Flooding South Lebanon - Human Rights Watch

suffered cluster attacks, such as those in Blida, said there was no Hezbollah military
activity nearby.
Israeli soldiers told Human Rights Watch that their radar would locate Hezbollah
launch sites while the rocket was airborne, and the IDF would then fire cluster
munitions in the vicinity of the launch area, using the area-effect weapons in an
attempt to kill the launch crew and destroy its launchers as they tried to escape.
Shooting back—typically with a “six-pack” of US M26 rockets—at Hezbollah rocket
launch sites generally occurred within one to 1.5 minutes of receipt of the launch
detection coordinates. 104
Civilian casualties from cluster munitions at the time of these strikes seem to have
been fairly limited, reflecting the fact that so much of the population had vacated
south Lebanon or hid in their basements, and that much of the Hezbollah rocket fire
and Israeli counter-battery fire occurred in fields and valleys where civilians were not
present at the time. However, the exact number of injuries and deaths from these
cluster strikes may never be known, as hospital staff were too overwhelmed at the
time to ask questions about the specific causes of injury or death.
The Final Barrage
Over the final days of the conflict, the Israeli use pattern changed dramatically.
According to the UN, Israel fired 90 percent of its cluster munitions during the last 72
hours, after the UN Security Council had passed Resolution 1701 calling for a
ceasefire on August 11, but before the ceasefire took effect at 8 a.m. on August 14. 105
During this period, there was also an intensification of bombardment by other
weapons, including artillery strikes as well as the aerial strikes on civilian homes
104 Human Rights Watch interviews with IDF reservists (names withheld), Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Israel, October 2006. Human
Rights Watch was told that for MLRS units Lebanon was divided into two sectors. The first was the tactical battle against
Hezbollah forces south of the Litani River under the direction of the IDF’s Northern Command. The second sector was the
strategic effort targeting locations north of the Litani River controlled by the operations division of the General Staff
Headquarters. Both active-duty and reserve MLRS battalions fired at targets in both sectors. Most MLRS attacks occurred prior
to the final 72 hours of fighting.
105 The UN has explained that “UNMACC’s calculations are based both on-the-ground identification of cluster bomb strike
locations and extensive conversations with South Lebanon residents.” UNOCHA, “A Lasting Legacy: The Deadly Impact of
Cluster Bombs in South Lebanon,” undated, but information as of September 16, 2006, p. 1, fn 3. Chris Clark, program
manager of MACC SL, told Human Rights Watch he reached this conclusion based largely on his own firsthand observations of
Israeli attacks throughout the war. He also noted the small number of reports of cluster munition attacks and casualties prior
to the final days of the war. Human Rights Watch interview with Chris Clark, program manager, Tyre, October 25, 2006.
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