Criminal Politics: Violence, âGodfathersâ and Corruption in Nigeria

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Role of Nigeria’s Federal Government Many activists and ordinary Nigerians with whom Human Rights Watch has spoken have described the situation in the country since the return to civilian rule in 1999 as one of betrayal. As described in this report, many of Nigeria’s worst human rights problems have become deeply entrenched over the past eight years along with the openly corrupt, abusive and criminal conduct of many government and political party officials. Government at all levels denies ordinary Nigerians a genuine voice in selecting their leaders, fails to protect the populace from the violence linked to power struggles between members of the political elite, and has been selective and ineffectual in combating the corruption and mismanagement that have led government to fail in meeting some of its most basic human rights obligations. During the Obasanjo administration, the limited and inconsistent efforts to address corruption and improve governance had little impact curtailing abuses. Challenges and Possibilities If President Yar’Adua’s government is to succeed where its predecessor failed, it will need to implement a broadly based and persistent reform effort. This is a daunting and long term task, but there are some discreet and relatively straightforward policy steps the administration could undertake that could generate momentum towards more far reaching reforms and real benefit for the Nigerian population. Human Rights Watch’s recommendations to the Nigerian government and international community are set forth at the beginning of this report. As a first and very important step, the Yar’Adua government must acknowledge the genuine problem before it, which is not primarily one of imperfect institutions, but rather a failure of those in power to obey existing laws or ensure accountability for politically motivated offenses. It may be unrealistic to expect President Yar’Adua to publicly acknowledge the extent to which his own government’s election was the product of fraud and abuse, but if his administration’s response to Nigeria’s crisis of governance is to be meaningful and far-reaching, it must at least implicitly take that reality into account. The problems that derailed the 2007 elections are the same 103 Human Rights Watch October 2007
problems that have crippled the capacity of Nigeria’s government and left it riddled with corruption and abuse. The Yar’Adua government must also undertake an impartial and comprehensive inquiry into the most serious allegations of corruption and human rights abuses implicating elected officials at all levels of government since the return to civilian rule. Evidence of criminal wrongdoing by politicians and government officials should result in criminal investigations. In particular, the Yar’Adua government should set a new tone by responding to credible allegations of corruption and political violence by government officials with criminal investigations and, where warranted, prosecutions. President Yar’Adua’s reformation of two key institutions that were central to securing the widespread PDP victories will be a crucial undertaking. In 2007 Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) discredited itself by trying to force opponents of President Obasanjo off of the ballot papers and by enthusiastically embracing the fraudulent results of the process it had organized. Nigeria’s federal police force and the EFCC have also suffered devastating blows to their effectiveness and credibility. The EFCC’s reputation was so badly tarnished during the election that the International Crisis Group called for a moratorium on all EFCC prosecutions until the institution’s independence and neutrality could be guaranteed. 367 These and other institutions are in need of effective and comprehensive reform. But the best way to improve upon the integrity of the police, INEC, the EFCC and other institutions is to make it impossible for those in government to attempt to subvert those institutions with impunity. The administration of President Yar’Adua will face daunting challenges should it seek to tackle the corruption, violence and impunity deeply rooted in Nigeria’s governance. President Yar’Adua came into office with a reputation for personal probity relative to other Nigerian politicians. Nonetheless, as described above, during Yar’Adua’s tenure as governor in Katsina State his administration sponsored groups that carried out political violence in support of the PDP. 368 In the 2007 367 International Crisis Group, “Failed Elections, Failing State?” 368 See above, Government Sponsorship of Political Thugs in Katsina State. Criminal Politics 104
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Nigeria Criminal Politics Violence,
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The Nigerian Police and Impunity fo
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In 1999, Nigeria’s military relin
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to account for their open mobilizat
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Recommendations To the government o
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To the Nigerian Police Force • Pr
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Historical Background and Context N
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Many Nigerians initially welcomed t
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elections should it choose to do so
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Foreign observers and Nigerian civi
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undertaken by Human Rights Watch an
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killed during the weeks surrounding
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and I fell down. After I fell down
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dating back to their days at univer
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Nnamdi Azikwe campus in Awka had be
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Human Rights Watch days later, his
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There is no question we can’t rel
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over the eight years of the Obasanj
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Money flows up and down…these hon
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along with at least two to three bu
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The best thing you can get is a mul
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During the 2007 elections, oppositi
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followed up by any meaningful actio
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police force and address serious po
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police’s shortcomings as an insti
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One should expect by now that issue
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2007 elections but then taken off i
Page 55 and 56: Case Study A: Oyo State This is whe
Page 57 and 58: Adedibu’s War Against Ladoja Rash
Page 59 and 60: The attempt to impeach Ladoja ended
Page 61 and 62: saw four or five people and they ju
Page 63 and 64: Ibadan. 197 Especially in Ibadan, A
Page 65 and 66: Box 4: A Future Governor Discusses
Page 67 and 68: apparent purpose of creating lists
Page 69 and 70: servants of attacking the NURTW men
Page 71 and 72: Among the politicians Chris Uba “
Page 73 and 74: Ngige—like much of the Nigerian p
Page 75 and 76: that purported “impeachment” pr
Page 77 and 78: Peter Obi was reinstated in Februar
Page 79 and 80: Fighting Over the Spoils According
Page 81 and 82: in Anambra reached the same conclus
Page 83 and 84: Case Study C: Rivers State They buy
Page 85 and 86: There are widespread complaints amo
Page 87 and 88: esponse to concerns that Igodo was
Page 89 and 90: In 1999 and 2003, [Governor] Odili
Page 91 and 92: The night before the April 14 elect
Page 93 and 94: Tom, or their former political spon
Page 95 and 96: In parallel with other situations d
Page 97 and 98: Kalare Violence and the 2007 Electi
Page 99 and 100: International observers told Human
Page 101 and 102: eportedly urged his disgruntled opp
Page 103 and 104: and encourages a greater scale of l
Page 105: A few minutes earlier, internationa
Page 109 and 110: Yar’Adua has also promised to str
Page 111 and 112: The International Response to Niger
Page 113 and 114: after the rigged elections made no
Page 115 and 116: firmly fixed at the opposite extrem
Page 117 and 118: Criminal Politics 114
Page 125: H UMAN R I GHTS WATCH 350 Fifth Ave
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Criminal Politics: Violence, âGodfathersâ and Corruption in Nigeria

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Criminal Politics: Violence, âGodfathersâ and Corruption in Nigeria