Semiconductor Equipment - Berenberg Bank
Semiconductor Equipment - Berenberg Bank
Semiconductor Equipment - Berenberg Bank
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BERENBERG EQUITY RESEARCH<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong><br />
<strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Shrinkage brings growth,<br />
but not for everyone<br />
Tammy Qiu<br />
Analyst<br />
+44 20 3465 2673<br />
tammy.qiu@berenberg.com<br />
Jean Beaubois<br />
Specialist Sales<br />
+44 20 3207 7835<br />
tammy.qiu@berenberg.com<br />
22 July 2013<br />
Technology Hardware
For our disclosures in respect of section 34b of the German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG) and<br />
our disclaimer please see the end of this document.<br />
Please note that the use of this research report is subject to the conditions and restrictions set forth in the disclosures and<br />
the disclaimer at the end of this document.
Table of contents<br />
Shrinkage brings growth, but not for everyone 4<br />
Helicopter view of the names 6<br />
Key debates 7<br />
Snapshot on capex trends and vendor exposures 10<br />
How much are chip-makers spending? 12<br />
Where are chip-makers spending? 21<br />
Companies<br />
AMSL: The best positioned player, but priced in 28<br />
AMS International: Front-end business undervalued 53<br />
Suess Microtec: Small, but active in growing markets 74<br />
Applied Materials: Recovery and growth priced in 92<br />
Tokyo Electron: Mainly exposed to legacy markets 117<br />
Disclosures in respect of section 34b of the German Securities<br />
Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG) 137<br />
Contacts: Investment <strong>Bank</strong>ing 140<br />
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<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Shrinkage brings growth, but not for everyone<br />
● We believe that the semiconductor equipment industry has entered a<br />
recovery cycle from beginning of 2013, after declining by 16% in 2012<br />
due to weak memory spending. ASML, Applied Materials (AMAT),<br />
Tokyo Electron (TEL), ASM International (ASMI) and KLA Tencor<br />
Corp (KLA) are seeing or guiding for order recovery compared with<br />
the 2012 trough level. We expect this order recovery trend to continue<br />
as 1) foundry/logic orders are likely to remain strong, driven by a<br />
28nm capacity expansion and a 20nm/16nm FinFET ramp-up, and 2)<br />
memory orders are expected to pick up from the 2012 level after a<br />
better supply/demand balance since the start of 2013, driven by the<br />
ramp-up of NAND 20nm and smaller nodes, DRAM 30nm and<br />
smaller nodes and 3D NAND.<br />
● Key debates: 1) Will the semiconductor cycles be as cyclical in the<br />
future as previously? 2) Where are we in the cycle now? 3) What will<br />
the impact be of Apple switching/buying into its foundry partners?<br />
1) We believe the semiconductor cycle will remain cyclical, but less<br />
volatile compared with historically, as a) memory capex, which<br />
caused fluctuations previously, is likely to be less volatile as<br />
memory-makers have become more conservative in their<br />
spending, b) logic/foundry capex is likely to remain strong, as<br />
competition intensifies in the consumer devices market.<br />
2) As the industry entered an order recovery cycle at the beginning<br />
of 2013, we expect that we will exit the recovery phase by end-<br />
2013/early 2014, and enter a more muted growth period, as a)<br />
Intel and Samsung’s capex is likely to be spent in H2, which will<br />
drive order growth in 2013 H2, b) foundry/logic capex is likely to<br />
remain at the current level over the next three years until 2016<br />
(TSMC indicated that its 2014 capex will be similar to that in<br />
2013), c) memory capex has recovered since mid-2013. We believe<br />
that memory capex growth in the next three years will not drive<br />
any significant total capex growth, as it will only account for 29%<br />
of total capex, versus 33-57% of total capex in the peak years.<br />
3) We believe that Apple’s foundry switch is likely to provide small<br />
positive upside for some equipment vendors, depending on their<br />
exposure to the various foundry/logic players. The foundry order<br />
switch is likely to create new capacity addition demand, which<br />
could give a short-term boost to overall capex.<br />
● The growth potential of different equipment vendors differs, as they<br />
are each exposed to different fabrication processes. We rank the<br />
vendors’ growth potential (between 2012 to 2017) as follows:<br />
1) ASML – 100% exposure to the lithography market, which is<br />
growing at a CAGR of 18%, driven by demand for ever smaller<br />
chips;<br />
2) ASMI – 60% exposure to the atomic layer deposition (ALD)<br />
market, which is growing at a CAGR of 15%;<br />
3) KLA – 100% exposure to process control market (growing at a<br />
CAGR of 6%), although AMAT may gain market share from it;<br />
4) SUSS – 30% exposure to the micro-electro-mechanical systems<br />
(MEMS) market, which is growing at a CAGR of 12%;<br />
5) LAM – 50% exposure to the silicon etching market (growing at<br />
CAGR 4%);<br />
6) AMAT – a diversified portfolio, but with 61% market exposure to<br />
growth markets and 39% to legacy markets; benefiting from the<br />
capex growth trend;<br />
7) TEL – 60% exposure to legacy markets.<br />
ASML Holding<br />
Hold (initiation)<br />
Current price Price target<br />
EUR67.68 EUR73.00<br />
19/07/2013 Amsterdam Close<br />
ASM International<br />
Buy (initiation)<br />
Current price Price target<br />
EUR27.49 EUR31.00<br />
19/07/2013 Amsterdam Close<br />
Suess Microtec<br />
Buy (initiation)<br />
Current price<br />
EUR7.65<br />
Price target<br />
EUR9.40<br />
19/07/2013 XETRA Close<br />
Applied Materials<br />
Hold (initiation)<br />
Current price<br />
USD16.56<br />
Price target<br />
USD14.40<br />
18/07/2013 New York Close<br />
Tokyo Electron<br />
Sell (initiation)<br />
Current price<br />
JPY4,790<br />
Price target<br />
JPY4,331<br />
19/07/2013 Tokyo Close<br />
Rating system: Absolute<br />
22 July 2013<br />
Tammy Qiu<br />
Analyst<br />
+44 20 3465 2673<br />
tammy.qiu@berenberg.com<br />
Jean Beaubois<br />
Specialist Sales<br />
+44 20 3207 7835<br />
jean.beaubois@berenberg.com<br />
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<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
● In this note, we initiate coverage on ASML with a Hold recommendation (PT<br />
€73) as we believe all positive news is well understood and priced in at the<br />
current price level. We initiate with Buy ratings on ASMI (PT €31), as it has a<br />
44% market share and no direct competitor in the growing ALD market, and<br />
on Suess Microtec (SUSS) (PT €9.4), as we believe the lithography segment can<br />
drive strong growth for SUSS in 2014 and 2015 without a significant<br />
contribution from other segments. We initiate with a Hold rating on AMAT<br />
(PT $14.4) as we can only see it gaining a further 1% in market share. We also<br />
initiate with a Sell rating on TEL (PT ¥4,331), as ~60% of its revenue is<br />
exposed to low-growth markets.<br />
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Helicopter view of the names<br />
Figure 1: Market share and market growth potential<br />
High<br />
Market share<br />
Low<br />
Low<br />
High<br />
Addressable market growth<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Figure 2: Relative share performance<br />
01/01/2008 01/01/2009 01/01/2010 01/01/2011 01/01/2012 01/01/2013<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
AMAT ASMI ASML TEL Suess<br />
Figure 3: Valuation matrix<br />
ROE*<br />
Dividend<br />
yield*<br />
No.1 ASML 19.7% AMAT 2.5% AMAT 9.7% TEL 26.5%<br />
No.2 AMAT 17.1% TEL 1.5% ASMI 6.2% SUSS 17.6%<br />
No.3 SUSS 9.1% ASML 0.9% ASML 4.5% AMAT 16.7%<br />
No.4 TEL 6.3% ASMI - TEL 4.3% ASMI 8.9%<br />
No.5 ASMI 6.2% SUSS - SUSS 1.6% ASML 6.5%<br />
* based on <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimation of 2014 performance<br />
Net cash based on 2012 YE balance<br />
Source: Bloomberg data, company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
FCF yield*<br />
Net cash/marcap<br />
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<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
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Key debates<br />
Will the semiconductor space remain as cyclical as before?<br />
We believe the semiconductor cycle is going to remain cyclical, but less<br />
volatile compared to history. Over the past decade, we have seen cycle peaks in<br />
2000, 2007 and 2011, followed by a capacity digestion period, ie trough cycles in<br />
2002 and 2009, driven by different market trends. Memory was the main driver for<br />
the 2000 and 2008 cycle peak, and logic/foundry drove the peak cycle with<br />
memory in 2011.<br />
Figure 4: <strong>Semiconductor</strong> capex to remain flattish for the next two years<br />
USD mn<br />
80,000<br />
70,000<br />
60,000<br />
50,000<br />
40,000<br />
30,000<br />
20,000<br />
10,000<br />
-<br />
35%<br />
30%<br />
25%<br />
20%<br />
15%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
0%<br />
Semi capex $mn Semi equipment revenue $mn Semi capex/semi revenue %<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
The 2000 cycle was driven by 1) strong PC demand, 2) increased DRAM content<br />
per PC, 3) increased capacity for 0.13 micron, 0.18 micron and 300mm.<br />
In 2007, the cycle was driven by 1) Apple’s Nano/Shuffle products and other<br />
portable media players, which led NAND demand, 2) a DRAM demand increase<br />
due to increased adoption of 64-bit processors, Microsoft Vista and the Sony<br />
PlayStation 3 (PS3) launch, 3) an increased mobile phone DRAM demand, and 4)<br />
DRAM, Logic and NAND moving to smaller nodes.<br />
The 2011 cycle was influenced by 1) smartphone/tablet demand offset by PC<br />
demand, 2) leading-edge chip increases (logic: 28nm; NAND: 20nm; DRAM:<br />
30nm) as the consumer electronics market grew.<br />
We believe future cycles will be less volatile: In the future, we believe the<br />
semiconductor capex trend will be less cyclical compared to previous cycles for the<br />
following reasons.<br />
1) Memory-makers become more conservative in their spending: The<br />
previous three peak cycles were driven by memory. Memory-makers have<br />
tended to double their capex in the peak years (ie 2000, 2004-2007, 2010) and<br />
cut capex by half in the following one/two years. Following the 2012 memory<br />
price slump, memory-makers became more cautious and are now ramping up<br />
addition capacity slower than before. Therefore we believe the cycle volatility<br />
caused by memory spending will be significantly reduced.<br />
2) Foundry/logic spending is likely to remain strong: Intel, Samsung<br />
(excluding memory) and Taiwan <strong>Semiconductor</strong> Manufacturing Company<br />
(TSMC) (which together account for 78% total foundry/logic capex) are<br />
heavily exposed to the consumer electronic markets, and the competition in<br />
the market is further intensified by the war between Apple, Samsung,<br />
Qualcomm, Intel and ARM. We believe that these companies have no choice<br />
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but to keep spending to maintain their leadership in the consumer devices<br />
market.<br />
Where are we in the cycle?<br />
We believe we are halfway into the current recovery cycle, and will enter a<br />
more muted growth phase by the end of 2013 or early 2014: ASML, AMAT,<br />
TEL, ASMI, KLA and LAM have all shown improved order intake/shipment<br />
levels from the beginning of 2013, compared to end-2012; hence, we believe we<br />
have entered a recovery cycle from the 2012 trough.<br />
We believe we may exit the recovery phase and enter a more muted growth phase<br />
of the cycle by end-2013/early 2014 for the following reasons.<br />
1) Samsung and Intel’s capex is likely to be spent in H2 and will drive order<br />
growth in H2 2013.<br />
2) TSMC, Samsung, Intel, Globalfoundries and other logic/foundry players<br />
have all budgeted higher/similar capex compared to 2012, and total logic<br />
and foundry capex is currently at a historical high (2013E: $37bn). After<br />
2013, we expect foundry/logic capex to remain at flattish until 2016. In<br />
addition, TSMC has indicated that its 2014 capex will be similar to the<br />
2013 level. We expect the solid order intake level to be maintained after<br />
2013/early 2014, but growth is likely to be muted.<br />
3) Memory spending has already picked up from the 2012 trough level since<br />
mid-2013. ASML, KLA and LAM have all indicated that memory spending<br />
is recovering. We estimate memory capex to grow at 11-15% in the next<br />
four years. However, as it only accounts for 29% of total capex, which is<br />
too small to drive significant capex hikes. Historically, memory spending<br />
used to account for up to 57% of total capex and hence had a greater<br />
impact on overall capex.<br />
Will the Apple/Samsung/TSMC/Globalfoundries shift be a zero<br />
sum game?<br />
In our view, any shift is a small positive for equipment vendors, depending<br />
on which of them Apple is shifting to: Since last year, there has been much<br />
speculation about whether Apple will shift its foundry orders from Samsung to<br />
TSMC/Intel, and whether Apple will buy fabrication plants (fabs) from United<br />
Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) or Globalfoundries. In our opinion, these<br />
shifts can be a small positive on a net basis for some equipment vendors, instead of<br />
simply a zero sum game. The new foundry is likely to build capacity which was not<br />
required previously; at the same time, the old foundry may cut its original spending<br />
level, but it may have already committed some capex as fab-building projects are<br />
multi-year projects.<br />
If Apple moves to TSMC, we believe ASML, AMAT, ASMI, and LAM will all<br />
benefit, as: 1) TSMC’s 20nm is lithography-intensive, and it only buys from ASML;<br />
2) AMAT has a strong relationship with TSMC (although the decrease in the<br />
Samsung order may have a negative impact on AMAT); and 3) TSMC 20nm is high<br />
K metal gate (HKMG)-based, which requires the ALD tool from ASMI.<br />
If Apple chooses Intel for its foundry orders, we believe TEL may benefit, with<br />
ASML also benefiting, but to a lesser extent, as 1) TEL has a close bond with Intel<br />
in relation to its etching tools, 2) AMAT does not have a strong relationship with<br />
Intel, 3) ASML may receive new orders, but it has to share Intel orders with Nikon,<br />
and 4) Intel’s capacity is 100% HKMG-based, which only leaves limited upside for<br />
ASMI.<br />
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If Apple buys Globalfoundries’ fabs, we believe ASML, TEL, ASMI, AMAT and<br />
LAM may all benefit, as 1) leading-edge nodes are lithography-intensive, providing<br />
upside for ASML, 2) TEL is strong at Globalfoundries in etching, 3) LAM has<br />
close relationships with foundries in etching, 3) AMAT has strong links in<br />
deposition with foundries, 4) Globalfoundries’ HKMG adoption rate is currently<br />
quite low, so it may require more ALD tools from ASMI to ramp up capacity as<br />
required.<br />
If Apple buys UMC’s fabs, we believe ASML, ASMI, AMAT and LAM could<br />
benefit as 1) leading-edge nodes are lithography-intensive, and hence are a strong<br />
suit for ASML, 2) LAM benefits from good relationships with foundries in etching,<br />
3) AMAT is strong in deposition with foundries, and 4) UMC may need to ramp<br />
up its HKMG processes, which would benefit ASMI.<br />
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<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
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Snapshot on capex trends and vendor exposures<br />
In our view, the capex level of the industry is likely to be flattish over the next two<br />
years (5% up in 2014 and 3% up in 2015), and increase by 10% in 2016 due to<br />
450mm migration, driven by strong foundry/logic and memory spending recovery.<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> equipment vendors’ growth potential differs from one vendor to<br />
another, as they are each exposed to different fabrication processes. We believe<br />
ASML and ASMI are likely to benefit from their sales addressable market (SAM)<br />
expansion, while TEL is likely to suffer from its declining SAM.<br />
Capex to remain flattish in 2014/2015<br />
Memory – NAND capex to return to growth and accelerate in 2014/15<br />
NAND capex is likely to return to growth in 2013 (up 6%) and accelerate in<br />
2014/2015 (up 15% and 20% respectively), driven by the high capital requirements<br />
of 20nm/below node, and 3D NAND.<br />
We believe NAND vendors are unlikely to increase capex significantly in the near<br />
future as they did historically in peak years (39-115% growth), as 1) the spending<br />
pattern has become more conservative since the 2012 trough period, 2) Samsung’s<br />
new NAND fab, Micron’s DRAM-NAND conversion, and Toshiba’s capacity<br />
resumption may provide new capacity in next two years, and 3) the low-/mid-end<br />
smartphone/tablet, which is likely to be the driver for the consumer devices<br />
market, requires less NAND content than high-end products.<br />
Memory – DRAM stable 5% growth in 2013/2014<br />
DRAM capex growth is likely to be stable and grow at 5% in 2013 and 2014,<br />
enabling a limited expansion of 30nm/20nm capacity.<br />
We believe DRAM capex will not increase significantly as: 1) capacity expansion<br />
demand is low (as per our conversations with industry sources, current capacity is<br />
sufficient to support annual bit growth of about 30%); 2) mid-/low-end consumer<br />
devices require less DRAM content per box; and 3) smartphone/tablet DRAM<br />
demand is not sufficient to offset the decline in PC unit growth as the content per<br />
box is less (0.6GB versus PCs at 4.2GB).<br />
Foundry/logic players remain solid, contributing 60% of total capex<br />
Foundry/logic players are heavily exposed to the consumer electronic markets, as<br />
Samsung and Intel manufacture their own chips for their smartphones, tablets and<br />
Ultrabooks, Apple contracts the Samsung foundry and TSMC for its chip<br />
manufacturing requirements and fabless players such as Qualcomm, Mediatek and<br />
Nvidia contract foundries like TSMC, Globalfoundries and UMC for their chip<br />
manufacturing.<br />
As a result of the increasing competition within the consumer electronics market,<br />
the chip-makers/device vendors require the most advanced chips in order to<br />
differentiate their end-products. The foundry/logic players are therefore under<br />
pressure to maintain their technology leadership, and all the major players are<br />
ramping up 20nm in 2013, to be followed by 16/14nm in 2014. We thus believe<br />
foundry/logic spending will remain solid, and will contribute about 60% of<br />
semiconductor capex.<br />
Growth potential differs as market exposure differs<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> equipment vendors’ growth potential differs from one to another,<br />
as each vendor is exposed to different fabrication processes.<br />
We believe the lithography, ALD, epitaxy deposition, process control and 3D<br />
packaging markets have considerable growth potential, driven by node shrinking<br />
and 3D wafer stacking demand, hence ASML, ASMI, KLA and SUSS are likely to<br />
outperform other equipment suppliers. We believe TEL will suffer from its high<br />
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Technology Hardware<br />
exposure to legacy markets such as dielectric etching.<br />
In the table below, we rank the market growth potential of the various markets,<br />
and relevant exposure of each of the key vendors. The vendors with high<br />
exposures to the growing markets are likely to outperform.<br />
Figure 5: Ranking by growth potential<br />
Lithography 18.0%<br />
Deposition - ALD<br />
3D bonding<br />
CAGR<br />
Comment<br />
<strong>Equipment</strong> Vendor's Main market exposure (market share 2012)<br />
2012-2017 ASML ASMI AMAT TEL SUSS KLA LAM<br />
15.0%<br />
14.0%<br />
Deposition - Epitaxy 7.5%<br />
Printing smaller chips requires<br />
leading edge lithography tools<br />
Demand increase as HKMG is<br />
required for 20nm and smaller<br />
node.<br />
Revenue may triple once volume<br />
adoption starts in 2016/17<br />
Extensively used for new chip<br />
designs, such as FinFET, 3D NAND<br />
100%<br />
(74% share)<br />
60%<br />
(44% share)<br />
11%<br />
(89%<br />
share)<br />
6%<br />
(44% share)<br />
13%<br />
(no.1 share)<br />
Process control 6.0%<br />
Demand increases as chip design<br />
gets more complex<br />
9%<br />
(76% share)<br />
100%<br />
(54% share)<br />
Deposition - PE CVD 5.0% Demand driven by 3D NAND<br />
Etching - Silicon 4.0% Demand driven by FinFET, 20nm<br />
19%<br />
(47% share)<br />
8% 8%<br />
(14% share) (9% share)<br />
50%<br />
(59% share)<br />
Photoresist processing 1.4%<br />
Demand decrease as legacy<br />
lithography tool demand declines,<br />
hence total lithography tool<br />
shipment decreases.<br />
34%<br />
(89% share)<br />
Deposition - PVD 0.5% Grow slower than PE CVD<br />
Etching - Dielectric 0.5%<br />
Ion Implanter<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Demand shifts to silicon etching as<br />
new chip designs like FinFET,<br />
20nm.<br />
-2.5% HKMG require less implant steps<br />
21%<br />
(78% share)<br />
11%<br />
(76% share)<br />
20%<br />
(63% share)<br />
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<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
How much are chip-makers spending?<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> equipment vendors supply equipment used in the chipmanufacturing<br />
process. Historically, semiconductor equipment industry revenues<br />
are closely correlated to semiconductor capex levels, which are determined by the<br />
capital intensity of the semiconductor industry (see Figure 6).<br />
Figure 6: Semi equipment revenue versus semi capex<br />
USD mn<br />
80,000<br />
70,000<br />
60,000<br />
50,000<br />
40,000<br />
30,000<br />
20,000<br />
10,000<br />
-<br />
35%<br />
30%<br />
25%<br />
20%<br />
15%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
0%<br />
Semi capex $mn Semi equipment revenue $mn Semi capex/semi revenue %<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
As shown in Figure 7, foundry and logic, memory and integrated device<br />
manufacturer (IDM) players are the three main groups of capex spenders within<br />
the sector, although the capex mix varies over time. IDMs were the main spenders<br />
in the early 2000s, replaced by memory chip manufacturers in 2004/2005 following<br />
the high memory demand from Apple (for its Nano/Shuffle products), Microsoft<br />
(Vista), Sony (PS3) and mobile handset manufacturers. Foundry and logic chipmakers<br />
became the biggest spenders in 2011 due to the ramp-up of fabless players<br />
and greater outsourcing from IDMs. Over the next few years, we expect semi<br />
capex to comprise: 1) strong foundry and logic spending driven by consumer<br />
electronics growth; 2) a normalisation in memory spending; and 3) shrinking IDM<br />
spending as increased capital requirements push IDMs to use more foundry<br />
services instead of in-house manufacturing.<br />
Figure 7: Three main semi capex spenders<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Foundry+logic IDM Memory (NAND+DRAM)<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
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The amount of capex from these three types of chip-makers will depend on their<br />
end-market demand and technology roadmap. We estimate the aggregate capex will<br />
remain flattish between 2013 and 2015. We expect 450mm migration-related capex<br />
to start increasing in 2016 from logic/foundry chip-makers, which will lead a 10%<br />
growth in overall capex (see Figure 8).<br />
Figure 8: Total capex to be flat in 2014/2015 and boosted in 2016 by 450mm spending<br />
$mn<br />
80,000<br />
70,000<br />
60,000<br />
50,000<br />
40,000<br />
30,000<br />
20,000<br />
10,000<br />
0<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Memory – NAND spending will normalise from now<br />
NAND capex grew aggressively from 2000 to 2007, outgrowing total<br />
semiconductor capex over the period. During this time, NAND bit shipments grew<br />
by c190%, fuelled by the increase of portable applications, such as digital cameras<br />
and personal digit assistants in 2000, followed by growth of Apple’s Nano/Shuffle<br />
products after launch in 2003. Since this period of rapid expansion, the NAND<br />
spending cycle tended to follow the spending cycle of total semiconductor capex<br />
(see Figure 9).<br />
Figure 9: NAND capex versus total semi capex growth<br />
% growth<br />
200%<br />
150%<br />
100%<br />
50%<br />
0%<br />
-50%<br />
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Foundry&logic IDM Memory<br />
-100%<br />
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
NAND Capex<br />
Total Capex<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
From the second half of 2011, the NAND industry struggled due to oversupply<br />
after its significant expansion phase; this was largely the result of softer demand in<br />
USB storage, fewer bundled cards with smartphones and channel inventory<br />
clearing. As a result, the NAND price fell by 42% in 2012 and 33% in 2011. In July<br />
2012, Toshiba cut its utilisation rate by 30% (6-8% aggregate NAND capacity), and<br />
indeed all NAND vendors have become more conservative in adding new capacity.<br />
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<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Toshiba and Micron are ramping up capacity slower than before, Samsung<br />
switched its NAND line 14 to LSI and has been converting its NAND production<br />
capacity in Austin, Texas since Q2 2012 to LSI (logic), and SK Hynix readjusted<br />
Fab M12’s capacity to produce both DRAM and NAND instead of being a<br />
dedicated NAND fab.<br />
Figure 10: NAND demand/supply<br />
Mns of 1GB Eqv 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E<br />
Demand/Supply<br />
NAND demand 11,295 20,195 32,131 45,872 62,992<br />
Growth 65.7% 78.8% 59.1% 42.8% 37.3%<br />
NAND supply 11,247 20,004 31,946 44,318 62,966<br />
Growth 72.5% 77.9% 62.1% 38.7% 42.1%<br />
ASP ($) 1.86 1.24 0.74 0.62 0.48<br />
Sufficiency 99.6% 99.1% 100.9% 96.7% 100.0%<br />
By Application<br />
Tablets 4.5% 8.5% 7.3% 5.3% 6.1%<br />
PC 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 1.3% 2.0%<br />
Server 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%<br />
Feature phone & sm 20.2% 22.3% 22.2% 21.5% 19.2%<br />
SSD 6.7% 12.8% 19.4% 29.2% 35.0%<br />
Data Card 46.5% 38.5% 32.9% 26.2% 23.6%<br />
Other 21.8% 17.6% 17.4% 16.4% 14.0%<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
We expect NAND bit shipments to grow at a modest level (40-50%) over the next<br />
three years (see Figure 10 above), mainly driven by demand for Solid State Drive<br />
(SSD) and, to a lesser extent, smartphones and tablets. The main portion of bit<br />
growth (40%) will come from node shrinking (more chips can be made from the<br />
same wafer as chip size shrinks); therefore, wafer capacity addition is likely to grow<br />
at a very low level.<br />
Figure 11: NAND content/box<br />
(GB Eqv) 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Tablet 27.2 25.4 15.7 11.6 14.8 17.7 21.5<br />
Growth 100% -7% -38% -26% 28% 19% 22%<br />
Smartphone & Feature phones 1.4 2.5 3.9 5.1 6.3 8.8 12.6<br />
Growth 70% 73% 61% 30% 23% 39% 43%<br />
Solid State Drives (SSD) 77.3 98.8 148.6 170.4 190.9 223.1 265.0<br />
Growth 35% 28% 50% 15% 12% 17% 19%<br />
Data Cards 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.5 1.7 1.9<br />
Growth 27% 34% 22% 15% 22% -32% 13%<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
We believe NAND vendors are unlikely to invest heavily in capacity additions in<br />
the near future because: 1) Samsung’s new mega NAND fab and Micron’s DRAM<br />
to NAND conversion will add new capacity in the next two years; 2) we estimate<br />
that the growth of smartphones and tablets will be driven by mid-/low-end<br />
products with low NAND content per box.<br />
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<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 12: NAND shrinkage roadmap<br />
NAND H1 2010 H2 2010 H1 2011 H2 2011 H1 2012 H2 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Samsung<br />
Toshiba/SanDisk<br />
Micron(Elpida)<br />
-3xnm/4xnm<br />
-3xnm/4xnm<br />
-27nm<br />
-24nm<br />
-21nm<br />
SK Hynix -3xnm/4xnm<br />
-26nm -20nm<br />
-19nm started 2012 end,<br />
- 21nm/19nm<br />
-16nm start in H2<br />
-25nm -20nm started in 2012 H1,<br />
-50% capacity on<br />
-19nm started in 2012 end,<br />
-19nm as main capacity<br />
-1Y(18nm-15nm) start in 2013<br />
-16nm start in 2013 end<br />
-16nm expansion<br />
-21/19/16nm<br />
-Start 3D NAND<br />
-16nm expansion<br />
-16nm start in 2013 end,<br />
-20nm/16nm<br />
-mainly ship 20nm,<br />
- start 16nm in Q3<br />
-1znm (12-14nm),<br />
-1Y nm/1xnm<br />
-3D NAND.<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Most vendors are currently building NAND at 19nm/20nm node, and are planning<br />
to start 16nm node at the end of the year (see Figure 12 above). We believe 16nm<br />
will mature in 2014, and vendors will enter 1Znm (12nm-14nm) and 3D NAND in<br />
2014/2015.<br />
Figure 13: NAND capex/revenue versus bit growth trend<br />
250%<br />
NAND<br />
200%<br />
150%<br />
100%<br />
50%<br />
0%<br />
-50%<br />
-100%<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
NAND capex/rev<br />
Bit growth<br />
Historically, NAND bit growth was highly correlated to NAND capex/sales, as<br />
shown in Figure 13. We believe the capex/revenue ratio is likely to be around 30-<br />
40% for the next few years, as the NAND bit shipment growth rate is slowing<br />
down to 40-50% from its historical level of 80-200%.<br />
We estimate NAND capex will grow by 20% in 2014/2015 after 6% growth in<br />
2013; reflecting the high amount of capital investment required to ramp up<br />
production of 1Y/1Znm in 2014/2015 and prepare for 3D NAND.<br />
Memory – DRAM spending pattern structurally changed<br />
Historically, DRAM capex has shown a bigger fluctuation versus total<br />
semiconductor capex during different spending cycles (2000, 2005-2007, 2008-<br />
2009) (see Figure 14). From the 1980s to 2007, the growth of the DRAM market<br />
was linked to the success of the PC and gaming industries. The capex peak in 2000<br />
was driven by strong PC demand following the Pentium 4 launch and increased<br />
DRAM content per PC. The 2004 peak was driven by the increased adoption of<br />
dual-cores, 64-bit processors and PS3 demand. From 2007 to 2011, the rise of<br />
smartphones and tablets drove DRAM market growth, although this was offset by<br />
the weak performance of the PC market.<br />
15
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 14: DRAM capex versus total semi capex growth<br />
% growth<br />
200%<br />
150%<br />
100%<br />
50%<br />
0%<br />
-50%<br />
-100%<br />
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
DRAM Capex<br />
Total Capex<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
Following the capacity digestion period of 2011-2012 and the 9% capacity cut in<br />
2012, independent researcher Gartner forecasts that the DRAM market will enter<br />
an over-demand phase in late 2013 at the earliest (see Figure 15). The growth of<br />
DRAM demand will be driven by smartphone and tablet unit shipments, and<br />
content per box growth.<br />
From now on, DRAM bit shipment is likely to grow at a moderate rate of<br />
30% rather than its historical level of 70%: 1) We believe the growth of the<br />
smartphone and tablet market will be driven by mid-/low-end products with low<br />
content per box (see Figure 16); 2) the demand uptick from smartphone and tablet<br />
shipment is not sufficient to offset the decline in PC unit growth because<br />
smartphones and tablets have a much lower content per box compared with PCs;<br />
and 3) content per box growth is slowing down.<br />
Figure 15: DRAM demand/supply<br />
Mns of 1GB Eqv 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E<br />
Demand/Supply<br />
DRAM demand 1,912 2,842 3,747 4,756 6,214<br />
Growth 43.8% 48.6% 31.9% 26.9% 30.7%<br />
DRAM supply 1,962 2,925 3,830 4,613 5,886<br />
Growth 44% 49.0% 31.0% 20.5% 27.6%<br />
ASP ($) 2.60 1.30 0.86 0.72 0.54<br />
Sufficiency 102.6% 102.9% 102.2% 97.0% 94.7%<br />
By Application<br />
PC 51.6% 44.3% 39.0% 48.8% 45.1%<br />
Tablets 0.2% 1.1% 2.4% 6.1% 8.1%<br />
Smartphones 3.3% 6.1% 12.3% 18.2% 21.7%<br />
Feature phones 2.4% 2.3% 1.8% 1.1% 0.8%<br />
Server 8.4% 11.8% 11.8% 13.9% 13.6%<br />
Consumer 7.7% 5.2% 4.0% 5.3% 4.8%<br />
Other 26.4% 29.1% 28.7% 6.6% 6.1%<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
16
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 16: DRAM content/box<br />
2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
PC 2.8 3.5 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.7 6.4<br />
Growth 15% 25% 21% 10% 9% 13% 13%<br />
Tablet 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.5 2.2 2.7<br />
Growth - 81% 25% 60% 62% 43% 26%<br />
Smartphone 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.9<br />
Growth 19% 74% 72% 30% 33% 38% 29%<br />
Featrue phone 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.5 2.2 2.7<br />
Growth 1% 81% 25% 60% 62% 43% 26%<br />
Server 18.0 35.2 45.0 53.2 57.7 77.6 111.8<br />
Growth 43% 96% 28% 18% 8% 34% 44%<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
In previous years, there has been DRAM capex investment in both capacity<br />
expansion and technology migration. As per our conversations with various<br />
industry sources, the current level of DRAM capacity in place is sufficient to<br />
support annual bit growth of about 30% for the next five years. This level will,<br />
therefore, be sufficient to meet our demand forecast (30% growth rate) (see Figure<br />
15). Micron has even indicated that wafer capacity will decline in 2013 and 2014.<br />
Therefore, we are only going to see capex investment on shrinkage, instead of<br />
additional capacity building, apart from the remaining part of SK Hynix’s fab M12<br />
expansion, which is likely to be very little.<br />
Figure 17: DRAM shrinking roadmap<br />
DRAM<br />
Samsung<br />
Micron<br />
H1 2010 H2 2010 H1 2011 H2 2011 H1 2012 H2 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
- 40nm started H1 2010 -Started 28nm Q4 2011,<br />
-40nm/35nm/28nm.<br />
-32nm stated 2012 Q1,<br />
-50nm<br />
-42nm &32nm<br />
-25nm started<br />
2012 end,<br />
-23nm start in 2013<br />
- expand 2Y(23nm/25nm)/28nm<br />
-start and expand 24nm in 2013<br />
end/2014,<br />
-32nm &24nm , skip 28nm.<br />
-2Ynm & 2Znm<br />
(20nm/21nm).<br />
- 24nm/2Znm<br />
Elpida<br />
SK Hynix<br />
-44nm<br />
-42nm<br />
-38nm started Q1 2011,<br />
-40nm/38nm<br />
-32nm started Q1 2012,<br />
-42nm & 32nm.<br />
-plan to ramp up 25nm,<br />
- expand 30nm/2xnm.<br />
-3xnm account for 70%,<br />
-28nm mass production started 2012 end,<br />
-23nm start in 2013<br />
- expand 28nm/23nm<br />
-23nm & 2Znm<br />
(20nm/21nm).<br />
Others<br />
-45nm/42nm/30nm<br />
-30nm&2xnm start and expand<br />
-2Xnm/2Znm<br />
Source: Company data<br />
In 2011 and 2012, all DRAM suppliers actively migrated down from the<br />
50nm/40nm node to the 30nm/20nm node (see Figure 17). Process node<br />
migration has slowed down after the accelerated period following the industry’s<br />
adoption of ArF immersion stepper in 2009/10. Today, physical barriers and the<br />
delay of the introduction of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography have raised<br />
technical hurdles for DRAM-makers, compared with the industry’s previous<br />
migration from 5Xnm to 3Xnm.<br />
All three of the main DRAM suppliers plan to expand their 20nm capacity over the<br />
next three years to 2016. Various DRAM vendors have told us that the node size<br />
for DRAM could fall to 12nm/8nm after the 20nm generation. We therefore<br />
estimate shrinkage-related capex will remain at a similar level for DRAM-makers<br />
from 2014 to 2016.<br />
17
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 18: DRAM capex/revenue versus bit growth trend<br />
DRAM<br />
100%<br />
80%<br />
60%<br />
40%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
DRAM Capex/revenue<br />
Bit growth<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
Historically, DRAM capital intensity was positively correlated to bit growth (see<br />
Figure 18). As discussed above, we expect DRAM bit growth to grow at a<br />
moderate 30% rate compared with its historical level of 70%. The spending pattern<br />
(capex/sales) of the DRAM industry is therefore likely to undergo structural<br />
change from the previous 40-60% level to 19-25%.<br />
We estimate that DRAM capex will remain flat or slightly down in 2013 even if the<br />
ASP improves, as DRAM-makers are likely to spend conservatively for the time<br />
being. We may start to see a small capex uptick in 2014/2015 because: 1) DRAMmakers<br />
may begin to spend more as they see sustainable profitability; and 2) most<br />
DRAM-makers plan to start or expand their 2Ynm (25/24/23nm) output in 2014,<br />
followed by 2Znm production in 2015. We could even see substantially higher<br />
capex growth if DRAM-makers start to upgrade current fab to facilitate EUV tools<br />
in 2014/2015, as the EUV tools are much bigger and heavier than previous<br />
lithography tools.<br />
Foundry and logic – the main spenders keep spending<br />
Foundry and logic capex grew at c22% from 2007-2012, versus total capex which<br />
was down by c1% during the same period. The strong capex growth was linked to<br />
the consumer electronics boom that began in 2009/2010.<br />
We expect the consumer electronic market to maintain solid growth over the<br />
next few years, driven by the intensified competition between vendors and form<br />
factor innovations. Logic players such as Intel and Samsung, are exposed to the<br />
trend because they manufacture the chips they use in own devices, while TSMC,<br />
the Samsung foundry, Globalfoundries and other foundries are exposed because<br />
they receive manufacturing orders from fabless players such as Apple, Qualcomm,<br />
Nvidia, Broadcom and Mediatek (see Figures 19 and 20).<br />
18
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 19: Foundry revenue components<br />
$mn<br />
30,000<br />
Foundry revenue by customer type<br />
25,000<br />
20,000<br />
15,000<br />
10,000<br />
5,000<br />
-<br />
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
Fabless IDM Other<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
Figure 20: Foundry grow with fabless<br />
Foundry revenue growth<br />
50.0%<br />
40.0%<br />
30.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
-10.0%<br />
-20.0%<br />
2007 2,008 2,009 2,010 2,011 2,012<br />
Fabless<br />
Total Foundry revenue<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
Apple, Samsung, Intel and other device vendors have been competing for market<br />
share by delivering end-products with higher specifications, lower power<br />
consumption, smaller form factors and lower price points. These ultimately require<br />
the use of chips which are manufactured with leading edge technology. As a result,<br />
Intel, Samsung, TSMC, Globalfoundries and others will be under pressure to<br />
maintain their current spending to adhere to their aggressive shrinkage roadmap.<br />
Due to the greater capital intensity required to develop leading-edge technology, we<br />
believe that there will be fewer players that can afford, and are willing, to invest in<br />
such advances. We estimate that 90% of foundry and logic capex will come from<br />
Samsung, TSMC, Intel and Globalfoundries in 2016, compared with 66% in 2007<br />
and 50% in 1999 (see Figure 21). Due to their large exposure to the consumer<br />
electronics market, and the intensified competition within that market, we believe<br />
these companies have no choice but to keep spending.<br />
19
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 21: Samsung, Intel, TSMC and Globalfoundries capex versus total capex<br />
$mn<br />
45,000<br />
40,000<br />
35,000<br />
30,000<br />
25,000<br />
20,000<br />
15,000<br />
10,000<br />
5,000<br />
0<br />
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E2014E2015E2016E<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Samsung, Intel, TSMC, GF Capex<br />
% of total semi capex<br />
Figure 22: Foundry/logic shrinking roadmap<br />
Foundry/Logic<br />
H1 2010 H2 2010 H1 2011 H2 2011 H1 2012 H2 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
TSMC<br />
-40/65nm contribute 53% revenue in 2010,<br />
-28nm started Q3 2011, 22% Q4 2012 rev<br />
-28nm good yield in HKMG & Poly SiON at 2012 end,<br />
-expand 28nm,<br />
-28nm mature,<br />
-20nm & 16nm FinFET risk - 20nm/16nm start<br />
production,<br />
volume production,<br />
-20nm/16nm,<br />
-10nm FInFET R&D.<br />
Samsung<br />
UMC<br />
GF<br />
Intel<br />
-40nm<br />
-65nm&finer eqv 35% rev, - 40nm eqv 10% above rev in Q4<br />
-40nm eqv low single digit. 2011,<br />
- 45nm,<br />
-started 32nm at 2010 end.<br />
-32nm<br />
-32nm HKMG started in 2011,<br />
-45/32nm supply constrain,<br />
-32nm yileld improved,<br />
-45nm/32nm<br />
-22nm 3D, main node in 2013<br />
-start 14nm end of 2013<br />
-started 28nm started with good yield<br />
in 2012 end,<br />
-28nm both HKMG & Poly SiON<br />
-28nm start, contribute low<br />
-28nm&20nm,<br />
-40nm contribute 15% revenue by 2012 esingle digit % by YE,<br />
-14nm tape out.<br />
mainly Poly SiON<br />
-28nm started and<br />
good yield at year<br />
end,<br />
-20nm<br />
-start 14nmFinFET in 2013<br />
-20nm,<br />
-develop 14nm XM<br />
-14nmXM<br />
-14nm 3D<br />
-20nm/14nm<br />
-10nm FInFET R&D<br />
-14nm FinFET risk<br />
production start<br />
-20nm/14nm,<br />
-10nm FInFET R&D.<br />
-10nm 3D,<br />
-next 7nm and 5nm<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
The roadmap in Figure 22 above shows that all major foundry and logic players<br />
plan to start production of 16/10nm in 2014/2015 after 20nm in 2013. From a<br />
technology perspective, 20nm node and beyond are much more capital-intensive<br />
than 28nm node due to the double/multiple patterning or the EUV required in<br />
their manufacturing process.<br />
Considering that Intel has historically re-used 80% of its tools for the next<br />
technology node, and Samsung/TSMC could follow the same route as shrinkage<br />
becomes more expensive, we forecast c3% growth in capex from 2013 to 2015. We<br />
also expect 450mm investment to start taking place in 2016 with an 18% uptick in<br />
capex.<br />
20
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Where are chip-makers spending?<br />
The semiconductor equipment vendors usually specialise in tools used in either one<br />
or more chip fabrication steps. In Figure 23, we lay out the exposures of different<br />
equipment suppliers within the chip fabrication process, and their relative market<br />
share in wafer fab equipment capex. The total wafer fab equipment capex was<br />
$38bn in 2012 – 81% of total capex.<br />
Figure 23: Chip fabrication process<br />
Silicon ingots up to 300mm in diameter<br />
Ingots sliced into wafer and polished<br />
ShinEtsu, Sumco, Siltronic<br />
Deposition: $6bn market (15.7% total semi equipment)<br />
AMAT 47%, TEL 12%, LAM 11%, ASMI 5%<br />
Grows, coats or transfer a material onto wafer, known as thin film deposition. Eg:<br />
SiO 2 which is widely used. (the yellow layer in pic) Performed by CVD/Pasma/PVD<br />
treatment systems.<br />
Si Wafer<br />
Photoresist processing - Coating:<br />
$1.6bn market (4.2%)<br />
TEL 89%, Dainippon 7%, Suss 1%<br />
Wafer is coated with chemical photoresist, thus pattern on<br />
photomask transferred to wafer surface after exposure.<br />
Photoresist:<br />
JSR, TOK,RHEM,ShinEtsu<br />
Chemical photoresist.<br />
SiO 2<br />
SiO 2<br />
Photoresist<br />
Lightsource:<br />
Cymer, Gigaphoton, Ushio<br />
Si Wafer<br />
Lithography:<br />
$6.5bn market (17.2%)<br />
ASML 74%, Nikon 17%, Canon 2%<br />
Wafer coated with photoresist exposed by<br />
litho tool (machine focuses, aligns, and<br />
moves the mask).<br />
Photoresist processing - Development:<br />
$1.6bn market (4.2%)<br />
TEL 89%, Dainippon 7%, Suss 1%<br />
Exposed region of wafer washed away by chemical, areas of with and without<br />
photoresist produce the pattern from mask. Performed by Coater/developers.<br />
Etching:<br />
$7.5bn market (incl clean, Planarization), (19.5%)<br />
LAM 29%. TEL 22%, Dainippon 18%, AMAT 12%<br />
The thin film layer from ‘Deposition’ not covered by photoresist is etched away, to<br />
permanently transfer pattern to wafer surface. Performed by Etch systems.<br />
Doping:<br />
$1.0bn market (2.7%) AMAT 76%, SEN 10%,<br />
Introduces atoms of elements into silicon to alter the electrical properties in the<br />
silicon dioxide free areas, forming transistors.<br />
Photoresist stripping:<br />
$0.2bn market (0.1%) Mattson 20%, PSK 19%, LAM 17%<br />
Remaining photoresist is removed from etched wafer.<br />
Part of lithography tools.<br />
Photomask:<br />
DNP, Toppanm<br />
To create 1-1 correspondence on<br />
wafer through litho.<br />
Develop<br />
Etching<br />
Doping<br />
DP:<br />
The steps from PR coating to PR stripping repeats to<br />
scale IC further scale to 20nm and beyond:<br />
10-100 layers will be constructed on single<br />
wafer<br />
Wafer level Testing<br />
Market Size $0.2bn, (0.1%) TEL 39%, Seimitsu 48%<br />
Performed before on wafer by wafer probe.<br />
Chips Packing:<br />
Market Size $3.9bn, (10.1%)<br />
Kulicke 19%, ASMP 16%<br />
Wafer is sliced to Dies, and packaged to become chips<br />
Wafer level Packing:<br />
Market Size $1.4bn, (3.0%)<br />
Mattson 20%, EV 6%, Ultratech 5%, Suss 4%<br />
Packaging an IC at wafer level before dicing.<br />
Source: Nikon, <strong>Berenberg</strong> data, Gartner data<br />
21
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
We believe the lithography, process control, and wafer level packaging markets<br />
have the biggest growth potential, driven by node shrinkage and 3D packaging<br />
demand, hence ASML, KLA and SUSS are likely to outperform other equipment<br />
suppliers. We do not like the etching, deposition and die level packaging markets<br />
because their growth potential is limited as a result of technology migration.<br />
Figure 24: Capex on fabrication steps/total semiconductor capex<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
2009 2010 2011 2012 2016E<br />
Deposition Photoresist Processing Lithography<br />
Etch, Clean and Planarization Doping Automation<br />
Process Control Wafer-Level Packaging Die-Level Packaging<br />
Test <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
Figure 24 shows that deposition, lithography and etching and cleaning are the only<br />
three process categories that individually account for more than 10% of total<br />
semiconductor capex. The combined capex for these three categories was 34% of<br />
total semiconductor capex in 2012. We expect the combined share of capex to<br />
expand to 38% in 2016, driven mainly by lithography growth. Wafer level<br />
packaging, due to its small base, has since 2003 seen the fastest growth at c10% per<br />
annum, compared with c2.6% for total semiconductor capex.<br />
Lithography – expanding market and ASML as monopolist<br />
During the past decade, the lithography market has grown by c1.7% per year, while<br />
total semiconductor capex has grown by 2.6% annually. Looking ahead to 2016, we<br />
estimate that the lithography market will grow at c20%, four times faster than total<br />
semiconductor capex. At a result, we estimate that lithography’s share of<br />
semiconductor capex will expand to 20% in 2016 from 12% today.<br />
As the chip-makers shrink from the 28nm mainstream node today to sub-10nm<br />
over the next three to four years, the demand for lithography is likely to increase<br />
significantly. According to TSMC, Intel and Samsung’s roadmaps, we believe 20nm<br />
will be the mainstream node for logic and foundry in 2013/2014, which is likely to<br />
be manufactured using the double patterning (DB) process. As a result, demand for<br />
the most advanced argon-fluoride (ArFi) tools will double, and methodology tools<br />
will also be needed to maintain an acceptable yield rate. Beyond 20nm, chip-makers<br />
may adopt EUV or triple/quadruple patterning using ArFi tools, but in both cases<br />
the lithography cost will increase significantly. The reason for this is that EUV may<br />
cost €100m each versus ArFi costs of €40m, and triple/quadruple patterning may<br />
need three to four times as many ArFi tools compared with single-patterning,<br />
which is currently used in 28nm.<br />
22
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 25: Lithography market share<br />
Nikon<br />
15%<br />
ASML<br />
74%<br />
NuFlare<br />
Technology<br />
7%<br />
Canon<br />
3%<br />
JEOL<br />
1%<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
The market has a limited number of players because of the complexity of<br />
lithography technology and the investment required to develop leading-edge<br />
equipment (see Figure 25). We believe ASML’s market share will expand after the<br />
EUV ramp-up. Nikon will lose market share to ASML because Intel, Nikon’s<br />
biggest customer, has committed to ASML’s EUV technology by joining the<br />
customer investment programme. We believe Nikon will not be a threat to ASML<br />
in the future because the specification of its tools lags ASML’s, and it does not<br />
have a credible EUV roadmap yet.<br />
Deposition – flat growth, DP and EUV impact limited, benefit from 3D<br />
NAND<br />
During the past decade, the deposition market has declined by c1.7% compared<br />
with the c2.6% growth in total semiconductor capex. Its share of total<br />
semiconductor capex fell from 12% in 2004 to 10% in 2012. We expect the<br />
deposition market to grow by c4% from 2012 to 2016, which is on par with total<br />
semiconductor capex growth, and remains at 10-11% of total semiconductor<br />
capex. Unlike etching, we do not expect the demand for deposition to rise with the<br />
adoption of double patterning and FinFET designs. It may benefit from the rampup<br />
of 3D NAND in 2015/2016.<br />
Among the different deposition solutions, plasma-enhanced chemical vapour<br />
deposition (PE CVD), ALD and epitaxy are likely to outgrow the deposition<br />
market due to the increasing number of interconnecting layers within advanced<br />
chips, HKMG adoption, and the ramp-up of 3D designs. At the same time, low<br />
pressure chemical vapour deposition (LP CVD) and physical vapour deposition<br />
PVD) are likely to underperform the deposition market (see Figure 26).<br />
23
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 26: Deposition solutions: PE CVD/ALD/epitaxy to<br />
outperform<br />
Deposition market by Solution<br />
30%<br />
25%<br />
20%<br />
15%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
0%<br />
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
LP CVD PE CVD ALD APCVD/SACVD<br />
PVD MO CVD Epitaxy<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
Figure 27: Deposition market share<br />
Tokyo Electron<br />
12%<br />
Lam Research<br />
11%<br />
Hitachi Kokusai<br />
Electric 7%<br />
ASM International 6%<br />
Applied<br />
Materials<br />
47%<br />
Others<br />
15%<br />
Veeco<br />
4%<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
As shown in Figure 27, AMAT holds a 47% share of the deposition market. It<br />
dominates all major sub-segments, including PE CVD, PVD and epitaxy. TEL<br />
holds the second-biggest market share at 12%, and is mainly concentrated in the<br />
CVD market. We do not expect the market share structure to change significantly<br />
in the next few years. We believe AMAT has continuously held the biggest market<br />
share because of its strong position in PE CVD and PVD solutions. TEL’s market<br />
share will benefit from ALD growth, and suffer from the decline in LP CVD<br />
adoption. ASMI’s market share may increase from 5% today, driven by the<br />
adoption of ALD and epitaxy.<br />
Among deposition market players, we like ASMI the most as it is only exposed to<br />
fast-growing ALD/epitaxy markets. We dislike TEL as it generates most of its<br />
deposition revenue from LP CVD, and its ALD exposure is not big enough to<br />
offset the LP CVD market’s decline. AMAT is widely exposed to this deposition<br />
market and is a leader in growing solution markets such as epitaxy and PE CVD.<br />
However, it is heavily exposed to PVD, which is growing but at a slower rate than<br />
the ALD, epitaxy and PE CVD markets.<br />
24
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Etching – positive from DP, FinFET, 3D NAND and small negative from<br />
EUV<br />
During the past decade, the etching market has grown by c0.5% a year compared<br />
with the c2.6% growth of total semiconductor capex. Its share in total<br />
semiconductor capex fell from 15% in 2004 to 13% in 2012. We expect the<br />
demand for etching to increase with the ramp-up of DP/multiple patterning,<br />
FinFET design and 3D NAND. The demand for etching is likely to decline when<br />
EUV starts to eliminate the double/multiple patterning processes, but the decline<br />
will be offset by increased etching demand from EUV mask manufacturing<br />
processes. Therefore, on a net basis, we believe the etching market will remain flat<br />
or slightly down in the next three years, and will underperform the total<br />
semiconductor capex.<br />
Figure 28: Deposition solutions – PE CVD/ALD/epitaxy to outperform<br />
Etching market by Solution<br />
40%<br />
35%<br />
30%<br />
25%<br />
20%<br />
15%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
0%<br />
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
Bevel Edge Removal Metal Etch Dielectric Etch<br />
Silicon Etch<br />
Other Ethc<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
Among the different etching solutions, silicon etching, which is dominated by<br />
LAM and Hitachi, is likely to outperform the etching market and take capex away<br />
from dielectric etching. This is because DP and 3D NAND/memory use more<br />
silicon etching steps. FinFET design uses both silicon etching and dielectric<br />
etching, and therefore has a neutral impact on the demand of silicon and dielectric<br />
etching steps (see Figure 28).<br />
Figure 29: Etching market share<br />
Tokyo Electron<br />
29%<br />
Applied<br />
Materials<br />
10%<br />
Lam Research<br />
47%<br />
Hitachi High-<br />
Technologies<br />
9%<br />
Others<br />
5%<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
25
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 29 shows that LAM dominates the etching market, with a 47% market share<br />
in 2012, followed by TEL, with a share of 29%. TEL may lose share in etching due<br />
to its focus on the low-growth dielectric etching market. AMAT has a 10% market<br />
share of the etching market. In 2011 and 2012, it lost 9% of its market share in the<br />
etching market, from both dielectric and silicon etching. In our opinion, winning<br />
back the lost share from LAM and Hitachi will not be easy.<br />
In the etching market, we think LAM will outperform as it has the greatest share in<br />
silicon etching. We think TEL will underperform because of its heavy exposure to<br />
dielectric etching (63% share). AMAT has a 10% share of the etching market. It<br />
generates more revenue from silicon etching than dielectric etching, and has a<br />
higher market share in silicon etching.<br />
Wafer level packaging<br />
The wafer level packaging market has doubled during the past 10 years. Its share of<br />
semiconductor capex went up from 1.7% in 2004 to 3% in 2012. The growth was<br />
mainly driven by solid TSV equipment demand, and offset by the fall in demand<br />
for contact probers, which are used in testing (see Figure 30). We expect the<br />
growth of the wafer level packaging market to remain robust, driven by 3D<br />
packaging, although this solution is still not widely adopted by chip-makers. 3D<br />
packing will gain more traction and become the key enabler for scaling after EUV’s<br />
physical limit is reached. Chip-makers will then pay more attention to 3D<br />
stacking/packaging solutions. We believe Samsung and other leading chip-makers<br />
have already started pilot production lines using 3D packaging technology.<br />
Figure 30: Wafer level packaging market trend<br />
Wafer Level Packaging market by Solution<br />
40%<br />
35%<br />
30%<br />
25%<br />
20%<br />
15%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
0%<br />
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
Litho Tool TSV Tool Bump Processing<br />
Packaging inspection<br />
Others<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
Figure 31: Wafer level packaging market share<br />
Lam Research<br />
3%<br />
Rudolph<br />
Technologies<br />
6% Ulvac<br />
5%<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
Others<br />
42%<br />
Disco<br />
15%<br />
Applied<br />
Materials<br />
9%<br />
Tokyo Electron<br />
3%<br />
Suss MicroTec<br />
4%<br />
EV Group<br />
7%<br />
Ultratech<br />
6%<br />
26
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Technology Hardware<br />
SUSS is the main beneficiary of this trend because of its exposure to 3D packaging<br />
wafer bounders, which have the highest growth potential within the wafer level<br />
packaging market. AMAT might benefit to a lesser extent through its exposure to<br />
bump processing, which is experiencing slower growth than wafer bounders. TEL<br />
will not benefit from the market expansion because its market share in wafer level<br />
packing is concentrated on the declining contact probers equipment area. If<br />
Samsung or other chip-makers manages to release a high-quality showcase chip<br />
next year, the adoption rate may accelerate as its competitors will not want to miss<br />
any major chip design solution.<br />
27
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
The best positioned player, but priced in<br />
• We initiate coverage of ASML with a Hold recommendation and a<br />
price target of €73. Our recommendation is based on the following<br />
factors. 1) We believe ASML is the best-quality semiconductor<br />
equipment company. It is 100% exposed to the lithography market,<br />
which we expect to double to $14bn by 2016. We expect ASML’s<br />
share of that market to expand from 74% to 80% by 2016. 2) ASML<br />
supplies lithography tools used in the chip fabrication process. It has a<br />
100% share of the extreme ultraviolet (EUV) market, which is<br />
essential for printing leading-edge chips. 3) However, we believe the<br />
market has mostly priced in these positive factors at ASML’s current<br />
~€70 level.<br />
• Key debates: 1) Can ASML deliver EUV with 69 wafer per hour<br />
(wph) throughput by 2014? 2) What demand is there for EUV tools?<br />
3) Is Nikon a threat to ASML’s position? 4) How will developments in<br />
EUV affect ASML’s margin?<br />
1. ASML has shown decent EUV progress over the last two<br />
quarters, and its acquisition of Cymer (2012) has strengthened its<br />
R&D capability. We believe it is very likely that ASML will deliver<br />
EUV with 69wph by mid-2014 as targeted.<br />
2. Our end-market demand analysis shows that chip-makers will<br />
need a total of 95 EUV tools between 2013 and 2016 for building<br />
required leading-edge chip capacity to meet demand for leadingedge<br />
chips. We expect ASML to ship 15, 24 and 50 tools in 2014,<br />
2015 and 2016 respectively.<br />
3. We do not see Nikon as a threat to ASML’s leadership position in<br />
the next 3 to 4 years, as it is focusing on pushing current<br />
technology (ArFi tools). The depreciation of the yen is unlikely to<br />
give Nikon a competitive advantage over ASML, as we believe the<br />
industry is price-inelastic.<br />
4. The initial ramp up of EUV tools carries a 25% margin and is<br />
margin-dilutive. Once ASML improves efficiency and Intel’s<br />
contribution starts to materialise, we believe EUV (a 47% margin<br />
by 2016) will be margin-accretive in 2015 and 2016.<br />
• Our revenue and EPS forecasts are in line with consensus.<br />
• Our price target of €73.00 implies a 12x P/E based on EPS estimates<br />
of €7.4/share, discounted by a 10% WACC. We have adopted this<br />
EPS estimate because it reflects the earnings power that EUV will, in<br />
our opinion, realise in 2016. The 12x P/E is 10% higher than the<br />
middle of its historical P/E range to reflect ASML’s potential 6%<br />
market share increase from 2010 to 2016.<br />
Y/E 31.12., EUR m 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Sales 5,651 4,732 5,034 6,580 7,344 9,346<br />
EBIT 1,467 1,146 808 1,445 2,035 3,014<br />
Net profit 1,467 1,146 890 1,494 1,902 2,900<br />
Y/E net debt (net cash) -1,998 -1,012 -550 -983 -2,461 -4,613<br />
EPS (proforma) 3.42 2.68 2.18 3.60 4.97 7.36<br />
CPS 4.86 1.66 1.67 3.99 6.25 8.09<br />
DPS 0.40 0.44 0.51 0.53 0.61 0.84<br />
Gross margin 43.4% 42.4% 39.9% 41.1% 43.2% 45.5%<br />
EBIT margin 29.0% 24.4% 17.5% 23.9% 30.1% 35.8%<br />
Dividend yield 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 1.2%<br />
ROCE 42.6% 28.2% 11.8% 18.8% 22.1% 25.9%<br />
EV/sales 4.9 5.9 5.5 4.2 3.8 3.0<br />
EV/EBIT 16.9 23.9 31.5 17.6 12.5 8.3<br />
P/E 19.8 25.2 35.5 19.7 13.9 9.3<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong><br />
Hold (initiation)<br />
Rating system<br />
Current price<br />
EUR 67.68<br />
Absolute<br />
Price target<br />
EUR 73.00<br />
19/07/2013 Amsterdam Close<br />
Market cap EUR 28,701 m<br />
Reuters ASML.AS<br />
Bloomberg ASML NA<br />
Share data<br />
Shares outstanding (m) 420<br />
Enterprise value (EUR m) 28,152<br />
Daily trading volume 1,521,170<br />
Performance data<br />
High 52 weeks (EUR) 68<br />
Low 52 weeks (EUR) 40<br />
Relative performance to SXXP AEX<br />
1 month 10.1 % 7.1 %<br />
3 months 19.1 % 15.5 %<br />
12 months 22.6 % 28.3 %<br />
Key data<br />
Price/book value 4.2<br />
CAGR sales 2011-2014 18.5%<br />
CAGR sales 2012-2016 28.3%<br />
Business activities:<br />
ASML is the world’s leading provider of<br />
lithography systems for the semiconductor<br />
industry. It designs, develops, integrates,<br />
markets and services the lithography tools used<br />
by its customers.<br />
22 July 2013<br />
Tammy Qiu<br />
Analyst<br />
+44 20 3207 2673<br />
tammy.qiu@berenberg.com<br />
Jean Beaubois<br />
Specialist Sales<br />
+44 20 3207 7835<br />
jean.beaubois@berenberg.com<br />
28
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Investment summary<br />
Our investment thesis on Hold-rated ASML is based on the following five points.<br />
1. ASML’s market share likely to expand from 74% to 80% in 2016: ASML<br />
ships 86% of the most-advanced ArFi tools and holds a 100% share of the<br />
EUV market. Chip-makers require EUV or other leading-edge tools to make<br />
smaller chips, we therefore expect ASML’s market share to expand from the<br />
current 74% to 80% in 2016.<br />
We do not believe that Nikon will benefit from the depreciation of the yen,<br />
and gain share from ASML. In our opinion, chip-makers are unlikely to switch<br />
tool vendors purely due to lower price because: 1) high specification and<br />
reliability are more important because they can affect yield rates; and 2) the<br />
extra reconfiguration and integration cost associated with new tools can easily<br />
exceed savings from tool prices.<br />
2. EUV is essential for shrinkage – €5bn revenue in 2016: We expect EUV to<br />
be widely adopted as it saves 34% on cost compared with existing double<br />
patterning (DP) technology. From our end-market analysis, we conclude that<br />
chip-makers will require a total of 95 tools by 2016 if they are to produce in<br />
line with their roadmap. We estimate the revenue contribution from EUV to<br />
be €1.2bn, €2.3bn and €5.0bn in 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively, which<br />
accounts for 18%, 31% and 54% of ASML’s total revenue.<br />
We do not expect ASML to lose EUV market share to Nikon before<br />
2017/2018, because: 1) Nikon is unlikely to release any EUV tools for<br />
commercial use before 2015/16, and all major chip-makers will have three to<br />
four ASML tools in place by that time; 2) Nikon’s recent presentation shows<br />
that it is focused on 450mm equipment development instead of EUV; 3)<br />
despite its dual-sourcing policy, Intel is unlikely to order any EUV tools that<br />
Nikon develops unless such tools show the same level of performance<br />
compared as ASML’s tool. We think Intel now buys over 50% of its new tools<br />
from ASML compared with less than 40% in 2009. This is because the<br />
performance of Nikon’s tools lags ASML’s equipment.<br />
3. Lithography market to double by 2016: The level of lithography investment<br />
increases as chip sizes shrink. This is true regardless of whether manufacturers<br />
adopt an EUV or a DP solution. As a result, we expect the lithography market<br />
to double by 2016 to $14bn (20% of total capex) from $7bn in 2012 (12% of<br />
total capex).<br />
4. However, we think the above factors are well understood by the market,<br />
and priced into the stock price: ASML’s share price has tripled since the<br />
start of 2011 because: 1) the company has made positive progress on the<br />
development of its EUV tool, and management has retained, and is likely to<br />
achieve, its target of 105 watts of light source power in 2014; 2) all chipmakers<br />
have laid out aggressive shrinkage plans to enter lithography-intensive<br />
20nm/16nm by 2014/2015; 3) Nikon is not focusing on EUV and we do not<br />
expect it to have any EUV model before 2015/2016, so ASML is likely to<br />
maintain its monopoly; 4) ASML’s customer co-investment programme (in<br />
which TSMC, Samsung and Intel have all invested in ASML to support its<br />
EUV and 450mm development) has demonstrated that the mainstream chipmakers<br />
recognise the company’s status as a technology leader.<br />
However, given that the stock price has nearly doubled since the beginning of<br />
2012, we are concerned that any execution issues that ASML has with its light<br />
source power, alongside industry or market speculation about alternative<br />
29
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
technology or materials, could hamper further share price performance.<br />
AMAT said at the US Semicon West 2013 conference in July that<br />
semiconductor companies are currently focusing more on new materials than<br />
they are on lithography scaling, ie EUV should have a minimal impact on the<br />
industry. AMAT also quoted that a fabless company suggested that 90% of its<br />
performance improvement came from materials, and only 10% from<br />
lithography. In addition, the consumer electronics market is currently driven<br />
by demand for mid- to low-end products, which do not require the most<br />
advanced chips. The demand for leading-edge chips could, therefore, decline if<br />
demand for mid- to low-end products rises.<br />
5. Valuation: Our price target of €73.00 implies a 12x P/E based on EPS<br />
estimates of €7.4/share, discounted by a 10% WACC. We have adopted this<br />
EPS estimate because it reflects the earnings power that EUV will, in our<br />
opinion, realise in 2016. Our 12x P/E has assigned a 10% premium to<br />
ASML’s historical mid-recovery-cycle P/E (9x-13x) to reflect ASML’s more<br />
competitive position (market share: 80% by 2016 compared with the last<br />
recovery cycle of 2010, when it had a market share of 70%).<br />
ASML’s RoE is the highest within our coverage, and it has the lowest dividend<br />
yield, FCF yield and net cash/market cap.<br />
Figure 1: Valuation matrix<br />
Dividend<br />
ROE*<br />
Cash/marc<br />
yield*<br />
FCF yield* Net cash/marcap<br />
No.1 ASML 19.7% AMAT 2.5% AMAT 9.7% TEL 26.5%<br />
No.2 AMAT 17.1% TEL 1.5% ASMI 6.2% SUSS 17.6%<br />
No.3 SUSS 9.1% ASML 0.9% ASML 4.4% AMAT 16.7%<br />
No.4 TEL 6.3% ASMI - TEL 4.3% ASMI 8.9%<br />
No.5 ASMI 6.2% SUSS - SUSS 1.6% ASML 6.5%<br />
* based on <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimation of 2014 performance<br />
Net cash based on 2012 YE balance<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimation, company data<br />
Key catalysts<br />
The following are the key catalysts for the share price.<br />
1) Further progress on EUV light source: Management has retained its target<br />
for 105 watts by mid-2014, and expects to reach 80 watts by<br />
September/October 2013. We think ASML’s acquisition of Cymer has further<br />
strengthened its R&D capability on EUV, and believe that ASML is likely to<br />
reach 105 watts by 2014 as targeted.<br />
2) DRAM and NAND order recovery provides order intake/revenue<br />
upside: After seeing DRAM orders recover in Q2, we believe memory orders<br />
will accelerate in the coming quarters, especially NAND orders. Companies<br />
such as KLA and LAM have indicated improving memory orders/spending<br />
compared with the 2012 trough last quarter.<br />
3) Chip-makers accelerate their roadmap on shrinkage: In our opinion, chipmakers<br />
could accelerate their shrinkage plans in next few months, as the level<br />
of competition in the consumer electronics market intensifies.<br />
4) Nikon fails to release EUV tools: We think Nikon is unlikely to announce<br />
any EUV-related progress until 2014/2015, as its current focus is on 450mm.<br />
30
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Key risks<br />
The following are the key risks for the stock.<br />
1) EUV feasibility and potential delay: We believe that with its acquisition of<br />
Cymer ASML is the only player able to deliver EUV tools. However,<br />
challenges remain to achieve the 105-watt target by mid-2014. For example,<br />
light source power is still at 55 watts today, and we may see new problems<br />
such as heat management as light source power increases.<br />
2) <strong>Semiconductor</strong> spending pause as consumer electronics market<br />
saturates: Smartphone and tablets have driven capex spend in past few years,<br />
if these markets become saturated, then as slower investment phase will result.<br />
3) Alternative technology steals EUV’s market: We believe alternative<br />
solutions, such as electron beam (E BEAM) and directed self-assembly (DSA),<br />
are unlikely to replace EUV today, because E BEAM currently has a low<br />
throughput, and DSA requires significant process control equipment<br />
investment. However, in long run, they can be threats to EUV demand if<br />
throughput is improved.<br />
31
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
The quasi-monopolist in the lithography market<br />
The lithography market today has three players: ASML, Nikon and Canon. In<br />
2012, ASML held a 74% market share by revenue – compared with Nikon’s 15% –<br />
and a 66% market share by shipment (see Figures 2 and 3). ASML focuses on the<br />
high end of the market and ships 86% of the most-advanced ArFi tools, which<br />
have an average selling price of €40m. Nikon and Canon mainly ship legacy tools,<br />
which cost €5m-10m each. Nikon lags ASML in ArFi tool development, which is<br />
the current mainstream lithography tool used by chip-makers. Nikon shipped its<br />
first ArFi tool in Q1 2009, whereas ASML started shipping in 2004. Canon only<br />
supplies legacy KrF and i-Line tools, and has no ArFi product.<br />
ASML will not, in our opinion, lose market share in the future. Lithography tools<br />
are usually fully integrated into chip-manufacturing process, so a manufacturer that<br />
wants to switch tool vendors must reconfigure its process and incur a significant<br />
initial service cost.<br />
Figure 2: Lithography market share by revenue<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
ASML Nikon Canon<br />
Source: Company data, Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Figure 3: Lithography market share by shipment<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011<br />
Nikon ASML Canon Lithratoch-Stepper ISI<br />
Source: The Information Network<br />
We believe EUV and ArFi tools will continue to be the mainstream lithography<br />
tools used by chip-makers for the foreseeable future, and generate the majority of<br />
the industry’s revenue. At the same time, legacy tools will be phased out slowly<br />
over the next four years.<br />
32
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
We estimate that ASML will hold an 80% share of the market in 2016, and<br />
maintain its current penetration rate with existing customers. We do not expect<br />
Nikon to develop EUV tools before 2015, and its ArFi tool’s throughput lags<br />
ASML’s tool. The throughput of Nikon’s NSR-S622D ArFi tool, released in<br />
January 2013, is 200wph versus 250wph of ASML’s NXT:1970Ci (to be released in<br />
Q3 2013). Throughput is a key specification watched by chip-makers, as higher<br />
wph means greater efficiency and cost-reduction per chip. We expect Nikon’s<br />
shipments to remain at low levels and Intel will remain its main customer.<br />
Figure 4: Lithography tool unit shipment<br />
Type ASP units 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
I-Line EUR 4-5m ASML 12 23 20 15 15 12 8<br />
Nikon* 4 16 35 16 21 20 15<br />
Canon 8 23 45 43 40 38 38<br />
KrF EUR 9-12m ASML 17 68 87 78 52 50 32<br />
Nikon* 16 12 28 3 6 8 10<br />
Canon 3 6 7 3 3 2 1<br />
ArF Dry EUR 20-23m ASML 10 12 11 4 4 8 8<br />
Nikon* 1 1 3 8 11 8 8<br />
Canon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0<br />
ArFi EUR 35-40m ASML 31 94 101 72 69 72 67<br />
Nikon* 15 28 18 13 15 13 8<br />
Canon 2 0 0 0 0 0 0<br />
EUV EUR 70-100m ASML 0 0 3 1 3 15 24<br />
Nikon* 0 0 0 0 0 0 2<br />
Canon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0<br />
Total 119 283 358 256 239 246 221<br />
ASML% 59% 70% 62% 66% 60% 64% 63%<br />
Nikon% 30% 20% 23% 16% 22% 20% 19%<br />
Canon % 11% 10% 15% 18% 18% 16% 18%<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
*Nikon 2012: FY March 2013<br />
We do not believe that the depreciation of the yen will give Nikon a competitive<br />
advantage over ASML. Chip-makers are unlikely to switch vendors purely to<br />
obtain a lower price: the reconfiguration and integration costs associated with new<br />
tools is likely to be more than the difference in ASP. Furthermore, chip-makers<br />
usually value tool specifications and reliability more than they do price points.<br />
33
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
EUV drives ASML’s future success<br />
EUV is the key enabler of Moore’s law, and ASML holds 100%<br />
market share<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> manufacturing is driven by Moore’s law, which states that the<br />
number of transistors on an affordable chip will double every two years. As chipmakers<br />
start to print 20nm chips, and subsequently 10nm, 7nm and 5nm chips, the<br />
EUV solution is both cheaper and simpler than ArFi solutions. ASML’s coinvestment<br />
programme demonstrated the commitment from Intel, Samsung and<br />
TSMC to this technology, and ASML is recognised as technology leader in this<br />
field.<br />
The DP/multi-patterning (MP) process using ArFi tools (which exposes the wafer<br />
twice instead of once in order to reduce the printed feature size) is now the<br />
mainstream solution for printing 20nm chips. However, manufacturers claim that<br />
this process is too costly because it increases the number of lithography exposures<br />
per wafer, meaning that they must either reduce output or buy more tools. EUV<br />
enables chip-makers to expose the critical layer in just one exposure instead of two.<br />
In terms of total cost per wafer (see Figure 5 below), EUV delivers cost savings of<br />
34% compared with ArFi’s DP process, even if EUV tools cost twice as much to<br />
buy.<br />
Figure 5: EUV solutions deliver a cost benefit<br />
by ArFi<br />
by EUV<br />
Overall patterning cost<br />
(incl litho, etching, etc)<br />
€70.82/wafer<br />
€46.44/wafer<br />
Litho cost<br />
€23.36/wafer<br />
€31.74/wafer<br />
2*ArFi exposures/layer 1*EUV exposure/layer<br />
Litho cost/total cost 33% 68%<br />
Source: ASML data<br />
Apart from the cost savings, EUV simplifies the fabrication process by halving the<br />
steps and cycle time required in DP (see Figure 6 below). Chip-makers are likely to<br />
allocate more “critical layers” – the layers on a chip that require the highest<br />
resolution and precision to EUV from ArFi. Logic/foundries players are likely to<br />
pick up EUV first to meet the demand for small chip designs from for consumer<br />
electronics devices, and because it is more expensive for them to use DP<br />
compared to memory players.<br />
34
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 6: EUV simplifies the process and the cost<br />
Source: ASML data<br />
Source: AMSL data<br />
ASML currently has a 100% share of the EUV market, and we do not expect this<br />
to change even after Nikon introduces its EUV tool after 2015/16. Lithography<br />
tools are usually fully integrated into the chip-manufacturing process, so<br />
manufacturers that want to switch tool vendors must reconfigure their processes<br />
and incur significant initial service costs. On our estimates, all major chip-makers<br />
will have three to four ASML EUV tools in place by 2015. It is therefore unlikely<br />
that they will place any EUV orders with Nikon. Even Nikon’s biggest customer,<br />
Intel, is unlikely to buy Nikon’s tools, unless they are superior to ASML’s. This is<br />
very unlikely in our view.<br />
Figure 7: ASML EUV status versus Nikon<br />
EUV status ASML Nikon<br />
Light source power 55 watt 10 watt @2012<br />
Wafer throughput 43 wph 8 wph<br />
Adoption can be used for 20nm required for 16nm-11nm<br />
-ArFi is the primary tool for sub 20nm process,<br />
View on EUV -EUV will be adopted as soon as wph meets requirement<br />
-Limited focus on EUV,<br />
TWINSCAN NXE:3100<br />
EUV tools<br />
na<br />
TWINSCAN NXE:3300<br />
First shipment Q4 2010 na<br />
Machine shipped 6 shipped na<br />
11 for 2013,<br />
Order in place<br />
na<br />
8-12 potential order for 2014<br />
- 2015: 30-36 tools,<br />
-Introduce EUV earliest 2015,<br />
Capacity<br />
- 2016/2017:60-66 tools<br />
-EUV in volume in 2018/2019.<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
We estimate that ASML will ship 15, 24 and 50 EUV in 2014, 2015 and 2016<br />
respectively, contributing €1.2bn, €2.3bn and €5.0bn respectively to its revenues.<br />
35
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
We believe 2016 shipments will be strong as chip-makers will start to allocate more<br />
layers to EUV as they gain more experience of the technology, and because<br />
DP/MP is currently too complex/expensive to be used in 20nm/10nm mass<br />
production.<br />
Our assumptions for tools shipped are based on our end market analysis (see<br />
Figure 8 below).<br />
Our assumptions are as follows.<br />
• Foundry/logic players (excluding Intel) will reach 340,000wpm 28nm<br />
and 60,000wpm 20nm/16nm capacity in 2013, and will continuously<br />
expand 20/16nm wafer capacity to reach 270,000wpm in 2016, which is<br />
less than 28nm capacity today: TSMC stated that 20/16nm could be a bigger<br />
node compared to 28nm. We have taken a conservative approach in making<br />
our 20/16nm capacity assumption, as TSMC may re-use equipment from 28nm<br />
if it ramps up aggressively on 20/16nm. We estimate that 10nm capacity will<br />
begin to ramp up from 2016 and reach 20,000wpm in 2016. We included four<br />
EUV R&D tools in our analysis and assigned €70m ASP for each of them,<br />
which is lower than the normal EUV ASP of €100m.<br />
• DRAM starts to adopt EUV in 2015, and migrates 53% of total wafer<br />
capacity to 30nm and below in 2016: We have been conservative here to<br />
reflect the memory spending pause. DRAM-makers plan to shift 69% capacity<br />
to 30nm or less, according to their various statements. We included two EUV<br />
R&D tools in our analysis, with an ASP of €70m each.<br />
• NAND starts to adopt EUV in 2016, and migrates 65% of total wafer<br />
capacity to 20nm and below in 2016: We have taken a conservative approach<br />
on NAND, too, to take account of the expected memory spending pause.<br />
NAND-makers plan to shift 83% capacity to 20nm or less, according to their<br />
various statements.<br />
3D NAND is less lithography intensive compared to 20nm/10nm NAND<br />
design. Our analysis suggests the impact of 3D NAND on total capex is likely<br />
to be small. We estimate that the maximum negative impact on EUV demand<br />
by 3D NAND is 3 EUV tools.<br />
• Intel will have 85,000wpm capacity on 22nm and 33,000wpm on 14/10nm<br />
in 2016, and it will re-use ArFi tools in 2014 when 14nm/10nm first ramps up.<br />
• In terms of market share, we assume ASML to have:<br />
o 100% of the EUV order from all chip-makers;<br />
o 100% of the ArFi/ArF tool order from foundry/logic (excluding Intel),<br />
DRAM and NAND players;<br />
o 60% of the KrF/I Line tool orders from foundry/logic (excluding Intel),<br />
DRAM and NAND players;<br />
o 60% of the ArFi,/ArF tool orders from Intel;<br />
o 50% of the KrF/I Line tool order from Intel.<br />
36
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 8: End-market demand analysis<br />
2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Foundry/logic (excl Intel)<br />
28nm wpm 340,000 340,000 340,000 340,000<br />
add 140,000 0 0 0<br />
20nm/16nm wpm 60,000 130,000 200,000 270,000<br />
add 60,000 70,000 70,000 70,000<br />
10nm wpm - - - 20,000<br />
add - - - 20,000<br />
Total Capex add $mn 4,591 2,254 4,401 6,433<br />
ASML get tool (EUV, ArFi, ArF only) 72 34 44 90<br />
EUV 4 2 23 36<br />
ArFi 56 28 18 26<br />
2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
DRAM<br />
Total wafer capacity 1,200,840 1,200,840 1,236,865 1,273,971<br />
shift to
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Lithography market to double in size by 2016<br />
Consumer electronics will be the main driver of semiconductor growth in the next<br />
few years, in our opinion. Chip-makers are actively scaling their chip sizes down to<br />
facilitate the new generation of device designs, which are smaller, lighter, more<br />
power-efficient and have better performance. As shown in Figure 9 below, all the<br />
major chip-makers are planning to enter lithography-intensive 20nm/10nm node<br />
in 2013/2014, and then expand their leading-edge chip output afterwards. As chipmakers<br />
shrink down the technology roadmap, they require more lithography tools<br />
which can print to smaller nodes.<br />
Figure 9: Chip-maker roadmap<br />
2010 2011 2012<br />
2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Foundry/Logic<br />
TSMC<br />
-40/65nm<br />
-28nm HKMG & Poly SiON<br />
-28nm/20nm/16nm FinFET -28nm/20nm/16nm -20nm/16nm/10nm FinFET<br />
Samsung -40nm -45/32nm HKMG -28nm HKMG & Poly SiON -20nm<br />
-20nm/14nm/10nm FinFET<br />
UMC -65nm/40nm - 40nm -40nm<br />
-28nm Poly SiON -28nm/20nm/14nm -14nm FinFET<br />
GF - 45nm/ 32nm 45nm/32nm<br />
-28nm -20nm/14nm XM -14nmXM -20nm/14nm/10nm FinFET<br />
Intel -32nm -22nm 3D, 14nm end of 2013<br />
-14nm 3D -10nm 3D/7nm/5nm<br />
NAND<br />
Samsung -27nm -21nm<br />
-19nm -19nm/16nm -16nm -12nm/14nm/3D NAND<br />
Toshiba/SanDisk -24nm -19nm<br />
-19nm/3D NAND. -16nm -12nm/14nm/3D NAND<br />
Micron(Elpida)<br />
- 25nm -20nm -1Y(18/15nm)/3D NAND -16nm/14nm/12nm/3D NAND<br />
SK Hynix<br />
-26nm -20nm - 16nm/3D NAND -14nm/12nm/3D NAND<br />
DRAM<br />
Samsung - 40nm -40nm/35nm/28nm -25nm - 2Y(23nm/25nm)/28nm<br />
-2Ynm & 2Znm (20/21nm).<br />
Micron -50nm -32nm<br />
-24nm<br />
- 24nm/2Znm<br />
Elpida<br />
SK Hynix<br />
-42nm<br />
-44nm<br />
-32nm<br />
-40nm/38nm<br />
-25nm<br />
-3xnm/28nm/23nm<br />
Others<br />
-45nm/42nm/30nm -30nm&2xnm<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimate<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
The level of lithography investment needs to increase as chip size<br />
decreases: Until EUV technology becomes available, DP/MP with ArFi tools will<br />
continue to be the mainstream solution used in printing 20nm chip (the DP/MP<br />
process exposes the wafer twice, rather than once, to achieve smaller chip size.<br />
Using logic fab as an example, the lithography investment needed for building a<br />
22/20nm fab is 1.8x greater than for building a 32/28nm fab (see Figure 10<br />
below), as more ArFi and methodology tools are required.<br />
Figure 10: Lithography tools required in leading-edge fab<br />
All scenarios are based on “typical” process using 2012 system productivity levels<br />
Source: ASML data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
-23nm & 2Znm (20/21nm)<br />
-2Xnm/2Znm<br />
Logic fab 45k wafers/month equipment required<br />
Logic 32/28nm 22/20nm by Double Patterning 10nm by EUV<br />
ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi EUV EUV<br />
ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi<br />
ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi<br />
ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi ArFi<br />
ArF ArF ArF ArF ArF ArF ArF<br />
KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF<br />
KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF KrF<br />
I-Line I-Line I-Line I-Line I-Line<br />
Lithography cost €600mn Cost 1.8 times more: €1,080mn Lithography cost €820mn<br />
9 more ArFi: 9*€40mn=€360mn 2 EUV tools: 2 * €100m=€200mn<br />
Metrology: €5-€7mn/ArFi tool<br />
Metrology: €5-€7mn/ArFi tool<br />
37 litho layers 40 litho layers<br />
38 litho exposures 52 litho exposures<br />
38
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 11: Lithography market double in 2016<br />
USD mn<br />
80,000<br />
70,000<br />
60,000<br />
50,000<br />
40,000<br />
30,000<br />
20,000<br />
10,000<br />
0<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Lithography capex <strong>Semiconductor</strong> capex Lithography as % total capex<br />
25%<br />
20%<br />
15%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
0%<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
The lithography market has grown by c1.7% over the past 10 years, while total<br />
semiconductor capex has fallen by c0.5% (see Figure 11). As stated above, chipmakers<br />
are constantly working to reduce the size of chips – and the smaller the<br />
chip the more it costs to print. We therefore expect the lithography market to grow<br />
at c20% for the next three years to reach $14bn in 2016, and for lithographyrelated<br />
capex as a percentage of total semiconductor capex to increase from 12%<br />
today to 20% in 2016. In our view, ASML, which is 100%-exposed to this market,<br />
will certainly benefit from this trend.<br />
39
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Gross margin expansion<br />
We expect ASML’s group adjusted gross margin to reach 45.9% in 2016 from<br />
41.9% in 2013. The following factors will contribute to this increase.<br />
1. We expect the EUV gross margin to improve after a two-year ramp-up<br />
period: We expect the EUV tools gross margin to reach ~45% in mid-2015,<br />
after volume shipment has begun. The EUV gross margin currently stands at<br />
25%.<br />
2. Intel’s €829m investment in R&D will be recognised in ASML’s gross<br />
margin over the next five years: Based on the level of business activity<br />
between ASML and Intel, we assume that a fifth of Intel’s investment (€166m)<br />
will be included in the figure in 2015, producing a minimum gross margin<br />
contribution in 2016 of 1.8%.<br />
3. We expect the group margin excluding EUV to reach 43.5% in 2016 due<br />
to the increased top line and growth in the high-margin service and software<br />
segment (€1.2bn revenue in 2016 versus €930m in 2012).<br />
4. Cymer’s positive gross margin impact: Cymer’s adjusted gross margin was<br />
56% in Q2 2013, higher than ASML’s average group gross margin (41.8% in<br />
Q2 2013). We expect the Cymer acquisition to lead to a 50bp increase in the<br />
group gross margin by 2016.<br />
We expect that with its current product portfolio, ASML will be able to maintain<br />
its existing profitability level given ASP stability. In addition, chip-makers look at<br />
total cost of ownership – ie the cost saving from a more efficient process or higher<br />
yield rate usually justifies the higher ASPs of new generation tools.<br />
Figure 12: ASML tool ASP will not decrease over time<br />
EUR mn<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Source: ASML data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> estimates<br />
Source: AMSL data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
ArFi NXT:1950i roadmap: 2011 2012 extensions 2013+ extensions<br />
Matched Machine Overlay 5.5nm 4.5nm 3.5nm<br />
On Product Overlay 9nm 6nm 4nm<br />
CDU 3nm 1.5nm 1nm<br />
Total focus control budget 110nm 90nm 70nm<br />
Throughput 190WPH 230WPH 250WPH<br />
Defects 10 defects/wafer 10 defects/wafer
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Key catalysts<br />
In our view, the following events could be catalysts for the share price.<br />
1. Further progress on EUV light source: EUV light source power is the<br />
bottleneck making it difficult for ASML to achieve the desired throughput<br />
level for it to be commercially viable. Cymer achieved 55 watts (43wph) in<br />
March 2013, and it is aiming to deliver 105 watts (69wph) by mid-2014. If<br />
Cymer announces any major progress on light source development towards<br />
that target, or even reaches 105 watts before mid-2014, then the stock price<br />
would react positively.<br />
In our opinion, the Cymer acquisition increased the likelihood of ASML being<br />
able to achieve its 105-watt target before mid-2014. ASML has announced<br />
decent progress in recent quarters, and management is confident that the<br />
company can reach 105-watt light source power by mid-2014.<br />
2. DRAM and NAND order growth: Memory orders have recovered from<br />
their trough in Q1 2013, and accounted for 35% of total orders in Q2. We<br />
believe that further improvement in memory orders would benefit ASML’s<br />
revenue and share price.<br />
In our opinion, we believe memory spending is increasing. 28% of KLA’s<br />
order were memory orders last quarter, up 60% from its December 2012<br />
quarter orders (17% of which were memory), and it expects memory to<br />
contribute 33% of orders in the June quarter. LAM has also indicated a<br />
strengthening in memory orders in H1; its memory shipment portion<br />
increased from a low 20% in December to 31% in the March quarter. We<br />
therefore believe it to be very likely that ASML’s memory order level will<br />
increase in the coming quarters, driven by customers such as Samsung and<br />
Toshiba.<br />
3. More aggressive shrinkage: Aggressive shrinkage plans will ultimately lead<br />
to a higher level of demand for EUV tools and ArFi tools, versus current<br />
modelled expectations.<br />
The chip-makers’ roadmaps are already aggressive, in our view, and so the<br />
opportunity for further acceleration in shrinkage terms would appear to be<br />
low. However, as competition intensifies in the consumer electronic market,<br />
Intel, TSMC and Samsung may bring their roadmaps forward in a bid to<br />
secure a technology leadership position.<br />
4. A delay in Nikon’s EUV development, or its exit from the EUV market:<br />
Nikon, ASML’s only competitor in this segment, is looking to introduce EUV<br />
after 2015/16. If Nikon delays this plan, or exits the EUV market altogether<br />
due to technical issues, we believe this would have a beneficial effect on<br />
ASML’s share price.<br />
We do not believe that Nikon will make an announcement on its EUV plans<br />
soon. It has stated that it is focusing on the ArFi market and that it expects its<br />
ArFi tool to extend to 20nm chip designs, while EUV is only required for<br />
printing 16nm/11nm chips. Therefore, we believe the timeframe for Nikon to<br />
announce any possible delay or EUV plan would be end-2014 at the earliest or<br />
2015, when it starts to focus on EUV production.<br />
41
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Financials<br />
P&L – EUV a future driver; foundry/logic orders solid<br />
ASML’s revenue is made up of tool revenue and software and service revenue. We<br />
model ASML’s revenue based on shipments of different types of tools.<br />
Figure 13: ASML tool revenue model<br />
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Shipment units<br />
I-Line 20 15 15 12 8 8<br />
KrF 87 78 52 50 32 28<br />
ArF Dry 11 4 4 8 8 12<br />
ArF Immersion 101 72 69 72 67 49<br />
EUV 3 1 3 15 24 50<br />
New 195 146 126 141 123 131<br />
Refurbished 27 24 17 16 16 16<br />
Total 222 170 143 157 139 147<br />
ASPs (E m)<br />
I-Line 3 4 4 4 4 4<br />
KrF 11 12 12 10 10 10<br />
ArF Dry 20 22 23 23 23 23<br />
ArF Immersion 35 38 42 45 45 45<br />
EUV 39 42 70 81 96 100<br />
Blended 22 22 27 33 42 53<br />
New System (inc EUV) 24 25 30 36 47 59<br />
Refurbished 4 8 5 6 6 6<br />
Revenues by technology<br />
I-Line 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 0%<br />
KrF 19% 24% 16% 10% 6% 4%<br />
ArF Dry 5% 2% 2% 4% 3% 4%<br />
ArF Immersion 72% 71% 74% 62% 51% 28%<br />
EUV 2% 1% 5% 23% 39% 64%<br />
Revenues by technology<br />
I-Line 62 56 61 48 32 32<br />
KrF 945 908 632 520 333 291<br />
ArF Dry 221 86 92 184 184 276<br />
ArF Immersion 3,540 2,710 2,875 3,238 3,015 2,202<br />
EUV 116 42 210 1,210 2,300 5,000<br />
New system sales 4,772 3,621 3,790 5,104 5,768 7,705<br />
Refurbished sales 112 180 80 96 96 96<br />
Total Eqpmt sales (E m) 4,884 3,802 3,870 5,200 5,864 7,801<br />
Total equip sales (exl EUV) 4,768 3,760 3,660 3,990 3,564 2,801<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
We expect EUV shipments to increase in volume in 2015 and 2016 after ramping<br />
up slowly in 2013 and 2014. We expect logic/foundry companies to gradually<br />
allocate more layers to EUV from ArFi as they gain more experience of it, and<br />
memory-makers to start adopting EUV after throughput improves over time. We<br />
estimate EUV will contribute the majority of ASML’s total tool revenue from 2016<br />
onwards.<br />
In 2013 and 2014, we expect ArFi tools to contribute the majority of ASML’s total<br />
revenue and unit shipment. The adoption of the DP process by logic/foundry<br />
players in 20nm node will drive solid demand for ArFi tools in 2013 and 2014.<br />
Starting in H2 2014, the demand of ArFi is likely to decrease as the onset of EUV<br />
reduces demand for DP. From this point, ArFi tools will then only be used for<br />
non-critical layers.<br />
42
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 14: ASML tool revenue/shipment by technology<br />
EUR mn<br />
8,000<br />
7,000<br />
6,000<br />
5,000<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
0<br />
Revenue by Technology<br />
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
I-Line KrF ArF Dry ArF Immersion EUV<br />
Unit mn<br />
250<br />
Shipment by Technology<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
I-Line KrF ArF Dry ArF Immersion EUV<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
The main contributor to orders and revenue has shifted to the foundry/logic<br />
segment from memory since 2010. Foundry accounted for 45% of ASML’s order<br />
book and 60% of its revenue in 2012. We expect the trend to continue until<br />
memory investment recovers. Memory players Micron and SK Hynix have both<br />
indicated that they have only made conservative capacity additions apart from their<br />
node migration. Demand from the foundry/logic segment however is likely to<br />
remain solid, driven by strong growth in the consumer electronics market and<br />
increasing competition between Intel, Samsung, TSMC and others.<br />
43
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 15: ASML booking/revenue by end-market<br />
100%<br />
Bookings by end market<br />
80%<br />
60%<br />
40%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
2011 2012<br />
IDM Foundry Memory<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Revenue by end market<br />
100%<br />
80%<br />
60%<br />
40%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
2011 2012<br />
IDM Foundry Memory<br />
Source: Company data<br />
ASML’s software and service segment comprises metrology products and holistic<br />
lithography software, designed to help customers optimise tool performance,<br />
achieve greater printed feature resolution and reduce overall production costs. As<br />
chip size scales down, ever higher levels of precision are required, which we believe<br />
will lead to increased demand for metrology and holistic software over the next few<br />
years as manufacturing processes become ever more complex.<br />
44
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 16: ASML P&L overview<br />
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Tool revenue ex EUV 4,768 3,760 3,660 3,990 3,564 2,801<br />
EUV revenue 116 42 210 1,210 2,300 5,000<br />
Software & Service 767 930 984 1,060 1,140 1,190<br />
Cymer 0 0 180 320 340 355<br />
Total revenues 5,651 4,732 5,034 6,580 7,344 9,346<br />
Gross profit exEUV 2,451 2,005 1,957 2,207 2,041 1,736<br />
Gross margin ex-EUV 44.3% 42.7% 42.1% 43.7% 43.4% 43.5%<br />
Gross profit EUV 0 0 53 370 983 2,350<br />
Gross Margin EUV 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 30.6% 42.7% 47.0%<br />
Gross profit Cymer- reported 0 0 -1 125 149 162<br />
Gross margin Cymer- reported 0.0% 0.0% -0.7% 39.0% 43.8% 45.7%<br />
Corporate Gross Profit - reported 2,451 2,005 2,008 2,702 3,172 4,249<br />
Corporate Gross Margin reported 43.4% 42.4% 39.9% 41.1% 43.2% 45.5%<br />
Corporate Gross Profit - adj 2,450 2,005 2,111 2,754 3,212 4,289<br />
Corporate Gross Margin -adj 43.3% 42.4% 41.9% 41.9% 43.7% 45.9%<br />
R&D - adj 590 589 875 920 800 760<br />
SG&A - ajd 219 259 295 304 280 260<br />
Other (income) expenses 0 0 -65 -120 -120 -120<br />
OPEX - Adj 808 848 1,105 1,104 960 900<br />
Op profit - reported 1,641 1,157 880 1,570 2,212 3,349<br />
opm - reported 29.0% 24.4% 17.5% 23.9% 30.1% 35.8%<br />
Op profit - adj 1,641 1,157 1,006 1,650 2,252 3,389<br />
opm - adj 29.0% 24.4% 20.0% 25.1% 30.7% 36.3%<br />
PBT - reported 1,649 1,151 870 1,570 2,212 3,349<br />
Tax Expense 182 4 62 126 177 335<br />
Effective Tax Rate % 11.0% 0.4% 7.2% 8.0% 8.0% 10.0%<br />
Net income - Reported 1,467 1,146 808 1,445 2,035 3,014<br />
Net income - adj 1,467 1,146 925 1,518 2,072 3,050<br />
No of Shares 426 424 420 417 413 410<br />
No. of shares diluted 429 427 424 421 417 414<br />
EPS - Reported 3.42 2.68 1.91 3.43 4.88 7.27<br />
EPS - adj 3.42 2.68 2.18 3.60 4.97 7.36<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
We estimate that ASML’s total revenue to be €5,034m in 2013, and grow at CAGR<br />
23% to reach €9,346m in 2016, driven by EUV tool shipment and high ASP. In<br />
2016, we expect EUV to contribute 54% of total revenue, with revenue from other<br />
tools declining over time.<br />
We estimate adjusted group gross margins will decline from 42.4% in 2012 to<br />
41.9% in 2013, primarily due to initial EUV shipment at below the group average<br />
gross margin (25%). We expect the group gross margin to improve over time due<br />
to 1) an EUV gross margin uptick, 2) increased group revenue level leading to<br />
leverage, and 3) increased services revenue and Cymer consolidation.<br />
45
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Strong cash and consistent dividends<br />
ASML’s €1.6bn of net cash (€3.8/share) at the end of Q2 2013 accounted for 5%<br />
of its market cap. The strong cash position will enable the company to explore all<br />
possible M&A opportunities, and more importantly, ensure a consistent level of<br />
R&D investment to maintain its technology leadership position.<br />
ASML generated €532m of free cash flow in 2012, down from €1,770m in 2011,<br />
due to a decrease in sales and EUV downpayments. We expect the timing of EUV<br />
downpayments may cause fluctuations in free cash flow in 2013 and 2014 before<br />
EUV ramps up in volume. Fluctuations in free cash flow fluctuation should end<br />
after 2015, when EUV can deliver a more consistent level of operating cash flow.<br />
Capital expenditure is guided up to €370m for 2013 (7.3% of 2013E sales), from<br />
€172m in 2012, due to EUV and 450mm facility expansion. We estimate capex will<br />
remain at a similar level until 2015, and return to €200m after all EUV- and<br />
450mm-related facility expansion is complete. The overall cash position will not be<br />
adversely impacted by the rising capex, as it will be offset by operating cash flow<br />
growth over time.<br />
ASML has a history of consistent dividend payouts as well as rising dividends. It<br />
raised 2012 dividends to €0.53/share, from €0.46/share in 2011, equal to a 20%<br />
payout ratio. If ASML distributes 17% (the average payout ratio in 2010-2012) of<br />
net income, we estimate that the dividend will increase to €1.3/share in 2016,<br />
which is a 2% dividend yield based on our price target.<br />
Figure 17: stable dividend payout<br />
8.00<br />
7.00<br />
6.00<br />
5.00<br />
4.00<br />
3.00<br />
2.00<br />
1.00<br />
25%<br />
20%<br />
15%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
0.00<br />
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
EPS DPS Payout ratio<br />
0%<br />
Source: Company date, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
ASML began a share buyback programme in 2011. It has executed €1.13bn in share<br />
buybacks to date, and announced another €1bn repurchase for 2013-2014 in Q1<br />
2013.<br />
46
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Valuation<br />
Our price target of €73.00 is based on a P/E valuation. The price target of €73.00<br />
implies a 12x P/E based on EPS estimates of €7.4/share, discounted by a 10%<br />
WACC back to 2014. We adopted the EPS estimate which fairly reflects EUV’s<br />
earning power as EUV is the main growth driver for ASML, in our opinion. EUV<br />
revenue is expected to grow by a CAGR of 188% over the next three years, and<br />
contribute 54% of revenue and 55% of the gross profit in 2016. We estimate EUV<br />
shipments to be fully ramped up in 2016.<br />
ASML traded at 7x to 24x forward P/E during the semiconductor industry<br />
recovery cycle between end-2009 to 2011 (see Figure 18). We believe we have now<br />
entered another recovery cycle from the beginning of 2013, as noted by front-end<br />
players such as ASML, AMAT, TEL and KLA which have started to see order<br />
levels pick up. ASML was trading at 9x to 13x in June-September 2010, which was<br />
six months after the start of the last recovery cycle.<br />
Our P/E of 12x is 10% higher than the middle point of historical 10x-13x midrecovery<br />
cycle P/E. This premium is assigned to reflect ASML’s stronger<br />
competitive position compared to 2010. ASML held a 70% market share in 2010;<br />
we expect it to hold a more than 80% by 2016, and dominate the EUV market.<br />
Figure 18: 10% P/E premium for the market leader<br />
Source: ASML<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
Figure 19: Peer group valuation<br />
Company Name PE EV/EBIT EV/Sales<br />
FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E<br />
NIKON CORP 14.12 13.42 12.25 9.83 8.28 8.53 0.82 0.80 0.87<br />
ASM INTL NV 27.03 14.02 13.19 50.89 10.49 13.21 3.13 1.91 1.52<br />
APPLIED MATERIAL 23.30 13.18 11.92 17.43 10.77 4.87 2.35 1.92 0.91<br />
KLA-TENCOR CORP 16.94 13.21 11.26 9.43 7.59 2.97 2.46 2.21 0.95<br />
LAM RESEARCH 20.99 11.64 10.15 14.73 8.28 2.90 1.74 1.44 0.58<br />
ULVAC INC na 10.21 7.36 25.28 12.27 15.08 0.82 0.75 1.04<br />
DAINIPPON SCREEN 28.32 14.13 14.41 67.36 11.63 13.66 0.76 0.70 0.81<br />
TOKYO ELECTRON 48.60 20.98 18.74 25.57 9.75 5.61 1.16 1.02 0.72<br />
Mean 22.41 13.85 12.41 27.57 9.88 8.35 1.66 1.34 0.92<br />
Median 22.14 13.32 12.09 21.36 10.12 7.07 1.45 1.23 0.89<br />
ASML HOLDING NV 25.04 15.67 12.17 21.81 10.74 2.10 4.80 3.73 0.67<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
47
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Key risks<br />
1. EUV feasibility: If ASML and Cymer fail to improve EUV light power to the<br />
required 105-watt level before mid-2014, we believe its share price will be<br />
negatively affected.<br />
In our opinion, ASML/Cymer is the only player with the capability to deliver<br />
EUV tools with the required throughput level. The Cymer acquisition further<br />
increased the likelihood of ASML achieving the 105-watt target by mid-2014.<br />
Management retained its 105-watt light source power target in Q2 and<br />
indicated that it expected to achieve 80 watts by September/October 2013.<br />
2. <strong>Semiconductor</strong> spending pause: ASML’s future success depends on how<br />
aggressive chip-makers shrink and on demand for leading-edge chips. The<br />
consumer electronics devices market has been driving demand for smaller<br />
chips in the past few years, so any slowdown in this market will affect spend.<br />
In our opinion, the consumer electronics market is unlikely to slow down in<br />
next few years due to strong demand from developing countries; however, we<br />
do expect intensified competition. Intel, Samsung, Apple and fabless players<br />
are likely to use leading-edge chip technology as a differentiation factor.<br />
Therefore the chance of chip-makers pausing investment in leading technology<br />
is very low.<br />
3. Alternative technology: EUV is now seen as the most credible method to<br />
achieve further shrinkage; however, development of other technologies such as<br />
E Beam and DSA (directed self assembly) are still ongoing.<br />
In our opinion, alternative solutions like E BEAM, DSA are unlikely to replace<br />
EUV as the cost-effective solution for printing leading-edge node. E<br />
Beam/multi-beam is currently suffering significant throughput limitations. The<br />
throughput for a single machine is less than 1wph. DSA is a method of using<br />
block copolymer material to generate a repeatable pattern. As per Gartner data,<br />
DSA has the potential to significantly reduce lithography costs, as only single<br />
patterning is needed. It may potentially be used for 14nm, but the associated<br />
cost is prohibitive.<br />
48
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Company background<br />
ASML is the world’s leading provider of lithography systems for the semiconductor<br />
industry, and manufactures lithography tools that are critical to the production of<br />
integrated circuits or chips. It designs, develops, integrates, markets and services<br />
the lithography tools used by its customers. Customers include all major foundry,<br />
logic and memory chip-makers and IDMs.<br />
Figure 20: ASML’s customers<br />
Company<br />
Samsung<br />
Intel<br />
TSMC group<br />
SK Hynix<br />
Globalfoundries<br />
Toshiba/Sandisk<br />
UMC<br />
Micron<br />
Sony<br />
Infineon<br />
Source: ASML<br />
ASML has a broad product portfolio for lithography tools, and it regularly<br />
refreshes tools to deliver a high specification.<br />
Figure21: Product portfolio<br />
Industry<br />
Memory/Logic/Foundry<br />
Foundry/Logic<br />
Foundry<br />
Memory<br />
Foundry<br />
Memory<br />
Foundry<br />
Memory<br />
IDM<br />
IDM<br />
ASML Product porfolio:<br />
EUV Resolution Throughput start shipping<br />
TWINSCAN NXE:3300 22nm/18nm 2013:43wph 2013 Q2<br />
TWINSCAN NXE:3100 22nm/20nm 2013:43wph 2010 Q4<br />
ArFi<br />
TWINSCAN NXT:1970Bi Estimate 2014<br />
TWINSCAN NXT:1960Bi Estimate 2013<br />
TWINSCAN NXT:1950i 38 nm >=230wph, aim250wph 2009 Q3<br />
TWINSCAN XT:1950Hi 38 nm >=148 wph 2009 H1<br />
TWINSCAN XT:1900Gi (OLD) 40 nm >=131 wph 2007 July<br />
TWINSCAN XT:1700Fi (OLD) 45 nm >=122 wph 2006 Q1<br />
ArF<br />
TWINSCAN XT:1450H 65 nm >=162 wph 2007 Mid<br />
TWINSCAN XT:1450G 65 nm >=145 wph 2004<br />
KrF<br />
TWINSCAN XT:1000H 80 nm 2008 Mid<br />
TWINSCAN XT:860K 110 nm >=210 wph 2007/2008<br />
TWINSCAN XT:800K 120 nm >=220 wph 2007/2008<br />
TWINSCAN XT:875G(OLD) 90 nm >=150 wph 2007 H2<br />
TWINSCAN XT:870G(OLD) 110 nm >=150 wph 2007 H2<br />
I Line<br />
TWINSCAN XT:400K 350 nm >=220 wph 2008<br />
TWINSCAN XT:450G (OLD) 365 nm >=141 wph 2008 H2<br />
TWINSCAN XT:400G(OLD) 365 nm >=149 wph 2007 Nov<br />
Source: ASML data<br />
49
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
ASML shareholder structure<br />
ASML has approximately 408m ordinary shares outstanding with a nominal value<br />
EUR0.09 each, listed at both NYSE Euronext Amsterdam and NASDAQ in New<br />
York. The free float percentage is 77.32%. The shareholder structure at end-2012<br />
end is shown below.<br />
Figure 22: Holding structure at end-2012<br />
Stichting<br />
Administratiekantoor<br />
TSMC/TSMC*<br />
5%<br />
Blackrock Inc<br />
6%<br />
Stichting<br />
Administratiekantoor<br />
MAKTSJAB/<br />
Intel*<br />
15%<br />
FMR LLC<br />
9%<br />
Other<br />
52%<br />
Capital Group<br />
International, Inc<br />
13%<br />
*Major shareholders have the same voting rights as other shareholders, with exception Intel and TSMC (and related<br />
foundations) in the Customer Co-Investment Program<br />
Source: ASML<br />
Customer co-investment programme<br />
In July 2012, ASML announced a customer co-investment programme to accelerate<br />
development of EUV and 450mm technology. Intel, Samsung and TSMC invested<br />
€4.4bn in total, for 23% of ASML’s share capital and €1.1bn in R&D funding. The<br />
shares issued under the programme only carry voting rights under exceptional<br />
circumstances, and are not transferable for two and a half years after issuance.<br />
The R&D contribution from Intel will be recognised through the revenue line after<br />
EUV shipment ramp-up. Samsung’s and TSMC’s R&D contribution will be<br />
recognised through operating income.<br />
We view the co investment programme as positive for both chip-makers and<br />
ASML. For ASML, it demonstrates that customers recognise EUV as Moore’s Law<br />
enabler, and that ASML has a leading position in this field. For chip-makers, the<br />
investment contribution helps ASML deliver a clearer and accelerated roadmap for<br />
EUV and 450mm.<br />
Management<br />
CEO Peter Wennink<br />
Peter Wennink became CEO in July 2013. Previously, he was executive vice<br />
president, CFO and a member of the management board from 1999.<br />
50
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Financials<br />
Profit and loss account<br />
Year-end December (EUR m) 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Sales 5,651.0 4,732.4 5,034.2 6,579.7 7,343.8 9,345.8<br />
Cost of sales 3,201.4 2,727.5 2,923.6 3,825.6 4,131.4 5,057.2<br />
Gross profit 2,449.6 2,004.9 2,110.6 2,754.1 3,212.4 4,288.6<br />
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses 218.5 259.3 294.5 304.0 280.0 260.0<br />
Research and development 589.9 588.7 874.8 920.0 800.0 760.0<br />
Other operating expenses 0.0 0.0 -64.5 -120.0 -120.0 -120.0<br />
Unusual or infrequent items 0.0 0.0 126.2 80.0 40.0 40.0<br />
EBIT 1,641.2 1,156.9 879.6 1,570.1 2,212.4 3,348.6<br />
Interest expenses -7.4 6.2 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Extraordinary income/loss 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
EBT 1,648.6 1,150.7 870.3 1,570.1 2,212.4 3,348.6<br />
Taxes 181.6 4.3 62.3 125.6 177.0 334.9<br />
Net income from continuing operations 1,467.0 1,146.4 807.9 1,444.5 2,035.4 3,013.8<br />
Income from discontinued operations (net of tax) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Net income 1,467.0 1,146.4 807.9 1,444.5 2,035.4 3,013.8<br />
Minority interest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Net income (net of minority interest) 1,467.0 1,146.4 807.9 1,444.5 2,035.4 3,013.8<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
51
ASML Holding NV<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Balance sheet<br />
Year-end December (EUR m) 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Intangible assets 154.4 159.1 2,776.1 2,729.0 2,682.0 2,635.0<br />
Property, plant and equipment 1,053.6 1,029.9 1,335.1 1,537.0 1,698.8 1,830.6<br />
Deferred taxe asset (LT) 38.7 39.4 52.5 52.5 52.5 52.5<br />
Other assets 307.3 350.2 309.6 309.6 309.6 309.6<br />
Fixed Assets 1,554.0 1,578.6 4,473.3 4,628.1 4,742.9 4,827.7<br />
Liquid assets 2,731.8 1,768.0 1,285.2 1,719.0 3,196.2 5,348.7<br />
Inventories 1,624.6 1,857.0 3,203.4 3,328.1 3,692.7 3,950.5<br />
Accounts receivable 880.6 605.3 956.3 1,120.4 1,042.3 1,213.9<br />
Current income tax assets 231.7 1,233.1 1,222.5 1,222.5 1,222.5 1,222.5<br />
Current Assets 5,706.8 5,832.3 6,959.7 7,682.2 9,446.0 12,027.8<br />
TOTAL 7,260.8 7,410.9 11,433.0 12,310.3 14,188.9 16,855.5<br />
Shareholders' equity 3,444.2 4,066.9 6,842.5 7,692.7 9,221.2 11,636.2<br />
Minority interest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Bonds (long term) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Deferred taxes 849.8 501.4 654.8 654.8 654.8 654.8<br />
Long-term debt 733.8 755.9 735.6 735.6 735.6 735.6<br />
Other liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Non-current liabilities 3,444.2 4,066.9 6,842.5 7,692.7 9,221.2 11,636.2<br />
Current liabilities 2,233.0 2,086.3 3,200.2 3,227.2 3,577.3 3,828.9<br />
TOTAL 7,260.8 7,410.5 11,433.0 12,310.3 14,188.9 16,855.5<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Cash flow statement<br />
EUR m 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
Net profit/loss 1,467 1,146 828 1,445 2,035 3,014<br />
Depreciation and Amortisation 165 187 211 235 235 235<br />
Changes in deferred taxes 63 -120 0 0 0 0<br />
Other 89 204 222 247 247 247<br />
Change in working capital 286 -713 -561 -262 64 -178<br />
Cash flow from operating activities 2,071 704 700 1,665 2,581 3,318<br />
Capex -301 -172 -370 -390 -350 -320<br />
Income from asset disposals 0 0 0 0 0 0<br />
Other cash flow from investing activities 0 -948 -236 0 0 0<br />
Cash flow from investing activities -301 -1,120 -606 -390 -350 -320<br />
Long term debt issuance 2 0 0 0 0 0<br />
Loan and receivable repayments -2 -3 -2 0 0 0<br />
Purchase of own shares -669 3,638 -357 -620 -500 -500<br />
Dividends paid -173 -189 -216 -221 -254 -347<br />
Others -150 -3,992 0 0 1 2<br />
Cash flow from financing activities -992 -546 -575 -841 -754 -846<br />
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash 4 -2 1 0 0 0<br />
Increase/decrease in liquid assets 0 0 0 0 0 0<br />
Liquid assets at end of period 2,732 1,768 1,285 1,719 3,196 5,349<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
52
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Front-end business undervalued<br />
• We initiate coverage on ASMI with a Buy recommendation and<br />
a price target of €31. ASMI supplies deposition equipment which is<br />
used in the chip fabrication process; its ALD and epitaxy tool are<br />
essential in manufacturing leading-edge chips. We are buyers for the<br />
following reasons: 1) we expect the ALD market (60% revenue) to<br />
grow at a CAGR of 20% to €700m over the next three years, driven<br />
by the new chip designs; 2) ASMI holds a 44% market share of the<br />
ALD market, and we believe it will maintain this as its comprehensive<br />
intellectual property (IP) portfolio has created high entry barriers for<br />
other players; 3) following the release of its Intrepid XP epitaxy tool,<br />
ASMI may receive orders from Intel due to its strong relationship<br />
with Intel and Intel’s dual sourcing policy; 4) its 40% holdings in ASM<br />
Pacific Technology Ltd (ASMP) accounts for 65% of ASMI’s share<br />
value as per our SOTP valuation. We expect holdings to decrease over<br />
time and this will act as a catalyst for the stock.<br />
• Key debates: 1) What is the value of ASMI front-end business? 2)<br />
will ASMI dispose of more ASMP shares?<br />
1. AMAT and Francisco Partners offered ASMI $800m for its<br />
front-end business in 2008. We believe the front-end business is<br />
worth more than $800m today ($949m/€730m as per our<br />
valuation) as ASMI is in a better position than it was in 2008,<br />
given it has gained a 6% ALD market share, and it may gain an<br />
Intel order with its newly launched epitaxy tool.<br />
2. ASMI has taken down its position from a controlling 53% to<br />
40% in Mar 13, .i.e. from a consolidated to a below the line item.<br />
This in our opinion was a 1st step, i.e. no longer have control of<br />
ASMP’s business. The lock up period will expires in September;<br />
we think further disposal will be likely thereafter.<br />
• Our revenue forecasts for in line with consensus, and our EPS are<br />
10%, 8% and 10% above consensus for 2013, 2014 and 2015. We<br />
believe that the gross margin will increase as a result of top-line<br />
growth, and that ASMI can offset its increasing R&D levels with costsavings.<br />
• Our €31 price target is based on an SOTP valuation. We value ASMI’s<br />
front-end operation at €11/share by applying a 14x P/E multiple on<br />
2014 EPS excluding ASMP at €0.81. The 14x P/E multiple is the<br />
average P/E of its peers excluding TEL, as TEL usually trades at a<br />
P/E premium due to its strong cash position. We value the back-end<br />
operation based on ASMP’s listed price, applying a 5% holding<br />
discount.<br />
Y/E 31.12., EUR m 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Sales 1,634 1,418 559 477 499<br />
EBIT 366 88 25 61 68<br />
Net profit 187 7 1,470 125 133<br />
Y/E net debt (net cash) -191 -206 -252 -363 -475<br />
EPS (GAAP) 3.12 0.15 22.98 1.95 2.09<br />
EPS (Proforma) 2.38 0.23 0.95 1.95 2.09<br />
CPS 3.93 0.76 0.25 2.03 1.68<br />
DPS 0.36 0.49 4.78 0.00 0.00<br />
Gross margin 35.6% 31.1% 33.9% 40.0% 41.0%<br />
EBIT margin 22.4% 6.3% 4.6% 12.8% 13.7%<br />
Dividend yield 1.4% 1.8% 17.6% 0.0% 0.0%<br />
ROCE 22.6% 1.8% 3.3% 6.2% 6.1%<br />
EV/sales 0.8 0.9 2.4 2.8 2.7<br />
EV/EBIT 3.6 15.0 52.4 21.8 19.4<br />
P/E 8.8 183.2 1.2 14.1 13.2<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong><br />
Buy (initiation)<br />
Rating system<br />
Current price<br />
EUR 27.49<br />
Absolute<br />
Price target<br />
EUR 31.00<br />
19/07/2013 Amsterdam Close<br />
Market cap EUR 1,736 m<br />
Reuters ASMI.AS<br />
Bloomberg ASM NA<br />
Share data<br />
Shares outstanding (m) 63<br />
Enterprise value (EUR m) 1,461<br />
Daily trading volume 244,210<br />
Performance data<br />
High 52 weeks (EUR) 31<br />
Low 52 weeks (EUR) 24<br />
Relative performance to SXXP AEX<br />
1 month 0.7 % -2.2 %<br />
3 months 10.2 % 6.6 %<br />
12 months -35.9 % -30.1 %<br />
Key data<br />
Price/book value 0.9<br />
CAGR sales 2011-2014 -29.4%<br />
CAGR sales 2012-2015 140.5%<br />
Business activities:<br />
ASMI is a leading supplier of semiconductor<br />
equipment, materials and process solutions for<br />
the wafer processing industry. It supplies<br />
equipment used for the deposition process.<br />
Non-institutional shareholders:<br />
Arthur Del Prado 18%<br />
22 July 2013<br />
Tammy Qiu<br />
Analyst<br />
+44 20 3207 2673<br />
tammy.qiu@berenberg.com<br />
Jean Beaubois<br />
Specialist Sales<br />
+44 20 3207 7835<br />
jean.beaubois@berenberg.com<br />
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ASM International NV<br />
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Investment summary<br />
We base our investment thesis on Buy-rated ASMI on the following five points.<br />
1. We expect the ALD market to reach €700m in the next three years:<br />
ASMI generates 60% of its revenue from the ALD market. We expect the<br />
addressable market to expand to €700m (a rise of c20%) in the next three<br />
years, driven by increasing HKMG adoption in foundries and logic. In 2012,<br />
the HKMG process was only adopted by Intel (100% of 22nm capacity),<br />
TSMC (60% of 28nm capacity) and Samsung (100% of 32nm capacity, 0% of<br />
28nm capacity). We expect TSMC, Samsung and other tier two foundries<br />
(such as Globalfoundries and UMC) to increase their HKMG-based capacity<br />
significantly in the next two years because HKMG is essential for building<br />
20nm/below chips. We do not expect ASMI to lose market share: it has<br />
accumulated a comprehensive IP portfolio on ALD technology. TEL, the only<br />
other main player in this market, currently licenses ASMI’s IP to make ALD<br />
tools.<br />
2. Market expansion driven by new epitaxy tools: ASMI’s previous epitaxy<br />
tool (17% of revenue) only addressed the power devices and analog markets;<br />
however, in 2012, it released a new epitaxy tool model (Intrepid XP) that<br />
targeted the logic market. We expect the epitaxy market to expand to €500m<br />
in the next three years from €423m today (a rise of c9% per year). Given<br />
ASMI’s strong relationship with Intel and Intel’s dual-sourcing policy, we<br />
believe that ASMI could gain orders from Intel and serve as its secondary<br />
supplier, after AMAT. We believe its market share may, therefore, expand<br />
from the current 10% level to 11% in 2015.<br />
3. ASMI’s front-end business worth more than $800m today: AMAT and<br />
Francisco Partners offered to acquire ASMI’s front-end business for $800m in<br />
2008. The price looked expensive due to a private equity buyout valuation<br />
premium before the financial crisis. We believe the front-end business is worth<br />
more than $800m today (worth $949m as per our valuation) because it is in a<br />
better position than it was in 2008. This is because: 1) ASMI’s market share in<br />
the ALD market has risen by 6% since 2008 to 44% in 2012; 2) 3D NAND<br />
will boost PE CVD (14% of revenue) in 2014/15, an opportunity that did not<br />
exist in 2008; and 3) ASMI could gain epitaxy orders with its newly launched<br />
tool and increase its exposure to strong logic capex.<br />
4. Further ASMP share disposal is a catalyst given investor frustration:<br />
ASMI’s share price is affected by its holding in ASMP, a non-strategic asset.<br />
We think that management has aligned its interest with shareholders (as<br />
demonstrated by the founder’s comments at the 2012 AGM). ASMI has<br />
already sold down a 12% tranche, and we expect it to sell further tranches<br />
following the September lock-up expiry. The market has been disappointed<br />
that the full stake was not disposed of. Our view is that a structured selling of<br />
the holding is the optimal approach as a better value can be realised.<br />
5. SOTP – 65% of ASMI’s share value comes from ASMP: In our SOTP,<br />
65% of ASMI’s share value comes from its 40% holding in ASMP, which we<br />
value based on ASMP’s share price after applying a 5% holding discount. We<br />
value ASMI’s front-end business at €10/share by applying 14x P/E on 2014<br />
EPS of €0.81.<br />
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Figure 1: Valuation matrix<br />
ROE*<br />
Dividend<br />
yield*<br />
FCF yield* Net cash/marcap<br />
No.1 ASML 19.7% AMAT 2.5% AMAT 9.7% TEL 26.5%<br />
No.2 AMAT 17.1% TEL 1.5% ASMI 6.2% SUSS 17.6%<br />
No.3 SUSS 9.1% ASML 0.9% ASML 4.5% AMAT 16.7%<br />
No.4 TEL 6.3% ASMI - TEL 4.3% ASMI 8.9%<br />
No.5 ASMI 6.2% SUSS - SUSS 1.6% ASML 6.5%<br />
* based on <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimation of 2014 performance<br />
Net cash based on 2012 YE balance<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimation, company data<br />
Based on our 2014 estimates, ASMI’s ROE is 6.2%, which is lower than that of<br />
ASML, AMAT, SUSS and TEL. It does not have a stable dividend policy in place.<br />
Its free cash flow yield is 6.2%, which is lower than SUSS and AMAT.<br />
Key catalysts<br />
The following are the key catalysts for the stock.<br />
● ASMP share disposal: In our opinion, there is little synergistic or strategic<br />
reason for keeping ASMP shares, as ASMP was operated independently from<br />
the beginning. We think that a structured selling of the holding will be positive<br />
for the share price.<br />
● Order intake recovery in the coming months: We believe ASMI is likely to<br />
announce further order growth in the next six to 12 months, driven by the<br />
semiconductor cycle recovery and ALD orders as chip-makers are expanding<br />
their leading-edge chip manufacturing capacity.<br />
● New epitaxy orders from logic: In our opinion, ASMI may not gain much<br />
market share from AMAT in the epitaxy market, but it could become a<br />
secondary supplier to Intel, given Intel’s dual-sourcing policy.<br />
Key risks<br />
The following are the key risks for the stock.<br />
● Leading-edge chip technology-related spending pause: We do not expect<br />
the capex on the most advanced chip technology to pause until 2017/2018,<br />
when we expect consumer electronic devices demand from emerging markets to<br />
become saturated.<br />
● Availability of alternative technology: We are not yet concerned about the<br />
threat from alternatives to ALD such as PE CVD, as PE CVD is currently<br />
lagging ALD in terms of its ability to achieve the required layer uniformity level.<br />
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Strong fundamentals unrecognised<br />
Consensus focus on front-end implied valuation<br />
The main focus of consensus lies on ASMI’s implied valuation for its front-end<br />
business, which has had a negative market cap since 2007 (see Figure 2). As a<br />
result, the pair trade of long ASMI/short ASMP was well known and widely<br />
discussed among investors, who predicted that ASMI’s share price would re-rate<br />
after it divests its ASMP holdings, and that ASMP’s share price would slump upon<br />
ASMI’s disposal.<br />
Figure 2: ASMI had negative market cap since 2007<br />
EUR bn<br />
2<br />
1.8<br />
1.6<br />
1.4<br />
1.2<br />
1<br />
0.8<br />
0.6<br />
0.4<br />
0.2<br />
0<br />
160%<br />
140%<br />
120%<br />
100%<br />
80%<br />
60%<br />
40%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
ASMI marcap<br />
ASMP as % of ASMI marcap<br />
In March 2013, ASMI divested 12% of its holding in ASMP, and ASMI’s share<br />
price fell by as much as 24% in the two months following the disposal. The slump<br />
occurred because 1) the market was expecting ASMI to sell more than 12% of its<br />
ASMP holdings and 2) investors were concerned about when and even if there will<br />
be further share disposals.<br />
We believe the market currently has a low expectation of further divestment once<br />
the lock-up period expires in September 2013, and a further disposal could be a<br />
catalyst for ASMI’s share price. However, we also analyse ASMI from a different<br />
angle. We believe its front-end business will also drive strong performance in the<br />
long run and make the stock an attractive investment.<br />
New chip designs trending in ASMI’s favour<br />
ASMI has a solid front-end business that generated 91% of its revenue from the<br />
deposition market in 2012, according to data from market researcher Gartner.<br />
While the total deposition market will grow by c5% between 2012 and 2017<br />
according to Gartner data, we believe that the ALD, PE CVD and epitaxy subsectors<br />
will outperform the total deposition market.<br />
AMAT dominates the deposition market, while ASMI’s market share has always<br />
been small: its market share in 2012 was c5.2% (see Figure 2). Compared with<br />
AMAT and LAM, which supply a broad range of deposition equipment, ASMI<br />
focuses on specific segments, including ALD, epitaxy and PE CVD. We expect<br />
ASMI to benefit from the new generation of mainstream chip designs, which<br />
include 20nm/10nm HKMG, FinFET and 3D NAND, given that 1) its ALD tool<br />
is essential in leading-edge chip manufacturing processes, such as HKMG, 2) its<br />
epitaxy tool is required in the manufacturing of FinFET chips and 3D NAND, and<br />
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ASM International NV<br />
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3) the ramp-up in 3D NAND may drive PE CVD tool demand.<br />
Figure 3: Deposition market share<br />
100.0%<br />
90.0%<br />
80.0%<br />
70.0%<br />
60.0%<br />
50.0%<br />
40.0%<br />
30.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008<br />
AMAT TEL LAM/Novellus Hitachi ASMI Veeco Aixtron<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
ALD will grow as HKMG adoption increases<br />
ASMI generates 70% of its front-end revenue from ALD equipment sales. We<br />
expect robust ALD growth due to the increased adoption of the HKMG process.<br />
The HKMG process is currently only used in some 28nm solutions but it will<br />
become mandatory for 20nm and smaller nodes, as it increases the transistor<br />
capacitance and allow chips to function with reduced power needs. The ALD<br />
process enables chip-makers to form thin films atom by atom, which enables the<br />
precise chip-manufacturing process required by advanced nodes. It offers better<br />
uniformity, surface roughness and thickness control than other solutions.<br />
Currently, Intel, TSMC and Samsung have adopted HKMG for some products.<br />
Globalfoundries has limited HKMG for 28nm, and UMC is due to ramp up<br />
HKMG 28nm in 2014 at the earliest. We expect that HKMG will be used by more<br />
logic/foundries as they scale down to 20nm and below. At the same time, HKMG<br />
layers will increase with shrinkage.<br />
We expect the ALD market to grow by a CAGR of 20% pa in next three years,<br />
versus the total deposition market grow which will grow by 6% during the same<br />
period according to Gartner’s estimates.<br />
Figure 4: ALD growth versus total deposition market<br />
$mn<br />
9,000<br />
8,000<br />
7,000<br />
6,000<br />
5,000<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
0<br />
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E<br />
ALD Deposition ALD/deposition<br />
12.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
8.0%<br />
6.0%<br />
4.0%<br />
2.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
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ASMI shares the ALD market with TEL/Hitachi (see Figure 5). We expect ASMI<br />
to maintain its high market share because: 1) it has already established a strong<br />
relationship with the mainstream foundry/logic players, all of which we believe<br />
have committed to using ASMI’s ALD tools; 2) ASMI has, since it became the first<br />
player in this market in 1999, built a comprehensive ALD-related IP portfolio that<br />
has raised the ALD market’s entry barriers; and 3) TEL is not really a competitor<br />
for ASMI because it only has batch ALD systems, while ASMI is more focused on<br />
single-wafer processing equipment.<br />
TEL licenses its ALD IP from ASMI and focuses on batch ALD equipment used<br />
in memory-makers. The only reason ASMI licensed its ALD IP to TEL is because<br />
the batch system is mainly used by a memory-maker with which TEL has a strong<br />
relationship, and is therefore hard for ASMI to penetrate. ASMI’s management has<br />
made a strong commitment to remain the leader in ALD technology and it has<br />
dedicated a further eight years R&D to turning ALD into a process that can be<br />
used reliably and efficiently by advanced semiconductor chip-makers.<br />
Figure 5: ALD market share<br />
100%<br />
80%<br />
60%<br />
40%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
ASMI<br />
TEL/Hitachi<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
Epitaxy may open up new opportunities<br />
ASMI’s current epitaxy exposure is concentrated on power devices and analog<br />
end-markets. In 2012, it released Intrepid XP, which targets the logic market. The<br />
epitaxy process is used extensively in FinFET and 3D NAND manufacturing. Its<br />
growth is, therefore, likely to be solid because all logic/foundries are releasing<br />
FinFET designs in 2013/2014 while 3D NAND will be in mass production from<br />
the end of 2014 and will mature in 2015 (see Figure 6).<br />
Figure 6: Epitaxy growth versus total deposition market<br />
$mn<br />
9,000<br />
8,000<br />
7,000<br />
6,000<br />
5,000<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
-<br />
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E<br />
Epitaxy Deposition Epi/deposition<br />
12.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
8.0%<br />
6.0%<br />
4.0%<br />
2.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
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ASM International NV<br />
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AMAT holds a dominant 89% share in the global epitaxy market (see Figure 7) and<br />
ASMI currently holds a 9% share. ASMI only addresses the power devices and<br />
analog markets, which are highly cyclical and low-growth (the analog market fell by<br />
4.8% from 2011 to 2012). We do not expect it to gain significant market share<br />
from AMAT because AMAT is already well established with logic/foundry players.<br />
However, we believe that ASMI may be able to serve as a second supplier to Intel<br />
after AMAT, given its strong relationship with Intel.<br />
Figure 7: Epitaxy market share<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
Applied Materials ASM International<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
PE CVD boost by 3D NAND<br />
PE CVD equipment is mainly used in building interconnecting layers in the chip<br />
manufacturing process. We believe the 3D NAND design which requires multilayer<br />
stack deposition is likely to boost the demand for PE CVD equipment. The<br />
roadmap of main NAND vendors shows that 3D NAND is likely to be<br />
manufactured in volume in 2015 after ramping up at the end of 2014.<br />
Gartner forecasts that the PE CVD market will grow by c5.4% between 2012 and<br />
2017, versus total deposition market growth of 5.0% during the same period (see<br />
Figure 8 below).<br />
Figure 8: PE CVD growth versus total deposition market<br />
$mn<br />
10,000<br />
9,000<br />
8,000<br />
7,000<br />
6,000<br />
5,000<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
0<br />
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E<br />
PE CVD Deposition PE CVD/deposition<br />
24.0%<br />
23.0%<br />
22.0%<br />
21.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
19.0%<br />
18.0%<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
AMAT and LAM/Novellus are the biggest players in the PE CVD market, and we<br />
do not expect ASMI’s market share to change significantly. However, it may still<br />
benefit from the market’s growth in absolute revenue terms (see Figure 9).<br />
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Figure 9: PE CVD market share<br />
100.0%<br />
90.0%<br />
80.0%<br />
70.0%<br />
60.0%<br />
50.0%<br />
40.0%<br />
30.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
AMAT ASMI Novellus /LAM<br />
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Key catalysts<br />
In our view, the following events could be catalysts for the stock.<br />
5. ASMP share disposal: ASMI’s share price fell by 24% over the two months<br />
following its divestment of 12% of ASMP in March 2013. Given the market<br />
has very low expectations of further divestment in September; we believe the<br />
share price will rise if ASMI does divest more.<br />
In our opinion, ASMP was operated independently from the beginning, and<br />
there is little synergistic or strategic reason for keeping ASMP shares, given<br />
that its end-market exposure does not overlap with ASMI’s. Therefore ASMI<br />
may dispose of more ASMP shares in the next two years, if not in September<br />
2013.<br />
6. Order intake recovery: As a semiconductor equipment vendor, ASMI’s order<br />
level is cyclical and subject to the capex level of chip-makers. Signs of an order<br />
recovery will ultimately lead to higher revenue and profitability, and will<br />
therefore be positive for the share price.<br />
In our opinion, ASMI will see an order recovery in the next 6 to 12 months. Its<br />
front-end peers ASML, AMAT, KLA and TEL have all started to see order<br />
intake growth from the beginning of 2013. Apart from the cycle-recoverydriven<br />
order increase, ASMI’s ALD orders are likely to be fuelled by leading<br />
foundries expanding their HKMG process-adoption rate in the next two years,<br />
and tier two foundries may follow from 2014.<br />
7. New Intel order for epitaxy product: ASMI’s epitaxy equipment previously<br />
addressed the analog and power management markets, which are highly cyclical<br />
and have a low growth rate (the analog market fell by 4.8% in 2012). In 2012,<br />
ASMI released its Intrepid XP epitaxy model that targeted the logic segment.<br />
We expect its share price to react positively if it wins market share in logic,<br />
which would give it exposure to new opportunities, such as FinFET design.<br />
AMAT dominates the global epitaxy market with an 89% market share. We<br />
believe it is unlikely that ASMI will win significant share from AMAT<br />
overnight, given that AMAT is well established with the big customers.<br />
However, ASMI may gain some small orders as the secondary supplier to Intel,<br />
with which it has a strong relationship.<br />
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Valuation<br />
ASMI’s valuation used to be dominated by its subsidiary, ASMP, with a negative<br />
valuation assigned to the front-end business (see Figure 10). In March 2013, ASMI<br />
reduced its holding in ASMP to 40%; ASMP now contributes 78% of ASMI’s<br />
market capitalisation.<br />
Figure 10: ASMI market cap versus ASMI’s ASMP shareholding<br />
EUR bn<br />
2<br />
1.8<br />
1.6<br />
1.4<br />
1.2<br />
1<br />
0.8<br />
0.6<br />
0.4<br />
0.2<br />
0<br />
160%<br />
140%<br />
120%<br />
100%<br />
80%<br />
60%<br />
40%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
SOTP valuation<br />
ASMI marcap<br />
ASMP as % of ASMI marcap<br />
Figure 11: Peer group valuation<br />
Company Name PE EV/EBIT EV/Sales<br />
FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E<br />
NIKON CORP 14.12 13.42 12.25 9.83 8.28 8.53 0.82 0.80 0.87<br />
APPLIED MATERIAL 23.30 13.18 11.92 17.43 10.77 4.87 2.35 1.92 0.91<br />
ASML HOLDING NV 25.04 15.67 12.17 21.81 10.74 2.10 4.80 3.73 0.67<br />
KLA-TENCOR CORP 16.94 13.21 11.26 9.43 7.59 2.97 2.46 2.21 0.95<br />
LAM RESEARCH 20.99 11.64 10.15 14.73 8.28 2.90 1.74 1.44 0.58<br />
ULVAC INC 0.00 10.21 7.36 25.28 12.27 15.08 0.82 0.75 1.04<br />
DAINIPPON SCREEN 28.32 14.13 14.41 67.36 11.63 13.66 0.76 0.70 0.81<br />
TOKYO ELECTRON 48.60 20.98 18.74 25.57 9.75 5.61 1.16 1.02 0.72<br />
Mean 22.16 14.06 12.28 23.93 9.91 6.97 1.86 1.57 0.82<br />
Median 22.14 13.32 12.04 19.62 10.25 5.24 1.45 1.23 0.84<br />
Mean excl TEL 18.39 13.07 11.36<br />
Median excl TEL 20.99 13.21 11.92<br />
ASM INTL NV 27.03 14.02 13.19 50.89 10.49 13.21 3.13 1.91 1.52<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
Our SOTP valuation of ASMI is based on the value of ASMI’s holding in ASMP<br />
and the front-end business. Our valuation of ASMI’s share of ASMP reflects<br />
ASMP’s listed price. We apply a 5% liquidation discount to ASMI’s shareholding in<br />
ASMP. We value ASMI’s front-end business based on a P/E valuation of 14x 2014<br />
adjusted EPS, excluding ASMP’s earning contribution.<br />
ASMI currently holds 40% of ASMP, compared with 53% before March 2013. The<br />
14x P/E is the mean P/E multiple of its peers for 2014 (see Figure 12) excluding<br />
TEL. We excluded TEL from mean calculation because it trades at a premium<br />
compared with its peers, due to its strong cash balance.<br />
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Figure 12: SOTP valuation<br />
ASMI SOTP valuation:<br />
ASMI's ASMPT share<br />
ASMI's holding 40%<br />
ASMP's 40% marcap (Eur mn) 1,352<br />
Valuation/ ASMI share (Eur ) 21<br />
5% holding discount 20<br />
ASMI Front end value<br />
EPS 2014 ex ASMP contribution (Eur) 0.81<br />
No. of shares (mn) 64<br />
PE<br />
14x<br />
Front end valuation (€ mn) 730<br />
Total valuation (Eur mn) 2,015<br />
Price per share (Eur) 31<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimate, Bloomberg data<br />
Worth more than $800m today<br />
In 2008 June, AMAT and Francisco Partners offered to acquire ASMI’s front-end<br />
business for $800m, of which $400m-500m was assigned to the ALD and PE<br />
CVD segments. The price looked expensive due to a private equity buyout<br />
valuation premium before the financial crisis. The offer was based on roughly 1.5x<br />
total sales. The ALD and PE CVD segments contributed 47% of front-end<br />
revenue at that time, according to Gartner data. The transaction was, however,<br />
terminated because of the financial crisis.<br />
In our opinion, ASMI is in a better position today than it was in 2008. We believe<br />
it is currently worth more than $800m ($949m) (see Figure 13), while the ALD and<br />
PE CVD businesses are worth more than $400m-500m.<br />
Figure 13: Front-end business worth $800m today<br />
Amount<br />
Price offered in 2008 June $mn 800<br />
Comment<br />
Our valuation today €mn 730 Our SOTP valuation<br />
@FX rate today €/$1.3 $mn 949 18% higher than $800mn<br />
@FX rate 2008 June €/$1.6 $mn 1168 46% higher than $800mn<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimate, Bloomberg data<br />
We believe ASMI is in a better position today than it was in 2008 for the following<br />
reasons.<br />
1) ASMI’s share of the ALD market has risen from 38% in 2008 to 44% today.<br />
It is unlikely to lose market share in the future as its strong IP portfolio has<br />
created a high entry barrier and TEL is not competing with ASMI in the same<br />
end-market. The visibility of ALD’s growth potential is much higher today<br />
than it was five years ago, because all mainstream logic/foundry players are<br />
adopting HKMG solutions in their advanced chip manufacturing processes.<br />
2) In 2014/2015, PE CVD growth will be fuelled by 3D NAND, which is a<br />
growth driver that did not exist in 2008. PE CVD is expected to benefit from<br />
3D NAND ramping up as the number of layers of the chip increase<br />
significantly.<br />
3) ASMI could gain logic customers through the epitaxy tool it released in 2012.<br />
This would bring extra upside.<br />
63
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 14: ASMI is better positioned today<br />
$mn 2008 2012 Change Market share change Comment<br />
Deposition 252 309 23% Flat<br />
Stayed at 5.2% deposition market<br />
share.<br />
PE CVD 82 44 -47% Down from 6% to 3% Lost share to LAM.<br />
ALD 76 187 146% Up from 38% to 44%<br />
Remain dominant, higher visibility<br />
on market growth compared to<br />
2008.<br />
LP CVD 49 26 -46% Down from 5% to 3% Lost share to Hitachi<br />
Epitaxy 45 53 17% Down from 18% to 10%<br />
Market share down as ASMI only<br />
focus on low growth analog and<br />
power devices applications. It may<br />
gain market share from AMAT with<br />
new equipment launched which<br />
targets logic players.<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimation<br />
The market is concerned that the industry will not see memory capex expand at the<br />
rate it did 2010. If this is correct, ASMI will lose some of its upside for PE CVD,<br />
which is used in memory-makers. Our response, however, is that although the<br />
memory market expanded in 2010 it has since pulled back, and PE CVD is not<br />
ASMI’s main exposure. The focus should be on the ALD division, where it<br />
generates the majority of its revenue.<br />
As ASMI is in a better position today than it was in 2008, we believe the ALD and<br />
PE CVD segment is now worth more than $400m-500m compared with 2008. In<br />
our analysis below, the combined value of these two businesses is at least $575m<br />
based on current FX rates. This value is 13% higher than the high end of the<br />
AMAT and Francisco Partners offer, and is worth 41% more than the high-end of<br />
that offer once the June 2008 FX rate is factored in.<br />
Figure 15: ALD and PE CVD worth more today<br />
Amount<br />
Comment<br />
Price offered in 2008 June $mn 400-500 for ALD, PECVD business<br />
ALD, PECVD % of revenue in 2012 $mn 74% As per Gartner data<br />
2013 group revenue €mn 398 <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimate<br />
2013 ALD, PECVD revenue 2013 €mn 295 Assume 74% from ALD and PECVD<br />
Value @1.5x sales €mn 442 In line with 2008 June valuation<br />
@FX rate today €/$1.3 $mn 575 15% higher than top end $500mn offer<br />
@FX rate 2008 June €/$1.6 $mn 707 41% higher than top end $500mn offer<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimation, Bloomberg for FX<br />
64
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Key risks<br />
1. Leading-edge related spending pause<br />
The ALD tool is the main focus for ASMI, and its development was fuelled by<br />
the industry’s adoption of the HKMG process. HKMG is essential for nodes<br />
of 20nm and below, and the demand for this process will therefore plunge if<br />
chip-makers suspend their investment in this most advanced chip technology.<br />
Leading-edge chips are mainly used in consumer electronics. We do not expect<br />
the market to slow down in the near future, as the intense level of competition<br />
puts pressure on devices vendors to adopt such chips. However, spending may<br />
not continue to be as high as today once emerging markets reach saturation in<br />
2017/18 time frame.<br />
2. Alternative technology<br />
The ALD tool is preferred in leading-edge chip manufacturing because,<br />
compared with CVD, it can accurately control the thickness of film layers.<br />
However, we understand from our conversations with industry specialists that<br />
CVD can achieve the same results as ALD if it is deposited slowly. The<br />
growth potential for ASMI’s future top-line growth will, therefore, come<br />
under pressure if chip-makers switch to a CVD-based process.<br />
In our opinion, a process switch takes a long time to happen. Currently, the<br />
HKMG process is mainly supported by ALD equipment, as CVD’s layer<br />
uniformity is lagging behind ALD. We are therefore not concerned about it in<br />
the next 12 to 18 months.<br />
65
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Financials<br />
ASMI has historically consolidated its ASMP results. However, following the<br />
disposal of 12% of its ASMP shares on 15 March 2013, it has deconsolidated<br />
these.<br />
ASMI’s revenue model<br />
We model ASMI’s revenue base on the front-end order intake trend.<br />
Figure 16: Revenue model<br />
Eur mn 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Revenue 1,634 1,418 559 477 499<br />
ASMI (front end) revenue 456 370 398 477 499<br />
ASMP (back end) revenue 1,178 1,048 160 - -<br />
Total New Orders 1,370 1,377 725 515 531<br />
ASMI (front end) new orders 398 360 491 515 531<br />
ASMI (front end) new orders yoy -2.2% -9.6% 36.3% 5.0% 3.0%<br />
ASMP (back end) new orders 971 1,017 234 - -<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
We estimate that ASMI’s underlying revenue will reach €559m in 2013, €160m of<br />
which will come from ASMP, and that the front-end operation’s revenue will grow<br />
to €467m in 2014. This top-line growth will be driven by the rising demand for<br />
ASMI’s equipment. With the increased adoption of HKMG in advanced chip<br />
manufacturing processes and ASMI’s strong share of the ALD market, we expect<br />
ALD equipment to increase its revenue contribution.<br />
We also expect its epitaxy revenue to grow as it may receive Intel orders for its<br />
new epitaxy tools. PE CVD is also contributing to revenue growth, but to a lesser<br />
extent because ASMI’s share of the market is minor compared with AMAT’s and<br />
LAM/Novellas’.<br />
Revenue by customer/region<br />
ASMI supplies equipment to the leading chip-makers in logic, foundry and<br />
memory, primarily for their deposition processes. It generated more than 50% of<br />
its revenue from its top three customers in 2012 (Intel, Samsung, TSMC we<br />
believe), compared with 40% in 2011. This concentration of revenue is a result of<br />
the concentration in capex spending and we expect it to last in the mid-term.<br />
Figure 17: ASMI revenue breakdown by customer/region<br />
100%<br />
100%<br />
80%<br />
80%<br />
60%<br />
60%<br />
40%<br />
40%<br />
20%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
2010 2011 2012<br />
Top 3 customer No. 4-10 Rest<br />
0%<br />
2010 2011 2012<br />
SE Asia EUROPE US Japan<br />
Source: Company data<br />
66
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Profit and loss – margin pick-up in 2013<br />
Figure 18: Profit and loss<br />
Eur mn 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Revenue<br />
ASMI (front end) 456 370 398 477 499<br />
ASMP (back end) 1,178 1,048 160 - -<br />
Total revenue 1,634 1,418 559 477 499<br />
Gross profit<br />
ASMI (front end) 172 124 151 191 204<br />
ASMP (back end) 410 316 38<br />
582 440 189 191 204<br />
Gross margin<br />
ASMI (front end) 37.8% 33.6% 37.9% 40.0% 41.0%<br />
ASMP (back end) 34.8% 30.2% 24.0%<br />
35.6% 31.1% 33.9% 40.0% 41.0%<br />
R&D<br />
ASMI (front end) 49 59 59 65 68<br />
ASMP (back end) 81 91 17<br />
129 149 76 65 68<br />
SG&A<br />
ASMI (front end) 61 65 62 65 68<br />
ASMP (back end) 115 138 26<br />
176 202 87 65 68<br />
Operating profit<br />
ASMI (front end) 63 1 30 61 68<br />
ASMP (back end) 214 88 (4)<br />
276 89 25 61 68<br />
Operating margin<br />
ASMI (front end) 13.7% 0.4% 7.5% 12.8% 13.7%<br />
ASMP (back end) 18.1% 8.4% -2.7%<br />
16.9% 6.3% 4.5% 12.8% 13.7%<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
We expect ASMI’s gross margin and operating margin to rise to the historical peak<br />
level reached in the previous cycle. We estimate the company gross margin at 34%,<br />
40% and 41% in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. We forecast that the group<br />
operating margin will be 5% in 2013, 13% in 2014 and 14% in 2015. We expect<br />
R&D and SG&A expenses to increase between 2013 and 2015 but at a slower pace<br />
than revenue growth.<br />
Dividends policy and cash distribution<br />
After a three-year dividend break between 2008 and 2010, ASMI distributed<br />
consistently stable dividends from 2010 to 2012. In 2012, it announced it would<br />
buy back 2m shares from shareholders. In addition to the dividend and the<br />
repurchase programme, it is returning 65% of the ASMP divestment proceeds<br />
(€4.25/share) to shareholders. In total, ASMI distributed €335m cash to investors<br />
from 2011, which is equivalent to about 20% of its market capitalisation.<br />
67
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 18: ASMI dividends history<br />
2010 2011 2012<br />
Dividends/share* 0.4 0.5 0.5<br />
Payout ratio 20.0% 14.7% 440.8%<br />
* dividends over the year, and paid in subsequent year<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Balance sheet and cash flow<br />
At end-Q1 2013, it had €564m in cash and zero long-term debt. After the<br />
proposed distribution of €274m to shareholders following the ASMP divestment,<br />
we estimate ASMI will have a healthy balance sheet with €275m net cash.<br />
We forecast ASMI will generate €104m and €82m free cash flow in 2014 and 2015<br />
respectively, benefiting from the increase in profitability and the top line.<br />
68
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Company background<br />
ASMI was founded by Arthur del Prado in 1968. It co-founded ASML with Philips<br />
Electronics. It is a leading supplier of semiconductor equipment, materials and<br />
process solutions for the wafer processing industry. It supplies equipment used for<br />
ALD, PE ALD, PE CVD, low pressure (LP) CVD and oxidation/diffusion. It<br />
currently holds 40% of shares in ASMP. ASMP is world’s largest assembly and<br />
packaging supplier for the semiconductor and LED industries, and is a leading<br />
supplier of stamped and etched lead frames.<br />
Figure 19: Product portfolio<br />
Technology<br />
ALD<br />
LP CVD<br />
PECVD<br />
Products<br />
EmerALD XP ALD<br />
Pulsar XP ALD<br />
Eagle XP8 ALD<br />
Advance Vertical Furnace A412<br />
Advance Vertical Furnace A400<br />
Dragon XP8<br />
Epitaxy Epsilon 2000<br />
Epsilon 3200<br />
Intrepid XP Epitaxy<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Holding in ASMP<br />
ASMP was founded in 1975 as the Asian marketing arm of ASMI. It has been<br />
operating independently since incorporation. ASMP was formally listed on the<br />
Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1989, and ASMI, as the parent company held 53%<br />
of ASMP’s shares before Mar 2013.<br />
At its AGM in May 2012, ASMI announced that it had appointed Morgan Stanley<br />
and HSBC to carry out a study into why the market had failed to recognise the<br />
market value of the company’s combined business (front end and back end).<br />
Subsequently, ASMI has analysed alternative solutions for crystallising the frontend<br />
business value, including a larger or full secondary placement of ASMP shares,<br />
a spin-off of ASMP, a sale of its ASMP stake, the sale of its front end, ASMP<br />
integration and a 100% ASMP acquisition. Due to concerns about pricing and tax<br />
efficiency, the company concluded that a partial secondary placement of 8% to<br />
12% of ASMP shares was the most suitable way to address the lack of recognition<br />
of ASMI’s combined business value.<br />
In March 2013, ASMI disposed of a 12% of stake in ASMP, and the company<br />
intends to distribute approximately 65% of the proceeds from disposal. The lockup<br />
period will expire in September 2013.<br />
ASMI shareholder structure<br />
ASMI has approximate 64m outstanding ordinary shares, listed at both NYSE<br />
Euronext Amsterdam and at NASDAQ in New York. The free float percentage is<br />
74%. The shareholder structure at the end of 2012 is shown below.<br />
69
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 20: Holding structure as at end-2012<br />
Arthur del Prado<br />
18%<br />
Aberdeen<br />
67%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
Capital Group<br />
companies<br />
Others<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Management<br />
Chuck del Prado, the son of Arthur del Prado, became ASMI’s CEO in 2008.<br />
Between 1989 and 1996, Chuck Del Prado held several marketing and sales<br />
positions at IBM Nederland NV. From 1996 to 2001, he worked in various<br />
manufacturing and sales management positions at ASML in Taiwan and the<br />
Netherlands. He was appointed director of marketing, sales and service of ASM<br />
Europe in March 2001. From 2003 to 2007, he was president and general manager<br />
of ASM America. From 1 January 2008 to 29 February 2008, he acted as executive<br />
vice president front-end operations at ASM America.<br />
Peter AM Van Bommel became CFO on 1 September 2010. Mr Van Bommel<br />
joined Philips in 1979. From the mid-1990s until 2005 he acted as CFO of several<br />
business units of the Philips group. Between 2006 and 2008 he was CFO at NXP,<br />
formerly Philips <strong>Semiconductor</strong>s. He was CFO of Odersun AG, a manufacturer of<br />
thin-film solar cells and modules until 31 August 2010. In April 2012, Mr Van<br />
Bommel was appointed a member of the supervisory board and a member of the<br />
Audit Committee of the Royal KPN NV.<br />
70
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Financials<br />
Profit and loss account<br />
Year-end December (EUR m) 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Sales 1,634.4 1,418.0 558.6 477.5 498.7<br />
Cost of sales 1,052.3 977.6 369.3 286.5 294.3<br />
Gross profit 582.1 440.4 189.3 191.0 204.5<br />
Selling, General and Administrative Expense 176.4 202.0 87.4 65.0 68.0<br />
Research and development 129.4 149.2 76.3 65.0 68.0<br />
Other operating expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Amortisation of intangible assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Restructuring expenses -89.8 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
EBIT 366.1 88.3 25.3 61.0 68.5<br />
Net interest expenses 15.0 14.6 0.7 0.0 0.0<br />
Other financial result 1.8 -6.9 3.9 0.0 0.0<br />
Extraordinary income/loss 0.0 0.0 1,409.8 0.0 0.0<br />
EBT 353.0 66.7 1,438.3 61.0 68.5<br />
Taxes 36.7 26.3 6.5 9.1 10.3<br />
Net income from continuing operations 316.3 40.4 1,431.8 51.8 58.2<br />
Income from discontinued operations (net of tax) - - - - -<br />
Net income 316.3 40.4 1,431.8 51.8 58.2<br />
Minority interest 129.4 33.3 -2.7 0.0 0.0<br />
Share of profit of associates 56.9 24.6 34.0 72.9 75.3<br />
Net income (net of minority interest) 186.9 7.2 1,470.0 124.7 133.5<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
71
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Balance sheet<br />
Year-end December (EUR m) 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Intangible assets 52.1 51.9 11.5 11.5 11.5<br />
Property, plant and equipment 260.2 275.4 39.0 10.3 -18.4<br />
Other assets 74.1 56.1 1,423.2 1,508.9 1,597.4<br />
Fixed Assets 386.4 383.5 1,473.7 1,530.8 1,590.6<br />
Liquid assets 390.3 290.5 255.6 367.6 480.3<br />
Accounts receivable 330.9 304.8 89.0 76.1 79.5<br />
Inventories 376.7 403.4 116.6 90.4 92.9<br />
Other current assets 82.7 80.0 6.3 5.4 5.6<br />
Deferred taxes 14.4 18.0 5.3 5.3 5.3<br />
Current income tax assets 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5<br />
Current Assets 1,195.8 1,097.6 473.3 545.2 664.0<br />
TOTAL 1,582.2 1,481.0 1,947.0 2,076.0 2,254.6<br />
Shareholders' equity 659.8 738.4 1,851.9 1,997.7 2,173.6<br />
Minority interest 297.9 308.1 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Long-term debt 15.3 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Subordinated capital 135.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Provisions 6.8 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Deferred taxes 0.9 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Pensions provisions 9.9 -6.0 3.4 3.4 3.4<br />
Other liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.3<br />
Non-current liabilities 659.8 738.4 1,851.9 1,997.7 2,173.6<br />
Short-term debt 40.7 61.7 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Accounts payable 157.5 151.8 62.2 48.2 49.5<br />
Other accruals 152.9 170.7 22.9 19.6 20.4<br />
Advance payments 42.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Deferred income 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Other liabilities 54.9 27.7 2.8 2.8 2.8<br />
Current portion of long term debt 4.3 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Current liabilities 456.5 421.6 91.4 74.1 76.3<br />
TOTAL 1,582.2 1,481.0 1,947.0 2,076.0 2,254.6<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
72
ASM International NV<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Cash flow statement<br />
EUR m 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Net profit/loss 316.2 38.8 1,431.8 51.8 58.2<br />
Depreciation and Amortisation 47.0 55.6 53.3 53.3 53.3<br />
Other operating cash flows -78.9 33.7 -1,408.9 0.5 0.5<br />
Change in working capital -67.6 -85.5 -60.2 22.7 -5.7<br />
Cash flow from operating activities 216.7 42.5 15.9 128.3 106.2<br />
Capex -85.4 -67.6 -24.6 -24.6 -24.6<br />
Investment in Intangible assets -7.1 -4.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0<br />
Payments for acquisitions -1.0 0.0 299.8 0.0 0.0<br />
Income from asset disposals 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Cash flow from investing activities -93.4 -71.9 275.0 -24.6 -24.6<br />
Inflows resulting from the issue of shares 4.12 2.21 0.99 0.00 0.00<br />
Purchase of own shares 0.0 -44.1 -1.1 0.0 0.0<br />
Dividends paid -22.3 -27.5 -305.6 0.0 0.0<br />
Other financing cash flows -37.1 -4.1 -21.9 8.2 31.0<br />
Cash flow from financing activities -55.3 -73.5 -327.6 8.2 31.0<br />
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash -18.1 3.1 1.5 0.0 0.0<br />
Increase/decrease in liquid assets 49.9 -99.8 -35.2 111.9 112.7<br />
Liquid assets at end of period 390.6 290.8 255.6 367.6 480.3<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
73
Suess Microtec AG<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Small, but active in growing markets<br />
• We initiate on Suess Microtec (SUSS) with a Buy<br />
recommendation and a price target of €9.4. SUSS supplies<br />
equipment used for chip packaging, photomask cleaning, and 3D<br />
integration, which will drive smaller chip sizes once shrinkage stops.<br />
Our Buy rating is based on the following: 1) the lithography segment’s<br />
strong performance (69% of SUSS’s revenue, and 100% of its profit),<br />
which is sufficient to drive group revenue growth; 2) Tamarack<br />
Scientific’s (acquired in 2012) margin may gradually converge to an<br />
average lithography margin of 20%; 3) bonder segment revenue is<br />
likely to triple in 2016/2017 once 3D bonder starts to ship in volume,<br />
driven by chip-makers expanding their 3D packaging capacity; and 4)<br />
the option value of more frequent cleaning for EUV photomasks as<br />
the move to EUV is made – the photomask segment’s revenue could<br />
double from the current €20m-40m level in 2015/2016.<br />
• Key debates: 1) How will the company’s “bread-and-butter”<br />
lithography segment perform in the future? 2) When will 3D bonding<br />
tools show significant growth? 3) Could SUSS become an acquisition<br />
target given its 3D bonding speciality?<br />
1. We expect the lithography segment to grow at 22% in 2014 and<br />
24% in 2015. With Tamarack’s contribution, semiconductor cycle<br />
recovery momentum and its high-growth end-market exposure,<br />
lithography is expected to contribute 100% of group revenue<br />
growth and 95% of group profit growth in 2015. It can therefore<br />
drive group growth even in the absence of a significant<br />
improvement in the other segments.<br />
2. 3D bonder volume shipments may not start before 2016/17, and<br />
some chip-makers may start building pilot lines in 2014/15; our<br />
bull-case assumption gives 9% and 8% revenue upside to our<br />
current group revenue estimates in 2014 and 2015 respectively.<br />
3. We think that an acquisition of SUSS’s 3D bonding business is<br />
unlikely given that: a) AMAT has used EV Group since 2009,<br />
and b) TEL may not have any further acquisition plans in the<br />
near term after acquiring Oerlikon and FSI in 2012.<br />
• Our EPS forecasts are 8% and 11% above consensus for 2014 and<br />
2015. We believe that the lithography segment will be able to drive<br />
total revenue and profit growth even without a material improvement<br />
from the bonder and photomask divisions. We estimate the<br />
lithography operating margin will slowly normalise to 20% after<br />
Tamarack’s integration.<br />
• Our €9.4 price target is based on 14x P/E on 2014 adjusted EPS of<br />
€0.67. The 14x P/E is at the mid of the historical 11-18x multiple<br />
applied in the middle of the order recovery cycle.<br />
Y/E 31.12., EUR m 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Sales 175 164 153 188 215<br />
EBIT 19 12 -8 19 29<br />
Net profit 15 8 -8 13 20<br />
Y/E net debt (net cash) -46 -26 -5 -7 -21<br />
EPS (reported) 0.77 0.49 -0.40 0.67 1.04<br />
EPS (Proforma) 0.77 0.41 -0.04 0.67 1.04<br />
CPS 2.43 1.34 0.26 0.38 1.09<br />
DPS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00<br />
Gross margin 37.8% 35.0% 30.0% 36.5% 38.8%<br />
EBIT margin 10.6% 7.2% -5.5% 9.9% 13.7%<br />
Dividend yield 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%<br />
ROCE 12.9% 7.5% -6.0% 9.6% 13.1%<br />
EV/sales 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.6<br />
EV/EBIT 5.4 10.4 -17.0 7.5 4.3<br />
P/E 10.0 15.8 -19.3 11.4 7.4<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong><br />
Buy (initiation)<br />
Rating system<br />
Current price<br />
EUR 7.65<br />
Absolute<br />
Price target<br />
EUR 9.40<br />
19/07/2013 XETRA Close<br />
Market cap EUR 147 m<br />
Reuters SMHNn.DE<br />
Bloomberg SMHN GY<br />
Share data<br />
Shares outstanding (m) 19<br />
Enterprise value (EUR m) 142<br />
Daily trading volume 73,041<br />
Performance data<br />
High 52 weeks (EUR) 10<br />
Low 52 weeks (EUR) 7<br />
Relative performance to SXXP TecDAX<br />
1 month -7.1 % -8.4 %<br />
3 months -12.2 % -13.7 %<br />
12 months -35.3 % -39.9 %<br />
Key data<br />
Price/book value 1.2<br />
Net gearing 0.0%<br />
CAGR sales 2012-2015 9.5%<br />
CAGR EPS 2012-2015 28.8%<br />
Business activities:<br />
Suess is a leading supplier of equipment and<br />
process solutions for the semiconductor and<br />
LED industry.<br />
22 July 2013<br />
Tammy Qiu<br />
Analyst<br />
+44 20 3207 2673<br />
tammy.qiu@berenberg.com<br />
Jean Beaubois<br />
Specialist Sales<br />
+44 20 3207 7835<br />
jean.beaubois@berenberg.com<br />
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Suess Microtec AG<br />
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Investment summary<br />
Our investment thesis on Buy-rated SUSS is predicated on four points.<br />
• Lithography can drive growth on its own, even without any contribution<br />
from the bonder and photomask divisions: We estimate group revenue and<br />
profit will grow at 14% and 58% respectively in 2015, with the lithography<br />
segment contributing 100% of group revenue growth and 83% of profit growth<br />
in 2015.<br />
The lithography segment is likely to show an organic growth rate similar to<br />
historical recovery cycle growth of ~15% in 2014 and 2015, and generate a<br />
~20% peak cycle margin. Tamarack’s contribution may triple to €30m by 2015,<br />
as SUSS is aiming to gain half of the back-end lithography market (a $60mn<br />
market). Along with Tamarack’s contribution, growth momentum from the<br />
semiconductor recovery cycle and strong growth in end-markets such as<br />
MEMS, we expect lithography to drive group revenue and profit growth on its<br />
own, without the company having to rely on significant improvements in other<br />
segments.<br />
• 3D bonder revenue may triple in 2016/17: Industry experts believe 3D<br />
integration could be one way to extend Moore’s law (ie that the number of<br />
components on integrated circuits doubles approximately every two years) once<br />
the physical shrinkage limit for chips is reached at ~5nm/3nm. Market<br />
researcher Yole Development expects the market to grow from $150m today to<br />
$500m-1bn in the next few years. In our opinion, even though we are not likely<br />
to see large order intakes before 2015/2016, the segment’s revenue could triple<br />
once volumes ramp up in 2016/2017. Our bull-case scenario for SUSS (seven<br />
tool shipments for 2014 and 2015 versus two tools by our estimates) suggests<br />
9% and 8% revenue upside and 42% and 18% operating profit upside for 2014<br />
and 2015 respectively compared to our current forecasts.<br />
• EUV photomask cleaning provides potential upside: SUSS holds a 100%<br />
share of the EUV photomask-cleaning tool market and an 80% share of the<br />
argon fluoride immersion (ArFi) photomask-cleaning tool market (combined<br />
market size: €50m-60m). We may see significant revenue upside in this segment<br />
once EUV volume shipments start in 2016, as EUV photomasks are likely to<br />
require more frequent cleaning than conventional photomasks as their structure<br />
is much more complex.<br />
• Valuation – at the middle of the range of historical multiples: Our price<br />
target of €9.4 is based on 14x P/E on 2014 adjusted EPS of €0.67, which is<br />
towards the middle of the historical 11-18x multiple range applied in the middle<br />
of the order recovery cycle.<br />
Figure 1: Valuation matrix<br />
ROE*<br />
Dividend<br />
yield*<br />
FCF yield* Net cash/marcap<br />
No.1 ASML 19.7% AMAT 2.5% AMAT 9.7% TEL 26.5%<br />
No.2 AMAT 17.1% TEL 1.5% ASMI 6.2% SUSS 17.6%<br />
No.3 SUSS 9.1% ASML 0.9% ASML 4.4% AMAT 16.7%<br />
No.4 TEL 6.3% ASMI - TEL 4.3% ASMI 8.9%<br />
No.5 ASMI 6.2% SUSS - SUSS 1.6% ASML 6.5%<br />
*based on <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates of 2014 performance. Net cash based on 2012 YE balance<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates, company data<br />
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Based on our 2014 estimates, SUSS’s ROE is lower than ASML’s and AMAT’s. Its<br />
FCF yield is lower than the front-end equipment vendors’, as we expect it will<br />
supply more 3D bonder demonstration tools to potential customers in 2014/2015,<br />
which is negative for operating cash flow.<br />
Key catalysts<br />
The key catalysts to drive the share price include the following.<br />
1) Further 3D bonder orders received from mainstream chip-makers:<br />
Samsung may release a showcase chip in 2014 that could be a trigger for other<br />
chip-makers to start placing orders. The other mainstream chip-makers may<br />
also build pilot lines if Samsung’s chip gains traction in the market.<br />
2) EUV photomasks require more frequent cleaning than conventional<br />
photomasks: EUV photomasks have a more complicated structure compared<br />
to conventional photomasks, and they may therefore need to be cleaned more<br />
frequently. We believe more data points will become available once EUV<br />
ramps up in 2014/2015.<br />
3) Order recovery: The front-end semiconductor equipment vendors have all<br />
reported/guided improved order levels in recent quarters compared to 2012<br />
levels. As a back-end player, SUSS is likely to see order improvement in the<br />
coming quarters.<br />
Key risks<br />
The key risks include the following.<br />
1) The timeframe for 3D bonder adoption remains uncertain and the<br />
division is currently loss-making: In our opinion, the 3D bonder division is<br />
not likely to receive orders in volume until 2015/16 and will remain lossmaking<br />
in 2014 and 2015.<br />
2) The photomask division has a lower operating margin than the<br />
lithography division (5% versus 21% in 2012) and dilutes the group<br />
operating margin: If EUV photomasks do not require more frequent<br />
cleaning than conventional photomasks, the division is likely to remain<br />
margin-dilutive.<br />
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Small, but active in growing markets<br />
SUSS is heavily exposed to various growing end-markets, including MEMS, 3D<br />
integration and EUV lithography equipment. It supplies equipment used by<br />
packaging/assembling companies, MEMS manufacturers, integrated device<br />
manufacturers (IDMs) and lithography photomask shops. It has optimised its endmarket<br />
exposure through various acquisitions and disposals over the past few years.<br />
3D bonding – revenue may triple in 2016/2017<br />
The hottest topic in the semiconductor industry today is how to deliver smaller<br />
chips with less power consumption, better performance and more functionality.<br />
Shrinking the size of chips used to be the only solution adopted by chip-makers. As<br />
current chip design is likely to approach its physical limits at 7nm/5nm, 3D<br />
integration is viewed as the most feasible way to continue delivering smaller chips.<br />
Yole Development expects the bonding market to grow from $150m today to<br />
$500m-1bn once volume adoption starts – therefore SUSS’s bonder revenue may<br />
triple from €30m to €100m in 2016/17.<br />
Stacking, which can be done at the die or wafer level, is one of the key primary<br />
technologies that enables 3D integration. It works by vertically stacking individual<br />
chip components and interconnecting them by means of TSV (through-silicon via)<br />
(see Figure 2 below). Shorter signal paths, reduced power consumption, enhanced<br />
bandwidths and smaller surface areas can be achieved by stacking dies or wafers on<br />
top of each other.<br />
Figure 2: 3D stacking and TSV<br />
Source:www.nist.gov<br />
Source: electronicsbus.com<br />
SUSS has received two orders from a leading IDM (Samsung we believe) for 3D<br />
bonders to build its 3D pilot line. If Samsung releases a sample chip next year, the<br />
remaining chip-makers are very likely to follow suit. Due to the high level of<br />
competition, chip-makers will want to remain diversified and become involved in<br />
all possible mainstream chip designs.<br />
3D integration has yet to be adopted by mainstream chip-makers as the main focus<br />
currently is on shrinking chip size and the performance/power consumption gain<br />
from 3D integration is less than that from chip shrinking/FinFET. We believe the<br />
mainstream chip-makers are likely to start working on 3D pilot lines while<br />
continuing to shrink chips. In our model, we have included one shipment each for<br />
2014 and 2015. Our bull-case scenario assumes all mainstream IDMs, memory and<br />
packaging houses will start building their pilot lines in 2014/2015. Excluding the<br />
chip-makers already working with EV Group (Intel and Micron, we believe), the<br />
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demand could amount to around seven new tools for 2014 and 2015 (one each for<br />
the top three packaging houses ASE, Amkor and SPIL, one for IBM, one for<br />
Toshiba/Sandisk, one for Hynix and one for TSMC), which is five more than our<br />
current estimate for 2014 and 2015 combined. The maximum revenue upside is 9%<br />
and 8% for 2014 and 2015 respectively, and operating profit upside is 42% and<br />
18% respectively, as the bonder segment is likely to reach break even.<br />
The bonder division has been loss-making in the past, and has wiped out half of<br />
the group’s operating profit for the past three years. The company has indicated<br />
that revenue of €30m-40m is required to break even. In our forecast, we expect the<br />
division’s revenue to reach €29m by 2015, and the operating loss will narrow<br />
significantly from €12m in 2012 to €5.4m, driven by higher revenue levels and<br />
future cost savings from improved efficiency (€2m-€3m/year).<br />
SUSS supplies wafer bonders, coater/developers, mask aligners and exposure<br />
equipment used in the 3D integration process. It shares the market with EV Group<br />
and has a leading market share in the temporary bonders market. If 3D bonding<br />
gains traction with other IDMs over the next two years, and becomes one of the<br />
mainstream solutions in 2016/2017, we may see the risk of other big front-end<br />
players such as AMAT and TEL joining the market.<br />
EUV photomask cleaning – potential upside<br />
EUV equipment is currently viewed as the only credible path for shrinking chip<br />
size without significantly increasing the cost. Currently, the mainstream chipmakers<br />
use ArFi tools for manufacturing leading-edge chips. We expect EUV tools<br />
to be shipped in volume in 2015/2016, with annual shipments of 24 and 50<br />
respectively (see Figure 3 below).<br />
Figure 3: EUV shipment ramp-up<br />
Unit mn<br />
250<br />
Shipment by Technology<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E<br />
I-Line KrF ArF Dry ArF Immersion EUV<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Currently, photomasks are cleaned after 5,000 lithography exposures, but it is<br />
unclear how regularly EUV photomasks should be cleaned. In our opinion, the<br />
photomask division will at least maintain its current €20m-40m run-rate for the<br />
foreseeable future, although a more frequent cleaning requirement – if decided –<br />
would provide further upside.<br />
SUSS holds a 100% share of the EUV photomask cleaning equipment market. The<br />
market size is relatively small (currently €50m-60m), hence the big equipment<br />
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players such as TEL and AMAT do not focus on this area – although we would<br />
expect them to join the market if it expands significantly.<br />
MEMS – smartphone- and tablet-driven<br />
The MEMS market provides 30% of SUSS’s revenue: As per Gartner data, the<br />
non optical sensor market grew by 14% in 2012, mainly driven by smartphone and<br />
tablets. MEMS sensors included in smartphones and tablets include accelerometers,<br />
gyroscopes, e-compasses, three-axis magnetometers and pressure sensors. Apple<br />
and Samsung were the biggest buyers of MEMS motion sensors in 2012, and we<br />
expect to see more and more tier two vendors such as Sony, ZTE and even China<br />
whitebox vendors (like xiaomi) incorporating MEMS sensors into their devices. As<br />
per iSuppli research, China-based handset and tablet-makers doubled their<br />
purchasing of MEMS motion sensors in 2012.<br />
Not only are more vendors installing MEMS into their devices, the number<br />
of MEMS sensors in smart devices is also growing. Apple pioneered the use of<br />
MEMS sensors (accelerometers, light sensors) in the iPhone2. In Samsung’s new<br />
flagship model Galaxy S4 released in 2013, there is a wealth of different sensors<br />
including the accelerometer as well as pressure, RGB light, geomagnetic, proximity,<br />
gyroscope, barometer, gesture temperature and humidity sensors. Today, smart<br />
devices contains up to nine sensors, and we believe this number will grow as<br />
vendors incorporate more sensors in their products to deliver a better user<br />
experience and new functionality.<br />
In the next few years, we expect the total MEMS industry is forecast to grow at<br />
c12%, mainly driven by the demand from smartphone and tablets (see Figure 4<br />
below).<br />
Figure 4: MEMS end-markets by application<br />
$mn<br />
10,000<br />
9,000<br />
8,000<br />
7,000<br />
24.0%<br />
6,000<br />
5,000<br />
4,000<br />
20.2% 3,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
0<br />
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E<br />
Mobile phones Tablet Consumer Automotive Industrial Military Wired Storage Computer<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> Estimation<br />
SUSS’s exposure, coating and bonding equipment are essential in MEMS<br />
manufacturing. It shares the market with TEL and EV Group; we do not expect<br />
any significant changes in market share structure in the near future. TEL holds a<br />
dominant market share in coaters/developers (photoresist processing), and its main<br />
focus is on supplying equipment used in the front-end semiconductor fabrication<br />
process rather than the MEMS market. SUSS currently supplies equipment used in<br />
MEMS manufacturing to more than 100 customers, and generates about 30% of its<br />
revenue from the MEMS market. We expect that its high level of diversification<br />
and technology leadership will enable it to benefit from the MEMS market growth.<br />
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Key catalysts<br />
In our view, the following events could be the catalysts for the stock price.<br />
1. 3D bonder orders from other mainstream chip-makers: SUSS’s share<br />
price increased by 10% on 28 March 2013 on the news that it had received a<br />
bonder order from a leading IDM (Samsung, we think). This demonstrates<br />
that 3D bonding designs are being recognised by mainstream chip-makers.<br />
If SUSS received further orders from other mainstream chip-makers and<br />
packaging houses, its share price would likely react positively.<br />
We believe Samsung may be planning to release sample chips using a 3D<br />
stacking design in 2014 following the recent bonder order. We believe it<br />
could be a trigger for other chip-makers to start building R&D/pilot lines<br />
based on 3D bonding solutions. Given the intensified competition among<br />
chip-makers today, they will not want to lag behind their competitors in any<br />
area. SUSS may therefore see an increase in 3D bonder orders as early as<br />
the second half of 2014, which would benefit its share price.<br />
2. More frequent EUV photomask cleaning: EUV masks require<br />
sophisticated cleaning tools due to their complex structure. SUSS has a<br />
100% share of the EUV photomask cleaning market. Conventional<br />
photomasks need to be cleaned every 5,000 exposures; however, it is unclear<br />
how regularly EUV photomasks need to be cleaned. Should it be decided<br />
that EUV photomasks need to be cleaned more regularly, there will be a<br />
surge in demand for cleaning tools and SUSS will be the main beneficiary.<br />
In our opinion, visibility on the cleaning tools required for EUV<br />
photomasks is currently low. The growth of the photomask segment will at<br />
least be maintained in line with today’s rate, and we can only see upside<br />
revenue potential. We are expecting further datapoints after the EUV rampup<br />
from mid-2014.<br />
3. Order recovery: SUSS generates 69% of its revenue from the lithography<br />
segment. Any sign of an order recovery will be positive for its share price.<br />
The higher the order intake, the higher the revenue growth and operating<br />
margin improvement due to increased utilisation rates.<br />
In our opinion, front-end equipment vendors such as ASML, AMAT, LAM<br />
and KLA have all reported improved order levels in recent quarters<br />
compared to end-2012. SUSS focuses on the back end of the<br />
semiconductor fabrication process, so it is likely to see an order recovery<br />
from end-2013. We believe the company may start to see order increases in<br />
the coming quarters, therefore, as the back-end players may start to place<br />
orders as soon as they see signs of a front-end recovery.<br />
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Valuation<br />
Our €9.0 price target is based a P/E of 14x on 2014 adjusted EPS of €0.67/share.<br />
The P/E of 14x was based on its historical multiple.<br />
Historically, SUSS has traded at 9x to 20x forward P/E during a semiconductor<br />
industry recovery cycle (end-2009 to 2011). We believe the industry entered a<br />
recovery cycle from the beginning of 2013, marked by front-end players registering<br />
a pick-up in orders. SUSS, as a back-end player, would expect to see its own<br />
recovery start after a three- to six-month delay. It was trading at an 11x to 18x<br />
multiple between December 2010 and March 2011, which was 12 months after the<br />
front-end players began their recovery cycle.<br />
We have taken the mid-point (14x) of the historical multiple (11x-18x).<br />
Figure 5: Peer group valuation<br />
Company Name PE EV/EBIT EV/Sales<br />
FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E<br />
NIKON CORP 14.12 13.42 12.25 9.83 8.28 8.53 0.82 0.80 0.87<br />
APPLIED MATERIAL 23.30 13.18 11.92 17.43 10.77 4.87 2.35 1.92 0.91<br />
ASML HOLDING NV 25.04 15.67 12.17 21.81 10.74 2.10 4.80 3.73 0.67<br />
ASM INTL NV 27.03 14.02 13.19 50.89 10.49 13.21 3.13 1.91 1.52<br />
KLA-TENCOR CORP 16.94 13.21 11.26 9.43 7.59 2.97 2.46 2.21 0.95<br />
LAM RESEARCH 20.99 11.64 10.15 14.73 8.28 2.90 1.74 1.44 0.58<br />
ULVAC INC na 10.21 7.36 25.28 12.27 15.08 0.82 0.75 1.04<br />
DAINIPPON SCREEN 28.32 14.13 14.41 67.36 11.63 13.66 0.76 0.70 0.81<br />
TOKYO ELECTRON 48.60 20.98 18.74 25.57 9.75 5.61 1.16 1.02 0.72<br />
Mean incl TEL&Nikon 22.70 14.05 12.38 26.93 9.98 7.66 2.01 1.61 0.90<br />
Median incl TEL&Nikon 23.30 13.42 12.17 21.81 10.49 5.61 1.74 1.44 0.87<br />
Back end players<br />
ASM PACIFIC TECH 28.35 16.78 15.32 24.57 14.64 4.10 2.91 2.41 0.73<br />
SUSS MICROTEC nm 12.29 7.85 nm 4.67 6.47 0.80 0.67 0.76<br />
ULTRATECH INC* 33.99 17.78 na 18.67 19.10 na 3.21 2.49 na<br />
Mean Back end companies 20.78 15.62 7.72 14.42 12.80 3.52 2.31 1.86 0.50<br />
Median Back end companies 28.35 16.78 7.85 18.67 14.64 4.10 2.91 2.41 0.73<br />
*Ultratech Inc 2015 consensus is not available<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
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Key risks<br />
1. Timing of 3D bonding adoption: The substrate bonder division has a -50%<br />
operating margin, and made a €12m loss in 2012 (group operating profit:<br />
€10m). It has never been profit-making in the past. The substrate bonder<br />
division is likely to keep making a loss until it begins volume shipments.<br />
In our opinion, 3D bonding has a bright future once the industry reaches the<br />
physical lithography shrinkage limit. However, the timeframe for volume<br />
adoption is unclear. Management has indicated that the division requires a<br />
revenue run-rate of €30m-40m/year to reach breakeven. The extra €7m-17m<br />
revenue will require SUSS to ship 1-3 more tools more each year compared to<br />
2012, which may be a challenge in the short term, in our opinion.<br />
2. The photomask division dilutes group operating profit: SUSS’s photomask<br />
revenue may remain at the €20m-40m level if it turns out that EUV photomasks<br />
do not require a more regular cleaning process. The segment is profit-dilutive as<br />
its operating margin is lower than the lithography division’s (5% versus 21% in<br />
2012). It accounted for 10% of total group operating profit in 2012.<br />
We believe the photomask division will remain profit-dilutive at the operational<br />
level as it has a lower operating margin compared to the lithography segment. If<br />
further data point shows that EUV photomasks need to be cleaned more<br />
regularly than conventional photomasks, SUSS may enjoy a period of high<br />
growth before other equipment vendors join the market. However, we are not<br />
expecting to see any significant growth in this segment until mid-2014, which is<br />
when we believe EUV will ramp up.<br />
3. Margin pressure: The main profit generator for SUSS has always been the<br />
lithography segment, which generated 100% of group operating profit in 2010,<br />
2011 and 2012. The profitability level is highly cyclical and highly dependent on<br />
the top-line level. The operating margin for the division was 20% for Q4 2011,<br />
and 2% in Q1 2013.<br />
The Tamarack acquisition is margin-dilutive as well, as it has a low level of<br />
profitability compared with the lithography segment.<br />
In our opinion, the profitability of the lithography division is likely to improve<br />
in the coming quarters as the top line recovers from the 2012 trough. Tamarack<br />
is only likely to account for a small part of lithography revenue in the next two<br />
years – 10% in 2014, 14% in 2015 – hence the margin dilution is not likely to be<br />
significant. We expect Tamarack to slowly converge to the average lithography<br />
operating profit level starting from 2015, as integration completes.<br />
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Financial<br />
Profit and loss account<br />
We model SUSS’s revenue based on the order intake trend. The lithography<br />
segment has a shorter lead time compared to substrate bonder and photo mask<br />
equipment, thus the order trend in the lithography segment is likely to be reflected<br />
in the top line earlier than the other two segments.<br />
Figure 6: Revenue forecast<br />
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Revenues (Eur millions)<br />
Lithography 111.5 113.2 96.9 118.0 145.9<br />
Substrate Bonder 20.5 23.1 24.2 28.5 29.2<br />
Photo mask equipment 36.3 22.9 26.4 36.0 34.2<br />
Other 7.1 4.8 5.4 6.0 6.0<br />
Total 175.4 164.0 152.9 188.5 215.3<br />
Percent of total<br />
Lithography 64% 69% 63% 63% 68%<br />
Substrate Bonder 12% 14% 16% 15% 14%<br />
Photo mask equipment 0% 14% 17% 19% 16%<br />
Other 0% 3% 4% 3% 3%<br />
Total 75% 100% 100% 100% 100%<br />
year-over-year % change<br />
Lithography 25% 2% -14% 22% 24%<br />
Substrate Bonder -17% 13% 5% 18% 3%<br />
Photo mask equipment 97% -37% 15% 36% -5%<br />
Other 1% -32% 12% 11% 0%<br />
Total 26% -6% -7% 23% 14%<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Lithography: SUSS mainly focuses on the mid-/back end of the semiconductor<br />
fabrication process, and so is affected by the semiconductor cycle with a three- to<br />
six-month delay compared to front-end-focused semiconductor equipment players<br />
like ASML, AMAT and KLA. The front-end players have seen an order recovery<br />
from Q1 2013; we therefore expect SUSS’s order intake to rebound from Q2.<br />
We expect total order intake to grow to €163m in 2013. Revenue is likely to<br />
decrease in 2013 due to the low order intake towards the end of 2012 and weak Q1<br />
revenue. We estimate that revenue will rebound in 2014 following the order<br />
recovery.<br />
Substrate bonder: After receiving the temporary bonder order from a leading<br />
IDM (Samsung, we think), management indicated that no further orders were<br />
expected from the same buyer or from its peers in the short term. We estimate that<br />
order intake and revenue levels will remain flat at the €20m-30m level for the time<br />
being, but will start to grow at high speed once other leading IDMs/foundries start<br />
to adopt 3D bonding as part of their chip-manufacturing process.<br />
Photomask equipment: We estimate photomask equipment revenue will remain<br />
flattish (€20m-40m) further data proves that EUV photomask requires more<br />
regular cleaning. As per ASML’s EUV roadmap, the first batch of EUV tools will<br />
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be dispatched from mid-2014, and we may have better visibility on the division’s<br />
revenue potential closer to that date.<br />
Revenue by region<br />
SUSS’s customers include large packaging companies, semiconductor IDMs, LED<br />
manufacturers and mask shops. The company generates the majority of its revenue<br />
from Taiwan, where many of the packaging companies are based. The share of<br />
revenue from Europe increased in 2012 due to the MEMS-related manufacturing<br />
equipment demand.<br />
Figure 7: Revenue breakdown by region<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
2010 2011 2012<br />
Europe North America Japan Rest of Asia<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Profit margin<br />
SUSS’s profitability depends on its product mix and factory utilisation. Among<br />
different product categories, lithography has the highest margin, followed by<br />
photomask equipment; substrate bonder is currently loss-making and management<br />
is not expecting it to be profitable in 2013.<br />
We estimate the gross margin will decrease from 35% to 30.3% in 2013 due to a<br />
lower revenue base, and a product mix shift towards substrate bonders, which are<br />
lower-margin. We expect the gross margin to improve in 2014 and 2015 due to an<br />
increased top line and improved factory utilisation.<br />
We estimate the company to reach breakeven at the operating margin level<br />
(excluding one-off write offs from the bonder segment) in 2013, and then gradually<br />
returning to 2011 profitability levels. The increasing level of profitability is believed<br />
to be driven by a higher gross margin, improved profitability of the substrate<br />
bonder segment, and a cost saving resulting from the corporate structure<br />
optimisation.<br />
84
Suess Microtec AG<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 8: Profit and loss<br />
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Revenues 175.4 163.8 152.9 188.5 215.3<br />
YOY 26.1% -6.6% -6.7% 23.3% 14.2%<br />
Cost of goods sold 109.1 106.4 107.0 119.6 131.8<br />
Gross profit 66.4 57.4 45.9 68.8 83.5<br />
% of revenues 37.8% 35.0% 30.0% 36.5% 38.8%<br />
Research & development 12.9 9.7 9.6 10.3 10.8<br />
% of revenues 7% 6% 6% 5% 5%<br />
SG&A 35.8 37.6 37.8 41.0 44.5<br />
% of revenues 20% 23% 25% 22% 21%<br />
Operating Income 18.6 11.7 -8.4 18.6 29.4<br />
% of revenues 10.6% 7.2% -5.5% 9.9% 13.7%<br />
Operating income (ADJ) 18.6 10.3 -1.6 18.6 29.4<br />
% of revenues 10.6% 6.3% -1.0% 9.9% 13.7%<br />
Lithography 25.5 23.7 11.3 19.2 28.1<br />
Substrate Bonder -11.1 -12.0 -11.6 -8.2 -5.4<br />
Photo mask equipment 5.3 1.1 2.8 4.4 4.2<br />
Operating Margin (Pro forma)<br />
Lithography 23% 21% 12% 16% 19%<br />
Substrate Bonder -54% -52% -48% -29% -18%<br />
Photo mask equipment 15% 5% 11% 12% 12%<br />
EPS - GAAP 0.77 0.49 -0.40 0.67 1.04<br />
EPS - Adj 0.77 0.41 -0.04 0.67 1.04<br />
Common shares (millions) 19 19 19 19 19<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Balance sheet and cash flow<br />
At end-Q1 2013, SUSS had net cash of €18m. We expect the net cash level will be<br />
€13m by end-2014 driven by earnings momentum. It had €85.7m in inventory on<br />
the balance sheet at end-Q1, and inventory days of 343. The inventories are mainly<br />
demo tools, and we expect the amount of demo tools it provides to potential<br />
customers to increase once 3D bonders become attractive.<br />
SUSS generated negative free cash flow in Q1 due to weak earnings and negative<br />
working capital movement. The longer cash conversion cycle resulted from the<br />
decrease in the revenue contribution from the lithography segment, which has a<br />
shorter lead time.<br />
We forecast SUSS to generate €17m free cash flow in 2015, and to benefit from the<br />
increase in profitability and in the top line.<br />
85
Suess Microtec AG<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Company background<br />
SUSS is a leading supplier of equipment and process solutions for the<br />
semiconductor and LED industry, with more than 60 years of engineering<br />
experience. It focuses primarily on the mid- and back-end of the semiconductor<br />
fabrication process, supplying equipment including mask aligners,<br />
coater/developers and UV tool sets (see Figure 9 below), which are used in wafer<br />
level packaging, advance packaging and MEMS manufacturing processes. It is also<br />
involved in the front-end semiconductor fabrication process, specifically in terms<br />
of supplying photomask cleaning tools. In 2012, SUSS acquired US-based<br />
Tamarack Scientific, and enhanced its product portfolio meaningfully with<br />
Tamarack’s laser processing and ultraviolet projection tools.<br />
Figure 9: SUSS product portfolio<br />
Lithography Substrate Bonder Photomask equipment<br />
Spin/Spray Coater/Developer Wafer bonder<br />
-ACS300 Gen2 -XBS300 -MaskTrack Pro<br />
-ACS200 Gen 3 -XBC300 Gen2 -Mask Track<br />
-ACS200 Plus -XBC300 -Asx series<br />
-Gamma -CBC200 -HMx series<br />
-Delta 12RC<br />
-ABC200<br />
-Delta Altaspray<br />
-CB200M<br />
-RCD 8<br />
-SB6/8e (semi auto)<br />
-Lab Spin 6 and Lab Spin 8 -SB6/8L<br />
-HP8<br />
-BA6/BA8<br />
Mask Aligner<br />
-BA8 Gen3<br />
-MA 300 Gen 2<br />
-CL 200/CL8<br />
-MA 200 Compact<br />
-MA150e<br />
-MA 100/150e/Gen2<br />
-MA/BA8 Gen3<br />
-MA/BA6 Gen2<br />
-MJB4<br />
Source: Company data<br />
End-markets<br />
SUSS’s customers include large packaging companies, semiconductor IDMs, LED<br />
manufacturers and mask shops. Its products are widely used in various endmarkets<br />
including advanced packaging, 3D integration, MEMS and mask<br />
manufacturing (see Figure 10).<br />
86
Suess Microtec AG<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 10: Products used in different end-markets<br />
Front end<br />
Back end<br />
Segment Photomask equipment Lithography<br />
Substrate Bonder<br />
Products used MaskTrack Pro Exposure system Mask Aligher Coater/developer Wafer bonders<br />
Process step Photomask cleaning Stepper, Scanner<br />
Mask Aligner<br />
(proximity exposure)<br />
coating/developing Bond Alignment<br />
(UV projection) Nano imprinting Permanent Bonding<br />
Temporary Bonding<br />
Mask manufacturing<br />
Advanced Packaging<br />
Markets<br />
3D Integration<br />
MEMS<br />
LED<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Mask manufacturing: Photomask equipment is used for cleaning and processing<br />
the photomasks used in the lithography process. SUSS currently holds an 80% share<br />
of the mask cleaning equipment market for ArFi lithography tools. The most<br />
advanced EUV lithography tools require the use of highly sensitive reflecting masks<br />
instead of optical transmission masks, and operators need to use advanced mask<br />
cleaning equipment: SUSS is currently the only provider of EUV mask cleaning<br />
tools.<br />
Advanced packaging (such as flip chip and wafer level packaging): With the<br />
growing spread of Ultrabooks, tablets and smartphones which demand thin, light<br />
designs, advanced packaging is preferred over traditional wire bonding for producing<br />
thin, light designs. Flip chips are used as a cost effective solution for forming<br />
electrical connections with small bump pitches instead of tradition wire. As a result,<br />
the completed chip is much smaller and thinner, and the short wires allow higher<br />
speed data processing. Wafer level packaging allows all steps of integrated circuit<br />
packaging to be performed at wafer level, and reduces the size of the packaging<br />
footprint so that no plastic housing and wires are needed.<br />
3D integration: New 3D integration technology is likely to be developed in parallel<br />
with shrinking as part of the constant requirement for smaller components, and is<br />
expected to drive smaller chip sizes once shrinkage has reached its physical limit. 3D<br />
stacking using through-silicon vias (TSV) is the one of the main 3D integration<br />
solutions being considered. By stacking the chips or wafers on top of each other<br />
instead of laying them out on a planar surface, 3D integration offers the advantages<br />
of shorter signal paths, reduced power consumption, enhanced bandwidths and a<br />
smaller surface area. Thinner wafers are usually required in 3D integration to reduce<br />
the thickness of chips.<br />
MEMS: MEMS are key components for automotive, industrial, medical, aerospace<br />
and consumer electronics. MEMS sensors are used in applications ranging from<br />
gaming, smartphone and medical testing to satellites. The manufacturing process for<br />
MEMS requires highly specialised equipment to create mechanical structures. SUSS<br />
has been supplying equipment to the MEMS industry ever since such products have<br />
been produced in volume.<br />
LED: SUSS solutions are used in three stages of the LED process: the structuring<br />
of substrates, the structuring of LED chips and chip packaging.<br />
87
Suess Microtec AG<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Acquisitions and divestments<br />
SUSS has completed three acquisitions in recent years to enhance its<br />
competitiveness (see Figure 11). In our opinion, all three deals are positive for<br />
SUSS, as they have all helped it optimise its end-market exposure and focus on its<br />
core target markets, including advanced packaging, 3D integration, MEMS and<br />
LED.<br />
Figure 11: SUSS’s M&A history<br />
Name Amount Description Synergy for Suess<br />
2012 Acquire<br />
Tamarack Scientific<br />
Co.,Inc<br />
$9.34mn<br />
Develops, manufactures and<br />
distribute UV projection<br />
lithography equipment<br />
- Same target end market, advanced packaging, 3D<br />
integration, MEMS and LED market,<br />
-enhance product portfolio, supplying a comprehensive<br />
range of equipment for mid/back end process<br />
2010 Dispose Test system $6.29mn<br />
Supply measurement and test<br />
systems for semiconductor<br />
industry<br />
-Test system market was too competitive for any<br />
suppliers to secure decent level of profit.<br />
-Reduced exposure to high saturated testing market,<br />
maintain profitability level<br />
2010 Acquire HamaTech APE $5.08mn<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong><br />
Leading photomask cleaning<br />
equipment supplier<br />
- helped SUSS to break into front end equipment<br />
industry,<br />
-set a strong fundamental for SUSS being the only<br />
EUV mask cleaning tool supplier today.<br />
Manufacturing plants<br />
SUSS used to operate four different production facilities:<br />
• Palo Alto (US) – photomask cleaning division (now sold);<br />
• Waterbury (US) – wafer bonders;<br />
• Garching (Germany) – mask aligners, coater/developers;<br />
• Vaihingen (Germany) – mask aligners, coater/developers.<br />
After it acquired HamaTech in February 2010, including its factory building at<br />
Sternenfels, SUSS decided to consolidate its main operation (everything bar<br />
ultraviolet projection and laser technology) in two locations. The transition was<br />
completed in 2011, and SUSS currently operates from the following facilities:<br />
• Garching (Germany) – mask aligners;<br />
• Sternenfels (Germany) – wafer bonders, coaters/developers, photomask<br />
equipment;<br />
• Corona (US) – ultraviolet projection and laser technology.<br />
In our view, this transition is positive for SUSS, as the integration of production<br />
facilities has enabled it to reduce costs and simplify its corporate structure.<br />
88
Suess Microtec AG<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 12: Holding structure as at end-2012<br />
Others,<br />
79%<br />
DWS Luxembourg, 3%<br />
Henderson, 3%<br />
Blackrock, 3%<br />
Credit Suisse, 3%<br />
DWS Frankfurt, 9%<br />
Source: Company data<br />
SUSS shareholder structure<br />
SUSS has approximately 19m outstanding ordinary shares, listed at XETRA. The<br />
free float percentage is 100%. The shareholder structure as at end-2012 is shown in<br />
Figure 12.<br />
Management<br />
CEO Frank Averdung<br />
Mr Averdung became CEO in February 2009. Prior to joining SUSS, he served as<br />
managing director of Carl Zeiss SMS GmbH, Jena, and general manager at AMAT<br />
in Munich.<br />
CFO Michael Knopp<br />
Mr Knopp became CFO in August 2007. Prior to joining SUSS, he was the<br />
commercial managing director of Kemmax GmbH located in Essen, as well as<br />
CFO of international operations of Canadian parent company Chemtrade<br />
Logistics.<br />
89
Suess Microtec AG<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Profit and loss account<br />
Year-end December (EUR m) 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Sales 175.4 163.8 152.9 188.5 215.3<br />
Cost of sales 109.1 106.4 107.0 119.6 131.8<br />
Gross profit 66.4 57.4 45.9 68.8 83.5<br />
Research and development 12.9 9.7 9.6 10.3 10.8<br />
Selling, General and Administrative expense 35.8 37.6 37.8 41.0 44.5<br />
Other operating income 1.0 -1.7 -6.8 1.1 1.2<br />
EBIT 18.6 11.7 -8.4 18.6 29.4<br />
Interest expenses -1.8 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2<br />
Extraordinary income/loss 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
EBT 20.4 12.9 -7.2 19.8 30.6<br />
Taxes 5.8 5.1 0.4 6.9 10.7<br />
Net income from continuing operations 14.6 7.8 -7.6 12.9 19.9<br />
Income from discontinued operations (net of tax) 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Net income 14.6 9.3 -7.6 12.9 19.9<br />
Minority interest 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Net income (net of minority interest) 14.6 7.8 -7.6 12.9 19.9<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
90
Suess Microtec AG<br />
Small/Mid-Cap: Technology Hardware<br />
Balance sheet<br />
Year-end December (EUR m) 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Intangible assets 22.2 22.9 22.3 22.3 22.3<br />
Property, plant and equipment 9.5 12.1 21.3 21.3 21.3<br />
Other assets 6.1 2.4 4.1 4.1 4.1<br />
Fixed Assets 37.7 37.3 47.7 47.7 47.7<br />
Liquid assets 56.4 36.6 15.9 18.3 31.8<br />
Accounts receivable 17.8 21.8 25.8 26.1 36.3<br />
Inventories 71.6 82.2 86.6 97.8 97.9<br />
Other current assets 4.2 2.6 4.3 4.3 4.3<br />
Current Assets 150.1 143.1 132.6 146.4 170.3<br />
TOTAL 187.7 180.4 180.4 194.2 218.0<br />
Shareholders' equity 120.4 127.2 127.4 141.5 162.6<br />
Minority interest 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Long-term debt 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0<br />
Other Non Current liabilities 6.2 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1<br />
Non-current liabilities 10.5 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0<br />
Accounts payable 7.6 6.9 8.7 8.4 11.2<br />
Short-term debt 10.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2<br />
Other liabilities 39.1 35.0 33.0 33.0 33.0<br />
Current liabilities 56.9 42.2 41.9 41.6 44.4<br />
TOTAL 187.7 180.4 180.4 194.2 218.0<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Cash flow statement<br />
EUR m 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Net profit/loss 13.8 9.1 -0.8 12.9 19.9<br />
Depreciation and Amortisation 6.4 6.8 4.6 4.6 4.6<br />
Change in working capital -12.2 -15.9 -12.0 -11.7 -7.6<br />
Other operating cash flows -1.8 -0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6<br />
Cash flow from operating activities 6.1 -0.6 -7.7 6.4 17.5<br />
Capex -3.4 -4.2 -13.1 -4.0 -4.0<br />
Other cash flow from investing activities -1.9 4.3 -9.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Cash flow from investing activities -5.3 0.1 -22.0 -4.0 -4.0<br />
Loan and receivable repayments -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Increase/decrease in debt position 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0<br />
Others -0.4 -11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Purchase of own shares 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Dividends paid 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Cash flow from financing activities -0.6 -11.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0<br />
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0<br />
Increase/decrease in liquid assets 0.5 -11.8 -29.6 2.4 13.5<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
91
Applied Materials Inc<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Recovery and growth priced in<br />
• We initiate coverage on Applied Materials (AMAT) with a Hold<br />
recommendation and a price target of $14.4. AMAT supplies<br />
equipment used in semiconductor, flat panel display (FPD) and solar<br />
cell manufacturing processes. Our Hold rating is based on the<br />
following. 1) AMAT only addresses 72% of the total wafer fab<br />
equipment (WFE) market (Gartner data), and would need to gain a<br />
3-6% market share from its current customer base to gain a further 2-<br />
4% total share by 2016, as targeted by management. We consider this<br />
to be a challenging target as the market is highly consolidated and<br />
AMAT’s competitors – LAM, TEL and KLA – are all trying to<br />
expand/maintain their market share. 2) We think that at the $16.5<br />
share price level, much of the good news such as cost savings and<br />
WFE market share gain opportunities is priced in.<br />
• Key debates: 1) Can AMAT achieve a 4% WFE share gain by 2016?<br />
2) Will AMAT be able to gain market share in the process control<br />
market from its competitor KLA? 3) Can management deliver the 5%<br />
opex cut as targeted by 2016?<br />
1. We expect AMAT to only gain a 1% share by 2016, as: a) its<br />
WFE market share has never reached 22% in the past 10 years;<br />
b) it would need to gain a 3-6% share from its current customer<br />
base to reach the target, as it only addresses 72% of the WFE<br />
market; c) its potential share gain from etching and process<br />
control only translates into a 1% total WFE share gain by 2016,<br />
according to our calculations.<br />
2. We think AMAT can gain up to a 5% market share in process<br />
control by 2016 from its competitor KLA, given the recent<br />
release of its new Applied SEMVision G6 product and the new<br />
president’s experience in the process control market.<br />
3. We believe the new president and CFO, both of whom had good<br />
track records at their respective previous posts at Varian Semi,<br />
will improve the likelihood of AMAT achieving is 5% opex cut<br />
target by 2016.<br />
• Our forecasts are in line with consensus.<br />
• We value AMAT on a P/E multiple basis: Our price target of<br />
$14.4 implies a P/E of 12x based on our 2014 EPS estimate of $1.2.<br />
The 12x P/E is the mid-point of the historical 10-14x multiple applied<br />
in the middle of the semiconductor recovery cycle.<br />
Hold (initiation)<br />
Rating system<br />
Current price<br />
USD 16.56<br />
Absolute<br />
Price target<br />
USD 14.40<br />
18/07/2013 New York Close<br />
Market cap USD 19,897 m<br />
Reuters AMAT.O<br />
Bloomberg AMAT US<br />
Share data<br />
Shares outstanding (m) 1,202<br />
Enterprise value (USD m) 18,595<br />
Daily trading volume 13,958,129<br />
Performance data<br />
High 52 weeks (USD) 17<br />
Low 52 weeks (USD) 10<br />
Relative performance to SXXP NASDAQ<br />
1 month 3.3 % 3.0 %<br />
3 months 21.5 % 15.7 %<br />
12 months 36.2 % 34.9 %<br />
Key data<br />
Price/book value 2.7<br />
Net gearing 0.0%<br />
CAGR sales 2012-2015 3.4%<br />
CAGR EPS 2012-2015 173.6%<br />
Business activities:<br />
AMAT supplies semiconductor<br />
fabrication equipment, flat panel display<br />
fabrication equipment and solar PV<br />
manufacturing systems.<br />
Y/E 31.10., USD m 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Sales 10,517 8,719 7,784 9,438 9,626<br />
EBIT 2,410 1,379 1,135 1,842 1,961<br />
Net profit 1,928 109 451 1,382 1,471<br />
Y/E net debt (net cash) -5,227 -1,046 -1,302 -2,268 -3,319<br />
EPS (GAAP) 1.45 0.06 0.38 1.17 1.25<br />
EPS (Proforma) 1.30 0.75 0.67 1.17 1.30<br />
CPS 4.51 1.14 1.63 2.47 3.40<br />
DPS 0.24 0.33 0.38 0.40 0.41<br />
Gross margin 41.8% 40.9% 42.1% 43.7% 43.4%<br />
EBIT margin 22.9% 15.8% 14.6% 19.5% 20.4%<br />
Dividend yield 1.4% 2.0% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5%<br />
ROCE 21.9% 1.5% 6.1% 17.1% 16.7%<br />
EV/sales 1.6 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.7<br />
EV/EBIT 6.9 14.5 16.4 9.4 8.1<br />
P/E 11.4 269.3 43.9 14.2 13.2<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong><br />
22 July 2013<br />
Tammy Qiu<br />
Analyst<br />
+44 20 3207 2673<br />
tammy.qiu@berenberg.com<br />
Jean Beaubois<br />
Specialist Sales<br />
+44 20 3207 7835<br />
jean.beaubois@berenberg.com<br />
92
Applied Materials Inc<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Investment summary<br />
Our investment thesis on Hold-rated AMAT is based on the following five points.<br />
1. We remain cautious about the likelihood of a 2-4% WFE share gain: We<br />
believe AMAT will gain a 1% share of the WFE market, rather than a 2-4%<br />
share, for the following reasons.<br />
From 2004 to 2012, AMAT’s share in WFE was between 15-20% (Gartner<br />
data), and it never gained more than 1.1% share within any three-year<br />
timeframe within that period.<br />
AMAT only addresses 72% of the WFE market (Gartner data), so to gain a<br />
further 2-4% share of the total market, it would need to gain by 3-6% from its<br />
current customer base. We consider this to be a challenging target as the<br />
market is highly consolidated and AMAT’s competitors are all also trying to<br />
expand/maintain market share. For example, LAM is aiming to gain a 3-5%<br />
etching share and a 4-8% deposition share, KLA expects its dollar amount<br />
market share to maintain, and TEL is aiming to expand its etching market<br />
share from 29% to 35% by 2015.<br />
In etching, we expect AMAT to gain a less than 1% market share through<br />
silicon etching expansion – which is less than a 1% WFE share. There are<br />
several reasons for the limited share gain: 1) all the main chip-makers are<br />
already penetrated by one/several equipment vendors; 2) AMAT benefits less<br />
from the 3D NAND-driven etching opportunity than LAM due to its lower<br />
memory exposure; 3) the etching market is becoming more competitive, with<br />
LAM aiming for a 3-5% share gain by 2016, and TEL is looking for a 6% gain<br />
by 2015.<br />
In process control, we expect AMAT to gain a maximum 5% of market<br />
share to reach its peak market share of 20% (which equates to a 1% WFE<br />
share) by 2016, as: 1) new president Gary Dickerson can leverage his 18 years’<br />
experience at KLA to increase AMAT’s penetration; 2) it has a strong 60%<br />
position in the defect review market (however, this only amounts to a 6%<br />
share of the total process control market, hence it will be insufficient to drive<br />
a bigger market share gain); 3) AMAT is less experienced in process control<br />
compared with KLA and indeed lost a 7% defect review share to KLA in<br />
2012 as KLA’s new tool is considered to be of superior quality.<br />
We do not think AMAT will gain etching and process control market<br />
share through acquisition: In our view, AMAT is only interested in chasing<br />
the market leaders, given its Varian acquisition. LAM and TEL hold the<br />
biggest etching market shares (47% and 29% respectively), and KLA holds the<br />
biggest process control market share, but we do not think AMAT is in a<br />
position to acquire LAM or KLA: LAM’s and KLA’s market caps are $8bn<br />
and $10bn respectively, which translate to 67% and 83% respectively of<br />
AMAT’s total balance sheet of $12bn. Having taken up ~$2bn debt to acquire<br />
Varian in 2011, we do not expect it to further stretch its balance sheet. We<br />
also think it unlikely that AMAT will buy TEL, as TEL is mainly exposed to<br />
the declining dielectric market.<br />
2. WFE spending to reach $37bn by 2016: We expect AMAT’s semiconductor<br />
revenue to reach $6.7bn excluding any market share gain ($7bn including<br />
expected share gain) in 2016, thus exceeding the 2007 peak level of $6.5bn,<br />
driven by the strong WFE spending environment. AMAT is most closely<br />
linked to WFE spending among the front-end equipment vendors, due to its<br />
more diversified product portfolio and balanced revenue exposure to<br />
growth/declining markets compared to peers.<br />
93
Applied Materials Inc<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
In our opinion, WFE spending could reach the $37bn mark in 2016, which<br />
was the peak level attained in 2011 and 2007. The strong WFE spending is<br />
expected to be driven by new technology such as FinFET, 20nm, 3D NAND<br />
and 450mm migration. AMAT, TEL, LAM and the SEMI trade association<br />
have all estimated that WFE spending will rise to $37bn-40bn in 2016/17.<br />
3. Our bull-case $1.7 peak EPS is 20% lower than AMAT’s 2016 bull-case<br />
of $2.15: AMAT laid out its 2016 bull-case EPS of $2.15 during the Semicon<br />
2013 event, citing 1) $37bn in WFE spending, 2) a 4% WFE market share gain<br />
from 2012 (up from 18% to 22% WFE market), 3) $1bn in Display revenue<br />
(equating to a 5% market share gain, and 3) cost-cutting in the material costs<br />
area and lower opex/revenue from 25% of revenue today to 20%, 4) a tax rate<br />
decrease of 2-3% to 22%. The $2.15 EPS suggests a fair value of $20.8 by end-<br />
2014 using our 12x P/E.<br />
AMAT laid out similar revenue/share gain targets in 2010, 2011 and 2012, but<br />
did not achieve all of them. We believe it is different this time, as the new<br />
president and CFO both had strong execution records when they were with<br />
Varian Semi. The new management team may be able to nudge AMAT into a<br />
better position to achieve these targets, especially the cost saving target.<br />
Our 2016 bull-case EPS estimate of $1.7 is 20% lower than AMAT’s bull-case<br />
of $2.15. The delta is down to our belief that AMAT will gain a 1% WFE<br />
market share rather than a 4% gain, and a lower gross margin (200bp) as a<br />
result of a drop in revenue.<br />
4. Solar/Display will remain a profit drag: Solar and Display revenue<br />
accounted for 10% of group revenue in 2012, resulting in a combined loss. In<br />
our opinion, the Display segment may return $1bn in revenue by 2016 (9% of<br />
AMAT’s total revenue), which is the level of revenue attained in 2008 and<br />
2010. However, it may remain margin-dilutive for the company as a whole as<br />
its margin has always been lower than its Silicon Systems Group (SSG)<br />
segment except in 2009, and TV-makers may exert pricing pressure on AMAT<br />
as they struggle to make a profit. We believe the solar segment will continue<br />
to make a loss for the next three years. AMAT’s cost-cutting initiative could in<br />
our view narrow the operating loss from $184m to $100m in 2013, but<br />
breakeven is unlikely.<br />
5. Valuation: Our price target of $14.4 implies a P/E of 12x based on 2014<br />
EPS estimates of $1.2. The 12x multiple was in the middle of range of the<br />
historical 10-14x mid-recovery cycle P/E.<br />
AMAT’s RoE is lower than ASML’s as its operating margin is lower. It has<br />
the highest FCF yield and dividend yield among the companies in our<br />
coverage universe.<br />
Figure 1: Valuation matrix<br />
ROE*<br />
Dividend<br />
yield*<br />
FCF yield* Net cash/marcap<br />
No.1 ASML 19.7% AMAT 2.5% AMAT 9.7% TEL 26.5%<br />
No.2 AMAT 17.1% TEL 1.5% ASMI 6.2% SUSS 17.6%<br />
No.3 SUSS 9.1% ASML 0.9% ASML 4.5% AMAT 16.7%<br />
No.4 TEL 6.3% ASMI - TEL 4.3% ASMI 8.9%<br />
No.5 ASMI 6.2% SUSS - SUSS 1.6% ASML 6.5%<br />
*base on <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimation of 2014 performance<br />
Net cash base on 2012 YE balance<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimate, company data<br />
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Key catalysts<br />
Key catalysts include the following:<br />
1) an increase in orders driven by the semiconductor recovery cycle – in<br />
our opinion, we are likely to see positive order intake in H2 2013 and 2014,<br />
driven by a strong logic/foundry and memory recovery;<br />
2) a process control share gain – in our opinion, with AMAT’s new product<br />
cycle (Applied SEMVision G6) in process control, combined with its new<br />
management’s experience in this market, we think it can gain 5% market share<br />
in this segment;<br />
3) a memory exposure gain – AMAT’s exposure to the memory market is<br />
lower than LAM’s, hence it is likely to benefit less from 3D NAND market<br />
expansion than LAM. We believe the share price will react positively if<br />
AMAT gains more memory share.<br />
Key risks<br />
Key risks include the following:<br />
1) a capex cut from Samsung, Intel and TSMC – in our opinion, however,<br />
these companies are unlikely to cut capex any time soon, as they need to be<br />
up to speed with the most advanced manufacturing technologies to maintain<br />
their competitive advantage;<br />
2) the sluggish solar energy segment will remain a drag on profit – we<br />
believe the Energy and Environment Solutions (EES) solar division will<br />
remain loss-making over the next three years. The cost-saving programme will<br />
only narrow the 2013 operating loss to $137m from the $184m loss in 2012.<br />
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Recovery and growth already priced in<br />
In our bull-case scenario, we believe AMAT’s SSG revenue will grow at c6.2%<br />
from now to 2016, and exceed the 2007 revenue peak by 2016, driven by 1) the<br />
strong WFE spending environment (WFE spending is likely to grow from $30bn<br />
today to $37bn in 2016 and $40bn in 2017), and 2) a 1% WFE share gain mainly<br />
due to a 5% process control potential share gain. Our bull cash 2016 non-GAAP<br />
EPS will reach $1.7, which has a CAGR of 23% pa from 2012 to 2016, driven by<br />
an opex cut from 25% of revenue in 2012 to 20% by 2016. However, the $1.7<br />
bull-case EPS is 20% lower than AMAT’s bull-case scenario $2.15.<br />
Figure 2: 2016 bull-case EPS of $2.15<br />
2016 AMAT bull case <strong>Berenberg</strong> Bull case Difference<br />
WFE $bn 37.0 37.0 -<br />
Market share 21.9% 19.0% -3%<br />
Revenue 12.4 11.3 -9%<br />
SSG 8.1 7.0 -13.6%<br />
AGS 2.6 2.6 -<br />
Non semi 1.7 1.7 -<br />
GM 46.0% 44.0% -2.0%<br />
Opex 2.5 2.3 -8.0%<br />
Opex% 20.0% 20.0% 0.0%<br />
OP% 26.0% 24.0% -2.0%<br />
EPS 2.15 1.7 -20.9%<br />
Share no mn 1,140 1,140 -<br />
Source: Company data<br />
AMAT’s 2016 bull-case EPS $2.15 is driven by 1) $37bn in WFE spending, 2) a<br />
4% WFE market share gain from 2012 (up from 18% to 22% of the WFE market),<br />
3) $1bn in Display revenue (equating to a 5% market share gain, and 3) costcutting<br />
in the material costs area and lower opex/revenue from 25% of revenue<br />
today to 20%, 4) a tax rate decrease of 2-3% to 22%. The $2.15 EPS suggests a fair<br />
value of $20.8 by end-2014 using our 12x P/E and discounted using 11.4%<br />
WACC.<br />
AMAT laid out similar market share expansion/revenue targets previously, but did<br />
not achieve all of them. In 2012, it aimed to gain market share in the etching and<br />
inspection markets. As per Gartner data, its market share in etching was down 2%<br />
from 2011 to 2012. In 2010, it aimed to gain 4% share in etching and 3% share in<br />
inspection. As per Gartner data, its etching market share increased only 2% from<br />
2009 to 2010, and its wafer inspection market share was only up 1%. In our<br />
opinion, the new president and CFO, both of whom had good executing track<br />
records, may put AMAT in a better position to achieve targets: however, we think<br />
a 2-4% gain is a stretch.<br />
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We remain cautious about the likelihood of a 2-4% share gain<br />
AMAT is aiming to gain a 2-4% WFE market share by 2016, specifically in etching<br />
and process control. As per Figure 3, the 2-4% share gain is an important element<br />
of AMAT’s bull-case 2016 projection, and accounts for 28% of peak $2.15 EPS.<br />
Compared to a flat market share, the extra 2% and 4% share gain would contribute<br />
a 7% and 10% EPS CAGR respectively.<br />
Figure 3: 4% share gain contributes 27% $2.15 EPS<br />
AMAT projection<br />
<strong>Berenberg</strong><br />
2012 0%<br />
2%<br />
vs<br />
4%<br />
vs<br />
1%<br />
vs<br />
2016<br />
share gain share gain 0% share gain share gain 0% share gain share gain 4% share gain<br />
Share gain 0% 2% 4% 1% -3%<br />
% of WFE 18% 18% 20% 22% 19% -3%<br />
WFE $bn 29.7 37 37 37 37<br />
SSG revenue $bn 5.5 6.7 7.4 11% 8.1 22% 7.0 -13%<br />
Other $bn 3.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3<br />
8.7 11.0 11.7 7% 12.4 13% 11.33 -9%<br />
GM % 40.9% 45% 46% 1% 46% 1% 44% -2%<br />
Opex % 25.0% 20% 20% 0% 20% 0% 20% 20%<br />
Opex $bn 2.2 2.2 2.3 7% 2.5 13% 2.3 -9%<br />
Op% 15.9% 25% 26% 1% 26% 1% 24% -2%<br />
Op profit $bn 1.4 2.7 3.0 11% 3.2 18% 2.7 -16%<br />
tax rate % 26% 22% 22% 0% 22% 0% 22% 0%<br />
EPS $ 0.75 1.55 1.95 26.1% 2.15 39% 1.70 -20.9%<br />
EPS CAGRvs 2012 20% 27% 30% 23%<br />
No. shares mn 1,275 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
In our opinion, AMAT will gain a 1% WFE share by 2016/2017, but it would be<br />
challenging to gain a 2-4% share as:<br />
1) from 2004 to 2012, AMAT’s share in WFE was between 15-20% (Gartner<br />
data), and it has never before gained more than a 1.1% share within any threeyear<br />
timeframe;<br />
2) AMAT only addresses 72% of the WFE market (Gartner data), so to gain a<br />
further 2-4% share of the total market, it would need to gain by 3-6% from its<br />
current customer base. We consider this to be a challenging target as the<br />
market is highly consolidated and AMAT’s competitors are all also trying to<br />
expand/maintain market share;<br />
3) it may gain 1% share in etching market as silicon etching market expansion,<br />
which is less than 1% WFE share;<br />
4) it may gain a maximum 5% market share in process control, which is a 1%<br />
WFE share, as the process control market is 16% of WFE spending at peak;<br />
5) we do not think AMAT will gain a 4% market share through acquisition in the<br />
etching or process control markets.<br />
Etching – we expect AMAT to gain a 1% share<br />
The etching market is dominated by LAM, which has a 47% market share.<br />
According to Gartner’s forecast, the etching market will remain about flat between<br />
2012 and 2016: although silicon and metal etching will grow, dielectric etching is a<br />
segment in decline.<br />
By our calculations (see Figure 4), AMAT can achieve a 1% etching market share<br />
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gain through silicon etching expansion – although if it wants a greater share, it will<br />
have to gain it from competitors. This will be difficult as: 1) each of the major<br />
equipment vendors already has an established relationship with one/all of the main<br />
chip-makers; 2) the etching market is expected to be driven by 3D NAND, which<br />
is an area in which AMAT may benefit less than LAM as it has lower memory<br />
exposure. AMAT estimated its NAND sales addressable market (SAM) would<br />
expand by 25% to 35%, versus LAM’s expectation of 35-55%; 3) the growing<br />
complexity of the technology is making it more difficult for companies to compete<br />
through product innovation; and 4) the market has always been competitive. In the<br />
etching market, LAM has recently indicated that it is aiming to gain a 3-5% market<br />
share by 2015/2016. TEL is aiming to increase its etching share from 29% to 35%<br />
by 2015. As a result, we believe AMAT will only gain an extra 1% share, which is<br />
less than 1% WFE share gain (LAM estimates that the etching market is 12-14% of<br />
total WFE).<br />
Figure 4: AMAT may gain a 1% etching share as the<br />
market shifts<br />
$mn 2,012 2016E Share Change<br />
Etching market 4,060 4,291<br />
LAM 42% 45% 3%<br />
AMAT 9% 10% 1%<br />
TEL 35% 32% -3%<br />
hitachi 8% 9% 1%<br />
of which Silicon etching 1920 2326 up c 5%<br />
LAM 1,132 1,371<br />
Hitachi 303 367<br />
AMAT 264 320<br />
TEL 174 210<br />
of which Dielectric etching 1,968 1,855 down c1%<br />
TEL 1,234 1,163<br />
LAM 511 482<br />
AMAT 101 95<br />
of which Metal etching 98 110 up c3%<br />
LAM 76 85<br />
AMAT 14 15<br />
Hitachi 8 9<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Process control – we expect AMAT to gain maximum 5% share<br />
AMAT has been trying to gain a process control market share from KLA since<br />
2008/2009 but with limited success. In May 2013, it noted an inspection share<br />
gain at both the foundry and logic level, which partly explains KLA’s weak result<br />
last quarter. KLA guided 8% below consensus, and its wafer inspection booking<br />
for Q1 2013 was 20% lower than the peak booking quarter.<br />
In our opinion, AMAT may further gain some share in the process control market,<br />
given that the new president Gary Dickerson is experienced in process control<br />
market (18 years at KLA) and has a good execution track record. However, we<br />
believe AMAT will only achieve a maximum market share of 15%, which was its<br />
peak level between 2009 to 2012, and will only gain a 5% process control market<br />
share (1% of WFE), because:<br />
1) it is a strong player in the defect review market (with a 60% share) – however,<br />
the defect review market only amounts to 6% of the total process control<br />
market, hence it will not in itself be sufficient to drive significant growth;<br />
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2) AMAT lags KLA in terms of technology and experience – it lost 7% of defect<br />
review market share to KLA in 2012 (see Figure 5) as KLA’s new tool allows<br />
it to identify and analyse 15nm defects which cannot be found by AMAT’s<br />
tool;<br />
3) KLA is well established with the main capex spenders such as Intel, TSMC,<br />
Samsung, Globalfoundries, SK Hynix, Micro/Elpida and Toshiba/Sandisk –<br />
AMAT’s relationship with these companies does not give it a competitive<br />
advantage over KLA.<br />
Figure 5: AMAT’s process control share fell by 2% in 2012<br />
2012<br />
2012 REV 2012 mkt share % 2011 mkt share %<br />
Market size AMAT KLA AMAT KLA AMAT KLA<br />
CD-SEM 533 52 0 9.7% 0.0% 14.0% 0.0%<br />
Mask Inspection/Review 489 66 332 13.5% 67.8% 21.6% 65.3%<br />
Optical Patterned Wafer Inspec 1,393 194 1,159 13.9% 83.2% 12.2% 84.5%<br />
SEM Defect Review and Classif 234 156 54 66.6% 23.0% 73.4% 10.9%<br />
Other Defect Review and Classi 6 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%<br />
AMAT&KLA common mkt 2,656 467 1,545 17.6% 58.2% 20.1% 59.2%<br />
Other markets 1,760 842 47.8% 47.8%<br />
Total Process Control 4,416 467 2,387 10.6% 54.1% 12.1% 54.7%<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
We do not believe AMAT will gain share through M&A<br />
Historically, AMAT used to gain market share through acquisition – ie it acquired<br />
Varian in 2011 to obtain ion implant market exposure (Varian had a 75% share of<br />
Ion implant market). However, we do not think AMAT will expand through<br />
acquisition in the etching and process control segments:<br />
1) judging by its Varian acquisition, we believe AMAT is only interested in<br />
market leaders, therefore it may only be interested in LAM, KLA and TEL in<br />
etching and process control markets (see Figures 6 and 7 below);<br />
2) we do not think AMAT will acquire LAM or KLA as we do not expect it will<br />
want to further stretch its balance sheet;<br />
3) we do not think AMAT will buy TEL as the latter is mainly exposed to<br />
declining dielectric market.<br />
Figure 6: The etching market is already largely consolidated<br />
100.00%<br />
90.00%<br />
80.00%<br />
70.00%<br />
60.00%<br />
50.00%<br />
40.00%<br />
30.00%<br />
20.00%<br />
10.00%<br />
0.00%<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
2012 2011 2010<br />
LAM Hitachi AMAT TEL Mattson Others<br />
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Figure 7: 21% of the process control market is shared by more than 20<br />
players<br />
100%<br />
80%<br />
60%<br />
40%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
2012 2011 2010<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
KLA Hitachi AMAT Nanometrics Hermes Microvision<br />
Carl Zeiss Rudolph Lasertec Nova Toray<br />
Nikon SII Nano Rave Semilab Omron<br />
JEOL Synopsys SEMES Dainippon Advantest<br />
Others<br />
2007 peak revenue will be exceeded in 2016, driven by strong WFE<br />
spending<br />
AMAT’s semiconductor revenue is more closely linked to the WFE spending cycle<br />
compared with other front-end semi equipment vendors (see Figure 8). We believe<br />
this is due to its more diversified product portfolio compared with peers and<br />
balanced revenue exposure to legacy and growing markets (see Figures 9 and 10).<br />
Figure 8: <strong>Semiconductor</strong> revenue is closely linked to WFE spending<br />
200.0%<br />
150.0%<br />
100.0%<br />
50.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
-50.0%<br />
-100.0%<br />
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
ASML ASMI - front end AMAT TEL KLA LAM WFE<br />
Source: Gartner data, Company data<br />
Figure 9: AMAT has the most diversified product portfolio<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong> AMAT LAM ASMI ASML TEL KLA<br />
Lithography<br />
Y<br />
Photoresist Processing (Track)<br />
Y<br />
Deposition Y Y Y Y<br />
Etch, Clean, and Planarization Y Y Y<br />
RTP and Oxidation/Diffusion Y Y Y<br />
Ion Implanter<br />
Y<br />
Process Control Y Y<br />
Manufacturing Automation and Control Y<br />
Wafer-Level Packaging Y Y Y Y<br />
Die-Level Manufacturing <strong>Equipment</strong> Y Y<br />
Test <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Source: Company data, Gartner data<br />
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Figure 10: AMAT has the most balanced market exposure<br />
Growth markets exposure 2012 Legacy markets exposure 2012<br />
ASML 100% 0%<br />
ASMI 91% 9%<br />
AMAT 61% 39%<br />
LAM 74% 26%<br />
KLA 100% 0%<br />
TEL 23% 77%<br />
Source: Gartner Data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
AMAT’s 2016 financial projection assumes WFE spend of $30bn-37bn: the highend<br />
$37bn assumption gives AMAT 30% EPS upside compared with the $30bn<br />
assumption.<br />
Figure 11: WFE spend in 2016 to be $30bn-37bn<br />
AMAT 2016 financial scenarios<br />
bull case<br />
WFE $bn 30.0 33.5 37.0 37.0<br />
Market share 19.9% 19.9% 19.9% 21.9%<br />
Revenue 9.9 10.8 11.7 12.4<br />
SSG 6.0 6.7 7.4 8.1<br />
AGS 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6<br />
Non semi 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7<br />
GM 44.0% 45.0% 46.0% 46.0%<br />
Opex 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5<br />
Opex% 21.0% 21.0% 20.0% 20.0%<br />
OP% 23.0% 24.0% 25.0% 26.0%<br />
EPS 1.5 1.7 1.95 2.15<br />
Share no mn 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140<br />
Source: Company data<br />
We believe WFE spend can reach $37bn in 2016, which was the peak level seen<br />
in 2011 and 2007. The strong WFE spend is likely to be driven by new technology<br />
such as FinFET, 20nm, 3D NAND and 450mm migration, which is more<br />
complex and capital-intensive than the technology in 2011 and 2007. All recent<br />
WFE spending projections from the industry point to the same conclusion (see<br />
Figure 12).<br />
Figure 12: WFE could reach $40bn by 2017<br />
$bn 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E<br />
AMAT 30 -10%~flat yoy up 32~35 37<br />
TEL 30 30 40<br />
LAM 30 28~32<br />
35~40<br />
Gartner 30 27 32 37 36 39<br />
SEMI 30 29 36<br />
<strong>Berenberg</strong> 30 30 33 35 37 40<br />
Source: Gartner data, company data, the SEMI trade organisation, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
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AMAT is very likely to benefit from the strong spending environment. In our<br />
view, if WFE steadily grows to $40bn in 2017, and assuming AMAT remains its<br />
18% share in WFE (15-20% historically), SSG revenue will grow at c5.4% per year<br />
from 2012 to 2017, and exceed its 2007 peak level of $6.5bn in 2016 ($6.7bn)<br />
without any market share gain.<br />
Figure 13: SSG exceeds 2007 peak in 2016 due to strong WFE spend<br />
$mn<br />
% of WFE<br />
45,000<br />
40,000<br />
35,000<br />
30,000<br />
25,000<br />
20,000<br />
15,000<br />
10,000<br />
5,000<br />
0<br />
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E<br />
AMAT SSG WFE AMAT SSG/WFE<br />
Source: Company data, Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
25.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
15.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
5.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
Operating leverage<br />
At Semicon 2013, AMAT’s management announced its target to decrease opex<br />
from 25% of revenue to 20% of revenue by 2016. The cost-cutting is likely to<br />
come from SG&A by lowering total SG&A from $1bn in 2012 to $840m by 2016<br />
(a 17% reduction). AMAT’s level of innovation will not be impaired by this in our<br />
opinion, as the R&D level is projected to reach 63% of opex from 56% in 2012<br />
(17% higher than the 2012 level in dollar terms).<br />
We see that AMAT is already taking initial steps to reduce its costs: for example, it<br />
will carry out a week-long factory shut down in Q3. Judging by the new president’s<br />
and CFO’s strong execution record in Varian Semi, we believe the cost-cutting<br />
projects will be successful.<br />
Solar and Display remain as profit drag<br />
Display accounted for 5% revenue in 2012, with a 7% operating margin compared<br />
to a 23% corporate average. The segment has recently shown signs of recovery.<br />
Orders increased by 41% qoq in Q2, and returned to the 2011 level. Management<br />
is expecting the strong momentum to continue, with $800m of orders expected in<br />
FY 2013, to reach $1bn in revenue by 2016 (c21%). In our opinion, the display<br />
segment may return to the $1bn revenue level by 2016, and we saw a similar<br />
revenue level back in 2008 and 2010. However, the margin is likely to be dilutive<br />
for the group as 1) the Display division’s operating margin has only once been<br />
higher than SSG’s, in 2009, when SSG’s margin was 8% and was significantly<br />
affected by the financial crisis, and 2) the main TV vendors such as Samsung, TCL<br />
Corp, Sony and Panasonic are either making very lean margins or are loss-making<br />
today, and may therefore place pricing pressure on AMAT.<br />
The EES division (5% group revenue and always loss-making except in 2011) is<br />
likely to remain loss-making in the next few years. Its order level was down by 43%<br />
qoq in Q2, with revenue also down qoq, by 17%. AMAT managed to narrow the<br />
operating loss from 96% to 89% by cutting costs, and is expecting a further $5m<br />
per quarter in cost cuts by the end of 2013. In our opinion, cost-cutting could help<br />
to narrow losses from $184m to $100m in 2013, but breakeven is unlikely in the<br />
next three years.<br />
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Key catalysts<br />
In our view, the following factors will be the main share price catalysts.<br />
1. <strong>Semiconductor</strong> recovery cycle, higher order intake: As with its peers,<br />
AMAT’s share price is closely correlated to the semiconductor cycle, as<br />
measured by equipment order intake and capex levels. Any sign that the<br />
industry is moving towards the peak cycle will benefit AMAT’s share price.<br />
In our opinion, the industry entered a steady recovery phase in Q1 2013.<br />
ASML, AMAT, KLA, ASMI and TEL have all reported better order intake<br />
levels than in 2012. We expect the positive order intake trend to continue in<br />
H2 2013 and 2014, driven by strong logic/foundry orders and memory<br />
recovery. We believe AMAT’s share price will benefit as a result.<br />
2. Market share gain: Revenue growth for semiconductor equipment<br />
companies is driven by SAM expansion and market share gain. AMAT has<br />
stated in Q2 it had gained market share in the process control market.<br />
Investors were encouraged by its comments regarding process control share<br />
gain.<br />
We do not believe there will be significant sustainable organic market share<br />
gain in this industry. In each of the fabrication process, we now have one well<br />
established dominant player followed by many small players. Any small player<br />
that wants to gain significant market share needs to have better products than<br />
the market leader, and its customers would need to recognise this. However,<br />
given AMAT’s new process control product (Applied SEMVision G6) and its<br />
new president had 18 experience in the market, we expect AMAT to announce<br />
more share gains in coming quarters.<br />
3. Memory customer gain: AMAT’s recent comment about the potential<br />
upside from memory markets does not sound as encouraging as similar<br />
comments made by LAM and KLA. We agree with management that 2014<br />
capex will be driven by NAND and foundry.<br />
In our opinion, if AMAT announce any share gain in memory in the coming<br />
quarters, its revenue upside in 2015 will be bigger than it is today as it would<br />
benefit from 3D NAND-related capex growth. As a result, its revenue and<br />
share price would react positively as a result.<br />
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Valuation<br />
Our valuation is based on a P/E multiple. Our price target of $14.40 implies a P/E<br />
of 12x based on 2014 EPS estimates of $1.20.<br />
Historically, AMAT has traded between 8x and 24x P/E during the semiconductor<br />
industry recovery cycle (from end-2009 to 2011 – see Figure 14). We believe we<br />
entered the recovery cycle at the start of 2013, when an increase in order levels was<br />
reported by front-end players such as ASML, AMAT, TEL and KLA. AMAT was<br />
trading at 10-14x between June and September 2010, which was six months after it<br />
entered the recovery cycle. Our P/E of 12x is in the middle of range of the<br />
historical 10-14x mid-recovery cycle P/E, and it is in line with its peer group<br />
median multiple based on 2014 earnings.<br />
Figure 14: 8-14x P/E in the middle of the semiconductor recovery cycle<br />
S Bl b d<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
Figure 15: Peer group valuation<br />
Company Name PE EV/EBIT EV/Sales<br />
FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E<br />
NIKON CORP 14.12 13.42 12.25 9.83 8.28 8.53 0.82 0.80 0.87<br />
ASM INTL NV 27.03 14.02 13.19 50.89 10.49 13.21 3.13 1.91 1.52<br />
ASML HOLDING NV 25.04 15.67 12.17 21.81 10.74 2.10 4.80 3.73 0.67<br />
KLA-TENCOR CORP 16.94 13.21 11.26 9.43 7.59 2.97 2.46 2.21 0.95<br />
LAM RESEARCH 20.99 11.64 10.15 14.73 8.28 2.90 1.74 1.44 0.58<br />
ULVAC INC na 10.21 7.36 25.28 12.27 15.08 0.82 0.75 1.04<br />
DAINIPPON SCREEN 28.32 14.13 14.41 67.36 11.63 13.66 0.76 0.70 0.81<br />
TOKYO ELECTRON 48.60 20.98 18.74 25.57 9.75 5.61 1.16 1.02 0.72<br />
Mean 22.63 14.16 12.44 28.12 9.88 8.01 1.96 1.57 0.89<br />
Median 23.01 13.72 12.21 23.55 10.12 7.07 1.45 1.23 0.84<br />
APPLIED MATERIAL 23.30 13.18 11.92 17.43 10.77 4.87 2.35 1.92 0.91<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
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The share price has increased by 60% since November 2012, mainly due to the<br />
improved semiconductor equipment order intake levels reported, comforting<br />
statements on share gains and SAM expansion potential. Following the rally, the<br />
P/E multiple stands at a higher level compared to the previous recovery cycle<br />
multiple in 2011, without any significant EPS downwards revision. We believe this<br />
multiple expansion is driven by momentum rather than strengthened<br />
fundamentals.<br />
Figure 16: forward P/E is higher than previous recovery cycle<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
Figure 17: No EPS major revision<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
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Key risks<br />
The key risks to our investment case are as follows.<br />
1. Capex cuts at Samsung, Intel and TSMC: AMAT generated 45% of its<br />
revenue from Samsung, Intel and TSMC in 2012. Any capex cut or investment<br />
delay from these three companies would thus have a significant impact on<br />
AMAT due to the high level of customer/capex spender concentration.<br />
In our opinion, Samsung, Intel and TSMC are not likely to reduce their capex<br />
spending at any time soon. All of them are heavily exposed to the consumer<br />
electronics market, which is highly competitive, and they have to keep up to<br />
speed with the most advanced manufacturing technologies to maintain their<br />
competitive advantage.<br />
2. Sluggish solar energy market: The solar energy market as a whole has<br />
suffered from oversupply in recent years. AMAT’s solar segment (EES) made<br />
an adjusted operating loss of $46m in 2012 before impairment charges. Orders<br />
were down by 88% yoy in 2012, and down by 43% qoq in Q2 2013. This<br />
continuing underperformance will have a negative impact on total corporate<br />
earnings.<br />
In our opinion, the solar market will continue to underperform over the next<br />
two years, until the oversupply issue is resolved. AMAT’s cost saving<br />
programme may only be able to narrow the operating loss down to $137m in<br />
2013 as per our estimate.<br />
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Financials<br />
AMAT’s revenue includes revenue from selling equipment used in semiconductors<br />
for manufacturing, FPD fabrication and solar PV panel manufacturing processes. It<br />
reports revenue under four segments: SSG, Applied Global Services (AGS),<br />
Display and EES.<br />
Order trend down for the remainder of 2013<br />
SSG order intake has increased by 14% qoq (see Figure 18 below), which trended<br />
to the same direction as its front-end semiconductor equipment peers.<br />
Management guided that the full-year wafer fab equipment market would be<br />
flat/down 10%, hence we expect the order intake to be down in Q3 and Q4, as the<br />
ytd order is already higher than 55% of 2012 total order. In addition, a week-long<br />
factory shutdown is due to take place in Q3, which we believe is an indication that<br />
management may have already noted some early sign of slowing down. As a result,<br />
we expect SSG orders to slow down in Q3 and Q4.<br />
Figure 18: Order trend in 2013<br />
Jan Q1 Apr Q2 Jul Q3 Oct Q4 2012 Jan Q1 Apr Q2 Jul Q3E Oct Q4E 2013E<br />
(Dollars in millions)<br />
SSG 1,418 1,969 1,166 741 5,294 1,363 1,551 1,365 1,338 5,616<br />
AGS 517 650 531 576 2,274 544 481 481 481 1,987<br />
Display 40 84 67 83 274 138 195 218 245 796<br />
EES 33 62 35 65 195 68 39 39 40 186<br />
Total 2,008 2,765 1,799 1,465 8,037 2,113 2,266 2,104 2,103 8,586<br />
Out of total<br />
SSG 71% 71% 65% 51% 66% 65% 68% 65% 64% 65%<br />
AGS 26% 24% 30% 39% 28% 26% 21% 23% 23% 23%<br />
Display 2% 3% 4% 6% 3% 7% 9% 10% 12% 9%<br />
EES 2% 2% 2% 4% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2%<br />
QOQ % change<br />
SSG 53% 39% -41% -36% -- 84% 14% -12% -2% --<br />
AGS -8% 26% -18% 8% -- -6% -12% 0% 0% --<br />
Display 100% 110% -20% 24% -- 66% 41% 12% 12% --<br />
EES -62% 88% -44% 86% -- 5% -43% 1% 1% --<br />
Total 26% 38% -35% -19% -- 44% 7% -7% 0% --<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Revenue/order by customer/region<br />
Samsung, TSMC and Intel are AMAT’s top three customers, accounting for<br />
32%/45% of the group revenue in 2011/2012 respectively. The majority of its<br />
revenue and order intake is from Asia. We expect to see a similar revenue/order<br />
customer/region mix in the future, as Samsung, TSMC and Intel are expected to<br />
remain the main capex spender in this sector.<br />
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Figure 19: Revenue by customer<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
Samsung TSMC Intel Others<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Figure 20: Revenue by region<br />
100.0%<br />
90.0%<br />
80.0%<br />
70.0%<br />
60.0%<br />
50.0%<br />
40.0%<br />
30.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
U.S. Japan Europe Korea Asia Pacific<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Figure 21: Orders by region<br />
100.0%<br />
90.0%<br />
80.0%<br />
70.0%<br />
60.0%<br />
50.0%<br />
40.0%<br />
30.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
U.S. Japan Europe Korea Asia Pacific<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Revenue – 2014 driven by logic/foundry<br />
In 2014, SSG revenue is expected to increase by 26%, having fallen by 10% in 2013<br />
(see Figure 22 below). The increase is likely to be driven by foundry and logic<br />
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expanding 20nm output using DP, and by the expansion of HKMG process<br />
adoption.<br />
By late 2014/2015, the semiconductor equipment market will be driven by 3D<br />
NAND- and FinFET-related spending. Recent comments from management<br />
suggest that its expected memory order intake in H2 is likely to be less than 25% of<br />
total orders, which is less positive than KLA’s and LAM’s recent results and<br />
statements.<br />
KLA is expecting memory to account for 44% of the June quarter’s total order<br />
intake, up from 28% in the March quarter and 17% in the December quarter.<br />
LAM’s memory shipment increased from a low 20% of total shipments in<br />
December 2012 to 31% in the March quarter. We therefore believe that AMAT’s<br />
memory exposure is not as great as peers KLA’s and LAM’s, hence its revenues<br />
from the 3D NAND capex boost may be limited. We estimate a much smaller<br />
revenue growth rate (3%) in 2015 following a 26% increase in 2014, due to<br />
AMAT’s memory exposure is lower, and majority of the equipment required for<br />
3D NAND capacity building would be shipping in 2014.<br />
We estimate that the AGS division’s revenue will decrease in 2013, due to the<br />
decreased order levels since H2 2012. Display revenue is expected to grow in 2014<br />
driven by recent order increases, but we remain cautious about the sustainability of<br />
a high order level. We estimate EES activity to remain at a low level, and we do not<br />
expect a major improvement until the industrial oversupply issue has been<br />
resolved.<br />
Figure 22: Revenue model by segment<br />
2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Revenues<br />
(Dollars in millions)<br />
SSG 5,414.0 5,536.0 4,945.3 6,186.7 6,359.5<br />
AGS 2,413.0 2,285.0 2,037.0 2,115.0 2,237.3<br />
Display 699.0 473.0 616.9 901.6 762.6<br />
EES 1,991.0 425.0 184.3 234.4 267.0<br />
Total 10,517.0 8,719.0 7,783.6 9,437.8 9,626.5<br />
% of total<br />
SSG 51.5% 63.5% 63.5% 65.6% 66.1%<br />
AGS 22.9% 26.2% 26.2% 22.4% 23.2%<br />
Display 6.6% 5.4% 7.9% 9.6% 7.9%<br />
EES 18.9% 4.9% 2.4% 2.5% 2.8%<br />
YOY % change<br />
SSG 2.1% 2.3% -10.7% 25.1% 2.8%<br />
AGS 29.3% -5.3% -10.9% 3.8% 5.8%<br />
Display -22.2% -32.3% 30.4% 46.2% -15.4%<br />
EES 34.5% -78.7% -56.6% 27.2% 13.9%<br />
Total 10.1% -17.1% -10.7% 21.3% 2.0%<br />
Opm (Pro forma)<br />
SSG 32.8% 27.8% 25.0% 26.9% 28.0%<br />
AGS 21.3% 23.2% 22.2% 22.6% 23.7%<br />
Display 22.3% 6.8% 20.3% 23.8% 18.0%<br />
EES 22.4% -43.3% -74.5% -9.0% -8.0%<br />
Total 22.9% 15.8% 14.6% 19.5% 20.4%<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
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Margin to expand with revenue growth and cost saving<br />
The SSG operating margin is expected to be down in 2013, with the cost saving<br />
expected from its planned factory shutdown offset by the low margin achieved in<br />
the first two quarters. However, we believe that the SSG margin will improve over<br />
the next two years driven by an increase in the top line and further cost-saving<br />
initiatives. We expect that the AGS operating margin will move with the top line,<br />
and hence also expand in 2014 and 2015. The Display division’s operating margin<br />
is projected to be 24% in 2014, due to the higher revenue level expected in this<br />
segment. We expect display’s revenue to drop by 24% in 2015 after 54% growth in<br />
2014, as we do not believe the strong order momentum will last. We believe that<br />
the loss in EES will narrow over time from $184m in 2012 to $137m in 2013,<br />
driven by the ongoing cost-saving programme.<br />
We estimate the gross margin will expand as revenues increase, from 40.9% in<br />
2012 to 42.1% in 2013 and 43.6% in 2014.<br />
Figure 23: Profit and loss<br />
Profit and Loss 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
(Dollars in millions)<br />
Revenues 10,517.0 8,719.0 7,783.6 9,437.8 9,626.5<br />
YOY % 10.1% -17.1% -10.7% 21.3% 2.0%<br />
Cost of goods sold 6,118.8 5,153.0 4,504.3 5,317.6 5,451.4<br />
Gross profit (proforma) 4,398.2 3,566.0 3,279.2 4,120.1 4,175.1<br />
Gross margin (proforma) 41.8% 40.9% 42.1% 43.7% 43.4%<br />
Research & development 1,113.0 1,236.0 1,283.6 1,379.3 1,347.7<br />
Marketing & selling 436.4 471.8 413.7 445.3 442.8<br />
General & administrative 439.0 479.2 447.4 453.0 423.6<br />
Operating Income (proforma) 2,409.8 1,379.0 1,134.5 1,842.4 1,961.0<br />
OP margin (proforma) 22.9% 15.8% 14.6% 19.5% 20.4%<br />
Interest & other expense (income) 16.0 78.0 41.0 0.0 0.0<br />
PBT (Pro forma) 2,393.8 1,301.0 1,093.5 1,842.4 1,961.0<br />
Taxes (proforma) 670.0 342.0 294.5 460.6 451.0<br />
Tax rate 28.0% 26.3% 26.9% 25.0% 23.0%<br />
Net income before JV (proforma) 1,723.8 959.0 799.0 1,381.8 1,510.0<br />
EPS - Pro forma $1.30 $0.75 $0.67 $1.17 $1.30<br />
YOY % 47.7% -42.4% -16.7% 66.2% 4.0%<br />
Common shares (millions) 1,329.8 1,274.8 1,203.8 1,197.5 1,194.5<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Dividends and share buyback<br />
AMAT has a history of paying a stable level of dividends. In March 2013, it raised<br />
its quarterly dividend level from $0.09 to $0.10. Assuming it maintains its dividend<br />
level, the payout ratio will be 33.5% and 30.5% in 2014 and 2015 respectively by<br />
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our estimates. Compared to its peers, AMAT’s payout ratio is higher than ASML (<br />
17% payout ratio), and lower than TEL (35% payout ratio).<br />
Figure 24: Dividend payout<br />
2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Dividends/share $ 0.26 0.24 0.33 0.38 0.40 0.41<br />
Payout ratio 29.5% 18.2% 44.6% 57.0% 34.7% 31.7%<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
AMAT repurchased $1,416m in shares in 2012. The total share buyback over the<br />
past three years stands at $2,234m, which is 11% of its market cap. We believe<br />
AMAT will keep returning cash to shareholders through share buyback and<br />
dividends.<br />
Balance sheet and cash flow<br />
Following the aggressive share buyback and the $4.9bn Varian acquisition, AMAT’s<br />
balance sheet is not as strong as it used to be. It had net cash of $904m at end-Q2.<br />
We expect a net cash balance of $1,302m at end-2013.<br />
In the absence of large-scale M&A, we expect AMAT to continue to generate<br />
positive cash flow. We estimate that the company generated free cash flow of<br />
$978m in 2013, $1,845m in 2014 and $1,929m in 2015, representing an FCF yield<br />
of 5%, 10% and 11% for 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively.<br />
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Company background<br />
AMAT was the biggest semiconductor equipment supplier worldwide by revenue<br />
in 2012 according to Gartner data (see Figure 25). It supplies semiconductor<br />
fabrication equipment, FPD fabrication equipment and solar PV manufacturing<br />
systems. AMAT’s customers include manufacturers of semiconductor chips, LCDs,<br />
solar PV cells and modules, and other electronic devices.<br />
Figure 25: AMAT revenue split<br />
100.0%<br />
90.0%<br />
80.0%<br />
70.0%<br />
60.0%<br />
50.0%<br />
40.0%<br />
30.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
Source: Gartner Data<br />
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
Deposition Etch Clean&Planarization<br />
RTP&Oxidation/Diffusion Ion Implanter Process Control<br />
Automation&Control<br />
Wafer-Level Packaging<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
AMAT operates in four reportable segments: Silicon Systems Group (SSG),<br />
Applied Global Services (AGS), Display and EES.<br />
Figure 26: Segments<br />
SSG<br />
Description<br />
Supplies semiconductor equipment used in chip fabrication processes including:<br />
- Deposition,<br />
- Etching,<br />
- Cleaning & Planarization,<br />
- Rapid Thermal Processing, Oxidation, Diffusion,<br />
- Ion Implant,<br />
- Process control,<br />
- Wafer level packaging.<br />
AGS<br />
Helping customers to lower cost, improve equipment and fab performance and maximise return on asset.<br />
- Provides semiconductor, display and solar customers with solutions that maximize output and<br />
efficiency<br />
- Largest supplier of software for automating semiconductor, display and solar factories<br />
Display<br />
Suppliers TFT-LCD equipment and services, which help make flat panel TVs more than 20% larger each<br />
year without price increases<br />
EES<br />
Supplies PV equipment used in:<br />
- Produce crystalline-silicon (c-Si), Solar PV cell and modules,<br />
- Help accelerate global PV adoption by delivering cost-effective solutions to improve productivity and<br />
increase cell efficiency<br />
Source: Company data<br />
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Compared to other major semiconductor equipment companies, AMAT has the<br />
broadest product portfolio, used in different chip fabrication processes (see Figure<br />
27).<br />
Figure 27: product portfolio of equipment vendors<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong> AMAT LAM ASMI ASML TEL KLA<br />
Lithography<br />
Y<br />
Photoresist Processing (Track)<br />
Y<br />
Deposition Y Y Y Y<br />
Etch, Clean, and Planarization Y Y Y<br />
RTP and Oxidation/Diffusion Y Y Y<br />
Ion Implanter<br />
Y<br />
Process Control Y Y<br />
Manufacturing Automation and Control Y<br />
Wafer-Level Packaging Y Y Y Y<br />
Die-Level Manufacturing <strong>Equipment</strong> Y Y<br />
Test <strong>Equipment</strong><br />
Source: Company data<br />
Acquisitions<br />
AMAT has been active in M&A during the past decade, acquiring Varian in 2011<br />
and Semitool in 2009 – and although it attempted to acquire ASMI in 2008, it was<br />
not successful. None of the companies that AMAT has acquired in the past few<br />
years operate in the same segments as AMAT – thus there is no overlap with<br />
AMAT in terms of market share. All the acquired companies have a dominant<br />
market share in their respective segments. We believe that AMAT’s strategy is to<br />
expand its total addressable market through acquisition, and to grow organically in<br />
the areas in which it currently has a position.<br />
Figure 28: M&A deals<br />
2011 Acquire<br />
Name Amount Description Synergy for AMAT<br />
Varian <strong>Semiconductor</strong><br />
<strong>Equipment</strong> Associates,<br />
Inc<br />
$4,900mn<br />
- Gain exposure to ion implantation market, where it do not<br />
Leading supplier of ion have any share before and Varian had 75% share,<br />
implantation equipment to -Enhance AMAT's Baccini Solar product portfolio with c-Si<br />
the semiconductor and products,<br />
solar industries - Supply chain synergy of $50-60mn in annual cost from<br />
end of 2nd year.<br />
2009 Acquire Semitool Inc $346mn<br />
2008 Rejected ASM International $800mn<br />
Supply equipment used in<br />
chip packaging<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> equipment<br />
vendor specialised in<br />
ALD deposition tool<br />
-Get exposure to advanced packaging and memory<br />
industry's conversion to copper interconnect.<br />
- Enhance its deposition product portfolio further,<br />
- Benefit from ASMI's comprehensive IP portfolio on<br />
ALD equipment.<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong>, Bloomberg data<br />
AMAT shareholder structure<br />
AMAT has approximately 1,203m outstanding ordinary shares listed on the<br />
NASDAQ stock exchange. The free-float percentage is 99%. The shareholder<br />
structure in June 2013 is shown below.<br />
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Figure 29: Holding structure in June 2013<br />
Harris Associates, 6%<br />
Others,<br />
84%<br />
Blackrock, 5%<br />
Vanguard, 5%<br />
State Street, 0%<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
Management<br />
Chairman and CEO, Michael Splinter<br />
Michael Splinter took over the role of CEO in April 2003, and has been chairman<br />
of the board of directors since March 2009. Prior to joining AMAT, Mr Splinter<br />
was at Intel Corporation, where he held a number of positions, including executive<br />
vice president and director of sales and marketing, and executive vice president and<br />
general manager of the technology and manufacturing group.<br />
CFO, Bob Halliday<br />
Bob Halliday was appointed senior vice president and CFO in February 2013, after<br />
the former CFO, George Davis, left to join Qualcomm. Mr Halliday was executive<br />
vice president and CFO of Varian <strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong> Associates prior to<br />
AMAT’s acquisition of the company in November 2011. Since the acquisition of<br />
Varian, Mr Halliday served as general manager of the implant business unit within<br />
AMAT’s SSG. He previously worked at Ionics, a manufacturer of water treatment<br />
capital equipment, where he served as COO and CFO.<br />
President, Gary Dickerson<br />
Gary Dickerson became president of AMAT in June 2012, and has been working<br />
on integrating newly-acquired companies since joining AMAT following its<br />
acquisition of Varian in November 2011. Mr Dickerson was CFO and a director of<br />
Varian from 2004 until Varian was acquired by AMAT. Prior to joining Varian in<br />
2004, Mr Dickerson served 18 years with KLA-Tencor Corporation, a supplier of<br />
process control and yield management solutions for the semiconductor and related<br />
industries, where he held a number of operations and product development roles<br />
before being appointed COO in 1999 and then president and COO in 2002.<br />
CTO, Om Nalamasu<br />
Om Nalamasu has been group vice president and chief technology officer at<br />
AMAT since January 2012, having served as corporate vice president and chief<br />
technology officer since January 2011. Nalamasu joined AMAT in June 2006, and<br />
until January 2011 was vice president of research and served as deputy chief<br />
technology officer and general manager of the company’s Advanced Technologies<br />
Group.<br />
General manager of SSG, Ranhir Thakur<br />
An executive vice president and general manager of SSG since December 2009,<br />
Ranhir Thakur previously served as senior vice president and general manager of<br />
SSG, and before then as senior vice president and general manager of the Thin<br />
Film Solar and Display division.<br />
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Financials<br />
Profit and loss account<br />
Year-end October (USD m) 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Sales 10,517.0 8,719.0 7,783.6 9,437.8 9,626.5<br />
Cost of sales 6,118.8 5,153.0 4,504.3 5,317.6 5,451.4<br />
Gross profit 4,398.2 3,566.0 3,279.2 4,120.1 4,175.1<br />
Sales and marketing 436.4 471.8 413.7 445.3 442.8<br />
General and administration 439.0 479.2 447.4 453.0 423.6<br />
Research and development 1,113.0 1,236.0 1,283.6 1,379.3 1,347.7<br />
Other operating income - - - - -<br />
Other operating expenses - - - - -<br />
Unusual or infrequent items 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
EBIT 2,409.8 1,379.0 1,134.5 1,842.4 1,961.0<br />
Interest income 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Interest expenses 16.0 78.0 41.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Income on ordinary activities before taxes 2,393.8 1,301.0 1,093.5 1,842.4 1,961.0<br />
Extraordinary income/loss 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
EBT 2,393.8 1,301.0 1,093.5 1,842.4 1,961.0<br />
Taxes 670.0 342.0 294.5 460.6 451.0<br />
Net income from continuing operations 1,723.8 959.0 799.0 1,381.8 1,510.0<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Balance sheet<br />
Year-end October (USD m) 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Property, plant and equipment 866.0 910.0 882.0 914.0 926.0<br />
Other Assets 1,709.0 5,035.0 4,815.0 4,595.0 4,375.0<br />
Fixed Assets 2,575 5,945 5,697 5,509 5,301<br />
Inventories 1,701 1,272 1,331 1,278 1,228<br />
Accounts receivable 1,532 1,220 1,286 1,235 1,186<br />
Other current assets 879 673 750 750 750<br />
Liquid assets 7,174 2,992 3,248 4,214 5,265<br />
Current Assets 11,286 6,157 6,615 7,477 8,429<br />
TOTAL 13,861 12,102 12,312 12,986 13,730<br />
Shareholders' equity 8,800 7,235 7,393 8,068 8,811<br />
Minority interest 0 0 0 0 0<br />
Long-term debt 1,947 1,946 1,946 1,946 1,946<br />
Non-current liabilities 8,800 7,235 7,393 8,068 8,811<br />
Accounts payable 2,794 2,265 2,322 2,322 2,322<br />
Other liabilities 320.0 656.0 650.0 650.0 650.0<br />
Current liabilities 2,794 2,265 2,322 2,322 2,322<br />
TOTAL 13,861 12,102 12,312 12,986 13,730<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
115
Applied Materials Inc<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Cash flow statement<br />
USD m 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Net profit/loss 1,928.0 109.0 450.8 1,381.8 1,470.8<br />
Depreciation and Amortisation 246.0 422.0 416.0 408.0 408.0<br />
Other 250.0 993.0 397.1 132.0 132.0<br />
Cash flow from operations before changes in w/c 2,426.0 1,851.0 1,152.8 2,024.9 2,109.8<br />
Change in working capital 4.0 327.0 -111.1 103.1 99.0<br />
Cash flow from operating activities 2,426.0 1,851.0 1,152.8 2,024.9 2,109.8<br />
Capex -209.0 -162.0 -175.0 -180.0 -180.0<br />
Payments for acquisitions 0.0 -4,900.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Other investing cash flow 919.0 392.0 292.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Cash flow from investing activities 710.0 -4,670.0 117.0 -180.0 -180.0<br />
Long Term Debt 1,730.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Short Term Debt 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Repayment of borrowings 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Purchase of own shares -350.0 -1,416.0 -348.0 -400.0 -400.0<br />
Inflow resulting from the issue of shares 49.0 97.0 85.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Dividends paid -314.0 -424.0 -455.6 -479.2 -479.2<br />
Cash flow from financing activities 960.0 -1,744.0 -718.6 -879.2 -879.2<br />
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash 6.3 -5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Increase/decrease in liquid assets 4,102.3 -4,568.0 551.2 965.7 1,050.6<br />
Liquid assets at end of period 5,959.0 1,392.0 1,943.2 2,908.9 3,959.5<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
116
Tokyo Electron Ltd<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Mainly exposed to legacy markets<br />
• We initiate coverage of TEL with a Sell recommendation and a<br />
price target of ¥4,331. TEL supplies equipment used for<br />
semiconductor chip fabrication, FPD and photovoltaic (PV)<br />
manufacturing. We are sellers because: 1) 77% of the revenues from<br />
its semiconductor precise equipment (SPE) segment (which accounts<br />
for 79% of revenue, and 100% profit) comes from lowgrowth/declining<br />
markets; 2) the loss-making FPD and PV segment is<br />
likely to remain weak, as the TV and solar markets remain sluggish.<br />
• Key debates: 1) Can TEL benefit from new chip designs including<br />
FinFET, 20nm and 3D NAND? 2) Has the recent depreciation of the<br />
yen improved TEL’s competitive position versus other equipment<br />
vendors? 3) Can it gain market share in the silicon etching market?<br />
1. We estimate TEL’s SPE revenue will grow by 7% in 2013<br />
and 6% in 2014 and will decline by 5% in 2015: The level of<br />
growth is unlikely to be as strong as peers as its SPE revenue is<br />
exposed to low-growth markets, such as photoresist processing,<br />
dielectric etching and LP CVD,<br />
2. We believe the depreciated yen versus the dollar will have a<br />
very limited impact on TEL: We do not think chip-makers will<br />
switch vendors purely for cost reasons, as they would incur extra<br />
expenses related to process reconfiguration/testing. TEL’s ASP<br />
may look attractive compared to peers AMAT and LAM, but<br />
other Japan-based competitors (ie Hitachi, Dainippon) have the<br />
same advantage.<br />
3. Management aims to grow its silicon etching market share,<br />
with growth driven by 20nm, FinFET and 3D NAND: We<br />
remain sceptical about whether TEL can increase its silicon<br />
etching share. It currently holds a 9% market share, but has fallen<br />
behind LAM, AMAT and Hitachi (an 89% combined share).<br />
These latter three already have strong positions with the main<br />
foundry, logic and memory players, so we see little room for<br />
TEL to expand.<br />
• Compared to consensus, our FY 2014 and FY 2015 EPS are 8%<br />
and 10% lower: We estimate revenue will remain flat from FY 2014<br />
to FY 2015, given TEL’s 60% exposure to low growth markets, while<br />
consensus is expecting 4% growth.<br />
• Our ¥4,331 PT implies an EV/sales of 0.9x, which is the middle of<br />
the historical EV/sales range (0.7-1.2x) during the semiconductor<br />
recovery cycle.<br />
Sell (initiation)<br />
Rating system<br />
Current price<br />
JPY 4,790<br />
Absolute<br />
Price target<br />
JPY 4,331<br />
19/07/2013 Tokyo Close<br />
Market cap JPY 910,222 bn<br />
Reuters 8035.T<br />
Bloomberg 8035 JT<br />
Share data<br />
Shares outstanding (m) 179<br />
Enterprise value (JPY bn) 660<br />
Daily trading volume 2,025,887<br />
Performance data<br />
High 52 weeks (JPY) 5,980<br />
Low 52 weeks (JPY) 3,225<br />
Relative performance to SXXP TOPIX<br />
1 month -6.0 % -9.7 %<br />
3 months -2.8 % -3.4 %<br />
12 months 12.6 % -31.2 %<br />
Key data<br />
Price/book value 1516.5<br />
Net gearing 0.0%<br />
CAGR sales 2012-2015 6.0%<br />
CAGR EPS 2012-2015 84.8%<br />
Business activities:<br />
Tokyo Electron supplies equipment used<br />
for semiconductor chip fabrication, flat<br />
panel display and photovoltaic<br />
manufacturing.<br />
Y/E 31.03., JPY bn 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Sales 633 497 549 596 593<br />
EBIT 60 13 17 53 52<br />
Net profit 37 6 15 39 39<br />
Y/E net debt (net cash) -247 -240 -250 -275 -321<br />
EPS (GAAP) 205.04 34.07 82.02 218.51 214.99<br />
EPS (Proforma) 205.04 34.07 82.02 218.51 214.99<br />
CPS 1380.00 1340.17 1396.31 1532.27 1793.15<br />
DPS 128.98 51.99 50.00 76.00 75.00<br />
Gross margin 33.4% 31.9% 31.7% 33.3% 31.6%<br />
EBIT margin 9.5% 2.5% 3.2% 8.9% 8.8%<br />
Dividend yield 2.5% 1.0% 1.0% 1.5% 1.5%<br />
ROCE 6.2% 1.0% 2.4% 6.3% 5.9%<br />
EV/sales 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1<br />
EV/EBIT 11.0 53.4 38.0 12.0 11.3<br />
P/E 24.8 149.1 61.9 23.2 23.6<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong><br />
22 July 2013<br />
Tammy Qiu<br />
Analyst<br />
+44 20 3207 2673<br />
tammy.qiu@berenberg.com<br />
Jean Beaubois<br />
Specialist Sales<br />
+44 20 3207 7835<br />
jean.beaubois@berenberg.com<br />
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Investment summary<br />
Our investment thesis on Sell-rated TEL is predicated on the following five points.<br />
• TEL is mainly exposed to legacy markets: TEL generates 77% of its SPE<br />
revenue from low-growth/declining markets. Compared to its peers ASML,<br />
ASMI, AMAT, KLA and LAM, which respectively have 0%, 9%, 39%, 0% and<br />
26% of their revenue exposed to low-growth/declining markets, TEL’s growth<br />
opportunity from expansion in its current markets is the weakest of the six<br />
companies. Therefore, we do not believe TEL will benefit from new chip<br />
designs/semiconductor technology as much as its peers.<br />
• TEL unlikely to return to 2007 peak: At the Semicon 2013 event in the US in<br />
July, TEL shared its bull-case scenario. It expects its FY 2017 revenues (ie to<br />
end-March 2018) to return to the FY 2007 peak level of ¥906bn from ¥497bn<br />
in 2012, driven by market expansion and share gains in etching and cleaning<br />
processes. We do not believe that TEL will be able to return to its 2007 peak<br />
level for the following reasons.<br />
o Revenue failed to return to the 2007 peak level during the last peak cycle<br />
(2009-2011). TEL’s revenue reached ¥668bn during this period, which was<br />
26% lower than the 2007 peak. The operating margin was 15% at the peak,<br />
compared with 19% in 2007. We believe that this lower revenue and margin<br />
was due to the impact of its exposure to low-growth markets.<br />
o TEL’s SPE revenue as a percentage of total wafer fab equipment (WFE)<br />
spending decreased from 20% in 2007 to 13% in 2012 excluding the impact<br />
of FX movements. We estimate TEL’s share of WFE decrease to 12% in<br />
2015 and 11% in 2017, as it is less likely to benefit from the new chip<br />
designs compare with its peers.<br />
o Our FY 2017 revenue estimate for TEL is ¥662bn (27% lower than TEL’s<br />
bull-case scenario of ¥906bn), including SPE revenue of ¥450bn (applying<br />
an 11% share of total WFE spending to TEL’s 2017 WFE estimate of<br />
$40bn), FPD/PV revenue of ¥101bn (in line with the 2007 peak level, plus<br />
¥32bn in solar revenue), and components revenue of ¥111bn (in line with<br />
the 2007 peak). Our operating margin in FY 2017 is 15% (TEL’s estimate:<br />
19%), including a ¥30bn cost saving compared with the 2012 level of<br />
¥146bn.<br />
Figure 1: We do not think TEL will return to 2007 peak<br />
2007 2010 2012<br />
2017E 2017E<br />
TEL <strong>Berenberg</strong><br />
Delta %<br />
Revenue JPY bn 906.1 668.7 497.3 906.0 661.8 -27.0%<br />
SPE JPY bn 726.4 511.3 392.1 450.0<br />
FPD/PV JPY bn 68.0 66.7 20.2 100.7<br />
Components 111.1 91.3 84.7 111.1<br />
OPM % 18.6% 14.6% 2.5% 19.0% 15.4% -3.6%<br />
OP profit JPY bn 168.5 97.6 12.5 172.1 102.2 -40.6%<br />
tax rate (effective) % 18.3% 26.9% 64.1% 30.0% 30.0% 0.0%<br />
EPS JPY 594.0 401.7 34.1 672.5 399.2 -40.6%<br />
no. share mn 178.9 179.0 179.2 179.2 179.2 0.0%<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimate<br />
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Tokyo Electron Ltd<br />
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o AMAT and LAM are also aiming to gain market share: AMAT is aiming to<br />
gain a 2-4% WFE share by 2016, and LAM is looking to gain a 3-5% share<br />
in the etching market and a 5-10% share in the cleaning market. In our view,<br />
TEL is in a weaker position compared with AMAT and LAM in terms of<br />
gaining share, as it does not have an established market position or<br />
experience in these growing markets.<br />
• Little upside from operating leverage and yen depreciation: TEL’s margin<br />
may improve due to cost savings, but we believe the margin is unlikely to show<br />
significant improvement without top-line growth. We estimate that the gross<br />
margin will stay at the 33% level (34% in 2007) after cost savings are taken into<br />
account. We estimate the operating margin will be 9% in 2015 (compared with<br />
19% in 2007), assuming that the ¥10bn saving planned for 2013 happens each<br />
year thereafter.<br />
• Yen depreciation has had little impact: In our opinion, the yen depreciation<br />
has had little impact on TEL from both an operational and competitiveness<br />
perspective, as: 1) its operations are not heavily exposed to FX movements in<br />
terms of yen contract prices and its manufacturing plants are located in Japan,<br />
meaning that the effect on its operations/cost base is limited; 2) we believe<br />
chip-makers care more about tool performance, reliability and supporting<br />
services than price; and 3) Japan-based Hitachi and Dainippon have the same<br />
FX advantage.<br />
• The FPD/PV segment remain a profit drag: In our opinion, the FPD/PV<br />
segment was always been a profit-dilutive segment for TEL. Between 2004 and<br />
2012, the segment’s margin was 10% at peak, which is lower than the SPE<br />
margin (which averaged 12.5% in 2004-2012). We estimate the segment will be<br />
loss-making in 2013, 2014 and 2015 due to the weak TV and solar markets.<br />
Management is targeting a profit in the solar business in two years’ time, but<br />
expects it to remain sluggish in 2013 and 2014. A weak performance may trigger<br />
impairments on the ¥22bn goodwill related to the Oerlikon Solar acquisition in<br />
2012.<br />
• Valuation: Our price target of ¥4,331 implies an EV/sales of 0.9x, which is the<br />
middle of the historical EV/sales range of 0.7x-1.2x during the semiconductor<br />
recovery cycle. We base our valuation on EV/sales instead of P/E, as TEL<br />
trades at a premium P/E compared to its peers due to its strong cash position.<br />
We believe EV/sales is the valuation methodology to reflect its weaker growth<br />
potential compared with ASML, AMAT and ASMI.<br />
TEL’s ROE is lower than ASML’s and AMAT’s as its operating margin is<br />
lower. It has the strongest cash position among its peers.<br />
Figure 2: Valuation matrix<br />
ROE*<br />
Dividend<br />
yield*<br />
FCF yield* Net cash/marcap<br />
No.1 ASML 19.7% AMAT 2.5% AMAT 9.7% TEL 26.5%<br />
No.2 AMAT 17.1% TEL 1.5% ASMI 6.2% SUSS 17.6%<br />
No.3 SUSS 9.1% ASML 0.9% ASML 4.5% AMAT 16.7%<br />
No.4 TEL 6.3% ASMI - TEL 4.3% ASMI 8.9%<br />
No.5 ASMI 6.2% SUSS - SUSS 1.6% ASML 6.5%<br />
*base on <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimation of 2014 performance<br />
Net cash base on 2012 YE balance<br />
Source: <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimate, company data<br />
119
Tokyo Electron Ltd<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Key catalysts<br />
Key catalysts would include the following.<br />
• <strong>Semiconductor</strong>/FPD/solar order recovery: In our opinion, TEL’s SPE<br />
orderbook will likely remain flattish in the FY 2013 as weaker foundry spending<br />
is offset by increasing memory spending, although we expect a slight increase<br />
towards the end of CY 2013. Nevertheless, we do not expect flat panel and<br />
solar orders to recover in the next few quarters.<br />
• Market share gain in the silicon etching segment: We believe TEL has little<br />
room to expand in the global silicon etching market, as LAM, Hitachi and<br />
AMAT already hold a combined 89% market share, and have penetrated all the<br />
mainstream chip-makers.<br />
Key risks<br />
Key risks include the following.<br />
• The FPD/solar segments remain a drag on group profit: The<br />
underperformance of the FPD and solar segments are in line with what we are<br />
seeing at AMAT. We expect these two divisions to remain sluggish and indeed<br />
loss-making in 2014 and 2015.<br />
• <strong>Semiconductor</strong> spending pause: We are not concerned about the expected<br />
pause in semi capex over the next four years, as chip-makers are ramping up<br />
new chip designs such as FinFET, 20nm and 3D NAND. However, TEL may<br />
benefit from this ramp-up to a lesser extent compared with front-end peers<br />
such as AMAT, ASML and ASMI as 77% of its SPE revenue is exposed to lowgrowth<br />
markets.<br />
120
Tokyo Electron Ltd<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
TEL is mainly exposed to legacy markets<br />
TEL supplies SPE, FPD/PV equipment and electronic components and computer<br />
networks (EC) equipment. The SPE segment generates 79% of group revenue and<br />
100% of its profit. The FPD/PV division is currently loss-making and the EC<br />
division has a 2% margin. We believe that TEL’s performance will be mainly<br />
driven by the SPE segment; any positive newsflow related to other segments may<br />
help the share price but not its business fundamentals.<br />
In the SPE segment, TEL has a diversified product portfolio including photoresist<br />
processing, deposition, etching and wafer level packaging equipment. It generates<br />
the majority of its revenue from the photoresist processing, deposition and etching<br />
markets (see Figure 3 below).<br />
Figure 3: TEL’s revenue from equipment<br />
Etch, 27%<br />
Clean, and<br />
Planarization,<br />
11%<br />
Deposition, 17%<br />
RTP and<br />
Oxidation/Diffusion, 5%<br />
Photoresist<br />
Processing<br />
(Track), 34%<br />
Wafer-Level Packaging, 6%<br />
Source: Gartner data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
TEL generates 77% of its SPE revenue from its legacy markets such as photoresist<br />
processing, LP CVD and dielectric etching, where it holds dominant market<br />
shares. It has 23% of SPE revenue coming from growing markets such ALD and<br />
silicon etching, where its market share is relatively small (see Figure 4 below).<br />
Compared to peers ASML, ASMI, AMAT, KLA and LAM, we believe TEL’s<br />
growth perspective to be the weakest, due to its high exposure in legacy markets.<br />
Consequently, it may not stand to benefit as much from new chip<br />
designs/semiconductor technology as its peers.<br />
As shown in Figure 4 below, ASML’s, ASMI’s, AMAT’s, KLA’s and LAM’s<br />
exposure to legacy markets are much smaller compared to TEL. If we assume that<br />
market shares will remain the same, TEL is likely to have the lowest growth rate<br />
among its peer group during 2012-2017.<br />
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Tokyo Electron Ltd<br />
Technology Hardware<br />
Figure 4: TEL is mainly exposed to legacy markets<br />
Market exposure<br />
High Growth markets<br />
2012-<br />
2017<br />
CAGR<br />
% of<br />
revenue<br />
2012<br />
market<br />
share<br />
Low Growth/Declining markets<br />
Market exposure<br />
ASML Lithograhy +18% 100% 74% no exposure to low growth market<br />
2012-<br />
2017<br />
CAGR<br />
% of<br />
revenue<br />
2012<br />
market<br />
share<br />
2012-<br />
2017<br />
Growth<br />
CAGR<br />
18.0%<br />
ASMI ALD deposition +15.0% 60% 45% LP CVD 1.0% 9% 51%<br />
Epitaxy +7.5% 17% 9%<br />
PE CVD +5.0% 14% 9%<br />
91% 9%<br />
AMAT PE CVD +5.0% 19% 47% Ion implanter -2.5% 11% 76%<br />
Epitaxy +8.0% 11% 89% Dielectric etching 0.5% 1% 5%<br />
Silicon etching +4.0% 8% 14% PVD 0.0% 21% 78%<br />
CMP&cleaning +3.0% 6% 59% RTP Thermal -3.0% 7% 42%<br />
Process control +6.0% 9% 76%<br />
Wafer level packaging excl conta +12.0% 6% 9%<br />
Fab automation +4.0% 3% 16%<br />
61% 39%<br />
KLA process control +6.0% 100% 54% no exposure to low growth market<br />
LAM Silicon etching +4.0% 50% 59% Dielectric etching 0.5% 14% 26%<br />
Metal etching +6.0% 4% LP CVD 1.0% 3% 10%<br />
Wafer level packaging excl conta +12.0% 1% Bevel edge removal -2.4% 3% 100%<br />
PE CVD +5.0% 15% 40% Cleaning (spin.spray processor) -2.0% 6% 15%<br />
ECD +4.0% 4%<br />
74% 26%<br />
TEL ALD deposition +15.0% 6% 44% Photoresist processing 1.4% 34% 89%<br />
Silicon etch +4.0% 8% 9% LP CVD 1.0% 12% 51%<br />
WL packaging-excl contact prob +12.0% 5% 3% Dielectric etching 0.5% 20% 63%<br />
WL packaging- contact prob +3.0% 4% 39% RTP oxidisation/diffusion -1.5% 3% 22%<br />
Cleaning (spin.spray processor) -2.0% 9% 13%<br />
23% 77%<br />
11.1%<br />
3.3%<br />
6.0%<br />
3.2%<br />
2.4%<br />
Source: Gartner Data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
Photoresist processing<br />
TEL generates 34% of its revenue from photoresist processing equipment. It had a<br />
dominant, 89% share of the global photoresist processing market in 2012, followed<br />
by its closest competitor Dainippon, with a 7% share (see Figure 5).<br />
Figure 5: Photoresist processing market share<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
2010 2011 2012<br />
Source: Gartner Data<br />
TEL Dainippon SEMES Suss FSI<br />
In our opinion, the photoresist processing market is likely to underperform the<br />
total semiconductor capex over the next few years. Demand for photoresist<br />
processing equipment is associated with unit growth of lithography equipment, as<br />
each photoresist coater/developer usually supports one lithography tool. As the<br />
new generation of lithography tools becomes more efficient in terms of<br />
throughput, and demand for legacy tools declines, the total number of lithography<br />
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Tokyo Electron Ltd<br />
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tools is likely to grow at a slower pace. Gartner forecasts the photoresist<br />
processing market will grow by c1.4% between 2012 and 2017, versus growth in<br />
semiconductor capex of c4.1%.<br />
In 2015-16, when extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) starts to ship in volume,<br />
we may potentially see a higher top-line growth rate. The photoresist used for<br />
EUV is different from conventional lithography tools and requires a different type<br />
of photoresist equipment which may carry a high ASP. However, there is little<br />
visibility on revenue upside.<br />
Etching<br />
TEL generates 27% of its revenue from etching equipment, with a 29% market<br />
share globally in 2012. Some 85% of TEL’s etching revenue comes from shipping<br />
dielectric etching equipment, with the remainder from silicon etching equipment. It<br />
holds a dominant 63% share in the dielectric etching market, and a 9% share in<br />
silicon etching (LAM leads this market with a 59% share).<br />
Etching market trends have moved against TEL over the past two years (see<br />
Figure 6) as the total addressable market (TAM) for dielectric etching has fallen by<br />
c20%, while the silicon etching TAM increased by c4% between 2010 and 2012.<br />
Figure 6: Etching market solutions<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
Source: Gartner Data<br />
2010 2011 2012<br />
Bevel Edge removal Dielectric Etch<br />
Metal Etch<br />
Other<br />
Silicon Etch (including TSV)<br />
This trend should continue over the next few years, driven by new chip<br />
manufacturing processes including double patterning (DP) and FinFET in<br />
logic/foundry, and 3D NAND in memory. From a process point of view, DP uses<br />
more silicon etching steps than single patterning (SP), as does FinFET. The<br />
memory chip manufacturing process currently requires that 55% of etching steps<br />
are carried out using silicon etching technology, and this percentage is expected to<br />
rise to 60% for 3D NAND. As a result, TEL’s TAM may shrink at an accelerated<br />
pace in the near future, unless it can offset this loss by gaining market share in<br />
silicon etching.<br />
TEL aims to increase its overall market share in etching from 29% currently to<br />
35% by 2015, as well as gain silicon etching market share. We remain sceptical<br />
about whether TEL can gain market share because the silicon etching market is<br />
crowded and competitive. LAM, Hitachi and AMAT all hold a bigger market share<br />
than TEL (Figure 7) and are currently shipping silicon etching tools to mainstream<br />
logic/foundries, while TEL is mainly supplying dielectric tools to these chipmakers.<br />
It would be hard for the latter to switch vendors due to process<br />
reconfiguration costs.<br />
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Figure 7: Silicon etching market share<br />
100.0%<br />
90.0%<br />
80.0%<br />
70.0%<br />
60.0%<br />
50.0%<br />
40.0%<br />
30.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
2010 2011 2012<br />
Lam Hitachi AMAT TEL Mattson<br />
Source: Gartner Data<br />
Deposition<br />
TEL generates 17% of its revenue from the deposition market, and had a 12%<br />
global market share in 2012. It generates 73% of its deposition revenue from LP<br />
CVD tools (with a 51% market share; Hitachi is the next biggest player – see<br />
Figure 8) and the rest from atomic layer deposition (ALD) tools.<br />
Figure 8: LP CVD market share<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
2010 2011 2012<br />
TEL LAM+novellus AMAT hitachi LAM+novellus AMAT hitachi<br />
Soucre: Gartner Data<br />
Source: Gartner data<br />
LP CVD equipment is used mainly in memory manufacturing processes and some<br />
poly silicon logic processes. In the future, we may see some LP CVD process<br />
demand being cannibalised by plasma-enhanced (PE) CVD solutions, as memory<br />
chip-makers migrate to 3D NAND. We may also see LP CVD lose logic market<br />
share as chip-makers shift to HKMG technology which uses ALD. We believe the<br />
LP CVD market will remain flattish in 2014-15, driven by memory spending offset<br />
by reduced logic adoption.<br />
The ALD market is growing quicker than the LP CVD market, as it is associated<br />
with the adoption of HKMG in mainstream logic/foundries. However, ALD<br />
revenue growth may be too small to drive TEL’s total top-line growth.<br />
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TEL unlikely to return to 2007 revenue peak, despite its bullcase<br />
scenario expectations<br />
At the Semicon 2013 event, TEL gave a more bullish outlook on its WFE<br />
spending expectations than AMAT and LAM. It expects the WFE market to reach<br />
$40bn in 2017 (which would represent c6% growth from 2012 to 2017), while<br />
AMAT and LAM expect $30bn-37bn and $30-35bn WFE spending respectively in<br />
2016 (c3.1% growth from 2012 using the mid-point of their WFE spending<br />
projection). In its bull-case scenario, it expects FY 2017 (ending March 2018)<br />
revenue to return to its FY 2007 peak level of ¥906bn, up from ¥497bn in 2012,<br />
driven by market expansion and share gains in etching and cleaning processes.<br />
We do not think that TEL will be able to return to its 2007 peak revenue level for<br />
the following reasons.<br />
1) During the last peak cycle (2009-2011), TEL’s revenue reached a peak of<br />
¥668bn, which was 26% lower than the 2007 peak level. The peak operating<br />
margin was 15% during this period (lower than the 19% achieved in 2007). We<br />
believe the lower revenue and operating margin level was due to the impact of<br />
its exposure to low-growth markets.<br />
Figure 9: TEL unlikely to return to 2007 revenue peak<br />
2007 2010 2012<br />
2017E 2017E<br />
TEL <strong>Berenberg</strong><br />
Delta %<br />
Revenue JPY bn 906.1 668.7 497.3 906.0 661.8 -27.0%<br />
SPE JPY bn 726.4 511.3 392.1 450.0<br />
FPD/PV JPY bn 68.0 66.7 20.2 100.7<br />
Components 111.1 91.3 84.7 111.1<br />
OPM % 18.6% 14.6% 2.5% 19.0% 15.4% -3.6%<br />
OP profit JPY bn 168.5 97.6 12.5 172.1 102.2 -40.6%<br />
tax rate (effective) % 18.3% 26.9% 64.1% 30.0% 30.0% 0.0%<br />
EPS JPY 594.0 401.7 34.1 672.5 399.2 -40.6%<br />
no. share mn 178.9 179.0 179.2 179.2 179.2 0.0%<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimate<br />
2) TEL’s SPE revenue as a percentage of total WFE spending has been<br />
decreasing over the past five years, from 20% in 2007 to 13% in 2012,<br />
excluding the impact of FX movements (see Figure 10). We estimate that this<br />
share will fall to 12% in 2015 and 11% in 2017, as it is less likely than peers to<br />
benefit from the new chip designs.<br />
Figure 10: Share of WFE down from 20% to 12%<br />
WFE $bn<br />
TEL SPE Rev/WFE<br />
45<br />
40<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
-<br />
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E<br />
WFE $bn TEL/WFE<br />
25.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
15.0%<br />
10.0%<br />
5.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
Source: Gartner data, company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimate<br />
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3) Our FY 2017 revenue estimate for TEL (see Figure 9) is ¥662bn (27% lower<br />
than the TEL bull-case scenario), comprising SPE revenue of ¥450bn (ie after<br />
applying the 11% share to TEL’s 2017 $40bn WFE estimate), FPD/PV<br />
revenue of ¥101bn (in line with 2007 peak levels, and includes solar revenue<br />
of ¥32bn), and components revenue of ¥111bn (in line with the 2007 peak).<br />
Our operating margin estimate for FY 2017 is 15% (TEL’s estimate: 19%),<br />
including a ¥30bn cost saving compared to the 2012’ ¥146bn level.<br />
4) TEL is aiming to gain share in the etching and cleaning markets, although so is<br />
AMAT (which plans to gain a 2-4% WFE share by 2016) and LAM (which is<br />
looking to gain by 3-5% in etching and by 5-10% in the cleaning market). In<br />
our opinion, with neither an established market position nor experience of<br />
these growing markets, TEL is in a weaker position than AMAT and LAM to<br />
gain share.<br />
Yen depreciation – limited impact<br />
The yen has depreciated by 30% against the US dollar since 2012. However, we<br />
believe the impact on TEL has been limited. From an operational/cost<br />
perspective, its operations are not heavily exposed to FX movements. TEL’s sales<br />
contracts are mostly denominated in yen and it hedges its foreign-currency<br />
exposures. Its main manufacturing plants are all based in Japan. Therefore the<br />
impact on its operations/cost base is limited.<br />
From a competitiveness perspective, the depreciation in the yen makes TEL’s<br />
prices more competitive compared to its US peers AMAT’s and LAM’s. However,<br />
we do not expect TEL to benefit much from this, as we do not believe chipmakers<br />
will switch vendors purely because of lower prices. From our conversations<br />
with industry specialists, chip-makers care more about equipment performance,<br />
reliability and support services than price.<br />
Even if chip-makers did switch due to lower prices, TEL’s gain could still be very<br />
limited as it only competes with US competitors in some of its end-markets and<br />
other Japan-based competitors such as Hitachi and Dainippon have the same<br />
advantage.<br />
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Key catalysts<br />
In our view, the following factors will be the main share price catalysts.<br />
• <strong>Semiconductor</strong>/FPD/solar order recovery: As with its peers, TEL trades on<br />
its order intake level. Any sign of order recovery in the semiconductor, FPD or<br />
solar industries would be positive for TEL’s share price.<br />
We believe TEL has already seen a positive order trend for semiconductors<br />
over the past two quarters, and we believe the company is likely to see similar<br />
order levels in the coming quarter as weaker foundry spending is offset by<br />
stronger memory spend. ASML, KLA and LAM have all shown early<br />
indications of a memory recovery recently and we expect TEL also to benefit.<br />
But while FPD and solar orders doubled in the last quarter (Q4 FY 2013)<br />
compared to Q3, we do not expect the orderbook to show material<br />
improvement in the near future as the solar and FPD markets remain sluggish.<br />
On a net basis, we expect a slight recovery in orders in the coming quarter,<br />
mainly driven by the semiconductor segment.<br />
• Market share gain in high-growth markets: TEL is mainly exposed to lowgrowth<br />
markets such as deposition, LP CVD and dielectric etching. Its only<br />
high-growth market is silicon etching, where growth is likely to be fuelled by<br />
20nm DP, FinFET and 3D NAND chip designs. Management is keen to<br />
increase TEL’s market share in silicon etching and we believe any market share<br />
gain will be positive for TEL’s share price.<br />
In our opinion, the silicon etching market is crowded: LAM (with a 59% share),<br />
Hitachi (16%) and AMAT (14%) all hold higher market shares than TEL (9%).<br />
LAM has strong relationships with logic and foundry players, while AMAT has<br />
strong relationships with memory players, hence we believe TEL has very<br />
limited opportunities to increase market share.<br />
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Valuation<br />
Our valuation is based on an EV/sales multiple. TEL trades at a premium P/E<br />
multiple compared to its peers, as it has a solid cash position. Its cash/market cap<br />
ratio (see Figure 11) was higher than its peers’ for the majority of 2006-2012.<br />
Hence, we use EV/sales as a valuation methodology for TEL instead of P/E to<br />
reflect its weaker growth potential compared to ASML, ASMI and AMAT.<br />
Figure 11: Stronger cash position compared to peers<br />
2006-2012<br />
Cash/marcap 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 avg<br />
TEL 14.8% 21.3% 23.2% 26.9% 31.4% 27.3% 26.5% 24.5%<br />
ASML 6.1% 4.7% 4.1% 3.8% 7.2% 10.1% 6.5% 6.1%<br />
ASMI 6.4% 6.1% 4.8% 11.1% 8.7% 13.9% 8.9% 8.6%<br />
AMAT 17.9% 20.8% 19.3% 18.2% 21.7% 40.0% 16.7% 22.1%<br />
LAM 14.6% 9.3% 14.7% 8.0% 11.5% 29.4% 39.7% 18.2%<br />
KLA 25.2% 18.5% 17.1% 14.4% 16.6% 22.0% 27.4% 20.2%<br />
Source: Company data, Bloomberg data<br />
Historically, TEL has traded at 0.7x-1.2x EV/sales in a semi recovery cycle. Our<br />
price target of ¥4,331 implies a EV/sales of 0.9x, which is in the middle of this<br />
range, but lower than its better quality peers (ASML, ASMI, AMAT, KLA and<br />
LAM). We believe that the lower multiple is justified due to its lower growth<br />
potential and profitability.<br />
Figure 12: Peer group valuation<br />
Company Name PE EV/EBIT EV/Sales<br />
FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E FY 2013E FY 2014E FY2015E<br />
NIKON CORP 14.12 13.42 12.25 9.83 8.28 8.53 0.82 0.80 0.87<br />
APPLIED MATERIAL 23.30 13.18 11.92 17.43 10.77 4.87 2.35 1.92 0.91<br />
ASML HOLDING NV 25.04 15.67 12.17 21.81 10.74 2.10 4.80 3.73 0.67<br />
ASM INTL NV 27.03 14.02 13.19 50.89 10.49 13.21 3.13 1.91 1.52<br />
KLA-TENCOR CORP 16.94 13.21 11.26 9.43 7.59 2.97 2.46 2.21 0.95<br />
LAM RESEARCH 20.99 11.64 10.15 14.73 8.28 2.90 1.74 1.44 0.58<br />
ULVAC INC na 10.21 7.36 25.28 12.27 15.08 0.82 0.75 1.04<br />
DAINIPPON SCREEN 28.32 14.13 14.41 67.36 11.63 13.66 0.76 0.70 0.81<br />
Mean 19.47 13.19 11.59 27.10 10.00 7.92 2.11 1.68 0.92<br />
Median 22.14 13.32 12.04 19.62 10.61 6.70 2.04 1.68 0.89<br />
TOKYO ELECTRON 48.60 20.98 18.74 25.57 9.75 5.61 1.16 1.02 0.72<br />
Source: Bloomberg data<br />
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Key risks<br />
The key risks to our investment case are as follows.<br />
• FPD/PV segment: TEL’s FPD/PV business was loss-making in FY 2012, and<br />
management has guided that the division will continue to make a loss over the<br />
next six months. The segment’s continuing underperformance is likely to have a<br />
negative impact on total corporate earnings, and may trigger a heavy<br />
impairment charge on goodwill related to its end-2012 acquisition of Oerlikon<br />
Solar.<br />
In our opinion, the underperformance of the FPD and solar divisions is in line<br />
with the experience of AMAT. We expect the two markets to remain sluggish in<br />
the near future, until the solar supply/demand balance improves and TV<br />
manufacturers start investing in new technology or capacity. TEL has ¥22bn of<br />
goodwill related to the Oerlikon solar acquisition, which is likely to be impaired<br />
if we see continuing underperformance.<br />
• <strong>Semiconductor</strong> spending pause: TEL generates 79% of sales and 100% of<br />
profit from its SPE division. The performance of SPE is highly correlated to<br />
chip-makers’ capex spend. If chip-makers’ capex level falls as the consumer<br />
electronics market reaches saturation, or technology migration starts to<br />
decelerate, TEL’s shipments, revenue and profit margin could be hit.<br />
In our opinion, capex spending is likely to remain strong over the next few<br />
years, driven by consumer devices growth in emerging markets. We believe<br />
there will be a capex uptick driven by 450mm migration in 2016. As a result, we<br />
are not too concerned about the expected capex pause in the next couple of<br />
years.<br />
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Financials<br />
Profit and loss account<br />
TEL’s revenue includes revenue from SPE, FPD and PV equipment and EC<br />
components.<br />
TEL’s revenue model<br />
We model TEL’s revenue based on front-end order intake trends.<br />
Figure 13: TEL revenue forecast<br />
(Yen Billions) F13E (3/2014) F14E (3/2015) F15E(3/2016)<br />
FY H1E H2E F13E H1E H2E F14E H1E H2E F15E<br />
Orders<br />
Orders 210.7 254.6 465.2 232.4 219.5 451.8 232.7 240.2 472.9<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong> 198.7 240.6 439.2 217.4 204.5 421.8 214.7 222.2 436.9<br />
Movement YOY<br />
Orders 7% 3% 5% 10% -14% -3% 0% 9% 5%<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong> 39% 21% 28% 9% -15% -4% -1% 9% 4%<br />
Revenue - Total 262.5 286.7 549.2 308.5 287.1 595.5 289.9 303.2 593.1<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong> 200.0 220.6 420.6 233.7 210.7 444.5 206.9 219.2 426.1<br />
FPD <strong>Equipment</strong> 12.0 13.6 25.6 14.1 15.7 29.8 16.0 18.0 34.0<br />
PV Solar 8.0 10.0 18.0 16.0 16.0 32.0 20.0 20.0 40.0<br />
Electronic Components 42.5 42.5 85.0 44.6 44.6 89.3 47.0 46.0 93.0<br />
Movement YOY<br />
Revenue - Total -2% 24% 10% 18% 0% 8% -6% 6% 0%<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> <strong>Equipment</strong> -7% 24% 7% 17% -4% 6% -11% 4% -4%<br />
FPD <strong>Equipment</strong> 30% 24% 27% 17% 15% 16% 13% 15% 14%<br />
PV Solar - - - 100% 60% 78% 25% 25% 25%<br />
Electronic Components 0% 1% 0% 5% 5% 5% 5% 3% 4%<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
We expect TEL’s equipment order intake to slightly increase in FY 2013 (ending<br />
March 2014), with a recovery in memory spend likely to drive its deposition<br />
segment, and with the mainstream logic/foundry segment starting to ramp up<br />
20nm/16nm FinFET mass production capacity. Order intake for FY 2014 (ending<br />
March 2015) will fall slightly as TEL is mainly exposed to low-growth and declining<br />
markets.<br />
We remain cautious about order intake for FPD/PV equipment and expect orders<br />
to increase at a moderate level.<br />
We estimate TEL’s underlying revenue will reach ¥549bn in FY 2013, which<br />
includes a ¥420bn contribution from the SPE segment, growing to ¥444bn in FY<br />
2014.<br />
Revenues and orders by customer/region<br />
TEL supplies equipment to the leading chip-makers in the logic, foundry and<br />
memory markets. The majority of its orders in FY 2013 came from foundry<br />
customers, in line with total capex spending trends, as foundry customers are the<br />
main buyers.<br />
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Figure 14: TEL order breakdown by customer type<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013<br />
MPU, System LSI, Others Foundry NAND DRAM<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Profit margin<br />
We expect TEL’s operating margin to increase from 3.2% in FY 2013 to 8.9% in<br />
FY 2014, and 8.8% in FY 2015, due to factory loading improvement following<br />
semiconductor order recovery.<br />
Balance sheet and cash flow<br />
TEL has a strong balance sheet, with ¥240bn net cash, and zero debt at the end of<br />
FY 2013. We expect TEL will maintain its healthy balance sheet for the near future<br />
and have ¥321bn of net cash at FY 2015.<br />
We forecast TEL to generate ¥19bn free cash flow in FY 2013, ¥38bn in FY 2014<br />
and ¥60bn in FY 2015.<br />
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Company background<br />
Founded in 1963, TEL is a world-leading supplier of SPE, FPD, PV and EC<br />
equipment.<br />
It supplies a broad range of SPE which are used in different chip manufacturing<br />
processes, and generates the majority of its revenue from shipping SPE. Its<br />
customers include major foundry, logic and memory chip-makers and IDMs.<br />
Figure 15: TEL product portfolio<br />
TEL Product portfolio:<br />
<strong>Semiconductor</strong> Production <strong>Equipment</strong>: Flat panel display equipment:<br />
Coater/Developer - photoresist processing FPD Coater/developers<br />
Clean track Lithius Pro V/Lithius pro V-i CS Series<br />
Clean track Lithius Pro/Lithius pro i Exceliner<br />
Clean track Lithius/lithius i+<br />
Clean track act 12/Clean track Act 8 FPD etch/ash systems<br />
Clean track Act 12 SOD/clean track ACT 8 SME Series<br />
Clean Track act M<br />
HT Series<br />
SE eries<br />
Wafer deposition:<br />
Impressio<br />
Triase SPAi<br />
Triase Ti/TiN<br />
Triase W<br />
Triase High K CVD<br />
Etching tools:<br />
Telius SP<br />
UNITY Me<br />
Tactras<br />
Wafer bonding/debonding<br />
Synapse V/Spnapse Z<br />
Synapse S<br />
Surface preparation tools:<br />
Auto wet station Expedius +<br />
Auto wet station Expedius -i<br />
Gas Chemical Etch system Certas WING<br />
Single Wafer cleaning system - Cellesta+<br />
Single Wafer cleaning system - Cellesta-i<br />
Scrubber system - NS 300+HT<br />
Scrubber system - NS 300+<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Its EC division acts as a distributor of a wide range of sophisticated electronic<br />
components and computer network equipment.<br />
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TEL’s shareholder structure<br />
TEL has approximately 180m outstanding ordinary shares listed on the Tokyo<br />
Stock Exchange, with a 94% free float. The shareholder structure at the 2012<br />
financial year-end (March 2013) is shown below.<br />
Figure 16: Holding structure at end-FY 2012<br />
The Master Trust <strong>Bank</strong> of<br />
Japan, Ltd. (trust account),<br />
11%<br />
Other, 81%<br />
Japan Trustee Services<br />
<strong>Bank</strong>, Ltd. (trust account),<br />
8%<br />
Source: Company data<br />
Management<br />
Chairman, president and CEO Tetsuro Higashi<br />
Mr Higashi joined TEL in 1996, and took over the role of president and CEO in<br />
Apr 2013, after former CEO Hiroshi Takenake resigned for health reasons.<br />
Executive vice president Hikaru Ito<br />
Mr Ito was appointed executive vice president of the SPE sales division and general<br />
manager in 2003.<br />
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Profit and loss account<br />
Year-end March (¥ bn) 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Sales 633.1 497.3 549.2 595.5 593.1<br />
Cost of sales 421.6 338.5 375.2 397.0 405.9<br />
Gross profit 211.4 158.7 174.0 198.5 187.1<br />
Administrative and selling expenses 69.5 73.0 83.6 71.5 60.0<br />
General and administration - - - - -<br />
Research and development 81.5 73.2 73.0 74.0 75.0<br />
Impairment charges - - - - -<br />
EBIT 60.4 12.5 17.4 53.0 52.1<br />
Interest income 4.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1<br />
Interest expenses -0.5 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0<br />
Income on ordinary activities before taxes 64.0 16.7 21.5 57.2 56.3<br />
Extraordinary income/loss -3.4 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
EBT 60.6 17.8 21.8 57.5 56.6<br />
Taxes 23.4 11.4 6.5 17.2 17.0<br />
Net income from continuing operations 37.2 6.4 15.0 40.0 39.3<br />
Income from discontinued operations (net of tax) - - - - -<br />
Net income 37.2 6.4 15.0 40.0 39.3<br />
Minority interest 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.8<br />
Net income (net of minority interest) 36.7 6.1 14.7 39.2 38.5<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
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Balance sheet<br />
Year-end March (¥ bn) 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Intangible assets 4.7 59.9 56.1 52.3 48.5<br />
Property, plant and equipment 126.9 135.7 122.7 109.2 95.7<br />
Financial assets 45.0 58.4 58.4 58.4 58.4<br />
Fixed Assets 176.6 254.0 237.2 219.9 202.6<br />
Liquid assets 211.8 190.5 190.5 190.5 190.5<br />
Financial investments 35.4 49.6 59.7 84.1 130.8<br />
Inventories 149.5 135.7 150.5 163.2 162.5<br />
Accounts receivable 150.3 100.5 111.3 120.7 120.2<br />
Other current assets 60.1 45.2 44.2 48.0 47.8<br />
Other accruals - - - - -<br />
Current Assets 607.1 521.5 556.3 606.4 651.8<br />
TOTAL 783.6 775.5 793.5 826.3 854.4<br />
Shareholders' equity 587.9 594.4 600.2 625.7 650.8<br />
Minority interest 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7<br />
Bonds (Long term) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Long-term debt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Pensions provisions 54.6 56.6 56.6 56.6 56.6<br />
Other liabilities 5.6 7.1 7.9 8.3 8.5<br />
Non-current liabilities 587.9 594.4 600.2 625.7 650.8<br />
Short-term debt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Accounts payable 47.0 36.3 40.1 42.4 43.4<br />
Other current liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Other liabilities 77.8 70.4 78.0 82.6 84.4<br />
Current liabilities 124.8 106.7 118.1 125.0 127.8<br />
TOTAL 783.6 775.5 793.5 826.3 854.4<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
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Cash flow statement<br />
¥ bn 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E<br />
Net profit/loss 36.7 6.1 14.7 39.2 38.5<br />
Depreciation of fixed assets 24.2 26.6 30.0 30.5 30.5<br />
Amortisation of intangible assets 0.0 0.0 3.8 3.8 3.8<br />
Other 8.8 -12.4 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Change in inventory 19.5 13.8 -14.8 -12.7 0.7<br />
Change in accounts receivable -13.9 49.8 -10.8 -9.4 0.5<br />
Change in Current assets -6.2 14.9 0.9 -3.7 0.2<br />
Change in accounts payable -6.6 -10.7 3.8 2.3 1.0<br />
Change in current liabilities -36.6 -7.4 7.6 4.5 1.9<br />
Change in other liabilities 3.8 3.5 0.8 0.5 0.2<br />
Non Controlling interest change 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Cash flow from operating activities 29.7 84.3 36.0 55.0 77.2<br />
Capex -39.5 -21.7 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0<br />
Income from asset disposals 1.1 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Financial investments 3.2 -13.4 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Investment in Intangible assets -0.5 -1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Payments for acquisitions 0.0 -55.1 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Other cash flow from investing activities 27.3 -109.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Cash flow from investing activities -8.4 -141.8 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0<br />
Long Term debt issuance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Short Term debt issuance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Purchase of own shares 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Dividends paid -23.1 -9.3 -9.0 -13.6 -13.4<br />
Other financing cash flow -4.9 -1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Cash flow from financing activities -27.3 -10.6 -9.0 -13.6 -13.4<br />
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash -0.3 -5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />
Increase/decrease in liquid assets -6.3 -73.5 10.1 24.4 46.7<br />
Liquid assets at end of period 158.7 85.3 95.3 119.7 166.4<br />
Source: Company data, <strong>Berenberg</strong> estimates<br />
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Please note that the use of this research report is subject to the conditions and restrictions set forth in the<br />
“General investment-related disclosures” and the “Legal disclaimer” at the end of this document.<br />
For analyst certification and remarks regarding foreign investors and country-specific disclosures, please<br />
refer to the respective paragraph at the end of this document.<br />
Disclosures in respect of section 34b of the German Securities Trading Act<br />
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG)<br />
Company<br />
Applied Materials Inc<br />
ASM International NV<br />
ASML Holding NV<br />
Suess Microtec AG<br />
Tokyo Electron Ltd<br />
Disclosures<br />
no disclosures<br />
no disclosures<br />
no disclosures<br />
no disclosures<br />
no disclosures<br />
(1) Joh. <strong>Berenberg</strong>, Gossler & Co. KG (hereinafter referred to as “the <strong>Bank</strong>”) and/or its affiliate(s) was Lead<br />
Manager or Co-Lead Manager over the previous 12 months of a public offering of this company.<br />
(2) The <strong>Bank</strong> acts as Designated Sponsor for this company.<br />
(3) Over the previous 12 months, the <strong>Bank</strong> and/or its affiliate(s) has effected an agreement with this company<br />
for investment banking services or received compensation or a promise to pay from this company for<br />
investment banking services.<br />
(4) The <strong>Bank</strong> and/or its affiliate(s) holds 5% or more of the share capital of this company.<br />
(5) The <strong>Bank</strong> holds a trading position in shares of this company.<br />
Historical price target and rating changes for Applied Materials Inc in the last 12 months (full coverage)<br />
Date Price target - USD Rating Initiation of coverage<br />
22 July 13 14.40 Hold 22 July 13<br />
Historical price target and rating changes for ASM International NV in the last 12 months (full coverage)<br />
Date Price target - EUR Rating Initiation of coverage<br />
22 July 13 31.00 Buy 22 July 13<br />
Historical price target and rating changes for ASML Holding NV in the last 12 months (full coverage)<br />
Date Price target - EUR Rating Initiation of coverage<br />
22 July 13 73.00 Hold 22 July 13<br />
Historical price target and rating changes for Suess Microtec AG in the last 12 months (full coverage)<br />
Date Price target - EUR Rating Initiation of coverage<br />
22 July 13 9.40 Buy 22 July 13<br />
Historical price target and rating changes for Tokyo Electron Ltd in the last 12 months (full coverage)<br />
Date Price target - JPY Rating Initiation of coverage<br />
22 July 13 4331.00 Sell 22 July 13<br />
<strong>Berenberg</strong> distribution of ratings and in proportion to investment banking services<br />
Buy 41.83 % 51.52 %<br />
Sell 19.20 % 9.09 %<br />
Hold 38.97 % 39.39 %<br />
Valuation basis/rating key<br />
137
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The recommendations for companies analysed by the <strong>Bank</strong>’s equity research department are either made on an<br />
absolute basis (“absolute rating system”) or relative to the sector (“relative rating system“), which is clearly stated in<br />
the financial analysis. For both absolute and relative rating system, the three-step rating key “Buy”, “Hold” and “Sell”<br />
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NB: During periods of high market, sector or stock volatility, or in special situations, the rating system criteria as<br />
described on our website may be breached temporarily.<br />
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Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht -BaFin- (Federal Financial Supervisory Authority),<br />
Graurheindorfer Straße 108, 53117 Bonn and Marie-Curie-Str. 24-28, 60439 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.<br />
General investment-related disclosures<br />
Joh. <strong>Berenberg</strong>, Gossler & Co. KG (hereinafter referred to as „the <strong>Bank</strong>“) has made every effort to carefully research<br />
all information contained in this financial analysis. The information on which the financial analysis is based has been<br />
obtained from sources which we believe to be reliable such as, for example, Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg and the<br />
relevant specialised press as well as the company which is the subject of this financial analysis.<br />
Only that part of the research note is made available to the issuer (who is the subject of this analysis) which is<br />
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Opinions expressed in this financial analysis are our current opinions as of the issuing date indicated on this<br />
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The functional job title of the person/s responsible for the recommendations contained in this report is “Equity<br />
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http://www.berenberg.de/research.html?&L=1&no_cache=1<br />
Legal disclaimer<br />
This document has been prepared by Joh. <strong>Berenberg</strong>, Gossler & Co. KG (hereinafter referred to as „the <strong>Bank</strong>“). This<br />
document does not claim completeness regarding all the information on the stocks, stock markets or developments<br />
referred to in it.<br />
On no account should the document be regarded as a substitute for the recipient procuring information for<br />
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The document has been produced for information purposes for institutional clients or market professionals.<br />
Private customers, into whose possession this document comes, should discuss possible investment decisions with<br />
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The <strong>Bank</strong> and/or its employees may hold, buy or sell positions in any securities mentioned in this document,<br />
derivatives thereon or related financial products. The <strong>Bank</strong> and/or its employees may underwrite issues for any<br />
securities mentioned in this document, derivatives thereon or related financial products or seek to perform capital<br />
market or underwriting services.<br />
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Analyst certification<br />
I, Tammy Qiu, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect my personal views<br />
about any and all of the subject securities or issuers discussed herein.<br />
In addition, I hereby certify that no part of my compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly related to the<br />
specific recommendations or views expressed in this research report, nor is it tied to any specific investment<br />
banking transaction performed by the <strong>Bank</strong> or its affiliates.<br />
Remarks regarding foreign investors<br />
The preparation of this document is subject to regulation by German law. The distribution of this document in other<br />
jurisdictions may be restricted by law, and persons into whose possession this document comes should inform<br />
themselves about, and observe, any such restrictions.<br />
United Kingdom<br />
This document is meant exclusively for institutional investors and market professionals, but not for private customers.<br />
It is not for distribution to or the use of private investors or private customers.<br />
United States of America<br />
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Third-party research disclosures<br />
Company<br />
Applied Materials Inc<br />
ASM International NV<br />
ASML Holding NV<br />
Suess Microtec AG<br />
Tokyo Electron Ltd<br />
Disclosures<br />
no disclosures<br />
no disclosures<br />
no disclosures<br />
no disclosures<br />
no disclosures<br />
(1) <strong>Berenberg</strong> Capital Markets LLC owned 1% or more of the outstanding shares of any class of the subject<br />
company by the end of the prior month.*<br />
(2) Over the previous 12 months, <strong>Berenberg</strong> Capital Markets LLC has managed or co-managed any public<br />
offering for the subject company.*<br />
(3) <strong>Berenberg</strong> Capital Markets LLC is making a market in the subject securities at the time of the report.<br />
(4) <strong>Berenberg</strong> Capital Markets LLC received compensation for investment banking services in the past 12 months,<br />
or expects to receive such compensation in the next 3 months.*<br />
(5) There is another potential conflict of interest of the analyst or <strong>Berenberg</strong> Capital Markets LLC, of which the<br />
analyst knows or has reason to know at the time of publication of this research report.<br />
* For disclosures regarding affiliates of <strong>Berenberg</strong> Capital Markets LLC please refer to the ‘Disclosures in respect of<br />
section 34b of the German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG)’ section above.<br />
Copyright<br />
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photocopied or duplicated in any form by any means or redistributed without the <strong>Bank</strong>’s prior written consent.<br />
© May 2013 Joh. <strong>Berenberg</strong>, Gossler & Co. KG<br />
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Contacts: Investment <strong>Bank</strong>ing<br />
Equity Research<br />
E-mail: firstname.lastname@berenberg.com; Internet www.berenberg.de<br />
BANKS ECONOMICS MID-CAP GENERAL<br />
Nick Anderson +44 (0) 20 3207 7838 Dr. Holger Schmieding +44 (0) 20 3207 7889 Gunnar Cohrs +44 (0) 20 3207 7894<br />
James Chappell +44 (0) 20 3207 7844 Dr. Christian Schulz +44 (0) 20 3207 7878 Bjoern Lippe +44 (0) 20 3207 7845<br />
Andrew Lowe +44 (0) 20 3465 2743 Robert Wood +44 (0) 20 3207 7822 Anna Patrice +44 (0) 20 3207 7863<br />
Eoin Mullany +44 (0) 20 3207 7854 Stanislaus von Thurn und Taxis +44 (0) 20 3465 2631<br />
Eleni Papoula +44 (0) 20 3465 2741 FOOD MANUFACTURING<br />
Michelle Wilson +44 (0) 20 3465 2663 Fintan Ryan +44 (0) 20 3465 2748 OIL & GAS<br />
Andrew Steele +44 (0) 20 3207 7926 Asad Farid +44 (0) 20 3207 7932<br />
BEVERAGES James Targett +44 (0) 20 3207 7873 Jaideep Pandya +44 (0) 20 3207 7890<br />
Philip Morrisey +44 (0) 20 3207 7892<br />
Josh Puddle +44 (0) 20 3207 7881 GENERAL RETAIL & LUXURY GOODS REAL ESTATE<br />
Bassel Choughari +44 (0) 20 3465 2675 Kai Klose +44 (0) 20 3207 7888<br />
BUSINESS SERVICES John Guy +44 (0) 20 3465 2674 Estelle Weingrod +44 (0) 20 3207 7931<br />
William Foggon +44 (0) 20 3207 7882<br />
Simon Mezzanotte +44 (0) 20 3207 7917 HEALTHCARE TECHNOLOGY<br />
Arash Roshan Zamir +44 (0) 20 3465 2636 Scott Bardo +44 (0) 20 3207 7869 Adnaan Ahmad +44 (0) 20 3207 7851<br />
Konrad Zomer +44 (0) 20 3207 7920 Alistair Campbell +44 (0) 20 3207 7876 Sebastian Grabert +44 (0) 20 3207 7834<br />
Charles Cooper +44 (0) 20 3465 2637 Daud Khan +44 (0) 20 3465 2638<br />
CAPITAL GOODS Louise Hinds +44 (0) 20 3465 2747 Ali Khwaja +44 (0) 20 3207 7852<br />
Frederik Bitter +44 (0) 20 3207 7916 Tom Jones +44 (0) 20 3207 7877 Tammy Qiu +44 (0) 20 3465 2673<br />
Benjamin Glaeser +44 (0) 20 3207 7918<br />
William Mackie +44 (0) 20 3207 7837 HOUSEHOLD & PERSONAL CARE TELECOMMUNICATIONS<br />
Margaret Paxton +44 (0) 20 3207 7934 Jade Barkett +44 (0) 20 3207 7895 Wassil El Hebil +44 (0) 20 3207 7862<br />
Alexander Virgo +44 (0) 20 3207 7856 Seth Peterson +44 (0) 20 3207 7891 Usman Ghazi +44 (0) 20 3207 7824<br />
Felix Wienen +44 (0) 20 3207 7915 Stuart Gordon +44 (0) 20 3207 7858<br />
INSURANCE Laura Janssens +44 (0) 20 3465 2639<br />
CHEMICALS Tom Carstairs +44 (0) 20 3207 7823 Paul Marsch +44 (0) 20 3207 7857<br />
John Philipp Klein +44 (0) 20 3207 7930 Peter Eliot +44 (0) 20 3207 7880 Barry Zeitoune +44 (0) 20 3207 7859<br />
Evgenia Molotova +44 (0) 20 3465 2664 Kai Mueller +44 (0) 20 3465 2681<br />
Jaideep Pandya +44 (0) 20 3207 7890 Matthew Preston +44 (0) 20 3207 7913 TOBACCO<br />
Sami Taipalus +44 (0) 20 3207 7866 Erik Bloomquist +44 (0) 20 3207 7870<br />
CONSTRUCTION Kate Kalashnikova +44 (0) 20 3465 2665<br />
Chris Moore +44 (0) 20 3465 2737 MEDIA<br />
Robert Muir +44 (0) 20 3207 7860 Robert Berg +44 (0) 20 3465 2680 UTILITIES<br />
Michael Watts +44 (0) 20 3207 7928 Emma Coulby +44 (0) 20 3207 7821 Robert Chantry +44 (0) 20 3207 7861<br />
Laura Janssens +44 (0) 20 3465 2639 Andrew Fisher +44 (0) 20 3207 7937<br />
DIVERSIFIED FINANCIALS Sarah Simon +44 (0) 20 3207 7830 Oliver Salvesen +44 (0) 20 3207 7818<br />
Pras Jeyanandhan +44 (0) 20 3207 7899 Lawson Steele +44 (0) 20 3207 7887<br />
Sales<br />
E-mail: firstname.lastname@berenberg.com; Internet www.berenberg.de<br />
Specialist Sales Sales Sales Trading<br />
BANKS LONDON HAMBURG<br />
Iro Papadopoulou +44 (0) 20 3207 7924 John von <strong>Berenberg</strong>-Consbruch +44 (0) 20 3207 7805 Paul Dontenwill +49 (0) 40 350 60 563<br />
Matt Chawner +44 (0) 20 3207 7847 Alexander Heinz +49 (0) 40 350 60 359<br />
CONSUMER Toby Flaux +44 (0) 20 3465 2745 Gregor Labahn +49 (0) 40 350 60 571<br />
Rupert Trotter +44 (0) 20 3207 7815 Karl Hancock +44 (0) 20 3207 7803 Chris McKeand +49 (0) 40 350 60 798<br />
Sean Heath +44 (0) 20 3465 2742 Fin Schaffer +49 (0) 40 350 60 596<br />
INSURANCE David Hogg +44 (0) 20 3465 2628 Lars Schwartau +49 (0) 40 350 60 450<br />
Trevor Moss +44 (0) 20 3207 7893 Zubin Hubner +44 (0) 20 3207 7885 Marvin Schweden +49 (0) 40 350 60 576<br />
Ben Hutton +44 (0) 20 3207 7804 Tim Storm +49 (0) 40 350 60 415<br />
HEALTHCARE James Matthews +44 (0) 20 3207 7807 Philipp Wiechmann +49 (0) 40 350 60 346<br />
Frazer Hall +44 (0) 20 3207 7875 David Mortlock +44 (0) 20 3207 7850<br />
Peter Nichols +44 (0) 20 3207 7810 LONDON<br />
INDUSTRIALS Richard Payman +44 (0) 20 3207 7825 Mike Berry +44 (0) 20 3465 2755<br />
Chris Armstrong +44 (0) 20 3207 7809 George Smibert +44 (0) 20 3207 7911 Stewart Cook +44 (0) 20 3465 2752<br />
Kaj Alftan +44 (0) 20 3207 7879 Anita Surana +44 (0) 20 3207 7855 Simon Messman +44 (0) 20 3465 2754<br />
Paul Walker +44 (0) 20 3465 2632 Stephen O'Donohoe +44 (0) 20 3465 2753<br />
MEDIA<br />
Julia Thannheiser +44 (0) 20 3465 2676 PARIS PARIS<br />
Miel Bakker (London) +44 (0) 20 3207 7808 Sylvain Granjoux +33 (0) 1 5844 9509<br />
TECHNOLOGY Dalila Farigoule +33 (0) 1 5844 9510<br />
Jean Beaubois +44 (0) 20 3207 7835 Clémence La Clavière-Peyraud +33 (0) 1 5844 9521 SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS<br />
Olivier Thibert +33 (0) 1 5844 9512 Max von Doetinchem +44 (0) 20 3207 7826<br />
TELECOMMUNICATIONS<br />
Julia Thannheiser +44 (0) 20 3465 2676 ZURICH CORPORATE ACCESS<br />
Stephan Hofer +41 (0) 44 283 2029 Patricia Nehring +44 (0) 20 3207 7811<br />
UTILITIES Carsten Kinder +41 (0) 44 283 2024<br />
Benita Barretto +44 (0) 20 3207 7829 Gianni Lavigna +41 (0) 44 283 2038 EVENTS<br />
Benjamin Stillfried +41 (0) 44 283 2033 Natalie Meech +44 (0) 20 3207 7831<br />
Sales Charlotte Kilby +44 (0) 20 3207 7832<br />
FRANKFURT BENELUX Charlotte Reeves +44 (0) 20 3465 2671<br />
Michael Brauburger +49 (0) 69 91 30 90 741 Miel Bakker (London) +44 (0) 20 3207 7808 Sarah Weyman +44 (0) 20 3207 7801<br />
Nina Buechs +49 (0) 69 91 30 90 735 Susette Mantzel (Hamburg) +49 (0) 40 350 60 694 Hannah Whitehead +44 (0) 20 3207 7922<br />
André Grosskurth +49 (0) 69 91 30 90 734 Alexander Wace (London) +44 (0) 20 3465 2670<br />
Boris Koegel +49 (0) 69 91 30 90 740 CRM<br />
Joerg Wenzel +49 (0) 69 91 30 90 743 SCANDINAVIA Greg Swallow +44 (0) 20 3207 7833<br />
Ronald Bernette (London) +44 (0) 20 3207 7828 Laura Cooper +44 (0) 20 3207 7806<br />
Marco Weiss (Hamburg) +49 (0) 40 350 60 719<br />
US Sales<br />
E-mail: firstname.lastname@berenberg-us.com<br />
BERENBERG CAPITAL MARKETS LLC<br />
Member FINRA & SIPC<br />
Andrew Holder +1 (617) 292 8222 Julie Doherty +1 (617) 292 8228 Jonathan Paterson +1 (646) 445 7212<br />
Colin Andrade +1 (617) 292 8230 Kelleigh Faldi +1 (617) 292 8288 Jonathan Saxon +1 (646) 445 7202<br />
Cathal Carroll +1 (646) 445 7206 Emily Mouret +1 (646) 445 7204<br />
Burr Clark +1 (617) 292 8282 Kieran O'Sullivan +1 (617) 292 8292<br />
140