>an</strong>d correction (regstell<strong>in</strong>g), at <strong>the</strong> same time?<br />
In one of my lives, as <strong>an</strong> academic, <strong>the</strong>se k<strong>in</strong>ds of questions are often subject to <strong>the</strong><br />
authoritative voice of high-powered, ‘objective’ <strong>an</strong>alyses of huge volumes of ‘empirical’ data<br />
published <strong>in</strong> scholarly journals. This chapter attempts someth<strong>in</strong>g different. I tell stories about<br />
<strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs I observe <strong>an</strong>d experience everyday as I learn, live <strong>an</strong>d lead <strong>in</strong> schools <strong>an</strong>d<br />
universities, <strong>in</strong>side homes <strong>an</strong>d churches, among government officials <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> teacher councils,<br />
<strong>in</strong> restaur<strong>an</strong>ts, s<strong>an</strong>dwich shops <strong>an</strong>d hairdressers.<br />
I speak from <strong>the</strong> v<strong>an</strong>tage po<strong>in</strong>t of a black person, a parent of two children, <strong>an</strong> academic De<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>side a once racially fortified Afrik<strong>an</strong>er campus <strong>in</strong> Pretoria, a community developer, a public<br />
critic, <strong>an</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary citizen. I have recorded <strong>the</strong>se stories not so much to adv<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>ory, but to<br />
deepen underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g. I seek to underst<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition from <strong>the</strong> perspective of <strong>the</strong> streets,<br />
as black <strong>an</strong>d white <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns struggle to f<strong>in</strong>d each o<strong>the</strong>r outside of <strong>the</strong> emotional<br />
volc<strong>an</strong>oes that ruptured at <strong>the</strong> Truth <strong>an</strong>d Reconciliation Commission (<strong>the</strong> TRC) or <strong>the</strong> elite<br />
negotiations that unfolded when politici<strong>an</strong>s met at <strong>the</strong> Convention for a Democratic <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> (CODESA).<br />
The stories are a sample from a much broader set of daily mus<strong>in</strong>gs on <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sition. I selected <strong>the</strong>se stories because each of <strong>the</strong>m cast a light on a different aspect of our<br />
<strong>new</strong> society—such as <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> curriculum, school org<strong>an</strong>ization, educational access, religious<br />
attitudes on university campuses, culture <strong>an</strong>d conflict, worship <strong>an</strong>d war.<br />
In tell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se stories of hate <strong>an</strong>d love, frustration <strong>an</strong>d exuber<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong>ger <strong>an</strong>d admiration,<br />
embarrassment <strong>an</strong>d embrace, fear <strong>an</strong>d hope—I wish to convey a sense of <strong>the</strong> rhythm of <strong>the</strong><br />
everyday, <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>ds of th<strong>in</strong>gs that make <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns ‘tick’, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> slow but as yet steady<br />
progress towards a more hum<strong>an</strong>e society. It has to be slow—after all, it took 350 years to<br />
mess us all up.<br />
I will not “conclude” <strong>the</strong> series of stories or summarise <strong>the</strong> key po<strong>in</strong>ts made. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, I would<br />
like <strong>the</strong> collection of stories to provide <strong>the</strong> basis for discussion <strong>an</strong>d deliberation among<br />
readers, <strong>an</strong>d that those who engage this chapter will draw <strong>the</strong>ir own conclusions <strong>an</strong>d make<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own <strong>in</strong>terpretations of how race is lived <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d how far <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sformation<br />
of education <strong>an</strong>d society has progressed s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> legal term<strong>in</strong>ation of apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>in</strong> 1994.<br />
Vignette 1. S<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> tune of a <strong>new</strong> ‘pe-salem’ (psalm)<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> school holidays my bro<strong>the</strong>r <strong>an</strong>d I would be posted from <strong>the</strong> Cape Flats to <strong>the</strong> little<br />
town of my birth, Montagu, to spend <strong>the</strong> time with my gr<strong>an</strong>dmo<strong>the</strong>r <strong>an</strong>d aunts. The scariest<br />
part of those visits were <strong>the</strong> Sunday morn<strong>in</strong>g trips to <strong>the</strong> Nederduitse Gereformeerde<br />
Send<strong>in</strong>gkerk (NG, or Dutch Reformed Mission Church), a beautiful piece of architecture <strong>in</strong><br />
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<strong>the</strong> Dorp (town) that eventually fell to apar<strong>the</strong>id’s obsession with keep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> town white.<br />
What scared me senseless as a boy was <strong>the</strong> emergence of <strong>an</strong> apparition from beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
elevated pulpit: a white gi<strong>an</strong>t dressed <strong>in</strong> a strik<strong>in</strong>g black gown would, without warn<strong>in</strong>g, break<br />
<strong>the</strong> funereal silence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pews <strong>an</strong>d pronounce <strong>in</strong> a deep, boom<strong>in</strong>g voice, “Ons sla<strong>an</strong> ons oe<br />
op na die berge....” (we lift our eyes unto <strong>the</strong> hills). M<strong>an</strong>, that put <strong>the</strong> fear of God <strong>in</strong>to me.<br />
Fortunately, <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> proceed<strong>in</strong>gs put you to sleep aga<strong>in</strong>.<br />
You would forgive me, <strong>the</strong>refore, if I accepted <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vitation to speak at <strong>the</strong> Dutch Reformed<br />
Church Skuilkr<strong>an</strong>s with some trepidation. It was <strong>the</strong> start of <strong>the</strong> week called P<strong>in</strong>ksterfees<br />
(Pentecost Feast), <strong>an</strong>d I was to be <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g speaker on <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>me of “listen<strong>in</strong>g.” My<br />
preconceptions fed expectations of <strong>an</strong> ag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d smileless dom<strong>in</strong>ee (m<strong>in</strong>ister) dressed <strong>in</strong><br />
black, <strong>an</strong> all-white church, a few stiff Afrika<strong>an</strong>s songs called ‘pe-salems’, half-empty pews<br />
occupied by pensioners, heavy org<strong>an</strong> music, a solemn <strong>in</strong>troduction, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> tentative<br />
h<strong>an</strong>dover to J<strong>an</strong>sen, whom some of <strong>the</strong> faithful might have thought was white.<br />
As I ascended <strong>the</strong> steps <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Church, I was greeted by a young black wom<strong>an</strong> who<br />
welcomed me <strong>in</strong> Sepedi (Sotho, <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous l<strong>an</strong>guage), <strong>an</strong>d who, to my surprise, jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>rwise white worship team on <strong>the</strong> stage to lead <strong>the</strong> congregation <strong>in</strong> song. The song leader<br />
was a young dom<strong>in</strong>ee dressed as if he had just come from shopp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d sport<strong>in</strong>g a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive<br />
pony tail. I was still <strong>in</strong> shock when a bunch of young girls took to <strong>the</strong> stage to perform what<br />
<strong>the</strong> charismatic churches call ‘spiritual d<strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g’ to a packed-out church with large numbers of<br />
youth. The pony-tailed youth dom<strong>in</strong>ee was by now <strong>in</strong> a tr<strong>an</strong>ce, hold<strong>in</strong>g his h<strong>an</strong>ds up <strong>in</strong><br />
worship, eyes closed, as he strummed a guitar to a mix of English <strong>an</strong>d Afrika<strong>an</strong>s songs which<br />
I was more accustomed to hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Baptist church circles. While I sat wait<strong>in</strong>g to speak,<br />
young <strong>an</strong>d old came to greet, some families of colleagues, o<strong>the</strong>rs just to tell me how delighted<br />
<strong>the</strong>y were to have me <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir Church. I felt ashamed of my prejudices.<br />
It was my turn to speak <strong>an</strong>d I told <strong>the</strong> rapt audience of what I had learnt listen<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
children, those precious undergraduate students of m<strong>in</strong>e at <strong>the</strong> University of Pretoria (UP) <strong>an</strong>d<br />
those delightfully honest children at high schools <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> area. I told <strong>the</strong>m of <strong>the</strong> tears I had<br />
seen as young people spoke about conflict <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir homes; of <strong>the</strong>ir difficulties <strong>in</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g<br />
racial <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>guage borders; of <strong>the</strong>ir fears about exclusion from <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id labour<br />
market; <strong>an</strong>d of <strong>the</strong>ir endur<strong>in</strong>g idealism about teach<strong>in</strong>g as a profession.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> church service drew to a close, <strong>the</strong> spiritual d<strong>an</strong>cers returned to “lay h<strong>an</strong>ds” on me <strong>an</strong>d<br />
to pray that I receive wisdom <strong>an</strong>d strength <strong>in</strong> my role as De<strong>an</strong> at UP. The young dom<strong>in</strong>ee<br />
raised a heart-render<strong>in</strong>g prayer ask<strong>in</strong>g God to save us from racism <strong>an</strong>d sexism <strong>in</strong> our<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual lives. We moved outside, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> radi<strong>an</strong>t senior dom<strong>in</strong>ee told me that <strong>the</strong> Church<br />
was built by Professor Carel Boshoff, that arch-conservative ideologue whose dreams of a<br />
volkstaat (separate geographical residence) for white Afrik<strong>an</strong>ers exists only <strong>in</strong> a semi-desert<br />
area of <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Cape.<br />
As I turned to leave, I bumped <strong>in</strong>to a gracious old wom<strong>an</strong> called Annemarie Bosch—<strong>the</strong> wife<br />
of that great Afrik<strong>an</strong>er <strong>the</strong>ologi<strong>an</strong> from UNISA (University of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>), David Bosch,<br />
who became famous years ago for his profound ideas about racial reconciliation when it was<br />
still extremely d<strong>an</strong>gerous to have such thoughts; <strong>in</strong> fact, <strong>the</strong>re are still some who believe that<br />
his gruesome death <strong>in</strong> a car accident was, well, not <strong>an</strong> accident. I was overwhelmed to meet<br />
<strong>the</strong> wife of one my heroes as a young student struggl<strong>in</strong>g to connect personal faith <strong>an</strong>d social<br />
justice <strong>in</strong> my Christi<strong>an</strong> commitment. The first bricks might have been laid by Professor<br />
Boshoff, but part of <strong>the</strong> church build<strong>in</strong>gs will be named after Professor Bosch.<br />
I turned to <strong>the</strong> senior dom<strong>in</strong>ee <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>quired about lidmaatskap (membership).<br />
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Vignette 2. Teach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> wrong stuff <strong>in</strong> a d<strong>an</strong>gerous world<br />
When my son started Grade 1, he would wake up at four <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> morn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d, with great speed<br />
<strong>an</strong>d alacrity, would wash, eat, dress <strong>an</strong>d pack his bags out of sheer excitement about <strong>the</strong> day<br />
ahead. By <strong>the</strong> time this same child started high school, I would have to wrestle him out of bed<br />
to try to get him to school before four <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> afternoon. Somewhere between Grade 1 <strong>an</strong>d high<br />
school, our children typically move from be<strong>in</strong>g great enthusiasts for learn<strong>in</strong>g to becom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
deeply disengaged from formal education. I have spent much of my time try<strong>in</strong>g to underst<strong>an</strong>d<br />
why <strong>an</strong>d how this natural thirst for learn<strong>in</strong>g among young children is so quickly lost after a<br />
few years <strong>in</strong>side this structure we call school.<br />
Throughout <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, I have been privileged to address more th<strong>an</strong> 30,000 students <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
past five years—black <strong>an</strong>d white, urb<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d rural, private <strong>an</strong>d public—<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>y all tell me <strong>the</strong><br />
same th<strong>in</strong>g, which I could summarise as follows: schools teach <strong>the</strong> wrong stuff.<br />
One could argue of course that schools were never created to become founta<strong>in</strong>s of knowledge,<br />
sources of <strong>in</strong>vention or sites for <strong>the</strong> liberation of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d. In fact, more th<strong>an</strong> one histori<strong>an</strong> has<br />
drawn powerful parallels between schools, mental asylums <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> prison system. One has<br />
only to witness <strong>the</strong> regimentation of children <strong>in</strong> school, <strong>the</strong> common uniform, <strong>the</strong> colourless<br />
teachers, <strong>the</strong> humourless pr<strong>in</strong>cipal, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>flexible security systems to wonder loudly about<br />
this quasi-prison environment. We pay for this, <strong>in</strong> more ways th<strong>an</strong> one.<br />
I partly share one view that schools as <strong>in</strong>stitutions are a set-up, a device to warehouse <strong>the</strong><br />
children of work<strong>in</strong>g parents <strong>in</strong> order to control <strong>the</strong>m <strong>an</strong>d prevent trouble on <strong>the</strong> streets. I<br />
partly share <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r view that schools are places to reproduce <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d of class-based society<br />
we live <strong>in</strong>, allocat<strong>in</strong>g ch<strong>an</strong>ces of success <strong>an</strong>d failure with astound<strong>in</strong>g (though not perfect)<br />
predictability—rich kids at affluent private schools make it big <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> corporate world; poor<br />
kids <strong>in</strong> run-down township schools trawl <strong>the</strong> streets with me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gless certificates, provided<br />
<strong>the</strong>y even get that far. What <strong>the</strong>se children have <strong>in</strong> common, though, is that <strong>the</strong>y were all<br />
taught <strong>the</strong> wrong stuff, <strong>an</strong>d that very few of <strong>the</strong>m were taught <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>ds of th<strong>in</strong>gs that enable<br />
<strong>the</strong>m to thrive <strong>in</strong> a diverse <strong>an</strong>d d<strong>an</strong>gerous world.<br />
When I talk <strong>in</strong> this direction at endless numbers of school ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong> audience normally<br />
splits down <strong>the</strong> middle. The one side th<strong>in</strong>ks that this k<strong>in</strong>d of speech is <strong>the</strong> best th<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>y<br />
could ever have heard. There is too much emphasis on competition, too much favour<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong><br />
kids who are talented <strong>in</strong> math <strong>an</strong>d science, too little focus on wholeness. The o<strong>the</strong>r side—<br />
whose children normally stride up to <strong>the</strong> podium struggl<strong>in</strong>g to carry all <strong>the</strong> trophies—<br />
absolutely hate what <strong>the</strong>y hear. How dare <strong>the</strong> speaker ra<strong>in</strong> on <strong>the</strong>ir child’s parade? After all,<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir children worked hard to achieve <strong>the</strong>se certificates <strong>an</strong>d accolades; <strong>the</strong>y won because <strong>the</strong>y<br />
played by <strong>the</strong> rules. Yet it is precisely <strong>the</strong> rules of <strong>the</strong> game that worry me. What is it that we<br />
teach, why <strong>an</strong>d with what consequences?<br />
I have yet to meet students <strong>in</strong> my first-year class at <strong>the</strong> University of Pretoria who remember<br />
school teachers because of <strong>the</strong>ir skills at solv<strong>in</strong>g quadratic equations, <strong>the</strong>ir fluency <strong>in</strong><br />
grammatical <strong>an</strong>alysis, or <strong>the</strong>ir knowledge of <strong>the</strong> DNA double helix structure. They remember<br />
s<strong>in</strong>gle teachers who made a difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir lives. They tell mov<strong>in</strong>g stories of <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
teachers who taught <strong>the</strong>m about community, about car<strong>in</strong>g, about compassion <strong>an</strong>d about<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge.<br />
Most of our teachers, however, have succumbed to <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dless focus on curriculum trivia<br />
re<strong>in</strong>forced by competitive exam<strong>in</strong>ations that measure <strong>in</strong>dividual perform<strong>an</strong>ce on a very<br />
narrow r<strong>an</strong>ge of competences. It did not help, of course, that under <strong>the</strong> former M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
Education, <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>the</strong> real threat of exposure of fail<strong>in</strong>g schools <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> media. The pressure<br />
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on teachers is relentless. One of my doctoral students, <strong>an</strong> accomplished ma<strong>the</strong>matics teacher<br />
at a private school, lives <strong>in</strong> fear every year that she might not keep her job because <strong>the</strong> failure<br />
to get 100% math passes <strong>in</strong> matric (matriculation exam<strong>in</strong>ation, Grade 12, <strong>the</strong> last year of<br />
school) me<strong>an</strong>s, at worst, that she would not have her contract re<strong>new</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d, at best, that she<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ds herself demoted to teach pre-matric classes <strong>an</strong>d live through this humiliation among her<br />
peers.<br />
Sadly, we have come to believe that <strong>the</strong> matriculation results measure achievement. We<br />
accept without hesitation that <strong>the</strong>se results represent fairness—despite <strong>the</strong> so obvious fact that<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>puts <strong>in</strong>to a child’s twelve years of school<strong>in</strong>g are so clearly differentiated by race <strong>an</strong>d<br />
class. And we make devastat<strong>in</strong>g decisions about children’s futures by read<strong>in</strong>g-off school<br />
exam<strong>in</strong>ation results <strong>the</strong> potential of a learner for success <strong>in</strong> life.<br />
Yet most university students I know—those kids with six dist<strong>in</strong>ctions <strong>in</strong> matric—have very<br />
little self-knowledge, hold very little respect for women, feel deeply uncomfortable <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
presence of black people, display <strong>in</strong>competence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages, lack basic knowledge<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir cont<strong>in</strong>ent, <strong>an</strong>d fail miserably at (re-)solv<strong>in</strong>g complex social problems.<br />
The demise of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>spection system under apar<strong>the</strong>id, when m<strong>an</strong>y black schools rejected <strong>the</strong><br />
surveill<strong>an</strong>ce functions of <strong>the</strong>se government officials, me<strong>an</strong>s that to this day schools are not<br />
accountable for what <strong>the</strong>y teach….except through that <strong>in</strong>direct measure of perform<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>the</strong><br />
Grade 12 exam<strong>in</strong>ation. One of my students found that a school <strong>in</strong> Soweto <strong>an</strong>d a school <strong>in</strong><br />
Pretoria, us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> same curriculum <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same subject (<strong>History</strong>) taught to <strong>the</strong> same grade<br />
level, had teachers who were teach<strong>in</strong>g complet<strong>in</strong>g different th<strong>in</strong>gs—<strong>the</strong> black teacher <strong>in</strong><br />
Soweto taught about black concerns, <strong>the</strong> white teacher <strong>in</strong> Pretoria taught about Europe<strong>an</strong>s.<br />
But <strong>the</strong>y both taught for <strong>the</strong> exam<strong>in</strong>ations.<br />
Given what we teach, it is no wonder that high school graduates are queu<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>in</strong> record<br />
numbers to enter fields such as actuarial science, account<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d economics. They might not<br />
know what <strong>an</strong> actuary is, but <strong>the</strong>y heard about <strong>the</strong> cut-throat competition for places <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
huge amounts of money that c<strong>an</strong> be made <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se discipl<strong>in</strong>es.<br />
When I recruit school kids <strong>in</strong> Grades 10-12 <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n high schools, one of <strong>the</strong> most<br />
common reasons for not becom<strong>in</strong>g a teacher is <strong>the</strong> salary. Somehow our schools—with not a<br />
little help from <strong>the</strong> parents—have conveyed to young people <strong>an</strong> underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g that to be<br />
successful is to make loads of money, to be educated is to maximize your number of subject<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>ctions, to be qualified is to be certificated.<br />
Aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> parents have bought <strong>in</strong>to this crass commercialization of higher tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. It is also<br />
not uncommon for me to f<strong>in</strong>d young people who wish to become teachers compla<strong>in</strong> bitterly<br />
that <strong>the</strong>ir parents w<strong>an</strong>t <strong>the</strong>m to study law or medic<strong>in</strong>e or eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g…”why waste your time<br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g a teacher?” Yet it is <strong>the</strong>se same parents that would w<strong>an</strong>t highly qualified teachers<br />
teach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir children—provided it is not <strong>the</strong>ir precious ones do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>struction. How<br />
selfish, if noth<strong>in</strong>g else.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> me<strong>an</strong>time, <strong>the</strong> world faces unprecedented levels of org<strong>an</strong>ized terror by both democratic<br />
Christi<strong>an</strong> states as well as ruthless Islamic killers, all act<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name of God. There is <strong>the</strong><br />
real possibility, by <strong>the</strong> way, of <strong>an</strong> unprecedented clash of clash of idiocies that could tear our<br />
pl<strong>an</strong>et apart. At <strong>the</strong> same time as aggregate global wealth <strong>in</strong>creases, <strong>in</strong>equalities between rich<br />
<strong>an</strong>d poor nations have deepened, at pace. And climates ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>an</strong>d environments collapse<br />
under <strong>the</strong> sheer weight of hum<strong>an</strong> greed.<br />
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Closer to home, while white schools celebrate “a 100% pass <strong>in</strong> matric”, <strong>the</strong>ir graduates run<br />
around Pretoria East beat<strong>in</strong>g up homeless <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>onymous black citizens. Young black youth<br />
who should be <strong>in</strong> school, run ramp<strong>an</strong>t through our society kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d maim<strong>in</strong>g at r<strong>an</strong>dom.<br />
Babies are rendered homeless as HIV/AIDS sweeps through poor communities. Grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
numbers of school-age children beg<strong>in</strong> to over-populate <strong>the</strong> prison system.<br />
But you would not know this from <strong>the</strong> school curriculum, or by exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g what schools<br />
teach.<br />
As it turns out, <strong>the</strong> 21 st century workplace does not require automatons. It calls for persons<br />
who c<strong>an</strong> work <strong>in</strong> teams, who c<strong>an</strong> solve complex problems, who c<strong>an</strong> reserve judgment, who<br />
are comfortable with difference, who c<strong>an</strong> cross cultural <strong>an</strong>d geographic boundaries, <strong>an</strong>d who<br />
underst<strong>an</strong>d people. Of course mech<strong>an</strong>ical skills matter <strong>an</strong>d technical competence helps. But it<br />
is not enough <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern workplace, <strong>an</strong>d it is certa<strong>in</strong>ly d<strong>an</strong>gerous <strong>in</strong> a complex <strong>an</strong>d divided<br />
world. And <strong>the</strong>re is no better place th<strong>an</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> which to live <strong>the</strong>se values <strong>an</strong>d apply<br />
<strong>the</strong>se skills.<br />
I was <strong>in</strong>vited recently to speak to <strong>the</strong> graduat<strong>in</strong>g matric class at a prestigious private school on<br />
<strong>the</strong> subject “<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> Needs You.” My dislike of <strong>the</strong> assigned topic could not be<br />
disguised. My political <strong>an</strong>tenna, seldom wrong, <strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>the</strong> assignment as follows: k<strong>in</strong>dly<br />
appeal to a group of upper middle class, ma<strong>in</strong>ly white, kids to please not leave black <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d employ <strong>the</strong>ir special skills to uplift this desperate develop<strong>in</strong>g country.<br />
I of course did <strong>the</strong> opposite, by rem<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se young people <strong>in</strong> this astound<strong>in</strong>gly welldraped<br />
school that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> did not need <strong>the</strong>m. In fact, <strong>the</strong>y need <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. They need<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> to teach <strong>the</strong>m humility, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of <strong>the</strong> arrog<strong>an</strong>ce of apar<strong>the</strong>id from which<br />
most of <strong>the</strong>ir parents were will<strong>in</strong>g beneficiaries; to teach <strong>the</strong>m service, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of<br />
overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g poverty made worse only by its visible existence alongside obvious wealth; to<br />
teach <strong>the</strong>m community, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of deep racial divisions which simmer below <strong>the</strong> surface of<br />
this fragile democracy <strong>in</strong> which black men get thrown to lions <strong>an</strong>d black workers get stuffed<br />
<strong>in</strong> wash<strong>in</strong>g mach<strong>in</strong>es.<br />
My po<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>in</strong> sum, is this—every parent <strong>an</strong>d citizen must realise three th<strong>in</strong>gs. One, that m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
of our schools are do<strong>in</strong>g little more th<strong>an</strong> produc<strong>in</strong>g technical mastery on a narrow r<strong>an</strong>ge of<br />
skills for a small m<strong>in</strong>ority of our population. Two, that such a narrow school<strong>in</strong>g fails to<br />
prepare students for complex <strong>an</strong>d dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g national <strong>an</strong>d global work contexts. And three,<br />
that skilled automatons operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a d<strong>an</strong>gerous <strong>an</strong>d unequal world place us all at risk.<br />
Vignette 3. Muslims <strong>an</strong>d Christi<strong>an</strong>s<br />
I happened to be <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United K<strong>in</strong>gdom between, so to speak, <strong>the</strong> two bomb<strong>in</strong>g episodes that<br />
rocked London. You would not know from <strong>the</strong> thriv<strong>in</strong>g commerce, <strong>the</strong> thous<strong>an</strong>ds of tourists<br />
(m<strong>an</strong>y with <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n accents) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> packed public tr<strong>an</strong>sport that this cosmopolit<strong>an</strong> city<br />
was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> grip of a terrorist onslaught. Until you read <strong>the</strong> papers or watched television, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
you become aware of a deep <strong>an</strong>xiety on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> British not about what happened, but<br />
about how it could happen. How, asks <strong>the</strong> media, could nice middle class British boys w<strong>an</strong>t to<br />
blow up <strong>the</strong>ir own people? And <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong>y <strong>an</strong>swer this question is immediately<br />
disappo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d potentially destructive. These young men, claim <strong>the</strong> press, are Al Qaeda<br />
operatives bra<strong>in</strong>washed <strong>in</strong> radical mosques <strong>an</strong>d whose sole aim is “to destroy our way of life.”<br />
I tried to imag<strong>in</strong>e a group of young radicals huddled <strong>in</strong> a secret venue pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to bomb<br />
London with <strong>the</strong> mission: “hey guys, let’s destroy <strong>the</strong> British way of life.”<br />
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In some ways <strong>the</strong>se terrorists are <strong>the</strong> product of a good education. They refuse to see <strong>the</strong><br />
world <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> bits-<strong>an</strong>d-pieces curriculum of <strong>the</strong> West where one facet of knowledge is<br />
unrelated or disjo<strong>in</strong>ted from <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r; where classroom knowledge is unrelated to social life;<br />
<strong>an</strong>d where one’s liv<strong>in</strong>g conditions are neatly detached from <strong>an</strong> underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of global<br />
economics. These thugs connect <strong>the</strong> dots from Kosovo to Palest<strong>in</strong>e to Baghdad <strong>an</strong>d to<br />
Guat<strong>an</strong>amo Bay <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>y see a systematic onslaught aga<strong>in</strong>st a group of people called<br />
Muslims. They heard about George Bush’s self-proclaimed “Crusade” aga<strong>in</strong>st Muslim<br />
nations, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>y bear witness to Fr<strong>an</strong>kl<strong>in</strong> Graham’s depiction of Islam as a wicked <strong>an</strong>d<br />
violent religion—a despicable remark that his fa<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> famed ev<strong>an</strong>gelist Billy Graham,<br />
refuses to repudiate. They see <strong>the</strong> hypocrisy of moral outrage at less th<strong>an</strong> 60 persons killed <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> first London bomb<strong>in</strong>gs but no equivalent moral outrage at <strong>the</strong> more th<strong>an</strong> 150,000 Iraqi’s<br />
killed—m<strong>an</strong>y women <strong>an</strong>d children—at <strong>the</strong> h<strong>an</strong>ds of both <strong>the</strong> Eastern <strong>an</strong>d Western <strong>in</strong>surgents.<br />
Sadly, <strong>the</strong>ir response to this relational underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> world is one of hatred <strong>an</strong>d<br />
violence.<br />
It is with this context <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that I was deeply dismayed by a despicable act of violence<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Muslims on <strong>the</strong> campus of <strong>the</strong> University of Pretoria. Recently, a right w<strong>in</strong>g<br />
ev<strong>an</strong>gelical visited <strong>the</strong> campus <strong>an</strong>d published a pamphlet titled, The End of Islam. This caused<br />
major outrage among <strong>the</strong> Muslim students on campus <strong>an</strong>d from isolated voices <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> broader<br />
Muslim community. What was even more disconcert<strong>in</strong>g was <strong>the</strong> support<strong>in</strong>g voices from <strong>the</strong><br />
so-called Christi<strong>an</strong> community who <strong>in</strong>sisted that Christi<strong>an</strong>s should st<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir ground. An<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s editorial gleefully played <strong>the</strong> neutral academic game, suggest<strong>in</strong>g that this was a<br />
matter of free speech.<br />
Th<strong>in</strong>k for a moment. Imag<strong>in</strong>e a radical Muslim cleric from <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r country visited <strong>the</strong> UP<br />
campus <strong>an</strong>d put out a pamphlet, The End of Christi<strong>an</strong>ity. These same fake voices of<br />
reasonableness would cry foul, <strong>the</strong>re would be a massive outcry from <strong>the</strong> conservative<br />
churches about threats to <strong>the</strong> Christi<strong>an</strong> ethos of <strong>the</strong> university, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>re would be all sorts of<br />
xenophobic comments about foreigners com<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> to disturb <strong>the</strong> peace.<br />
The so-called Christi<strong>an</strong>s support<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-Muslim sentiment sparked by this m<strong>in</strong>dless<br />
Americ<strong>an</strong> ev<strong>an</strong>gelical raise serious questions for me about <strong>the</strong> me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g of faith among <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Christi<strong>an</strong>s.<br />
In fact, ma<strong>in</strong>stream <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Christi<strong>an</strong>s scare me. At <strong>the</strong> drop of a hat, <strong>the</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> be<br />
me<strong>an</strong>-spirited, foul-mou<strong>the</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d aggressive towards <strong>an</strong>yone different from <strong>the</strong>m—such as<br />
Muslims. The people who defended <strong>the</strong> Americ<strong>an</strong> ev<strong>an</strong>gelical are drawn from <strong>the</strong> same crowd<br />
who for m<strong>an</strong>y decades found ample <strong>the</strong>ological justification <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Scriptures for apar<strong>the</strong>id. In<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r words, this is a group of right-w<strong>in</strong>g religious bigots for whom faith has very little to do<br />
with <strong>the</strong> God of <strong>the</strong> Bible, except as <strong>the</strong>y twist His image <strong>an</strong>d contort His message. I sat <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
all-white Dutch Reformed Church <strong>in</strong> Centurion recently, on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> funeral of a<br />
dear friend of m<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>an</strong>d at <strong>the</strong> height of a very mov<strong>in</strong>g sermon, <strong>the</strong> white Dom<strong>in</strong>ee casually<br />
slipped <strong>in</strong> a racially paternalistic joke about people he called ‘Die Kleurl<strong>in</strong>ge’ (The<br />
Coloureds). Nobody bl<strong>in</strong>ked <strong>an</strong> eyelid.<br />
What <strong>the</strong> Iraqi war hopefully teaches George Bush is that people c<strong>an</strong>not be bombed <strong>in</strong>to<br />
submission. What <strong>the</strong> London bomb<strong>in</strong>gs hopefully teaches Tony Blair is that <strong>the</strong>re are people<br />
who refuse to believe a lie. And what <strong>the</strong> UP <strong>in</strong>cident hopefully teaches <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns is that<br />
ev<strong>an</strong>gelicals who peddle Christi<strong>an</strong>ity with such hostility towards o<strong>the</strong>r faiths, like Islam, do<br />
noth<strong>in</strong>g more th<strong>an</strong> sow <strong>the</strong> seeds of hatred <strong>an</strong>d division <strong>in</strong> a very fragile democracy. As a<br />
Christi<strong>an</strong>, I am offended by <strong>the</strong> actions of <strong>the</strong>se bigots. My faith as a Christi<strong>an</strong> is streng<strong>the</strong>ned<br />
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when it is generous <strong>an</strong>d accommodat<strong>in</strong>g; it is deme<strong>an</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d dim<strong>in</strong>ished when it is selfish <strong>an</strong>d<br />
exclusive.<br />
Vignette 4. What hard boiled eggs tell us about our education system<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> few restaur<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> Pretoria that opens early enough for a bus<strong>in</strong>ess breakfast is<br />
Cappuc<strong>in</strong>o’s <strong>in</strong> a plush area called Brooklyn Square. I ordered one item on <strong>the</strong> menu <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n<br />
ordered someth<strong>in</strong>g that was not: a hard-boiled egg. The waitress was adam<strong>an</strong>t: it c<strong>an</strong>not be<br />
done. In half-playful didactic pose, I <strong>in</strong>structed her that only two th<strong>in</strong>gs were needed: hot<br />
water <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> egg. “It c<strong>an</strong>not be done,” she <strong>in</strong>sisted, <strong>an</strong>d called <strong>the</strong> M<strong>an</strong>ager. The M<strong>an</strong>ager<br />
returned with a slightly different message: “it will disturb <strong>the</strong> kitchen,” he made clear. I asked<br />
how throw<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> egg <strong>in</strong>to boil<strong>in</strong>g water could disturb <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g, except <strong>the</strong> water. He shifted<br />
gears: “okay…I will make you a hardboiled egg because we are not busy…but <strong>the</strong> next time<br />
you come, just know that we will not be able to make you <strong>the</strong> hardboiled egg.” I made it clear<br />
to him that this was likely to be my last visit, given <strong>the</strong> fuss over a hardboiled egg, <strong>an</strong>d that I<br />
was <strong>the</strong>refore only concerned about <strong>the</strong> present—a hardboiled egg, now. About 30 m<strong>in</strong>utes<br />
later my plate showed up with two slices of toast <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> egg—sunny-side up! I returned it to<br />
<strong>the</strong> kitchen, refus<strong>in</strong>g to respond to <strong>the</strong> provocation.<br />
I have had so m<strong>an</strong>y similar experiences <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> that such <strong>in</strong>cidents no longer upset<br />
me. What <strong>the</strong>y offer, however, is <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong> education system that tra<strong>in</strong>s our youth to<br />
follow rules no matter how illogical <strong>the</strong>y might be, to jo<strong>in</strong> long l<strong>in</strong>es at <strong>the</strong> electricity<br />
department without ever question<strong>in</strong>g why it had not moved for 40 m<strong>in</strong>utes, to accept <strong>the</strong><br />
restaur<strong>an</strong>t menu not as a social construct but as someth<strong>in</strong>g fixed <strong>an</strong>d immutable. Small<br />
wonder we never w<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nobel Prize <strong>in</strong> physics, chemistry or biology—because I have never<br />
known <strong>an</strong>yone to w<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se prizes for follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> published experimental h<strong>an</strong>dbook or<br />
mimick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> established algorithm. The creative impulse requires a will<strong>in</strong>gness to break <strong>the</strong><br />
rules, to ask fresh questions, to imag<strong>in</strong>e disallowed thoughts, to follow unfamiliar pathways.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs that always stun me about my university students who come from <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n schools is how <strong>in</strong>credibly neat <strong>the</strong>ir work is. My students colour with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>es.<br />
Their h<strong>an</strong>dwrit<strong>in</strong>g is impeccable. The external form <strong>an</strong>d presentation of <strong>the</strong> assignment is<br />
without error: bright <strong>an</strong>d beautiful, neat <strong>an</strong>d tidy—until you read <strong>the</strong> content.<br />
This is d<strong>an</strong>gerous for our democracy—not <strong>the</strong> neat presentation of material, but <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />
this comes at <strong>the</strong> cost of ideas. Our students confuse form with subst<strong>an</strong>ce, what you look like<br />
with who you are, rules with right liv<strong>in</strong>g, do<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs right with do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> right th<strong>in</strong>gs. No<br />
wonder my students are more likely to ask <strong>the</strong>ir lecturers “how m<strong>an</strong>y pages should I write for<br />
<strong>the</strong> assignment?”---ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> “what k<strong>in</strong>d of ideas are you look<strong>in</strong>g for?”<br />
The public behaviour of citizens tells us much about <strong>the</strong>ir education system. The only way to<br />
expla<strong>in</strong> how Americ<strong>an</strong>s citizens could act so recklessly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world is by underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
education system as one that is completely ethnocentric, one which assumes that <strong>the</strong> world is<br />
America. How else could you expla<strong>in</strong> a national competition—like baseball—be<strong>in</strong>g called <strong>the</strong><br />
World Series? Or a once popular Americ<strong>an</strong> song beat<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> words “We are <strong>the</strong><br />
world….”? Their education is <strong>in</strong>sular <strong>an</strong>d self-centred---which is why wip<strong>in</strong>g out one of <strong>the</strong><br />
world’s oldest civilizations—<strong>the</strong> Biblical l<strong>an</strong>ds of <strong>the</strong> Tigres <strong>an</strong>d Euphrates—hardly causes a<br />
stir <strong>in</strong>side this <strong>new</strong>est Empire.<br />
Closer to home, I have never understood outcomes based education. One of <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g<br />
features of OBE is that it encourages learners to be critical th<strong>in</strong>kers. But why would a<br />
government bent on stifl<strong>in</strong>g orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>an</strong>d critical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g w<strong>an</strong>t to produce citizens who are<br />
critical th<strong>in</strong>kers? The response of President Mbeki to Archbishop Tutu’s criticism of his<br />
137
government, is only <strong>the</strong> most visible example of what happens to people who act as critical<br />
citizens—even those with <strong>the</strong> credibility <strong>an</strong>d status of <strong>the</strong> Archbishop. This happens all <strong>the</strong><br />
time—<strong>in</strong>tellectuals who are castigated or excluded from mak<strong>in</strong>g contributions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir fields<br />
because <strong>the</strong>y dared to question a governmental action; party activists who are demoted or<br />
passed over because <strong>the</strong>ir loyalty was called <strong>in</strong>to question; trade unionists who are vilified for<br />
tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent st<strong>an</strong>d on our policy on Zimbabwe, where <strong>the</strong> state has declared war on<br />
its opponents. We have a curriculum that preaches one th<strong>in</strong>g (critical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
government that underm<strong>in</strong>es it.<br />
I am really not concerned about whe<strong>the</strong>r Mbeki or Tutu is correct; what I am concerned about<br />
is what our children learn from adult behaviour about what is appropriate to say, do or even<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k as citizens of a <strong>new</strong> democracy. What bo<strong>the</strong>rs me is what k<strong>in</strong>d of community we create<br />
when we deme<strong>an</strong> those who ask questions or raise objections. What troubles me is what k<strong>in</strong>d<br />
of society my gr<strong>an</strong>dchildren will <strong>in</strong>herit—when <strong>the</strong> one we have was won at such a great<br />
price.<br />
You see, it is not at all about <strong>the</strong> hardboiled egg. It is about hardboiled people, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
education system that turns out such automatons. By <strong>the</strong> way, omelettes taste much better—<br />
just make sure it’s on <strong>the</strong> menu before you “order.”<br />
Vignette 5. A tale of two schools<br />
I arrived two m<strong>in</strong>utes late at Kempton Park high school where I was to speak to <strong>the</strong> staff <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong>n later <strong>the</strong> entire school at assembly. The pr<strong>in</strong>cipal was already address<strong>in</strong>g his teachers<br />
who were packed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> common room. As I entered <strong>the</strong> staff room, he welcomed me with<br />
<strong>the</strong> words: ‘Professor J<strong>an</strong>sen, jy is laat vir my klas’ (you are late for my class). You have to<br />
underst<strong>an</strong>d someth<strong>in</strong>g about Afrika<strong>an</strong>s school culture to realise that this was only partly me<strong>an</strong>t<br />
to humour me; he was also deadly serious. The fact that one of his staff gave me a h<strong>an</strong>ddrawn<br />
map that led me on <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>voluntary tour of <strong>the</strong> nearby airport was irrelev<strong>an</strong>t; it was<br />
simply not acceptable to be late. What I <strong>the</strong>n witnessed was someth<strong>in</strong>g I will never forget as<br />
long as I live. The pr<strong>in</strong>cipal asked <strong>the</strong> teachers whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y had <strong>an</strong>y <strong>an</strong>nouncements. One<br />
teacher leaped up <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>nounced proudly that one of <strong>the</strong> hockey teams had beaten a team<br />
from Pretoria East high school—<strong>the</strong> entire body of teachers rose <strong>in</strong> applause to acknowledge<br />
this energetic teacher. Ano<strong>the</strong>r teacher leaped up, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>nounced that one of <strong>the</strong> senior boys<br />
had won a national competition <strong>in</strong> one of <strong>the</strong> science subjects; aga<strong>in</strong>, warm <strong>an</strong>d susta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
applause for <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>nounc<strong>in</strong>g teacher. And this went on <strong>an</strong>d on. I was conv<strong>in</strong>ced that I had a<br />
taken a wrong turn <strong>an</strong>d ended up <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r country. Discipl<strong>in</strong>e, enthusiasm, leadership,<br />
acknowledgment, team effort, celebration. When last did I see someth<strong>in</strong>g like this <strong>in</strong> a <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n school?<br />
On time, this meet<strong>in</strong>g ended <strong>an</strong>d we left for <strong>the</strong> assembly where hundreds of neatly-clad<br />
young people were seated on <strong>the</strong> cold playground <strong>in</strong> bright yellow uniforms as airpl<strong>an</strong>es flew<br />
overhead with <strong>an</strong> almighty noise.<br />
The assembly was run by <strong>the</strong> students. The entire event was dedicated to celebrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> lives<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> work of <strong>the</strong> teachers of <strong>the</strong> school. This recognition came <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of <strong>the</strong> Oscars.<br />
One teacher after <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r was called to <strong>the</strong> Symposium as each student read a beautiful<br />
citation that spoke of professionalism, commitment <strong>an</strong>d excellence. The students <strong>an</strong>d teachers<br />
hugged, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>re were tears. By now I was conv<strong>in</strong>ced that I had taken a wrong turn <strong>in</strong>to<br />
<strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r country. By <strong>the</strong> time I was called to address <strong>the</strong> student body, I was overwhelmed<br />
with emotion, with joy. If every <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n school had just 50% of what I witnessed, I<br />
thought, this would be a w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g country.<br />
138
After a wonderful tea, I left for my second school visit—to a township school <strong>in</strong> Pretoria East.<br />
It was a different country. About half <strong>the</strong> teachers did not show-up for work that day. I arrived<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> school <strong>in</strong>terval, which lasted 20 m<strong>in</strong>utes. After 90 m<strong>in</strong>utes, <strong>the</strong> students were still<br />
enjoy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> unpl<strong>an</strong>ned, extended <strong>in</strong>terval. The pr<strong>in</strong>cipal did not seem unduly perturbed by<br />
this loss of <strong>in</strong>structional time. When classes resumed, only one of <strong>the</strong> teachers I observed was<br />
actually teach<strong>in</strong>g. As I sat through this Physics class, I observed so much error with respect to<br />
<strong>the</strong> subject matter, I was tempted to <strong>in</strong>tervene. By this time, much of <strong>the</strong> students had left<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terval <strong>an</strong>d not returned to school. My hart s<strong>an</strong>k, <strong>an</strong>d for <strong>the</strong> first time <strong>in</strong> my life I<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k I experienced what people call ‘depression.’<br />
In 2006 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> commemorated <strong>the</strong> 30 th Anniversary of <strong>the</strong> June 16 th Upris<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
students that radiated from Soweto throughout <strong>the</strong> country. That event was a turn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st apar<strong>the</strong>id, <strong>an</strong>d we owe <strong>the</strong> youth of <strong>the</strong> time a tremendous gratitude for<br />
<strong>the</strong> sacrifices <strong>the</strong>y made towards <strong>the</strong> freedom of all <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns. But that sacrifice came at<br />
a great price, for our schools never recovered from <strong>the</strong> breakdown <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> culture of teach<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d learn<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
I am a child of 1976. It was <strong>the</strong> year <strong>in</strong> which I failed my first-year at university <strong>in</strong> part<br />
because I did not underst<strong>an</strong>d a word of Afrika<strong>an</strong>s (<strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t l<strong>an</strong>guage of my<br />
undergraduate university at <strong>the</strong> time) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> part because my classes were const<strong>an</strong>tly closed or<br />
disrupted as <strong>the</strong> student leadership declared “solidarity with <strong>the</strong> comrades <strong>in</strong> Soweto.” I did<br />
not even know where Soweto was, but I k<strong>new</strong> that this stirr<strong>in</strong>g was someth<strong>in</strong>g much more<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t th<strong>an</strong> a BSc degree. I rema<strong>in</strong> deeply grateful to <strong>the</strong> activists of <strong>the</strong> time for teach<strong>in</strong>g<br />
me words like justice, equality, <strong>an</strong>d solidarity.<br />
Thirty years later, we owe it to <strong>the</strong> youth of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> to restore <strong>the</strong> culture of teach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
learn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> all our schools. We need to make every school burn with enthusiasm for people<br />
<strong>an</strong>d energy for learn<strong>in</strong>g, like Kempton Park high school. If only <strong>the</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> lose those ugly<br />
yellow uniforms!<br />
Vignette 6. Access to what?<br />
I was not go<strong>in</strong>g to make <strong>an</strong> appear<strong>an</strong>ce at <strong>the</strong> public hear<strong>in</strong>gs on education of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Commission. One, I did not believe that <strong>the</strong>se hear<strong>in</strong>gs offered much<br />
beyond symbolic value, <strong>an</strong>d that <strong>the</strong>re exists nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> capacity nor <strong>the</strong> humility <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
national education system to concede <strong>an</strong>d deliver on <strong>the</strong> deep <strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> provision of<br />
basic education <strong>in</strong> our country. Two, because everyth<strong>in</strong>g I might have to say on <strong>the</strong> subject of<br />
access to education I have consistently placed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public doma<strong>in</strong> not only through formal<br />
academic publication but, more import<strong>an</strong>tly perhaps, through countless media pieces<br />
delivered <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t, radio, television. Some of my colleagues conv<strong>in</strong>ced me that such a ‘public<br />
accountability forum’ enables critical <strong>an</strong>d committed writ<strong>in</strong>gs to enjoy a more elevated<br />
visibility <strong>an</strong>d recognition <strong>an</strong>d that I should <strong>the</strong>refore show up. I am still not persuaded<br />
however that government will revisit policy direction, re-imag<strong>in</strong>e pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d re-energize<br />
implementation based on what happens <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se public hear<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
What ultimately persuaded me to make <strong>an</strong> appear<strong>an</strong>ce was <strong>an</strong> early morn<strong>in</strong>g meditation on <strong>the</strong><br />
writ<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> Harvard <strong>the</strong>ologi<strong>an</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>hold Niebuhr who famously posed that ‘our capacity<br />
for justice makes democracy possible; but our <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ation towards <strong>in</strong>justice makes democracy<br />
necessary.’ And it is <strong>the</strong> democratic spirit that charges <strong>the</strong>se hear<strong>in</strong>gs that makes such a forum<br />
so necessary s<strong>in</strong>ce we are on record as a country on our capacity for justice.<br />
139
I do not w<strong>an</strong>t my comments however to be misconstrued as a comment on M<strong>in</strong>isterial<br />
personality; <strong>the</strong> challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g us lie much deeper <strong>an</strong>d yet <strong>the</strong> responsibility for <strong>in</strong>equalities<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> provision<strong>in</strong>g of basic education lies squarely <strong>an</strong>d primarily at <strong>the</strong> door of government.<br />
The politici<strong>an</strong>s will rightly claim that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has near full enrolments <strong>in</strong> primary<br />
school<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d even over-enrolment if <strong>the</strong> question of learner age by grade was taken <strong>in</strong>to<br />
account. In this sense <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> forms one of only a h<strong>an</strong>dful of countries <strong>in</strong> SSA that has<br />
enjoyed such high levels of enrolment <strong>an</strong>d that already meets <strong>the</strong> compell<strong>in</strong>g UNESCO vision<br />
of Education for All.<br />
But this formal accomplishment has very little to do with national policy after 1994 s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has always enjoyed relatively high enrolment rates primarily because of <strong>the</strong><br />
absence of a destabiliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternal war (on <strong>the</strong> scale of countries like Zimbabwe <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Mozambique) <strong>an</strong>d because of <strong>the</strong> extensive, if unequal, <strong>in</strong>frastructure that exists for school<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> most parts of <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>equalities with respect to basic education lie not, however, <strong>in</strong> formal statistics on<br />
enrolment; it lies <strong>in</strong> what exactly learners have access to, under what conditions, for how<br />
long, for whom, <strong>an</strong>d at what costs.<br />
It is a shameful blight on our proud democracy that <strong>the</strong>re are still thous<strong>an</strong>ds of children who<br />
are forced to learn <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> harsh, open environment, under trees <strong>an</strong>d without <strong>the</strong> basic facilities<br />
necessary for dignity <strong>an</strong>d for learn<strong>in</strong>g (show selection of recent photographs from rural<br />
nor<strong>the</strong>rn prov<strong>in</strong>ces). I simply c<strong>an</strong>not underst<strong>an</strong>d how it is possible that a country with our<br />
levels of resources—material <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tellectual—c<strong>an</strong>not resolve this basic <strong>in</strong>justice <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
provision of basic education.<br />
The problem of access starts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early years where white <strong>an</strong>d middle class children enjoy<br />
<strong>the</strong> privilege of high quality preschool education while <strong>the</strong> majority of children do not. The<br />
head-start provided by ECE (early childhood education) exposure c<strong>an</strong>not be overstated. The<br />
child who enters grade one with basic competences of read<strong>in</strong>g, writ<strong>in</strong>g, draw<strong>in</strong>g, imag<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d count<strong>in</strong>g already established stretches far ahead of those whose first structured <strong>in</strong>struction<br />
only beg<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal public system. While <strong>the</strong> department of education would claim to<br />
have all k<strong>in</strong>ds of smart programmes comb<strong>in</strong>ed under <strong>an</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>tegrated’ logic, this is a<br />
smokescreen for <strong>in</strong>competence. Such programmes simply do not tr<strong>an</strong>slate <strong>in</strong>to action for <strong>the</strong><br />
children described <strong>in</strong> this section. A serious exam<strong>in</strong>ation of government spend<strong>in</strong>g on ECE<br />
compared to spend<strong>in</strong>g on almost <strong>an</strong>y o<strong>the</strong>r sector (primary school<strong>in</strong>g, for example), <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
cursory gl<strong>an</strong>ce at <strong>the</strong> org<strong>an</strong>izational status of ECE <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> department compared to, say, higher<br />
education, will demonstrate that this voiceless group of learners—young children—do not<br />
enjoy priority <strong>in</strong> educational pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d allocation.<br />
But when rural <strong>an</strong>d poor children show up for school<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dex of <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
st<strong>an</strong>dard of <strong>in</strong>struction is extremely high. One research report after <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r–from <strong>the</strong> long<br />
established TIMSS (Third International Ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>an</strong>d Science Studies) report to <strong>the</strong> more<br />
recent longitud<strong>in</strong>al studies of ma<strong>the</strong>matics achievement-- has demonstrated that for such<br />
children, stay<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> school carries few benefits <strong>in</strong> terms of concrete knowledge ga<strong>in</strong>s. It is<br />
partly a question of <strong>the</strong> lack of mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue <strong>in</strong>struction, though this problem is often<br />
overstated; it is also a problem of <strong>the</strong> lack of teacher knowledge; it is a problem of basic<br />
resources for teach<strong>in</strong>g not be<strong>in</strong>g available such a quality learn<strong>in</strong>g materials or textbooks; <strong>an</strong>d<br />
it is about <strong>the</strong> lack of ventilated facilities <strong>in</strong> often crowded classroom spaces.<br />
140
It is no wonder <strong>the</strong>n that <strong>the</strong> drop-out rates <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> school system are stagger<strong>in</strong>g. Only a small<br />
percentage of children who enter grade one appears for <strong>the</strong> matriculation exam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> grade<br />
12, a serious problem of efficiency <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> school system. Initial access does not guar<strong>an</strong>tee<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ued access.<br />
The problem of dropout rates is most severe for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n boys. It is mislead<strong>in</strong>g to claim<br />
that gender equity has been achieved <strong>in</strong> secondary school enrolments because this simply<br />
me<strong>an</strong>s that boys have dropped out. While <strong>the</strong>re are marg<strong>in</strong>ally more boys th<strong>an</strong> girls <strong>in</strong> primary<br />
school, <strong>the</strong>re are markedly fewer boys th<strong>an</strong> girls <strong>in</strong> secondary schools. In <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition from<br />
primary to secondary school, boys drop out of school but <strong>the</strong>y also drop <strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong>ti-social<br />
activities <strong>an</strong>d group<strong>in</strong>gs spurr<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> high levels of crim<strong>in</strong>ality. There is a direct connection<br />
between <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong> school system to reta<strong>in</strong> young boys <strong>an</strong>d our ability to break <strong>the</strong><br />
cycles of crime <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society.<br />
It is not fair, though, to ask young people, <strong>an</strong>d young boys <strong>in</strong> particular, to stay <strong>in</strong> school<br />
when what <strong>the</strong>y f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> school is so unattractive <strong>in</strong> terms of accommodation, facilities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
pedagogy. If we <strong>in</strong>sist that children enjoy compulsory basic education, it is crucial to make<br />
that experience positive <strong>an</strong>d engag<strong>in</strong>g by attend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> conditions under which children<br />
learn <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> capacity of those (teachers) who are required to <strong>in</strong>spire learn<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The const<strong>an</strong>t disruption of <strong>in</strong>structional time is one of <strong>the</strong> most serious charges with respect to<br />
<strong>the</strong> rights of children to quality basic education. What happened <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern Cape recently,<br />
led by <strong>the</strong> country’s largest teachers union, approaches levels of crim<strong>in</strong>ality. It is simply<br />
<strong>in</strong>excusable <strong>in</strong> a young <strong>an</strong>d fragile democracy, that a union c<strong>an</strong> take it upon itself to disrupt<br />
<strong>the</strong> learn<strong>in</strong>g of children for weeks on end at <strong>the</strong> very moment that our young people are about<br />
to sit for <strong>the</strong>ir f<strong>in</strong>al exam<strong>in</strong>ations. That this could happen <strong>in</strong> one of <strong>the</strong> economically poorest<br />
<strong>an</strong>d rout<strong>in</strong>ely underperform<strong>in</strong>g prov<strong>in</strong>ces smacks of arrog<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d irresponsibility on <strong>the</strong> part<br />
of those who claim to be defend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rights of <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alized.<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has a pench<strong>an</strong>t for <strong>the</strong> symbolic. The l<strong>an</strong>guage of miracles <strong>an</strong>d ra<strong>in</strong>bows light up<br />
<strong>the</strong> political l<strong>an</strong>dscape. Our capacity to buy <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> exhortatory claims of policy is stagger<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
It masks <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> poorest communities of our nation, we could collectively be<br />
accused of deny<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rights of <strong>the</strong> most vulnerable children to a quality basic education, or<br />
to <strong>an</strong>y education at all.<br />
Vignette 7. Cross<strong>in</strong>g emotional times zones on <strong>the</strong> same day<br />
Sometimes I feel just feel tired be<strong>in</strong>g black <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Nobody warned me <strong>in</strong><br />
1994 about <strong>the</strong> emotional rollercoaster that would for a long time def<strong>in</strong>e everyday life for<br />
ord<strong>in</strong>ary black <strong>an</strong>d white people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> streets, at work, <strong>in</strong> school, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shops, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
church—everywhere -- as we struggle to f<strong>in</strong>d each o<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
One of my third year students died <strong>in</strong> his sleep <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r day. This was easily <strong>the</strong> saddest day<br />
<strong>in</strong> my life as De<strong>an</strong> at <strong>the</strong> University of Pretoria. A bright young m<strong>an</strong>, Je<strong>an</strong>dre Diedrichs was<br />
respected by his professors <strong>an</strong>d loved by his fellow students. He was <strong>the</strong> only child of two<br />
wonderful, dot<strong>in</strong>g parents. I traveled <strong>the</strong> long road to <strong>the</strong> funeral service at <strong>the</strong> Dutch<br />
Reformed Church Wonderpark with hundreds of o<strong>the</strong>r mourners. Even though I was one of<br />
only a h<strong>an</strong>dful of black mourners <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> packed church, I felt completely at home among my<br />
fellow <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns. His tearful parents came to greet me with <strong>the</strong> words: “he was truly<br />
happy with <strong>an</strong>d among you.” It was one of those rare moments where you could just be<br />
yourself, lost among your community <strong>in</strong> your common hum<strong>an</strong>ity. Though I was sad at <strong>the</strong><br />
loss of this wonderful young Afrik<strong>an</strong>er, my heart was lifted by <strong>the</strong> warmth of <strong>the</strong> church<br />
community <strong>an</strong>d by <strong>the</strong> compassion of <strong>the</strong> friends <strong>an</strong>d parents of my student.<br />
141
I rushed back to <strong>the</strong> Office, <strong>an</strong>d had about 30 m<strong>in</strong>utes before <strong>the</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs started aga<strong>in</strong>. There<br />
is a lovely <strong>new</strong> bread shop near <strong>the</strong> University, <strong>an</strong>d I stopped to buy fresh s<strong>an</strong>dwiches which<br />
take about 10 m<strong>in</strong>utes to prepare. With this time on my h<strong>an</strong>ds, I stepped <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> hairdresser<br />
next door <strong>an</strong>d asked <strong>the</strong>m to quickly take-off my hair. Still warm <strong>an</strong>d lifted from <strong>the</strong> church<br />
experience, my guard was down. Big mistake. The white wom<strong>an</strong>, fix<strong>in</strong>g a plug without<br />
<strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r client <strong>in</strong> sight, shrieked a familiar refra<strong>in</strong>: “I don’t do ethnic hair!!!” I lost it,<br />
expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to her that she too was ‘ethnic’ <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>quir<strong>in</strong>g how she dealt with my white friends<br />
who had my hair texture when <strong>the</strong>y stopped by for a haircut. A shout<strong>in</strong>g match ensued, <strong>an</strong>d I<br />
left <strong>the</strong> shop, reckon<strong>in</strong>g that now <strong>an</strong>d aga<strong>in</strong> this barbaric behaviour was bound to express<br />
itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> still <strong>new</strong>ish <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. As I moved next door, deflated <strong>an</strong>d feel<strong>in</strong>g that I now<br />
had my racist quota for <strong>the</strong> month, a white wom<strong>an</strong> comes out of <strong>the</strong> kitchen hold<strong>in</strong>g my<br />
s<strong>an</strong>dwiches aloft <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> a loud voice <strong>an</strong>nounced: “you speak good English for a black m<strong>an</strong>!”<br />
In less th<strong>an</strong> 2 m<strong>in</strong>utes, my hopeful, lifted spirit was crushed by two white compatriots, one a<br />
white English wom<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d one a white Afrika<strong>an</strong>s wom<strong>an</strong>; it did not matter.<br />
That was a rough day, but <strong>the</strong>n I thought about how often I travel <strong>in</strong> one day or weekend<br />
through different emotional time zones, <strong>an</strong>d how unconscious I am of <strong>the</strong> effects this must<br />
have on <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> heart. Like <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r day I found myself tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g teachers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
middle of a huge squatter camp on <strong>the</strong> outskirts of Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg, <strong>an</strong>d wondered why <strong>the</strong>se<br />
energetic young teachers would even care to show-up for work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se miserable conditions<br />
that clearly did not improve s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> dawn of our post-apar<strong>the</strong>id democracy. The next<br />
even<strong>in</strong>g I found myself speak<strong>in</strong>g at a huge <strong>an</strong>d impressive white, Afrika<strong>an</strong>s Dutch Reformed<br />
Church, light-years away from <strong>the</strong> squatter camp <strong>in</strong> terms of resources, culture, l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d<br />
colour. The next even<strong>in</strong>g I opened a book launch <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> heart of <strong>the</strong> outrageously rich S<strong>an</strong>dton<br />
Square where people spoke with exaggerated English accents. This k<strong>in</strong>d of travel<strong>in</strong>g is not<br />
normal, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> each place I had to make tricky emotional <strong>an</strong>d political readjustments <strong>in</strong> terms<br />
of how I spoke, what l<strong>an</strong>guage I spoke, <strong>an</strong>d what I spoke about.<br />
Shortly after I told a white colleague about <strong>the</strong> hair <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>an</strong>dwich <strong>in</strong>cidents, she left my office<br />
distraught <strong>an</strong>d sent <strong>an</strong> email message apologis<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> bad behaviour of what she called<br />
‘my mense’ (my people). I wrote her a terse email back, suggest<strong>in</strong>g that that was precisely <strong>the</strong><br />
problem. Those people, I told her, are my people.<br />
142
13 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s <strong>new</strong> education system: great <strong>in</strong>tentions –<br />
harsh realities<br />
By L<strong>in</strong>da Chisholm<br />
Few th<strong>in</strong>gs were more import<strong>an</strong>t to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s tr<strong>an</strong>sition to a non-racial democracy th<strong>an</strong><br />
education. Education featured both as a system to be ch<strong>an</strong>ged <strong>an</strong>d as a source of resist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
<strong>an</strong>d oppositional ideas. N<strong>in</strong>eteenth <strong>an</strong>d twentieth century mission education, available to a<br />
h<strong>an</strong>dful of people, had created a literate elite that played a subst<strong>an</strong>tial role <strong>in</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g<br />
opposition to <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g segregation at <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> twentieth century. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduction of B<strong>an</strong>tu Education <strong>in</strong> 1954 extended poor quality state education <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second<br />
half of <strong>the</strong> century to larger numbers of students; as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>strument of state control, it stifled<br />
<strong>an</strong>d stultified <strong>the</strong> creative <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tellectual life of <strong>the</strong> majority of black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns.<br />
Christi<strong>an</strong> National Education provided <strong>the</strong> foundations for higher levels of education amongst<br />
whites, <strong>an</strong>d separate systems were also created for people classified as coloured <strong>an</strong>d Indi<strong>an</strong>. A<br />
set of values about <strong>the</strong> superiority of whites <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> West <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>feriority of <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>Africa</strong> justified <strong>an</strong>d was embedded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> practices of this racially divided system.<br />
Secondary <strong>an</strong>d higher education black students emerg<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> bowels of apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
schools from <strong>the</strong> late 1960s through <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>an</strong>d 1980s provided <strong>the</strong> fuel for much of <strong>the</strong><br />
ris<strong>in</strong>g resist<strong>an</strong>ce to apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> latter quarter of <strong>the</strong> century. Teachers added <strong>the</strong>ir voices<br />
from <strong>the</strong> 1980s. In <strong>the</strong> 1980s, tr<strong>an</strong>sformation through people’s education <strong>an</strong>d worker<br />
education was <strong>the</strong> rally<strong>in</strong>g cry of popular <strong>an</strong>d union movements. Unlike similar movements <strong>in</strong><br />
Eastern Europe, <strong>the</strong> radicalis<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>guage was socialist, <strong>Africa</strong>nist <strong>an</strong>d non-racial.<br />
Expectations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, when <strong>the</strong> political conditions for ch<strong>an</strong>ge were set <strong>in</strong> place<br />
first by <strong>the</strong> unb<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> exiled liberation movements <strong>in</strong> 1990, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n by democratic<br />
elections <strong>in</strong> 1994, were great. The context of ch<strong>an</strong>ge, globally, however, had a dramatic effect<br />
on <strong>the</strong> approach to educational ch<strong>an</strong>ge at <strong>the</strong> national level <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The end<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong><br />
Cold War <strong>an</strong>d unleash<strong>in</strong>g of a global ideology of unfettered market fundamentalism left its<br />
mark on <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> goals <strong>an</strong>d visions of <strong>the</strong> early 1990s were tr<strong>an</strong>slated <strong>in</strong>to<br />
practice. New elites rapidly emerged, cement<strong>in</strong>g alli<strong>an</strong>ces with old elites around <strong>an</strong> amalgam<br />
of approaches that comb<strong>in</strong>ed older hum<strong>an</strong>ist visions <strong>an</strong>d goals with <strong>new</strong>er approaches more <strong>in</strong><br />
tune with global discourses. The outcomes have been uneven <strong>an</strong>d uncerta<strong>in</strong> for <strong>the</strong> majority,<br />
who rema<strong>in</strong> mired <strong>in</strong> poverty.<br />
This chapter assesses education <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> through exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g outcomes <strong>in</strong> 2006<br />
as aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> expectations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tentions articulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition years of 1990-1994. Key<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicators of such <strong>an</strong> adequate assessment must be based not on unrealistic expectations of<br />
what it is possible to achieve with<strong>in</strong> a decade, but on a careful exam<strong>in</strong>ation of what was<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiated, <strong>in</strong> what context <strong>an</strong>d with what results <strong>an</strong>d implications. An underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong><br />
ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g context over time is vital, as it poses simult<strong>an</strong>eously both different constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d<br />
challenges at different times. The chapter argues that for <strong>the</strong> ANC before <strong>the</strong> election, <strong>the</strong> goal<br />
was <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrated system of education <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to be achieved through a national<br />
qualifications’ framework, reform of all sectors <strong>an</strong>d aspects of education to improve access,<br />
equity <strong>an</strong>d quality of education for <strong>the</strong> majority, <strong>an</strong>d a major <strong>in</strong>itiative to skill <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tegrate<br />
unemployed <strong>an</strong>d marg<strong>in</strong>alised youth <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> economy <strong>an</strong>d society. In <strong>the</strong> first few years after<br />
1994, legislative <strong>an</strong>d policy reform did achieve <strong>an</strong> overhaul of <strong>the</strong> system at this level. This<br />
did not have <strong>an</strong> immediate effect on <strong>the</strong> system at <strong>the</strong> level where it mattered. Exclusion<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ued on <strong>the</strong> basis of race, gender <strong>an</strong>d poverty <strong>an</strong>d learn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
outcomes of education cont<strong>in</strong>ued to reflect <strong>the</strong> broader social <strong>in</strong>equalities of <strong>the</strong> society. Ten<br />
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years later, some improvements could be noted, but major challenges rema<strong>in</strong>ed, specifically <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> sphere of <strong>the</strong> quality, outcomes <strong>an</strong>d relev<strong>an</strong>ce of education to a life after school.<br />
Expectations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tentions 1990 – 1994<br />
A critical dimension of <strong>the</strong> emergence of <strong>new</strong> policies <strong>an</strong>d visions was <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>y were<br />
produced <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of conflict between old <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong> social forces, <strong>an</strong>d amongst <strong>new</strong><br />
social forces, over <strong>the</strong> direction that <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> society <strong>an</strong>d its education policy should take (see<br />
Chisholm, Motala <strong>an</strong>d Vally, 2003, for <strong>an</strong> overview). The <strong>new</strong> legislative <strong>an</strong>d policy context<br />
that was created was very much <strong>the</strong> result of compromise <strong>an</strong>d negotiation between <strong>the</strong>se<br />
different <strong>an</strong>d conflict<strong>in</strong>g social forces.<br />
The most import<strong>an</strong>t social actors <strong>in</strong> produc<strong>in</strong>g visions <strong>an</strong>d policies were on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>an</strong>d those<br />
emerg<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> old state <strong>an</strong>d its associated National Party <strong>an</strong>d on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r those coher<strong>in</strong>g<br />
around <strong>in</strong>ternal social movements <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> formerly outlawed <strong>an</strong>d exiled <strong>Africa</strong>n National<br />
Congress. The latter two took shape separately, but quickly converged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> run-up to <strong>the</strong><br />
elections. The ideas of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal social movement, <strong>the</strong> National Education Coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Council (NECC) - a popular movement of students, parents <strong>an</strong>d teachers <strong>in</strong> education – were<br />
expressed first <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> call to ‘peoples education’ <strong>in</strong> 1986 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n <strong>in</strong> policy form through <strong>the</strong><br />
National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) that reported <strong>in</strong> 1992. Contest<strong>in</strong>g its vision<br />
was that produced by <strong>the</strong> still-existent apar<strong>the</strong>id Department of Education. The NECC’s<br />
National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) sought a comprehensive <strong>an</strong>d systemic<br />
overhaul of <strong>the</strong> system <strong>in</strong> a way that prioritised redress, redistribution <strong>an</strong>d affirmative action<br />
<strong>an</strong>d gave a central role to <strong>the</strong> state <strong>in</strong> effect<strong>in</strong>g necessary ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> system <strong>an</strong>d structure,<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g, govern<strong>an</strong>ce, curriculum, adult education, education for learners with special needs,<br />
technical <strong>an</strong>d vocational education (hum<strong>an</strong> resource development), higher education, early<br />
childhood education, teacher education, l<strong>an</strong>guage, support services <strong>an</strong>d post-secondary<br />
education. Its goal was a s<strong>in</strong>gle, non-racial <strong>an</strong>d non-sexist educational system geared to<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>an</strong>d aspirations of all <strong>in</strong> society.<br />
As NEPI was produc<strong>in</strong>g its reports, <strong>the</strong> Congress of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Trade Unions developed a<br />
strong, proactive policy that focused on <strong>in</strong>tegration of <strong>the</strong> systems of technical <strong>an</strong>d formal<br />
education through a set of articulation <strong>an</strong>d accreditation processes <strong>an</strong>d procedures. The <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Democratic Teachers’ Union engaged <strong>in</strong> a debate about compulsory <strong>an</strong>d free<br />
education, <strong>an</strong>d placed <strong>the</strong> goal of 13 years of education, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g pre-school education, on<br />
<strong>the</strong> agenda.<br />
Both <strong>the</strong> NEPI reports <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> COSATU policy, as well as o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>fluences, made <strong>the</strong>ir way<br />
<strong>in</strong>to what became <strong>the</strong> ANC’s policy statement on education created on <strong>the</strong> eve of <strong>the</strong> election,<br />
A Policy Framework for Education <strong>an</strong>d Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g (J<strong>an</strong>uary 1994) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Development Programme (February 1994). The vision expressed here sought to create <strong>an</strong><br />
education <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g system that would undo <strong>the</strong> damage wrought by ‘<strong>the</strong> fragmented,<br />
unequal <strong>an</strong>d undemocratic’ system <strong>in</strong> place up until that time. It saw education <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g as<br />
‘basic hum<strong>an</strong> rights’ that would be enshr<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> a Bill of Rights, <strong>an</strong>d someth<strong>in</strong>g to which all<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals would have access irrespective of race, class, gender, creed or age, <strong>in</strong> which<br />
hum<strong>an</strong> potential of all would be developed, through which participation <strong>in</strong> democratic life<br />
would be guar<strong>an</strong>teed by education, <strong>an</strong>d freedom of choice would be exercised ‘with<strong>in</strong> a social<br />
<strong>an</strong>d national context of equality of opportunity <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> redress of imbal<strong>an</strong>ces’ <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions of society would be reconstructed, developed <strong>an</strong>d tr<strong>an</strong>sformed. It developed a<br />
specific set of values, pr<strong>in</strong>cipals <strong>an</strong>d policy proposals <strong>in</strong> each of <strong>the</strong> sectors of education to<br />
give effect to this vision.<br />
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The specific policy proposals envisaged a radical ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure of <strong>the</strong> system<br />
reframed <strong>in</strong> terms of a <strong>new</strong> national qualifications framework that would achieve <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tegration of education <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Education would be supported <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced from<br />
contributions not only by <strong>the</strong> state, but also parents <strong>an</strong>d bus<strong>in</strong>ess. Teacher tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g,<br />
preparation <strong>an</strong>d development would be reoriented to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of lifelong learn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
culture of active learn<strong>in</strong>g, while l<strong>an</strong>guage policy would be <strong>in</strong>formed by <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of<br />
multil<strong>in</strong>gualism <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> curriculum would be <strong>in</strong>formed by values of non-racialism <strong>an</strong>d nonsexism<br />
<strong>in</strong> a national core curriculum that would <strong>in</strong>tegrate academic <strong>an</strong>d vocational skills.<br />
The Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme emphasised <strong>the</strong> role of education <strong>in</strong><br />
achiev<strong>in</strong>g economic growth <strong>an</strong>d social equity, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> achievement of <strong>an</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>tegrated system<br />
of education <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g that provides opportunities to all, young <strong>an</strong>d old, men <strong>an</strong>d women,<br />
rural <strong>an</strong>d urb<strong>an</strong>’. It focuses specifically on girls <strong>an</strong>d women <strong>in</strong> education <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, adult<br />
basic education <strong>an</strong>d literacy programmes <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d qualification structures. As <strong>the</strong><br />
Quarterly Review for March 1994 po<strong>in</strong>ted out, direct<strong>in</strong>g attention to <strong>the</strong>se issues, however,<br />
me<strong>an</strong>t also direct<strong>in</strong>g attention away from o<strong>the</strong>r issues of no less concern. These <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>the</strong><br />
content of school<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ges to be <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> curriculum <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r aspects of<br />
knowledge <strong>an</strong>d skills that had little to do with economic growth (Chisholm, Motala <strong>an</strong>d Vally,<br />
2003: 75).<br />
This <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g vision saw <strong>the</strong> light of day as <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> Interim Constitution was be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
hammered out through multiparty negotiations. The Constitution <strong>in</strong>cluded a number of<br />
provisions that had a bear<strong>in</strong>g on how education would unfold. First, it enshr<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> right to<br />
basic education. Second, its l<strong>an</strong>guage clauses m<strong>an</strong>dated a policy of multil<strong>in</strong>gualism <strong>in</strong><br />
schools. And third, powers gr<strong>an</strong>ted to national, regional <strong>an</strong>d local levels accorded rights,<br />
powers <strong>an</strong>d functions to school govern<strong>in</strong>g bodies with<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> overarch<strong>in</strong>g framework <strong>in</strong> which<br />
central government would be responsible for norms <strong>an</strong>d st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>an</strong>d regional government<br />
for implementation of policy. The constitution also allowed for national funds to be<br />
supplemented by local funds. Most import<strong>an</strong>tly, <strong>the</strong> constitution, as product of a negotiated<br />
process aimed at national reconciliation, provided for a Government of National Unity <strong>in</strong>to<br />
which m<strong>an</strong>y bureaucrats of <strong>the</strong> old order would be <strong>in</strong>tegrated.<br />
New hope dawned on a morn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> April 1994 that saw long, snak<strong>in</strong>g queues of peaceful<br />
voters wait<strong>in</strong>g to make <strong>the</strong>ir mark <strong>an</strong>d reap <strong>the</strong> rewards of victory. These rewards were not<br />
immediately forthcom<strong>in</strong>g however. Already, <strong>the</strong> economic writ<strong>in</strong>g was on <strong>the</strong> wall. Fiscal<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d belt-tighten<strong>in</strong>g would characterise <strong>the</strong> first few years of democracy, as <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong><br />
government found its feet. In education, this me<strong>an</strong>t that <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> education budget<br />
should not be exp<strong>an</strong>ded but ra<strong>the</strong>r reorg<strong>an</strong>ised <strong>an</strong>d redistributed with<strong>in</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g parameters<br />
held sway over <strong>the</strong> more Keynesi<strong>an</strong> approach advocat<strong>in</strong>g exp<strong>an</strong>sion of <strong>the</strong> education budget.<br />
Both <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terim constitution <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> fiscal policy, that came to be encapsulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> soonto-be-<strong>in</strong>famous<br />
Growth, Employment <strong>an</strong>d Redistribution Policy (GEAR) of 1996, shaped <strong>the</strong><br />
terra<strong>in</strong> of ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first few years of freedom.<br />
The broad approach adopted <strong>in</strong> education <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> shared much with emerg<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational trends. In <strong>the</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g world, <strong>the</strong> Jomtien World Conference on Education for<br />
All <strong>in</strong> 1990 articulated a set of common goals <strong>an</strong>d strategies that bound educational discourse<br />
across diverse contexts <strong>an</strong>d boundaries for a decade, until it was re-specified as six major<br />
goals <strong>in</strong> Dakar <strong>in</strong> 2000, two of which were adopted as Millenium Development Goals. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>itial goals <strong>in</strong>cluded commitments to decentralisation <strong>an</strong>d cost-shar<strong>in</strong>g as a me<strong>an</strong>s of<br />
achiev<strong>in</strong>g universal primary education as a right for all. How to improve access, equity,<br />
quality <strong>an</strong>d relev<strong>an</strong>ce of basic education with<strong>in</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ed resources was as much a priority<br />
for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, not subjected to Structural Adjustment Facilities, as for all those countries <strong>in</strong><br />
145
<strong>the</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g world that were. In 2000, <strong>the</strong>se priorities, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> discourse, ch<strong>an</strong>ged, as did<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s overall approach.<br />
Terra<strong>in</strong> of ch<strong>an</strong>ge 1994-1999<br />
In its first two years <strong>in</strong> office, <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> Government of National Unity led by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
National Congress moved with extraord<strong>in</strong>ary speed to re-org<strong>an</strong>ise 18 departments of<br />
education <strong>in</strong>to one national <strong>an</strong>d n<strong>in</strong>e <strong>new</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>cial departments, re-populate <strong>the</strong> upper<br />
echelons of government <strong>an</strong>d bureaucracy, staff parliament <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>itiate processes to br<strong>in</strong>g<br />
vision to reality through <strong>new</strong> policy.<br />
The repeal of apar<strong>the</strong>id legislation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>troduction of legislation for a National Qualifications<br />
Framework <strong>an</strong>d National Education Policy were prepared <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first year. A review of<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g of education was <strong>in</strong>itiated even as spend<strong>in</strong>g that had previously been allocated on a<br />
racial basis, was now reoriented <strong>in</strong> terms of prov<strong>in</strong>cial hous<strong>in</strong>g, health, welfare <strong>an</strong>d<br />
educational needs <strong>an</strong>d aimed at equity between black <strong>an</strong>d white. A special fund was<br />
established (<strong>the</strong> RDP fund) to provide for primary school nutrition <strong>an</strong>d school renovation<br />
programmes <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> establishment of democratic govern<strong>an</strong>ce structures <strong>in</strong> schools. A<br />
National Student F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Aid Scheme was mooted to assist needy students <strong>in</strong> higher<br />
education. And <strong>an</strong> ill-fated pl<strong>an</strong> for <strong>the</strong> redeployment of teachers to achieve pupil:teacher<br />
ratios of 1:35 <strong>in</strong> secondary <strong>an</strong>d 1:40 <strong>in</strong> primary schools was set <strong>in</strong> motion as a costconta<strong>in</strong>ment<br />
effort. Moves were also afoot to redesign school curricula, teacher education <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustry skills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g programmes. Higher education was <strong>the</strong> subject of a review. By <strong>the</strong> end<br />
of 1996 a National Education Policy Act <strong>an</strong>d a <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Schools Act had been<br />
legislated, <strong>an</strong>d a <strong>new</strong> curriculum was due for implementation <strong>in</strong> 1997/8. Each was <strong>the</strong> result<br />
of extensive processes of consultation <strong>an</strong>d negotiation.<br />
The nature, pace <strong>an</strong>d form of ch<strong>an</strong>ge at <strong>the</strong> top was not matched by ch<strong>an</strong>ge at <strong>the</strong> bottom,<br />
where it mattered, <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s 27,864 schools, of which 70% were primary, 20%<br />
secondary, 9% comb<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d 1% serv<strong>in</strong>g learners with special needs. Even though less th<strong>an</strong> a<br />
quarter of <strong>the</strong>se schools, <strong>the</strong> formerly white, Indi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d coloured schools, had slowly started<br />
to desegregate, <strong>the</strong> pace was slow, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> right of school govern<strong>in</strong>g bodies to set fees <strong>an</strong>d<br />
determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> medium of <strong>in</strong>struction of a school enabled particularly white schools to exclude<br />
black learners on <strong>the</strong>se grounds. This me<strong>an</strong>t that <strong>the</strong> relatively better quality education<br />
available here was still denied to black children. The experience of m<strong>an</strong>y black learners<br />
with<strong>in</strong> desegregat<strong>in</strong>g schools <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se early days was often that of racial discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, abuse<br />
<strong>an</strong>d violence. A case cited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> University of <strong>the</strong> Witwatersr<strong>an</strong>d’s Education Policy Unit’s<br />
Quarterly Reviews was that of a school <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Prov<strong>in</strong>ce where black pupils were<br />
s<strong>in</strong>gled out for a lecture on personal hygiene while <strong>the</strong>ir white counterparts cont<strong>in</strong>ued with<br />
normal school<strong>in</strong>g. Protests from parents highlighted o<strong>the</strong>r forms of racism occurr<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong><br />
school, such as name-call<strong>in</strong>g, racial separation <strong>in</strong> classrooms <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> restriction of sport<strong>in</strong>g<br />
activities to <strong>the</strong> popular ‘white’ sport, rugby (Chisholm, Motala, Vally, 2003: 345).<br />
These schools were numerically a m<strong>in</strong>ority with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> overall context, where <strong>Africa</strong>n schools<br />
formed by far <strong>the</strong> majority of schools. Approximately 7 out of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s <strong>the</strong>n 12 million<br />
learners were <strong>Africa</strong>n-only <strong>an</strong>d be<strong>in</strong>g schooled <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>tly rural prov<strong>in</strong>ces of<br />
KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape <strong>an</strong>d Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Prov<strong>in</strong>ce (now Limpopo). These prov<strong>in</strong>ces<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>the</strong> previous b<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong>s or homel<strong>an</strong>ds to which l<strong>an</strong>d policy of <strong>the</strong> previous<br />
century had relegated <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>Africa</strong>n people to eke out a liv<strong>in</strong>g. Several million more<br />
were be<strong>in</strong>g educated <strong>in</strong> township schools. Urb<strong>an</strong> township schools were <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly affected<br />
not only by <strong>the</strong> context of poverty but also of family migration from rural to urb<strong>an</strong> areas as<br />
well as with<strong>in</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> areas <strong>in</strong> a search for better conditions. Violence, v<strong>an</strong>dalism <strong>an</strong>d what was<br />
known as a disrupted culture of learn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d teach<strong>in</strong>g, m<strong>an</strong>ifested <strong>in</strong> high levels of teacher<br />
146
<strong>an</strong>d learner absenteeism, cont<strong>in</strong>ued to characterise <strong>the</strong> everyday reality <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y township <strong>an</strong>d<br />
rural schools. The silent p<strong>an</strong>demic of HIV/AIDS was beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to claim more <strong>an</strong>d more<br />
victims.<br />
In order to address <strong>the</strong>se issues, schools were encouraged to develop <strong>the</strong>ir own Mission<br />
Statements, Codes of Conduct <strong>an</strong>d school policies on how to combat crime <strong>an</strong>d violence <strong>an</strong>d<br />
promote <strong>the</strong> culture of teach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d learn<strong>in</strong>g. As a School Register of Needs <strong>in</strong> 1997 revealed,<br />
conditions of teach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d learn<strong>in</strong>g here rema<strong>in</strong>ed parlous. Equity had not been achieved: this<br />
was m<strong>an</strong>ifested <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence of basic conditions such as school build<strong>in</strong>gs, classrooms,<br />
runn<strong>in</strong>g water, toilets <strong>an</strong>d sport<strong>in</strong>g facilities <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y schools where class sizes <strong>an</strong>d<br />
pupil:teacher ratios also rema<strong>in</strong>ed high, learners dropped out of school early <strong>an</strong>d abuse of<br />
especially girls was at unacceptable levels. Up to 50% of schools had <strong>in</strong>adequate supplies of<br />
stationery, textbooks <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r learn<strong>in</strong>g support materials.<br />
Little dent seemed to have been made to <strong>the</strong> high illiteracy rates amongst adults <strong>an</strong>d schoolgoers,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>re was as yet little evidence that access to education, <strong>an</strong>d its quality <strong>an</strong>d<br />
relev<strong>an</strong>ce, had improved. A 1994 study had showed that while 80% of black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns<br />
were unable to read passages written at a St<strong>an</strong>dard 5 (Grade 7) level, about 40% of all white<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns failed to read <strong>an</strong>d compute at this level. Indi<strong>an</strong>s were on average more literate<br />
th<strong>an</strong> whites, with ‘coloured’ literacy between that of whites <strong>an</strong>d blacks. While black females<br />
on average stayed <strong>in</strong> school on half-year longer th<strong>an</strong> males, female literacy was lower. The<br />
study drew attention to deep <strong>an</strong>d cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ter-racial <strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>an</strong>d to <strong>the</strong> fact that black<br />
children suffer from <strong>the</strong> lowest quality schools. It argued that although enrolments had<br />
exp<strong>an</strong>ded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s, this was not matched by improvements <strong>in</strong> literacy levels, po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to a<br />
contradiction between exp<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g school<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d educational quality (see Fuller, Pillay <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Sirur; Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Day, 1/6/95, Weekly Mail, 2/6/95; Sowet<strong>an</strong>, 2/6/95). End-of-f<strong>in</strong>al-year<br />
matriculation exam<strong>in</strong>ation results between 1994 <strong>an</strong>d 1999 embarrass<strong>in</strong>gly cont<strong>in</strong>ued to show<br />
white students achiev<strong>in</strong>g high marks, <strong>an</strong>d black students achiev<strong>in</strong>g very low marks - fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicators that <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> vision <strong>an</strong>d policy were not be<strong>in</strong>g felt at <strong>the</strong> school level.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> aims of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> curriculum implemented from 1998 was to improve<br />
educational outcomes. The curriculum had been ‘cle<strong>an</strong>sed’ of its racist <strong>an</strong>d sexist elements <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> immediate aftermath of <strong>the</strong> election. This <strong>in</strong>volved check<strong>in</strong>g exist<strong>in</strong>g syllabi for <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage-use <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> particular sensitivity to race <strong>an</strong>d gender. Teacher unions had played a<br />
critical role <strong>in</strong> this process. The curriculum was considered as need<strong>in</strong>g root <strong>an</strong>d br<strong>an</strong>ch<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge, however, <strong>an</strong>d so <strong>in</strong> 1998 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> adopted outcomes-based education as its<br />
official curriculum approach. In 1997, <strong>the</strong> Department of Education spent R25m to provide<br />
emergency tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d materials for <strong>the</strong> implementation of Curriculum 2005 (Chisholm,<br />
Motala <strong>an</strong>d Vally, 2003: 450). The focus of Curriculum 2005 was to be on learnercentredness,<br />
on outcomes determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> process of learn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d on cont<strong>in</strong>uous ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong><br />
summative assessment. The objectives were to move away from rote learn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d promote<br />
critical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d problem-solv<strong>in</strong>g skills.<br />
Outcomes or competency-based education was <strong>in</strong>tegral to <strong>the</strong> conceptualisation of <strong>the</strong><br />
National Qualifications Framework as <strong>an</strong> overarch<strong>in</strong>g framework for <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g education<br />
<strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> borrowed <strong>the</strong> idea of a National Qualifications Framework <strong>an</strong>d<br />
outcomes-based education <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s from Australia, New Zeal<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d Scotl<strong>an</strong>d,<br />
imbu<strong>in</strong>g it with its own br<strong>an</strong>d of revolutionary idealism. The idea encapsulated all sectors <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions of education with<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> imag<strong>in</strong>ary framework that was represented by a ladder of<br />
opportunity, <strong>in</strong> which it would be possible to accumulate credits <strong>an</strong>d move with ease ei<strong>the</strong>r up<br />
<strong>the</strong> ladder, or sideways, depend<strong>in</strong>g on choice <strong>an</strong>d will. These approaches, it was hoped, would<br />
147
enable <strong>the</strong> skills- formation that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> needed to develop across all sectors to enter<br />
competitively <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> global economy.<br />
Competency-based education was also central to <strong>the</strong> conception of skills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g embodied <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> Skills Development Act of 1998. The Skills Development Act <strong>an</strong>d later National<br />
Skills Development Strategy grew out of co-determ<strong>in</strong>ationist, negotiated efforts between<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ised labour, bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> state. The aims were partly to ensure skills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for<br />
school-leavers, upskill<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g workforce, <strong>an</strong>d enterprise tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
exceptionally large numbers of unemployed young men <strong>an</strong>d women, concentrated <strong>in</strong> rural<br />
areas. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s system of technical colleges had provided <strong>in</strong>effectively for preemployment<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g; its apprenticeship system for <strong>the</strong> currently-employed was ‘<strong>in</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e’,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> enterprise tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g provided to <strong>the</strong> unemployed by state departments was of ‘low<br />
quality’ <strong>an</strong>d reach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>signific<strong>an</strong>t numbers’ (Kraak, 2004: 120). The Act <strong>in</strong>tended to address<br />
<strong>the</strong>se problems <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> system. It provided for <strong>the</strong> establishment of a National Skills Authority<br />
(NSA) <strong>in</strong> April 1999 <strong>an</strong>d for a <strong>new</strong> fund<strong>in</strong>g framework for skills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. This is a<br />
compulsory national levy-gr<strong>an</strong>t system based on 1% of payroll <strong>in</strong>troduced from 2001.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r one of <strong>the</strong> Act’s ma<strong>in</strong> outcomes was <strong>the</strong> launch of 25 Sector Education <strong>an</strong>d Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
Authorities (SETAs) on 20 March 2000. The levy is collected centrally <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>n redistributed<br />
on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>an</strong>d to SETAs who adm<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>t for tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r to <strong>the</strong><br />
National Skills Fund which uses it for targeted tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. SETAs receive 80% of <strong>the</strong> levy,<br />
while <strong>the</strong> NSF receives 20% of it. Like Curriculum 2005, this dimension of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> vision<br />
was a broad <strong>an</strong>d ambitious one, aimed at overcom<strong>in</strong>g multiple damages <strong>an</strong>d deprivations of<br />
<strong>the</strong> past.<br />
Outcomes ten years down <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e 1994-2006<br />
There are different perspectives on whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> goals <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tentions set <strong>in</strong> 1994 have been<br />
achieved or not.<br />
There seems to be a broad consensus amongst <strong>an</strong>alysts of education that ten years after 1994,<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has not achieved <strong>the</strong> goals it set itself. The National Qualifications Framework<br />
has not succeeded <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g education <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, or <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g better educational<br />
opportunities. Unemployment generally <strong>an</strong>d amongst young school-leavers <strong>an</strong>d those under<br />
<strong>the</strong> age of 35 rema<strong>in</strong>s exceptionally high at 72% <strong>in</strong> 2002 (Altm<strong>an</strong>, 2003). SETAs have<br />
become wracked by allegations of corruption. The numbers of adult learners tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d<br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g literate have fallen. And <strong>the</strong> school<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d higher education sectors have sought to<br />
dist<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>mselves from competency-based approaches to education. In 2000, <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong><br />
curriculum was reviewed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light of strong criticism of its impracticability <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> 2002, a<br />
<strong>new</strong> National Curriculum was brought <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g for implementation <strong>in</strong> 2005. The National<br />
Qualifications Framework was reviewed <strong>in</strong> 2002, <strong>an</strong>d several recommendations made, but<br />
divisions between <strong>the</strong> Departments of Labour <strong>an</strong>d Education have resulted <strong>in</strong> a deadlock over<br />
what is to be done.<br />
To date <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong> schools has focused on <strong>in</strong>tegration of black children <strong>in</strong>to white schools.<br />
Although formerly white, Indi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d coloured schools have assimilated <strong>Africa</strong>n children, it is<br />
clear that Indi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d coloured schools have done so more th<strong>an</strong> former white <strong>an</strong>d especially<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s-speak<strong>in</strong>g schools (Soudien <strong>an</strong>d Sayed, 2003; Soudien, 2004; Sujee, 2004;<br />
Chisholm <strong>an</strong>d Sujee, 2007). Violence, as well as racist <strong>an</strong>d sexist abuse is still evident.<br />
Attention to national processes of <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>an</strong>d citizenship have often distracted from <strong>the</strong><br />
experiences of non-nationals. Increas<strong>in</strong>gly attention is also be<strong>in</strong>g focused on <strong>the</strong> experiences<br />
of refugee children (Clacherty, 2006).<br />
148
The M<strong>in</strong>ister of Education herself has acknowledged <strong>the</strong> persistence of <strong>the</strong>se challenges. She<br />
acknowledges that despite reconciliation at national level <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tegration at school level, both<br />
racism <strong>an</strong>d sexism persist (P<strong>an</strong>dor, 2006: n.p.) but argues that <strong>the</strong>re are more girls th<strong>an</strong> boys<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n schools, that girls are do<strong>in</strong>g better th<strong>an</strong> boys <strong>an</strong>d that ‘<strong>the</strong> problem of<br />
underachievement among boys requires carefully thought-out <strong>in</strong>terventions’ (Ibid). This<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly common view, also documented <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
Consortium for Monitor<strong>in</strong>g Educational Quality, is however contested. Recent research on<br />
matriculation exam<strong>in</strong>ation results, for example, seems to suggest that gender achievement<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly follows <strong>the</strong> fracture of class, <strong>an</strong>d that whereas white <strong>an</strong>d Indi<strong>an</strong> girls <strong>in</strong> former<br />
white schools (<strong>the</strong>refore more affluent) are achiev<strong>in</strong>g above average, <strong>Africa</strong>n girls <strong>in</strong> poor,<br />
rural <strong>an</strong>d township schools are do<strong>in</strong>g worse th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir male counterparts (Kahn, 2006). These<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs chime with Mitchell’s argument that whe<strong>the</strong>r one maps girlhood <strong>in</strong> contemporary<br />
Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong> through visual images, statistics or <strong>the</strong> voices of girls, gender <strong>in</strong>equality,<br />
poverty <strong>an</strong>d HIV/AIDS all feature prom<strong>in</strong>ently <strong>in</strong> young women’s educational experiences<br />
(Mitchell, 2005).<br />
A study on rural education reported <strong>in</strong> 2005 that rights to, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d through education were<br />
not be<strong>in</strong>g met for <strong>the</strong> majority of children liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s rural areas.<br />
(NMF/HSRC/EPC: 2005). In 2006, <strong>the</strong> Report of <strong>the</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Commission of <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>’s Investigation <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Right to Basic Education <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> also concluded that<br />
‘<strong>the</strong> lived daily reality at school for m<strong>an</strong>y children <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, particularly those children<br />
<strong>in</strong> rural <strong>an</strong>d township schools, is <strong>in</strong>congruous with <strong>the</strong> legislation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> policies of <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of education’’ (SAHRC, 2006: 3). It suggested that <strong>the</strong> right to education was not<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g met. It cited poverty, HIV/Aids, violence <strong>an</strong>d abuse, lack of <strong>in</strong>clusivity of <strong>the</strong> system,<br />
lack of <strong>in</strong>frastructure, role of teachers, l<strong>an</strong>guage of learn<strong>in</strong>g, govern<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d community<br />
participation, as well as service delivery <strong>an</strong>d monitor<strong>in</strong>g as import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g that this<br />
right was not be<strong>in</strong>g met.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> major issues <strong>in</strong>hibit<strong>in</strong>g access to school<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>the</strong> last ten years has been <strong>the</strong><br />
question of school fees. Although school<strong>in</strong>g was made compulsory for ten years, it was not<br />
free. This was despite free education be<strong>in</strong>g high on <strong>the</strong> agenda of school student movements<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> Congress of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Students (COSAS) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s. Over <strong>the</strong> decade <strong>the</strong>re<br />
was a grow<strong>in</strong>g campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st school fees. There was also <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g evidence that fees<br />
were <strong>in</strong>stitutionalis<strong>in</strong>g class ra<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> racial <strong>in</strong>equality by enabl<strong>in</strong>g former privileged<br />
schools to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir competitive edge by us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> high fees <strong>the</strong>y charged to buy<br />
additional teachers <strong>an</strong>d ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructure (Fiske <strong>an</strong>d Ladd, 2005). In poorer schools, by<br />
contrast, fees charged were m<strong>in</strong>imal <strong>an</strong>d pr<strong>in</strong>cipals often used <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ability to pay <strong>the</strong>m to<br />
shame <strong>an</strong>d humiliate families (NMF/EPC/HSRC, 2005). They often also failed to apprise<br />
parents of <strong>the</strong> exemption policy <strong>in</strong> place for those unable to afford school fees. Mount<strong>in</strong>g<br />
pressure has resulted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department of Education propos<strong>in</strong>g to abolish school fees <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
poorest schools from 2007. Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>in</strong>formation provided by prov<strong>in</strong>cial departments<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated that 7,687 schools with 2,556,550 learners, about a quarter of <strong>the</strong> total number,<br />
w<strong>an</strong>ted to be declared no-fee schools (www.education.gov.za; National Assembly; For<br />
Written Reply; Question 704).<br />
A debate about <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s ‘disappear<strong>in</strong>g children’ - those who drop out of school -<br />
exploded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> press follow<strong>in</strong>g a review conducted for <strong>the</strong> Centre for Educational Policy<br />
Development <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>an</strong>agement (Mail <strong>an</strong>d Guardi<strong>an</strong>, 25 Nov 2005; 20 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006). It was<br />
reported that between 1995 <strong>an</strong>d 2001, a startl<strong>in</strong>g 40% of primary school children dropped out<br />
of school. This led to a specially commissioned <strong>an</strong>alysis of dropout statistics <strong>an</strong>d questions <strong>in</strong><br />
Parliament (see www.education.gov.za, Written reply, Question 691), all of which<br />
cumulatively resulted <strong>in</strong> a great improvement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation available on <strong>the</strong> topic (see for<br />
example Crouch 2005). The Department of Education ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that what passes for<br />
149
dropouts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> compulsory phase is often a problem of repeaters. There have been<br />
suggestions <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, as elsewhere, that dropouts are ma<strong>in</strong>ly boys. But work by<br />
Jennifer Sch<strong>in</strong>dler (2005), cited by <strong>the</strong> Department, suggests that boys are not dropp<strong>in</strong>g out of<br />
<strong>the</strong> system more readily th<strong>an</strong> girls; <strong>the</strong>y are flow<strong>in</strong>g through <strong>the</strong> system at a slower rate. Her<br />
work shows that boys are repeat<strong>in</strong>g grades <strong>an</strong>d dropp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d out of school more often th<strong>an</strong><br />
girls. ‘By <strong>the</strong> age of 18,’ she argues, ‘far more boys th<strong>an</strong> girls had failed to complete 12 years<br />
of school<strong>in</strong>g, although <strong>the</strong>y were both still participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> school.’ Underly<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se raw<br />
statistics <strong>an</strong>d debates, it must be remembered, are often <strong>the</strong> harrow<strong>in</strong>g stories of AIDS<br />
orph<strong>an</strong>s. They are amongst those children who are disproportionately represented amongst <strong>the</strong><br />
poor <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, constitut<strong>in</strong>g a particularly vulnerable group<strong>in</strong>g. More th<strong>an</strong> 40% o those<br />
aged 14 or younger fall below <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational poverty l<strong>in</strong>e of $1 per day <strong>in</strong> 1995 (Roberts,<br />
2003: 490).<br />
Learn<strong>in</strong>g outcomes rema<strong>in</strong> one of <strong>the</strong> most signific<strong>an</strong>t challenges <strong>the</strong> country has to face. In<br />
2006, <strong>the</strong> Third International Maths <strong>an</strong>d Science Survey of achievement <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
reported that ‘<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> had <strong>the</strong> lowest perform<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>an</strong>d science of <strong>the</strong> 50<br />
TIMSS particip<strong>an</strong>ts’ (Reddy, 2003: xi). Data from <strong>the</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong>n Consortium for<br />
Monitor<strong>in</strong>g Educational Quality <strong>an</strong>alys<strong>in</strong>g regional read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d math achievements <strong>in</strong> Grade 6<br />
was show<strong>in</strong>g similar results. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Namibia, both with higher Gross National<br />
Products th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir neighbours, perform signific<strong>an</strong>tly worse th<strong>an</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong>m. The reasons<br />
for <strong>the</strong>se results are complex, relat<strong>in</strong>g to historical legacies <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g impact on<br />
schools. Writ<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> Commonwealth M<strong>in</strong>isters, M<strong>in</strong>ister P<strong>an</strong>dor remarks that ‘much<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s to be done <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> realm of redress.’ She suggests that although <strong>the</strong> curriculum <strong>an</strong>d<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage policy for schools was rewritten – ‘perhaps one of our most dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g challenges’<br />
– m<strong>an</strong>y schools do not have access to subjects like physical, ma<strong>the</strong>matical <strong>an</strong>d computer<br />
sciences, arts <strong>an</strong>d culture, as well as technical subjects <strong>an</strong>d that ‘this process will take a few<br />
years to implement <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’ (P<strong>an</strong>dor, 2006, n.p.).<br />
The complexities of implement<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> policy of additive bil<strong>in</strong>gualism (mo<strong>the</strong>r tongue<br />
followed by <strong>the</strong> gradual addition of second <strong>an</strong>d third l<strong>an</strong>guages) <strong>in</strong> contexts where parents<br />
often opt for a medium of <strong>in</strong>struction that teachers have not mastered <strong>an</strong>d that children do not<br />
underst<strong>an</strong>d has recently comm<strong>an</strong>ded signific<strong>an</strong>t research attention. As curriculum <strong>an</strong>d<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage policy have become settled, though, attention has shifted to <strong>the</strong> time that teachers<br />
spend <strong>in</strong> class, <strong>the</strong>ir subject knowledge <strong>an</strong>d teach<strong>in</strong>g methodologies, <strong>an</strong>d adequacy of teacher<br />
education <strong>an</strong>d school textbooks. New accountability regimes have been implemented with <strong>the</strong><br />
agreement of teacher unions, while <strong>new</strong> pl<strong>an</strong>s have been mooted for <strong>the</strong> regular licens<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
teachers.<br />
Ch<strong>an</strong>ces for those mak<strong>in</strong>g it through matric to fur<strong>the</strong>r education are complicated by <strong>the</strong> major<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ges that <strong>the</strong> system has undergone <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last decade. Although <strong>the</strong> technical <strong>an</strong>d higher<br />
education <strong>in</strong>stitutional complex has been signific<strong>an</strong>tly overhauled, old <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong> challenges<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ue to constitute barriers to educational participation at this level. P<strong>an</strong>dor says that<br />
reform <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> higher education sector has been ‘most visible <strong>an</strong>d rapid. Just over 50 percent of<br />
<strong>the</strong> students <strong>in</strong> higher education are now women <strong>an</strong>d close on 75 percent are black students.<br />
Ten years ago those percentages were reversed <strong>an</strong>d whites were <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority’ (Op cit). She<br />
refers optimistically to <strong>the</strong> Department’s ‘redesign’ of <strong>the</strong> ‘geopolitical footpr<strong>in</strong>t of apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
education with <strong>an</strong> ambitious programme of mergers <strong>an</strong>d tr<strong>an</strong>sformation’ <strong>an</strong>d its ‘equally<br />
ambitious programme’ of recapitalis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> technical college system to address <strong>the</strong> skills<br />
deficit crisis. Critics like Jonath<strong>an</strong> J<strong>an</strong>sen have been less persuaded of <strong>the</strong> extent of <strong>the</strong><br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sformation of higher education, draw<strong>in</strong>g attention not only to <strong>the</strong> racial cont<strong>in</strong>uities <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutional cultures but also <strong>the</strong> relationship of shifts such as <strong>the</strong> spread of m<strong>an</strong>agerialism to<br />
<strong>the</strong> global context of higher education developments. Higher education both globally <strong>an</strong>d<br />
150
locally, he argues, has been tr<strong>an</strong>sformed by its realignment to <strong>the</strong> market. ‘Left to <strong>the</strong> market,’<br />
he argues, ‘strong <strong>in</strong>stitutions will rema<strong>in</strong> strong, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> weak will rema<strong>in</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alised’<br />
(J<strong>an</strong>sen, 2004). Despite <strong>the</strong> National Students’ F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Aid Scheme <strong>an</strong>d reorg<strong>an</strong>isation of<br />
<strong>the</strong> sector, it is clear that unemployment <strong>an</strong>d poor fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>an</strong>d higher educational prospects<br />
rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fate of m<strong>an</strong>y school-leavers.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> unforeseen outcomes of disappo<strong>in</strong>ted expectations <strong>an</strong>d frustration with <strong>the</strong> lack of<br />
real educational <strong>an</strong>d employment opportunities, comb<strong>in</strong>ed with <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s history of<br />
violence <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>equality, seems to have been a rise <strong>in</strong> violent crime (Leggett, 2005). Prison<br />
reform <strong>an</strong>d mech<strong>an</strong>isms for deal<strong>in</strong>g with juvenile offenders have not resulted <strong>in</strong> a reduction of<br />
crime. Indeed, prisons are notoriously overcrowded. Incarceration provides <strong>the</strong> basis for<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegration of youthful offenders <strong>in</strong>to g<strong>an</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d, as Jonny Ste<strong>in</strong>berg has shown <strong>in</strong> his book on<br />
g<strong>an</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>side <strong>an</strong>d outside prisons <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Western Cape, g<strong>an</strong>g networks <strong>an</strong>d activities have<br />
spread from <strong>in</strong>side to outside prisons (Ste<strong>in</strong>berg, 2005). These are <strong>the</strong> harsh realities of posapar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Harsh realities<br />
There c<strong>an</strong> be little doubt that <strong>the</strong> political ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> 1994 ushered <strong>in</strong> a <strong>new</strong> vision <strong>an</strong>d major<br />
improvements <strong>in</strong> social spend<strong>in</strong>g aimed at equalis<strong>in</strong>g educational services <strong>an</strong>d outcomes <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The reasons for <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uities <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>in</strong> education <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
need to be sought both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> long shadow cast by history as well as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> contemporary<br />
social dynamics of <strong>the</strong> society. New policies aimed at tr<strong>an</strong>sformation have been domesticated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> overrid<strong>in</strong>g social reality of <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>an</strong>d poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Thus, although<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y educational <strong>in</strong>stitutions have improved, <strong>the</strong>y have not improved equally. Despite<br />
signific<strong>an</strong>t ch<strong>an</strong>ges, class <strong>an</strong>d race <strong>in</strong>equality, <strong>in</strong>flected by gender, cont<strong>in</strong>ue to give shape to<br />
<strong>the</strong> contours of educational <strong>in</strong>stitutions, experiences <strong>an</strong>d life-ch<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Poverty, unemployment, me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gful civic participation <strong>an</strong>d education rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> most<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t challenges for <strong>the</strong> society. Government programmes to provide education <strong>an</strong>d skills<br />
have had mixed successes. Children <strong>an</strong>d youth from poorer households, <strong>an</strong>d especially<br />
female-headed households, have had more difficulty access<strong>in</strong>g education, <strong>an</strong>d educational<br />
provision <strong>an</strong>d teach<strong>in</strong>g quality is more w<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> poor th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> affluent, urb<strong>an</strong> communities.<br />
Higher education opportunities exist, but <strong>the</strong> exigencies of poverty <strong>an</strong>d poor school<strong>in</strong>g often<br />
leave such possibilities out of reach. That <strong>the</strong> route to <strong>an</strong>d possibility of me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gful<br />
employment <strong>an</strong>d fur<strong>the</strong>r education exist for a small m<strong>in</strong>ority only me<strong>an</strong>s that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
high proportion of unemployed youth becomes a ‘disproportionately large offender pool’<br />
(Leggett, 2005: 148).<br />
Conclusion<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong>se harsh realities, <strong>the</strong>re is powerful testimony that communities, men, women,<br />
young people <strong>an</strong>d children place <strong>an</strong> extremely high value on education; <strong>the</strong> history of struggle<br />
for a <strong>new</strong> society is not one easily left beh<strong>in</strong>d. These aspirations cont<strong>in</strong>ue to be expressed <strong>in</strong><br />
org<strong>an</strong>ised formations <strong>in</strong> civil society <strong>an</strong>d educational endeavours that represent a vital<br />
comb<strong>in</strong>ation of past legacies <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong> contemporary social configurations.<br />
151
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152
14 The media picture. Mapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> contemporary media<br />
scene <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
By Se<strong>an</strong> Jacobs<br />
Introduction<br />
The post-1994 or contemporary scenario for media <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is qualitatively different<br />
from what tr<strong>an</strong>spired under colonialism (<strong>the</strong> first <strong>new</strong>spapers were published <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> late n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century) or later s<strong>in</strong>ce 1948 when <strong>the</strong> system of Apar<strong>the</strong>id was <strong>in</strong>troduced.<br />
The ch<strong>an</strong>ges for media of <strong>the</strong> last decade or so (beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with media reforms soon after<br />
Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela’s release from prison <strong>in</strong> 1990) are certa<strong>in</strong>ly momentous <strong>an</strong>d quite<br />
remarkable. However, a closer look suggests that <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ges to <strong>the</strong> media environment<br />
while far-reach<strong>in</strong>g -- as suggested by some academic observers (cf. Berger 1999) or from<br />
observers with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> state (GCIS 2002) -- have not led to nearly as susta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong><br />
representation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> expected positive effects on democratic participation (cf. Barnett 2003)<br />
as <strong>the</strong> magnitude of <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ges might had us to expect. In effect, <strong>the</strong> state-sponsored or<br />
market-led media reforms <strong>in</strong>troduced much-needed <strong>an</strong>d long-overdue ch<strong>an</strong>ges to <strong>the</strong> media<br />
environment. However, <strong>the</strong> public sphere more broadly rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y ways <strong>the</strong> same:<br />
reflect<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong> old <strong>in</strong>equalities of access <strong>an</strong>d power, as well as <strong>new</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation ones.<br />
In short, <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> public sphere <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> reflects <strong>the</strong> narrow political <strong>an</strong>d<br />
economic tr<strong>an</strong>sition that is cont<strong>in</strong>ues to unfold <strong>in</strong>side <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Back history<br />
The historical roots of <strong>the</strong> present media configuration are: (1) <strong>the</strong> hegemony of a n<strong>in</strong>eteenth<br />
century British colonial liberalism, (2) <strong>the</strong> rise of m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g capital which developed its own<br />
press to rationalize its dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d deflect criticism or scrut<strong>in</strong>y of its bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>an</strong>d labor<br />
practices, (3) Afrik<strong>an</strong>er nationalism <strong>an</strong>d its tradition of <strong>an</strong> explicit, party-political press l<strong>in</strong>ked<br />
to <strong>an</strong> ethnic economic <strong>an</strong>d political project, (4) <strong>the</strong> rise <strong>an</strong>d “fall” of state broadcast<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
(5) <strong>the</strong> vagaries of <strong>the</strong> political tr<strong>an</strong>sition of <strong>the</strong> late 1980s <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> early 1990s <strong>an</strong>d its impact<br />
on <strong>the</strong> nature of press <strong>an</strong>d broadcast restructur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d reform.<br />
Under colonialism <strong>an</strong>d Apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>the</strong> media l<strong>an</strong>dscape was characterized by racial exclusion,<br />
with a predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>tly white presence <strong>an</strong>d a structured black absence (cf. Tomaselli 1987;<br />
Tomaselli <strong>an</strong>d Louw 1989). Media for <strong>an</strong>d by black people as well as that by <strong>the</strong> political left,<br />
operated on <strong>the</strong> borders of <strong>an</strong> essentially white, conservative public sphere.<br />
The state exercised <strong>an</strong> effective monopoly over <strong>the</strong> broadcast sector (both radio <strong>an</strong>d -- once it<br />
was <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> 1976 -- television) that predictably served as <strong>the</strong> exclusive doma<strong>in</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id state, <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g party <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir supporters. Pr<strong>in</strong>t media, <strong>in</strong> turn, was controlled by a<br />
duopoly that controlled <strong>the</strong> two key markets: respectively <strong>the</strong> English <strong>an</strong>d Afrika<strong>an</strong>s l<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
markets – <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guages spoken by most whites – that were <strong>the</strong> most attractive to advertisers.<br />
These two sets of presses also co<strong>in</strong>cided roughly with <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> political fissures <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> white<br />
community: English ‘liberalism,’ tied to m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g capital, <strong>an</strong>d Afrik<strong>an</strong>er political <strong>in</strong>terests tied<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Apar<strong>the</strong>id state.<br />
While Afrika<strong>an</strong>s-l<strong>an</strong>guage media was more straightforward <strong>in</strong> its support of apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Afrik<strong>an</strong>er nationalism, <strong>the</strong> English press often presented some opposition to apar<strong>the</strong>id (but<br />
from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> limited legal context of that system), though it only very <strong>in</strong>frequently<br />
expressed support for black liberation movements. (English <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n) liberalism, both as<br />
<strong>an</strong> ideology <strong>an</strong>d a political movement, that <strong>the</strong>se papers exemplified, c<strong>an</strong> perhaps best be<br />
described as a racialized vari<strong>an</strong>t of n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century British liberalism, exported via<br />
colonialism. Historically it has found expression with<strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ly white political parties <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
153
<strong>Africa</strong>, such as <strong>the</strong> Democratic Party <strong>an</strong>d its ideological <strong>an</strong>cestors like <strong>the</strong> Progressive Party<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Progressive Federal Party, dom<strong>in</strong>ated by white English speakers.<br />
Apar<strong>the</strong>id was characterized by outright b<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>in</strong>timidation <strong>an</strong>d imprisonment of media<br />
workers as well as <strong>the</strong> closure <strong>an</strong>d discouragement of media deemed hostile to <strong>the</strong> state. More<br />
th<strong>an</strong> one hundred press laws were passed dur<strong>in</strong>g this period. Some observers suggest a<br />
correlation between <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> repressive laws aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> left w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d black press <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream press’ ability to flourish <strong>an</strong>d build monopolies without <strong>an</strong>y real competition<br />
(TRC 1998; Horwitz 2001).<br />
This media order was somewhat altered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late Apar<strong>the</strong>id period with <strong>the</strong> emergence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
1980s of a vocal “alternative” press, largely foreign-funded <strong>an</strong>d white-run, <strong>an</strong>d closely tied<br />
(sometimes explicitly) to black resist<strong>an</strong>ce. Yet, despite its courage <strong>an</strong>d its report<strong>in</strong>g, which<br />
frequently upstaged <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream media (Switzer <strong>an</strong>d Adhikari 2000), <strong>the</strong> alternative press<br />
were not as successful <strong>in</strong> signific<strong>an</strong>tly alter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> structures of what passed for <strong>the</strong> Apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
“public sphere.” They never<strong>the</strong>less presented a major threat to <strong>the</strong> state as <strong>the</strong> government’s<br />
harassment of <strong>the</strong>se papers proved: it was only from <strong>the</strong>se publications that pr<strong>in</strong>t runs were<br />
seized; <strong>the</strong> majority of emergency media regulations were aimed at <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
The reform of <strong>the</strong> political system <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 1990s was central <strong>in</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> fundamental<br />
rules of <strong>the</strong> game after Apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>in</strong>sofar as <strong>the</strong> media regime was concerned. The reform<br />
period roughly beg<strong>an</strong> with <strong>the</strong> release of Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> lift<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> b<strong>an</strong>s on<br />
liberation movements <strong>an</strong>d last<strong>in</strong>g until <strong>the</strong> April 1994 elections.<br />
It would be useful to highlight a number of characteristics of this period that would prove to<br />
have last<strong>in</strong>g effects after 1994. The first is that media reform <strong>in</strong> this period was l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong><br />
ma<strong>in</strong> political division between <strong>the</strong> National Party <strong>an</strong>d its allies on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> ANC<br />
<strong>an</strong>d its allies on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>an</strong>d corporate vacillated between <strong>the</strong> two. Second is that<br />
<strong>the</strong> liberal democratic tone that dom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>the</strong> political-constitutional <strong>an</strong>d macro-economic<br />
negotiations permeated deliberation <strong>an</strong>d struggles over media’s shape <strong>an</strong>d place <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
political sphere. Thirdly, this set of media, especially broadcast media, emerged very quickly<br />
as crucial to <strong>the</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g election fortunes of <strong>the</strong> two ma<strong>in</strong> parties <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>izations. The<br />
heightened <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> reform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> broadcast<strong>in</strong>g sector, especially <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> future<br />
role <strong>an</strong>d place of <strong>the</strong> public broadcaster (<strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Corporation of<br />
SABC), me<strong>an</strong>t that reforms hardly dealt with <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t media. This leads me to my f<strong>in</strong>al<br />
po<strong>in</strong>t, which is that a wide difference emerged between <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>ds of reforms pursued <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
broadcast sector <strong>an</strong>d pr<strong>in</strong>t respectively. Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g was subjected to extensive legislative<br />
reform that resulted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> SABC’s monopoly be<strong>in</strong>g broken, while <strong>the</strong> structural<br />
underp<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs of pr<strong>in</strong>t (ownership <strong>an</strong>d control <strong>an</strong>d its l<strong>in</strong>ks to production, distribution <strong>an</strong>d<br />
advertis<strong>in</strong>g) cont<strong>in</strong>ued to be exclusively governed by market pr<strong>in</strong>ciples. This would have<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t implications -- <strong>in</strong> terms of old <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong> class <strong>an</strong>d racial <strong>in</strong>equalities <strong>an</strong>d cleavages --<br />
for <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d of public sphere that would develop over <strong>the</strong> long term.<br />
The post-1994 period<br />
On <strong>the</strong> surface <strong>the</strong> contemporary <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n media environment appears very democratic.<br />
The media are protected by <strong>the</strong> country’s Constitution <strong>an</strong>d have freedoms to criticize<br />
government. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Bill of Rights conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second chapter of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Constitution (signed <strong>in</strong>to law <strong>in</strong> 1996) all citizens have <strong>the</strong> right to freedom of<br />
expression, which <strong>in</strong>cludes “freedom of <strong>the</strong> press <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r media” <strong>an</strong>d “freedom to receive<br />
<strong>an</strong>d impart <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>an</strong>d ideas” (GCIS 2002:121). A <strong>new</strong> law passed <strong>in</strong> 2000 (<strong>the</strong><br />
Promotion of Access to Information Act), provide unprecedented access to state-held<br />
<strong>in</strong>formation to <strong>in</strong>dividual citizens or org<strong>an</strong>izations. The end of <strong>the</strong> state's monopoly over<br />
broadcast<strong>in</strong>g as well as diversification of commercial pr<strong>in</strong>t media also characterizes <strong>the</strong> media<br />
sector. The latter was achieved with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of <strong>new</strong> titles <strong>an</strong>d ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> untilnow<br />
exclusive racial ownership patterns.<br />
154
The most signific<strong>an</strong>t structural ch<strong>an</strong>ges to broadcast<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994 are <strong>the</strong> gradual<br />
privatization of <strong>the</strong> SABC’s broadcast<strong>in</strong>g services, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of <strong>the</strong> first free-to-air<br />
terrestrial television station, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> emergence of community radio on <strong>the</strong> scene. The second<br />
set of developments <strong>in</strong>itiated after 1994 was <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ued (<strong>an</strong>d accelerated) ownership <strong>an</strong>d<br />
control shifts with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> press.<br />
The first black press conglomerate emerged immediately after <strong>the</strong> 1994 elections, tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
place of one of <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g white conglomerates. Foreign ownership was also <strong>in</strong>troduced<br />
when <strong>the</strong> Irish <strong>new</strong>spaper group, Independent PLC, bought a majority stake <strong>in</strong> a set of<br />
<strong>new</strong>spapers owned by <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g corporation Anglo-Americ<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1994. The period also saw<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of tabloid <strong>new</strong>spapers that -- for better or worse -- will tr<strong>an</strong>sform <strong>the</strong> nature<br />
of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong>spaper market <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. However, despite <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>the</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g<br />
majority of ma<strong>in</strong>stream <strong>new</strong>spapers <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> are still controlled by <strong>the</strong> five<br />
conglomerates <strong>an</strong>d are still largely aimed at a middle-class (<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>refore overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
white) audience favored by advertisers. Such a regime still dom<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>the</strong> media both <strong>in</strong> terms<br />
sett<strong>in</strong>g daily <strong>an</strong>d weekly <strong>new</strong>s agendas, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>the</strong> power relations with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> press.<br />
The broadcast<strong>in</strong>g scene<br />
Radio <strong>an</strong>d television services have undergone signific<strong>an</strong>t ch<strong>an</strong>ges s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> democratic<br />
elections <strong>in</strong> 1994, emerg<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> only real mass media <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Most <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns<br />
have access to broadcast media <strong>an</strong>d surveys affirm it as <strong>the</strong>ir ma<strong>in</strong> source of <strong>new</strong>s. N<strong>in</strong>ety per<br />
cent of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns get <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>new</strong>s from radio, sixty per cent from TV <strong>an</strong>d even less from<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>t (Davidson 2002).<br />
Post-1994, <strong>the</strong> radio sector c<strong>an</strong> be divided <strong>in</strong>to three levels or tiers. Firstly, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> public<br />
sphere, dom<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong> SABC which is a national public broadcaster funded through TV<br />
license fees (less <strong>an</strong>d less), advertis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d sponsorship revenue, <strong>an</strong>d, f<strong>in</strong>ally, o<strong>the</strong>r bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
services (<strong>the</strong> SABC rents production facilities to outside producers, for example). The second<br />
tier consists of private, commercial broadcast<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> third, community radio (cf. Barnett<br />
1999).<br />
The reforms to broadcast<strong>in</strong>g legislation me<strong>an</strong>s <strong>the</strong> SABC is now under control of a Board that<br />
is selected through public hear<strong>in</strong>gs (org<strong>an</strong>ized through Parliament) <strong>an</strong>d appo<strong>in</strong>ted by <strong>the</strong><br />
country’s president. Under <strong>the</strong> Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Act of 1999, <strong>the</strong> SABC became a limited liability<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y with <strong>the</strong> state as one hundred percent shareholder, <strong>an</strong>d was restructured <strong>in</strong>to two<br />
arms: commercial <strong>an</strong>d public services. Until 1995, <strong>the</strong> SABC monopolized <strong>the</strong> country’s<br />
airwaves, with <strong>the</strong> exception of a h<strong>an</strong>dful of small, <strong>in</strong>dependent stations that started out <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
so-called homel<strong>an</strong>ds (Radio 702 <strong>an</strong>d Capitol Radio, previously discussed) but have s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
relocated to <strong>the</strong> metropolis of Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg <strong>an</strong>d Durb<strong>an</strong>, respectively. The broadcast sector<br />
was restructured (through legislation) follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1994 elections, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Independent<br />
Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Authority (IBA) directed <strong>the</strong> SABC to sell its six radio regional stations to<br />
separate private <strong>in</strong>vestors.<br />
In 2002 <strong>the</strong> SABC operated n<strong>in</strong>eteen radio stations, attract<strong>in</strong>g some twenty million listeners<br />
daily (GCIS 2002: 122). The SABC operates 6 commercial music-based ch<strong>an</strong>nels, <strong>the</strong> biggest<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> national station 5FM that, <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> racial segmentation of <strong>the</strong> market,<br />
explicitly targets a young, urb<strong>an</strong>, white, middle-class audience, <strong>an</strong>d Metro FM that targets a<br />
young, urb<strong>an</strong>, black audience <strong>in</strong> turn. In addition to <strong>the</strong>se stations, <strong>the</strong> SABC operates a r<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
of public-service radio stations, cater<strong>in</strong>g to various communities <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>guages. For example,<br />
<strong>the</strong> station SAfm broadcasts <strong>in</strong> English. Radio Sonder Grense or “Radio Without Borders”<br />
broadcasts <strong>in</strong> Afrika<strong>an</strong>s while <strong>in</strong> Thobela FM broadcasts <strong>in</strong> Sepedi. Some services also<br />
broadcasts to “ethnic” communities. For example, Lotus FM broadcasts <strong>in</strong> English to serve<br />
<strong>the</strong> Indi<strong>an</strong> community. The stations with <strong>the</strong> largest known audience are Ukhozi FM (<strong>in</strong><br />
Zulu), Lesedi FM (Sesotho), <strong>an</strong>d Umhlobo Wenene (Xhosa). Toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>se three stations<br />
have <strong>an</strong> average daily audience of over 9.5 million people. The SABC’s public service or ‘full<br />
155
spectrum’ stations offer a mix of music, current affairs, drama <strong>an</strong>d call-<strong>in</strong> programm<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Music makes up fifty per cent of <strong>the</strong> schedule of <strong>the</strong>se stations; twenty per cent of <strong>the</strong> time is<br />
allocated to <strong>new</strong>s bullet<strong>in</strong>s, talk shows, magaz<strong>in</strong>es <strong>an</strong>d documentaries; <strong>an</strong>d twelve per cent to<br />
<strong>new</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong>s-related programs. The rest of <strong>the</strong> time is allocated to formal educational<br />
programs, sport, <strong>an</strong>d religious programm<strong>in</strong>g (SABC 2002). The SABC produces <strong>the</strong> bulk of<br />
<strong>new</strong>s radio: its radio <strong>new</strong>s staff generates some two hundred <strong>new</strong>s programs per week with a<br />
comb<strong>in</strong>ed airtime of almost 300 hours (GCIS 2002: 122). Radio <strong>new</strong>s has editorial offices <strong>in</strong><br />
all major cities of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, a wide network of local <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational correspondents, as<br />
well as access to <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong>s wire services Reuters, Agence Fr<strong>an</strong>ce Presse (AFP), <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> local<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Press Association (SAPA). However by 2003, cost-cutt<strong>in</strong>g has had major<br />
effects on this network; <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>the</strong> SABC was <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly rely<strong>in</strong>g on freel<strong>an</strong>cers, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><br />
some cases, <strong>the</strong> same correspondents who supplied <strong>the</strong> SABC under Apar<strong>the</strong>id with biased<br />
reports. In o<strong>the</strong>r cases, as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> large United States <strong>an</strong>d British markets, <strong>the</strong> SABC <strong>in</strong> 1995<br />
“outsourced” its foreign coverage (where it w<strong>an</strong>ted a more <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>an</strong>gle) to a British<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y Feature Stories.<br />
Increas<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> SABC is encouraged to privatize as <strong>the</strong> government decreases its subsidies<br />
to <strong>the</strong> public broadcaster. The privatization of <strong>the</strong> SABC has had major implications for its<br />
<strong>new</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d current affairs programm<strong>in</strong>g. For example, <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> <strong>new</strong>s bullet<strong>in</strong>s are now<br />
“sponsored” by commercial firms. In <strong>the</strong> run-up to <strong>the</strong> 2002 UN World Conference on Social<br />
Development, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g firm Anglo-Americ<strong>an</strong>’s sponsored a slot on environmental issues on<br />
<strong>the</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t SAfm <strong>new</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d current affairs program, AM Live.<br />
The private commercial radio sector is made up of a r<strong>an</strong>ge of regional <strong>an</strong>d local stations; <strong>the</strong><br />
majority of <strong>the</strong>se offer a music format for niche audiences, much along <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>es of <strong>the</strong> US<br />
model, broadcast<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> FM frequency. Exceptions are Radio 702 <strong>an</strong>d Cape Talk, both<br />
AM-frequency stations, which have a talk-format. Yfm <strong>in</strong> Gauteng caters for a youth audience<br />
<strong>an</strong>d is mostly a music station but does <strong>in</strong>clude talk <strong>an</strong>d discussion programs.<br />
Besides <strong>the</strong> public <strong>an</strong>d commercial tiers, <strong>the</strong>re is also <strong>the</strong> community radio sector. At present<br />
<strong>the</strong>re are some 65 on-air licensed community stations <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (from a high-po<strong>in</strong>t of<br />
more th<strong>an</strong> eighty community radio stations when <strong>the</strong>y were first licensed <strong>in</strong> 1995). Accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to legislation, a board that is democratically elected must control a community radio station.<br />
A community radio station’s programm<strong>in</strong>g must also reflect <strong>the</strong> cultural, religious, l<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
<strong>an</strong>d demographic needs of <strong>the</strong> community <strong>an</strong>d must highlight grassroots community issues,<br />
such as development, health care, general education, <strong>an</strong>d local culture. In general, community<br />
radio “must promote <strong>the</strong> development of a sense of common purpose with democracy <strong>an</strong>d<br />
improve quality of life” (Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Act 1999). Most community radio stations play a good<br />
deal of music, broadcast educational programm<strong>in</strong>g on health, agriculture <strong>an</strong>d democracy, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
host “talk-back” (basically call-<strong>in</strong>) shows on issues of community concern (often featur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
guests such a district nurses, local government officials or community polic<strong>in</strong>g offers). There<br />
tends to be little local or alternative content to <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream <strong>in</strong> <strong>new</strong>s bullet<strong>in</strong>s of community<br />
radio stations, as stations often subscribe to national radio <strong>new</strong>s services that operate like<br />
press wire services. Community radio stations also rely heavily on state <strong>an</strong>d donor fund<strong>in</strong>g for<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>come as <strong>the</strong>y struggle to attract advertisers. The low pay <strong>an</strong>d unfavorable work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
conditions force <strong>the</strong> stations to rely on volunteers, who <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y cases use <strong>the</strong> community<br />
radio stations as tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g grounds to DJ posts at private stations, robb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> community<br />
stations of <strong>in</strong>stitutional stability <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> capacity to develop <strong>the</strong>ir staffs. In a number of cases<br />
<strong>the</strong>se volunteers are foreign students who do not stay for long periods. A station like Bush<br />
Radio <strong>in</strong> Cape Town has relied heavily on foreign student <strong>in</strong>terns.<br />
From a one-ch<strong>an</strong>nel television <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary 1976, <strong>the</strong> SABC today offers six<br />
television ch<strong>an</strong>nels broadcast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> eleven l<strong>an</strong>guages. Four are free-to-air, namely SABC1,<br />
SABC2, SABC3 <strong>an</strong>d Bop-TV, while <strong>Africa</strong>2<strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d SABC <strong>Africa</strong> are pay-television<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>nels, broadcast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>Africa</strong> by satellite. Most <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns have access to<br />
<strong>the</strong> first three stations through terrestrial television.<br />
156
The Government Census counts more th<strong>an</strong> four million households with licensed television<br />
sets <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (GCIS 2002: 123). About fourteen million adults watch SABC television<br />
daily, mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>the</strong> country with <strong>the</strong> largest television audience <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (GCIS<br />
2002: 123). Eight percent of all broadcast time on all services is allocated to advertis<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
About fifty per cent of all programs tr<strong>an</strong>smitted are produced <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>; <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>der<br />
consists of ma<strong>in</strong>ly popular Americ<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> television productions. News production<br />
is thoroughly modern <strong>an</strong>d technically on par with most Western Europe<strong>an</strong> countries. SABC<br />
<strong>new</strong>s teams report<strong>in</strong>g from all parts of <strong>the</strong> country, us<strong>in</strong>g modern portable electronic cameras<br />
<strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>e-feed equipment via more th<strong>an</strong> 220 television tr<strong>an</strong>smitters feed television <strong>new</strong>s. Some<br />
98 <strong>new</strong>s bullet<strong>in</strong>s are broadcast <strong>in</strong> all eleven l<strong>an</strong>guages weekly.<br />
M-Net, <strong>the</strong> country’s only private subscription television launched <strong>in</strong> 1986, had by 2002<br />
grown to 1.23 million subscribers <strong>in</strong> forty-one <strong>Africa</strong>n countries (GCIS 2002: 124). M-Net,<br />
now a listed comp<strong>an</strong>y on <strong>the</strong> Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg Stock Exch<strong>an</strong>ge, operates two terrestrial ch<strong>an</strong>nels.<br />
In November 1999, M-Net’s debut on <strong>the</strong> Nigeri<strong>an</strong> Stock Exch<strong>an</strong>ge, made it <strong>the</strong> first <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n comp<strong>an</strong>y to list <strong>in</strong> that country. M-Net’s programm<strong>in</strong>g schedulers have persisted with<br />
a menu of sports <strong>an</strong>d enterta<strong>in</strong>ment. M-Net still does not broadcast <strong>an</strong>y <strong>new</strong>s programs.<br />
The second M-Net ch<strong>an</strong>nel, Community Services Network, offers sports programm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
specialized batches of programm<strong>in</strong>g to “niche m<strong>in</strong>orities” like <strong>the</strong> large community of <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns of Indi<strong>an</strong> descent, immigr<strong>an</strong>ts from Portugal <strong>an</strong>d Italy, or Jewish, Islamic <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Christi<strong>an</strong> religious communities.<br />
M-Net still enjoys a daily 2-hour “open w<strong>in</strong>dow” (marketed locally by M-Net as “Open<br />
Time”) on terrestrial television <strong>in</strong> terms of <strong>an</strong> agreement with <strong>the</strong> government <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> public<br />
broadcaster on which it screens non-encoded programs (available to viewers without<br />
decoders). M-Net, not surpris<strong>in</strong>gly, used <strong>the</strong> open w<strong>in</strong>dow programm<strong>in</strong>g to aggressively<br />
market its subscription services as well as sell advertis<strong>in</strong>g space to a larger audience th<strong>an</strong> its<br />
subscription base, giv<strong>in</strong>g it a head start over <strong>the</strong> public broadcaster. Nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong><br />
democratic government nor its regulatory arm – first <strong>the</strong> IBA <strong>an</strong>d now ICASA – has made<br />
<strong>an</strong>y attempt thus far to revoke M-Net’s “Open Time” privileges.<br />
In June 1998, <strong>the</strong> government released a policy that allowed <strong>an</strong> extension of terrestrial, private<br />
“free-to-air” national <strong>an</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>cial or regional television services. Follow<strong>in</strong>g a public<br />
bidd<strong>in</strong>g process, <strong>the</strong> IBA awarded <strong>the</strong> first privately owned, free-to-air television license on<br />
March 30, 1998, to Midi Television, a consortium of trade <strong>in</strong>vestment, “black empowerment”<br />
groups (which held <strong>the</strong> majority of shares), <strong>an</strong>d Warner Bro<strong>the</strong>rs, a subsidiary of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational conglomerate, Time-Warner. The station that came <strong>in</strong>to existence goes by <strong>the</strong><br />
name E.TV.<br />
The E.TV ch<strong>an</strong>nel started broadcast<strong>in</strong>g on 1 October 1998. News broadcasts <strong>an</strong>d a 24-hour<br />
service were <strong>in</strong>troduced early <strong>in</strong> 1999. While E.TV still trail beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> SABC stations <strong>an</strong>d<br />
M-Net <strong>in</strong> terms of viewership, recent AMPS (All Media <strong>an</strong>d Product Survey) <strong>in</strong>dicates that it<br />
has grown that figure by 31 per cent over a six month period between August <strong>an</strong>d December<br />
2000 to 6.7 million viewers. S<strong>in</strong>ce its <strong>in</strong>ception, E.TV provided <strong>the</strong> only serious competition<br />
to <strong>the</strong> SABC’s monopoly of local <strong>new</strong>s broadcasts. The station’s f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial difficulties <strong>an</strong>d<br />
m<strong>an</strong>agerial problems me<strong>an</strong>t, however, that it could not ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a consistent challenge. The<br />
local media is perennially full of reports of E.TV’s imm<strong>in</strong>ent closure or takeover by <strong>new</strong><br />
owners. For example, m<strong>an</strong>y of E.TV’s senior journalists left <strong>the</strong> station to jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> SABC <strong>an</strong>d<br />
its advertis<strong>in</strong>g revenue dropped considerably <strong>in</strong> 2002. Satellite television developed rapidly<br />
after 1995, when <strong>the</strong> first commercial satellite television broadcasts were made. M-Net,<br />
through its sister comp<strong>an</strong>y MultiChoice <strong>Africa</strong>, quickly moved to monopolize that market. In<br />
l<strong>in</strong>e with <strong>the</strong> exp<strong>an</strong>sionism of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n capital <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n cont<strong>in</strong>ent (see<br />
<strong>Africa</strong> Confidential, October 11, 2002). MultiChoice now dom<strong>in</strong>ates satellite broadcast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>. It has a presence <strong>in</strong> over 50 countries, with a subscriber base of nearly 1,4 million<br />
(GCIS 2002: 124). The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n DStv (digital satellite television) service offered by<br />
MultiChoice provides viewers of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternationally dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t <strong>new</strong>s ch<strong>an</strong>nels BBC, CNN,<br />
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CNBC as well as <strong>the</strong> locally produced “Parliamentary Ch<strong>an</strong>nel” (ak<strong>in</strong> to <strong>the</strong> US C-Sp<strong>an</strong><br />
Ch<strong>an</strong>nel). Despite <strong>the</strong> decreas<strong>in</strong>g prices of satellite decoders <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last few years, <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>an</strong>d<br />
for <strong>the</strong> service grows <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> service still rema<strong>in</strong>s largely off-limits outside of a small elite <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
In liberal terms, it appears as if <strong>the</strong> picture <strong>in</strong> broadcast media is relatively open <strong>an</strong>d diverse.<br />
However, <strong>in</strong> a racially <strong>an</strong>d class segmented market like <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s, market pressures tend<br />
to replicate <strong>the</strong> state-created exclusions <strong>an</strong>d physical demarcations that characterized<br />
Apar<strong>the</strong>id. As is <strong>the</strong> case <strong>in</strong> broadcast<strong>in</strong>g elsewhere, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s government has reduced<br />
direct state support <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of subsidies to <strong>the</strong> public broadcaster, <strong>in</strong>stead encourag<strong>in</strong>g it to<br />
become self-sufficient. In effect, <strong>the</strong> state now encourages <strong>the</strong> public broadcaster to fund its<br />
programm<strong>in</strong>g ma<strong>in</strong>ly through advertis<strong>in</strong>g. In television, <strong>the</strong> results have been major cuts <strong>in</strong><br />
programm<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d its replacement with (United States-orig<strong>in</strong>ated) <strong>in</strong>fomercials, re-broadcasts<br />
of low-brow, imported programs, <strong>an</strong>d, most import<strong>an</strong>tly a re-racializ<strong>in</strong>g of television <strong>an</strong>d<br />
radio audiences <strong>in</strong>to “market” segments. This segmentation co<strong>in</strong>cides with <strong>the</strong> black/white<br />
racial divide <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g class divisions with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority black population.<br />
The pr<strong>in</strong>t media<br />
At <strong>the</strong> time of writ<strong>in</strong>g at least 25 daily <strong>an</strong>d weekly <strong>new</strong>spapers <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> could be<br />
considered as key to political debates <strong>an</strong>d with signific<strong>an</strong>t national or regional impact or<br />
readerships. However, s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994 public debate as well as circulation wars have been<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ated by ten or so English-l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>new</strong>spapers, most of which are <strong>the</strong> same set of titles<br />
owned basically by <strong>the</strong> same set of conglomerates who ruled <strong>the</strong> press under Apar<strong>the</strong>id. Yet,<br />
as I argue above, major ch<strong>an</strong>ges occurred <strong>in</strong> terms of ownership, control <strong>an</strong>d editorial<br />
m<strong>an</strong>agement structures.<br />
In 1995 Independent Newspapers <strong>in</strong>creased its stake <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Argus Group to 58 per cent.<br />
Independent <strong>new</strong>spapers <strong>in</strong>augurated “Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Report”, a bus<strong>in</strong>ess supplement <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong><br />
its dailies countrywide, it revamped <strong>the</strong> Cape Times <strong>an</strong>d Natal Mercury, <strong>an</strong>d promptly<br />
launched a <strong>new</strong> title, <strong>the</strong> Sunday Independent. Independent also appo<strong>in</strong>ted a number of black<br />
editors to its titles, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Daily News, Cape Times (although a white editor was appo<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
aga<strong>in</strong> after circulation dropped), Cape Argus, Pretoria News, <strong>an</strong>d later <strong>the</strong> Sunday<br />
Independent. Independent’s Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg daily <strong>new</strong>spaper, The Star, rema<strong>in</strong>s under white<br />
editorship till today. Editorially, <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong>spaper group Independent’s <strong>new</strong>s copy is shaped by<br />
circulation biases. It still largely writes for a white, middle-class audience, favored by<br />
advertisers despite <strong>the</strong> appo<strong>in</strong>tments of black editors <strong>an</strong>d black journalists <strong>in</strong> key positions. In<br />
general content is shaped largely by economic imperatives. As journalist Chris McGreal noted<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1999 regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> coverage of crime:<br />
The overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g victims of rape, murder <strong>an</strong>d car hijack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> are black. You<br />
wouldn’t know that from read<strong>in</strong>g Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg’s two ma<strong>in</strong> dailies, The Star <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Citizen.<br />
The daily diet of crime stories is heavily weighted <strong>in</strong> favor of coverage of whites.<br />
In 1998, Independent Newspaper’s parent comp<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>creased its stake <strong>in</strong> its <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
operations to 75,7% <strong>an</strong>d shortly after <strong>the</strong> country’s second democratic elections <strong>in</strong> June 1999<br />
took full control of <strong>the</strong> group.<br />
Outside <strong>the</strong> developments at Independent Newspapers <strong>the</strong> restructur<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
<strong>new</strong>spaper bus<strong>in</strong>ess, was “a bit more complicated” (Horwitz 2001: 312). As po<strong>in</strong>ted out<br />
earlier, under Apar<strong>the</strong>id Anglo-Americ<strong>an</strong> owned TML through its subsidiary Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg<br />
Consolidated Investments (JCI). In 1995, Anglo-Americ<strong>an</strong> decided to sell JCI: <strong>the</strong> word <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> for <strong>the</strong>se sales is “unbundle”. One of <strong>the</strong>se units that were sold was Johnnies<br />
Industrial Corporation (popularly known as Johnnic), a US$2 billion diversified comp<strong>an</strong>y<br />
with a controll<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> TML. Anglo-Americ<strong>an</strong> sold Johnnic to a consortium of black<br />
<strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g groups called <strong>the</strong> National Empowerment Consortium (NEC). The consortium<br />
consisted of <strong>an</strong> association of trade union retirement funds (ma<strong>in</strong>ly of <strong>the</strong> ANC-ally Congress<br />
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of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Trade Unions), <strong>an</strong>d major <strong>in</strong>vestment groups dom<strong>in</strong>ated by black bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
people, which <strong>in</strong>cluded NAIL (<strong>the</strong> owners of Sowet<strong>an</strong>).<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>essmen who played a key role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> deal was Cyril Ramaphosa, <strong>the</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g<br />
ANC negotiator dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> constitutional talks with <strong>the</strong> Apar<strong>the</strong>id government from 1990 to<br />
1994. The Johnnic deal was cl<strong>in</strong>ched <strong>in</strong> April 1996. Ramaphosa, who has s<strong>in</strong>ce become<br />
chairm<strong>an</strong> of Johnnic, was named chairm<strong>an</strong> of TML one year later. His appo<strong>in</strong>tment <strong>an</strong>d his<br />
obvious l<strong>in</strong>ks to <strong>the</strong> ANC, given <strong>the</strong> party’s vocal protestations about <strong>the</strong> press <strong>an</strong>d its own<br />
desires to own one, were not missed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> media. TML owned <strong>the</strong> two premier bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
publications, F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Mail (a weekly) <strong>an</strong>d Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Day as well as <strong>the</strong> largest circulation<br />
Sunday paper, Sunday Times. At <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> sale, some of <strong>the</strong> senior (mostly white)<br />
journalists with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>y, bolstered by white liberal politici<strong>an</strong>s, attempted to pre-empt<br />
<strong>an</strong>y ch<strong>an</strong>ges to TML. They suggested that <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> owners would slavishly dem<strong>an</strong>d editorial<br />
allegi<strong>an</strong>ce to <strong>the</strong> ANC (as if <strong>the</strong> publications <strong>in</strong> question had up to that time not toed <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e<br />
of English capital or Apar<strong>the</strong>id). Some observers <strong>in</strong>sist <strong>the</strong> relationship was more explicit<br />
(Tomaselli et al 1987). McGreal (1999), for example, called <strong>the</strong> English press, “soft on<br />
Apar<strong>the</strong>id”. The “threat” of ANC <strong>in</strong>terference <strong>in</strong> editorial content of TML papers quickly died<br />
down as Ramaphosa made few major ch<strong>an</strong>ges to <strong>the</strong>se papers. The editorial l<strong>in</strong>e still favored<br />
free market capital <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ly white editors of <strong>the</strong> key bus<strong>in</strong>ess publications were largely<br />
reta<strong>in</strong>ed, although, <strong>the</strong> owners did appo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>the</strong> first black editor of <strong>the</strong> Sunday Times <strong>in</strong> late<br />
2002. By 1999, <strong>the</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Commission would report that about 76 percent of <strong>the</strong><br />
country’s top media m<strong>an</strong>agers were white compared with 88 percent <strong>in</strong> 1994 (HRC 1999).<br />
In <strong>the</strong> past, media owners <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> had considerable <strong>in</strong>fluence over <strong>the</strong> editorial tone of<br />
<strong>new</strong>spapers. However, post-apar<strong>the</strong>id that was no longer <strong>the</strong> case (Steenveld 1998: 7). For<br />
example, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1999 national <strong>an</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>cial elections <strong>the</strong> editors of <strong>the</strong> F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Mail, now<br />
under black ownership (which <strong>in</strong>cluded lead<strong>in</strong>g ANC politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d bus<strong>in</strong>ess sympathizers),<br />
decided to endorse <strong>the</strong> United Democratic Movement (UDM), a small opposition party led by<br />
ANC <strong>an</strong>d National Party dissenters. Cyril Ramaphosa, as chairperson of Johnnic, wrote <strong>an</strong><br />
open letter to <strong>the</strong> editor of <strong>the</strong> F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Mail dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g he withdraw <strong>the</strong> endorsement<br />
(Jacobs 1999). But that was probably where <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> owners’ <strong>in</strong>fluence ended, as <strong>the</strong>y did not<br />
succeed <strong>in</strong> major mak<strong>in</strong>g ch<strong>an</strong>ges to <strong>the</strong> readership profile <strong>an</strong>d general editorial l<strong>in</strong>e. One<br />
reason was that TML, before <strong>the</strong> Johnnic sale, had gone <strong>in</strong>to partnership with British media<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y, Pearsons Plc., for ownership of Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Day <strong>an</strong>d F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Mail. BDFM <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Pearsons also own <strong>the</strong> Summit TV ch<strong>an</strong>nel on DSTV (subscription direct satellite television),<br />
which apes Americ<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> economic <strong>new</strong>s ch<strong>an</strong>nels like CNBC. For a while <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
late 1990s, BDFM was subcontracted by <strong>the</strong> SABC to produce <strong>an</strong>d present a late-night<br />
economics <strong>new</strong>s bullet<strong>in</strong> (shown on SABC3). Pearsons is well established <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> UK where it<br />
owns <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluential F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Times. Johnnic did not w<strong>an</strong>t to jeopardize <strong>the</strong> impend<strong>in</strong>g deal<br />
with threats to impose political control over <strong>the</strong> papers. However, <strong>the</strong> most import<strong>an</strong>t reason<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> black owners of TML have been unable to aggressively ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>the</strong> editorial l<strong>in</strong>e of<br />
<strong>the</strong> papers <strong>in</strong> its control, is related to <strong>the</strong> fact that “black economic empowerment” <strong>in</strong> its early<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ifestation, was underwritten by a cynical <strong>in</strong>vestment system: Lo<strong>an</strong>s from large <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce corporations backed Johnnic as was <strong>the</strong> case for <strong>the</strong> bulk of <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r “black empowerment” ventures. As a result, <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> media “owners” are subject <strong>the</strong><br />
dictates of those who supply <strong>the</strong>m with <strong>the</strong> lo<strong>an</strong> capital.<br />
The <strong>new</strong> partners of black empowerment ventures are ma<strong>in</strong>ly Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong>stitutions. For<br />
example, S<strong>an</strong>lam, <strong>the</strong> gi<strong>an</strong>t Afrik<strong>an</strong>er-owned <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce firm, held at least 17 per cent of NAIL<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1997. Horwitz (2001: 315) po<strong>in</strong>ts out that, for example, that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> media area <strong>the</strong> list of<br />
black-Afrik<strong>an</strong>er jo<strong>in</strong>t ventures is surpris<strong>in</strong>gly extensive <strong>an</strong>d underscores <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sformation of<br />
that sector <strong>in</strong> particular. The motivations for such jo<strong>in</strong>t ventures are both political- <strong>an</strong>d profitbased.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> government’s policies is to award state contracts to comp<strong>an</strong>ies with<br />
signific<strong>an</strong>t black <strong>in</strong>vestors. Politically, it is possible that <strong>the</strong> Afrika<strong>an</strong>s comp<strong>an</strong>ies worried <strong>the</strong><br />
ANC-government might use <strong>the</strong> state as Afrik<strong>an</strong>ers did, <strong>an</strong>d, hence were labor<strong>in</strong>g to attract<br />
159
lack shareholders before Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong>stitutions are frozen out <strong>the</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id economy.<br />
NasPers <strong>an</strong>d Perskor for example, both had big stakes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> school textbook pr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
under Apar<strong>the</strong>id. It was <strong>the</strong>refore not surpris<strong>in</strong>g when NasPers signed a deal with <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong><br />
ANC’s <strong>in</strong>vestment arm, Thebe Investments, <strong>in</strong> late 1996 to publish <strong>an</strong>d distribute school<br />
textbooks, <strong>an</strong>d to operate private <strong>an</strong>d dist<strong>an</strong>ce-education through pr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d distribution<br />
subsidiaries. Similarly, Perskor sold a signific<strong>an</strong>t stake to <strong>the</strong> Kagiso Trust, a former<br />
liberation-oriented non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>ization. Kagiso, with <strong>the</strong> assist<strong>an</strong>ce of two<br />
Afrik<strong>an</strong>er groups, subsequently became <strong>the</strong> majority shareholder of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>y. The<br />
irony of <strong>the</strong> Perskor-Kagiso deal was that a black corporation with progressive roots became<br />
<strong>the</strong> publisher of <strong>the</strong> editorially conservative Citizen daily <strong>new</strong>spaper, <strong>an</strong>d Rapport, <strong>the</strong><br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s Sunday <strong>new</strong>spaper known for its conservative right-w<strong>in</strong>g politics.<br />
Likewise NasPers signed a R110 million “jo<strong>in</strong>t venture” deal to set up City Press Media with<br />
a black bus<strong>in</strong>ess consortium. The deal earmarked 51 per cent of <strong>the</strong> black-targeted City Press<br />
(with a circulation of 115,000 <strong>in</strong> 2000) for black <strong>in</strong>vestment groups, (one of <strong>the</strong>m led by<br />
Oscar Dhlomo, a former secretary-general of Bu<strong>the</strong>lezi’s Inkatha movement who as a<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>essm<strong>an</strong> became very close to <strong>the</strong> ANC). That deal would later revert back to NasPers<br />
when <strong>the</strong> black <strong>in</strong>vestment groups could not come up with <strong>the</strong> capital.<br />
Analyses of <strong>the</strong> pattern of press ownership <strong>in</strong>dicate that even though <strong>the</strong>re has been a<br />
diversification or de-racialization of ownership from five major groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past to six<br />
groups currently, it has had limited effects on democratiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> public sphere (Krabill <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Boloka 2000). The structure of <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t media – circulation, distribution networks, <strong>the</strong> price<br />
structure <strong>an</strong>d advertis<strong>in</strong>g – is, some m<strong>in</strong>or ch<strong>an</strong>ges aside, all aimed at reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> racialized<br />
(white) readership. This suggests that <strong>the</strong> question of de-racialization of <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t media -<br />
while key to democratiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> media <strong>in</strong> SA- does not solely lie with ownership, but equally<br />
with <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> structure: that is, publish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d pr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r factors raised above.<br />
Some critics have noted that what essentially ch<strong>an</strong>ged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> media is <strong>the</strong> color of <strong>the</strong><br />
monopolies with no major tr<strong>an</strong>sformation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ways <strong>the</strong> media houses operate. The mass<br />
media are still driven largely by profit motives <strong>an</strong>d a liberal ethic. The pr<strong>in</strong>t media <strong>in</strong>dustry,<br />
unlike <strong>the</strong> broadcast media, has not been subjected to <strong>an</strong>y debate about a signific<strong>an</strong>t ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> way it operates (Horwitz 2000: 310). Politically <strong>in</strong>fluential pr<strong>in</strong>t media owners viewed<br />
(<strong>an</strong>d still view) <strong>an</strong>y regulation as equal to state <strong>in</strong>terference <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> government has been<br />
aware of <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>an</strong>y state regulation talk on <strong>the</strong> health of <strong>the</strong> economy (Republic of SA<br />
2000). In terms of employment practices, a UNESCO-funded study of affirmative action <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> media, that was made public <strong>in</strong> 2000, showed that both black males <strong>an</strong>d female <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns are still underrepresented, particularly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> top levels of <strong>the</strong> media (Goga 2000).<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, a signific<strong>an</strong>t but underrated development has been <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of tabloid<br />
<strong>new</strong>spapers aimed specifically at <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g black market. The earliest example of this was<br />
Sowet<strong>an</strong> Sunday World. This paper had ironically started out as a broadsheet, Sunday World,<br />
which <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> owners of Sowet<strong>an</strong> launched <strong>in</strong> March 1999. The owners had gr<strong>an</strong>d pl<strong>an</strong>s for<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> paper, aim<strong>in</strong>g to develop a <strong>new</strong>spaper that would reflect <strong>the</strong> life-experiences of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>new</strong> <strong>an</strong>d grow<strong>in</strong>g black “middle class” – or as one report suggested: a “wealthy, top-end black<br />
readership” (Mail <strong>an</strong>d Guardi<strong>an</strong>, March 5, 1999). Distributed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn parts of <strong>the</strong><br />
country – <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gauteng, Mpumal<strong>an</strong>ga, North-West, <strong>an</strong>d Limpopo prov<strong>in</strong>ces – Sunday World<br />
avowed to promote <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> political order <strong>in</strong> which black people would thrive as well as be<br />
openly supportive of <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g ANC. It hired some of <strong>the</strong> best journalists <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>agers from<br />
<strong>the</strong> established ma<strong>in</strong>stream press. The <strong>new</strong>spaper was first brought out as a broadsheet, but<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g massive circulation drops <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>imal <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> advertis<strong>in</strong>g revenue (which hit<br />
<strong>the</strong> pockets of its owners), soon reverted to a tabloid, <strong>the</strong> Sowet<strong>an</strong> Sunday World, <strong>in</strong> 2000.<br />
The <strong>new</strong>, renamed Sowet<strong>an</strong> Sunday World under a <strong>new</strong> editor quickly made up for <strong>the</strong><br />
circulation losses, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g its readership by more th<strong>an</strong> 100 percent with<strong>in</strong> months.<br />
Rem<strong>in</strong>iscent of earlier developments <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> black press market, NasPers (its media <strong>in</strong>terests<br />
now renamed as Media24) shortly afterwards launched its own tabloid aimed at <strong>the</strong> black<br />
160
market, Sunday Sun <strong>in</strong> 2001 as a rival for Sowet<strong>an</strong> Sunday World. Media24 also later<br />
published <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s first daily tabloid <strong>new</strong>spaper, Daily Sun, <strong>in</strong> 2002.<br />
These tabloids, while claim<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong>ir mission to create a serious black “reader class”, have<br />
thus far done noth<strong>in</strong>g signific<strong>an</strong>t of <strong>the</strong> sort. Instead <strong>the</strong>se papers peddle sex, sports <strong>an</strong>d crime<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> style of <strong>the</strong> British tabloids. At its <strong>in</strong>ception, <strong>the</strong> Daily Sun owners were explicit <strong>the</strong>y<br />
would not cover politics “explicitly.” Daily Sun publisher Deon du Plessis is on record as<br />
say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> paper has a “strictly non-political outlook” (Bulger 2003). The paper does not<br />
employ a political editor or have op<strong>in</strong>ion-editorials. The Daily Sun <strong>an</strong>d Sunday Sun have<br />
developed a socially conservative editorial st<strong>an</strong>ce. The papers collectively celebrate freemarket<br />
solutions to economic development <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d rightw<strong>in</strong>g views on topics as<br />
diverse as immigration <strong>an</strong>d abortion.<br />
Apart from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of tabloids, observers have also taken note of what is loosely<br />
referred to as “tabloidization”, to capture <strong>the</strong> dramatic impact of cutbacks <strong>in</strong> <strong>new</strong>srooms <strong>an</strong>d<br />
editorial resources s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994. F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial pressures on <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong>spaper <strong>in</strong>dustry aris<strong>in</strong>g out of<br />
<strong>the</strong> proliferation of o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>new</strong> media, depressed advertis<strong>in</strong>g markets, ris<strong>in</strong>g costs of paper <strong>an</strong>d<br />
distribution, <strong>an</strong>d related factors, have led <strong>new</strong>spaper owners to massively to reduce <strong>the</strong>ir staff<br />
numbers, <strong>the</strong>ir resources <strong>an</strong>d skill levels of rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g journalists (<strong>the</strong> latter development is<br />
often referred to as <strong>the</strong> “juniorization” of <strong>new</strong>srooms).<br />
Former Mail <strong>an</strong>d Guardi<strong>an</strong> editor Anton Harber has argued that Independent Newspapers has<br />
been particularly hard-hit. To meet <strong>the</strong> expectations of <strong>an</strong> owner [Tony O’Reilly] count<strong>in</strong>g it<br />
[profits] <strong>in</strong> Irish pounds. Every time <strong>the</strong> R<strong>an</strong>d dips, <strong>the</strong> only way to give <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestor <strong>the</strong><br />
return he expects is to cut costs (Harber 2002: onl<strong>in</strong>e).<br />
Harber cites <strong>the</strong> example of “one of our serious quality <strong>new</strong>spapers” not even hav<strong>in</strong>g “a fulltime<br />
editor. It has a report<strong>in</strong>g staff of two-<strong>an</strong>d-a-half. Ano<strong>the</strong>r major Saturday <strong>new</strong>spaper has<br />
one-<strong>an</strong>d-a-half reporters” (Harber 2002: onl<strong>in</strong>e). Harber was most probably referr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
respectively to <strong>the</strong> Sunday Independent <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Saturday Star, both papers based <strong>in</strong><br />
Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg. And he wrote <strong>an</strong> apparent reference to <strong>the</strong> Sowet<strong>an</strong>:<br />
At one of <strong>the</strong> biggest <strong>new</strong>spaper <strong>new</strong>srooms <strong>in</strong> this country, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>an</strong>agement was upset with<br />
staff surf<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternet. So <strong>the</strong>y put <strong>in</strong> place only one onl<strong>in</strong>e term<strong>in</strong>al, … depriv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
journalists of <strong>the</strong>ir primary research base, particularly s<strong>in</strong>ce this <strong>new</strong>spaper no longer has <strong>an</strong><br />
active library (Idem).<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stream English-l<strong>an</strong>guage papers play a crucial agenda-sett<strong>in</strong>g role for<br />
public op<strong>in</strong>ion as well as serve as <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>itive public space(s) for major policy debates. The<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s- <strong>an</strong>d <strong>Africa</strong>n-l<strong>an</strong>guage also shape public op<strong>in</strong>ion, but to a lesser extent. The<br />
English-l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>new</strong>spapers dom<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t media <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d millions of <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns read English l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>new</strong>spapers on a daily basis. The Sowet<strong>an</strong> alone, with a<br />
predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>tly black readership, has over 1.5 million daily readers, but does not have <strong>the</strong><br />
same impact politically as <strong>new</strong>spapers like <strong>the</strong> Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Day <strong>an</strong>d Star with much smaller<br />
circulation. The English-l<strong>an</strong>guage press is also read by <strong>the</strong> most import<strong>an</strong>t decision-makers<br />
<strong>an</strong>d policy advisors <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country on a regular basis <strong>an</strong>d no doubt <strong>in</strong>fluences coverage <strong>in</strong> non-<br />
English <strong>new</strong>spapers as well as television <strong>an</strong>d radio. With <strong>the</strong> advent of on-l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>new</strong>spapers on<br />
<strong>the</strong> Internet, <strong>the</strong> sphere of <strong>the</strong> English l<strong>an</strong>guage press (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>new</strong>s sites owned by <strong>the</strong><br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s press that is tr<strong>an</strong>slated) is only likely to grow <strong>in</strong> future (D<strong>an</strong>so <strong>an</strong>d McDonald 2001;<br />
Wasserm<strong>an</strong> 2001).<br />
Conclusion<br />
Ma<strong>in</strong>stream <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n media has a long history of replicat<strong>in</strong>g narrow ideological <strong>an</strong>d<br />
material debates among whites, whe<strong>the</strong>r elites or <strong>the</strong> mass of that section of <strong>the</strong> population.<br />
Under apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>the</strong> English l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>new</strong>spapers subscribed heavily to <strong>the</strong> idea of a “liberal”<br />
press. The reality was that <strong>the</strong>y operated as profit-oriented enterprises, ma<strong>in</strong>ly aimed at <strong>the</strong><br />
white population <strong>an</strong>d reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> general-political st<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> large English m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
capital, which owned <strong>the</strong>m. Because English big bus<strong>in</strong>ess was not directly represented <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
161
state after <strong>the</strong> 1948 nationalist victory, <strong>the</strong> English l<strong>an</strong>guage press, along with <strong>the</strong> Chamber of<br />
M<strong>in</strong>es <strong>an</strong>d Chamber of Industry, became <strong>the</strong> key sites for <strong>the</strong> political expression of<br />
autonomous capitalist <strong>in</strong>terests. The Afrika<strong>an</strong>s l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>new</strong>spapers tended to be more <strong>the</strong><br />
agents of <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> factions of Afrik<strong>an</strong>er nationalist politics that controlled <strong>the</strong> state for much<br />
of <strong>the</strong> twentieth century <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Indeed, like m<strong>an</strong>y o<strong>the</strong>r l<strong>an</strong>guage-based nationalist<br />
<strong>new</strong>spapers, <strong>the</strong> Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>new</strong>spapers functioned as <strong>in</strong>stitutions for <strong>the</strong> articulation of<br />
ideology <strong>an</strong>d constituted key sites for <strong>the</strong> development of nationalist leaders. The marg<strong>in</strong>al<br />
black press, when repressed by government, tended to reflect ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> modernist, petitionary<br />
protest st<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> small <strong>Africa</strong>n middle-class <strong>in</strong>telligentsia, or later <strong>the</strong> revolutionary<br />
visions of political org<strong>an</strong>izations that dom<strong>in</strong>ated among <strong>the</strong> black majority. Throughout <strong>the</strong><br />
1980s, as resist<strong>an</strong>ce to apar<strong>the</strong>id as well as to economic exploitation reached fever pitch, <strong>an</strong><br />
“alternative press” emerged that directly sought to challenge apar<strong>the</strong>id through its journalism.<br />
One f<strong>in</strong>al, characteristic of apar<strong>the</strong>id was that under Apar<strong>the</strong>id broadcast<strong>in</strong>g – with m<strong>in</strong>or<br />
exceptions that were tolerated – was <strong>the</strong> exclusive doma<strong>in</strong> of <strong>the</strong> state. For most of <strong>the</strong><br />
period of NP rule, censorship was conducted <strong>in</strong> powerful yet <strong>in</strong>direct fashion. The<br />
government passed laws aga<strong>in</strong>st representation of entire areas of public life. It b<strong>an</strong>ned<br />
“undesirable” people <strong>an</strong>d groups <strong>an</strong>d passed legislation prohibit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> dissem<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
ideas.<br />
I highlighted <strong>the</strong> major reforms of <strong>the</strong> early 1990s that accomp<strong>an</strong>ied political liberation. These<br />
<strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs of a debate around restructur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> SABC from a “state broadcaster”<br />
to a “public broadcaster,” <strong>an</strong>d some attempts to restructure <strong>new</strong>srooms. However, I suggest<br />
that <strong>the</strong> full potential of <strong>the</strong>se processes were underm<strong>in</strong>ed by narrow political aims (with <strong>an</strong><br />
eye on <strong>an</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>tage <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1994 democratic election <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of broadcast<strong>in</strong>g, for example),<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that exist<strong>in</strong>g media elites succeeded <strong>in</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> structural underp<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs of pr<strong>in</strong>t<br />
media rema<strong>in</strong>ed largely <strong>in</strong>tact. Never<strong>the</strong>less, this period also solidified <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
import<strong>an</strong>ce of media, <strong>an</strong>d especially journalists, to political processes. This will have<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t implications for <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d of public sphere that would develop over <strong>the</strong> immediate<br />
term <strong>an</strong>d for <strong>the</strong> impacts of <strong>the</strong> media of communication on <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n political battles.<br />
References<br />
Berger, G. 1999. Towards <strong>an</strong> Analysis of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Media <strong>an</strong>d Tr<strong>an</strong>sformation, 1994-<br />
1999. Tr<strong>an</strong>sformation, 38. 84-115.<br />
Government Communication <strong>an</strong>d Information Systems. 2002. 2002. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Yearbook<br />
2001/2002. Pretoria: Government Pr<strong>in</strong>ter.<br />
Goga, F. 2000. Toward Affirmative Action: Issues of Race <strong>an</strong>d Gender <strong>in</strong> Media<br />
Org<strong>an</strong>izations. March 2000. Durb<strong>an</strong>: UNESCO <strong>an</strong>d Cultural <strong>an</strong>d Media Studies, University<br />
of Natal.<br />
Harber, A. 2002. The Power of Words: Journalism <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Age of <strong>the</strong> Market. Indicator SA, 19<br />
(3). 13-19.<br />
Horwitz, R. 2001. 2000. Communication <strong>an</strong>d Democratic Reform <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University Press.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Commission. 1999. Public Inquiry <strong>in</strong>to Racism <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Media. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg:<br />
HRC.<br />
Jacobs, S. 1999. The News Media. In Reynolds, A. Elections ’99: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The<br />
Campaigns, Results <strong>an</strong>d future prospects. Cape Town: David Philip <strong>an</strong>d James Currey.<br />
Jacobs, S. 1999b. Tensions of a Free Press: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> After Apar<strong>the</strong>id. Research Paper.<br />
Jo<strong>an</strong> Shorenste<strong>in</strong> Center for <strong>the</strong> Press, Politics <strong>an</strong>d Public Policy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard<br />
University. June 1999.<br />
Jacobs, S. <strong>an</strong>d R. Krabill. 2005. Mediat<strong>in</strong>g M<strong>an</strong>enberg <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-Apar<strong>the</strong>id Public Sphere:<br />
Media, Democracy <strong>an</strong>d Citizenship <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> S. L. Rob<strong>in</strong>s (ed.), Limits to Liberation<br />
after Apar<strong>the</strong>id. Cape Town: David Philip <strong>an</strong>d Ohio University Press.<br />
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McDonald, D. <strong>an</strong>d S. Jacobs. 2005. (Re)writ<strong>in</strong>g Xenophobia: Underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g Press Coverage<br />
of Cross-Border Migration <strong>in</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong>, Journal of Contemporary <strong>Africa</strong>n Studies, 23<br />
(3): 295-325<br />
McGreal, C. 1999. Nelson’s Columnists, The Guardi<strong>an</strong>, May 24.<br />
Switzer, L. <strong>an</strong>d M. Adhikari (eds.). 2000. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s Resist<strong>an</strong>ce Press: Alternative Voices<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Last Generation under Apar<strong>the</strong>id. A<strong>the</strong>ns: Ohio University Press.<br />
Tomaselli, K. Teer-Tomaselli, R. <strong>an</strong>d Muller, J. 1987. Narrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Crisis. Hegemony <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Press. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg: Richard Lyon & Co.<br />
Tomaselli, K. <strong>an</strong>d Louw, E. 1989. “Militarization, Hegemony <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Media,<br />
1976-1986,” <strong>in</strong> Con-text: a Journal for Contemporary Social <strong>an</strong>d Cultural Theory <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Practice <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Context, 2, 27-48.<br />
Truth <strong>an</strong>d Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 1998. F<strong>in</strong>al Report of <strong>the</strong> TRC, Volume 4,<br />
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http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/commissions/1998/trc/4chap6.htm.<br />
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15 The l<strong>an</strong>guage question. The struggle between English<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r official <strong>an</strong>d unofficial l<strong>an</strong>guages<br />
By Kwesi Kwaa Prah<br />
Introduction<br />
It is often forgotten that historically <strong>the</strong> tensions between l<strong>an</strong>guage groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
have prom<strong>in</strong>ently featured <strong>the</strong> struggles between Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d English. This was culturally a<br />
signific<strong>an</strong>t str<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict, which led to <strong>the</strong> war between Boer <strong>an</strong>d Brit, <strong>the</strong> Anglo-Boer<br />
War (1899-1902). Indeed, this is what <strong>the</strong> white Afrik<strong>an</strong>ers have called <strong>the</strong> taal-stryd. The<br />
struggle to assert <strong>the</strong> usage of Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of English hegemony cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
years follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Anglo-Boer War. In 1906, <strong>the</strong> English Cape Town <strong>new</strong>spaper The Cape<br />
Times could condescend<strong>in</strong>gly write that; “Afrika<strong>an</strong>s is <strong>the</strong> confused utter<strong>an</strong>ce of halfarticulated<br />
patois.” Afrika<strong>an</strong>s was often denigrat<strong>in</strong>gly described as a kombuis taal (a kitchen<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage), referr<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> fact that it was a l<strong>an</strong>guage used <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> kitchen by serv<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d<br />
slaves. Sensitivities aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> social power of English was strik<strong>in</strong>gly registered <strong>in</strong> 1913<br />
when <strong>the</strong> Boer leader Steyn cabled <strong>the</strong> Kaapsch Taalfeest <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g words; “… <strong>the</strong><br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage of <strong>the</strong> conqueror <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mouth of <strong>the</strong> conquered is <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage of <strong>the</strong> slaves.”<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s was accepted as a school subject <strong>in</strong> 1914, recognized by <strong>the</strong> church <strong>in</strong> 1916-19, at<br />
university level <strong>in</strong> 1918, <strong>an</strong>d completely by both chambers of parliament at a jo<strong>in</strong>t sitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
1925. Possibly, no s<strong>in</strong>gle personality <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 20 th century served <strong>the</strong> object of elevat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s to equality with English as C.J. L<strong>an</strong>genhoven.<br />
Thus when <strong>the</strong> Afrik<strong>an</strong>er elite came <strong>in</strong>to power <strong>in</strong> 1948, <strong>the</strong>y brought with <strong>the</strong>m a historical<br />
baggage <strong>an</strong>d a collective memory of cultural rivalry aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> English. They proceeded<br />
rapidly <strong>in</strong> all areas of social life to catch up with <strong>the</strong> social, economic <strong>an</strong>d cultural gap<br />
between English-speak<strong>in</strong>g white <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Afrika<strong>an</strong>s-speak<strong>in</strong>g white <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
This process was carried out on <strong>the</strong> backs of <strong>the</strong> non-white population. The process of<br />
achiev<strong>in</strong>g cultural <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>guistic supremacy, more or less, cont<strong>in</strong>ued un<strong>in</strong>terruptedly until<br />
1976, when <strong>Africa</strong>n school children <strong>in</strong> Soweto decisively rejected <strong>an</strong>d revolted aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of Afrika<strong>an</strong>s as a medium of <strong>in</strong>struction <strong>in</strong> schools. This protest aga<strong>in</strong>st Afrika<strong>an</strong>s as<br />
L<strong>an</strong>guage of Instruction (LOI) under Apar<strong>the</strong>id marked a watershed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history of<br />
Apar<strong>the</strong>id fascism <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. It <strong>an</strong>nounced to <strong>the</strong> world <strong>the</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g term<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />
Apar<strong>the</strong>id.<br />
Forced removals <strong>an</strong>d “gr<strong>an</strong>d apar<strong>the</strong>id” from <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> 1960s made <strong>the</strong> non-white<br />
population to various degrees “<strong>in</strong>visible”. They were geographically <strong>an</strong>d physically kept away<br />
from specified areas dur<strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong> hours of <strong>the</strong> day. However, this policy of enforced<br />
physical <strong>in</strong>visibility was matched by <strong>an</strong> equally pernicious policy of selective cultural<br />
<strong>in</strong>visibility. Cultural visibility was only tolerated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> B<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong>s/Homel<strong>an</strong>ds. It was on <strong>the</strong><br />
basis of <strong>the</strong>se Homel<strong>an</strong>ds, as territorial units <strong>in</strong> which specific <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages were spoken<br />
that <strong>the</strong> concept of quasi-<strong>in</strong>dependence was developed. By <strong>the</strong> late 1970s <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>the</strong> 1980s <strong>the</strong> Homel<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> picture of <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guages spoken <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>m was as follows:<br />
• Tr<strong>an</strong>skei (Xhosa) – declared <strong>in</strong>dependent on 26 October 1976<br />
• Ciskei (also Xhosa) – declared <strong>in</strong>dependent on 4 December 1981<br />
• Bophuthatsw<strong>an</strong>a (Tsw<strong>an</strong>a) – declared <strong>in</strong>dependent on 6 December 1977<br />
• Venda (Venda) – declared <strong>in</strong>dependent 13 September 1979<br />
• KwaZulu (Zulu)<br />
• KwaNdebele (Ndebele)<br />
165
• KaNgw<strong>an</strong>e (Swazi)<br />
• Gaz<strong>an</strong>kulu (Tsonga/Sh<strong>an</strong>ga<strong>an</strong>)<br />
• QwaQwa (Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Sotho)<br />
• Lebowa (Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Sotho/Pedi)<br />
The idea was to treat each B<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong> as a separate “nation” so that practically <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of<br />
<strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n majority was obviated. In effect, although, <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage speak<strong>in</strong>g citizens<br />
form three-quarters of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n population <strong>the</strong>ir l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>an</strong>d cultures were<br />
practically treated as those of <strong>in</strong>signific<strong>an</strong>t m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
The Soweto upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d after<br />
English was <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society too powerful to be superseded by Afrika<strong>an</strong>s. The<br />
sociology of l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> after 1976 offers import<strong>an</strong>t lessons for <strong>the</strong> observer.<br />
English after <strong>the</strong> Soweto upris<strong>in</strong>g received a boost. Whereas <strong>Africa</strong>n schoolchildren had<br />
rejected Afrika<strong>an</strong>s as LOI, this rejection had not been made on <strong>the</strong> grounds that <strong>the</strong>y preferred<br />
<strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong>ir l<strong>an</strong>guages as LOI. Indeed, part of <strong>the</strong> strategy of apar<strong>the</strong>id had been to foist on<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong>ir l<strong>an</strong>guages but without resources <strong>an</strong>d encouragement to develop <strong>the</strong>se<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>in</strong>to l<strong>an</strong>guages of science <strong>an</strong>d technology. <strong>Africa</strong>ns had <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>in</strong>ternalized <strong>the</strong><br />
attitude that work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages was part of <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id strategy of keep<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns as “hewers of wood <strong>an</strong>d drawers of water.” <strong>Africa</strong>n schoolchildren <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir parents<br />
had developed <strong>the</strong> impression that English was <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage of adv<strong>an</strong>cement <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
whereas <strong>the</strong>y rejected Afrika<strong>an</strong>s this was done <strong>in</strong> favour of English <strong>an</strong>d not <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages. Afrika<strong>an</strong>s had by <strong>the</strong> mid-seventies developed <strong>in</strong>to a fully-fledged l<strong>an</strong>guage of<br />
science <strong>an</strong>d technology. One c<strong>an</strong> say that from <strong>the</strong> time <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-sixties when <strong>the</strong> Afrika<strong>an</strong>sspeak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Afrika<strong>an</strong>s-educated Dr. Chris Barnard accomplished his epoch-mak<strong>in</strong>g heart<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>spl<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>the</strong> signific<strong>an</strong>ce of Afrika<strong>an</strong>s as a l<strong>an</strong>guage of science <strong>an</strong>d technology equal to <strong>an</strong>y<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world was established for all to see.<br />
Thus under apar<strong>the</strong>id, <strong>the</strong> two l<strong>an</strong>guages of <strong>the</strong> white m<strong>in</strong>ority, namely, Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d<br />
English, held sway over <strong>an</strong>d above <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages. While English reta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
<strong>the</strong> preem<strong>in</strong>ence it had historically acquired <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public doma<strong>in</strong> through service as <strong>the</strong><br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage of British colonial power, Afrika<strong>an</strong>s was systematically developed with enormous<br />
state resources <strong>an</strong>d bless<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a second official l<strong>an</strong>guage. Its social role covered <strong>the</strong> entire<br />
r<strong>an</strong>ge of functions, which <strong>an</strong>y official l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>in</strong> a developed first world society would have.<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s had <strong>in</strong> fifty years become a l<strong>an</strong>guage of modernity.<br />
Partial public usages of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>in</strong> formal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>formal capacities<br />
were restricted to usage <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “B<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong>s”. <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages were thus officially tolerated<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>, more or less, 13 percent of <strong>the</strong> country where after be<strong>in</strong>g denied <strong>the</strong>ir citizenship<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic, black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns were supposedly allowed to exercise <strong>the</strong>ir political<br />
rights. However, even <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se B<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong>s, English, <strong>an</strong>d frequently Afrika<strong>an</strong>s, functioned as<br />
official l<strong>an</strong>guages alongside <strong>the</strong> local <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage. <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> country, <strong>the</strong><br />
so-called white <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, where <strong>Africa</strong>ns formed a clear majority were treated as<br />
foreigners. In <strong>the</strong> parl<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> Apar<strong>the</strong>id state <strong>the</strong>y were “resident aliens”, who were <strong>in</strong><br />
addition to <strong>the</strong>ir own l<strong>an</strong>guages required to learn <strong>an</strong>d be educated through <strong>the</strong> medium of both<br />
English <strong>an</strong>d Afrika<strong>an</strong>s.<br />
The Apar<strong>the</strong>id state thus created n<strong>in</strong>e l<strong>an</strong>guages located <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> B<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong>s. With time <strong>the</strong><br />
B<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong> elites developed <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cultural <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>guistic representations of <strong>the</strong><br />
B<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong>s. This l<strong>in</strong>guistic differentiation, nomenclature <strong>an</strong>d dispensation were largely carried<br />
<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> post-Apar<strong>the</strong>id era.<br />
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The post-apar<strong>the</strong>id years have seen <strong>the</strong> limited but pr<strong>in</strong>cipled dism<strong>an</strong>tl<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong><br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrative structure of apar<strong>the</strong>id-based education <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> adoption of a <strong>new</strong> education<br />
system, which reflects better, at least on paper, <strong>the</strong> cultural <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>guistic <strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage-speakers. The dramatic development of Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> fifty years <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> prosperity<br />
<strong>an</strong>d enlightenment it has brought Afrik<strong>an</strong>ers should br<strong>in</strong>g to our underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> relev<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of l<strong>an</strong>guage to social tr<strong>an</strong>sformation <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. It also implicitly po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d future tr<strong>an</strong>sformation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country will have to pay full attention to <strong>the</strong><br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage question. A democratically based l<strong>an</strong>guage policy is crucial for <strong>the</strong> development of a<br />
democratic culture. Without a policy, which culturally empowers mass society, development<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> will <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> long run stagnate.<br />
L<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> constitution<br />
In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s <strong>new</strong> 1994 Bill of Rights, it is stated that; “Everyone has <strong>the</strong> right to use <strong>the</strong><br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d to participate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cultural life of <strong>the</strong>ir choice, but no one exercis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se<br />
rights may do so <strong>in</strong> a m<strong>an</strong>ner <strong>in</strong>consistent with <strong>an</strong>y provision of <strong>the</strong> Bill of Rights.” In<br />
addition <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t is made that; “Persons belong<strong>in</strong>g to a cultural, religious or l<strong>in</strong>guistic<br />
community may not be denied <strong>the</strong> right, with o<strong>the</strong>r members of that community (a) to enjoy<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir culture, practice <strong>the</strong>ir religion <strong>an</strong>d use <strong>the</strong>ir l<strong>an</strong>guage; <strong>an</strong>d (b) to form, jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><br />
cultural, religious <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>guistic associations <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r org<strong>an</strong>s of civil society”. It is fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
stated that <strong>the</strong>se rights “may not be exercised <strong>in</strong> a m<strong>an</strong>ner <strong>in</strong>consistent with <strong>an</strong>y provision of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Bill of Rights”. These def<strong>in</strong>itions of rights had practically been <strong>in</strong> force from <strong>the</strong> late<br />
1920s for <strong>the</strong> white m<strong>in</strong>ority (both Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d English speak<strong>in</strong>g), but until 1994 been<br />
denied <strong>Africa</strong>ns.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> constitution, which came <strong>in</strong>to force <strong>in</strong> 1994, <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>e <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages that had<br />
previously enjoyed official status <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> B<strong>an</strong>tust<strong>an</strong>s were gr<strong>an</strong>ted formal equality with<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d English at <strong>the</strong> national level. The l<strong>an</strong>guage of Section 6 of <strong>the</strong> Found<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Provisions reads as follows: “The official l<strong>an</strong>guages of <strong>the</strong> Republic are Sepedi, Sesotho,<br />
Setsw<strong>an</strong>a, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrika<strong>an</strong>s, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa <strong>an</strong>d<br />
isiZulu. Recogniz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> historically dim<strong>in</strong>ished use <strong>an</strong>d status of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous l<strong>an</strong>guages of<br />
our people, <strong>the</strong> state must take practical <strong>an</strong>d positive measures to elevate <strong>the</strong> status <strong>an</strong>d<br />
adv<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong>se l<strong>an</strong>guages.” The letter <strong>an</strong>d spirit of <strong>the</strong>se words is that all are equal as<br />
<strong>in</strong>herited from <strong>the</strong> old regime. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> state is enjo<strong>in</strong>ed to correctively take <strong>the</strong><br />
necessary steps to elevate to equality <strong>the</strong> formerly depressed l<strong>an</strong>guages. It is with this latter<br />
view <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that o<strong>the</strong>r provisions were made that; “A P<strong>an</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n L<strong>an</strong>guage Board<br />
(PANSALB) established by national legislation must promote, <strong>an</strong>d create conditions for, <strong>the</strong><br />
development <strong>an</strong>d use of, all official l<strong>an</strong>guages; <strong>the</strong> Khoe Khoe <strong>an</strong>d S<strong>an</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guages; <strong>an</strong>d <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Sign l<strong>an</strong>guage; <strong>an</strong>d promote <strong>an</strong>d ensure respect for all l<strong>an</strong>guages commonly used by<br />
communities <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Germ<strong>an</strong>, Greek, Gujarati, H<strong>in</strong>di, Portuguese, Tamil,<br />
Telegu <strong>an</strong>d Urdu; <strong>an</strong>d Arabic, Hebrew, S<strong>an</strong>skrit <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r l<strong>an</strong>guages used for religious<br />
purposes <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>”. This body was effectively established but its track record has <strong>in</strong><br />
m<strong>an</strong>y respects fallen far short of expectations. In practice <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages for which it<br />
was primarily me<strong>an</strong>t to cater have not made much developmental headway. The constitution<br />
missed no ch<strong>an</strong>ce to register <strong>the</strong> swift desirability of l<strong>in</strong>guistic equality <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
Exhortatively, it dem<strong>an</strong>ded that; “The national government <strong>an</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>cial governments, by<br />
legislative <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r measures, must regulate <strong>an</strong>d monitor <strong>the</strong>ir use of official l<strong>an</strong>guages. ….<br />
all official l<strong>an</strong>guages must enjoy parity of esteem <strong>an</strong>d must be treated equitably”.<br />
All <strong>in</strong> all, <strong>the</strong>se constitutional provisions were a compromise between <strong>the</strong> conflict<strong>in</strong>g positions<br />
<strong>an</strong>d dem<strong>an</strong>ds of <strong>the</strong> various parties <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sitional negotiations. The <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
National Congress (ANC), represent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> majority of black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns, favoured a<br />
167
laissez faire approach, which m<strong>an</strong>y suggested would result over time <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> emergence of a<br />
national l<strong>an</strong>guage, probably English. The Democratic Party (DP), which largely represented<br />
<strong>the</strong> majority of English-speak<strong>in</strong>g whites, favoured English as <strong>the</strong> sole official l<strong>an</strong>guage. In<br />
contrast, <strong>the</strong> National Party (NP), represent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> white Afrika<strong>an</strong>s-speak<strong>in</strong>g community, was<br />
particularly concerned that Afrika<strong>an</strong>s should reta<strong>in</strong> its official status alongside English.<br />
Inkhata, based <strong>in</strong> KwaZulu Natal, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory supported <strong>the</strong> more widespread usage of <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages, but <strong>in</strong> practice was diffident. O<strong>the</strong>r parties, like <strong>the</strong> P<strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>nist Congress (PAC)<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Az<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> People’s Org<strong>an</strong>ization (AZAPO) were strongly <strong>in</strong> favour of <strong>the</strong> enh<strong>an</strong>ced<br />
usage <strong>an</strong>d development of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages.<br />
The eleven-l<strong>an</strong>guage policy was <strong>an</strong> attempt to satisfy this wide r<strong>an</strong>ge of clash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
to avoid possible future conflicts around this potentially explosive issue. This is why <strong>the</strong><br />
constitution made a cautionary provision that; “The national government <strong>an</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
governments may use <strong>an</strong>y particular official l<strong>an</strong>guages for <strong>the</strong> purposes of government, tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>to account usage, practicality, expense, regional circumst<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> bal<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> needs<br />
<strong>an</strong>d preferences of <strong>the</strong> population as a whole or <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce concerned; but <strong>the</strong> national<br />
government <strong>an</strong>d each prov<strong>in</strong>cial government must use at least two official l<strong>an</strong>guages.<br />
Municipalities must take <strong>in</strong>to account <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage usage <strong>an</strong>d preferences of <strong>the</strong>ir residents.”<br />
Basically, it was decided that <strong>an</strong>y l<strong>an</strong>guage, which had previously enjoyed official status <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>y part of <strong>the</strong> country would be recognized nationally. But <strong>in</strong> pursuit of this objective,<br />
extenuat<strong>in</strong>g, discretionary <strong>an</strong>d mitigat<strong>in</strong>g circumst<strong>an</strong>ces were thus clearly spelt out. It may be<br />
argued that <strong>in</strong> attempt<strong>in</strong>g to satisfy all constituencies, <strong>the</strong> government failed to chart a truly<br />
<strong>new</strong> route forward, which fundamentally met <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> teem<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guagespeak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
majorities.<br />
In December 1995, M<strong>in</strong>ister Ngub<strong>an</strong>e, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n M<strong>in</strong>ister for Arts, Culture, Science <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Technology <strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>the</strong> establishment of a L<strong>an</strong>guage Pl<strong>an</strong> Task Group, to be known as<br />
LANGTAG. It was appo<strong>in</strong>ted to advise <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister who was responsible for l<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
matters on how to urgently devise a coherent National L<strong>an</strong>guage Pl<strong>an</strong> for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister po<strong>in</strong>ted out that L<strong>an</strong>gtag was to be a policy advisory group to his M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d<br />
should <strong>in</strong> no way be confused with <strong>the</strong> P<strong>an</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n L<strong>an</strong>guage Board (P<strong>an</strong>salb). P<strong>an</strong>salb<br />
would rema<strong>in</strong> to be <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent statutory body appo<strong>in</strong>ted by <strong>the</strong> Senate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong> year<br />
(1996) <strong>in</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> P<strong>an</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n L<strong>an</strong>guage Board Act (Act No. 59 of 1995) <strong>an</strong>d will<br />
be expected to monitor <strong>the</strong> observ<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> Constitutional provisions <strong>an</strong>d pr<strong>in</strong>ciples relat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to <strong>the</strong> use of l<strong>an</strong>guages, as well as <strong>the</strong> content <strong>an</strong>d observ<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>an</strong>y exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>new</strong><br />
legislation, practice <strong>an</strong>d policy deal<strong>in</strong>g with l<strong>an</strong>guage matters. The immediate rationale for<br />
this body was that dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g months follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> end of Apar<strong>the</strong>id, it had become<br />
clear that although multil<strong>in</strong>gualism was <strong>in</strong>deed a sociol<strong>in</strong>guistic reality of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>the</strong>re<br />
was a clear tendency towards unil<strong>in</strong>gualism <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. Multil<strong>in</strong>gualism was <strong>in</strong>visible <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> public service, <strong>in</strong> most public discourse <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> major mass media. Emerg<strong>in</strong>g wisdom<br />
was that <strong>the</strong> Government had failed to secure a signific<strong>an</strong>t position for l<strong>an</strong>guage matters<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> national development pl<strong>an</strong>. Consequently, despite <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Constitution<br />
provided for <strong>the</strong> cultivation of multil<strong>in</strong>gualism, <strong>the</strong>re was still <strong>an</strong> urgent need for <strong>the</strong><br />
Department of Arts, Culture, Science <strong>an</strong>d Technology to devise a coherent National L<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
Pl<strong>an</strong> which not only directly addressed <strong>the</strong>se issues, but also drew on <strong>the</strong> framework of <strong>the</strong><br />
Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development Programme (RDP) <strong>an</strong>d maximized <strong>the</strong> utilization of <strong>the</strong><br />
country’s multil<strong>in</strong>gual hum<strong>an</strong> resources. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, it was <strong>the</strong> view of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istry that, <strong>the</strong><br />
need for such a Task Group was essential <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light of (a) <strong>the</strong> lack of toler<strong>an</strong>ce of l<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
diversity <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> result<strong>an</strong>t "multil<strong>in</strong>gualism is a costly problem" ideology evident <strong>in</strong> some<br />
sectors of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society weighed aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> fundamental import<strong>an</strong>ce of l<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
empowerment <strong>in</strong> a democratic society; <strong>an</strong>d (b) <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g criticism from l<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
stakeholders of <strong>the</strong> tendency to unil<strong>in</strong>gualism <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
168
M<strong>in</strong>ister Ngub<strong>an</strong>e emphasized that a National L<strong>an</strong>guage Pl<strong>an</strong> would have to be a statement of<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>'s l<strong>an</strong>guage-related needs <strong>an</strong>d priorities <strong>an</strong>d that it should <strong>the</strong>refore set out to<br />
achieve at least <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g objectives: Firstly, all <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns should have access to all<br />
spheres of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society by develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a level of spoken <strong>an</strong>d written<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage which is appropriate for a r<strong>an</strong>ge of contexts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> official l<strong>an</strong>guage(s) of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
choice. Secondly, all citizens of <strong>the</strong> country should have access to <strong>the</strong> learn<strong>in</strong>g of l<strong>an</strong>guages<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue. Thirdly, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages, which were marg<strong>in</strong>alized by<br />
<strong>the</strong> hegemonic policies of <strong>the</strong> past should be ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d developed. Fourthly, equitable<br />
<strong>an</strong>d widespread l<strong>an</strong>guage facilitation services should be established. With <strong>the</strong> benefit of<br />
h<strong>in</strong>dsight we c<strong>an</strong> today not say that <strong>the</strong> establishment of this body has made much positive<br />
difference to <strong>the</strong> situation, which was so clearly diagnosed with<strong>in</strong> a few months of <strong>the</strong><br />
usher<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> of post-Apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The desirability of all <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns learn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage has been frequently aired but implementationally little progress has been<br />
made <strong>in</strong> this direction.<br />
Post-apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> had <strong>in</strong>herited a lop-sided l<strong>in</strong>guistic scenario <strong>an</strong>d proceeded<br />
volubly through <strong>the</strong>se constitutional provisions <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r government <strong>in</strong>itiatives to dism<strong>an</strong>tle<br />
<strong>the</strong> structure of <strong>the</strong> racist <strong>an</strong>d unsavoury <strong>in</strong>herit<strong>an</strong>ce. <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages were officially<br />
elevated to <strong>the</strong> status of national l<strong>an</strong>guages, but a decade <strong>an</strong>d more after <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong><br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id regime, <strong>the</strong> equality of <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>e <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages with English <strong>an</strong>d Afrika<strong>an</strong>s<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s more on paper th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> reality. As Professor Sizwe Satyo of <strong>the</strong> University of Cape<br />
Town made <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t “one plus one equals eleven”.<br />
It is worth po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out that, across <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent, <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage policies, which have<br />
emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-colonial era, bear unc<strong>an</strong>ny formal <strong>an</strong>d subst<strong>an</strong>tial resembl<strong>an</strong>ces.<br />
Everywhere, <strong>Africa</strong>n post-colonial regimes have on paper elevated <strong>the</strong> status of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>digenous <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages but noth<strong>in</strong>g beyond this has <strong>in</strong>variably been achieved. They<br />
have from one country to <strong>the</strong> next, by evidence of <strong>the</strong> record, been particularly <strong>in</strong>effectual <strong>in</strong><br />
serv<strong>in</strong>g as a viable basis for <strong>the</strong> exp<strong>an</strong>sion of democratic <strong>an</strong>d popular cultures or societal<br />
development. Most observers who have looked at <strong>the</strong> issue of l<strong>an</strong>guage policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> are<br />
agreed about <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>re is a big gap between <strong>in</strong>tended policy (pl<strong>an</strong>ned or espoused<br />
policy) <strong>an</strong>d action or implementation. One import<strong>an</strong>t reason for <strong>the</strong> vacillation is that elite<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests have become very entrenched <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> status quo <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> use of colonial l<strong>an</strong>guages.<br />
Indeed, <strong>in</strong> a cultural sense it is arguable that <strong>Africa</strong>n elites owe <strong>the</strong>ir positions of privilege <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence to <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> colonial l<strong>an</strong>guages. They are l<strong>an</strong>guages of power. Therefore,<br />
whereas frequently m<strong>an</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> see <strong>the</strong> logic <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> argument for <strong>the</strong> unst<strong>in</strong>ted use of <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages, <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g groups <strong>an</strong>d elites are unable to, as it were, cut off <strong>the</strong> br<strong>an</strong>ch on which<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are sitt<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
It is estimated that 76 percent of <strong>the</strong> population of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> speak at least one l<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
from one of <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g two groups, namely, Nguni, Sotho as home l<strong>an</strong>guage. 63 percent of<br />
first-l<strong>an</strong>guage speakers with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nguni <strong>an</strong>d Sotho groups also know a l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
group as a second or even third l<strong>an</strong>guage. Afrika<strong>an</strong>s l<strong>an</strong>guage-speakers form about 12 percent<br />
<strong>an</strong>d English mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue speakers about 8 percent of <strong>the</strong> population. The smaller <strong>an</strong>d noncognate<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages are spoken by about 4 percent of <strong>the</strong> population. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> also<br />
recognizes o<strong>the</strong>r non-official l<strong>an</strong>guages, <strong>the</strong>se be<strong>in</strong>g; F<strong>an</strong>agalor, Lobedu, Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Ndebele,<br />
Phuthi, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Sign L<strong>an</strong>guage, Khoe Khoe <strong>an</strong>d S<strong>an</strong>. These non-official l<strong>an</strong>guages may<br />
be used <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> official circumst<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> limited areas where it has been determ<strong>in</strong>ed that<br />
<strong>the</strong>se l<strong>an</strong>guages are prevalent.<br />
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In <strong>the</strong> decade after Apar<strong>the</strong>id, what has <strong>in</strong> fact happened is that <strong>the</strong> public dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
English, one of <strong>the</strong> smallest l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country, spoken as a home l<strong>an</strong>guage by only<br />
about 8% of <strong>the</strong> population, has been streng<strong>the</strong>ned at <strong>the</strong> expense of all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r l<strong>an</strong>guages.<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s, spoken by about 12% of <strong>the</strong> population, has compared to English lost its stature.<br />
The <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>guages like isiZulu <strong>an</strong>d isiXhosa, <strong>the</strong> two largest<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country, <strong>an</strong>d which are almost fully mutually <strong>in</strong>telligible, cont<strong>in</strong>ue to be<br />
almost completely neglected. In fact, <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>e <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages are probably <strong>in</strong> a weaker<br />
position today th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong>y were before <strong>the</strong>1990s. More th<strong>an</strong> three-quarters of <strong>the</strong> population<br />
speaks <strong>the</strong>se l<strong>an</strong>guages. Serious English proficiency among <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue<br />
speakers does not count more th<strong>an</strong> 12 percent. In this respect, <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage scene <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> is not much different from <strong>the</strong> rest of sub-Sahar<strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, where less th<strong>an</strong> 10% of<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns are proficient <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> official l<strong>an</strong>guages of <strong>the</strong>ir country, usually a colonial l<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
like English, French or Portuguese. What has been happen<strong>in</strong>g is that <strong>the</strong> supremacy of<br />
English, above all else, is becom<strong>in</strong>g patently clear.<br />
The state of affairs described above has evoked considerable resist<strong>an</strong>ce from some quarters.<br />
The white Afrika<strong>an</strong>s-speak<strong>in</strong>g community has been particularly vehement <strong>an</strong>d often<br />
vociferous <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir protest. The “coloured” population who constitute <strong>the</strong> majority of<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s-speakers does not show much public concern for <strong>the</strong> dim<strong>in</strong>ishment of <strong>the</strong> social<br />
power of Afrika<strong>an</strong>s. Indeed, m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong> “coloured” population, particularly at <strong>the</strong> younger<br />
age levels <strong>in</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> areas are drift<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> camp of English speakers. Ano<strong>the</strong>r remarkable<br />
fact worth not<strong>in</strong>g is that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-Apar<strong>the</strong>id period some Afrik<strong>an</strong>er public <strong>in</strong>tellectuals <strong>an</strong>d<br />
l<strong>in</strong>guists have started openly associat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> defense of Afrika<strong>an</strong>s with <strong>the</strong> general defense of<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> hegemonic position of English.<br />
Debates about <strong>the</strong> positions of English, Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
society appear regularly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong>spapers. In a letter which appeared <strong>in</strong> April 2002 <strong>in</strong> The<br />
Star (Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg), <strong>the</strong> author, Bob Broom, <strong>in</strong> reaction to D<strong>an</strong> Roodt’s earlier letter<br />
(Government suppresses Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> favour of English, April 8 th , 2002) suggested that: “Far<br />
from oppress<strong>in</strong>g Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> favour of English, our government has realized that English is a<br />
universal l<strong>an</strong>guage, spoken <strong>an</strong>d understood by <strong>the</strong> majority of our trad<strong>in</strong>g partners <strong>an</strong>d is <strong>the</strong><br />
chosen l<strong>an</strong>guage of <strong>in</strong>struction of most faculties of learn<strong>in</strong>g. This government that is “hellbent”<br />
on promot<strong>in</strong>g English above all o<strong>the</strong>rs, does so despite <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>convenience to m<strong>an</strong>y of its<br />
own people, as English is not <strong>the</strong>ir first l<strong>an</strong>guage. Yet <strong>the</strong>y also see <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>disputable sense of<br />
it. Pity <strong>the</strong> Afrik<strong>an</strong>ers could not/would not acknowledge <strong>the</strong> same”. The battle between<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d English <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ues, above <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>the</strong> majorities, who<br />
speak <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages. In a sharp reaction to Roodt, Ettiene v<strong>an</strong> Zyl <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r letter;<br />
(Don’t perpetuate Afrik<strong>an</strong>er imperialism), po<strong>in</strong>ted out that: “Apart from <strong>the</strong> gross<br />
misrepresentation <strong>in</strong>volved, Roodt presents us with <strong>the</strong> aggravat<strong>in</strong>g spectacle of someone<br />
claim<strong>in</strong>g his right to self-assertion while bemo<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> use of that same right by <strong>the</strong> majority<br />
of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns. What Roodt fails to see is that <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> right to self-assertion <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage of <strong>the</strong>ir choice by <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns will of necessity <strong>in</strong>volve a ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
drastic scal<strong>in</strong>g down of <strong>the</strong> use of Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public doma<strong>in</strong>”. Some may argue that no<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage should be down scaled, ra<strong>the</strong>r all l<strong>an</strong>guages should be elevated to <strong>the</strong> same level by<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> necessary resources to enable <strong>an</strong>d permit this.<br />
One hardly notices much reaction from <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage-speakers <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce of English, but occasionally we hear <strong>an</strong>d read strident <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage-speak<strong>in</strong>g voices. They are however, generally few <strong>an</strong>d far between. In a sharply<br />
worded cri de coeur written by <strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage-speak<strong>in</strong>g reader, which appeared <strong>in</strong> The<br />
Star (K.C. Motshabi. <strong>Africa</strong>ns opt for English as <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>guage of ‘Bra<strong>in</strong>y People’ 9.6.2006),<br />
<strong>the</strong> writer trench<strong>an</strong>tly observed that: “It is dishearten<strong>in</strong>g to see people actively shunn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
170
l<strong>an</strong>guages. <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages are relegated to second best, compared to English, despite <strong>the</strong><br />
fact that <strong>the</strong> constitution advocates for equality with respect to l<strong>an</strong>guages. What is more<br />
disturb<strong>in</strong>g is that <strong>Africa</strong>ns are assist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alization of <strong>the</strong>ir mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongues. The<br />
country is currently busy produc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Africa</strong>n youth who c<strong>an</strong> hardly read, let along write a text<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue. These youths fail to even pronounce <strong>Africa</strong>n names correctly, let<br />
alone spell <strong>the</strong>m. In some extreme cases, some <strong>Africa</strong>n children c<strong>an</strong> hardly construct a<br />
sentence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir parents’ mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue. The poor kid’s identity is lost because <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
supposed, for example, to be Tsw<strong>an</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d yet <strong>the</strong>y know noth<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>the</strong> Tsw<strong>an</strong>a culture <strong>an</strong>d<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage. These children look down upon <strong>Africa</strong>n culture just like most Caucasi<strong>an</strong>s do. They<br />
look down upon <strong>Africa</strong>n religious practices as backward superstition. They are alienat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves, with <strong>the</strong> help of <strong>the</strong>ir parents, from <strong>the</strong>ir own cultures. It is unfortunate that most<br />
parents still believe that speak<strong>in</strong>g eloquent English necessarily me<strong>an</strong>s you are <strong>in</strong>telligent. The<br />
fallacy of this observation is <strong>the</strong> suggestion that <strong>the</strong> English <strong>in</strong> Engl<strong>an</strong>d are all <strong>in</strong>telligent<br />
because <strong>the</strong>y speak English. The <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g is that when parents enroll <strong>the</strong>ir children <strong>in</strong><br />
township schools <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>sist that <strong>the</strong>ir children attend schools that offer <strong>the</strong>ir mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue.<br />
When <strong>the</strong>se kids move to schools <strong>in</strong> town, mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue preference is shelved for English<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Afrika<strong>an</strong>s. Gr<strong>an</strong>ted, <strong>the</strong> school may not be offer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage at that stage<br />
even though it has <strong>Africa</strong>n pupils <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority. <strong>Africa</strong>n parents resign <strong>the</strong>mselves to <strong>the</strong><br />
status quo more often that not. Our children should learn o<strong>the</strong>r l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>in</strong> addition to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue. Imag<strong>in</strong>e if White, Coloured <strong>an</strong>d Indi<strong>an</strong> children were to learn <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages as <strong>the</strong>ir second l<strong>an</strong>guage at school that would add some impetus to nationbuild<strong>in</strong>g.”<br />
The writer’s perceptions of <strong>the</strong> issues around <strong>the</strong> LOI debates <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> were equally<br />
perceptive <strong>an</strong>d forthright. Go<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> heart of <strong>the</strong> excuses, which are often made to justify<br />
<strong>the</strong> hegemony of English <strong>an</strong>d to a lesser extent Afrika<strong>an</strong>s he reiterated that; “Some argue that<br />
as English is <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational l<strong>an</strong>guage, it must receive priority <strong>an</strong>d that <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages are<br />
restricted to <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong>re are no opportunities aris<strong>in</strong>g from mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue<br />
proficiency. O<strong>the</strong>rs argue that <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages have limited vocabularies, hence <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
no sufficient academic textbooks written <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages. As a start we need to<br />
vigorously promote <strong>the</strong> teach<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages while simult<strong>an</strong>eously develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />
academic books <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages. The Christi<strong>an</strong> bible, for <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, has been tr<strong>an</strong>slated<br />
<strong>in</strong>to all <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages so that <strong>the</strong> less Anglicized c<strong>an</strong> access <strong>the</strong> teach<strong>in</strong>gs of Christi<strong>an</strong>ity.<br />
It is import<strong>an</strong>t that we decolonize our m<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>an</strong>d avoid giv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> to <strong>the</strong> status quo. By <strong>the</strong><br />
way, one does not need to be convers<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> English for one to be <strong>an</strong> electrici<strong>an</strong> or mech<strong>an</strong>ic,<br />
for example. This c<strong>an</strong> be achieved if we could develop material <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages for our<br />
children to study. The Afrika<strong>an</strong>s, French <strong>an</strong>d Russi<strong>an</strong>s, to mention but a few, are all liv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
examples of excellence through mo<strong>the</strong>r-tongue teach<strong>in</strong>g.” In one letter, this writer<br />
summarized <strong>the</strong> issues as seen from <strong>the</strong> viewpo<strong>in</strong>t of a sensitive <strong>an</strong>d socially conscious<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage-speaker.<br />
L<strong>an</strong>guage policy for tr<strong>an</strong>sformation <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
The po<strong>in</strong>t that must be forcefully made is that multil<strong>in</strong>gualism not bil<strong>in</strong>gualism or<br />
unil<strong>in</strong>gualism needs to be cultivated if all voices <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages are to be heard.<br />
If <strong>an</strong>d when this <strong>new</strong> spirit <strong>an</strong>d policy based on multil<strong>in</strong>gualism becomes operative, a <strong>new</strong><br />
impetus to a more democratic <strong>an</strong>d majoritari<strong>an</strong> approach to l<strong>an</strong>guages use <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
could move <strong>in</strong>to gear. As th<strong>in</strong>gs currently st<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>the</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majorities of <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n society are culturally relatively-deprived <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>guistically silenced. Ano<strong>the</strong>r way of<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g this po<strong>in</strong>t is to say that <strong>the</strong>y are culturally dom<strong>in</strong>ated. So that “apar<strong>the</strong>id may be dead,<br />
but long live apar<strong>the</strong>id”.<br />
171
Obviously, given its rich cultural mix, which should be a source of economic social <strong>an</strong>d<br />
cultural strength, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, like all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r former colonial countries of <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent is<br />
still yoked with <strong>the</strong> burden of l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d cultural colonialism. Sagacious multiculturalism<br />
will permit <strong>the</strong> celebration of all <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>an</strong>d cultures <strong>an</strong>d should allow<br />
cross-fertilization <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ter-penetration of <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>an</strong>d groups across cultural <strong>an</strong>d<br />
l<strong>in</strong>guistic boundaries. But even <strong>the</strong>n, democracy requires <strong>the</strong> pre-em<strong>in</strong>ence of <strong>the</strong> cultures <strong>an</strong>d<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages of <strong>the</strong> majorities. Development <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> c<strong>an</strong>not be susta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> conditions<br />
where <strong>the</strong> majorities are by purpose or omission culturally <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>guistically disempowered.<br />
When this has been said, <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t also needs to be made that; empowerment through eleven<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages is nei<strong>the</strong>r economically feasible nor technically justifiable. Of <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>e <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages currently officially acknowledged <strong>in</strong> law, all except two c<strong>an</strong> be grouped under<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r Nguni or Sotho-Tsw<strong>an</strong>a. Venda st<strong>an</strong>ds a bit out of this cluster<strong>in</strong>g. Tsonga/Sh<strong>an</strong>ga<strong>an</strong><br />
also st<strong>an</strong>ds on its own. Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, enjoy a degree of mutual <strong>in</strong>telligibility to allow<br />
written forms accessible to <strong>the</strong>m all. Sotho-Tsw<strong>an</strong>a, likewise, will <strong>in</strong>clude a mutually<br />
<strong>in</strong>telligible cluster of Pedi, Sotho, <strong>an</strong>d Tsw<strong>an</strong>a. As Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Kwet<strong>an</strong>a has passionately <strong>an</strong>d<br />
with cynicism made <strong>the</strong> case; “<strong>History</strong> has unwisely created isiXhosa, isiZulu, siSwati <strong>an</strong>d<br />
isiNdebele <strong>in</strong>to separate l<strong>an</strong>guages, which divided <strong>the</strong> biological gr<strong>an</strong>d-gr<strong>an</strong>d-children of <strong>the</strong><br />
Nguni House, <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> later generations, history aga<strong>in</strong> mischievously gave <strong>the</strong> impression that<br />
<strong>the</strong> speakers of <strong>the</strong>se l<strong>an</strong>guages are different nations, not even tribes. The same goes for <strong>the</strong><br />
Sesotho groups, who are biologically l<strong>in</strong>ked amongst <strong>the</strong>mselves, first, <strong>an</strong>d to <strong>the</strong> Nguni, too”.<br />
In each <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, varieties of <strong>the</strong>se two clusters are spoken <strong>in</strong> seven countries <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n region. There is certa<strong>in</strong>ly more sense <strong>in</strong> produc<strong>in</strong>g a book for 10 million people<br />
<strong>in</strong>stead of 1 million people. For this <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>new</strong> orthographic <strong>an</strong>d spell<strong>in</strong>g forms<br />
need to be undertaken, with <strong>an</strong> eye on <strong>the</strong> economies of scale. It is import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d necessary<br />
that <strong>the</strong> relev<strong>an</strong>t departments <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n state co-operate with neighbour<strong>in</strong>g<br />
countries, which have mutually <strong>in</strong>telligible l<strong>an</strong>guages. This c<strong>an</strong> be done <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> framework of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong> Development Conference (SADC). All of this will require firstly,<br />
systematic pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d secondly, adequate resources, especially at <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itially stages of<br />
implementation.<br />
L<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> national question <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
For reasons of <strong>the</strong> history of centuries-long white dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society, which<br />
is <strong>the</strong> most thorough <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tense of such cases on <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n cont<strong>in</strong>ent, it is often forgotten<br />
that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is <strong>in</strong>deed, <strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n country like all o<strong>the</strong>rs on <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n cont<strong>in</strong>ent. At<br />
least three-quarters of its population are made up of <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage-speak<strong>in</strong>g people whose<br />
histories <strong>an</strong>d cultures are coterm<strong>in</strong>ous with those of all <strong>the</strong> neighbour<strong>in</strong>g countries. White<br />
dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d repression has submerged this <strong>Africa</strong>n character of <strong>the</strong> society, <strong>an</strong>d through<br />
<strong>the</strong> operation of <strong>an</strong> economic system which <strong>in</strong>volves all, but <strong>in</strong> which aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns are kept<br />
at <strong>the</strong> bottom of <strong>the</strong> heap. Thus, <strong>the</strong> cultural <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>guistic oppression of <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>, which affects <strong>Africa</strong>ns more profoundly th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>y o<strong>the</strong>r group <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country, is<br />
paralleled by <strong>an</strong> economic structure of subord<strong>in</strong>ation. The national question <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
refers to <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>omalies aris<strong>in</strong>g out of this situation <strong>an</strong>d how <strong>the</strong>se c<strong>an</strong> be corrected as<br />
processes for <strong>the</strong> em<strong>an</strong>cipation of <strong>the</strong> structurally suppressed majorities of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
society. Ano<strong>the</strong>r way of mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t is that, how do we ensure that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n character<br />
of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is fully <strong>an</strong>d democratically represented <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> economic, cultural, l<strong>in</strong>guistic,<br />
political <strong>an</strong>d social life of <strong>the</strong> people? How do we ensure that <strong>the</strong> culture of <strong>the</strong> majority, <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages-speak<strong>in</strong>g three-quarters of <strong>the</strong> population, is given primacy <strong>an</strong>d centrestage<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> development <strong>an</strong>d future of <strong>the</strong> country? A judicious policy of <strong>Africa</strong>-centeredness<br />
is necessary.<br />
172
For those to whom <strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>-centred approach is like a red flag to a bull, <strong>the</strong> prospect of <strong>the</strong><br />
above raises <strong>the</strong> ire <strong>an</strong>d frightens o<strong>the</strong>rs. But this does not need to be so. The elevation of<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>an</strong>d cultures <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> to equality <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> demographic centrality<br />
<strong>the</strong>y deserve is only <strong>an</strong> exercise <strong>in</strong> democracy. The situation <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is such that<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage-speakers are <strong>the</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majorities with cultures l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>an</strong>d<br />
histories, which have been ruthlessly suppressed under colonialism, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> legacy of this<br />
<strong>in</strong>herited <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> neo-colonial or post-colonial era. Here, <strong>Africa</strong>ns must as of necessity, if <strong>the</strong><br />
em<strong>an</strong>cipation process of mass society is to cont<strong>in</strong>ue, reclaim centre-stage. This is no different<br />
from what obta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> all free societies.<br />
All Europe<strong>an</strong> countries have m<strong>in</strong>orities from <strong>the</strong> four corners of <strong>the</strong> world. If we take Brita<strong>in</strong><br />
as <strong>an</strong> example, <strong>the</strong>re are Turks, Kosovars, Ch<strong>in</strong>ese, Indi<strong>an</strong>s, Pakist<strong>an</strong>is, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>Africa</strong>ns etc.<br />
Indeed, <strong>the</strong>se m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>y Europe<strong>an</strong> country are almost as sizeable as non-<strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. But <strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong>se m<strong>in</strong>orities does not obliterate <strong>the</strong><br />
cultural <strong>an</strong>d national character of <strong>the</strong>se countries. They are all Europe<strong>an</strong> countries <strong>in</strong> which<br />
above all else Europe<strong>an</strong> culture is celebrated.<br />
In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>the</strong> “ra<strong>in</strong>bow nation” has rightfully been extolled as a desirable<br />
end; a <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n world <strong>in</strong> which all it’s dist<strong>in</strong>ct cultures <strong>an</strong>d people f<strong>in</strong>d accommodative<br />
cultural space <strong>an</strong>d acknowledgement. But, sometimes <strong>the</strong> “ra<strong>in</strong>bow nation” idea has also<br />
tended to be <strong>in</strong>terpreted as me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has no pre-em<strong>in</strong>ent national character;<br />
that its national character is amorphous <strong>an</strong>d nondescript; that <strong>the</strong> present situation is <strong>the</strong> ideal<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ifestation of “ra<strong>in</strong>bowism”. This argument implicitly denies <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> present<br />
situation, <strong>the</strong> cultures <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>guages of <strong>the</strong> majorities are suppressed <strong>an</strong>d silenced <strong>in</strong> favour of<br />
a dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t Eurocentric high culture, which everybody is willy nilly obliged by force of<br />
circumst<strong>an</strong>ce to emulate. Democratic pluralism is thus usurped <strong>in</strong> favour of undemocratic<br />
pluralism.<br />
I have elsewhere argued that, <strong>the</strong> technological culture of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is constructed on <strong>the</strong><br />
cultures of its white m<strong>in</strong>ority. Knowledge, its production <strong>an</strong>d reproduction, is negotiated <strong>an</strong>d<br />
built <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>an</strong>d cultures of this culturally Europe<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority. An <strong>Africa</strong>-centred<br />
approach <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> implies that if development is to take place which provides <strong>the</strong><br />
masses of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society cultural <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>guistic access <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> process, this will have<br />
to be done <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cultures <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>guages of <strong>the</strong> masses, unless we w<strong>an</strong>t to suggest that <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>an</strong>d cultures of <strong>the</strong> masses are <strong>in</strong>herently <strong>in</strong>ferior <strong>an</strong>d c<strong>an</strong> provide no basis<br />
for social <strong>an</strong>d cultural adv<strong>an</strong>cement.<br />
In education, knowledge production <strong>an</strong>d reproduction is carried out exclusively <strong>in</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
English or Afrika<strong>an</strong>s. The <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages do not feature <strong>in</strong> this area. By <strong>an</strong>d large, we c<strong>an</strong><br />
say that <strong>the</strong> process of tr<strong>an</strong>sformation <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> at <strong>the</strong> cultural <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>guistic levels po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
to a steady <strong>in</strong>tegration of <strong>the</strong> emergent <strong>Africa</strong>n elites <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> cultures of <strong>the</strong> white m<strong>in</strong>orities,<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>cipally <strong>the</strong> English. For as long as this trend cont<strong>in</strong>ues it is difficult to see how <strong>the</strong><br />
cultures of mass society, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage-speak<strong>in</strong>g majorities c<strong>an</strong> move <strong>in</strong>to modernity<br />
with <strong>the</strong>ir l<strong>in</strong>guistic <strong>an</strong>d cultural belong<strong>in</strong>gs. The dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t trend is to <strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>the</strong> majorities<br />
<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>an</strong>d cultures of <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
Thus while <strong>an</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>-centred approach would be misplaced if it was suggested as a<br />
developmental paradigm for contemporary Brita<strong>in</strong>, Irel<strong>an</strong>d, Germ<strong>an</strong>y, Fr<strong>an</strong>ce, or Sweden,<br />
where <strong>Africa</strong>ns are m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> it is only natural that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n cultural <strong>an</strong>d<br />
historical belong<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> people should be provided relev<strong>an</strong>t space. When this is resisted,<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is restricted.<br />
173
The bal<strong>an</strong>ce sheet<br />
As earlier <strong>in</strong>dicated, <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g supremacy of English above all <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages is<br />
not peculiar to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. A similar situation prevails <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole of post-colonial <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Right across <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guages of colonial dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce have m<strong>an</strong>aged to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
hegemony <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>deed <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir power <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>fluence as <strong>Africa</strong>n elites cont<strong>in</strong>ue to<br />
wholeheartedly embrace <strong>the</strong> usage of <strong>the</strong>se l<strong>an</strong>guages.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n media <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce of English rema<strong>in</strong>s unchallenged. Today,<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s <strong>new</strong>spapers m<strong>an</strong>age to hold <strong>the</strong>ir own. In this latter <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce capital <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
resources help to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> solidity of <strong>the</strong> Afrika<strong>an</strong>s presence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> media. In <strong>the</strong> media,<br />
both pr<strong>in</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d electronic, <strong>the</strong> subord<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage-speakers<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ues to be very marked. At <strong>the</strong> national level all daily <strong>an</strong>d weekly <strong>new</strong>spapers are ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Afrika<strong>an</strong>s or English. The implicit presumption is that only those citizens who are ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
literate <strong>in</strong> English or Afrika<strong>an</strong>s need to know what is go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> country. The silent<br />
majorities who speak <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages are thus kept <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dark. Accept <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cases of<br />
isiZulu, where <strong>in</strong> KwaZulu-Natal <strong>the</strong>re are two regional papers published <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d<br />
one isiXhosa paper.<br />
When <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, as is currently <strong>the</strong> case, one comes frequently across <strong>the</strong> view, ma<strong>in</strong>ly<br />
among <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage-speakers, that most of <strong>the</strong> <strong>new</strong>spapers, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g relatively<br />
prestigious ones like, The Argus, The Independent, The Mail <strong>an</strong>d Guardi<strong>an</strong> or Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Day<br />
p<strong>an</strong>dy to <strong>the</strong> white m<strong>in</strong>ority, its <strong>in</strong>terests, <strong>an</strong>d politico-philosophical liberalism, it is often<br />
forgotten that <strong>the</strong> narrowness of <strong>the</strong> social base of <strong>the</strong> audiences of <strong>the</strong>se papers is not<br />
exclusively def<strong>in</strong>ed or dictated solely on account of <strong>the</strong> views articulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se papers.<br />
Even more import<strong>an</strong>tly, what is at stake here is that, <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage of discussion is <strong>the</strong><br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage of a small m<strong>in</strong>ority. By <strong>the</strong> very fact of <strong>the</strong> use of English, <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>an</strong>d character<br />
of <strong>the</strong> audience is def<strong>in</strong>ed. Is this shock<strong>in</strong>g? No, <strong>in</strong>deed, this is to be expected. The simple<br />
truth is that <strong>the</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage def<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> audience.<br />
Radio requires a low resource threshold for effective usage <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>y l<strong>an</strong>guage. However, even <strong>in</strong><br />
this area, <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>the</strong> approach to <strong>the</strong> usage of <strong>the</strong> medium is weak <strong>an</strong>d unsystematic.<br />
In television <strong>an</strong>d c<strong>in</strong>ema <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages are hardly featured. In <strong>the</strong> case of television, over<br />
<strong>the</strong> past few years some scope has been provided for <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage broadcasts on <strong>the</strong><br />
public broadcaster.<br />
The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n parliamentari<strong>an</strong>, Duma Nkosi who <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past consistently chose to address<br />
parliament <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> isiZulu, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview, <strong>in</strong>formed me that he is conv<strong>in</strong>ced that<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y politici<strong>an</strong>s are unsuccessful <strong>an</strong>d unable to express <strong>the</strong>ir views properly <strong>an</strong>d correctly to<br />
<strong>the</strong> masses <strong>the</strong>y address because <strong>the</strong>y speak <strong>in</strong> English, a l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>ir proficiency<br />
is limited. This compounds fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> problem that, <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>variably address also audiences<br />
for whom <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> English l<strong>an</strong>guage is totally foreign. Indeed, Nkosi remarked that a<br />
few years ago, at <strong>the</strong> height of <strong>the</strong> conflict <strong>an</strong>d bloodshed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gauteng area of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>,<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> months preced<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> 1994 elections, some of <strong>the</strong> conflicts between different parties <strong>in</strong><br />
his view were exacerbated by poor communication <strong>in</strong> English <strong>an</strong>d misunderst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs aris<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong>reof.<br />
Conclusion<br />
In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> as <strong>in</strong>deed <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>Africa</strong>, l<strong>an</strong>guage policies need to move from be<strong>in</strong>g pious<br />
articles of faith enshr<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> constitutions <strong>an</strong>d policy documents by <strong>in</strong>consequent rul<strong>in</strong>g elites.<br />
If <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>Africa</strong>ns are to make progress <strong>in</strong> social, economic, political <strong>an</strong>d cultural<br />
development <strong>the</strong>y will need to pursue <strong>the</strong>se policies at <strong>the</strong> level of active practice.<br />
174
Arguably, <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ued social <strong>an</strong>d political <strong>in</strong>feriority of <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is<br />
a component <strong>an</strong>d reflection of <strong>the</strong> general status of <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>in</strong> contemporary <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
For how long c<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong>se conditions of <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d cultural <strong>in</strong>feriority cont<strong>in</strong>ue? One<br />
c<strong>an</strong>not tell. What one c<strong>an</strong> say with certa<strong>in</strong>ty however is that; it c<strong>an</strong>not go on forever.<br />
Ultimately, <strong>the</strong> power, strength <strong>an</strong>d voices of <strong>the</strong> democratic majorities must <strong>an</strong>d will prevail.<br />
175
16 The impact of <strong>the</strong> AIDS epidemic <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
By He<strong>in</strong> Marais<br />
<strong>History</strong> has not been k<strong>in</strong>d to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. 30 After centuries of colonialism came one of <strong>the</strong><br />
most ferocious systems of <strong>in</strong>stitutionalized racism <strong>the</strong> world has known. For almost 50 years,<br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id wreaked havoc <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> lives of black <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns while secur<strong>in</strong>g for whites<br />
possibly <strong>the</strong> highest st<strong>an</strong>dard of liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g world. By <strong>the</strong> early 1990s, after a<br />
long liberation struggle, <strong>the</strong> country was beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to extricate itself from its ignom<strong>in</strong>ious<br />
past. The future seemed to be <strong>the</strong>re for <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g—except that <strong>the</strong> country now found itself<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> path of a swiftly-grow<strong>in</strong>g AIDS epidemic which, <strong>in</strong> a few years, would become <strong>the</strong><br />
worst such epidemic <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.<br />
As <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns voted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir first democratic election <strong>in</strong> April 1994, few were th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<br />
about AIDS, <strong>an</strong>d even fewer had <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>kl<strong>in</strong>g of what <strong>the</strong> epidemic held <strong>in</strong> store for <strong>the</strong>m <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir country. A mere four years earlier, it had been estimated that less th<strong>an</strong> 1% of adult <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns were <strong>in</strong>fected with HIV, <strong>the</strong> virus that causes AIDS. An endur<strong>in</strong>g sense of<br />
exceptionalism encouraged <strong>the</strong> notion that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, somehow, would evade <strong>the</strong> serious<br />
epidemics underway <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r parts of East <strong>an</strong>d Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong>. The Communist Party leader<br />
Chris H<strong>an</strong>i was one of <strong>the</strong> rare public figures to have recognized <strong>the</strong> threat. In 1990, he had<br />
told conference-goers <strong>in</strong> Maputo that:<br />
Those of us <strong>in</strong> exile are especially <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfortunate situation of be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> areas where <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>cidence of this disease is high. We c<strong>an</strong>not afford to allow <strong>the</strong> AIDS epidemic to ru<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
realization of our dreams. Exist<strong>in</strong>g statistics <strong>in</strong>dicate that we are still at <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong><br />
AIDS epidemic <strong>in</strong> our country. Unattended, however, this will result <strong>in</strong> untold damage <strong>an</strong>d<br />
suffer<strong>in</strong>g by <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> century. 31<br />
HIV data highlight two prime features of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s epidemic: <strong>the</strong> astonish<strong>in</strong>g speed with<br />
which it evolved (national adult HIV prevalence of less th<strong>an</strong> 1% <strong>in</strong> 1990 rocketed to almost<br />
25% with<strong>in</strong> 10 years), <strong>an</strong>d its extraord<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>in</strong>tensity. When voters went to <strong>the</strong> polls for <strong>the</strong><br />
country’s second-ever democratic election <strong>in</strong> 1999, at least 3 million <strong>an</strong>d possibly as m<strong>an</strong>y as<br />
4 million <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns were liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV, <strong>the</strong> virus that causes AIDS. 32 By 2006, that<br />
number had surpassed 5 million (ASSA, 2005). 33<br />
30 This article is based on He<strong>in</strong> Marais’s book Buckl<strong>in</strong>g: The impact of AIDS <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, published by <strong>the</strong><br />
Centre for <strong>the</strong> Study of AIDS at Pretoria University. An electronic version is available at<br />
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001789/<strong>in</strong>dex.php<br />
31 Chris H<strong>an</strong>i, speak<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>an</strong> AIDS conference <strong>in</strong> Maputo, Mozambique, 1990, cited <strong>in</strong> Marais H (2000). To <strong>the</strong><br />
edge: AIDS Review 2000. Pretoria, Centre for <strong>the</strong> Study of AIDS.<br />
32 The Actuarial Society of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s (ASSA) AIDS models are among <strong>the</strong> most sophisticated of <strong>the</strong>ir k<strong>in</strong>d.<br />
The 1999 figure is derived from <strong>the</strong> ASSA 2002 model, which retrospectively estimated that 3.2 million <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns were liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV <strong>in</strong> that year. Us<strong>in</strong>g less nu<strong>an</strong>ced assumptions <strong>an</strong>d data, UNAIDS/WHO (2000)<br />
estimated <strong>the</strong>re were 4.2 million <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns with HIV at <strong>the</strong> end of 1999.<br />
33 ASSA (2005). ASSA 2003 AIDS <strong>an</strong>d demographic model. Cape Town, ASSA. For a summary, see<br />
http://www.assa.org.za/scripts/file_build.asp?id=100000538&pageid=1000000022. The latest estimates of <strong>the</strong><br />
Actuarial Society of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> are that 5.2 million <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns were liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV <strong>in</strong> 2005, compared<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Jo<strong>in</strong>t United Nations Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS) estimate of 5.5 million.
35%<br />
30%<br />
25%<br />
20%<br />
15%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
0%<br />
HIV prevalence among <strong>an</strong>tenatal cl<strong>in</strong>ic attendees <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>: 1990-2004<br />
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />
Source: Department of Health of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
There is no firm evidence yet that <strong>the</strong> epidemic is reced<strong>in</strong>g, although its adv<strong>an</strong>ce does appear<br />
to be slow<strong>in</strong>g. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to model<strong>in</strong>g done by <strong>the</strong> Actuarial Society of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (ASSA),<br />
<strong>the</strong>re were more th<strong>an</strong> 520 000 <strong>new</strong> HIV <strong>in</strong>fections <strong>in</strong> 2005 (over 1,400 people became<br />
<strong>in</strong>fected each day), compared with over 300 000 AIDS deaths—<strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong> total<br />
number of people liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV was still ris<strong>in</strong>g. The number of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns liv<strong>in</strong>g with<br />
HIV is expected to reach 5.8 million by 2010 (ASSA, 2005).<br />
HIV <strong>in</strong>fection levels <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> tend to be higher among <strong>the</strong> poor, who are ma<strong>in</strong>ly black<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns, with HIV prevalence highest among people liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>formal’ areas. In such<br />
areas, average adult HIV prevalence was 17.6%, but well over 20% <strong>in</strong> some areas). HIV<br />
prevalence was considerably lower <strong>in</strong> tribal areas (12%) <strong>an</strong>d on farms (10%). A recent<br />
national household HIV survey has shown that women are signific<strong>an</strong>tly more likely to be<br />
HIV-<strong>in</strong>fected th<strong>an</strong> men: 20% of adult women (15-49 years) were liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV <strong>in</strong> 2005,<br />
compared with 12% of men. Among young people (15-24 years), women were four times<br />
more likely to be HIV-<strong>in</strong>fected th<strong>an</strong> men. One <strong>in</strong> four women between <strong>the</strong> ages of 20 <strong>an</strong>d 39<br />
years is liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV (HSRC et al., 2005). 34<br />
The epidemic shows marked regional vari<strong>an</strong>ce. HIV prevalence r<strong>an</strong>ges as high as 15-16% <strong>in</strong><br />
KwaZulu-Natal <strong>an</strong>d Mpumal<strong>an</strong>ga prov<strong>in</strong>ces (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> east of <strong>the</strong> country) to as low as 5% <strong>an</strong>d<br />
2% <strong>in</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Cape <strong>an</strong>d Western Cape prov<strong>in</strong>ces, respectively. In five of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
n<strong>in</strong>e prov<strong>in</strong>ces, at least one <strong>in</strong> ten adults were HIV-positive <strong>in</strong> 2005 (HSRC et al., 2005).<br />
34 Hum<strong>an</strong> Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Medical Research Council, Centre for AIDS Development,<br />
Research <strong>an</strong>d Evaluation (2005). HIV prevalence, <strong>in</strong>cidence, behaviour <strong>an</strong>d communication survey 2005.<br />
Pretoria, HSRC.<br />
178
The best-laid pl<strong>an</strong>s<br />
It’s often forgotten that, as <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns celebrated <strong>the</strong> arrival of democracy <strong>in</strong> 1994, a<br />
National AIDS Pl<strong>an</strong> was ready for action. It had been drafted <strong>in</strong> a remarkable, 18-month<br />
process of consultation that bears comparison to that of <strong>the</strong> Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development<br />
Programme (<strong>the</strong> RDP, which was me<strong>an</strong>t to guide <strong>the</strong> country’s socio-economic recovery).<br />
The <strong>new</strong>ly-elected, democratic government endorsed <strong>the</strong> AIDS pl<strong>an</strong> almost immediately.<br />
But implement<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> pl<strong>an</strong> was not easy. Numerous difficulties were encountered as<br />
government policies <strong>an</strong>d state structures were overhauled, often <strong>in</strong> a climate of disorientation<br />
<strong>an</strong>d resentment. The Pl<strong>an</strong> became ent<strong>an</strong>gled <strong>in</strong> compet<strong>in</strong>g priorities <strong>an</strong>d was gradually<br />
submerged by <strong>in</strong>stitutional confusion <strong>an</strong>d a hush of AIDS denial or ignor<strong>an</strong>ce that extended to<br />
<strong>the</strong> highest levels of government. The private sector was even slower out of <strong>the</strong> start<strong>in</strong>g<br />
blocks; so, too, <strong>the</strong> trade union movement.<br />
Worse, from 1995 onward, even <strong>the</strong>se lumber<strong>in</strong>g efforts to limit <strong>the</strong> epidemic’s surge were<br />
regularly be<strong>in</strong>g eclipsed by controversy—some of it spurious, some of it distress<strong>in</strong>g. AIDS<br />
was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> headl<strong>in</strong>es, but <strong>the</strong> attention was focused less on <strong>the</strong> epidemic th<strong>an</strong> on a series of<br />
debacles that r<strong>an</strong>ged from a m<strong>in</strong>or fund<strong>in</strong>g sc<strong>an</strong>dal surround<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> AIDS <strong>the</strong>atre production to<br />
<strong>the</strong> government’s 1998 decision not to fund AZT treatment for pregn<strong>an</strong>t, HIV-positive<br />
women. 35 Even as <strong>the</strong> epidemic ga<strong>the</strong>red momentum, a fog of <strong>in</strong>credulity seemed to ga<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>in</strong>side <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Africa</strong>n National Congress (ANC). AIDS service org<strong>an</strong>izations toiled to pick<br />
up <strong>the</strong> pieces, but <strong>the</strong>y too were drawn <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> controversies, <strong>an</strong>d relations between <strong>the</strong>m <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> government soured om<strong>in</strong>ously. 36<br />
A nightmare beg<strong>in</strong>s<br />
AIDS epidemic arrive furtively, <strong>in</strong> phases. First, <strong>the</strong>re is a ris<strong>in</strong>g number of <strong>new</strong> HIV<br />
<strong>in</strong>fections. In <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s case, <strong>the</strong>se probably only peaked <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early 2000s. As more<br />
people become <strong>in</strong>fected, <strong>the</strong> total number of people liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV (or ‘HIV prevalence’)<br />
keeps ris<strong>in</strong>g—<strong>the</strong> second phase. Even without <strong>an</strong>tiretroviral treatment, a person <strong>in</strong>fected with<br />
HIV c<strong>an</strong> survive for 8-11 years (depend<strong>in</strong>g on genetic factors, nutrition levels etc.). So, while<br />
a grow<strong>in</strong>g number of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns were be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>fected with HIV, that fact rema<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
‘<strong>in</strong>visible’ to <strong>the</strong> untra<strong>in</strong>ed eye until large numbers of people became sick with AIDS-related<br />
illnesses. In this third phase, AIDS-related deaths <strong>in</strong>crease dramatically. That process is now<br />
well-underway <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d will likely cont<strong>in</strong>ue until deep <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> next decade. The<br />
f<strong>in</strong>al phase is marked by a ris<strong>in</strong>g number of children who have lost parents to AIDS. That toll<br />
is unlikely to peak before 2020.<br />
By 2000, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, had entered <strong>the</strong> nightmarish phase of its AIDS epidemic, as large<br />
numbers of people <strong>in</strong>fected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s beg<strong>an</strong> succumb<strong>in</strong>g to AIDS-related illnesses.<br />
Early <strong>in</strong> that year, President Thabo Mbeki sparked outrage across <strong>the</strong> world when he seemed<br />
to side with a small group<strong>in</strong>g of so-called AIDS ‘denialists’ who reject <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g<br />
scientific consensus that HIV causes AIDS. Amid claims that life-prolong<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>tiretroviral<br />
(ARV) drugs were even more d<strong>an</strong>gerous th<strong>an</strong> AIDS itself, <strong>the</strong> government refused to<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduce <strong>an</strong> ARV programme <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public health system, <strong>an</strong>d resisted dem<strong>an</strong>ds that it<br />
implement a countrywide programme to prevent <strong>the</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>smission of HIV from mo<strong>the</strong>rs to<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir <strong>new</strong>borns.<br />
35 AZT was a drug that reduced <strong>the</strong> odds of <strong>an</strong> HIV-positive mo<strong>the</strong>r tr<strong>an</strong>smitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> virus to her <strong>new</strong>born.<br />
36 For a detailed survey <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alysis of this period, see Marais H (2000). To <strong>the</strong> edge: AIDS Review 2000. Centre<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Study of AIDS. Pretoria University. Available at http://www.csa.za.org/filem<strong>an</strong>ager/fileview/8/<br />
179
The government also vigorously disputed research f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs about <strong>the</strong> epidemic’s death toll.<br />
When word came that <strong>the</strong> Medical Research Council (MRC) estimated that 25% of all deaths<br />
(<strong>an</strong>d 40% of deaths among adults) dur<strong>in</strong>g 1999/2000 had been due to AIDS, <strong>the</strong> release of <strong>the</strong><br />
research document was unexpectedly delayed, possibly due to pressure from with<strong>in</strong><br />
government. Eventually leaked to <strong>the</strong> media, <strong>the</strong> MRC report concluded that AIDS had<br />
become <strong>the</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g cause of death <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (Dorr<strong>in</strong>gton et al., 2001). 37 Government<br />
spokespeople declared <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs ‘alarmist’ <strong>an</strong>d ‘<strong>in</strong>accurate’, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Cab<strong>in</strong>et commissioned<br />
Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (a state agency) to exam<strong>in</strong>e mortality trends.<br />
Me<strong>an</strong>while, a pamphlet circulated <strong>in</strong> top ANC structures <strong>in</strong> early 2002, had poured more oil<br />
on <strong>the</strong> water by recycl<strong>in</strong>g AIDS ‘denialist’ claims, dismiss<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs that AIDS was <strong>the</strong><br />
biggest killer <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country <strong>an</strong>d declar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> provision of <strong>an</strong>tiretroviral treatment to be <strong>in</strong><br />
conflict with <strong>the</strong> need to address ‘<strong>the</strong> real health concerns of <strong>the</strong> millions of our people’<br />
(Anon, 2002). 38 The pamphlet sparked worldwide outrage. Possibly as a consequence, <strong>the</strong><br />
President’s Office all but withdrew from <strong>the</strong> so-called public AIDS debate.<br />
When asked whe<strong>the</strong>r he k<strong>new</strong> <strong>an</strong>yone with HIV, President Mbeki told <strong>the</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post <strong>in</strong><br />
September 2003: ‘I really honestly don’t’. 39 A national household HIV survey conducted <strong>the</strong><br />
previous year by <strong>the</strong> country’s premier social science research <strong>in</strong>stitution (<strong>the</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong><br />
Sciences Research Council, HSRC) had found that one <strong>in</strong> six <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns was HIVpositive<br />
(HSRC, 2002). 40 Quizzed about <strong>the</strong> AIDS death toll, President Mbeki said:<br />
‘Personally, I don’t know <strong>an</strong>ybody who has died of Aids.’ A few months later, <strong>in</strong> February<br />
2004, President Mbeki was still <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that ‘We do not know what [kills] <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns’. 41<br />
A year later, <strong>the</strong> long-awaited Mortality <strong>an</strong>d causes of death <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, 1997-2003<br />
report, commissioned by <strong>the</strong> government from Statistics SA, put to rest <strong>an</strong>y l<strong>in</strong>ger<strong>in</strong>g doubts<br />
about <strong>the</strong> AIDS death toll. Based on <strong>in</strong>formation from nearly 2.9 million death notification<br />
37 The leak so <strong>in</strong>censed government that it reportedly dem<strong>an</strong>ded that <strong>the</strong> MRC <strong>in</strong>stitute a forensic enquiry to<br />
identify its source. Dorr<strong>in</strong>gton R et al. (2001). The impact of HIV/AIDS on adult mortality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
September. Medical Research Council. Available at http://www.mrc.ac.za/bod/<br />
38 Anon (2002). Castro Hlongw<strong>an</strong>e, carav<strong>an</strong>s, cats, geese, foot & mouth <strong>an</strong>d statistics: HIV/AIDS <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
struggle for <strong>the</strong> hum<strong>an</strong>isation of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n. Monograph. March. Available at<br />
http://www.virusmyth.net/aids/data/<strong>an</strong>cdoc.htm. For more detailed discussion of <strong>the</strong> paper <strong>an</strong>d AIDS ‘denialism’<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d around <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Africa</strong>n National Congress, see Marais H (2005). Buckl<strong>in</strong>g: The impact of AIDS <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Pretoria, Centre for <strong>the</strong> Study of AIDS. Available at<br />
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001789/<strong>in</strong>dex.php,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Heywood M (2004). The price of denial. Development Update, 5(3). December. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg. Available at<br />
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001195/4-The_Price_of_Denial-Mark_Heywood.pdf. For a detailed<br />
rebuttal of some of <strong>the</strong> technical claims made by ‘AIDS denialists’, see Coons M (2000). HIV, AIDS, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
Distortion of Science. Paper. August (a version is available at http://www.aegis.org/topics/hiv_exist.html), <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Gallo R et al. (2006). ‘Errors <strong>in</strong> Celia Farber's March 2006 article <strong>in</strong> Harper's Magaz<strong>in</strong>e’, available at<br />
www.tac.org.za/Documents/ErrorsInFarberArticle.pdf.<br />
39 The quote appeared <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 24 September, 2003, edition of <strong>the</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post. The Government<br />
Communication <strong>an</strong>d Information System (GCIS) later ‘clarified’ President Mbeki’s remarks, say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>in</strong><br />
reply to a question whe<strong>the</strong>r ‘he k<strong>new</strong> of <strong>an</strong>yone <strong>in</strong> his family or amongst his close associates who had died of<br />
AIDS or was <strong>in</strong>fected by HIV’. See Govt clarifies Mbeki's statement on HIV/AIDS, IRIN, 30 September 2003;<br />
available at http://www.aegis.com/<strong>new</strong>s/ir<strong>in</strong>/2003/IR030935.html.<br />
40 HSRC (2002). Nelson M<strong>an</strong>dela HSRC Study of HIV/AIDS: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n national HIV prevalence,<br />
behavioural risks <strong>an</strong>d mass media. Household survey 2002. Pretoria, HSRC. Available at<br />
http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/<strong>in</strong>dex.asp?id=2009.<br />
41 The <strong>in</strong>terview was screened on SABC2 television on 8 February 2004. The full text is available at<br />
http://www.<strong>in</strong>fo.gov.za/speeches/2004/04021809461003.htm.<br />
180
certificates, <strong>the</strong> report presented harrow<strong>in</strong>g data show<strong>in</strong>g a 58% <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> deaths had<br />
occurred <strong>in</strong> just five years, between 1997 <strong>an</strong>d 2002. Among people 15 years of age <strong>an</strong>d older,<br />
deaths had <strong>in</strong>creased by 62%. Among people aged 25-44 years, <strong>the</strong> number of deaths had<br />
more th<strong>an</strong> doubled. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns, <strong>the</strong> study showed, were dy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> unprecedented numbers,<br />
at exceptional rates <strong>an</strong>d at unusually young ages (Statistics SA, 2005). 42<br />
Deaths<br />
Total number of deaths by age group <strong>an</strong>d year of death,<br />
1997-2002<br />
180000<br />
160000<br />
140000<br />
120000<br />
100000<br />
80000<br />
60000<br />
40000<br />
20000<br />
0<br />
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002<br />
Year<br />
Source: Adapted from Statistics SA (2005).<br />
0-4 Years 25-44 Years 45-64 Years 65-84 Years<br />
Could <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> ‘non-natural’ deaths expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> observed trends? No. ‘Non-natural’<br />
deaths decl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> absolute number <strong>in</strong> 1997-2002, <strong>an</strong>d formed <strong>an</strong> ever-smaller share of total<br />
deaths (down from 17% <strong>in</strong> 1997 to 11% <strong>in</strong> 2001) (Statistics SA, 2005). Improvements <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
death registration system probably accounted for a small part of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial trend. But by 1999<br />
most of <strong>the</strong> improvements <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> system had been <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>an</strong>d death registration was 90%<br />
complete—yet <strong>the</strong> upward trend <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>nual deaths cont<strong>in</strong>ued subsequently. F<strong>in</strong>ally, population<br />
growth (which has been runn<strong>in</strong>g at about 12% per <strong>an</strong>num) also accounted for a part of <strong>the</strong><br />
trend (Bradshaw et al., 2004). 43 However, population growth nor improved data capture <strong>an</strong>d<br />
report<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>an</strong> expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shifts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> distribution of deaths between various age groups be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
seen <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (see graph below).<br />
42 Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (2005). Mortality <strong>an</strong>d causes of death <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, 1997–2003: F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs from death<br />
notification. Pretoria. Available at: http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03093/P03093.pdf<br />
43 Bradshaw D et al. (2004). Unabated rise <strong>in</strong> number of adult deaths <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Medical<br />
Journal. April.<br />
181
Deaths<br />
30000<br />
25000<br />
20000<br />
15000<br />
10000<br />
5000<br />
0<br />
Distribution of male <strong>an</strong>d female deaths, 1997 & 2002<br />
0-4 5-9 10-<br />
14<br />
15-<br />
19<br />
20-<br />
24<br />
25-<br />
29<br />
30-<br />
34<br />
35-<br />
39<br />
40-<br />
44<br />
Age<br />
45-<br />
49<br />
1997 (Males) 1997 (Females) 2002 (Males) 2002 (Females)<br />
Source: Adapted from Statistics SA (2005)<br />
In 1997, a similar number of males—between 10 900 <strong>an</strong>d 12 600—died <strong>in</strong> each age cohort<br />
from 25-29 years all <strong>the</strong> way to 70-74 years. By 2002, that pattern had disappeared. Deaths<br />
were now peak<strong>in</strong>g sharply among males aged 30-44 years, men who should be <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prime of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir lives. In 1997, roughly similar numbers of women were dy<strong>in</strong>g from 25-29 years up to<br />
55-59 years, with deaths <strong>the</strong>n <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g among older women. By 2002, that pattern had tilted<br />
dramatically. Most women were now dy<strong>in</strong>g between <strong>the</strong> ages of 25 <strong>an</strong>d 39 years—three times<br />
as m<strong>an</strong>y as five years earlier (Stats SA, 2005). <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns are dy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> patterns that<br />
matched those predicted by AIDS models. Yet, eighteen months after <strong>the</strong> release of <strong>the</strong><br />
Statistics SA report, nei<strong>the</strong>r President Mbeki nor his government had offered subst<strong>an</strong>tive<br />
comment on its f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
Activism, much of it spearheaded by <strong>the</strong> Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), did force <strong>the</strong><br />
government <strong>in</strong> 2003 to relent <strong>an</strong>d develop a national <strong>an</strong>tiretroviral treatment programme. By<br />
end-2005, almost 200 000 people were receiv<strong>in</strong>g such life-prolong<strong>in</strong>g drugs, more th<strong>an</strong> half of<br />
<strong>the</strong>m via <strong>the</strong> public health sector (WHO/UNAIDS, 2006). As well, fund<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> Health<br />
Department’s AIDS programme has <strong>in</strong>creased subst<strong>an</strong>tially <strong>in</strong> recent years. A massively<br />
exp<strong>an</strong>ded <strong>an</strong>tiretroviral programme could force this trend onto a slightly lower path, but <strong>the</strong><br />
toll will still be horribly severe. The latest ASSA 2003 model, which factors <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
government <strong>an</strong>tiretroviral programme, estimates that <strong>the</strong> epidemic will claim <strong>the</strong> lives of more<br />
th<strong>an</strong> 350 000 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>in</strong> 2006, <strong>an</strong>d that <strong>the</strong> death toll could keep ris<strong>in</strong>g at least until<br />
2015.<br />
AIDS as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dex of <strong>in</strong>equality<br />
Average life expect<strong>an</strong>cy <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has now fallen to 51 years (ASSA, 2005). How did it<br />
get to this?<br />
50-<br />
54<br />
55-<br />
59<br />
60-<br />
64<br />
65-<br />
69<br />
70-<br />
74<br />
75-<br />
79<br />
80-<br />
84<br />
182
M<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong> factors that drive <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s AIDS epidemic are ent<strong>an</strong>gled <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> social<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d economic accumulation strategies that have moulded <strong>the</strong> society over <strong>the</strong> past<br />
120 years. Systematic dispossession <strong>an</strong>d dislocation, <strong>the</strong> fragmentation <strong>an</strong>d polarization of<br />
society, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> entrench<strong>in</strong>g of highly unequal social relations helped create a social <strong>an</strong>d<br />
ideological terra<strong>in</strong> that would hugely favour <strong>the</strong> sexual tr<strong>an</strong>smission of a virus like HIV. The<br />
AIDS epidemic is <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r words, with <strong>the</strong> circuits <strong>an</strong>d terms on which power,<br />
opportunity <strong>an</strong>d entitlements are distributed <strong>an</strong>d desires <strong>an</strong>d needs are pursued. In <strong>the</strong> case of<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>the</strong>se are highly unequal.<br />
Especially evident <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is <strong>the</strong> powerful role of circular migration (Walker et al.,<br />
2004), 44 <strong>an</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eered pattern of labour mobility which was design to service capital<br />
accumulation strategies that centered largely on m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, before extend<strong>in</strong>g to urb<strong>an</strong><br />
m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d service economies. Circular migration split (ma<strong>in</strong>ly male) workers from<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir families <strong>an</strong>d communities for long periods of time. As one researcher has noted (Lurie,<br />
2000): 45<br />
If one were to design a social experiment <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> attempt to create <strong>the</strong> conditions conducive to<br />
<strong>the</strong> spread of HIV <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r sexually tr<strong>an</strong>smitted diseases, you would remove several hundred<br />
thous<strong>an</strong>d rural men from <strong>the</strong>ir families, house <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gle-sex hostels, provide <strong>the</strong>m with<br />
cheap alcohol <strong>an</strong>d easy access to commercial sex workers <strong>an</strong>d allow <strong>the</strong>m to return home<br />
periodically. These conditions roughly describe <strong>the</strong> situation for more th<strong>an</strong> eight hundred<br />
thous<strong>an</strong>d gold m<strong>in</strong>ers <strong>an</strong>d countless o<strong>the</strong>r migr<strong>an</strong>t labourers work<strong>in</strong>g throughout <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
today.<br />
Even dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id era <strong>the</strong>se patterns were tr<strong>an</strong>snational (with <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
economy, for example, us<strong>in</strong>g migr<strong>an</strong>t labour from Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swazil<strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Zimbabwe). The arrival of HIV <strong>in</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong> co<strong>in</strong>cided with dramatic ch<strong>an</strong>ges that<br />
affected population mobility <strong>an</strong>d systems of migr<strong>an</strong>t labour. The gradual demise of apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s saw migration <strong>in</strong>crease, both with<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d across <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s borders.<br />
By <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s, some 60% of adult men <strong>an</strong>d one third of adult women deemed resident <strong>in</strong><br />
KwaZulu-Natal were migrat<strong>in</strong>g elsewhere, accord<strong>in</strong>g to one survey (Walker et al., 2004).<br />
Throughout <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong>, women <strong>in</strong> particular became more mobile, <strong>the</strong>ir migratory<br />
quests for work often stemm<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>in</strong>secure livelihoods <strong>in</strong> rural areas (Crush,<br />
2001).<br />
But this is not simply a matter of history <strong>an</strong>d its echoes. S<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> has<br />
recorded m<strong>an</strong>y impressive achievements. But its unequal social structure cont<strong>in</strong>ues to be<br />
reproduced along <strong>an</strong> economic growth path that conforms, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>, to neoliberal<br />
strictures. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> UNDP, <strong>in</strong>come distribution rema<strong>in</strong>s highly unequal <strong>an</strong>d has<br />
deteriorated <strong>in</strong> recent years—as reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s G<strong>in</strong>i co-efficient, which rose from<br />
44<br />
Walker L, Reid G & Cornell M (2004). Wait<strong>in</strong>g to happen: HIV/AIDS <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Double Storey. Cape<br />
Town.<br />
45<br />
See Lurie M (2000). Migration <strong>an</strong>d AIDS <strong>in</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong>: A review. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Journal of Science, 96.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> late 1940s, <strong>the</strong> social epidemiologist Sidney Kark’s <strong>an</strong>alysis of <strong>the</strong> syphilis epidemic <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
arrived a very similar conclusion when he concluded that <strong>the</strong> epidemic could nei<strong>the</strong>r be understood nor<br />
effectively controlled without tak<strong>in</strong>g note of <strong>the</strong> development pattern of <strong>the</strong> country. See Kark SL (1949). The<br />
social pathology of syphilis <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Medical Journal, 23:77-84. Repr<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> International<br />
Journal of Epidemiology (2003), 32(2):181-186.<br />
183
0.596 <strong>in</strong> 1995 to 0.635 <strong>in</strong> 2001 (UNDP, 2003). 46 Poverty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>equality, <strong>the</strong> UNDP has<br />
rem<strong>in</strong>ded, cont<strong>in</strong>ue to express strong spatial <strong>an</strong>d racial patterns.<br />
Very high unemployment, a shift from perm<strong>an</strong>ent to casual employment, <strong>an</strong>d stagn<strong>an</strong>t real<br />
wages <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y sectors have characterized <strong>the</strong> lives of millions of workers over <strong>the</strong> past 10-15<br />
years. The shedd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>formalization of labour has hit black <strong>Africa</strong>n women especially<br />
hard, m<strong>an</strong>y of whom have only sporadic access to poorly paid <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>secure jobs but who bear<br />
much of <strong>the</strong> responsibility for social reproduction.. The official (narrow) unemployment rate<br />
was 31.6% among black <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>in</strong> 2005 (compared with 5.1% among whites) <strong>an</strong>d 37.6% of<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n women were jobless, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Labour Force Survey. 47 Indeed, <strong>the</strong> overlap of<br />
gender <strong>an</strong>d socio-economic <strong>in</strong>equalities is especially harsh <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (though it is hardly<br />
unique to it—some 70% of <strong>the</strong> world’s poorest people, those liv<strong>in</strong>g on less th<strong>an</strong> US$ 1 a day,<br />
are women).<br />
HIV prevalence is highest among <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns liv<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>s<br />
Even if HIV <strong>in</strong>fections were evenly distributed among all <strong>in</strong>come qu<strong>in</strong>tiles, at least half <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV would be poor. A grow<strong>in</strong>g body of evidence, though,<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicates that HIV prevalence is highest among poor <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns, particularly black<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>an</strong>d especially among black <strong>Africa</strong>n women.<br />
A grow<strong>in</strong>g body of research shows HIV prevalence is higher among people with lower skills<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>comes. Among health workers <strong>in</strong> private <strong>an</strong>d public health facilities <strong>in</strong> four prov<strong>in</strong>ces,<br />
for example, HIV prevalence was just under 14% among professionals but exceeded 20%<br />
among non-professional staff (Shis<strong>an</strong>a et al., 2003). 48 A national study among educators found<br />
HIV prevalence was highest among those with low socio-economic status: among those<br />
earn<strong>in</strong>g R132 000 (US$ 19,000) or more a year, HIV prevalence was 5.4%, while among<br />
those earn<strong>in</strong>g less th<strong>an</strong> R60 000 (US$ 8,000) a year, prevalence was 17.5% (Shis<strong>an</strong>a et al.,<br />
2005). An HIV prevalence study among employees of <strong>the</strong> Buffalo City Municipality <strong>in</strong> 2004<br />
found higher prevalence among temporary th<strong>an</strong> perm<strong>an</strong>ent staff, with <strong>in</strong>fection levels highest<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> lowest skills levels (Thomas et al., 2005). 49 Among <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n workers participat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> a three-country seroprevalence survey of 34 major comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> 2000-2001, HIV<br />
prevalence was 15% for unskilled workers, 18% for <strong>the</strong>ir semi-skilled counterparts <strong>an</strong>d 20%<br />
for contract employees—but much lower, at 7%, for skilled workers <strong>an</strong>d, at 4%, for<br />
m<strong>an</strong>agement staff (Evi<strong>an</strong> et al., 2004).<br />
46 UNDP (2003). <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Hum<strong>an</strong> Development Report 2003. The Challenge of Susta<strong>in</strong>able Development<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Unlock<strong>in</strong>g People’s Creativity. Pretoria, UNDP. Summary available at<br />
www.undp.org.za/NHDR2003/NHDRSumFull.pdf<br />
47 The official (narrow) def<strong>in</strong>ition unemployment refers only to those economically active persons who sought<br />
employment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> four weeks prior to <strong>the</strong> survey. The exp<strong>an</strong>ded def<strong>in</strong>ition <strong>in</strong>cludes economically active persons<br />
who are deemed to have been discouraged from seek<strong>in</strong>g work. When workers who have given up on look<strong>in</strong>g for<br />
jobs are tallied, <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate exceeds 40%. See Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (2005a). Labour force survey.<br />
March. Pretoria. For most of <strong>the</strong> employed, not hav<strong>in</strong>g a job is not a temporary circumst<strong>an</strong>ce: almost three<br />
quarters of <strong>the</strong> unemployed had never had a job, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> 1999 October Household Survey. See Statistics<br />
SA (2000). October Household Survey 1999. Statistics SA. Pretoria, cited <strong>in</strong> Aliber (2003). Chronic poverty <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Incidence, causes <strong>an</strong>d policies. World Development, 31(3).<br />
48 Shis<strong>an</strong>a O et al. (2003). The impact of HIV/AIDS on <strong>the</strong> health sector: National survey of health personnel,<br />
ambulatory <strong>an</strong>d hospitalised patients <strong>an</strong>d health facilities 2002. HSRC, MEDUNSA & MRC. HSRC Press. Cape<br />
Town. Available at http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/<strong>in</strong>dex.asp?areaid=4.<br />
49 Thomas EP et al. (2005). HIV prevalence study <strong>an</strong>d cost<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>alysis undertaken for <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>an</strong><br />
HIV/AIDS workplace strategy for Buffalo City Municipality. Medical Research Council & <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Cities<br />
Network. Available at http://www.sacities.net.<br />
184
A recent <strong>an</strong>alysis of <strong>the</strong> epidemiology of HIV <strong>in</strong> 22 public <strong>an</strong>d private sector org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>in</strong><br />
all 9 prov<strong>in</strong>ces of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, found that HIV prevalence among labourers on average was<br />
more th<strong>an</strong> twice as high as among m<strong>an</strong>agers (12.4% compared with 5.3%)(Colv<strong>in</strong>, Connolly,<br />
Madurai, 2006). 50 Such f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs fit with those of successive national household HIV surveys<br />
which found HIV <strong>in</strong>fection levels were highest among residents of <strong>in</strong>formal urb<strong>an</strong><br />
settlements, who generally are un- or under-employed (HSRC et al., 2002 & 2005). In <strong>the</strong><br />
most recent survey, prevalence among residents of urb<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>formal areas was almost twice as<br />
high, compared with <strong>the</strong>ir counterparts <strong>in</strong> formal urb<strong>an</strong> areas—17.6% compared with 9.1%<br />
(HSRC et al., 2005).<br />
Women, who on average are poorer th<strong>an</strong> men <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, are also more likely to be HIV<strong>in</strong>fected<br />
th<strong>an</strong> men. The same national survey found HIV prevalence among adult women (15-<br />
49 years) was 20%, compared with 12% <strong>in</strong> men, <strong>in</strong> 2005 (HSRC et al., 2005). Among young<br />
people (15-24 years), women were four times more likely to be HIV-<strong>in</strong>fected th<strong>an</strong> men. One<br />
<strong>in</strong> four women between <strong>the</strong> ages of 20 <strong>an</strong>d 39 years is liv<strong>in</strong>g with HIV (HSRC et al., 2005).<br />
Two, powerful dynamics <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>in</strong>terlace: on one h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>the</strong> deeply-embedded social <strong>an</strong>d<br />
economic <strong>in</strong>equalities that def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society <strong>an</strong>d, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>an</strong> AIDS<br />
epidemic that is disproportionately severe among <strong>the</strong> more vulnerable <strong>an</strong>d historically<br />
disadv<strong>an</strong>taged sections of society. Typically, it is <strong>the</strong> poor—those sections of society who are<br />
forced to build <strong>the</strong>ir lives <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> path of peril—that are worst-affected with disaster strikes.<br />
The AIDS epidemic fits this trend.<br />
Worse, <strong>the</strong> epidemic’s impoverish<strong>in</strong>g repercussions tend also to be most severe for people<br />
who were poor to start with. Because AIDS ma<strong>in</strong>ly strikes adults <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir productive years, it<br />
affects household labour supply. Illness decreases <strong>an</strong>d, eventually, death removes <strong>the</strong> labour a<br />
person is able to contribute to <strong>the</strong> household. In <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al stages of illness, care duties c<strong>an</strong><br />
become so time-consum<strong>in</strong>g that o<strong>the</strong>r household members have to neglect or ab<strong>an</strong>don <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
work. The overall effect is to (fur<strong>the</strong>r) impoverish <strong>the</strong> household.<br />
Basel<strong>in</strong>e realities<br />
Although <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is classified as a middle-<strong>in</strong>come country, <strong>the</strong> harshly skewed<br />
allocation of <strong>in</strong>come <strong>an</strong>d resources me<strong>an</strong>s that just under half <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n population--<br />
48.5% or almost 22 million people—live below <strong>the</strong> national poverty l<strong>in</strong>e (of R420 or US$ 60<br />
per month), accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> UNDP (Frye, 2006; UNDP, 2003). 51 O<strong>the</strong>r estimates put that<br />
percentage as high as 55%. As m<strong>an</strong>y as one quarter of households are trapped <strong>in</strong> chronic<br />
poverty (Aliber, 2003). In a recent countrywide Afrobarometer survey, four <strong>in</strong> ten respondents<br />
said <strong>the</strong>y had gone without food or were unable to buy medic<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong>y needed, three <strong>in</strong> ten<br />
couldn’t afford to pay for water, <strong>an</strong>d six <strong>in</strong> ten went without <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>come at some stage <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
previous year (Afrobarometer, 2005). 52<br />
50 Colv<strong>in</strong> M, Connolly C, Madurai L (2006). ‘The epidemiology of HIV <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n workplaces’.<br />
(Submitted for publication). Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, when this data set was comb<strong>in</strong>ed with those of HSRC household HIV<br />
surveys <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> HSRC educators study, HIV prevalence was slightly higher for unemployed men th<strong>an</strong> for<br />
employed men (14.3% compared with 11.1%) but considerably higher for unemployed women th<strong>an</strong> for<br />
employed women (17.1% compared with 11.1%). See Colv<strong>in</strong> M & Connolly C (2006). The epidemiology of<br />
HIV <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n workplaces. Presentation to UCLA Bus<strong>in</strong>ess & AIDS <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> sem<strong>in</strong>ar. June 21-23.<br />
Zimbali, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
51 Frye I (2006). The ‘second economy’: Short h<strong>an</strong>d, underh<strong>an</strong>d or sleight of h<strong>an</strong>d? Paper. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg.<br />
Available at www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001973/Frye_second-economy.pdf<br />
52 Afrobarometer (2005). Lived poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Afrobarometer Brief<strong>in</strong>g. 10 March. Available at<br />
http://www.afrobarometer.org/SA%20Brief<strong>in</strong>g-Poverty.pdf.<br />
185
Aga<strong>in</strong>st a backdrop of modest but consistent economic growth, <strong>in</strong>frastructure development<br />
<strong>an</strong>d service delivery has improved markedly on several fronts s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994. 53 Generally, though,<br />
<strong>the</strong>se efforts have not matched mushroom<strong>in</strong>g needs, <strong>an</strong>d with provision <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly occurr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
under aegis of <strong>the</strong> market, affordability is a central issue. Me<strong>an</strong>while, high unemployment <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>an</strong> ongo<strong>in</strong>g shift toward poorly paid <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>secure casual labour cont<strong>in</strong>ues to squeeze <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>comes of <strong>the</strong> poor (UNDP, 2003).<br />
Access to paid employment is among <strong>the</strong> most import<strong>an</strong>t factors affect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> poverty status<br />
of households; joblessness accounts to a large degree for <strong>the</strong> extent of impoverishment <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The official (narrow) unemployment rate exceeded 26% <strong>in</strong> 2005, though when<br />
workers who have given up on look<strong>in</strong>g for jobs are counted, <strong>the</strong> unemployment rate reaches is<br />
over 40%, equivalent to 8.1 million people (Statistics SA, 2005a). 54 For most of <strong>the</strong> employed,<br />
not hav<strong>in</strong>g a job is not a temporary circumst<strong>an</strong>ce: almost three quarters of <strong>the</strong> unemployed<br />
had never had a job, <strong>an</strong>d among those who had been employed previously, 41% had been<br />
jobless for three or more years, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> 1999 October Household Survey. 55<br />
In rural areas, where about 70% of poor households live (Aliber, 2003), l<strong>an</strong>d-based livelihood<br />
strategies generally do not provide viable escape routes from poverty. Wage <strong>in</strong>comes are<br />
vitally import<strong>an</strong>t, but are exceed<strong>in</strong>gly scarce <strong>an</strong>d poorly paid (De Swardt, 2003; Sender,<br />
2000). Poverty is not conf<strong>in</strong>ed to rural <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Grow<strong>in</strong>g numbers of urb<strong>an</strong> residents,<br />
most of <strong>the</strong>m jobless, live <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>formal settlements on <strong>the</strong> perimeters of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s cities. 56<br />
Local work opportunities are scarce, tr<strong>an</strong>sport costs are high, <strong>in</strong>frastructure poor, access to<br />
basic services uneven <strong>an</strong>d services are generally unaffordable. As noted, it’s here, on <strong>the</strong><br />
marg<strong>in</strong>s of urb<strong>an</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, that HIV <strong>in</strong>fection levels are highest (HSRC et al., 2005). 57<br />
Safety nets<br />
When disaster strikes, safety nets tend to be threadbare for low-<strong>in</strong>come households. Sav<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
levels are very low, often non-existent, while debt-levels are high <strong>an</strong>d access to medical aid<br />
<strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r forms of <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce comparatively rare. More th<strong>an</strong> 90% of poor households are<br />
pay<strong>in</strong>g off debt each month, accord<strong>in</strong>g to one recent study, <strong>an</strong>d one quarter of <strong>the</strong>m are<br />
regarded to be ‘highly <strong>in</strong>debted’ (Saldru, 2005). 58 Whe<strong>the</strong>r affected by AIDS or not,<br />
households <strong>in</strong> a Free State study were spend<strong>in</strong>g most of <strong>the</strong> money <strong>the</strong>y borrowed on food—a<br />
rem<strong>in</strong>der of how close to <strong>the</strong> edge m<strong>an</strong>y households live. As for sav<strong>in</strong>gs, from ¾ to 9/10 of<br />
households <strong>in</strong> some studies have said <strong>the</strong>y had no sav<strong>in</strong>gs whatsoever (De Swardt, 2003).<br />
53 For a detailed review of service delivery see Hemson D & Owusu-Ampomah (2004). ‘A better life for all?<br />
Service delivery <strong>an</strong>d poverty alleviation’ <strong>in</strong> D<strong>an</strong>iel, <strong>South</strong>all & Lutchm<strong>an</strong> (eds.). State of <strong>the</strong> nation: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
2004-2005. HSRC Press. Cape Town, pp 511-537.<br />
54 Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (2005a). Labour force survey. March. Pretoria.<br />
55 Statistics SA (2000). October Household Survey 1999. Statistics SA. Pretoria.<br />
56 Average <strong>an</strong>nual household <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s largest cities rose by almost 50% between 1996 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
2001—but <strong>the</strong> proportion of households earn<strong>in</strong>g less th<strong>an</strong> R10 000 <strong>an</strong>nually also grew signific<strong>an</strong>tly (SA Cities<br />
Network, 2004). In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>in</strong>come disparities have widened.<br />
57 Burdens of illness <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s largest cities are shock<strong>in</strong>gly high. Tuberculosis <strong>in</strong>cidence rates, for<br />
example, r<strong>an</strong>ge from 251 per 100 000 population to as high as 1 470 per 100 000 (SA Cities Network, 2004)—<br />
much higher th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> 2002 notification rate of 93 per 100 000 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Russi<strong>an</strong> Federation, a country commonly<br />
associated with exceptionally high TB rates; see EuroTB (2005). Russi<strong>an</strong> Federation country profile. Fact Sheet,<br />
available at http://www.eurotb.org/country_profiles/russia.pdf.<br />
58 Saldru (2005). The f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial diaries: Investigat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial lives of <strong>the</strong> poor (F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> brief). Centre for<br />
Social Science Research, University of Cape Town. Available at<br />
http://www.f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cialdiaries.com/files/F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs%20<strong>in</strong>%20brief.pdf. ‘Highly <strong>in</strong>debted’ me<strong>an</strong>s that debt payments<br />
on average absorb at least 20% of total monthly <strong>in</strong>come.<br />
186
Only 15% of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns have <strong>an</strong>y form of medical aid, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Statistics SA<br />
(2005b). 59 Among low-<strong>in</strong>come earners (<strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>in</strong> households earn<strong>in</strong>g less th<strong>an</strong> R6,000 or<br />
US$ 850 a month) only 7% have some form of medical scheme coverage (Broomberg,<br />
2006). 60 The racial disparities are shock<strong>in</strong>g: three out of four whites belong to medical<br />
schemes, compared with one out of fourteen black <strong>Africa</strong>ns (Statistics SA, 2005b). (Steps are<br />
underway to create a <strong>new</strong> class of medical scheme aimed at persons with <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>come of<br />
R2,000-R6,000 or US$ 280-850.) Community-based burial <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d ‘stokvels’ are<br />
widespread: as m<strong>an</strong>y as 4 <strong>in</strong> 5 households <strong>in</strong> parts of <strong>the</strong> country belong to such schemes. But<br />
<strong>the</strong>y provide meagre protection. When serious illness or death occurs, beneficiaries typically<br />
have to turn to relatives, or take on fur<strong>the</strong>r debt to cover costs (De Swardt et al., 2003).<br />
How do poor households commonly respond once <strong>the</strong> costs of AIDS accumulate? Income<br />
levels appear to drop signific<strong>an</strong>tly after <strong>an</strong> AIDS death—due ma<strong>in</strong>ly, it seems, to high funeral<br />
expenses (Booysen & Bachm<strong>an</strong>n, 2002). 61 AIDS care-related expenses on average absorb one<br />
third of monthly household <strong>in</strong>come (Ste<strong>in</strong>berg et al., 2002). 62 With sc<strong>an</strong>t access to<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutionalized forms of (subsidized) social welfare, poor households bear most of <strong>the</strong><br />
additional burden <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>an</strong>d by rely<strong>in</strong>g on networks of reciprocity. Studies <strong>in</strong>dicate that<br />
poor, affected households do <strong>the</strong>ir best to protect food provision by cutt<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r expenditures<br />
(especially cloth<strong>in</strong>g, education <strong>an</strong>d durables). Frequently, though, <strong>the</strong> tactic fails. Thus, a<br />
longitud<strong>in</strong>al study <strong>in</strong> urb<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d rural parts of Free State prov<strong>in</strong>ce has found that AIDSaffected<br />
households’ spent 20-30% less on food th<strong>an</strong> did unaffected households (Booysen <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Bachm<strong>an</strong>n, 2002).<br />
Three features, <strong>the</strong>refore, st<strong>an</strong>d out. First, <strong>the</strong> severity of <strong>the</strong> epidemic <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Second, its <strong>in</strong>ord<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong>tensity among <strong>the</strong> poorer sections of a society which, third, is already<br />
marked by deep social <strong>an</strong>d economic <strong>in</strong>equalities.<br />
Home- <strong>an</strong>d community-based care<br />
Much of <strong>the</strong> burden of <strong>the</strong> epidemic funnels toward <strong>the</strong> poorer sections of society. In <strong>an</strong><br />
epidemic as severe as <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s, with several hundred thous<strong>an</strong>d people becom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
seriously ill <strong>an</strong>d dy<strong>in</strong>g of AIDS each year, <strong>the</strong> sheer volume of care needs would swamp <strong>the</strong><br />
formal health system. Some form of home- <strong>an</strong>d community-based care is vital.<br />
A general shift toward home- <strong>an</strong>d community-based care has been <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t element of<br />
<strong>the</strong> post-1994 overhaul of <strong>the</strong> health system. In <strong>the</strong>ory, such <strong>an</strong> approach marshalls <strong>the</strong><br />
respective strengths of households, <strong>the</strong> communities <strong>the</strong>y constitute <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>the</strong>y<br />
spawn, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> state—<strong>an</strong>d creates ‘cont<strong>in</strong>uum of care’ that would boost <strong>the</strong> quality, scale <strong>an</strong>d<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ability of care.<br />
Supported <strong>in</strong> various ways by <strong>the</strong> public sector <strong>an</strong>d NGOs, care-givers at <strong>the</strong> home <strong>an</strong>d<br />
community levels would, to <strong>the</strong> extent possible, tend to <strong>the</strong> daily needs of patients, provide<br />
59 Statistics <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (2005b). General Household Survey, July 2004. Pretoria. Available at<br />
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P0318July2004.pdf.<br />
60 Broomberg J (2006). Consultative Investigation <strong>in</strong>to Low Income Medical Schemes (LIMS). Draft f<strong>in</strong>al report<br />
(2006). Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg. Available at www.medicalschemes.com/.../LIMS%20F<strong>in</strong>al%20Report%20Draft%2028-2-<br />
06.doc<br />
61 Booysen F & Bachm<strong>an</strong>n MO (2002). HIV/AIDS, poverty <strong>an</strong>d growth: Evidence from a household impact<br />
study conducted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Free State prov<strong>in</strong>ce, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Paper presented at <strong>the</strong> Annual Conference of <strong>the</strong><br />
Centre for <strong>the</strong> Study of <strong>Africa</strong>n Economies. 18-19 March. St Ca<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>e’s College. Oxford.<br />
62 Ste<strong>in</strong>berg M, Johnson S, Schierhout S & Ndegwa D (2002). Hitt<strong>in</strong>g home: how households cope with <strong>the</strong><br />
impact of <strong>the</strong> HIV/AIDS epidemic. Henry J Kaiser Foundation & Health Systems Trust. October. Cape Town.<br />
187
emotional support <strong>an</strong>d help patients draw on ‘formal’ health-care <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r services (for<br />
example, access<strong>in</strong>g gr<strong>an</strong>ts, etc.). This would occur aga<strong>in</strong>st a backdrop of ‘<strong>in</strong>tegrated services’<br />
that addressed <strong>the</strong> basic needs of people <strong>in</strong>fected with or affected by AIDS to food, shelter,<br />
education, health care <strong>an</strong>d more.<br />
The current reality is less allur<strong>in</strong>g. Patients <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir caregivers are hav<strong>in</strong>g to subsidise m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
aspects of care provision <strong>the</strong>mselves while, <strong>in</strong> turn, pay<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> costs of not receiv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> levels<br />
of care <strong>an</strong>d support <strong>the</strong>y require. Essential needs—such as food <strong>an</strong>d money for basic<br />
necessities—often go unmet (Mills, 2004; Campbell et al., 2005). 63 As a result, m<strong>an</strong>y homebased<br />
care projects are hav<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>corporate food relief <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>ir work, sometimes at <strong>the</strong><br />
expense of o<strong>the</strong>r tasks if staff <strong>an</strong>d resources are limited.<br />
Assessments of self-<strong>in</strong>itiated care projects report that care-givers often lack <strong>the</strong> basic<br />
resources <strong>the</strong>y need to safely <strong>an</strong>d efficiently perform <strong>the</strong>ir tasks. Home-based care kits are<br />
essential, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly are be<strong>in</strong>g made available by government departments or funded by<br />
donors. But needed also is better tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d equipment for perform<strong>in</strong>g care tasks, as well as<br />
psychological support <strong>an</strong>d counsell<strong>in</strong>g. Often caregivers <strong>the</strong>mselves lack knowledge about<br />
AIDS, or are unaware that <strong>the</strong> person be<strong>in</strong>g cared for is HIV positive (Campbell et al., 2005).<br />
In such cases, basic precautions are neglected, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> care-giver risks becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>fected<br />
herself. When surveyed, care-givers rout<strong>in</strong>ely cite as major problems <strong>the</strong> mental <strong>an</strong>d<br />
emotional stra<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir work entails. They are thrust <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> roles of mediators, counselors,<br />
saviours. Yet <strong>the</strong>y may not even be able to provide someth<strong>in</strong>g as basic as a pa<strong>in</strong>killer. Most<br />
rely on support from friends, colleagues <strong>an</strong>d/or family but, when quizzed, <strong>the</strong>y typically admit<br />
to feel<strong>in</strong>g overwhelmed <strong>an</strong>d alone (Giese et al., 2003; Ogden et al., 2004). 64<br />
The paucity <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>consistency <strong>an</strong>d poorly coord<strong>in</strong>ated nature of <strong>in</strong>stitutional support is one of<br />
<strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gle biggest weakness <strong>in</strong> home- <strong>an</strong>d community-based care currently. In such <strong>an</strong> erratic<br />
context, <strong>the</strong> ‘cont<strong>in</strong>uum of care’ relies heavily on <strong>the</strong> services of non-governmental<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations (NGOs) <strong>an</strong>d community-based org<strong>an</strong>izations (CBOs), <strong>an</strong>d on <strong>the</strong> toil <strong>an</strong>d<br />
resources of <strong>in</strong>dividuals. Most of <strong>the</strong> ‘formalized’ care projects <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> rely on<br />
neighbourhood volunteers who perform basic nurs<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r care-giv<strong>in</strong>g tasks <strong>in</strong> patients’<br />
homes. These tend to emerge haphazardly, separately struggl<strong>in</strong>g along similar learn<strong>in</strong>g<br />
curves. By no me<strong>an</strong>s do <strong>the</strong>y constitute a cogent response yet. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> overall tenor is one<br />
of crisis m<strong>an</strong>agement (Ak<strong>in</strong>tola, 2004; Ak<strong>in</strong>tola & Qu<strong>in</strong>l<strong>an</strong>, 2003). 65<br />
While <strong>the</strong> well-be<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> poor becomes ever more precarious, <strong>the</strong>refore, additional burdens<br />
are be<strong>in</strong>g shifted onto <strong>the</strong>m. Warp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> process fur<strong>the</strong>r is stigma, which some caregivers say<br />
63 Mills EA (2004). HIV/AIDS <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> ‘cont<strong>in</strong>uum of care’: An ethnographic study of home-based care <strong>in</strong> KTC,<br />
Cape Town. Honours <strong>the</strong>sis. Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cape Town; Campbell C, Nair<br />
Y, Maim<strong>an</strong>e S & HIVAN (2005). Home-based carers: A vital resource for effective ARV roll-out <strong>in</strong> rural<br />
communities? AIDS Bullet<strong>in</strong>, 14(1). March. Medical Research Council. Cape Town. Available at:<br />
http://www.mrc.ac.za/aids/march2005/homebased.htm<br />
64 Giese S, Me<strong>in</strong>tjies J, Croke R & Chamberla<strong>in</strong> R (2003). Health <strong>an</strong>d social services to address <strong>the</strong> needs of<br />
orph<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r vulnerable children <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of HIV/AIDS. Report submitted to <strong>the</strong> National HIV/AIDS<br />
Directorate, Department of Health. J<strong>an</strong>uary. Cape Town; Ogden J, Esim S & Grown C (2004). Exp<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
care cont<strong>in</strong>uum for HIV/AIDS: Br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g carers <strong>in</strong>to focus. Horizons Report. June. Population Council <strong>an</strong>d<br />
International Center for Research on Women. Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, DC. Available at<br />
http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/horizons/xpndngcrcntnm.pdf.<br />
65 Ak<strong>in</strong>tola O (2004). The gendered burden of home-based care-giv<strong>in</strong>g. Policy Brief. August. Health Economics<br />
<strong>an</strong>d HIV/AIDS Research Division, University of KwaZulu-Natal; Ak<strong>in</strong>tola O & Qu<strong>in</strong>l<strong>an</strong> T (2003). Report of <strong>the</strong><br />
scientific meet<strong>in</strong>g on empirical evidence for <strong>the</strong> demographic <strong>an</strong>d socioeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS. 26-28<br />
March. Durb<strong>an</strong>.<br />
188
c<strong>an</strong> be as debilitat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d dra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> care-giv<strong>in</strong>g process itself. 66 Much of <strong>the</strong> AIDS<br />
burden is be<strong>in</strong>g displaced <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>visible’ zones of <strong>the</strong> home—<strong>an</strong>d onto <strong>the</strong> shoulders of<br />
women, most of <strong>the</strong>m poor, m<strong>an</strong>y desperately so. As currently practiced, home- <strong>an</strong>d<br />
community-based care codifies <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tensifies <strong>the</strong> exploitation of women’s labour, f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial<br />
<strong>an</strong>d emotional reserves—a form of value extraction that subsidises <strong>the</strong> economy at every level<br />
from <strong>the</strong> household outward, yet rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>visible <strong>in</strong> political <strong>an</strong>d economic discourse.<br />
Thus, much of <strong>the</strong> costs of home- <strong>an</strong>d community-based care are hidden, deflected back <strong>in</strong>to<br />
<strong>the</strong> domestic zones of <strong>the</strong> poor. In do<strong>in</strong>g so, it adheres to <strong>the</strong> same polaris<strong>in</strong>g logic that def<strong>in</strong>es<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n society at large. Not only is this unjust, it underm<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ability of care<br />
provision <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of this drawn-out crisis of AIDS. 67<br />
Aga<strong>in</strong>st a backdrop of ramp<strong>an</strong>t impoverishment, <strong>the</strong> skewed distribution of care duties, <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
burgeon<strong>in</strong>g need for care, it is vital that <strong>the</strong> state enlists <strong>the</strong> assets of o<strong>the</strong>r sectors of society<br />
<strong>an</strong>d provides stronger <strong>an</strong>d more reliable support to community-level responses (Giese et al.,<br />
2003).<br />
The <strong>in</strong>stitutional impact of AIDS<br />
At <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional level, AIDS will leave its mark as higher morbidity <strong>an</strong>d mortality rates<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>slate <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>creased absenteeism <strong>an</strong>d personnel losses. Especially vulnerable are those<br />
sectors of <strong>the</strong> state <strong>an</strong>d civil society most closely <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> reproduction of ‘hum<strong>an</strong>’ <strong>an</strong>d<br />
‘social capital’.<br />
Education system<br />
Nationally, HIV prevalence among teach<strong>in</strong>g staff was measured at almost 13% <strong>in</strong> 2004,<br />
though it varied by age, <strong>in</strong>come level, race <strong>an</strong>d area. Among educators <strong>in</strong> KwaZulu-Natal <strong>an</strong>d<br />
among those aged 25-34 years nationally, one <strong>in</strong> five was HIV positive (Shis<strong>an</strong>a et al.,<br />
2005). 68 In-service deaths among educators <strong>in</strong>creased by 30% between 1997/98 <strong>an</strong>d 2003/04;<br />
<strong>in</strong> KwaZulu-Natal <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>an</strong> 80% <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same period. Along with contract<br />
term<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d resignations, mortality now r<strong>an</strong>ks among <strong>the</strong> top causes of staff losses—<br />
which is say<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a sector where, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> HSRC study, more th<strong>an</strong> half <strong>the</strong><br />
educators polled said <strong>the</strong>y w<strong>an</strong>ted to leave <strong>the</strong> profession (Shis<strong>an</strong>a et al., 2005). 69<br />
It has been estimated that about 30,000 educators would need to be tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>nually to<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> current staff<strong>in</strong>g levels <strong>an</strong>d ensure swift replacement. But <strong>the</strong> profession is not<br />
attract<strong>in</strong>g <strong>new</strong>comers <strong>in</strong> sufficient numbers, partly due to concerns about employment<br />
<strong>in</strong>security. Me<strong>an</strong>while tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g college cut-backs <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r restructur<strong>in</strong>g have hamstrung<br />
66<br />
As reported <strong>in</strong> assessments of care-giv<strong>in</strong>g projects <strong>in</strong> Khayelitsha, Gugulethu <strong>an</strong>d Delft (Cape Town), 2004;<br />
personal communication; see also Ak<strong>in</strong>tola (2004).<br />
67<br />
Home- <strong>an</strong>d community-based care programmes <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>an</strong>da acquired a character different from those be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
seen <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. There, attempts were made to professionalize care provision, <strong>an</strong>d greater effort went <strong>in</strong>to<br />
try<strong>in</strong>g to co-ord<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>an</strong>d network <strong>the</strong> various types <strong>an</strong>d levels of care-giv<strong>in</strong>g activities. Volunteers played a<br />
pivotal role <strong>in</strong> identify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d support<strong>in</strong>g ill persons <strong>an</strong>d provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m with basic care, but <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong> turn were<br />
supported by mobile teams of professionals. As a result, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Ak<strong>in</strong>tola (2004), <strong>the</strong> programmes <strong>in</strong><br />
Ug<strong>an</strong>da were ‘community-oriented’, whereas those <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> tend to be ‘community-based’.<br />
68<br />
Shis<strong>an</strong>a O et al. (2005). The health of our educators: A focus on HIV/AIDS <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n public schools.<br />
HSRC Press. Cape Town.<br />
Educators with low socio-economic status had much higher HIV prevalence th<strong>an</strong> did <strong>the</strong>ir better-off<br />
counterparts: among those earn<strong>in</strong>g R132 000 or more a year, HIV prevalence was 5.4%, but among those<br />
earn<strong>in</strong>g less th<strong>an</strong> R60 000 a year, prevalence was 17.5% (Shis<strong>an</strong>a et al., 2005:118).<br />
69<br />
See HSRC (2005). ‘Study of <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d supply of educators <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n public schools.’ Fact Sheet<br />
No. 10. HSRC. Pretoria.<br />
189
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g capacity. M<strong>an</strong>agement <strong>an</strong>d adm<strong>in</strong>istrative skills are especially <strong>in</strong> short supply (Vass,<br />
2003). 70<br />
In such a context, AIDS is likely to aggravate dysfunction <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public education system. The<br />
effects could spill wide. If basic school education suffers, <strong>the</strong> spr<strong>in</strong>gboard for higher<br />
education <strong>an</strong>d skills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g weakens—to unhappy effect <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> economy that has been geared<br />
to rely more heavily on a strong top-end skills base. Ch<strong>an</strong>nels for quality educational<br />
adv<strong>an</strong>cement will of course be available—but to those who c<strong>an</strong> afford <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
What might this me<strong>an</strong> for <strong>in</strong>ter-generational social mobility? Already, even secondary (highschool)<br />
education offers little protection aga<strong>in</strong>st unemployment. In fact, at over 30%,<br />
unemployment levels are highest among workers with secondary education (UNDP, 2003). 71<br />
If <strong>the</strong> quality of public school education deteriorates fur<strong>the</strong>r, aga<strong>in</strong>st a backdrop of cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alization of <strong>the</strong> poorest households—<strong>an</strong>d of overall polarization—social mobility will<br />
be hobbled, trapp<strong>in</strong>g more <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mire of chronic poverty. Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> c<strong>an</strong> avert<br />
such consequences will help decide what k<strong>in</strong>d of society future generations will <strong>in</strong>herit.<br />
Health system<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>stays of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s effort to reduce <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> AIDS epidemic is<br />
<strong>an</strong>tiretroviral (ARV) <strong>the</strong>rapy provision. Of <strong>the</strong> roughly 1 million <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns need<strong>in</strong>g<br />
ARV drugs, just over 200 000 of <strong>the</strong>m were receiv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> drugs by mid-2006. Just under half<br />
of <strong>the</strong>m were access<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> treatment via <strong>the</strong> private health sector (WHO/UNAIDS, 2006) 72 ,<br />
which is accessible to a small m<strong>in</strong>ority of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns (Ijumba & Barron, 2005). 73<br />
The bulk of ARV provision will have to occur through <strong>the</strong> public health sector, which itself is<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g underm<strong>in</strong>ed by AIDS. By <strong>the</strong> turn of <strong>the</strong> century already, accord<strong>in</strong>g to research by <strong>the</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Sciences Research Council, AIDS was responsible for about 13% of deaths among<br />
health workers. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> need for well-tra<strong>in</strong>ed health personnel has never been<br />
greater. Complet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rollout of <strong>the</strong> government’s ARV programme will require <strong>an</strong><br />
additional 3 200 doctors, 2 400 nurses, 765 social workers <strong>an</strong>d 112 pharmacists <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> public<br />
health system by 2009 (Ijumba, Day, Ntuli, 2004). 74 Need far outstrips supply.<br />
This is overlaid with broader <strong>in</strong>equities. A large share of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s gross domestic<br />
product—approximately 9%—goes to health care. However, <strong>the</strong> spend<strong>in</strong>g occurs <strong>in</strong> a two-tier<br />
system. About 60% of <strong>the</strong> funds pay for <strong>the</strong> health care of <strong>the</strong> 15% of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns with<br />
private medical <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong>d who use <strong>the</strong> for-profit private health system. Annual per capita<br />
expenditure on health care <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> private sector is almost six times larger th<strong>an</strong> that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
public sector (Benatar, 2003). 75 As a general rule, <strong>in</strong>come determ<strong>in</strong>es who gets what sort of<br />
health care. An additional layer on <strong>in</strong>equity <strong>in</strong>volves <strong>the</strong> loss of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n healthcare<br />
workers to <strong>in</strong>dustrialized countries which c<strong>an</strong> pay higher salaries <strong>an</strong>d, often, provide better<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g conditions. More th<strong>an</strong> 23,000 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n medical professionals were work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
70<br />
Vass J (2003). The impact of HIV/AIDS. In HSRC. Hum<strong>an</strong> Resources Development Review 2003. Pretoria.<br />
71<br />
The UNDP report draws on Labour Force Survey data, which <strong>in</strong>dicate that tertiary education is perquisite<br />
(though no guar<strong>an</strong>tee <strong>in</strong> itself) for employment security.<br />
72<br />
WHO/UNAIDS (2006). Progress on global access to HIV <strong>an</strong>tiretroviral <strong>the</strong>rapy: A report on ‘3 by 5’ <strong>an</strong>d<br />
beyond. March. Geneva, WHO & UNAIDS.<br />
73<br />
Ijumba P & Barron P (eds.) (2005). <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n health review 2005. Health Systems Trust. Durb<strong>an</strong>.<br />
Available at http://www.hst.org.za/generic/29.<br />
74<br />
Ijumba P, Day C, Ntuli A (2004). <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n health review 2003/2004. Health Systems Trust. Durb<strong>an</strong>.<br />
Available at http://www.hst.org.za/publications/423.<br />
75<br />
Benatar SR (2004). Health care reform <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> crisis of HIV <strong>an</strong>d AIDS <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. The New Engl<strong>an</strong>d<br />
Journal of Medic<strong>in</strong>e, 351(1):81-92.<br />
190
Australia, C<strong>an</strong>ada, New Zeal<strong>an</strong>d, United K<strong>in</strong>gdom <strong>an</strong>d USA <strong>in</strong> 2003, accord<strong>in</strong>g to a<br />
Org<strong>an</strong>ization for Economic Co-operation <strong>an</strong>d Development study. 76<br />
Overall, AIDS will corrode <strong>in</strong>stitutions’ capacities to provide predictable, consistent <strong>an</strong>d<br />
acceptable st<strong>an</strong>dards of service. Already saddled with hulk<strong>in</strong>g workloads <strong>an</strong>d compromised<br />
capacity, <strong>the</strong> police, correctional <strong>an</strong>d judicial services seem especially vulnerable. So, too, <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>an</strong>y community-based org<strong>an</strong>isations that play vital welfarist roles at local level—m<strong>an</strong>y of<br />
which rely on a few key <strong>in</strong>dividuals.<br />
This does not me<strong>an</strong> that some form of ‘collapse’ necessarily follows. One of <strong>the</strong> weaknesses<br />
of current prognoses is <strong>the</strong>ir neglect of <strong>the</strong> ways <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> epidemic’s impact is tempered<br />
or aggravated by unequal access to <strong>in</strong>come, resources <strong>an</strong>d services. A subst<strong>an</strong>tial proportion<br />
of public serv<strong>an</strong>ts is, by virtue of <strong>the</strong>ir skills <strong>an</strong>d status, likely to have quality medical<br />
<strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce coverage, to receive regular medical check-ups <strong>an</strong>d to be able to afford<br />
<strong>an</strong>tiretroviral <strong>the</strong>rapy. They will not escape <strong>the</strong> epidemic, but its effects are likely to be less<br />
punish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir r<strong>an</strong>ks th<strong>an</strong> among <strong>the</strong>ir lower-skilled <strong>an</strong>d less-secure colleagues.<br />
Deflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> economic impact<br />
The fashionable tendency to try <strong>an</strong>d discern <strong>the</strong> epidemic’s effects on national economic<br />
output obscures <strong>the</strong> highly uneven <strong>an</strong>d deeply polariz<strong>in</strong>g economic impact of AIDS.<br />
The direct costs of AIDS to org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d bus<strong>in</strong>esses tend to arrive <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of higher<br />
health-care costs <strong>an</strong>d more expensive workers’ benefits, while <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>direct costs take <strong>the</strong> form<br />
of reduced productivity, loss of skills, experience <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutional memory, as well as<br />
(re)tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d recruitment time <strong>an</strong>d expenses. Indirect costs are signific<strong>an</strong>tly higher for<br />
skilled workers, compared with <strong>the</strong>ir less-skilled counterparts, as are employee benefit costs<br />
(Whiteside & O’Grady, 2003). 77 In a serious AIDS epidemic, those costs c<strong>an</strong> add up to a k<strong>in</strong>d<br />
of hidden employment or payroll tax (De Waal, 2003). 78<br />
That <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s epidemic will affect <strong>the</strong> economy at large seems beyond dispute—but it’s<br />
less clear what <strong>the</strong> extent of that damage might be (Barnett & Whiteside, 2000). 79 Some<br />
estimates seem to trivialise <strong>the</strong> effect of AIDS by suggest<strong>in</strong>g a negligible effect on national<br />
economic output, o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>an</strong>ticipate severe damage. ING Bar<strong>in</strong>gs (2000), for example,<br />
estimated that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s gross domestic product (GDP) would be just 2.8% smaller <strong>in</strong><br />
2015 th<strong>an</strong> it would have been <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence of <strong>an</strong> AIDS epidemic. Projections by <strong>the</strong> Bureau<br />
for Economic Research (2006) 80 forecast that GDP would be 8.8% smaller <strong>in</strong> 2020 due to<br />
AIDS epidemic, while Arndt <strong>an</strong>d Lewis (2000) 81 concluded that GDP would be 17% lower <strong>in</strong><br />
2010. The disagreements stem from <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> estimates rest on different assessments of<br />
76 See Tamar Kahn. ‘SA steps up bid to reta<strong>in</strong> health staff’. Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Day, 7 June 2006. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg. The <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n government reportedly has reached <strong>an</strong> agreement with <strong>the</strong> United K<strong>in</strong>gdom barr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> recruitment of<br />
doctors <strong>an</strong>d nurses <strong>in</strong> SA.<br />
77 Whiteside A & O’Grady M (2003). AIDS <strong>an</strong>d private sector: Lessons from sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong>. In Sisask A (ed.)<br />
One step fur<strong>the</strong>r: Responses to HIV/AIDS. Sida, UNRISD. Stockholm.<br />
78 De Waal A (2003). Why <strong>the</strong> HIV/AIDS p<strong>an</strong>demic is a structural threat to <strong>Africa</strong>’s govern<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d economic<br />
development. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. 27(2):6-24. The outl<strong>in</strong>es of such a ‘tax’ have emerged <strong>in</strong> a few<br />
studies, among <strong>the</strong>m Rosen <strong>an</strong>d Simon (2003), which focused on six Botsw<strong>an</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n comp<strong>an</strong>ies<br />
where HIV prevalence among workers r<strong>an</strong>ged from 8% to 25%. Apply<strong>in</strong>g a conservative set of assumptions, <strong>the</strong><br />
authors concluded that <strong>an</strong> ‘AIDS tax’ of 1-6% of labour costs per year was be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>curred. See Rosen S & Simon<br />
JL (2003). Shift<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> burden: The private sector’s response to <strong>the</strong> AIDS epidemic <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Bullet<strong>in</strong> of <strong>the</strong><br />
World Health Org<strong>an</strong>ization, 81(2):133-137.<br />
79 Barnett T & Whiteside A (2000). Guidel<strong>in</strong>es for studies of <strong>the</strong> social <strong>an</strong>d economic impact of HIV/AIDS.<br />
UNAIDS Best Practice Collection. UNAIDS. Geneva.<br />
80 See ‘AIDS: SA not fac<strong>in</strong>g doomsday scenario’. Mail & Guardi<strong>an</strong>, 13 July 2006. Available at<br />
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=277346&area=/break<strong>in</strong>g_<strong>new</strong>s/break<strong>in</strong>g_<strong>new</strong>s__bus<strong>in</strong>ess/<br />
81 Arndt C & Lewis J (2000). The macro implications of HIV/AIDS <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: A prelim<strong>in</strong>ary assessment.<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Journal of Economics, 68(5): 856-87.<br />
191
<strong>the</strong> epidemic’s demographic impact, about <strong>the</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>nels along which AIDS affects <strong>the</strong><br />
economy, <strong>an</strong>d about <strong>the</strong> nature of those effects <strong>the</strong>mselves (Nattrass, 2002). 82<br />
In a serious epidemic, comp<strong>an</strong>ies generally have four, basic strategic options (Rosen <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Simon, 2003): <strong>the</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> HIV prevention programmes, <strong>the</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> provide treatment,<br />
care <strong>an</strong>d support to AIDS-affected workers <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir families, <strong>the</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vest more <strong>in</strong><br />
susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d extend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir hum<strong>an</strong> capital base, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>the</strong> terms on which<br />
<strong>the</strong>y employ labour.<br />
A h<strong>an</strong>dful of major comp<strong>an</strong>ies have <strong>in</strong>troduced high-profile ARV treatment programmes for<br />
some of <strong>the</strong>ir employees, <strong>an</strong>d several more also emphasize HIV prevention. Most comp<strong>an</strong>ies,<br />
especially medium-sized ones, seem to be tak<strong>in</strong>g AIDS <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir stride. 83 They have<br />
considerable leeway for deflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> effects of <strong>the</strong> epidemic—<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>y’re us<strong>in</strong>g it (Rosen et<br />
al., 2006).<br />
Comp<strong>an</strong>ies cont<strong>in</strong>ue to shift <strong>the</strong> terms on which <strong>the</strong>y use labour, a trend that predates AIDS<br />
but is hav<strong>in</strong>g a huge effect on work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns’ abilities to cushion <strong>the</strong>mselves aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
<strong>the</strong> repercussions of <strong>the</strong> epidemic. Comp<strong>an</strong>ies have been <strong>in</strong>tensify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> adoption of laboursav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
work methods <strong>an</strong>d technologies (spurred by a host of <strong>in</strong>centives) 84 , <strong>the</strong> outsourc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
casualization of jobs, <strong>an</strong>d cutt<strong>in</strong>g worker benefits—a trend that predates AIDS but appears, to<br />
some extent, to be spurred on by <strong>the</strong> epidemic (Rosen et al., 2006; Rosen & Simon, 2003).<br />
When surveyed <strong>in</strong> 2004, almost one quarter of m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>an</strong>d almost one fifth of<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g comp<strong>an</strong>ies reported that <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> mach<strong>in</strong>ery <strong>an</strong>d equipment <strong>in</strong><br />
order to reduce <strong>the</strong>ir labour dependency because of AIDS (Bureau for Economic Research,<br />
2004). 85 The effects have been particularly harsh on workers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> middle <strong>an</strong>d lower skills<br />
tiers.<br />
Medical benefits are now often capped at levels far too low to cover <strong>the</strong> costs of serious ill<br />
health or <strong>in</strong>jury, while comp<strong>an</strong>ies have been slash<strong>in</strong>g employer contributions <strong>an</strong>d requir<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that workers pay a larger share of <strong>the</strong> premiums for <strong>the</strong> same benefits. By <strong>the</strong> turn of <strong>the</strong><br />
century already, on average more th<strong>an</strong> one third of workers with access to medical schemes<br />
had withdrawn from <strong>the</strong>m because <strong>the</strong>y couldn’t afford to pay <strong>the</strong>ir contributions. 86 Accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to one of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s largest <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce comp<strong>an</strong>ies, ‘<strong>the</strong> burden of medical aid costs are<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g borne by employees’ (Old Mutual, 2003). 87 Regulatory ch<strong>an</strong>ges proposed by <strong>the</strong><br />
government <strong>in</strong> 2006 could improve some workers’ access to medical <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce schemes, but<br />
casual workers are unlikely to benefit. In addition, a major shift has also occurred from<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ed-benefit retirement funds to def<strong>in</strong>ed-contribution funds (<strong>the</strong> latter offer<strong>in</strong>g meagre help<br />
to workers felled, for example, by disease <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prime of <strong>the</strong>ir lives) (Barchiesi, 2004; V<strong>an</strong><br />
den Heever, 1998). 88<br />
82 Nattrass N (2002). AIDS, growth <strong>an</strong>d distribution <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. CSSR Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper No 7. Centre for<br />
Social Science Research, University of Cape Town. Available at http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/papers/wp7.zip.<br />
83 The m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dustry, whose historical reli<strong>an</strong>ce on migr<strong>an</strong>t labour has helped shape <strong>the</strong> template of social<br />
relations on which <strong>the</strong> epidemic would eventually erupt, <strong>an</strong>d a h<strong>an</strong>dful of m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial services<br />
firms have <strong>in</strong>troduced high-profile <strong>an</strong>tiretroviral treatment programmes for some of <strong>the</strong>ir employees, <strong>in</strong> addition<br />
to HIV prevention activities.<br />
84 UNDP (2003). <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Hum<strong>an</strong> Development Report 2003. The Challenge of Susta<strong>in</strong>able Development<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Unlock<strong>in</strong>g People’s Creativity. Pretoria, UNDP.<br />
85 Bureau for Economic Research (2004). The impact of HIV/AIDS on selected bus<strong>in</strong>ess sectors <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>,<br />
2004. October. Stellenbosch.<br />
86 See ‘Will your trustee fund survive AIDS?’ Old Mutual Trustee Times. February 2000. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg, cited <strong>in</strong><br />
Rosen & Simon (2003:132).<br />
87 Old Mutual (2003). Old Mutual Healthcare Survey 2003. Cape Town. See<br />
http://www2.oldmutual.com/CR/reports/ccr/2003/<strong>in</strong>dicators/economic/customers/needs.htm.<br />
88 Def<strong>in</strong>ed-benefit funds provide long-term support for <strong>the</strong> spouses of deceased workers (at signific<strong>an</strong>t cost to<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>ies). Def<strong>in</strong>ed-contribution funds provide a one-off pay-out equal to <strong>the</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed amounts contributed by<br />
192
The net effect has been a consistent whittl<strong>in</strong>g of real wages <strong>an</strong>d benefits for those <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns with formal employment—at a time when <strong>the</strong>y <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir families are at <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
risk of severe illness <strong>an</strong>d premature death. Left to fend for <strong>the</strong>mselves, me<strong>an</strong>while, are <strong>the</strong><br />
masses of ‘casual’ workers, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> unemployed.<br />
These sorts of adjustments are enabl<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>an</strong>y comp<strong>an</strong>ies (particularly larger ones) to sidestep<br />
<strong>the</strong> worst of <strong>the</strong> epidemic’s impact. But m<strong>an</strong>y thous<strong>an</strong>ds of enterprises lack that evasive<br />
agility. As <strong>the</strong> epidemic shr<strong>in</strong>ks household <strong>in</strong>comes, smaller bus<strong>in</strong>esses could be hit hard—<br />
especially those that rely heavily on <strong>the</strong> custom of poor households, such as <strong>in</strong>formal retailers,<br />
spaza shops <strong>an</strong>d ‘microenterprises’.<br />
In such ways, m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong> costs of <strong>the</strong> epidemic are be<strong>in</strong>g ‘socialised’, deflected <strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong>d<br />
bottled up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> lives, homes <strong>an</strong>d neighbourhoods of <strong>the</strong> poor. A massive, regressive<br />
redistribution of risk <strong>an</strong>d responsibility is underway.<br />
A <strong>new</strong> wave of activism<br />
Aired occasionally is <strong>the</strong> expectation that AIDS will <strong>in</strong>tensify sheer, desperate need <strong>an</strong>d<br />
enflame challenges aimed at <strong>the</strong> state. Experiences elsewhere <strong>in</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>an</strong>d East <strong>Africa</strong><br />
suggest that such needs- or entitlement-driven mobilization <strong>an</strong>d activism is relatively rare.<br />
However, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s more recent history of large-scale <strong>an</strong>d diffuse political activism<br />
might position it <strong>in</strong> a special category—as <strong>the</strong> dramatic emergence of <strong>the</strong> Treatment Action<br />
Campaign (TAC) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1990s would seem to suggest.<br />
An <strong>in</strong>dependent association of org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals, <strong>the</strong> TAC has used <strong>the</strong> discourse<br />
of hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d socioeconomic rights–<strong>an</strong>d thus, by implication, also <strong>the</strong> discourse of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n liberation struggle–to successfully challenge government policy, raise public<br />
awareness of AIDS <strong>an</strong>d AIDS treatment, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>itiate alternative grassroots projects. An early<br />
breakthrough came when <strong>the</strong> TAC (as a ‘friend of <strong>the</strong> court’) jo<strong>in</strong>ed a court case brought by<br />
39 pharmaceutical corporations aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n government. By help<strong>in</strong>g mobilize<br />
<strong>an</strong> impressive gallery of legal <strong>an</strong>d health expertise domestically, by tapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
networks of ‘<strong>an</strong>ti-globalization’ <strong>an</strong>d AIDS activism, <strong>an</strong>d by highlight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ferocious<br />
profiteer<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> pharmaceutical <strong>in</strong>dustry, <strong>the</strong> TAC helped shame <strong>the</strong> corporations <strong>in</strong>to<br />
withdraw<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir court challenge. This sort of tactical cunn<strong>in</strong>g became a hallmark of TAC<br />
activism.<br />
Comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g court-based challenges with direct action <strong>an</strong>d grassroots mobilization, <strong>an</strong>d forg<strong>in</strong>g<br />
tactical alli<strong>an</strong>ces with o<strong>the</strong>r social formations (especially <strong>the</strong> trade union movement <strong>an</strong>d<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ized religion), <strong>the</strong> TAC devised <strong>the</strong> most successful adaptation of liberation struggle<br />
traditions seen s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994. Especially astute <strong>in</strong>itially was <strong>the</strong> ambivalent relationship it struck<br />
with <strong>the</strong> government, with <strong>the</strong> TAC position<strong>in</strong>g itself simult<strong>an</strong>eously as critic, watchdog <strong>an</strong>d<br />
supporter. By 2003, however, that tactical agility was w<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> government’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>tr<strong>an</strong>sigence (first on <strong>the</strong> roll-out of a prevention of mo<strong>the</strong>r-to-child tr<strong>an</strong>smission pl<strong>an</strong>, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
on a national <strong>an</strong>tiretroviral treatment strategy) forced <strong>the</strong> battle-l<strong>in</strong>es to be drawn more<br />
emphatically. Still, a programme that br<strong>in</strong>gs toge<strong>the</strong>r grassroots tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d mobilization,<br />
tactical activism, c<strong>an</strong>ny use of <strong>the</strong> media <strong>an</strong>d a strong policy research <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alysis capacity<br />
has reaped several major victories–not least <strong>the</strong> mid-2003 decision of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
government to exp<strong>an</strong>d AIDS treatment <strong>an</strong>d care provision through <strong>the</strong> public health system.<br />
<strong>the</strong> employer <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> worker up to <strong>the</strong> last day of employment. By 2000, almost three quarters of 800 retirement<br />
funds had def<strong>in</strong>ed-contribution funds, up from just one quarter <strong>in</strong> 1992.<br />
193
Does this herald a wave of wider radical mobilization <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>in</strong> pursuit of social<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge, with AIDS serv<strong>in</strong>g as a k<strong>in</strong>d of prism for wider griev<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d unmet needs?<br />
Certa<strong>in</strong>ly, <strong>the</strong> TAC helped legitimize <strong>an</strong>d validate progressive rights-based criticism, protest<br />
actions <strong>an</strong>d policy <strong>in</strong>terventions <strong>in</strong> a period when <strong>the</strong>se were be<strong>in</strong>g rout<strong>in</strong>ely demonized from<br />
with<strong>in</strong> government as <strong>the</strong> gestures of reactionary, wreck<strong>in</strong>g tendencies. Largely due to <strong>the</strong><br />
TAC, health (<strong>an</strong>d specifically AIDS) has become <strong>the</strong> only arena <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> state’s<br />
monopoly on policymak<strong>in</strong>g authority has been visibly <strong>an</strong>d successfully challenged <strong>in</strong> a<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>ed way s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, as Greenste<strong>in</strong> (2003) has observed. 89 But it rema<strong>in</strong>s to be seen<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> TAC c<strong>an</strong> adjust strategically to current realities as adroitly as it adapted tactically<br />
to opportunities <strong>in</strong> its early years. Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> TAC c<strong>an</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sform <strong>in</strong>to, or spawn, a more<br />
exp<strong>an</strong>sive social movement rema<strong>in</strong>s to be seen.<br />
What c<strong>an</strong> be done?<br />
The AIDS epidemic meshes with social relations that reproduce <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>an</strong>d deprivation,<br />
generat<strong>in</strong>g a glacial, miserable crush. In that respect, it exposes <strong>the</strong> world we live <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
underscores <strong>the</strong> need to tr<strong>an</strong>sform it.<br />
An obvious, long-term challenge is to prevent <strong>the</strong> spread of HIV more effectively. This will<br />
be no easy feat. There is some evidence of ‘positive’ behaviour ch<strong>an</strong>ge among young <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>ns (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creased condom use <strong>an</strong>d absta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g from casual sex), but it’s not yet<br />
clear whe<strong>the</strong>r this is signific<strong>an</strong>t enough to slow <strong>the</strong> epidemic’s adv<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
The extent of <strong>the</strong> epidemic’s impact will be shaped also by <strong>the</strong> speed <strong>an</strong>d extent to which<br />
<strong>an</strong>tiretroviral (ARV) treatment is made available, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> degree to which treatment is<br />
adhered to. This requires universal <strong>an</strong>d affordable access to ARV <strong>the</strong>rapy, along with<br />
improved tuberculosis treatment programmes, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> overhaul of <strong>the</strong> home- <strong>an</strong>d communitybased<br />
care system.<br />
In a society <strong>in</strong> which millions are impoverished <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> midst of abund<strong>an</strong>ce, all this is<br />
underp<strong>in</strong>ned by a more fundamental challenge that is rooted <strong>in</strong> some of <strong>the</strong> same, elemental<br />
needs <strong>an</strong>d dem<strong>an</strong>ds that fuelled <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s liberation struggle: b<strong>an</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g disease,<br />
privation <strong>an</strong>d exclusion. AIDS underscores <strong>the</strong> need for <strong>an</strong> encompass<strong>in</strong>g social package that<br />
forms part of <strong>an</strong> overarch<strong>in</strong>g programme of redistribution <strong>an</strong>d rights-realization. This should<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude safeguarded food security, <strong>the</strong> provision of affordable (that is to say, decommodified)<br />
essential services, large-scale job creation <strong>an</strong>d workers’ rights protection, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> alignment<br />
of social tr<strong>an</strong>sfers to unfold<strong>in</strong>g needs. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s development path, <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r words, must<br />
acquire a much stronger redistributive character.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> short-term, <strong>the</strong> system of social tr<strong>an</strong>sfers requires a radical, progressive overhaul, which<br />
should <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of a universal social assist<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>strument that c<strong>an</strong> provide a<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imum level of social support, such as <strong>the</strong> ‘basic <strong>in</strong>come gr<strong>an</strong>t’, a device championed by<br />
trade unions, church org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d much of <strong>the</strong> NGO sector for several years already. 90<br />
Poor households rely heavily on social tr<strong>an</strong>sfers—all <strong>the</strong> more so those affected by health<br />
crises (Booysen & Bachm<strong>an</strong>n, 2002). The current system, though, is marred by several<br />
h<strong>in</strong>dr<strong>an</strong>ces, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g me<strong>an</strong>s test<strong>in</strong>g, rigid eligibility criteria <strong>an</strong>d a high relative cost of<br />
apply<strong>in</strong>g for gr<strong>an</strong>ts (Liebenberg, 2002). Welfare spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 2005 was more th<strong>an</strong> 3% of gross<br />
89 Greenste<strong>in</strong> R (2003). State, civil society <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> reconfiguration of power <strong>in</strong> post-apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Paper presented at WISER sem<strong>in</strong>ar. 28 August. University of Witwatersr<strong>an</strong>d. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg.<br />
90 See, for example, Liebenberg S (2002). Universal access to social security rights: C<strong>an</strong> a basic <strong>in</strong>come gr<strong>an</strong>t<br />
meet <strong>the</strong> challenge? ESR Review, 3(2). September. University of Western Cape. Available at<br />
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/esr2002/2002sept_universal.php#universal .<br />
194
domestic product, 91 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>istry has argued that fur<strong>the</strong>r exp<strong>an</strong>sion was fiscally<br />
unsusta<strong>in</strong>able. On fiscal grounds, <strong>the</strong> claim is moot. As well, it implies that social tr<strong>an</strong>sfers<br />
function as a form a ‘charity’, despite ample evidence of its vital, developmental <strong>an</strong>d dem<strong>an</strong>dboost<strong>in</strong>g<br />
functions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n context (Shepherd, 2004; EPRI, 2004; ILO, 2003; De<br />
Swardt, 2003; Committee of Inquiry <strong>in</strong>to a Comprehensive System of Social Security for<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, 2002a). 92 F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial simulations <strong>in</strong>dicate, for example, that a ‘basic <strong>in</strong>come<br />
gr<strong>an</strong>t’ of just R100 (US$ 14) per month could contribute subst<strong>an</strong>tially to reduc<strong>in</strong>g poverty <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. 93<br />
Worlds apart<br />
That AIDS m<strong>an</strong>gles <strong>an</strong>d ru<strong>in</strong>s is clear. In a society with <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s characteristics, it does<br />
so with great discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, feed<strong>in</strong>g off <strong>an</strong>d aggravat<strong>in</strong>g exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>equalities. In <strong>the</strong> wake of<br />
this epidemic—which will last <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r generation, perhaps longer—<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> c<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>ticipate deeper impoverishment <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tensified polarization. But <strong>the</strong> epidemic also<br />
highlights <strong>the</strong> fact that millions of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns endure hardships that are extraord<strong>in</strong>ary but,<br />
tragically, not unusual. AIDS underscores <strong>the</strong> central challenge <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s faces: to make<br />
what is today <strong>the</strong> harrow<strong>in</strong>g rout<strong>in</strong>e of millions, <strong>the</strong> extraord<strong>in</strong>ary ordeal of a few.<br />
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198
17 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: trends <strong>an</strong>d forecasts <strong>in</strong> a<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Africa</strong>n political economy<br />
By John D<strong>an</strong>iel<br />
We w<strong>an</strong>t to exp<strong>an</strong>d to projects throughout <strong>Africa</strong>, as this is <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s best <strong>in</strong>terest. If<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Africa</strong>n countries are do<strong>in</strong>g well <strong>the</strong>y have more resources with which to purchase<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n goods <strong>an</strong>d services…not only is a stable cont<strong>in</strong>ent beneficial for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
but <strong>the</strong> IDC earns f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d developmental returns on its <strong>in</strong>vestments<br />
Abel Mal<strong>in</strong>ga, head of m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d beneficiation strategic bus<strong>in</strong>ess unit, IDC, Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Day<br />
14.02.2006<br />
Introduction<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 2002, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s Hum<strong>an</strong> Sciences Research Council (HSRC) has been monitor<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> activities of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n private <strong>an</strong>d state-owned corporates <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. This has been <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> rapid post-1990s penetration of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n marketplace, <strong>an</strong> arena off-limits<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> s<strong>an</strong>ctions era of <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>an</strong>d 1980s. Out of this research project, three articles have<br />
appeared <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> HSRC’s State of <strong>the</strong> Nation series of volumes (see reference section). The<br />
first <strong>in</strong> 2003 surveyed <strong>the</strong> emergence of a post-apar<strong>the</strong>id phenomenon - <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>esses operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> all parts of <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent. It detailed <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g signific<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n market to <strong>the</strong> local economy <strong>an</strong>d identified <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t trends <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>teraction with this ‘<strong>new</strong>’ world. The second <strong>an</strong>d third articles were narrower <strong>in</strong> scope,<br />
exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 2004 <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n-Nigeri<strong>an</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess nexus while <strong>in</strong> 2005 <strong>the</strong> focus was on<br />
<strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g centrality of <strong>Africa</strong>’s m<strong>in</strong>eral <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r resources as a me<strong>an</strong>s to alleviat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>’s emerg<strong>in</strong>g energy deficit. In a fourth article due out <strong>in</strong> late 2006, <strong>an</strong>d of which this<br />
contribution is a shortened version, <strong>the</strong>re is a return to <strong>the</strong> 2003 format. Look<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong><br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ental marketplace as a whole, <strong>the</strong> trends <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s economic engagement with<br />
<strong>Africa</strong> are identified <strong>an</strong>d some predictions are offered as to how this engagement will unfold<br />
through <strong>the</strong> rest of this decade.<br />
Review<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n political economy today, one is struck by certa<strong>in</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t differences<br />
from that of <strong>the</strong> late 1990s. Then <strong>Africa</strong> was <strong>in</strong> economic terms thoroughly marg<strong>in</strong>alized as a<br />
result of a process of post-cold war western divestment from <strong>Africa</strong>. The result was that <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n corporates enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n market often seemed to be <strong>the</strong> ‘only show <strong>in</strong> town’.<br />
By <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> 1990s <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> had become <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gle largest source of <strong>new</strong> foreign<br />
direct <strong>in</strong>vestment (FDI) <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> overall.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce 2000, much <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n FDI arena has ch<strong>an</strong>ged. Today, <strong>in</strong> 2006, <strong>in</strong> a more <strong>in</strong>vestorfriendly<br />
environment, <strong>new</strong> <strong>an</strong>d would-be <strong>in</strong>vestors are to be found <strong>in</strong> all corners of <strong>the</strong><br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ent, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g some of its least appeal<strong>in</strong>g spots like Equatorial Gu<strong>in</strong>ea, <strong>the</strong> Sud<strong>an</strong>,<br />
Zimbabwe, <strong>an</strong>d Cote D’Ivoire. In this latest post-colonial ‘scramble’ for <strong>Africa</strong>’s resources,<br />
<strong>the</strong> field has become more crowded <strong>an</strong>d more competitive. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n corporates c<strong>an</strong> no<br />
longer expect to have everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir own way as a consequence of two developments.<br />
One is <strong>the</strong> ‘rediscovery’ by some former colonial powers <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> United States of <strong>an</strong> appetite<br />
for do<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. For <strong>the</strong> US, this has <strong>in</strong>volved considerable activity along<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>’s oil-rich West <strong>Africa</strong>n coast <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> restoration of economic ties with Libya. The<br />
second has been <strong>the</strong> emergence of <strong>new</strong> largely Asi<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestors. The Ch<strong>in</strong>ese are <strong>the</strong> most<br />
prom<strong>in</strong>ent but active too has been Indi<strong>an</strong> capital, along with <strong>the</strong> Jap<strong>an</strong>ese, Malaysi<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>South</strong> Kore<strong>an</strong>s.
The upward escalation <strong>in</strong> FDI flows <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Africa</strong> is illustrated by <strong>the</strong> 50% <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> value<br />
of <strong>new</strong> external <strong>in</strong>vestment (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong>to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>) from $18.7 billion <strong>in</strong> 2004 to<br />
$28-30 billion <strong>in</strong> 2005 (http://www.unctad.org). The bulk of that <strong>new</strong> money has been<br />
concentrated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> oil <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>erals sector (copper, plat<strong>in</strong>um, gold, z<strong>in</strong>c <strong>an</strong>d silver, <strong>the</strong> prices<br />
of which bar gold have all surged to record highs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last year), attracted, accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Mills (2006:4), by ‘a cyclical commodity upsw<strong>in</strong>g driven especially by Ch<strong>in</strong>ese dem<strong>an</strong>ds’.<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r factors, such as <strong>the</strong> desire of <strong>the</strong> United States to reduce its depence on Middle Eastern<br />
oil sources, have played a role.<br />
What this has contributed to is a cont<strong>in</strong>ental growth rate which now exceeds <strong>the</strong> world<br />
average. The sluggish rates of <strong>the</strong> late 1990s have given way to a 5.1% <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
real GDP <strong>in</strong> both 2004 <strong>an</strong>d 2005, exceed<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> world average by nearly 2%. The OECD has<br />
predicted a growth rate of 5.8% <strong>in</strong> 2006 driven primarily by <strong>Africa</strong>’s oil producers where<br />
growth is likely to be <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region of 6.9% (Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Day 19.05.06) Concurrent with this<br />
growth has been <strong>an</strong> improvement <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s external debt situation brought on by w<strong>in</strong>dfall oil<br />
profits, ris<strong>in</strong>g commodity prices <strong>an</strong>d a more lenient attitude to both aid <strong>an</strong>d debt relief by <strong>the</strong><br />
G-8 <strong>an</strong>d rich nations <strong>in</strong> general.<br />
The <strong>Africa</strong>n economic environment today is, <strong>the</strong>refore, different from that of <strong>the</strong> turn of this<br />
century. It is both more user-friendly <strong>an</strong>d more efficient. The <strong>new</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestors have brought<br />
with <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> sophisticated <strong>an</strong>d tougher m<strong>an</strong>agement methods of neo-liberalism <strong>an</strong>d have<br />
bulldozed aside <strong>the</strong> slow, cumbersome <strong>an</strong>d excessively bureaucratic ways of <strong>the</strong> first post<strong>in</strong>dependence<br />
era. It is here, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Neuma Grobelaar (2006:9-10), that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
corporates have contributed signific<strong>an</strong>tly. She argues that:<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>in</strong>vestment is clearly lead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> growth of <strong>the</strong> private sector <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, by<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g revenue generation for governments; improv<strong>in</strong>g economic growth <strong>an</strong>d exports;<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sferr<strong>in</strong>g technology; ensur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> re<strong>in</strong>dustrialisation of some economies through <strong>the</strong><br />
acquisition <strong>an</strong>d revitalisation of moribund state-owned enterprises; formalis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> market,<br />
<strong>the</strong>reby ensur<strong>in</strong>g greater price stability…<strong>an</strong>d improved consumer choice; creat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
employment; tr<strong>an</strong>sferr<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>ess skills; <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g good corporate practice; <strong>an</strong>d boost<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment confidence from o<strong>the</strong>r foreign <strong>in</strong>vestors…<br />
The <strong>Africa</strong>n market as <strong>in</strong>vestment dest<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
Despite <strong>the</strong> emergence (<strong>an</strong>d re-emergence) <strong>in</strong> recent times of o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>vestors, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> 2005 <strong>the</strong> largest s<strong>in</strong>gle source of <strong>new</strong> FDI on <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent. It also cont<strong>in</strong>ued its<br />
upward curve <strong>in</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>new</strong> FDI, as figure 1 illustrates.<br />
R millions<br />
Figure 1: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Investments <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>Africa</strong><br />
1997-2004<br />
40000<br />
35000<br />
30000<br />
25000<br />
20000<br />
15000<br />
10000<br />
5000<br />
0<br />
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br />
Type of <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />
Direct<br />
Portfolio<br />
O<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Total FDI<br />
200
Source: Statistics adapted from <strong>the</strong> quarterly reports of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Reserve B<strong>an</strong>k.<br />
The po<strong>in</strong>t needs to be made that <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n FDI reflected above <strong>in</strong>cludes<br />
those by some corporates which arguably are no longer <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n comp<strong>an</strong>ies. Major<br />
groups like Anglo Americ<strong>an</strong>, Dimension Data <strong>an</strong>d SABMiller have moved offshore <strong>in</strong> recent<br />
years <strong>an</strong>d now have <strong>the</strong>ir primary list<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> London. However, even if <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>in</strong>vestments is stripped out, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>Africa</strong>’s largest supplier of <strong>new</strong><br />
FDI (see figure 2 below), followed by <strong>the</strong> United K<strong>in</strong>gdom <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> United States. Australi<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d C<strong>an</strong>adi<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is almost exclusively <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>volves<br />
mult<strong>in</strong>ational gi<strong>an</strong>ts like <strong>the</strong> Australi<strong>an</strong>-based BHP Billiton. Given its long <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>, Fr<strong>an</strong>ce’s position may seem low but it reflects <strong>the</strong> fact that French bus<strong>in</strong>ess limits<br />
itself almost exclusively to Fr<strong>an</strong>ce’s former colonial possessions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong><br />
economy of <strong>the</strong>ir one-time ‘jewel <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir crown’, Cote D’Ivoire, has self-destructed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last<br />
decade.<br />
Source: Reg Rumney (2006) Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Map Foundation<br />
Ch<strong>in</strong>a’s st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g as n<strong>in</strong>th <strong>in</strong> Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Map’s ‘top ten’ is certa<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>an</strong> under-reflection of <strong>the</strong><br />
extent of its <strong>in</strong>volvement on <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Reg Rumney, Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Map’s chart<br />
reflects ‘<strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>in</strong>vestments’ <strong>an</strong>d often times, he argues, Ch<strong>in</strong>a does not go public with<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y of its ventures, especially those <strong>in</strong> countries with poor hum<strong>an</strong> rights records – for<br />
example, Sud<strong>an</strong> (<strong>in</strong>terview February 2006).<br />
Figures 3 <strong>an</strong>d 4 show that by country Mozambique leads <strong>the</strong> way as <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n capital’s<br />
most favoured <strong>in</strong>vestment dest<strong>in</strong>ation. S<strong>in</strong>ce 1994, Mozambique has attracted between 25-<br />
30% of all <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n FDI <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Africa</strong>. This level of <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> economy which 10-<br />
15 years ago was a ‘basket case’ has been driven by two factors. First, Mozambique has been<br />
<strong>the</strong> site of two huge <strong>in</strong>dustrial projects <strong>in</strong> which <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>in</strong>vestors have been prom<strong>in</strong>ent.<br />
One has been <strong>the</strong> Mozal alum<strong>in</strong>ium smelter project <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s Industrial<br />
Development Corporation (IDC) has 24% equity while <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>volved Sasol <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
construction of a pipel<strong>in</strong>e from on-shore natural gas fields <strong>in</strong> central Mozambique to Secunda<br />
<strong>in</strong> Mpumal<strong>an</strong>ga.<br />
The second is that alongside <strong>the</strong>se two schemes, some 300 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n comp<strong>an</strong>ies have<br />
opened up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. These are located <strong>in</strong> every sector of <strong>the</strong> economy <strong>an</strong>d employ at<br />
201
least 50,000 Mozambic<strong>an</strong>s. This <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> its eastern neighbour’s economy has<br />
contributed to Mozambique’s tr<strong>an</strong>sformation from be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1991 <strong>Africa</strong>’s poorest perform<strong>in</strong>g<br />
economy to growth rates <strong>in</strong> recent years of about 8%.<br />
The DRC’s second place needs qualification. As noted above, Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Map’s <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />
tables are based on ‘<strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>in</strong>tentions’ <strong>an</strong>d not on monies actually spent. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
capital’s largest <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> DRC will be <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gr<strong>an</strong>d Inga hydroelectric power project<br />
but it is a long-term scheme whose realisation will take <strong>an</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r 10-15 years. If one strips Inga<br />
out, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> DRC slips beh<strong>in</strong>d Nigeria <strong>in</strong>to third spot <strong>an</strong>d equal with Namibia.<br />
Given its image as a site of economic chaos <strong>an</strong>d corruption, <strong>the</strong> level of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
<strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> Nigeria may surprise some. The key has been MTN’s extraord<strong>in</strong>ary success <strong>in</strong><br />
that market <strong>an</strong>d its demonstration that bus<strong>in</strong>ess c<strong>an</strong> be done <strong>an</strong>d money made <strong>in</strong> Nigeria. In<br />
its wake, o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n comp<strong>an</strong>ies have set up shop <strong>in</strong> Nigeria, sell<strong>in</strong>g commodities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g services to <strong>Africa</strong>’s largest consumer market <strong>an</strong>d one which for years was starved<br />
of quality products. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>in</strong>vestors have developed waterfront-type shopp<strong>in</strong>g malls<br />
<strong>in</strong> which groups like Game, Shoprite, Pep Stores, Truworths <strong>an</strong>d Woolworths, Exclusive<br />
Books <strong>an</strong>d Nu Metro c<strong>in</strong>emas have located. Leisure groups like Protea Hotels have taken over<br />
<strong>an</strong>d refurbished run-down hotel establishments <strong>an</strong>d built <strong>new</strong> ones.<br />
Source: Reg Rumney (2006), Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Map Foundation<br />
202
Source: Reg Rumney (2006), Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Map Foundation<br />
As figure 5 below shows, <strong>the</strong> sector which has attracted <strong>the</strong> largest chunk of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
FDI <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Africa</strong> has been telecommunications, followed by m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, electricity, steel <strong>an</strong>d<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r matters, <strong>an</strong>d oil <strong>an</strong>d gas. The rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 13% covers <strong>the</strong> b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, retail, hotel/leisure<br />
sectors as well as farm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d food producers.<br />
Source: Reg Rumney (2006), Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Map Foundation<br />
203
Two factors suggest that <strong>the</strong> telecommunications sector will for <strong>the</strong> foreseeable future rema<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s priority <strong>in</strong>vestment area. One is <strong>the</strong> massive growth <strong>in</strong> mobile telephony<br />
worldwide <strong>an</strong>d two, <strong>the</strong> comparative lack of penetration of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n market. Most <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
consumers do not have a cellphone <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>y w<strong>an</strong>t one <strong>an</strong>d some <strong>Africa</strong>n markets are<br />
potentially huge. The DRC is a case <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t where Vodakom currently has signed up only<br />
about two percent of potential customers. For Vodakom a peace dividend <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> future will be<br />
lucrative.<br />
The economic salience of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n market<br />
Exports<br />
In <strong>the</strong> decade 1991-2001 <strong>Africa</strong>’s share of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s export market grew from four to<br />
twelve percent. In our 2003 article, we predicted that it would cont<strong>in</strong>ue to grow, a view<br />
seem<strong>in</strong>gly borne out by <strong>the</strong> 2002 figure of 16.7%. It was also <strong>in</strong> that year that <strong>Africa</strong> overtook<br />
<strong>the</strong> Americas to become <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s third largest export region. What we did not<br />
<strong>an</strong>ticipate, however, was that 2002 seems set to be this decade’s high–water mark <strong>in</strong> terms of<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>’s share of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s global trade.<br />
Whe<strong>the</strong>r that will be <strong>the</strong> case or not, time will tell but it is signific<strong>an</strong>t, as figure 6 below<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicates, that s<strong>in</strong>ce 2002 - <strong>an</strong>d for two years <strong>the</strong>reafter - <strong>Africa</strong>’s share of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
global exports has ei<strong>the</strong>r fallen or only risen slightly <strong>an</strong>d not sufficiently to match <strong>the</strong> peak<br />
2002 figure. This is not to suggest that <strong>the</strong> r<strong>an</strong>d value of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s exports <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Africa</strong><br />
has not risen. It has but only by a modest R7.1billion over <strong>the</strong> period 2003-2005. By contrast,<br />
<strong>the</strong> larger Asi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> markets rose by R21billion <strong>an</strong>d just under R25 billion<br />
respectively. What this suggests is that after <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial decade of growth for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
capital, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n export market might have peaked <strong>an</strong>d is unlikely to grow even <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
context of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>Africa</strong>n economic growth rate noted earlier. What this is <strong>in</strong>dicative of<br />
is <strong>the</strong> level of poverty <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>the</strong> small size of its consumer market, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> lack of<br />
‘trickle-down’ from <strong>the</strong> commodities’ boom.<br />
A second conclusion is that for <strong>the</strong> foreseeable future <strong>the</strong> Asi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> markets will<br />
rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s most import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> trade terms. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> gap between <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r two regions is widen<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
R millions<br />
140,000<br />
120,000<br />
100,000<br />
80,000<br />
60,000<br />
40,000<br />
20,000<br />
0<br />
Figure 6: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s exports by r<strong>an</strong>d value by region 2002-2005<br />
<strong>Africa</strong> Americas Asia Europe Pacific<br />
Region<br />
Source: DTI’s economic data base <strong>an</strong>d SARS prelim<strong>in</strong>ary trade statistics<br />
204<br />
2002<br />
2003<br />
2004<br />
2005
Imports<br />
In regard to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s imports, we commented <strong>in</strong> our 2005 article on <strong>the</strong> modest <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
<strong>in</strong> imports from <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>the</strong> surge <strong>in</strong> imports from Asia <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> fact that between <strong>the</strong>m Asi<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> imports made up 80% of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s total imports. The cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g picture<br />
is little different <strong>in</strong> that <strong>in</strong> 2005 imports from <strong>Africa</strong> rose by only 0.6%, Asi<strong>an</strong> import volumes<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ued to mount reach<strong>in</strong>g 40% of <strong>the</strong> total while by comb<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>the</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Asi<strong>an</strong><br />
totals cont<strong>in</strong>ued to be <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region of 80%.<br />
R millions<br />
150,000<br />
100,000<br />
50,000<br />
0<br />
Figure 7: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n imports by region 2003-2005<br />
<strong>Africa</strong> Americas Asia Europe Pacific<br />
Region<br />
Source: DTI’s economic data base <strong>an</strong>d SARS prelim<strong>in</strong>ary trade statistics<br />
Trade bal<strong>an</strong>ces<br />
In terms of trade bal<strong>an</strong>ces, <strong>the</strong> downward curve <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s positive bal<strong>an</strong>ce with <strong>Africa</strong><br />
(from 5:1 <strong>in</strong> 2001 to 3:1 <strong>in</strong> 2004) persisted <strong>in</strong> 2005 with <strong>the</strong> ratio fall<strong>in</strong>g to 2.67: 1. Aga<strong>in</strong>, as<br />
<strong>in</strong> recent years, <strong>the</strong> narrow<strong>in</strong>g gap was <strong>the</strong> product of <strong>Africa</strong> sourc<strong>in</strong>g more oil <strong>an</strong>d natural gas<br />
from <strong>Africa</strong>n supplies. In 2005, fuels made up 42.4% of all imports from <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
R millions<br />
40,000<br />
30,000<br />
20,000<br />
10,000<br />
0<br />
-10,000<br />
-20,000<br />
-30,000<br />
-40,000<br />
-50,000<br />
-60,000<br />
Figure 8: SA trade bal<strong>an</strong>ce by region 2000-2005<br />
2003<br />
2004<br />
2005<br />
<strong>Africa</strong> Americas Asia Europe Pacific<br />
Source: HSRC corporate mapp<strong>in</strong>g database<br />
Region<br />
Table 1 reflects <strong>the</strong> volumes of total trade (imports <strong>an</strong>d exports comb<strong>in</strong>ed) between <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>Africa</strong>n trade partners outside of <strong>the</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong>n Customs Union (SACU).<br />
It reveals that this country’s top ten <strong>Africa</strong>n trade partners rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same ten countries<br />
<strong>the</strong>y have been over <strong>the</strong> past half decade, although <strong>the</strong>re have been some shifts up <strong>an</strong>d down<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ‘league places’, so to speak. But not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past two years <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> top seven.<br />
What is extraord<strong>in</strong>ary about this table is <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g resilience of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n-<br />
205<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
2002<br />
2003<br />
2004<br />
2005
Zimbabwe’s trade relations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>in</strong> r<strong>an</strong>d value terms <strong>the</strong> volumes of both imports<br />
<strong>an</strong>d exports are ris<strong>in</strong>g. It is also worth highlight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>iscule levels of imports<br />
from seven of <strong>the</strong>se top ten counties; <strong>in</strong> fact, <strong>in</strong> one or two cases import volumes have actually<br />
decl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> recent years.<br />
The one country <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> top ten which has seen a sharp <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> its exports to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is<br />
Angola, ris<strong>in</strong>g from R 28 million <strong>in</strong> 2002 to R1.7 billion <strong>in</strong> 2004 <strong>an</strong>d R1.9 billion <strong>in</strong> 2005. As<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of Nigeria, almost all of this is accounted for by oil imports. Exports to Angola<br />
over <strong>the</strong> same period held steady <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region of R 3.3 to R 3.5 billion.<br />
Table 1: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s top ten <strong>Africa</strong>n trad<strong>in</strong>g partners<br />
Exports (Rbillion)<br />
Imports Total Trade Position Position Position Position<br />
Country 2005 2005 2005 2005 2004 2003 2002<br />
ZIMBABWE 7.49 3.13 10.62 1 1 1 1<br />
NIGERIA 3.39 4.16 7.56 2 2 3 3<br />
ZAMBIA 5.44 1.30 6.75 3 3 4 4<br />
MOZAMBIQUE 6.40 0.20 6.60 4 4 2 2<br />
ANGOLA 3.54 1.89 5.43 5 5 5 5<br />
KENYA 2.98 0.20 3.18 6 6 6 8<br />
TANZANIA 2.76 0.25 3.01 7 7 9 9<br />
MAURITIUS 2.19 0.17 2.36 8 9 7 7<br />
MALAWI 1.64 0.46 2.09 9 8 8 6<br />
DEM REP of<br />
CONGO 1.81 0.26 1.83 10 10 10 10<br />
Source: DTI’S economic data base <strong>an</strong>d SARS prelim<strong>in</strong>ary trade statistics<br />
Trends <strong>an</strong>d Prospects <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n-<strong>Africa</strong>n Trade Relations<br />
So what c<strong>an</strong> be said of <strong>the</strong> period ahead? The follow<strong>in</strong>g is predicted:<br />
1) The lucrative <strong>Africa</strong>n private telecommunications sector will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to open up <strong>an</strong>d<br />
exp<strong>an</strong>d, rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>reby <strong>the</strong> most active site of <strong>new</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n FDI. With<strong>in</strong> it, <strong>the</strong><br />
two ma<strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n players – MTN <strong>an</strong>d Vodacom - will rema<strong>in</strong> deeply <strong>in</strong>volved but<br />
MTN will outperform its rival <strong>an</strong>d develop <strong>in</strong>to a formidable mult<strong>in</strong>ational operator. It<br />
will soon overtake Egypt’s Orascom as <strong>Africa</strong>’s biggest player;<br />
2) <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sector will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to exp<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n market, a process<br />
<strong>in</strong> which a number of so-called ‘junior’ m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g comp<strong>an</strong>ies will be active alongside <strong>the</strong><br />
established majors;<br />
3) The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n energy sector (oil, gas <strong>an</strong>d electricity) will <strong>in</strong>tensify its ‘scramble’ to<br />
acquire <strong>Africa</strong>n oil, gas <strong>an</strong>d hydro/water resources as a core strategy to overcome <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>’s develop<strong>in</strong>g energy deficit. We predict, however, that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s desire to<br />
acquire a greater share of <strong>Africa</strong>’s oil resources will not easily be realised;<br />
4) The above notwithst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, we predict that Sasol with its technological edge <strong>in</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g<br />
coal <strong>an</strong>d gas <strong>in</strong>to liquid fuels will be <strong>the</strong> next <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n comp<strong>an</strong>y to develop <strong>in</strong>to a<br />
global player <strong>an</strong>d that its current ‘love-hate’ relationship with <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
government will persist so that <strong>the</strong> possibility of it mov<strong>in</strong>g offshore <strong>an</strong>d delist<strong>in</strong>g from<br />
<strong>the</strong> JSE c<strong>an</strong>not be discounted;<br />
206
5) Despite <strong>the</strong> DRC’s current status as <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s tenth largest trade partner <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>,<br />
we predict that <strong>the</strong> country will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to be a site of considerable <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
political/diplomatic <strong>an</strong>d military activity. More th<strong>an</strong> <strong>the</strong> DRC’s m<strong>in</strong>erals potential, this<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g high level of activity will be driven by <strong>the</strong> long-term import<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> Gr<strong>an</strong>d<br />
Inga hydro-electrical power project;<br />
6) Zimbabwe will rema<strong>in</strong> as <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s most import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>Africa</strong>n trade partner, but under<br />
current conditions <strong>the</strong>re will be little or no <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>new</strong> FDI <strong>in</strong> that country. Indeed,<br />
if <strong>the</strong> Mugabe government carries through with its black economic empowerment<br />
legislation directed at <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sector, <strong>the</strong>re is a prospect of a shut down or divestment<br />
of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g operations <strong>in</strong> that country;<br />
7) We <strong>an</strong>ticipate grow<strong>in</strong>g levels of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n economic <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nigeri<strong>an</strong>,<br />
T<strong>an</strong>z<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>, Zambi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Mozambic<strong>an</strong> economies. In regard to <strong>the</strong> latter, we expect<br />
Mozambique to move up <strong>the</strong> trade-partner league table with <strong>the</strong> possible exp<strong>an</strong>sion of <strong>the</strong><br />
Mozal alum<strong>in</strong>ium smelter project <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g up of Mozambique’s off-shore natural<br />
gas fields;<br />
8) We <strong>an</strong>ticipate <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased role <strong>an</strong>d presence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n market of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
state-backed f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>in</strong>stitutions (<strong>the</strong> Development B<strong>an</strong>k of Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong> (DBSA) <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> IDC) <strong>an</strong>d its private b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g sector. The current modest <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<br />
footpr<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> will grow <strong>in</strong>to a considerable network with St<strong>an</strong>bic, First R<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Barclays/Absa populat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Anglophone <strong>Africa</strong>n l<strong>an</strong>dscape <strong>in</strong> ever <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g numbers.<br />
Telecommunications<br />
If <strong>the</strong>re were <strong>an</strong> award for <strong>the</strong> best perform<strong>in</strong>g post-apar<strong>the</strong>id <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n corporate <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>, it would be won by MTN for what this comp<strong>an</strong>y has achieved <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d beyond<br />
<strong>in</strong> less th<strong>an</strong> a decade is remarkable.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> appall<strong>in</strong>g state by <strong>the</strong> late 1990s of <strong>Africa</strong>’s fixed-l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d telecommunications’<br />
networks, <strong>the</strong> sector was ripe for privatization <strong>an</strong>d MTN was <strong>the</strong> first <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n operator<br />
to take adv<strong>an</strong>tage of <strong>the</strong> market opportunities <strong>the</strong>n open<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. In 1998, it launched<br />
commercial operations <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>an</strong>da, Rw<strong>an</strong>da <strong>an</strong>d Swazil<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d with<strong>in</strong> three years had signed<br />
up one million customers. Its real <strong>Africa</strong>n breakthrough, however, came <strong>in</strong> Nigeria when <strong>in</strong><br />
2001 it was awarded one of Nigeria’s Global Systems Mobile licences for a fee of US$285<br />
million. At <strong>the</strong> time this was MTN’s biggest <strong>in</strong>vestment outside <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d was a move<br />
regarded <strong>in</strong> local corporate circles as a huge gamble given <strong>the</strong> perception that Nigeria was not<br />
a place where outsiders could do bus<strong>in</strong>ess profitably.<br />
MTN entered Nigeria project<strong>in</strong>g that it would take five years before it received <strong>an</strong>y return on<br />
its <strong>in</strong>vestment, which by <strong>the</strong> end of 2003 had topped US$ 1 billion <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>frastructural <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
start-up costs. By <strong>the</strong>n, however, its customer base had topped one million <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> 2004 - two<br />
years ahead of schedule - it recorded <strong>an</strong> after-tax surplus of R2.4 billion, exceed<strong>in</strong>g by R0.2<br />
billion <strong>the</strong> profit it made <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> that year. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> Nigeri<strong>an</strong> operation has<br />
gone from strength to strength <strong>an</strong>d as of 2006 had some 7.6 million Nigeri<strong>an</strong> subscribers.<br />
2005 <strong>an</strong>d early 2006 was a hyperactive period for MTN. Through a <strong>new</strong> round of mergers<br />
<strong>an</strong>d acquisitions, it acquired a 51% majority share <strong>in</strong> Telecel Zambia <strong>an</strong>d Telecel Cote<br />
D’Ivoire, a 44% share <strong>in</strong> Mascom Wireless <strong>in</strong> Botsw<strong>an</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d 100% control of <strong>the</strong> national<br />
operator <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). In a fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>ternationalisation of its<br />
operations, MTN made its first move <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> extra-<strong>Africa</strong>n market acquir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> November<br />
2005 a 49% <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> Ir<strong>an</strong>cell for which it paid <strong>an</strong> up-front license fee of EUR 3000 million.<br />
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In <strong>in</strong>vestment terms, m<strong>an</strong>y regard Ir<strong>an</strong> as politically-risky but this has not daunted <strong>the</strong><br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past <strong>an</strong>d its o<strong>the</strong>r risky <strong>in</strong>vestment doma<strong>in</strong>, Nigeria, has turned, <strong>in</strong>to a ‘cash<br />
cow’ (Sunday Times 07.05.06).<br />
The boldness of its Ir<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> venture was matched <strong>in</strong> May 2006 when MTN purchased <strong>the</strong><br />
Leb<strong>an</strong>on-based Investkom group for R33 billion, giv<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>the</strong>reby a presence <strong>in</strong> 11 fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>an</strong>d Middle Eastern countries. With <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>alisation of this deal, MTN will be<br />
operative <strong>in</strong> 21 countries, 15 of <strong>the</strong>m <strong>Africa</strong>n, <strong>an</strong>d will have a customer base of over 28<br />
million subscribers. With such growth, perhaps <strong>the</strong> real risk <strong>the</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>y now faces is <strong>the</strong><br />
possibilty of a takeover bid by one of <strong>the</strong> global players like Ch<strong>in</strong>a Telekom (Mail <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Guardi<strong>an</strong> 02-08.06.06).<br />
M<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>’s m<strong>in</strong>erals <strong>an</strong>d energy commodities boom has seen m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g groups, big <strong>an</strong>d small, from<br />
all parts of <strong>the</strong> world converge on <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent. This has <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
gi<strong>an</strong>t AngloGold Ash<strong>an</strong>ti – one of <strong>the</strong> world’s two largest gold producers – <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> mediumsized<br />
R<strong>an</strong>dgold <strong>an</strong>d Exploration. Both are <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g gold <strong>in</strong> Mali, Gh<strong>an</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d<br />
T<strong>an</strong>z<strong>an</strong>ia while AngloGold has <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> Namibia <strong>an</strong>d R<strong>an</strong>dgold <strong>in</strong> Senegal <strong>an</strong>d Burk<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Faso. While <strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g heavily <strong>in</strong> its two Mali<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>es, R<strong>an</strong>dgold is engaged <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> aggressive<br />
exploration drive elsewhere <strong>in</strong> Mali <strong>an</strong>d Senegal where it is evaluat<strong>in</strong>g 31 sites, as well as <strong>in</strong><br />
Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso, Gh<strong>an</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d T<strong>an</strong>z<strong>an</strong>ia. The options it holds <strong>in</strong> Cote D’Ivoire are currently on<br />
hold pend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> restoration of stability.<br />
AngloGold is <strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g heavily <strong>in</strong> upgrad<strong>in</strong>g its Gh<strong>an</strong>a<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>es acquired through <strong>the</strong> merger<br />
With Ash<strong>an</strong>ti Gold. The o<strong>the</strong>r major <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n gold m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g group, Gold Fields, has also<br />
entered <strong>the</strong> Mali<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sector by fund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> exploration ventures of <strong>an</strong> Irish group,<br />
Glencar M<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, which has three options <strong>in</strong> Mali. Should <strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong>se prove to be viable,<br />
Gold Fields reserves <strong>the</strong> right to acquire participation rights <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> venture. Current<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicationa are that at least one of <strong>the</strong>se m<strong>in</strong>es will come on stream (Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Day 25.04.06).<br />
While <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s major m<strong>in</strong>ers are focussed on west <strong>Africa</strong>, smaller or so-called ‘junior’<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g groups are concentrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir efforts <strong>in</strong> central sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d east<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>. By <strong>an</strong>d large <strong>the</strong> juniors have moved to take up options <strong>in</strong> some of <strong>Africa</strong>’s high-risk<br />
troublespots, like Zimbabwe <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> eastern DRC, where it seems <strong>the</strong> majors fear <strong>the</strong>y have<br />
too much to lose while <strong>the</strong> juniors are prepared to run <strong>the</strong> risk.<br />
Oil <strong>an</strong>d energy<br />
In <strong>the</strong> third of <strong>the</strong> State of <strong>the</strong> Nation volumes we reported on how <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> was resort<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly to <strong>Africa</strong>’s oil, gas <strong>an</strong>d hydropower resources as a me<strong>an</strong>s to meet<strong>in</strong>g its grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
energy dem<strong>an</strong>ds. We noted also how <strong>in</strong> regard to oil, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> was focuss<strong>in</strong>g on both <strong>the</strong><br />
upstream (exploration <strong>an</strong>d production) <strong>an</strong>d downstream functions (ref<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d retail<strong>in</strong>g). In<br />
regard to this latter, we commented on <strong>the</strong> establishment of <strong>the</strong> Cape Oil <strong>an</strong>d Gas Supply<br />
Initiative (COEGSI) as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative to acquire a larger share of <strong>the</strong> supply side of <strong>the</strong> oil<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustry (rigs, equipment, cloth<strong>in</strong>g, food etc). The <strong>in</strong>itiative has scored some successes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
downstream market. These <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment by Germ<strong>an</strong>y’s MAN Ferrostaal to create <strong>an</strong><br />
off-shore oil <strong>an</strong>d gas fabrication facility on <strong>the</strong> Cape west coast which will employ up to<br />
14,000 workers (<strong>Africa</strong> Investor April 2006:21).<br />
Besides PetroSA’s acquisition <strong>in</strong> April 2006 of a 10% stake <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> oil exploration block off<br />
<strong>the</strong> coast of Namibia, we are aware of only one explorative concession be<strong>in</strong>g acquired on <strong>the</strong><br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ent by a <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n concern <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last year. Aga<strong>in</strong> this was PetroSA which acquired<br />
rights to a petroleum block <strong>in</strong> Egypt’s Gulf of Suez (Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Report 05.05.06). We do not<br />
208
expect <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> to have much future success <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> arena of concessions, unless perhaps<br />
as a junior partner with mult<strong>in</strong>ationals. This is because <strong>the</strong> scramble for <strong>Africa</strong>’s oil<br />
concessions has become ever more competitive <strong>an</strong>d is attract<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> attention of global players<br />
whose resources <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n groups c<strong>an</strong>not match. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g proportion<br />
of <strong>the</strong> bids on offer are for deep-level off-shore fields <strong>an</strong>d <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n bidders c<strong>an</strong>not match<br />
<strong>the</strong> technological resources available to <strong>the</strong> oil mult<strong>in</strong>ationals <strong>in</strong> this niche area. A fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
complication is that as oil prices soar, <strong>Africa</strong>n governments are becom<strong>in</strong>g more aware of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
streng<strong>the</strong>ned barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g position. Thus, not only are <strong>the</strong>y dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g ever higher prices which<br />
only <strong>the</strong> gi<strong>an</strong>ts like Chevron <strong>an</strong>d ExxonMobil <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> state-owned oil comp<strong>an</strong>ies of <strong>the</strong> West<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong>ir Ch<strong>in</strong>ese <strong>an</strong>d Indi<strong>an</strong> counterparts c<strong>an</strong> afford, but <strong>the</strong>y are also dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g larger<br />
offset deals. Thus, for 1`example, <strong>the</strong> Angol<strong>an</strong> government has made it clear that it will look<br />
most favourably at those bidders for sites <strong>in</strong> seven off-shore blocks who are also will<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
<strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> its <strong>new</strong> ref<strong>in</strong>ery <strong>in</strong> Lobito, a project seen by m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> oil trade as economically<br />
unviable. In March 2006, <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese energy comp<strong>an</strong>y, S<strong>in</strong>opec, agreed to <strong>in</strong>vest $3 billion<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ref<strong>in</strong>ery as well as pay $2.4 billion for oil concessions <strong>in</strong> two blocs off <strong>the</strong> Angol<strong>an</strong><br />
coast while ExxonMobil <strong>an</strong>nounced it would spend $2 billion <strong>an</strong>nually <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> exploration,<br />
development <strong>an</strong>d production of oil <strong>an</strong>d gas reserves <strong>in</strong> Nigeria. These are amounts no <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n comp<strong>an</strong>y c<strong>an</strong> match.<br />
Sasol<br />
If <strong>the</strong> above is correct, <strong>the</strong>n Sasol, which already plays a central role <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s energy<br />
sector, will become even more import<strong>an</strong>t. Established as a state-subsidized entity to develop<br />
oil from coil, Sasol has <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last decade become a world leader <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> production of syn<strong>the</strong>tic<br />
liquid fuel from both coal <strong>an</strong>d natural gas. Liquid fuels from gas are cheaper <strong>an</strong>d cle<strong>an</strong>er <strong>an</strong>d<br />
will be used <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> years ahead to power <strong>the</strong> electric power pl<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> is<br />
go<strong>in</strong>g to need. Consequently, Sasol’s expertise is <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased dem<strong>an</strong>d worldwide <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y has become <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> mega gas to liquid schemes <strong>in</strong> Qatar, Ch<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States <strong>an</strong>d Nigeria. The first of <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong> Qatar came on stream <strong>in</strong> June 2006.<br />
Once <strong>an</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id-cosseted corporation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> beneficiary of a r<strong>an</strong>ge of subsidies <strong>an</strong>d tax<br />
breaks, <strong>the</strong> now privatized Sasol is develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a global gi<strong>an</strong>t earn<strong>in</strong>g profits on such a<br />
scale that government is contemplat<strong>in</strong>g impos<strong>in</strong>g a ‘w<strong>in</strong>dfall’ tax regime on <strong>the</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>y.<br />
This suggestion has been met with hostility from Sasol <strong>an</strong>d a th<strong>in</strong>ly-disguised threat to move<br />
offshore. We predict that Sasol’s relationship with government will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to be volatile.<br />
We predict too that while Sasol’s role <strong>an</strong>d import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> local economy will grow, it will<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly f<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational market offers it far more lucrative opportunities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
this will cause tensions around issues like loyalty <strong>an</strong>d core <strong>in</strong>terests. The possibility that Sasol<br />
might relocate abroad <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> next decade should not be discounted, its current protestations<br />
notwithst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The DRC<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> energy considerations above, we predict that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> years ahead <strong>the</strong> DRC will<br />
become central to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s evolv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Africa</strong>n strategy. This will be less a product of <strong>the</strong><br />
DRC’s considerable m<strong>in</strong>eral resources but because its hydropower potential offers a possible<br />
long-term solution to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s emerg<strong>in</strong>g energy crisis. Taspp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to this potenetial is<br />
<strong>the</strong> objective of <strong>the</strong> long-term Gr<strong>an</strong>d Inga project. Its success over <strong>the</strong> pl<strong>an</strong>ned 15-20 year<br />
construction phase will depend, however, on <strong>the</strong> achiev<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce of peace <strong>an</strong>d<br />
stability <strong>in</strong> this conflict-ravaged country. Some progress has been made <strong>in</strong> recent years under<br />
<strong>the</strong> second Kabila regime but <strong>the</strong> years ahead will require a heavy dose of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s<br />
diplomatic energy.<br />
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If this is achieved, <strong>the</strong>re will be o<strong>the</strong>r sp<strong>in</strong>-offs. In a recent Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Day article (02.03.06),<br />
Di<strong>an</strong>na Games noted that <strong>in</strong> recent years ‘hundreds of comp<strong>an</strong>ies have made <strong>the</strong> trek to<br />
K<strong>in</strong>shasa <strong>an</strong>d Lubumbashi to look for opportunities <strong>the</strong>re’. With peace <strong>an</strong>d stability, we would<br />
expect <strong>the</strong> same mushroom<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n bus<strong>in</strong>esses <strong>in</strong> K<strong>in</strong>shasa <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r major<br />
centers, as has occurred <strong>in</strong> Mozambique <strong>an</strong>d Nigeria.<br />
Zimbabwe<br />
By contrast <strong>an</strong>d assum<strong>in</strong>g a cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> political status quo <strong>in</strong> Zimbabwe, we predict<br />
that that country will cont<strong>in</strong>ue as <strong>the</strong> site of a great hum<strong>an</strong> tragedy with negative<br />
consequences for all its neighbours - <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> more th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>y o<strong>the</strong>r. While as of February<br />
2006 <strong>the</strong>re were still 26 <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n comp<strong>an</strong>ies operative <strong>in</strong> Zimbabwe<br />
(IRIN@ir<strong>in</strong><strong>new</strong>s.org 06.02.06), we predict <strong>an</strong> eventual decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> Zimbabwe<strong>an</strong>-<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
trade. Most of <strong>the</strong>se comp<strong>an</strong>ies are operat<strong>in</strong>g at less th<strong>an</strong> full capacity <strong>an</strong>d some are little more<br />
th<strong>an</strong> holdi<strong>in</strong>g operations pend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> eventual ch<strong>an</strong>ge of situation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. In <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>terim, <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of <strong>the</strong> Zimbabwe<strong>an</strong> economy will ultimately impact on<br />
its ability to import <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n products while <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>ticipated semi-nationalisation of <strong>the</strong><br />
Zimbabwe<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sector will lead to a slowdown - <strong>an</strong>d eventual shutdown - of <strong>the</strong> one<br />
sector of that economy still functional <strong>an</strong>d reasonably profitable. Without discount<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
hum<strong>an</strong> tragedy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> result<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>flow <strong>in</strong>to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> of desperate economic refugees, we<br />
predict that Zimbabwe will become less <strong>an</strong>d less relev<strong>an</strong>t to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s evolv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
economic strategy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. It is already beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to move off <strong>the</strong> radar screen.<br />
Mozambique, Nigeria, Zambia <strong>an</strong>d T<strong>an</strong>z<strong>an</strong>ia<br />
This will not be <strong>the</strong> case <strong>in</strong> regard to <strong>the</strong> above countries where we will see cont<strong>in</strong>ued growth<br />
<strong>an</strong>d ever closer ties. In regard to Mozambique, this will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to be largely one-way traffic<br />
with <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n comp<strong>an</strong>ies becom<strong>in</strong>g ever more active <strong>in</strong>side Mozambique. These will be<br />
p<strong>an</strong>-sectoral but will be fuelled largely by those will<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> Mozambique’s abund<strong>an</strong>t<br />
m<strong>in</strong>eral resources.<br />
In regard to Nigeria, <strong>the</strong> picture could be similar provided political stability prevails <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong><br />
government does not lose control of events <strong>in</strong> its oil-rich Delta. Likewise key is Nigeria’s<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g reform of its f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial regulatory system. If <strong>the</strong>se factors materialize positively, not<br />
only will Nigeria supply <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g amounts of oil to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> but its b<strong>an</strong>ks <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dustrial<br />
gi<strong>an</strong>ts will enter <strong>the</strong> local market <strong>in</strong> larger numbers, some <strong>in</strong>itially by way of list<strong>in</strong>gs on <strong>the</strong><br />
JSE. Recently, for example, <strong>the</strong> so-called <strong>in</strong>tegrated energy-solutions firm, O<strong>an</strong>do (listed on<br />
<strong>the</strong> Nigeri<strong>an</strong> stock market with a market capitalisation of US$400 million), applied for a<br />
list<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> JSE. It has set up office <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>dton <strong>an</strong>d is <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> team<strong>in</strong>g up with SASOL<br />
<strong>an</strong>d PetroSA <strong>in</strong> pursuit of gas-to-liquids opportunities <strong>in</strong> West <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Simult<strong>an</strong>eously, we predict that <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n comp<strong>an</strong>ies will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to mushroom across<br />
<strong>the</strong> Nigeri<strong>an</strong> economic l<strong>an</strong>dscape deriv<strong>in</strong>g benefits from a market starved for decades of<br />
quality consumer products.<br />
Almost unnoticed, T<strong>an</strong>z<strong>an</strong>ia has <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last decade become <strong>the</strong> site of considerable <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n economic activity. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> estimated <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n expatriate population <strong>in</strong><br />
T<strong>an</strong>z<strong>an</strong>ia of between 4-5000 is <strong>the</strong> largest such cluster of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Located<br />
primarily <strong>in</strong> Dar es Salaam <strong>an</strong>d Arusha, it operates <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> retail, b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, construction, m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g,<br />
leisure <strong>an</strong>d tourism, <strong>an</strong>d telecommunications sectors. While Shoprite is clearly <strong>the</strong><br />
supermarket of choice amongst local shoppers, <strong>the</strong>re is also some resentment at <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
presence of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns, dubbed by those hostile to <strong>the</strong>m as <strong>the</strong> ‘kuburu’( a derivative of<br />
<strong>the</strong> word ‘boer’). Particular resentment is directed at <strong>the</strong> rough <strong>an</strong>d tough labour regime<br />
operative at <strong>the</strong> T<strong>an</strong>z<strong>an</strong>iteOne m<strong>in</strong>e, a facility described by one researcher as be<strong>in</strong>g run along<br />
210
<strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>es of a n<strong>in</strong>eteenth-century frontier comp<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Americ<strong>an</strong> west (Schroeder <strong>in</strong>terview<br />
24.03.06). With <strong>the</strong> T<strong>an</strong>z<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> government keen to exp<strong>an</strong>d its economic ties with <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re is little doubt that <strong>the</strong> volume of trade between two old ‘struggle’ allies will soar<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> decade ahead.<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s corporate presence <strong>in</strong> Zambia dates back to colonial times with Anglo-<br />
Americ<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> copper <strong>in</strong>dustry. That presence shr<strong>an</strong>k after <strong>in</strong>dependence with<br />
<strong>the</strong> partial nationalisation of <strong>the</strong> copper sector but never entirely disappeared. The startl<strong>in</strong>g<br />
price recovery of Zambi<strong>an</strong> copper on <strong>the</strong> world market <strong>in</strong> recent times has seen <strong>South</strong><br />
Afgric<strong>an</strong> capital pour back <strong>in</strong>to Zambis. In 2006, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> overtook Brita<strong>in</strong> as <strong>the</strong> largest<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestor <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> local economy, pour<strong>in</strong>g some $373 million <strong>in</strong>to agriculture, m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
tourism, retail <strong>an</strong>d services sectors, creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Chicago Tribune<br />
( 20.04.04), nearly 22,000 <strong>new</strong> jobs. With <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>erals’ boom likely to persist, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
capital will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to look at Zambia as a site of opportunity.<br />
B<strong>an</strong>ks <strong>an</strong>d F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Institutions<br />
The ‘big four’ <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g groups are Nedb<strong>an</strong>k, FirstR<strong>an</strong>d (which has First<br />
National B<strong>an</strong>k (FNB) as a subsidiary), St<strong>an</strong>dard B<strong>an</strong>k <strong>an</strong>d Absa. When <strong>the</strong>y launched <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
post-1990s push <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>the</strong>y faced a market largely dom<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong> HSBC, Citigroup,<br />
St<strong>an</strong>dard Chartered <strong>an</strong>d Barclays. Their own extra-<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n presence was m<strong>in</strong>imal with<br />
St<strong>an</strong>dard hav<strong>in</strong>g operations <strong>in</strong> Namibia <strong>an</strong>d Swazil<strong>an</strong>d while <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r three were limited to<br />
Namibia. In <strong>the</strong> last decade, each has exp<strong>an</strong>ded <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>Africa</strong>n footpr<strong>in</strong>t signific<strong>an</strong>tly. St<strong>an</strong>dard<br />
is <strong>the</strong> largest with operations <strong>in</strong> 16 countries outside of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> while Nedb<strong>an</strong>k has six<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n outlets, Absa five <strong>an</strong>d FNB three.<br />
Despite all of <strong>the</strong> above activity, <strong>Africa</strong>’s contribution to <strong>the</strong> big four’s bottom l<strong>in</strong>e is modest.<br />
In 2005 <strong>the</strong>ir comb<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>Africa</strong>n operations contributed only ten per cent to <strong>the</strong>ir overall<br />
earn<strong>in</strong>gs with First R<strong>an</strong>d’s, Absa’s <strong>an</strong>d Nedb<strong>an</strong>k’s <strong>Africa</strong>n assets contribut<strong>in</strong>g only 4%, 1.7%<br />
<strong>an</strong>d 0.05% respectively to headl<strong>in</strong>e earn<strong>in</strong>gs. So, why do <strong>the</strong>y bo<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n market?<br />
The <strong>an</strong>swer is likely a comb<strong>in</strong>ation that <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>y see <strong>the</strong> market as hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
potential, albeit modest by comparison with <strong>the</strong>ir local operations, while also serv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g needs of m<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>the</strong>ir major <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n corporate clients as <strong>the</strong>y move <strong>in</strong>to <strong>new</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d sometimes unfamiliar operat<strong>in</strong>g environments.<br />
Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most signific<strong>an</strong>t development <strong>in</strong> recent times <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g circles has<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved Brita<strong>in</strong>’s Barclays B<strong>an</strong>k tak<strong>in</strong>g a 60% sharehold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Absa. This will also impact on<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n b<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g scene as <strong>the</strong> second phase of <strong>the</strong> merger, which is to be realised <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
period 2005-07, will <strong>in</strong>volve Absa tak<strong>in</strong>g control of all of Barclay’s current <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
operations bar that of Egypt (which <strong>in</strong> operational terms Barclays regards as part of its Middle<br />
Eastern cluster). Barclays is currently active <strong>in</strong> 11 <strong>Africa</strong>n countries outside of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Given Absa’s current location <strong>in</strong> T<strong>an</strong>z<strong>an</strong>ia <strong>an</strong>d Zimbabwe, <strong>the</strong> deal will boost <strong>the</strong> b<strong>an</strong>k’s<br />
profile from five to thirteen countries <strong>an</strong>d will vault it <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> big league of <strong>Africa</strong>n b<strong>an</strong>ks. A<br />
feature of <strong>the</strong> merger is that Absa’s <strong>in</strong>vestment vehicle (<strong>the</strong> Corporate <strong>an</strong>d Merch<strong>an</strong>t B<strong>an</strong>k)<br />
will merge with Barclay’s <strong>in</strong>vestment arm, <strong>the</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation of which will create a major <strong>new</strong><br />
fund<strong>in</strong>g force on <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent, one which it claims will focus on m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g projects.<br />
Operat<strong>in</strong>g alongside <strong>the</strong> private b<strong>an</strong>ks has been <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s two state-owned development<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>stitutions, <strong>the</strong> IDC <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> DBSA. Both were apar<strong>the</strong>id-era creations <strong>an</strong>d limited to<br />
<strong>the</strong> local market but both have s<strong>in</strong>ce 1994 been unshackled <strong>an</strong>d allowed to move <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>in</strong>terior. The IDC’s m<strong>an</strong>date is to fund private projects that are commercially viable<br />
(produce returns) <strong>an</strong>d which will have a development impact. To <strong>the</strong>se ends, <strong>the</strong> IDC relates<br />
to <strong>Africa</strong> through equity <strong>in</strong>vestments, commercial lo<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d export f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce. The DBSA has a<br />
211
three-pronged role as ‘f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cier’ of debt <strong>an</strong>d equity commitments, a ‘partner’ <strong>in</strong> knowledge<br />
shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d equity commitments <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> ‘advisor’ on projects <strong>an</strong>d o<strong>the</strong>r developmental issues<br />
(www.dbsa.org.za).<br />
In <strong>the</strong> 2004-2005 f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial year, 24% of <strong>the</strong> DBSA’s <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>an</strong>d lend<strong>in</strong>g operations were<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> SADC arena. To date, it has committed to over 120 projects <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. These have<br />
<strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>the</strong> Lesotho Highl<strong>an</strong>ds Water Project; <strong>the</strong> Mozambique to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> Natural Gas<br />
project, which entailed a lo<strong>an</strong> to SASOL; <strong>the</strong> Mozal alum<strong>in</strong>ium smelter; <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> N4 toll-road<br />
component of <strong>the</strong> Maputo Corridor. Elsewhere <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>the</strong> DBSA has focussed on water<br />
<strong>an</strong>d electricity energy projects, telecommunications, hous<strong>in</strong>g, agriculture <strong>an</strong>d agro-process<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
66% of its <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> 2004 were geared at energy-related <strong>in</strong>frastructure.<br />
With regards to its <strong>Africa</strong>n operations, <strong>the</strong> IDC is m<strong>an</strong>dated to assist <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> development of<br />
projects, as well as acquisitions <strong>an</strong>d exp<strong>an</strong>sion. With regard to equity <strong>in</strong>vestments, <strong>the</strong> IDC is<br />
restricted to no more th<strong>an</strong> a 50% stake <strong>in</strong> SADC-based projects <strong>an</strong>d a 25% stake <strong>in</strong> projects <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> outside of SADC. The IDC also requires that projects must <strong>in</strong> some way stimulate<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n exports.<br />
By June 2004, <strong>the</strong> IDC had 89 projects <strong>an</strong>d export-f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g schemes <strong>in</strong> 28 <strong>Africa</strong>n countries,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g several signific<strong>an</strong>t m<strong>in</strong>eral projects, like <strong>the</strong> Corridor S<strong>an</strong>ds tit<strong>an</strong>ium project <strong>in</strong><br />
Mozambique; <strong>the</strong> K<strong>an</strong>sh<strong>an</strong>si copper m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g project <strong>in</strong> Zambia, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Kolwezi Tail<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
project <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> DRC, which extracts copper <strong>an</strong>d cobalt from tail<strong>in</strong>gs (waste material from<br />
previous m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g ventures). The IDC’s top eight countries by exposure as of September 2005<br />
were Mozambique ($577m), Nigeria ($23m), Zambia ($32m), Lesotho ($31), Swazil<strong>an</strong>d<br />
($17m), Malawi <strong>an</strong>d, Mauritius (both $13m) <strong>an</strong>d Namibia (US$10m).<br />
Conclusion<br />
Clearly, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n capital has emerged as a signific<strong>an</strong>t economic force <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
1990 <strong>an</strong>d its presence will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to exp<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> years ahead. Yet, we return aga<strong>in</strong> to <strong>the</strong><br />
po<strong>in</strong>ts made earlier <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> paper, namely, that as <strong>an</strong> export dest<strong>in</strong>ation, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n market has<br />
levelled out <strong>an</strong>d is unlikely to grow signific<strong>an</strong>tly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> period ahead. Certa<strong>in</strong>ly it will <strong>in</strong> no<br />
way challenge <strong>the</strong> primacy of <strong>the</strong> Asi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> arenas. It will be <strong>the</strong>se two markets<br />
that will constitute <strong>the</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>es of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s future export growth.<br />
References<br />
D<strong>an</strong>iel J, Naidoo V & Naidu S (2003) ‘The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns have arrived’: post-apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
corporate exp<strong>an</strong>sion <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Africa</strong>. In D<strong>an</strong>iel J, Habib A & <strong>South</strong>all R. (eds.) The State of <strong>the</strong><br />
Nation: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2003-2004. Cape Town: HSRC Press.<br />
D<strong>an</strong>iel J, Lutchm<strong>an</strong> J & Naidu S. (2004) <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Nigeria: two unequal centres <strong>in</strong> a<br />
periphery. In D<strong>an</strong>iel J, <strong>South</strong>all, R & Lutchm<strong>an</strong> J. (eds.) The State of <strong>the</strong> Nation: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
2004-2005. Cape Town: HSRC Press.<br />
D<strong>an</strong>iel J & Lutchm<strong>an</strong> J (2005) <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: scrambl<strong>in</strong>g for energy. In Buhlungu S,<br />
D<strong>an</strong>iel J, <strong>South</strong>all, R & Lutchm<strong>an</strong> J (eds.) The State of <strong>the</strong> Nation: <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 2005-2006.<br />
Cape Town: HSRC Press.<br />
Grobbelaar N (2006) <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Corporate Engagement with <strong>Africa</strong>: unpack<strong>in</strong>g negative<br />
<strong>an</strong>d positive perceptions. In SAIIA (ed.) <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Yearbook of International Affairs<br />
2005/06. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg. SAIIA.<br />
Mills G (2006) Ten th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>Africa</strong> c<strong>an</strong> do for itself. Wash<strong>in</strong>gton DC: <strong>the</strong> Heritage Foundation,<br />
February.<br />
Rumney R (2006) <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>’s FDI flows <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Africa</strong>. Presentation to <strong>the</strong> National Treasury<br />
Interdepartmental Workshop. Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg, 15 February.<br />
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18 List of authors<br />
John Appolis<br />
John Appolis is a long st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g activist <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> trade union movement <strong>an</strong>d social movement.<br />
Presently, he holds <strong>the</strong> position of secretary <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent union GIWUSA <strong>an</strong>d is <strong>the</strong><br />
deputy chairperson of <strong>the</strong> Anti-privatisation Forum.<br />
Patrick Bond<br />
Patrick Bond is a political economist with longst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g research <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>an</strong>d NGO work <strong>in</strong><br />
urb<strong>an</strong> communities <strong>an</strong>d with global justice movements <strong>in</strong> several countries. He is professor at<br />
University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Development Studies where he directs <strong>the</strong> Centre for<br />
Civil Society <strong>an</strong>d is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> research on economic justice, energy <strong>an</strong>d water.<br />
L<strong>in</strong>da Chisholm<br />
Professor Chisholm is <strong>the</strong> Research Director of Child, Youth, Family <strong>an</strong>d Social development<br />
at <strong>the</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Research Council. She has worked <strong>in</strong> different universities <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
abroad on educational <strong>an</strong>d policy related matters. She has participated <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d chaired different<br />
policy mak<strong>in</strong>g committees <strong>in</strong> education.<br />
Eddie Cottle<br />
Eddie Cottle is <strong>an</strong> activist <strong>an</strong>d researcher.<br />
He is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> Umzabalazo we Jubilee <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> Social Movements Indaba.<br />
John D<strong>an</strong>iel<br />
Professor John D<strong>an</strong>iel has taught at universities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States, Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>an</strong>ds, Swazil<strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. He was a member of <strong>the</strong> research department of <strong>the</strong> Truth <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Reconciliation Commission from 1996-2001 <strong>an</strong>d recently retired from a research directorship<br />
<strong>in</strong> democracy <strong>an</strong>d govern<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>the</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Sciences Research Council (HSRC). He is<br />
currently one of <strong>the</strong> editors of <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>nual State of <strong>the</strong> Nation volume published by <strong>the</strong> HSRC<br />
Press.<br />
David Everatt<br />
David Everatt is Director of Strategy & Tactics, one of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>'s lead<strong>in</strong>g development<br />
research agencies; <strong>an</strong>d a Visit<strong>in</strong>g Research Fellow at <strong>the</strong> school of Public & Development<br />
M<strong>an</strong>agement, University of <strong>the</strong> Witwatersr<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
Stephen Gelb<br />
Stephen Gelb is Executive Director of The EDGE Institute <strong>an</strong>d Visit<strong>in</strong>g Professor of<br />
Economics at <strong>the</strong> University of <strong>the</strong> Witwatersr<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg. He has worked as <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>tiapar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
activist <strong>in</strong> C<strong>an</strong>ada, as a policy <strong>an</strong>alyst at <strong>the</strong> Development B<strong>an</strong>k of Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong>,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d taught economics <strong>an</strong>d political economy at York University, <strong>the</strong> New School for Social<br />
Research, <strong>an</strong>d University of Durb<strong>an</strong>-Westville. He has been a consult<strong>an</strong>t for <strong>the</strong> ANC,<br />
213
COSATU, <strong>the</strong> SA Council of Churches, several SA government departments, <strong>the</strong> World<br />
B<strong>an</strong>k, UNCATD <strong>an</strong>d UNIDO. He has written widely on <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n economic <strong>an</strong>d political<br />
issues.<br />
Gorm Gunnarsen<br />
Gorm Gunnarsen holds <strong>an</strong> MA from <strong>the</strong> Institute for <strong>History</strong> <strong>an</strong>d a PhD from <strong>the</strong> English<br />
Institute, University of Copenhagen, where he has worked as a lecturer. He has also been<br />
teach<strong>in</strong>g history <strong>an</strong>d English at upper secondary schools. For several years he was <strong>the</strong><br />
chairm<strong>an</strong> of <strong>the</strong> D<strong>an</strong>ish <strong>an</strong>ti-apar<strong>the</strong>id movement (SAC). He has published several books on<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d solidarity issues.<br />
David Hemson<br />
Dr David Hemson is a Research Associate of <strong>the</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Sciences Research Council (HSRC)<br />
<strong>in</strong> Durb<strong>an</strong>. He has published articles <strong>an</strong>d books on <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n trade union development<br />
<strong>an</strong>d social issues.<br />
Fred Hendricks<br />
Fred Hendricks is currently <strong>the</strong> De<strong>an</strong> of Hum<strong>an</strong>ities at Rhodes University <strong>in</strong> Grahamstown.<br />
He is also Professor of Sociology <strong>an</strong>d was for m<strong>an</strong>y years HOD of Sociology at Rhodes <strong>an</strong>d at<br />
<strong>the</strong> University of <strong>the</strong> Western Cape. He obta<strong>in</strong>ed his PhD <strong>in</strong> Sociology from Uppsala<br />
University <strong>in</strong> Sweden. He was president of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Sociological Association.<br />
Se<strong>an</strong> Jacobs<br />
Se<strong>an</strong> Jacobs is assist<strong>an</strong>t professor of communication studies <strong>an</strong>d <strong>Africa</strong>n Studies at <strong>the</strong><br />
University of Michig<strong>an</strong>, Ann Arbor <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States. He held a postdoctoral fellowship at<br />
New York University <strong>an</strong>d fellowships at Harvard University <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> New School for Social<br />
Research. Previously he worked as a political researcher for <strong>the</strong> Institute for Democracy <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (IDASA) <strong>in</strong> Cape Town, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. His popular writ<strong>in</strong>g has appeared <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
The Nation (New York), The Mail & Guardi<strong>an</strong> (Joh<strong>an</strong>nesburg) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>Africa</strong> Confidential<br />
(London). He co-edited Thabo Mbeki's World: The Politics <strong>an</strong>d Ideology of <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
President (Zed Books, 2002).<br />
Jonath<strong>an</strong> J<strong>an</strong>sen<br />
Jonath<strong>an</strong> D. J<strong>an</strong>sen serves as De<strong>an</strong> of Education at <strong>the</strong> University of Pretoria <strong>an</strong>d as Vice<br />
President of <strong>the</strong> Academy of Science of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. His doctoral studies on <strong>the</strong> state <strong>an</strong>d<br />
curriculum <strong>in</strong> Zimbabwe was completed at St<strong>an</strong>ford (1991) <strong>an</strong>d his MS <strong>in</strong> science education<br />
at Cornell University (1987). His latest (co-edited) book is on comparative education policy<br />
<strong>an</strong>d law <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> USA, <strong>an</strong>d his most recent publications on <strong>the</strong> leadership of<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sition (<strong>in</strong> journals such as Harvard Educational Review, Journal of Educational Ch<strong>an</strong>ge,<br />
Leadership <strong>an</strong>d Policy <strong>in</strong> Schools). He recently received <strong>an</strong> Honorary Doctorate <strong>in</strong> Education<br />
from University of Ed<strong>in</strong>burgh <strong>an</strong>d several national awards for research <strong>an</strong>d research capacity<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
214
Pallo Jord<strong>an</strong><br />
Pallo Jord<strong>an</strong> is <strong>the</strong> current M<strong>in</strong>ister of Arts <strong>an</strong>d Culture <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. He became head of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ANC's Research Unit <strong>in</strong> 1980. He has been a member of ANC’s National Executive<br />
Committee from 1985. Pallo Jord<strong>an</strong> was sworn <strong>in</strong> as a Member of Parliament <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ister for<br />
Posts, Telecommunications <strong>an</strong>d Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1994. In 1996 he was M<strong>in</strong>ister for<br />
Environmental Affairs <strong>an</strong>d Tourism. Between 1999 <strong>an</strong>d 2004 he was chairperson of <strong>the</strong><br />
Foreign Affairs Committee <strong>in</strong> Parliament. In April 2004 President Mbeki appo<strong>in</strong>ted Dr Jord<strong>an</strong><br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister of Arts <strong>an</strong>d Culture.<br />
Patrick Mac M<strong>an</strong>us<br />
Patrick Mac M<strong>an</strong>us is a long st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g activist, born <strong>in</strong> Irel<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> D<strong>an</strong>ish solidarity<br />
movements. In <strong>the</strong> turbulent years before 1990, he was chairm<strong>an</strong> of <strong>the</strong> D<strong>an</strong>ish <strong>an</strong>ti-apar<strong>the</strong>id<br />
movement (LSA/SAK). He has been engaged <strong>in</strong> <strong>History</strong>, Philosophy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>Africa</strong>n Studies. He<br />
has taught at several D<strong>an</strong>ish educational <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d published poems <strong>an</strong>d books on<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n culture.<br />
Neva Seidm<strong>an</strong> Makgetla<br />
Dr Makgetla completed her BA (Hons) at Harvard University, <strong>an</strong>d her PhD <strong>in</strong> Economics <strong>in</strong><br />
Berl<strong>in</strong>. She has lectured <strong>in</strong> Economics at universities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> U.S., <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong><br />
University of <strong>the</strong> Witwatersr<strong>an</strong>d. She has worked for <strong>the</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Government as Chief<br />
Director for Fiscal Policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> RDP Office <strong>an</strong>d as Director of Research <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />
Labour. From early 2001 she has been head COSATU’s policy unit.<br />
He<strong>in</strong> Marais<br />
He<strong>in</strong> Marais is a <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n writer <strong>an</strong>d journalist. He is <strong>the</strong> author of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Limits<br />
to Ch<strong>an</strong>ge—The political-economy of tr<strong>an</strong>sition (Juta/Zed), To <strong>the</strong> Edge: AIDS policy <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (University of Pretoria), <strong>an</strong>d most recently Buckl<strong>in</strong>g: The impact of AIDS <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> (University of Pretoria), as well as numerous essays <strong>an</strong>d articles on politics <strong>an</strong>d<br />
development <strong>in</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. He is <strong>the</strong> co-author of <strong>the</strong> United Nations’ 2002 Report on <strong>the</strong><br />
global AIDS epidemic (UNAIDS), <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>in</strong>ce 2001 has been <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cipal author of <strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>nual<br />
AIDS Epidemic Update report issued by <strong>the</strong> United Nations.<br />
Morten Nielsen<br />
Morten Nielsen has worked as chairm<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d co-ord<strong>in</strong>ator for Sou<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Africa</strong> Contact (SAK)<br />
<strong>the</strong> former <strong>an</strong>ti-apar<strong>the</strong>id movement <strong>in</strong> Denmark for m<strong>an</strong>y years. He has also been work<strong>in</strong>g as<br />
a journalist for <strong>the</strong> D<strong>an</strong>ish NGO sector <strong>an</strong>d has been <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> several book projects.<br />
Lungisile Ntsebeza<br />
Lungisile Ntsebeza (PhD) is Associate Professor <strong>an</strong>d Head of <strong>the</strong> L<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d Govern<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
Research Group <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department of Sociology at <strong>the</strong> University of Cape Town. He is also<br />
Chief Research Specialist <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Democracy <strong>an</strong>d Govern<strong>an</strong>ce Unit of <strong>the</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Sciences<br />
Research Council. His book Democracy Compromised: chiefs <strong>an</strong>d <strong>the</strong> politics of l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> came out <strong>in</strong> 2005. Ntsebeza has also edited, with Ruth Hall, L<strong>an</strong>d Reform <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>in</strong> 2006.<br />
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Kwesi Kwaa Prah<br />
Kwesi Kwaa Prah is Emeritus Professor of Sociology, University of <strong>the</strong> Western Cape <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Professor Extraord<strong>in</strong>ary at <strong>the</strong> University of <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. He is currently Director of <strong>the</strong><br />
Centre for Adv<strong>an</strong>ced Studies of <strong>Africa</strong>n Society (CASAS) based <strong>in</strong> Cape Town.<br />
H<strong>an</strong>s Erik Stolten<br />
H<strong>an</strong>s Erik Stolten holds <strong>an</strong> MA <strong>an</strong>d a PhD <strong>in</strong> history from <strong>the</strong> University of Copenhagen,<br />
where he has worked as a lecturer <strong>an</strong>d research fellow at <strong>the</strong> Centre of <strong>Africa</strong>n Studies. He<br />
worked as author <strong>an</strong>d reader on <strong>the</strong> Great D<strong>an</strong>ish Encyclopaedia. Previously, he was<br />
employed by <strong>the</strong> D<strong>an</strong>ish Public Record Office. He has written articles, reviews <strong>an</strong>d reports for<br />
several periodicals <strong>an</strong>d has been editor <strong>an</strong>d co-author of books on <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n history <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-apar<strong>the</strong>id movement. He worked for three years as a Research Fellow at <strong>the</strong> Nordic<br />
<strong>Africa</strong> Institute <strong>in</strong> Uppsala, Sweden.<br />
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