Flooding South Lebanon - Human Rights Watch
Flooding South Lebanon - Human Rights Watch
Flooding South Lebanon - Human Rights Watch
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Disproportionate Attacks<br />
In justifying its decision to mount the armed conflict in <strong>Lebanon</strong>, Israel has said that<br />
the proper way to measure the proportionality of its actions is “not only in respect to<br />
the initial Hizbullah cross-border attack, or even the 4,000 missiles fired at Israel’s<br />
northern towns and villages, but also against the threat of the tens of thousands of<br />
missiles which Hizbullah had amassed and continued to receive from Iran and<br />
Syria.” 356 It is important to recognize that this argument is relevant only to Israel’s<br />
rationale for war (or jus ad bellum) and does not in any measure justify the massive<br />
cluster attacks in the last 72 hours of the war. Those must be weighed by the<br />
principle of proportionality in the conduct of war (or jus in bello), under international<br />
humanitarian law.<br />
International humanitarian law defines proportionality in terms of “attacks,” not the<br />
overall military response to the threat posed by an enemy. 357 “Attacks” mean “acts of<br />
violence against the adversary, whether in offence or defence.” 358 The military<br />
advantage of any given attack must be understood within the context of the broader<br />
strategy of a war. Even legal scholars who judge military advantage in light of the<br />
attack as a whole rather than its specific aspects acknowledge that “‘an attack as a<br />
whole’ is a finite event, not to be confused with the entire war.” 359 Where a given<br />
attack produces disproportionately high civilian harm to low military advantage, it<br />
cannot be justified simply because a party deems the purpose of the overall military<br />
campaign to have value.<br />
In the passage cited above, Israel has also justified the proportionality of its decision<br />
to go to war by citing the threat to its population from the entire Hezbollah arsenal.<br />
But again, this argument has little to do with measuring the proportionality of cluster<br />
attacks, which must be judged not in terms of the overall decision to use force but in<br />
terms of the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Cluster munitions<br />
356 Israel’s Response to Accusations of Targeting Civilian Sites in <strong>Lebanon</strong> During the “Second <strong>Lebanon</strong> War.”<br />
357 The issue of proportionality also arises in the analysis of legal justification of war, which is not the subject of our analysis<br />
in this paper.<br />
358 Protocol I, art. 49(1). See ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12<br />
August 1949, p. 603 (“In other words, the term ‘attack’ means ‘combat action.’”).<br />
359 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, p. 87.<br />
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