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Berenberg Macro Views
Economics
Euro crisis update: the bare essentials
“Sleepwalking into the abyss”. The British media have missed no
opportunities in the last six months to predict imminent disaster for the
Eurozone. Instead, the crisis has faded as fast as optimists like us had
hoped. How come?
Simple mistake: In analysing the euro crisis, many observers make a
simple mistake: they confuse their dreams for a perfect world with reality.
The world does not have to be perfect to work: Reality never lives up
to textbook ideals, and it does not have to. For example, an immediate
full-scale banking union would be most useful to defuse the credit crunch
for small and medium-sized enterprises in the euro periphery. But it is not
essential for the euro crisis to fade. Credit constraints slow the pace of
recovery. But they do not prevent recovery.
Stripping it to the bare essentials, the Eurozone needs four
ingredients for its crisis to fade. All four are in place.
1. A reliable mechanism to contain contagion: The problems of
small countries must not endanger the region as a whole. The ECB’s
OMT safety net sees to that.
2. The right incentives so that small countries like Greece fix their big
underlying problems. Berlin’s tough-love approach of conditional
credits for compliant countries provides exactly these incentives.
3. The political will to stick to the grand bargain: The strong help
the weak while the weak accept the strings attached. Germany is
solidly pro-euro and all peripheral countries are striving to meet the
conditions.
4. Some growth in key export markets: Good news from Germany,
the US, UK, China and Switzerland is more than offsetting the
wobbles in some emerging markets for euro periphery exports.
The tail risks have receded. But they still exist. Our top two risks:
Italian politics: If Berlusconi’s legal troubles were to bring down the
Letta government, new elections could trigger a bout of uncertainty.
But the real danger, the Grillo challenge, has receded.
German court: If the court weakens the ECB’s OMT safety net too
much, investors might panic again. Unlikely but not impossible. If the
risk materialised, the ECB could resort to massive quantitative easing.
On balance, we maintain our cautious optimism: The Eurozone is
on the right track. The path will not always be smooth. That’s life.
Chart 1: Economic sentiment, the periphery is catching up fast
Key Macro Reports:
Understanding Germany
– a last golden decade
ahead
13 October 2010
Euro crisis: The role of
the ECB
29 July 2011
Saving the euro: The case
for an ECB yield cap
26 June 2012
Tough love: the true
nature of the euro crisis
20 August 2012
Euro Plus Monitor:
Spring 2013 Update
7 March 2013
Labour market reform:
progress in the periphery
15 March 2013
Euro crisis:
progress report
24 May 2013
Mind the court: the top
event risk in Europe
31 May 2013
German election preview:
the other lady
27 August 2013
110
110
100
100
90
Eurozone
Periphery
80
70
Jan 05 Jan 06 Jan 07 Jan 08 Jan 09 Jan 10 Jan 11 Jan 12 Jan 13
Periphery: weighted average for Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Source: EU Commission
1
90
80
70
29 August 2013
Dr Holger Schmieding
Chief Economist
+44 20 3207 7889
holger.schmieding@berenberg.com

Berenberg Macro Views
Economics
Confusing dreams and reality
“Sleepwalking into the abyss” or “the euro crisis is back”. For the last six months,
British media including The Economist have missed no opportunity to predict
imminent disaster for the Eurozone. So far, however, the crisis monster has failed to
rear its head again. With a gradual fading of market tensions, the Eurozone economy
has started to recover. How come?
In analysing the euro crisis, many observers make a simple mistake: they conflate
their dreams for a perfect world with reality.
The world does not have to be perfect in order to work. For example, Germany
would arguably be much better off if it had a simple flat tax and a deregulated labour
market. But in real life, a ridiculously complex tax system and an overregulated labour
market have not prevented Germany from turning itself into the economic
powerhouse of Europe. In the same vein, most Britons would live a more
comfortable life if the country had a properly functioning housing market. But in real
life, Britain’s absurd restrictions on the supply of new houses are not preventing the
country from enjoying a credit-fuelled economic upturn.
The same logic holds for the euro crisis. Many observers believe that the region
needs full political union, full fiscal union, an immediate banking union and a full
German/ECB guarantee for sovereign debt or the realisation of some other
pipedream to get out of its crisis. Some of the arguments such observers make are
not wrong. Yes, some kinds of financial tensions could be contained more reliably by
a full-scale mutualisation of public debt or other variants of fiscal or even political
union. And yes, an immediate banking union or any other way to end the credit
crunch for small and medium-sized enterprises in parts of the euro periphery in one
fell swoop might be quite helpful. But discussing what may or may not be desirable is
very different from analysing what is strictly necessary for the euro crisis to fade.
Sleepwalking into the
abyss? Not really
You don’t have to be
perfect to get some growth
Desirable does not equal
essential
The bare essentials
Stripping it down to the bare essentials, the Eurozone needs four ingredients
for its crisis to fade. All four are in place.
1. A reliable mechanism to contain contagion: The problems of small countries
must not endanger the region as a whole. Since Draghi’s announcement on 26
July 2012 that the second most powerful economic institution in the world, the
European Central Bank, would not commit suicide but would instead do all it
takes to preserve the euro and its own existence, this ingredient is present.
2. The right incentives so that countries like Greece fix their underlying
problems. With the tough-love approach pursued by Germany and the ECB, this
ingredient is there as well: Europe helps nations such as Greece or Ireland with
serious amounts of money if the recipients submit to harsh reform conditions. 1
Despite occasional hiccups, the reform process is well entrenched and well
advanced. 2
Contagion control in place
Crisis countries are
adjusting
1 We explain this approach in detail in Tough Love: the true nature of the euro crisis, Berenberg, 20 August
2012.
2 See for example our Euro Plus Monitor, Spring 2013 Update, Berenberg and Lisbon Council, 7 March 2013.
2

Berenberg Macro Views
Economics
3. The political will to stick to the grand bargain: The strong help the weak
while the weak accept the strings attached. All German mainstream political
parties back Chancellor Merkel’s euro policies. No realistic result of the German
election on 22 September 2013 could lead to Germany turning its back on its
European partners. 3 At the periphery, the will to do what it takes to stay part of
the euro family has survived numerous challenges including elections and
changes in government in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain.
4. Some growth in key export markets: To export their way out of their
domestic adjustment recessions, the euro peripheral countries need some
increase in global demand and in core European domestic demand. So far,
external demand has proved suitably resilient. For the euro periphery, good news
from Germany, the US, UK, China and Switzerland is more than offsetting the
wobbles in a number of emerging markets.
Of course, past performance provides no guarantees for the future. But it does hold
lessons. Eurosceptics and the readers of those British media who know very little
about what is really happening on the continent underestimate at their own peril the
capacity of the Eurozone to contain and overcome its crisis.
The political will has
survived various elections
Key export markets are
growing
Risks are receding as economies turn the corner
Serious risks remain, including the risks that (i) the German Constitutional Court
could constrain the ECB’s OMT safety in a way that renders it ineffective or that (ii)
potential new elections in Italy or Greece could sweep irresponsible mavericks like
Beppe Grillo or Alexis Tsipras into power. But with the peripheral economies
starting to stabilise and the rise in unemployment starting to fizzle out, the
vulnerability of the Eurozone to contagion hazards and the political challenges in
peripheral economies are now less serious than they used to be.
It could still go wrong. But it would now take a bigger shock to trigger massive new
tensions. Also, the probability that such a shock will occur has receded. In the next
two sections, we take a closer look at the two major risks – the German
Constitutional Court and Italian politics.
Of course. Life is full of
risks
It would no take a bigger
shock to trigger a new
wave of crisis
Risk 1: Italian politics
In early 2013, Italian politics topped our list of what could still go wrong in the
Eurozone. The risk receded when Italy’s President Napolitano (our favourite excommunist)
forced Italy’s centre-left and centre-right into an uneasy coalition in early
April after the inconclusive election of late February. The risk could flare up again if
the centre-left votes to strip the centre-right leader, the convicted tax fraudster
Berlusconi, of his Senate seat and the centre-right then withdraws from government.
The Senate is scheduled to vote on 9 September, although the vote might still be
delayed.
New Italian elections would create new uncertainty. That would be awkward. But as
we argued in March, the later such new elections come, the less disruptive they would
Thank you, Mr President
Less concerned than
3 See our German election preview: the other lady, Berenberg, 27 August 2013.
3

Berenberg Macro Views
Economics
probably be. We are less concerned about political instability in Italy than we were in
early 2013.
before
Logic suggests that Berlusconi, while playing hardball to get as much out of his
centre-left coalition partner as possible, does not have an incentive to go for new
elections. If he lost such elections, as he probably would, his chances of getting
any kind of leniency or even pardon from a new Italian government and/or the
Italian president would probably be zero. His best chance to stay out of jail, or at
least avoid lengthy house arrest, would be to stay on speaking terms with
President Napolitano and the centre-left rather than throwing the country into
new turmoil in a rash response to losing his Senate seat.
President Napolitano has shown a steely resolve to keep Italy out of trouble. If
he feared that the uncertainty created by new elections could disrupt Italy’s
economic healing process, he might just ask Prime Minister Letta to stay on as
interim prime minister for an extended period until it were safe to call new
elections or until a post-Berlusconi centre-right sorted itself out and joined the
government again. In the meantime, a centre-left interim government would have
a majority in Italy’s House of Representatives but not in the Senate. In such
circumstances, Italy might not get much done. But neither would it provoke a
disaster. After all, US President Obama and Germany’s Chancellor Merkel are in
the same position: both lack a majority in their upper houses and cannot get
major laws passed unless they strike specific deals with the opposition.
Berlusconi: how best to
stay out of jail?
A caretaker government if
need be?
New elections in Italy in late 2013 or early 2014 would be much less of a risk
than they would have been in May or June. Memories of the savage Monti tax
hikes of 2012 are now less raw. Italian consumer confidence and other leading
economic indicators have recovered. Beppo Grillo has shown himself to be a
dictatorial leader of his “Five Star” movement, alienating some erstwhile
supporters. Opinion polls (Chart 2) suggest that new elections would now be a
straight race between the centre-left and centre-right with both sides, on balance,
likely to pursue fairly sensible and pro-euro policies if they won.
Chart 2: Centre-left up, Grillo down: Italian opinion polls
40%
New elections in Italy
would be awkward but
less dangerous than before
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
Berlusconi coalition
Centre-left coalition
Monti
Grillo
Other
Grillo is trailing far
behind the mainstream
0%
Feb 2013 Mrz 2013 Apr 2013 Mai 2013 Jun 2013 Jul 2013 Aug 2013
Average of the five most recent opinion polls each week. Source: Ipsos, Coesis, IPR, EMG, Peipoli, LORIEN,
Euromedia, SWG, Tecne
4

Berenberg Macro Views
Economics
Risk 2: German court
Some time after the German elections on 22 September 2013, the German
Constitutional Court will probably give its verdict on the ECB’s OMT programme.
Judging by the tone of the court hearings on 12 and 13 June 2013, the judges are no
fans of the ECB promise to buy sovereign bonds of peripheral countries in the event
of renewed market turmoil, to put it mildly. But Berlin sees the ECB’s safety net as
essential to contain the euro crisis. The court has no tradition of contradicting Berlin
on key issues of Germany foreign policy. And whatever their misgivings about the
OMT, the judges probably have no desire to trigger grave financial turmoil.
We thus expect the judges to say that the OMT is legal under the German
constitution and the German interpretation of the Maastricht treaty if the OMT
respects some constraints which the judges will outline.
The genuine risk we see is that the judges, in trying to constrain the OMT, may do so
in a way that renders it ineffective. In markets, perceptions matter even more than
substance. And the judges are not financial experts. If markets conclude after the
verdict that a constrained OMT is no longer a reliable shield against contagion risks,
contagion might again spread like wildfire in the Eurozone, sending financial markets
and leading economic indicators into a tailspin.
We consider this unlikely. But we cannot rule it out. If the risk were to materialise,
the ECB would need to find other ways to make good on its vow to do all it takes to
preserve the euro. As a first reaction, the ECB would probably cut rates by 25bp and
remind markets that the bank has other powerful instruments including outright
quantitative easing at its disposal. If that were not enough, the ECB would probably
start a major programme of quantitative easing with outright purchases of sovereign
bonds of all member countries above a certain ratings threshold. The threshold
would likely be set to include Italian and Spanish bonds but not those of Greece or
Portugal. Massive quantitative easing would probably calm markets again. The risk of
renewed recession in the wake of escalating market turmoil would give the ECB the
justification to act so decisively.
It would be one of the ironies of history. If the German Constitutional Court rules
against the ECB promise to buy sovereign bonds of some countries that meet certain
conditions, the result could be massive and unconditional purchases of sovereign
bonds of almost all Eurozone countries. That would be unfortunate. But it would not
spell disaster.
The judges have no
tradition of upsetting
Berlin on key issues of
foreign policy
Expect the judges to
constrain the OMT
But what if these
constraints render the
OMT ineffective?
If worst came to worst, the
ECB would not shy away
from quantitative easing
to end a market panic
An irony of history?
The end of the crisis? Not yet, but maybe soon
At the start of 2013, we had a clear idea of what we wanted to do at the end of the
year: we wanted to write a big report declaring the end of the euro crisis. As we
discussed in March, the biggest risk to our plan remains that we may have missed the
boat. Judging by the level of market tensions, the euro crisis was largely over by
February 2013. But we first need to actually see the economic rebound in the euro
periphery which leading indicators are now flagging, and we need to get beyond the
German court verdict, before we can judge whether or not the crisis is over for good.
Until then, we still face the risk that a new but probably less vicious wave of crisis
could hit the Eurozone before we can sound the all-clear.
A merry Christmas?
5

Berenberg Macro Views
Economics
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