Criminal Politics: Violence, âGodfathersâ and Corruption in Nigeria

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Nigeria’s police must make political violence an investigative priority and be given the autonomy and resources for effective and impartial investigations. The credibility of vital anti-corruption institutions must be bolstered by new and public commitments to uphold their independence—a commitment that would be best demonstrated by allowing them to pursue some of Nigeria’s most corrupt ruling party politicians. Nigeria’s international partners also have a role to play. Nigeria’s foreign and regional partners should be more forthright in criticizing the very serious shortcomings of Nigeria’s democracy that infringe upon the rights of its populace and insist upon meaningful reform. This would include urging the federal government of Nigeria to vigorously investigate and prosecute key politicians and their financial sponsors responsible for political violence during the recent elections, and to institute necessary reforms to end such practices. Nigerian politicians must come to recognize that political violence is not about who wins the next election, but that it has important implications for the rights and well-being of all Nigerians that extend far beyond election day. The report is based largely on two four-week Human Rights Watch research missions to Nigeria in early 2007 before, during, and after the April 2007 elections. This included field research in Anambra, Delta, Ekiti, Gombe, Katsina, Lagos, Oyo, and Rivers States and interviews in the capital Abuja. While patterns of abuse in some of those states are among Nigeria’s worst, they are not atypical in nature, and the federal government’s failure to tackle their underlying causes is common to the whole of Nigeria. Human Rights Watch conducted more than one hundred interviews with federal, state, and local public officials; politicians from ruling and opposition political parties; journalists; civil society workers; religious leaders; lawyers; members of armed gangs and cult groups; political godfathers; and victims of human rights abuse. The names of many interviewees have been withheld to protect them from possible reprisal. 5 Human Rights Watch October 2007
Recommendations To the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria • Launch a transparent, comprehensive, and impartial inquiry into allegations of corruption, vote-rigging, and sponsorship of political violence during Nigeria’s April 2007 elections. The inquiry should aim to uncover the architects and sponsors of such crimes, focusing especially on: o The role of elected officials and the leadership of federal institutions including Nigeria’s police force and Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and o Allegations of improper political manipulation of the EFCC, INEC, the police and other government institutions prior to and during the 2007 election campaign. This inquiry should be implemented by an independent body created and overseen with the input of stakeholders including civil society groups. Findings should be made public and should result in criminal investigations in which there is evidence of criminal wrongdoing. The inquiry should also result in recommendations to be taken into account by Nigeria’s Electoral Reform Panel. • Enact and aggressively implement the Freedom of Information Bill, which would provide Nigerians a tool to compel government institutions to make public important information including basic data concerning expenditures and government policy. • Respect the independence of Nigeria’s Electoral Reform Panel, ensure the transparency of its deliberations and conclusions, and publicly explain in detail the reasons for enacting each of the Panel’s recommendations, or for not doing so. • Enact a law requiring the president, all members of the National Assembly and all ministers in the federal cabinet to follow and sustain President Criminal Politics 6
Page 1 and 2: Nigeria Criminal Politics Violence,
Page 3 and 4: The Nigerian Police and Impunity fo
Page 5 and 6: In 1999, Nigeria’s military relin
Page 7: to account for their open mobilizat
Page 11 and 12: To the Nigerian Police Force • Pr
Page 13 and 14: Historical Background and Context N
Page 15 and 16: Many Nigerians initially welcomed t
Page 17 and 18: elections should it choose to do so
Page 19 and 20: Foreign observers and Nigerian civi
Page 21 and 22: undertaken by Human Rights Watch an
Page 23 and 24: killed during the weeks surrounding
Page 25 and 26: and I fell down. After I fell down
Page 27 and 28: dating back to their days at univer
Page 29 and 30: Nnamdi Azikwe campus in Awka had be
Page 31 and 32: Human Rights Watch days later, his
Page 33 and 34: There is no question we can’t rel
Page 35 and 36: over the eight years of the Obasanj
Page 37 and 38: Money flows up and down…these hon
Page 39 and 40: along with at least two to three bu
Page 41 and 42: The best thing you can get is a mul
Page 43 and 44: During the 2007 elections, oppositi
Page 45 and 46: followed up by any meaningful actio
Page 47 and 48: police force and address serious po
Page 49 and 50: police’s shortcomings as an insti
Page 51 and 52: One should expect by now that issue
Page 53 and 54: 2007 elections but then taken off i
Page 55 and 56: Case Study A: Oyo State This is whe
Page 57 and 58: Adedibu’s War Against Ladoja Rash
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The attempt to impeach Ladoja ended
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saw four or five people and they ju
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Ibadan. 197 Especially in Ibadan, A
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Box 4: A Future Governor Discusses
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apparent purpose of creating lists
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servants of attacking the NURTW men
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Among the politicians Chris Uba “
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Ngige—like much of the Nigerian p
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that purported “impeachment” pr
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Peter Obi was reinstated in Februar
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Fighting Over the Spoils According
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in Anambra reached the same conclus
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Case Study C: Rivers State They buy
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There are widespread complaints amo
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esponse to concerns that Igodo was
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In 1999 and 2003, [Governor] Odili
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The night before the April 14 elect
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Tom, or their former political spon
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In parallel with other situations d
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Kalare Violence and the 2007 Electi
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International observers told Human
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eportedly urged his disgruntled opp
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and encourages a greater scale of l
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A few minutes earlier, internationa
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problems that have crippled the cap
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Yar’Adua has also promised to str
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The International Response to Niger
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after the rigged elections made no
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firmly fixed at the opposite extrem
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Criminal Politics 114
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H UMAN R I GHTS WATCH 350 Fifth Ave
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Criminal Politics: Violence, âGodfathersâ and Corruption in Nigeria

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