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Nigeria Banking Sector Coverage - December 2011 'Bad ... - Imara

Nigeria Banking Sector Coverage - December 2011 'Bad ... - Imara

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<strong>Nigeria</strong> <strong>Banking</strong> <strong>Sector</strong> Overview<br />

Having undergone a major recapitalisation in 2005, where<br />

new minimum capital requirements of NGN 25bn led to the<br />

number of banks in <strong>Nigeria</strong> reduced to 25 from 89 through<br />

regulatory mergers and acquisition and later to 24 through<br />

market-induced merger and acquisition, <strong>Nigeria</strong>’s banking<br />

sector was supposed to be sound and well poised for the<br />

growth that its under banked retail market would provide<br />

with bank branches growing from 2,900 in 2005 to almost<br />

5,500 in mid-2009. Indeed, all seemed well, until the GFC<br />

hit in 2008, and the sector’s shiny coat began to unravel.<br />

As noted by the current CBN Governor in a public lecture in<br />

<strong>December</strong> 2010, the GFC affected <strong>Nigeria</strong> through both the<br />

financial and real (trade, remittances and aid) channels.<br />

The undiversified nature of the <strong>Nigeria</strong>n economy and the<br />

high dependence on exports of crude oil as well as foreign<br />

capital inflows compounded the impact of the external<br />

shock arising from the crisis, as <strong>Nigeria</strong> experienced low<br />

demand for its oil export due to recession in the economies<br />

of her major trading partners. This, coupled with the<br />

collapse in the international price of oil, led to severe<br />

decline in foreign exchange receipts and consequently,<br />

government revenue contraction. There was a substantial<br />

decline in foreign capital inflows just as foreign trade<br />

finance reduced significantly for some banks while for<br />

others credit lines literally dried-up.<br />

The greatest impact was, however, felt in the capital<br />

markets. The excess liquidity that had hitherto found its<br />

way into the stock market in the heydays of 2006/2007,<br />

which had also allowed banks to raise capital, had led to<br />

many of <strong>Nigeria</strong>’s bank’s being overcapitalised. The increase<br />

in capital supported banks’ balance sheet growth with<br />

banking sector assets as percentage of GDP increasing<br />

rapidly to 60% from about 30% in 2004. Struggling to<br />

profitably deploy all of this capital (most banks actually<br />

took in more capital than they had sought to raise as the<br />

NSE allowed this at the time in the event of<br />

oversubscriptions), banks were under pressure to create risk<br />

asset amidst limited product innovation and diversification.<br />

This, the CBN notes, coupled with poor risk management,<br />

led to a concentration of assets in certain areas, in<br />

particular margin lending and oil trading/marketing. As at<br />

end-<strong>December</strong> 2008, banks’ total exposure to the oil<br />

industry stood at over NGN 754bn, representing over 10% of<br />

the industry total and over 27% of shareholders’ funds.<br />

Thus, as foreign investors began to pull their funds out of<br />

the market, looking to reduce their exposure to “riskier”<br />

emerging and frontier markets, further exacerbating<br />

investor negativity due to the waning economy, panic selling<br />

by domestic investors followed. The capital market<br />

downturn had a negative impact on bank balance sheet<br />

through increased provisioning for bad debts and lower<br />

profitability. The result was a sharp deterioration in the<br />

quality of bank assets which then led to concerns over<br />

banking sector liquidity.<br />

Concerned about the state of some of the <strong>Nigeria</strong>n<br />

banks and the overall stability of the financial<br />

system, the Central Bank of <strong>Nigeria</strong> (CBN),<br />

commissioned special examinations on all 24 banks<br />

in <strong>Nigeria</strong>. These examinations highlighted<br />

significant deficiencies in capital adequacy and<br />

liquidity requirements, and illustrated major<br />

weaknesses in corporate governance and risk<br />

management practices. Ten banks were adjudged<br />

to be in grave states with deficiencies in capital<br />

adequacy i.e.: Oceanic Bank, Union Bank of<br />

<strong>Nigeria</strong>, Intercontinental Bank, Bank PHB, Afribank<br />

<strong>Nigeria</strong>, Finbank, Equitorial Trust Bank, Spring<br />

Bank and Wema Bank Plc. The tenth bank, Unity<br />

Bank, was not deemed to be in grave danger, but<br />

still adjudged to have insufficient capital and<br />

unacceptable levels of non-performing loans<br />

(NPLs). Of these, eight also had significant<br />

deficiencies in liquidity, risk management<br />

practices and corporate governance policies.<br />

Dec 2010<br />

Negative NAV (NGN bn)<br />

Oceanic Bank International<br />

<strong>Nigeria</strong> Plc (94 261)<br />

Union Bank of <strong>Nigeria</strong> Plc (135 894)<br />

Intercontinental Bank Plc (330 709)<br />

Bank PHB Plc (242 309)<br />

Afribank <strong>Nigeria</strong> Plc (260 940)<br />

Finbank Plc (104 751)<br />

Equitorial Trust Bank Ltd (27 253)<br />

Spring Bank Plc (87 869)<br />

Source: CBN<br />

The CBN took proactive steps, including the<br />

injection of NGN 620bn as a convertible loan that<br />

amounts to Tier II capital into the banks, replacing<br />

the Chief Executives and Executive Directors of<br />

eight of the banks with competent managers with<br />

experience and integrity, introducing the<br />

guarantee of the local interbank market to ensure<br />

continued liquidity for all banks and guaranteeing<br />

foreign creditors and correspondent banks’ credit<br />

lines to ensure confidence and maintain important<br />

correspondent banking relationships. The CBN also<br />

moved to create a “bad bank”, the Asset<br />

Management Corporation of <strong>Nigeria</strong> (AMCON). By<br />

31 <strong>December</strong> 2010, AMCON had executed loan<br />

purchase and service agreements with 21<br />

participating banks to acquire NPLs with a face<br />

value of NGN 2.04tn for just under NGN 800bn.<br />

92.5% of the purchased NPLs were from the 10<br />

“intervened” banks with the balance of 7.25%<br />

coming from other banks. AMCON issued 3-year<br />

zero coupon bonds with a yield of 10.125% as<br />

consideration for the purchased NPLs. This helped<br />

to further stabilise the banking sector.<br />

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