Criminal Politics: Violence, âGodfathersâ and Corruption in Nigeria
Criminal Politics: Violence, âGodfathersâ and Corruption in Nigeria
Criminal Politics: Violence, âGodfathersâ and Corruption in Nigeria
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police’s shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs as an <strong>in</strong>stitution are political pressures that often prevent the<br />
police from <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g abuses connected to politicians or other prom<strong>in</strong>ent allies of<br />
the rul<strong>in</strong>g party. As one prom<strong>in</strong>ent politician from southwestern <strong>Nigeria</strong> said to<br />
Human Rights Watch, “Political crimes are not ord<strong>in</strong>ary crimes. In such cases the<br />
[state’s] Commissioner [of Police] becomes a messenger from above—he requires a<br />
nod from higher authorities to function effectively…so what needs to change is the<br />
m<strong>in</strong>dset <strong>in</strong> Abuja.” 139 One Lagos-based activist noted that “there is a lot of secondguess<strong>in</strong>g<br />
also. Even if the president does not issue a directive [not to <strong>in</strong>vestigate<br />
someone], people try <strong>and</strong> guess what he would <strong>and</strong> would not like.” 140<br />
The effects of the police force’s equivocal commitment to accountability were clearly<br />
evident dur<strong>in</strong>g the months surround<strong>in</strong>g the 2007 elections. Rather than attempt to<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigate <strong>and</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g to account sponsors of election-related violence, the<br />
leadership of the police force largely fell <strong>in</strong>to a pattern of refus<strong>in</strong>g to respond to<br />
<strong>in</strong>cidents of political violence orchestrated by lead<strong>in</strong>g politicians or <strong>in</strong>fluential<br />
members of the PDP.<br />
Human Rights Watch <strong>in</strong>terviewed then-Inspector General of Police Sunday Eh<strong>in</strong>dero,<br />
an appo<strong>in</strong>tee of President Obasanjo, dur<strong>in</strong>g the run-up to the election. Asked about<br />
the police response to scores of widely publicized <strong>in</strong>stances of election-related<br />
violence, Eh<strong>in</strong>dero said that he knew of “only one” <strong>in</strong>cident of election-related<br />
violence that had taken place dur<strong>in</strong>g the entire pre-election period—an <strong>in</strong>cident that<br />
happened to occur <strong>in</strong> his physical presence. 141 That level of public unconcern com<strong>in</strong>g<br />
from <strong>Nigeria</strong>’s top police official was remarkable, especially consider<strong>in</strong>g that lowerlevel<br />
police officers had promised robust <strong>in</strong>vestigations of many other clashes <strong>and</strong><br />
attempted murders at the time. 142<br />
139 Human Rights Watch <strong>in</strong>terview, Ibadan, February 9, 2007.<br />
140 Human Rights Watch <strong>in</strong>terview with Innocent Chukwuma, Lagos, February 6, 2007.<br />
141 Human Rights Watch <strong>in</strong>terview with Sunday Eh<strong>in</strong>dero, Abuja, February 21, 2007. The <strong>in</strong>cident Eh<strong>in</strong>dero referenced was a<br />
clash between rival PDP factions at a rally <strong>in</strong> the town of Akure. That clash is described <strong>in</strong> the Oyo State case study below.<br />
142 By that po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>Nigeria</strong> had already witnessed more than 70 <strong>in</strong>cidents of election-related violence that had been widely<br />
reported <strong>in</strong> the press, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> some <strong>in</strong>stances lower-level police officers had promised <strong>in</strong>vestigations. See Human Rights Watch,<br />
Election or “Selection”?, pp. 19-21.<br />
<strong>Crim<strong>in</strong>al</strong> <strong>Politics</strong> 46