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ETFR<br />

exchange-traded funds report<br />

www.indexuniverse.<strong>com</strong>/ETFR<br />

Issue No. 78<br />

May 2007<br />

And That’s<br />

The Way it Is<br />

By Jim Wiandt<br />

Let me say first that I am a big fan of<br />

Tom Lauricella and Diya Gullapalli of The<br />

Wall Street Journal. I think there are few<br />

financial journalists out there really working<br />

for investors’ interests. The financial<br />

media is a sordid, incestuous landscape,<br />

where big reporters are regularly<br />

snatched up by fund <strong>com</strong>panies to<br />

be<strong>com</strong>e well-paid PR agents, and gritty<br />

reporting is softened by fancy dinners<br />

and golf outings. A reporter pointing out<br />

scandalous behavior and really lobbying<br />

for the interests of average investors is a<br />

breath of fresh air. Often, that’s just what<br />

Tom and Diya do.<br />

But (and you knew there was a “but”<br />

<strong>com</strong>ing), these two have just plain gotten<br />

it wrong this time. In a March 17<br />

post mortem of the February 26-27 market<br />

collapse, Tom and Diya came out<br />

with a coauthored article, Fast-Money<br />

Crowd Embraces ETFs.<br />

UPDATES<br />

Adding Risk for<br />

Individual Investors<br />

The article examined the performance of<br />

emerging markets ETFs in the wake of<br />

the collapse of the Chinese market. In<br />

particular, it focused on the iShares FTSE<br />

Xinhua 25 ETF (NYSE: FXI), a popular<br />

fund tracking 25 large-cap Chinese <strong>com</strong>panies<br />

listed on the Hong Kong Stock<br />

Exchange. The gist was that the very<br />

structure of ETFs failed: US investors sold<br />

ETFs like FXI at prices lower than the<br />

underlying stocks ever traded. In short,<br />

the article claimed, “fast money” took<br />

advantage of individual investors.<br />

Here’s the central fact of the article,<br />

directly quoted:<br />

One ETF managed by Barclays Global<br />

Investors that tracks the Chinese stock<br />

market closed the US day on Feb. 27 down<br />

9.9% even though the index it was tracking<br />

had fallen just 2.1% during Chinese trading<br />

hours. That index fell another 3.1%<br />

5<br />

IN THIS ISSUE<br />

<strong>ETFR's</strong> publisher, Jim Wiandt, discusses<br />

the affect of recent market turmoil on FXI.<br />

Cover<br />

HealthShares, the slim health centric ETFs<br />

that began trading on the NYSE earlier<br />

this year, have be<strong>com</strong>e some of the most<br />

active ETFs in the market recently,<br />

attracting volume and assets.<br />

Cover<br />

The fundamental twist continues as FTSE<br />

RAFI indexes be<strong>com</strong>e the basis for a line<br />

of mutual funds by Charles Schwab; ETFs<br />

tracking the same indexes were licensed<br />

to PowerShares last year.<br />

Page 3<br />

Looking for a dash of pure technical<br />

analysis to <strong>com</strong>plete your portfolio?<br />

PowerShares teamed up with Dorsey<br />

Wright to design an ETF using a form of<br />

technical analysis called relative strength.<br />

Page 6<br />

ETFR’s Q1 performance derby includes<br />

the top 20 winning and losing ETFs.<br />

Pages 8<br />

ETFR’s monthly database includes all USlisted<br />

ETFs. For European and international<br />

ETFs, please see the electronic version<br />

of ETFR or go to www.indexuniverse.<strong>com</strong>.<br />

Page 12<br />

HealthShares gain market appeal<br />

After being excoriated in some corners<br />

of the media for their reed thin, healthcentric<br />

ETFs, seven HealthShares topped<br />

the 10 best performing ETF list at close<br />

of business on April 5, according to the<br />

Wall Street Journal. (The three other<br />

ETFs were also in the healthcare sector.)<br />

While one day of stellar performance<br />

does not a successful track<br />

record make, it does suggest that this<br />

ETF family can add alpha to a portfolio.<br />

In the days following this headturning<br />

performance, one or two<br />

HealthShares remained among the<br />

WSJ’s top ten ETFs.<br />

The biotech space is heating up<br />

and be<strong>com</strong>ing more active since the<br />

recent FDA’s Dandreon decision.<br />

“There were more than 11 IPOs last<br />

year in the biotech space, and liquidity<br />

is trying to find a sector home,”<br />

says Nat Wasserstein, president of<br />

XShares Advisors. “Emerging markets<br />

have been disappointing, blue chips<br />

are flat at best, and real estate is dropping<br />

like a stone.”<br />

Wasserstein goes on to argue that<br />

the hardest part of investing in<br />

biotech is choosing individual stocks—<br />

which is exactly why ETFs are so<br />

appealing. While all health sector ETFs<br />

diversify single stock risk,<br />

HealthShares’ ETFs are slim tools that<br />

allow investors to isolate a specific<br />

healthcare subsector and can<br />

serve strategies long or short.<br />

3


ETFR<br />

4 Natural gas ETF<br />

in the works<br />

Victoria Bay Asset Management, the<br />

folks that brought the $900 million US<br />

Oil Fund (AMEX: USO) to market, has<br />

filed papers with the SEC for an ETF tied<br />

to the price of natural gas. The US<br />

Natural Gas will, like other <strong>com</strong>modity<br />

ETFs, buy natural gas futures contracts<br />

on the New York Mercantile Exchange<br />

and roll them one month to the next,<br />

while investing collateral cash in<br />

Treasuries. Victoria Bay’s isn’t the first<br />

natural gas ETF in development.<br />

Barclays Global Investors is also planning<br />

such a fund.<br />

Claymore adds three<br />

quirky and four style ETFs<br />

In early April, Claymore Securities<br />

added seven ETFs to its ever-expanding<br />

lineup. As usual with this ETF provider,<br />

three of the products are quirky, four<br />

are domestic style boxes.<br />

The style ETFs include: BIR Leaders<br />

Mid-Cap Value (AMEX: BMV); BIR<br />

Leaders Small-Cap Core (AMEX: BES),<br />

Q1 Expert Portfolios<br />

Amidst much market turmoil, the major<br />

indexes were either flat or down slightly<br />

as the first quarter closed. The Dow<br />

was down 0.9%, while the S&P 500<br />

and the Nasdaq Composite gained<br />

0.2% and 0.3% respectively. (For a<br />

fuller picture of first quarter performance,<br />

see March Madness, this issue<br />

page 7.)<br />

The best performing<br />

portfolio<br />

for March was<br />

Saddle River, up<br />

1.98%, and the<br />

best performer for<br />

the quarter was<br />

UPDATES<br />

Great Companies Large-Cap Growth<br />

(AMEX: XGC), and Zacks Mid-Cap Core<br />

(AMEX: CZA).<br />

The remaining three ETFs are:<br />

• BIR Leaders 50 (AMEX: BST), which<br />

tracks the BIR Leaders 50 Index. It<br />

holds 50 <strong>com</strong>mon stocks and ADRs<br />

listed on US exchanges and covered<br />

by Best Independent Research,<br />

LLC, a consortium of the following<br />

five independent research <strong>com</strong>panies:<br />

Ativo Research, Channel Trend<br />

Inc, Columbine Capital Services,<br />

Ford Equity Research, and Thomas<br />

White International.<br />

• Ocean Tomo Growth 6<br />

PMMA Momentum, up 3.34%.<br />

New<strong>com</strong>er Saddle River Capital<br />

Management rebalanced its portfolio,<br />

as scheduled March 1, and now holds<br />

RSP at 17.5%, IWR at 15%, IWM at<br />

10%, EFA at 40%, EEM at 10% and<br />

XLB at 7.5%.<br />

All the portfolios invested $1 million<br />

January 1, 2007 in no more than<br />

ten ETFs.<br />

Advisor<br />

Ret (%)<br />

Ret (%) Ret (%)<br />

Q1<br />

March<br />

2006 2005<br />

XTF 80 Growth 1.59 2.63 17.96 8.80<br />

PMAA Momentum 1.94 3.34 19.71 9.90<br />

Saddle River 1.98 2.05 16.78 13.16<br />

S&P 500 1.00 0.30 15.80 4.84<br />

Russell 2000 0.63 1.95 18.40 4.59<br />

EAFE 2.90 4.05 26.30 13.34<br />

1 the next day in China.<br />

You can see what Tom and Diya are<br />

driving at: If the underlying Chinese<br />

stocks only dropped 5.2% over two days,<br />

how could US investors sell with prices<br />

down 9.9%?<br />

The argument is wrong in many ways,<br />

and this is one case where a picture is<br />

definitely worth a thousand words. The<br />

chart on page nine shows the performance<br />

of three iterations of the FTSE<br />

Xinhua 25 Index trading across three different<br />

markets:<br />

• The underlying index, trading in<br />

China<br />

• FXC, the UK-based ETF tied to the<br />

index<br />

• FXI, the US ETF<br />

Where to begin?<br />

The easiest place is with the assertion that<br />

the Chinese market “fell another 3.1%<br />

the next day.” Indeed: The underlying<br />

index closed down 3.1% the next day in<br />

China. But as you can see in the chart on<br />

page nine, the market opened down 6%<br />

from the previous close, or just 1.77% off<br />

of the close of the US market (a full 4<br />

hours and 45 minutes earlier). If you look<br />

at that chart, the trend lines are almost<br />

<strong>com</strong>ically perfect: a seamless, connectthe-dots<br />

painting of shifting investor sentiment.<br />

It looks to me like, well, stock<br />

market trading in action.<br />

The article drove me crazy because I’d<br />

spent a long time over two days with<br />

Tom and Diya in the days before the article<br />

was published patiently explaining<br />

some of their misunderstandings of how<br />

ETFs work. And after all of that, they<br />

ended up posting something that really<br />

warrants a retraction. If you’re going to<br />

<strong>com</strong>pare today’s US-listed ETF close with<br />

something, try tomorrow’s live opening<br />

of the Chinese index. It seemed to be a<br />

case of the story writing itself, with the<br />

facts being lined up behind that initial<br />

idea, instead of the other way around.<br />

The Facts<br />

• On February 27, funds like FXI (and,<br />

indeed, much of the market) went into a<br />

downward spiral. Here’s that quote<br />

again: “One ETF managed by Barclays<br />

Global Investors that tracks the Chinese<br />

stock market closed the US day on Feb.<br />

27 down 9.9% even though the index it<br />

was tracking had fallen just 2.1% during<br />

Chinese trading hours. That index fell<br />

another 3.1% the next day in China.”<br />

• That first line is meaningless. The<br />

market crash (and everyone knows international<br />

markets have increasingly<br />

moved in lockstep) did not start to happen<br />

until early afternoon in the US, hours<br />

after the Asian markets had closed.<br />

• The second line is a fumble at best, and<br />

a ham-handed hand at making the data fit<br />

the story at worst. Focusing on the close of<br />

Chinese trading the next day, rather than<br />

the open, is simply a fundamental mistake.<br />

Quick quiz: “How do free markets<br />

work?” Answer: “They price in the relevant<br />

information.” If someone sees what<br />

they think is an inefficiency on the sell<br />

side, they BUY BUY BUY. It happens every<br />

day in every market in various degrees.<br />

Only in the wake of a market sell-off and<br />

settling is anything clear.<br />

Effectively, the sellers of FXI were<br />

caught that day in the same place as intraday<br />

sellers of DIA, SPY or any one of a<br />

thousand individual stocks: the markets hit<br />

bottom around 3pm EST, and if you sold<br />

then, you lost out. The US equity markets<br />

recovered some territory 9<br />

ETFR • May 2007 5


ETFR<br />

5 between 3pm and 4pm that day,<br />

and that recovery continued when the<br />

Chinese market opened four-and-a-half<br />

hours later. You can see that clearly in the<br />

trend line of recovery in the chart below.<br />

The great irony here is that there is far<br />

more defined, gameable risk in a traditional<br />

mutual fund that prices its net asset<br />

value once a day. Say an ordinary<br />

investor sends in money to his fund <strong>com</strong>pany<br />

to purchase shares of the AA Active<br />

China Fund at the close of the Chinese<br />

market. He gets those shares priced at<br />

the NAV. The next day, the US market<br />

trades up 3%. A hedge fund manager<br />

can practically be certain that the Chinese<br />

market will follow the US market up when<br />

it opens four-plus hours later. But because<br />

the fund’s price is based on the previous<br />

day’s close in China, he can still buy<br />

shares at yesterday’s NAV. Essentially, for<br />

a fund that does not “fair value price”<br />

(and most of them don’t), the odds are<br />

very strong that hedge fund managers<br />

and other “fast money” can swoop in<br />

and steal that return from the rest of the<br />

funds shareholders. That, like expenses,<br />

is something knowable; the live direction<br />

of trading is not. I’ll take my chances in a<br />

volatile market to bet on the losing team<br />

after the game is over any day.<br />

As a result, a long-only investor in a traditional<br />

mutual fund is much more likely to<br />

get damaged by hedge fund trading<br />

around volatility than an ETF investor.<br />

The only ETF investors who were damaged<br />

in February were those who panicked and<br />

bailed out intraday<br />

on February 27.<br />

Traditional fund<br />

investors, on the<br />

other hand, could<br />

(and probably did)<br />

get hit by a bunch of<br />

shares being bought<br />

on the cheap based<br />

on stale pricing<br />

(assuming no fair<br />

value pricing is in<br />

effect). To add insult<br />

to injury, traditional<br />

mutual fund shareholders<br />

will have to<br />

pay capital gains on<br />

all the fund activity<br />

caused by buys and<br />

sells based on this<br />

late-trading strategy.<br />

Pct Change (%)<br />

2.00%<br />

0.00%<br />

-2.00%<br />

-4.00%<br />

-6.00%<br />

-8.00%<br />

-10.00%<br />

-12.00%<br />

The Malaysia Example<br />

Tom and Diya’s argument, while wrong,<br />

is not new. The poster child for “failed<br />

ETF pricing” is the iShares MSCI Malaysia<br />

ETF (AMEX: EWM). In 1997, during the<br />

Asian financial crisis, the Malaysian markets<br />

shut down to international investors.<br />

Malaysia’s politicians, furious at currency<br />

speculators like George Soros, also halted<br />

trading in the Malaysian ringgit.<br />

For US investors, EWM quickly became<br />

the only game in town. If you had bigtime<br />

Malaysian exposure, EWM was the<br />

only way to hedge it. Effectively, the ETF<br />

became the price discovery mechanism<br />

not only for the Malaysian market, but also<br />

for the Malaysian currency.<br />

As might be expected, the ETF traded<br />

at wild premiums and discounts to the<br />

closed-off Malaysian markets, with discounts<br />

reaching 20-30%. But while people<br />

decried these differences, the ETF was<br />

actually doing its job: it was pricing the<br />

market as accurately as possible, given<br />

investor sentiment at the time.<br />

FTSE China<br />

Trading Feb 27 - Feb 28<br />

16:15<br />

21:00<br />

0:30<br />

3:30<br />

7:30<br />

11:30<br />

15:30<br />

19:30<br />

23:30<br />

3:00<br />

6:30<br />

10:30<br />

13:30<br />

Trading Hours (EST)<br />

Conclusion<br />

It seems to me that the only case Tom<br />

and Diya could even try to make about<br />

trading on February 27 is that ETFs trading<br />

outside the live market for the underlying<br />

stocks may have more volatility, due<br />

to thinner overall trading. But what’s the<br />

suggestion there? Shut down after-hours<br />

trading? Don’t allow live trading on foreign<br />

markets in the US? It’s lunacy, especially<br />

when the obvious alternative (openend<br />

funds) has more knowable downside<br />

to investors. ETFs are only a reflection of<br />

the markets they represent.<br />

In effect, you end up blaming the<br />

market for its own volatility. The ETF<br />

structure didn’t fail, as Tom and Diya<br />

seem to suggest. In fact, the opposite is<br />

true: ETFs reflected prevailing market<br />

sentiment at that time. There happened<br />

to have been more sellers than buyers. If<br />

you had the guts to take the other side of<br />

that trade, instead of selling in panic, you<br />

made money. That’s how the market<br />

works. That’s arbitrage. That’s capitalism.<br />

The truth is that ETFs have brought<br />

MORE liquidity, MORE transparency and<br />

MORE stability to the markets. You can<br />

short ETFs, even in a precipitously falling<br />

market (unlike ordinary equities). And if<br />

a ton of short volume <strong>com</strong>es in, the ETF<br />

shares theoretically have to be created to<br />

cover those loans, necessitating the purchase<br />

of the underlying and actually flattening<br />

the downward volatility.<br />

In short: good intentions, bad execution.<br />

The great irony is that, like the general<br />

tone of current affairs, the authors<br />

have really turned reality on its head to<br />

make the very strength of ETFs into their<br />

weakness. They’re simply barking up the<br />

wrong tree. Take on ETFs for being too<br />

narrow? Sure. Do some exchange-traded<br />

products have ill-considered structures<br />

and active-like costs? Absolutely. Those<br />

criticisms you can level. But don’t take on<br />

the free markets.<br />

FTSE China Local<br />

Market<br />

FXC China ETF London<br />

FXI China ETF US<br />

China<br />

Market: 21:00pm – 3:00am<br />

London<br />

Market: 3:00am – 11:30am<br />

US<br />

Market: 9:30am – 16:15pm<br />

ETFR • May 2007 9

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