Flooding South Lebanon - Human Rights Watch

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Proportionality A further legal requirement is that the potential harm to civilians and civilian objects expected in any attack must be proportionate to the military advantage anticipated. Major General A.P.V. Rogers, a former Director of British Army Legal Services, explains the rationale behind this principle: Although they are not military objectives, civilians and civilian objects are subject to the general dangers of War in the sense that attacks on military personnel and military objectives may cause incidental damage. It may not be possible to limit the radius of effect entirely to the objective to be attacked… Members of the armed forces are not liable for such incidental damage, provided it is proportionate to the military gain expected of the attack. While the principle is clear, in practice weighing the expected military advantage against possible collateral damage can be an extremely complex, especially in the heat of an armed conflict. In their report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Committee established to review NATO bombings in Yugoslavia highlighted the particular difficulties which arise when military objectives are located in densely populated areas: The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary to resolve them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on the background and values of the decision maker. It is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same relative values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants.… It is suggested that the determination of relative values must be that of the “reasonable military commander.” The test of proportionality to be applied in a case of armed conflict (jus in bellum (sic)) is broader that that applied under the principles of self-defense outside the 121 Human Rights Watch February 2008
context of actual warfare (jus ad bellum). But it should be noted that the policies applied in practice by the IDF conformed even with this stricter test of proportionality. In relation to the self-defense standard, it should be recalled that international law provides that the proportionality of a response to an attack is to be measured, not in regard to the specific attack suffered by a state, but in regard to what is necessary to remove the overall threat. As Rosalyn Higgins, currently President of the International Court of Justice, has written, proportionality: cannot be in relation to any specific prior injury - it has to be in relation to the overall legitimate objective of ending the aggression. Accordingly, the right of self-defense includes not only acts implemented to prevent the immediate threat, but also to prevent subsequent attacks”. In Israel’s case this means that its response had to be measured not only in respect to the initial Hizbullah cross-border attack, or even the 4,000 missiles fired at Israel’s northern towns and villages, but also against the threat of the tens of thousands of missiles which Hizbullah had amassed and continued to receive from Iran and Syria. From theory to practice - Israel’s operations in Lebanon Israel has adopted the principles of international humanitarian law outlined above and the IDF has entrenched them in its orders, doctrine and education. With regard to the selection of targets, for example, the IDF’s “Law of War on the Battlefield” not only emphasizes that a distinction must be made between military objectives and civilian objects but also that “in cases where there is doubt as to whether a civilian object has turned into a military objective… it must be assumed that it is not a military objective unless proven otherwise.” Similarly, in relation to the question of proportionality, the IDF position is clear: Even when it is not possible to isolate the civilians from an assault and there is no other recourse but to attack, the commander is required to refrain from an attack that is expected to inflict harm on the civilian population, which is disproportionate to the expected military gain. Flooding South Lebanon 122
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Lebanon Flooding South Lebanon Isra
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Civilian Harm......................
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Acronyms BLU CBU CCW COI DPICM ICRC
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Summary The Israel Defense Forces (
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Israel’s strikes in 2006 were the
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leaving behind vast numbers of haza
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compensate for the cluster rockets
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immediately before a negotiated cea
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knowingly or recklessly indiscrimin
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production, transfer and stockpilin
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numerous men, women, and children w
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To the Secretary-General of the Uni
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Cluster Munitions and International
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At least 14 states and a small numb
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• Refraining from launching attac
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This does not just mean immediate c
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Israel is a major producer and expo
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Types of Cluster Munitions and Subm
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An unexploded M77, a US-made dual p
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This CBU-58B cluster bomb casing, s
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likely that the MZD-2s found in Leb
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contaminated by submunitions. 89 Ho
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Timing and Targets: When and How Cl
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with 500-pound bombs. The increase
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Human Rights Watch field research c
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percent, and dismissed the problem
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A UNIFIL deminer holds an Israeli-m
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Civilian Harm Cluster munitions hav
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51 Human Rights Watch February 2008
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submunition causing it to explode.
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Dr. `Abdel Nasser Farran told Human
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Agriculture Perhaps the most danger
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exploded, and a young woman was pic
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from the war. 180 Tragedy struck wh
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injured in my legs. I still can’t
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in operation for many years, includ
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Page 78 and 79: the grove of fruit trees. Though sh
Page 80 and 81: of the fighting. Although no one is
Page 82 and 83: oad to visit his cousin when his br
Page 84 and 85: Four-year-old `Ali Muhammad Yaghi w
Page 86 and 87: place.” 237 Assessing the monetar
Page 88 and 89: especially because we needed to irr
Page 90 and 91: conflict interrupted existing clear
Page 92 and 93: An engine from a US-made M26 Multip
Page 94 and 95: duds around villages. 268 With the
Page 96 and 97: Various reasons exist as to why com
Page 98 and 99: Lack of Israeli Assistance Perhaps
Page 100 and 101: checkpoints. Similarly, UNIFIL has
Page 102 and 103: Israel’s Statements on the Use of
Page 104 and 105: This statement followed the finding
Page 106 and 107: investigations into Israel’s appa
Page 108 and 109: that would confirm that these weapo
Page 110 and 111: specific to the weapons. When conce
Page 112 and 113: disregard of that character, they g
Page 114 and 115: employed, the way that they were us
Page 116 and 117: are antipersonnel, area denial weap
Page 118 and 119: emain to take care of elderly or si
Page 120 and 121: early 2007 aimed at identifying the
Page 122 and 123: the United States, there is little
Page 124 and 125: Conclusion Israel’s use of cluste
Page 126 and 127: kidnapped IDF soldiers, and so aver
Page 130 and 131: In practice, this requires that the
Page 132 and 133: neutralization offers a definite mi
Page 134 and 135: it is more brutal. If Hizbullah had
Page 136 and 137: Another issue of humanitarian conce
Page 138 and 139: Acknowledgements This report was wr
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Flooding South Lebanon - Human Rights Watch

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