April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

South Asia Plus 

April-June 2013 

Vol. 3 No. 2 

Quarterly Magazine 

Centre for Internal & Regional Security (IReS) 

COMMENTARIES 

Naxal Violence: The Latehar Carnage and the Forgotten 

Lessons 

India and Pakistan: Political Fallouts and Larger 

Questions of the LoC Violations 

J&K after Afzal Guru: Immediate Excuse and Inherent 

Problems 

Hyderabad Terror Attacks: Road-blocks in the National 

Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) 

SEMINAR REPORT 

Ladakh 2013 - Economy, Society, Governance & 

Politics- New Issues, Young Voices 

REPORT REVIEW 

Review: India, Pakistan - Propelling Indus Water 

'Terrorism' (IWT) 

BOOK REVIEW 

Addressing the Psychosocial Paradigms of Terrorism 

IPCS 

INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES



Vol. 3 No. 2 

Editor 

Deepak Kumar Nayak 

Research Officer, IReS, IPCS 

COMMENTARY 

Maldives: GMR, Nexbis and the Tale of Two Ousters 4 

N Manoharan, Vivekananda International Foundation 

Af-Pak Diary: Decoding Hakimullah Mehsud's Talks Offer 5 

D Suba Chandran, Director, IPCS 

Reading Pakistan: Why Target Health Workers Administering 

Vaccinations? 6 


Pakistan: Combating the TTP through Reconciliation 

in Afghanistan 7 

Sander Ruben Aarten, Research Intern, IReS, IPCS 

J&K and the Indo-Pak Peace Process: New Delhi, Islamabad 

and the Hurriyat 8 

Zainab Akhter, Research Officer, IReS, IPCS 

Water Conflicts in South Asia: Lessons from the Alwar River 

Parliament 9 

Roomana Hukil, Research Officer, IReS, IPCS 

Naxal Violence: Expanding into India's Northeast? 10 

Bibhu Prasad Routray, Visiting Fellow, IPCS 

India and Pakistan: Political Fallouts and Larger Questions 

of the LoC Violations 11 

PR Chari, Visiting Professor, IPCS 

Sri Lanka: Implications of Silencing the Judiciary 12 

M Mayilvaganan, Assistant Professor, National Institute of 

Advanced Studies, Bangalore 

India and Pakistan: The Kargil Redux 13 

PR Chari, Visiting Professor, IPCS 

Naxal Violence: The Latehar Carnage and the Forgotten 

Lessons 14 

Deepak Kumar Nayak, Research Officer, IReS, IPCS 

J&K after Afzal Guru: Immediate Excuse and Inherent 

Problems 15 


India's Northeast: Islamist Militancy in Assam? 16 

Bibhu Prasad Routray, Visiting Fellow, IPCS 

Teesta Water Accord: Expectations for Indo-Bangladesh Water 

Diplomacy 17 


Early Warning and Peace Alert: Transforming Rajouri 

& Poonch in J&K 18 


Review: India-Sri Lanka Track-II Initiative 19 

Prof. V. Suryanarayan, Former Director, Centre for South and 

Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras 

Hyderabad Terror Attacks: Road-blocks in the National 

Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) 20 


India and Pakistan: Is Islamabad's Strategy Changing 

on the LoC? 21 

J Jeganaathan, Research Fellow, IPCS 

India's Northeast: The Threat of Islamist Militancy 22 

Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman, Research Scholar, IIT Guwahati, Assam 

Bangladesh: An Analysis of Pranab Mukherjee's Visit 23 

Harun ur Rashid, Former Bangladesh Ambassador to 

the UN, Geneva 

Sri Lanka: Third UNHRC Resolution and India's Dilemma 24 


Naxal Violence: Is the Maoist Base Slipping in Odisha? 25 


India, China, and Bangladesh: The Contentious Politics of the 

Brahmaputra River 26 


Kargil: Echoes of Attacks against Minorities in Pakistan 27 


Kashmir: Protests and the Return of the Fidayeen 28 


Sri Lanka and the UNHRC Resolution: A Paper Tiger? 29 

J Jeganaathan, Research Fellow, IReS, IPCS 

Naxal Violence: The Peoples' Liberation Front of India 

(PLFI) in Jharkhand 30 


Sri Lanka: Tamil Nadu and India's Foreign Policy 31 

Prof. V. Suryanarayan, Former Director, Centre for South 

and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras 

Bangladesh: Is it the Shahbagh Spring? 32 

Suvolaxmi Dutta Choudhury, Research Scholar, JNU, New Delhi 

India, China & the Brahmaputra: Riparian Rivalry 33 


SEMINAR REPORT 

Ladakh 2013 - Economy, Society, Governance & 

Politics- New Issues, Young Voices 34 


REPORT REVIEW 

Review: India, Pakistan - Propelling Indus Water 

'Terrorism' (IWT) 37 


BOOK REVIEW 

Addressing the Psychosocial Paradigms of Terrorism 38 

Ashok Bhan, Former Director General of Police, 

Jammu & Kashmir 

Cover Page Photo: IPCS Research team on a Field Trip 

B-7/3 Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 110 029, India 

91-11-4100 1900, 4165 2556-59 

www.ipcs.org



Ladakh 2013 - Economy, Society, Governance & Politics- New 

Issues, Young Voices, February 2013 

During January-March 2013, the Center for Internal 

and Regional Security (IReS) organised a review of 

South Asia in January 2013 – focussing on what 

happened in individual countries during 2012, along 

with a forecast and assessment of what is likely to be 

the road map in 2013. As a part of the research 

activities, two programmes within the IReS – Armed 

Conflicts in South Asia and Non-Traditional Security 

organised two conferences/dialogues. 

The Programme on Armed Conflicts in South Asia 

(ACSA) organised the seventh annual conference on 

the armed conflicts and also released its annual year 

book for the previous year. The Programme is likely to 

undertake two Peace Audits on J&K and India’s 

Northeast during the next two quarters – April-June 

and July-September 2013. 

The Non-Traditional Security Programme (NTSP) 

within the IReS organised a track-II dialogue involving 

India and Pakistan on improving the Indus Waters 

governance. The NTSP is also likely to release various 

reports representing the perspectives from India, 

Pakistan and both parts of J&K on sharing the Indus 

Waters during April-June 2013. 

Seventh Annual Conference on Armed Conflicts in South Asia, 

January 2013 

Besides, during this quarter, the IReS is also likely to 

organise the third national dialogue on the naxal 

violence. The objective of this conference is to 

identify new trends in the naxal violence, besides 

undertaking a critique of the counter naxal strategies 

– political, military and developmental. 

With elections are likely to be held in May 2013 in 

Pakistan, the IReS is likely to have focussed 

discussions, interviews and publications on the 

subject. 

South Asia: A Review (2012) and A Forecast (2013), January 2013 

D. Suba Chandran 

Director 

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi 

South Asia Plus 3

April-June 4 

Commentary 

Maldives: GMR, Nexbis and the Tale of Two Ousters 

N Manoharan 

Vivekananda International Foundation 

In successive months, two foreign companies have been 

asked to leave the Maldives by its government citing various 

reasons. First it was GMR, an Indian infrastructure company, 

that was awarded a project to upgrade and manage Ibrahim 

Nasir International Airport; and then it was Nexbis, a 

Malaysian-based venture that was contracted to manage the 

border control system (BCS) of the atoll state. What reasons 

were cited by the Maldivian government for the ouster? How 

many of them were genuine and how many of them were 

motivated – politically, economically and diplomatically? 

What were the actual reasons behind the ouster and what are 

the consequences? 

Overall, three broad reasons were offered by the government 

of Maldives to oust either of the companies. The first issue 

was on the transparency of the contract. President 

Mohammed Waheed alleged that the contract “was signed 

during the previous government conceivably under dubious 

conditions”. However, the fact of the matter is that the 

contract was awarded through an international bidding 

process overseen by the International Finance Corporation 

(IFC). In a letter dated 03 December 2012, the IFC's Vice 

President, Karin Finkelston points out that the project 

“followed international best practices at each step of the 

bidding process to ensure the highest degree of 

competitiveness, transparency and credibility of the process.” 

The second reason cited was that the GMR contract was 

“illegal”. The IFC has contended this by observing that the 

contract “complied with Maldivian laws and regulations”. 

Even if one got to ignore this, the Maldivian Attorney General 

in his legal opinion dated 28 December 2010 clearly stated 

that the contract agreements “do not violate any provision of 

the Constitution of the Republic of Maldives or any law 

regulation, rule or decree...” 

The third reason was that the GMR project was “against the 

national interest” of the Maldives. The same reason was cited 

for the termination of the BCS project undertaken by Nexbis 

Limited. It is highly unlikely that the abrogation of the GMR 

contract served any national interest of the Maldives. 

Economically, there would be a loss of around US$3.5 billion 

to the Maldives' revenue over a period of 25 years. 

Significantly, when the project got underway in November 

2010, it became the single biggest FDI into the Maldives; that 

too, at the time of global economic recession. The project was 

to upgrade, maintain and operate the existing airport; as well 

as build a new terminal by 2014. In the process, the aim was to 

increase traffic from 2.6 million passengers per annum to over 

5 million. The airport is not only the largest in the Maldives, 

but is considered as one of the fastest growing in the region. 

All these have come to a naught now, despite GMR spending 

over US$230 million. The move has also sent negative signals 

to prospective investors in the Island; in addition to creating 

jitters and uncertainty amongst the present ones. 

Diplomatically, the ouster did upset India to the extent of 

shaking mutual confidence in the otherwise smooth bilateral 

relations. 

As reasons offered for the termination of the contract appear 

unimpressive, one tends to look for actual motivations. In the 

process, one cannot miss local political and electoral factors. 

Despite unseating Nasheed in a “bloodless coup”, the present 

Waheed regime has been witnessing political crisis in the form 

of protests and non-cooperation from Nasheed's Maldivian 

Democratic Party (MDP). Constituted mostly by anti-Nasheed 

parties, the present regime in the Maldives has been undoing 

whatever Nasheed did during his tenure; GMR and Nexbis 

being among them. The idea is to take the wind out of the 

MDP's sails. As the country is going to polls this year, there are 

also electoral considerations. The parties wish to gain as much 

political mileage as possible, even if that is economically 

painful or diplomatically embarrassing. 

More worrying is the favourable disposition of these groups 

towards China; that has been desperately looking for a strong 

foothold in the Indian Ocean. In a tweet, the Adhaalath Party 

that spearheaded the anti-GMR, anti-Nexbis movement 

stated, “We would rather give the airport contract to our 

friends in China, who now make the majority of our tourist 

population.” It further stated, “…the addition of the Maldives 

as a friend [by China] would be a massive blow to future Indian 

power in this region.” Beijing has, for long, been building 

maritime and other linkages with the countries of Eastern 

Africa, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. The avowed 

objective behind this is to ensure the security of its sea lanes, 

especially the unhindered flow of critically-needed energy 

supplies from Africa and West Asia. At the same time, these 

linkages have had the impact of somewhat encircling India, 

which some term as the “String of Pearls” construct. The 

Maldives is undoubtedly an important “pearl”. Sino-Maldives 

interactions have increased in the recent past to the extent of 

China opening an embassy in Male in 2011. Lately, the Chinese 

have remained among the top visitors to the Maldives. Beijing 

has evinced a keen interest in developing infrastructure in the 

Ihavandhoo, Marao and Maarandhoo Islands of the Maldives. 

Therefore, it is not without reasons that the current 

dispensation in Male holds the view that “it will be to the 

detriment of the Maldives to not engage with China.”

Commentary 

Af-Pak Diary: Decoding Hakimullah Mehsud's Talks Offer 

D Suba Chandran 

Director, IPCS 

Following an earlier statement from the TTP on negotiating 

with the State under certain pre-conditions, Hakimullah 

Mehsud, leader of the TTP, sent a video message last week. 

What does the message convey? Given the fact that this 

message follows a previous offer to talk, what are the 

implications for that larger agenda? 

Talks Without Laying Down Arms 

The TTP leader's primary message is loud and clear. The 

Pakistani Taliban has no intention to give up arms, even if the 

State agrees to its earlier demand to negotiate. The preconditions 

that the earlier message conveyed included 

removing all laws repugnant with the tenets of Islam, 

redrafting the constitution of Pakistan in accordance with the 

Sharia, withdrawing support to the US in Afghanistan, and 

revenging India for 1971. 

Invariably, Hakimullah's dispatch also underlined the preconditions 

set in the earlier message. While the government 

may be willing to negotiate with the TTP without the latter 

laying down its weapons, there may be nothing much to 

discuss on the four demands, perhaps excepting the last one. 

No Divide Within the TTP 

Both the video message, which showed Hakimullah making an 

address along with Wali-ur-Rehman, and his statement made 

it clear that there is no divide within the TTP. The general 

perception amongst those who have been following the 

internal equations of the TTP is that there is a divide between 

Hakimullah and Wali-ur-Rehman. There have been reports 

that immediately after the killing of the previous chief of the 

TTP – Baitullah, there was a succession struggle between the 

two factions led by Hakimullah and Wali-ur-Rehman. 

Though both belong to the Mehsud tribe, there have been 

numerous reports of a divide between the two. Hakimullah 

was reported to have stated in his message, “Wali-ur-Rehman 

is sitting with me here, and we will remain together until 

death.” 

Have they patched up? Or is this a ploy to pressurise Pakistan 

to negotiate? The TTP is not a monolith and has always been a 

divided house. Maulvi Nazir, who was killed by an American 

drone last week, was considered a “pro-Pakistan Taliban”, 

who was never in favour of targeting the security forces of 

Pakistan. On the other hand, the Khyber Taliban led by the 

notorious Tariq Afridi (who is rumoured to have been killed) 

has been well known for targeting the military and 

paramilitary. The recent abductions and subsequent killings of 

21 Levies belonging to Pakistan are believed to be the Khyber 

Taliban's operations. 

No Divide Between the Taliban, TTP and al Qaeda 

Hakimullah, in his message, reportedly conveyed, “There is no 

difference between the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and 

al Qaeda.” While every single Taliban faction within Pakistan, 

including the Haqqani Network, owes its allegiance to Mullah 

Omar, there has been an attempt led by the Pakistani 

establishment to sever the link between the Taliban (Afghan 

and Pakistani) and the al Qaeda. There has been international 

(primarily, the US) support for this attempt to de-link the 

Taliban from the al Qaeda. 

To a certain extent, this has been successful at multiple levels. 

The US, along with key international players, has been 

exerting pressure to keep the Taliban away from the al Qaeda. 

The objective is to ensure that the link between the two is 

severed, so that the Taliban can be negotiated with to reach a 

final settlement in Afghanistan, as the 2014 deadline fast 

approaches. Previously Germany, and now France, is engaged 

in arranging a dialogue between the Afghan Taliban and 

Karzai's administration. Even Pakistan was kept away from this 

dialogue earlier, but now in the Paris round of talks held 

during December 2012, Islamabad was kept in the loop. It was 

no coincidence that Pakistan released a few leaders of the 

Afghan Taliban, including a former Taliban minister and a 

former Governor of Helmand province, on the eve of 2013. 

While the Afghan Taliban may be willing to play along with this 

strategy, will the TTP led by Hakimullah also follow suit? It is 

common knowledge that within the TTP, it was Maulvi Nazir's 

faction, which was opposed to the al Qaeda and its affiliates; 

Nazir engaged the Uzbek militants closer to the al Qaeda in a 

series of battles in 2008-09 and drove them out of Waziristan. 

On the other hand, leaders like Baitullah, Hakimullah, Wali-ur- 

Rehman and Tariq Afridi have not cut their ties with the al 

Qaeda. Worse, they have become the bridge between the al 

Qaeda and sectarian militants from Punjab, now referred to as 

the Punjabi Taliban. 

If this message were true – that the al Qaeda, TTP and Afghan 

Taliban stand united, it would spell doom for any 

reconciliation within Pakistan and Afghanistan. Perhaps, 

Hakimullah owes allegiance to Mullah Omar rhetorically, but 

is linked with the al Qaeda leadership both financially and 

operationally. 

So what should we do? Should we take his message seriously? 

Damned if we do, and damned if we do not. That, in its 

essence, is the Taliban conundrum for us. 

Perhaps, one of the objectives behind this was to convey that 

the TTP now stands united. 

South Asia Plus 5


Commentary 

Reading Pakistan: Why Target Health Workers Administering Vaccinations? 



Though the killing of health workers and members of NGOs 

engaged in social activities is not a new phenomenon in 

Pakistan, what has been striking during the last two months, is 

the intensity and geographical spread of the phenomenon. 

Initially, such killings remained exceptions and were limited to 

the tribal regions in Pakistan's Northwest; but now, one can 

observe their occurrences at regular intervals, including in 

cosmopolitan cities like Karachi. 

Why is there a sudden spurt in the killing of health workers in 

Pakistan who, by administering polio vaccinations, are doing a 

great humanitarian service? 

Target Health Workers: Mapping the Expanse 

Consider the following major killings to understand the nature, 

intensity and the geographical expanse of the attacks on health 

workers: 

01 January 2013, Swabi (Khyber Paktunkhwa): Six aid workers 

were ambushed on the Islamabad-Peshawar Motorway. 

19 December 2012, Charsadda (KP): A female health worker and 

her driver were shot dead in Charsadda district. 

18 December 2012, Karachi (Sindh): In a coordinated attack, four 

female workers were killed in different localities (reported to be 

dominated by the Pashtuns) of the city. 

18 December 2012, Peshawar (KP): A female health worker was 

killed in a village close to the city. 

16 June 2012, Miranshah (North Waziristan): Hafiz Gul Bahadur, 

a TTP commander banned polio vaccinations in the region, “as 

long as drone attacks are not stopped in Waziristan.” 

Targeting Health Workers: Understanding the Motivations 

Three reasons could be cited for the killings of these innocent 

workers. First, they make for an easy target. Given the number of 

health workers and the places of their work, providing them 

security is a herculean task. They have to travel widely in interior 

regions, where the law and order situation is worse, thus 

becoming an easy prey for the TTP. Most of them are outsiders 

and strangers to the areas they visit to administer vaccinations. 

Society therefore, should double up their efforts to ensure the 

workers are not targeted by militants; though the workers are 

outsiders, their killers are not. 

Second, is what could be referred to as the ghost of bin Laden. 

Many within the ranks of the TTP suspect that health workers 

are used by the CIA as spied. Remember, Dr Shakil Afridi used the 

guise of a vaccination drive to locate Osama? 

Third, even outside the TTP, a general suspicion about health 

workers prevails amongst civil society. There is always a larger 

conspiracy theory, starting from 9/11 being a CIA-Jewish 

conspiracy, which is accepted as a fact even amongst the educated. 

In this context, consider the following suspicion: in Pakistan, the 

use of iodised salt is considered to lead to infertility and is believed 

to be a part of a conspiratorial family planning drive. 

The Washington Post, in one of its reports, quoted a cleric in 

Lahore asking, “Why are the US and the West so worried about 

the health of Pakistanis, that they are forcing us to use iodine? 

They have an agenda.” The TTP is exploiting this very lack of 

awareness and general ignorance. 

The State: Primary Culprit? 

But why blame only the Taliban and the TTP? 

Presently, most health workers engaged in humanitarian aid in 

adverse situations belong to multiple NGOs. But, is this not the 

primary duty of Pakistan's health department? In the rest of 

South Asia, the State has been extremely proactive in vaccinating 

its children. The State in India, for example, has extensively used 

film actors and famous cricketers to create awareness in the first 

place, followed by an extensive campaign to eradicate polio. 

Unfortunately, in Pakistan, both have been missing. Consider the 

following numbers relating to the country's health sector. 

Pakistan, along with Nigeria and Afghanistan, is one of the three 

countries at the global level where polio is endemic. According to 

a WHO estimate, more than 300 children died in 2012 alone due 

to measles. While releasing the 2012 annual report- Health of 

the Nation, the President of Pakistan Medical Association (PMA) 

was reported to have said, “the existing situation is that a large 

number of newborns die in the first year of their life, whereas 

30,000 – 35,000 women perish due to complications during 

pregnancies; while tuberculosis, cardiac diseases, diabetes, 

cancers, kidney diseases and hepatitis B and C are on the rise.” 

If polio is endemic in Pakistan, so is corruption in its health 

department. Whilst health departments all over South Asia are 

facing a governance crisis, the lack of accountability further 

complicates the problem in Pakistan. More importantly, how 

much the State spends on the health of its citizens is of vital 

concern. Presently, the health sector gets less than 0.3 percent 

of the annual budget – both at the federal and provincial levels. 

A larger problem in the future, therefore, could be in terms of 

international donors, led by the UN, deciding to stop these 

welfare activities. The UN, citing a lack of security, has already 

suspended the programme a few times. Given the prevalent 

sense of insecurity, international donors may be forced to rethink 

their strategy, which could severely affect the future of 

children in Pakistan. 

Should We Thank the TTP For Creating Awareness? 

Corruption, problems of governance in the health sector and low 

government spending on health, may pose a larger threat to 

Pakistan than attacks by the TTP. It is extremely unfortunate that 

what the State could not do as a part of its positive campaign to 

create awareness, the TTP could do with their negative 

campaign.

Commentary 

Pakistan: Combating the TTP Through Reconciliation in Afghanistan 

Sander Ruben Aarten 

Research Intern, IReS, IPCS 

Reconciliation with the Taliban in Afghanistan has become a 

viable option ever since the Obama administration 

dramatically narrowed down the primary strategic objectives 

of the war to defeating the al Qaeda and breaking its ties with 

the Taliban. Critical success factors for a political 

reconciliation include, among others, a power sharing 

agreement between Kabul and the Taliban, a general 

ceasefire, and a severing of ties between the Taliban and the al 

Qaeda. These factors are not as far-fetched as they may 

appear. According to a recently published report by the Royal 

United Services Institute, the Taliban's leadership is keeping 

the option to cut ties with the al Qaeda open. 

The effort to bring the Taliban into the Afghan political 

mainstream is supported by most stakeholders in the Afghan 

conflict, including Pakistan. Pakistan's interest in the 

reconciliation process is often explained in the context of 

Islamabad's concerns about the potential of having a highly 

unstable Afghanistan at its borders. A continuation or 

deepening of the standoff between the Afghan government 

and the Taliban in the post-2014 scenario would pose a direct 

security threat to Pakistan. Not only would a civil war lead to a 

high influx of Afghan refugees and trigger a resurgence of 

Pashtun irredentism, but the likelihood of the Taliban 

strengthening its positions in the south and southeast of the 

country would also provide the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e- 

Taliban Pakistan, TTP) sanctuary in Afghanistan, where it is out 

of reach of the Pakistani army. 

The TTP's Origins and Support Base 

Since 2007, the TTP has emerged as a major threat to 

Pakistan's internal security. The army has been able to roll 

back this process of Talibanisation after a series of large-scale 

attacks on the TTP, albeit at a very high cost. The operations 

claimed thousands of civilian and military lives, left millions of 

Pakistanis internally displaced, and destroyed infrastructure 

and other civilian targets. Despite the army's success in 

retaining control over reclaimed areas, the TTP continues to 

be a serious security threat. A sign of its takfiri ideology, the 

TTP primarily chooses “impure” and un-Islamic targets for its 

attacks. Not only does this mean that the group has a 

sectarian nature, but it also explains why Pakistani security 

forces and government officials, as well as “agents of the 

west” such as NGOs often fall prey to TTP attacks. The TTP's 

raison d'être revolves around three goals: introducing Islamic 

law in Pakistan, assisting the Afghan Taliban in their struggle 

against foreign forces, and breaking the US-Pakistani alliance. 

Danish Institute for International Studies postulates in a 2010 

report, support for the TTP is rather an expression of popular 

discontent with Pakistani authorities. Islamabad's decadelong 

neglect of the tribal areas was aggravated by military 

operations along with its tacit support for (or the army's 

inability to protect against) the US drone strikes inside the 

tribal areas has added a sense of injustice to the prevailing 

disillusionment of the locals with the government and has 

further fueled anti-Americanism. 

Consequences of Afghan Reconciliation for the TTP 

If a reconciliation agreement is achieved in Afghanistan (that 

is, at least the two above-mentioned criteria are included), it 

will provide Pakistan with a powerful weapon against the TTP. 

If the Taliban is brought into the political mainstream, 

Afghanistan's largest belligerent faction is neutralised thus 

allowing the ANSF and any foreign residual forces to focus all 

counterinsurgency actions inside Afghanistan against any 

transnational insurgent groups, such as the TTP and the al 

Qaeda. Further, the necessary cut of al Qaeda-Taliban ties 

would damage the al Qaeda's leverage in the region. 

Moreover, in a recent video message published by Reuters, 

Hakimullah Mehsud the leader of the TTP, said that he will 

follow the lead of the Afghan Taliban in terms of policy-making 

after 2014. If he keeps his word, this would further isolate the 

al Qaeda. Another advantage would be that the number of 

drone strikes is likely to decrease after the Taliban is brought 

into the political mainstream. Not only will this reduce anti- 

American and anti-government sentiments, but it will also 

take away one of the most significant and popular support 

pillars of the TTP. 

A successful political reconciliation in Afghanistan will 

neutralise the Taliban as a warring faction. Due to the 

interconnectivity between the insurgent groups in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, the politicisation of the Taliban will 

undermine the strength and influence of the al Qaeda and the 

TTP. However, reconciliation is a very difficult exercise, the 

success of which depends on a plethora of variables. 

Moreover, the isolation of the TTP and the al Qaeda, and a 

likely reduction in the number of drone strike attacks inside 

Pakistan does not solve the socio-economic problems of the 

tribal regions. In addition to supporting the reconciliation 

process in Kabul, Islamabad must also take significant steps 

towards improving the socio-economic prospects for the local 

population. 

The TTP is able to continue its operations quite simply 

because it manages to garner a relatively broad support base 

amongst the local population. The local population does not 

necessarily support the TTP because they subscribe to its 

extremist Islamic teaching; but as Qandeel Siddique of the 

South Asia Plus 7


Commentary 

J&K and the Indo-Pak Peace Process: New Delhi, Islamabad and the Hurriyat 

Zainab Akhter 


After a prolonged ceasefire between India and Pakistan since 

2004, the Line of Control (LoC) has recently witnessed a 

violent outburst. Despite the continued bus and truck 

services, hostility has returned to the LoC. In this regard, what 

further measures can be pursued? Recently, the moderate 

Hurriyat visited Pakistan; without the tacit understanding of 

both countries, this visit could not have happened. Do they 

provide a space for both countries to reach a plausible 

solution? 

Before embarking on the visit on 17 December 2012, the head 

of the moderate Hurriyat, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, stated the 

purpose of the initiative was to stress on Islamabad, the need 

to bring Kashmir and the Hurriyat to the forefront of its 

political engagement with India. 

India, Pakistan and the Hurriyat: Differing Strategies 

Both India and Pakistan were flexible in terms of allowing the 

visit of the moderate Hurriyat to Pakistan. At the time, one of 

the reasons given for such a strategy was that both countries 

will face general elections in 2014 and thus have a motive to 

sell something to their people, for which the moderates serve 

the purpose. 

Over many decades, successive governments in Islamabad 

have treated Kashmir as a bilateral issue and as such explored 

the possibility of settling the issue through the process of 

dialogue with New Delhi. Post the visit, the statement by the 

Hurriyat (M) that Pakistan is in favour of making Kashmir a 

trilateral matter by involving a representative of the people 

from Kashmir, has set all eyes on New Delhi to see whether the 

Congress-led UPA Government would support the trilateral 

process of dialogue or not. If Delhi supports triangular talks, it 

means that the Hurriyat Conference leaders, as well as others 

who are on the other side of the fence, should expect an 

invitation from the Government of India for talks. 

Within J&K, a section believes that India has succeeded to a 

degree, in taking the moderate Hurriyat on board in its “plan 

to weaken” the Kashmiri resistance movement. They are of 

the opinion that because of its weak position at the centre, 

the Congress wants to play the Kashmir card. This time, having 

the Hurriyat on board, would be with the objective to win 

Indian voters; who want peace to prevail so that the pace of 

economic prosperity continues. Hence, in a way, this is one 

more exercise to keep the “pot boiling” and the Kashmir issue 

“alive”. 

the lone survivor of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, was secretly 

hanged in Pune. 

The invitation by Pakistan to the Hurriyat could be understood 

in two different ways. Firstly, Pakistan might be trying to give 

an impression that they have not ignored the Kashmir issue; 

and secondly, that they are trying to take the local leadership 

in Kashmir into consideration. But, does the present stand-off 

at the LoC imply a complete deviation from the above 

strategy? 

The Hurriyat used the visit to convey their dissatisfaction with 

both India and Pakistan. Taking part in a discussion at the 

Institute of Strategic Studies of Islamabad (ISSI), the 

moderates stressed that though intra-Kashmir Confidence 

Building Measures (CBMs) need to be strengthened, the 

people of Kashmir should also have a say in this regard. They 

urged Pakistan to give unconditional support to the people of 

Kashmir in determining their futures and were of the view 

that an alternative settlement negotiated amongst India, 

Pakistan and Kashmiris would be the more doable approach 

towards reaching a solution. The need for channelizing 

Pakistan's support into policy was also brought forward by the 

Hurriyat. 

What Next? 

Can India and Pakistan channel the Hurriyat visit to instigate 

CBMs? Mirwaiz termed the visit as successful and is in favour 

of CBMs between India and Pakistan, to address the Kashmir 

issue. All separatist factions need to be accommodated and 

must be involved in the political process. New Delhi should 

invite them for talks since, given the current crisis across the 

LoC on the disruption of the ceasefire agreement, New Delhi 

will have to restart the peace process, both at the bilateral 

level, as also within India vis-à-vis the Hurriyat. 

For Pakistan, the issue of Kashmir may indeed be popular; but 

according to a report in Dawn, listing Kashmir as the core issue 

in any negotiation with India after the 2008 Mumbai terror 

attacks does not suit Pakistan. It further says that Kashmir is 

no more a priority for Pakistan and that the Pakistan 

government has remained over-cautious after Ajmal Kasab,

Commentary 

Water Conflicts in South Asia: Lessons from the Alwar River Parliament 

Roomana Hukil 


The much articulated and sensationalised meeting of 

November 2012 was unsuccessful to offer respite with 

respect to the Cauvery water row between Karnataka and 

Tamil Nadu. As envisaged, the Chief Ministers of both states 

were incompetent in addressing the principle theme of the 

meeting – to discuss the issue within the larger context of 

farmers directly affected by the issue, and seeking a final 

settlement between both states. For years, regulatory 

mechanisms including the Cauvery River Authority (CRA) and 

the Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal (CWDT) have been unable 

to offer either of the states any compliance on ruling. 

What does the status quo imply for the current plight of the 

farmers and the future course of the issue? Is there an existing 

model within India or South Asia that could be used as a 

template to address the Cauvery Water row? Could the Alwar 

River Parliament be considered a suitable case study in the 

context of the Cauvery, which could look into the possibility of 

establishing a constitutional mechanism for efficient water 

governance by both Tamil Nadu and Karnataka? 

Alwar River Parliaments: A Case Study 

Assessing the water paradigm of the Arvari River in Rajasthan 

in 1985 can help in identifying an excellent example of 

effective resource revival. Before the leadership of water 

conservationist, Rajender Singh, the Arvari waterway was a 

dead river. This was attributed to the mineral extraction and 

logging that had decimated the forestry of the region and 

damaged the entire watershed. As a result, the entire 

watercourse and farmland had completely dried up. More so, 

floods caused by monsoon rains became perennial; due to 

which villagers abandoned their johads or rainwater storage 

tanks thus leading to acute water shortages. 

In these circumstances, Singh established community-led 

institutions in each village in the region; from Gram Sabhas to 

Mahila Banks and River Parliaments. One of the most 

successful developments was the introduction of the Alwar 

River Parliament that was not only garnered in the interest of 

reviving the defunct watercourse, but also to establish 

effective water governance that would prevent future crises 

from taking place. With a view to meet escalating village 

requirements, Rajender Singh initiated rural development 

and employment generation, whereby integrating water 

conservation as his primary motive at Gopalpura village. He 

built 8600 johads in 1058 villages spread over 6500 sq.km. Out 

of these, 3500 were built by the Tarun Bhagat Singh NGO and 

as an aftereffect, the local community was motivated enough 

to build the remaining 5100 structures. The area covered 

parts of the contiguous districts of Alwar, Dausa, Sawai 

Madhopur, Karoli and Jaipur. As a result, five seasonal rivers – 

the Ruparel, Arvari, Sarsa, Bhagani and Jahajwali – in the 

northeast region of Rajasthan became perennial. 

However, after regenerating the rivers, the Rajasthan state 

government gave fishing contracts to locals and outsiders in 

certain stretches of the Arvari River. Singh feared a derailment 

in his graph and consequently, in order to protect the river 

from ill effects, the Arvari River Parliament - a decentralised 

power model - was introduced in 72 villages located on the 

riverbanks of the Arvari River. 

The idea of the Parliament was to safeguard and uphold the 

integrated water management efforts of the community for 

the river catchment. It comprised of two representatives from 

each village. Till today, it constitutes one of the eleven rules 

that pertain to the use of the river, water management, 

extraction or sale of the river water, revival of traditional 

methods for conservation, propagating equitable 

distribution, accessibility of the water resource, etc. A 

coordination committee comprising members selected by the 

Parliament handles operations and ensures compliance with 

the rules. Though this River Parliament has no legal status and 

its decisions are not legally binding, the moral force of the 

people makes its survival possible. 

Cauvery: Lessons from Alwar 

In the context of the Cauvery River, a marked correlation of 

activities can be vividly drawn from the example of the Alwar 

River Project. Despite socio-economic, political and 

demographic differences between the two Rivers, certain 

achievements still paramount a relationship. Looking at the 

current water dynamics of the South, establishing a 

centralised parliamentary system, solely governed by the 

state, may seem to offer some respite. Constitutionally, 

recognising such a set-up would ensure equitable distribution 

and access to waterways. 

Water expert, B.G Verghese, advocates the need for 

catchment basin management for the Cauvery water dispute. 

“One of the ways for resolving the Cauvery challenge is by 

looking at the Water Parliament models of Alwar. The efforts 

towards water conservation have had numerous positive 

impacts on the communities inhabiting these areas. The 

Cauvery issue requires a holistic approach to our water 

environment. It is essential to revamp our outmoded systems 

and look into the intricate fabrics of the structure”. As in the 

case of Alwar, establishing Water Parliaments for the Cauvery, 

instituting autonomous state control, pricing river water, 

extensively engaging consumer (farmer) participation and so 

on, are among the few alternatives that look into providing a 

sense of relief to the issue. 

South Asia Plus 9


Commentary 

Naxal Violence: Expanding into India's Northeast? 

Bibhu Prasad Routray 

Visiting Fellow, IPCS 

Ever since contact between the Communist Party of India- 

Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and an insurgent group operating in 

India's northeast was first established in 2006, the Naxalites 

have pursued twin objectives in the region. Firstly, the 

Northeast has been used as a transit route to ferry arms and 

other ammunition from China. Secondly, the region has also 

figured in the geographical expansion strategy of the 

extremists. What has been their success in these two 

objectives? Are they relatively more successful in their first 

objective than the second? Why? 

For the CPI-Maoist, 2008 was a landmark year. In October that 

year, they issued a joint statement with the Manipur-based 

People's Liberation Army (PLA). Both reiterated their 

commitment to "consolidate the mutual understanding and 

friendship" and to "stand hand in hand to overthrow the 

common enemy". Intelligence agencies, however, maintain 

that the links between the two had been firmed up in 2006. 

Since then, and till 2011, the PLA assisted the Maoists in 

procuring Chinese arms and communication equipment via 

Myanmar. The PLA also provided training to the Maoists. A 

PLA leader, who had led a team of instructors to train Maoists 

in Jharkhand, was arrested in April 2012. 

While the PLA fulfilled the crucial logistic requirements of the 

Maoists, it was Assam, bordering West Bengal, which figured 

prominently in the expansion plan of the CPI-Maoist. 

Interestingly, the operational weakness of the most 

prominent insurgent group in the state - the United Liberation 

Front of Asom (ULFA), served the Maoists' interests well. 

According to intelligence sources, the Maoists first attempted 

to court fringe Adivasi groups in Assam. However, they had to 

settle for the ULFA since most of the Adivasi groups were, and 

still are, in the process of negotiations with the state. Assam's 

Police database on 150 Maoist cadres in the state includes 

many former ULFA cadres. 

The willingness of the ULFA to play facilitator to Maoist 

strategies for the Northeast had become apparent in 2010. 

That year, ULFA Chief Paresh Baruah congratulated the 

Maoists for carrying out successful strikes on the security 

forces in Chhattisgarh's Dantewada. Again, in 2011, the ULFA 

extended its sympathy after senior Maoist leader Kishenji was 

killed in West Bengal. In May 2012, Baruah criticising the 

killing of four Maoist cadres in Assam, reiterated "We (the 

Maoists and the ULFA) may have different ideologies but we 

share a common quest. Our enemy is common and the 

Maoists have our complete moral support." 

Interestingly, however, official assessments carried out by 

New Delhi and Assam till mid-2012, differed significantly on 

the issue of ULFA and Maoist linkages. In June 2012, the then 

Home Minister P Chidambaram, responding to increasing 

talks about a nexus between the Maoists and the ULFA, 

reiterated that the central agencies have no proof of such a 

linkage. 

The Assam government, on the other hand, underlined the 

existence of such a nexus. In May 2012, the Assam Police 

declared to have created a database of 150 active Maoist 

cadres in Assam. A month later, Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi 

asserted, "Be it ULFA, be it NSCN-IM or be it (Manipur's) PLA, 

every one has close links with the Maoists. We have no doubt 

about that.” Contradicting the then Union Home Minister's 

statement, the Chief Minister went on to assert, "He 

(Chidambaram) may have his own sources, but I have my 

own." 

Subsequently, New Delhi fell in line and started supporting the 

Assam government's view point on the Maoists. In December 

2012, Union Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh 

went to the extent of suggesting that the upper Assam 

districts- Dibrugarh and Tinsukia should be included in the list 

of Left Wing Extremism-affected districts. 

While the debate over the attempts of the Maoists to find a 

foothold in Assam and the rest of the Northeast is more or less 

settled, the extent of their actual presence continues to be a 

matter of speculation. It is apparent that the Assam 

government is inclined to portray an alarmist description 

woven around Maoist fundraising, recruitment and plans for 

violence. 

However, the fact remains that the expansionist quest of the 

CPI-Maoist in Assam is also a narrative of repeated setbacks 

and failures. In May 2012, for example, the four Maoists killed 

in Tinsukia district included the outfit's area commander 

Siddhartha Bargohain. Prior to that incident, over 60 Maoist 

cadres and over-ground workers had been arrested from 

several upper Assam districts. Recent media reports on 16 

January 2013 indicated the arrest of Maoist central 

committee member Alok Bakshi in Visakhapatnam. Bakshi 

was in charge of the expansion plan of the Maoists in Assam. 

Therefore it can be reasonably concluded that, so far, the 

attempts by the Maoists to gain a foothold in the Northeast 

have been successfully dealt with. 

This reality on the ground, as well as the sufficient awareness 

generated so far on the Maoist activities provides added 

advantage to the security establishment in Assam and other 

Northeast states to checkmate future LWE endeavours in the 

region. The Northeast has a substantial central force 

presence. The police in these states too, have sufficient 

counter-insurgency experience. The dip in insurgency-related 

violence in the region in recent years, further allows the police 

to concentrate its efforts on Maoist activities in the future.

Commentary 

India and Pakistan: Political Fallouts and Larger Questions of the LoC Violations 

PR Chari 

Visiting Professor, IPCS 

The ceasefire existing since 2004 along the Line of Control 

(LoC), which divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan, was 

recently breached. The consequent firings leading to the 

death of soldiers from both countries' Armies is tragic and 

needless. 

A well-understood mechanism exists to defuse tensions 

through flag meetings between local commanders. Issues 

that cannot be settled at a local level are referred to higher 

levels for negotiation and resolution. The important point to 

note therefore, in the context of the recent violations, is that 

these established mechanisms clearly did not work leading to 

tensions at the national level. 

Why Do Border Violations Occur? 

The LoC is well delineated on the map and recognised either 

by physical features or boundary markers. A complex medley 

of factors is generally responsible for these breaches, with 

personality issues intervening. A newly posted officer might, 

for instance, wish to impress his senior officer as having “josh” 

(transliterated to mean enthusiasm and courage). A superior 

officer might wish to improve his regiment's position for its 

easier defence, by plugging an infiltration route or gaining 

higher ground. Naturally, the adversary understands these 

tactical manoeuvres and wishes to frustrate them; leading to 

frayed tempers, heightened instabilities and, if not defused, 

firings, casualties and greater tensions along the LoC. The 

Indian Army's standard explanation that border firings by 

Pakistan are intended to facilitate the infiltration of its jihadist 

elements has become passé, therefore, with the passage of 

time. 

Consider the facts of the present firings, killings and tensions 

in the Mendhar sector. The facts are murky, but it seems that a 

Pakistani soldier was killed in a small arms firing duel, and to 

deter the infiltration of militants in this area, the Indian Army 

constructed a bunker within the no-military-presence zone 

along the LoC. Pakistani protests were ignored, leading to the 

killing of two Indian soldiers on routine patrol duty in bad 

weather. What set this border incident apart from several 

others in the past was the barbaric beheading of one of these 

soldiers, which has greatly angered the Indian Army and 

people. The Pakistani explanation that jihadis operating in this 

area were responsible is questionable, since the LoC is heavily 

militarised on both sides. Such an assertion would imply they 

were moving around freely in this area, which seems 

problematic given the circumstances. 

Political Fallouts of the Violation 

The first political action of Pakistan's was to stop the crossborder 

movement of people, as also cross-border trade 

between the two parts of Kashmir. For its part, India held up 

the agreement negotiated for relaxing visa restrictions, which 

included senior citizens being permitted visas on arrival at the 

Wagah border, and also denied entry to Pakistani singers and 

sportspersons. The linkage of border incidents with greater 

contacts between the two nations displays the extreme 

fecklessness of both countries as they are discouraging the 

very constituencies that harbour vested interests in 

promoting normalcy in India-Pakistan relations. 

Fortunately, better sense has now prevailed, and New Delhi 

and Islamabad are taking steps to resume their interrupted 

dialogue. With the imminent withdrawal of the US and ISAF 

from Afghanistan in 2014, the need of the hour is for greater 

coordination between India and Pakistan to draw up a 

strategy for grappling with the post-2014 situation, rather 

than fritter away their energies in internecine strife. 

Does, therefore, preventing border incidents, evolving 

confidence-building measures (CBMs) and deepening Indian- 

Pakistani ties require an “uninterrupted and uninterruptable” 

dialogue between the two antagonists? An ideal solution, no 

doubt, but too deterministic to appreciate the political 

realities of Indo-Pak relations. Dialogue for the sake of 

dialogue, with little hope of fruitful results is hardly likely to 

commend itself to hard-headed political establishments. 

Witness the humdrum manner in which the inter-Korean 

dialogue has continued for years after the Korean War ended 

in 1954, and became a joke. Consequently, faith must be 

reposed in the desire of the two leaderships to normalise 

relations and proceed to address their internal challenges. 

Is Pakistani Soldiery Under the Control of its Military 

Leadership? 

Let's face it. Despite the growing inability of the Pakistani 

Army to provide for the country's national security, the 

Pakistani civilian leadership only provides the façade behind 

which the Pakistan Army actually calls the shots. The country 

presently faces four serious threats to internal security - 

domestic terrorism that has even targeted the GHQ in 

Rawalpindi, as well as naval and air bases; continuing losses in 

the FATA region to Taliban attacks; American drone attacks 

along the Af-Pak border emphasising the country's 

abbreviated sovereignty; and, secular strife that is tearing the 

fabric of Pakistan apart. 

In this milieu, opening a fifth front just does not make sense. A 

plausible reason for the barbaric beheading of the Indian 

soldier, therefore, could be the extreme frustration that 

currently afflicts Pakistani soldiers. Coming from a restricted 

recruitment base, family linkages are strong among them and 

discipline has to be strictly enforced from above. Is that 

discipline eroding? In other words, is Pakistani soldiery still 

under the control of the Pakistani military leadership? 

South Asia Plus 11


Commentary 

Sri Lanka: Implications of Silencing the Judiciary 

M Mayilvaganan 

Assistant Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore 

The impeachment of Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake in Sri 

Lanka has drawn significant international attention to President 

Rajapaksa's government. Concerns about his model of 

functioning and its implications on the basic principles of 

democracy have been raised. 

Justice Bandaranayake's impeachment and her post subsequently 

being filled by the government's senior legal adviser Mohan 

Peiris, reflects Rajapaksa's post-war strategy: “My way or the 

highway”. After dislodging the Tigers and neutralising former 

Army Chief Sarath Fonseka, as well as eventually silencing the 

most powerful institution – the army, the President conclusively 

proved his absolute dominance by impeaching the Chief Justice of 

the Supreme Court. 

Establishing Supremacy Over Democratic Institutions: 

Rajapaksa Style 

There were no surprises when Rajapaksa ratified the Parliament's 

impeachment motion, moved by the SLFP-UPFA combine, 

instead of referring to the expert committee. Just as was the case 

when he pushed for the proposed legislation of the Divi Neguma 

Bill that would reportedly increase the resources of the Colombo 

government, particularly the President's brother Basil Rajapaksa's 

powerful economic development ministry. This deed seems the 

latest proverbial nail on the potential challenger – the judiciary – 

to his “autocratic” reign. Notably, the judiciary was the only 

institution that was, perhaps, out of Rajapaksa's supremacy up 

until now. It also sends a clear message to the rest that dissent is 

not taken lightly and that nothing perceived as a threat or act 

leading to the erosion of Rajapaksa's power will be tolerated. 

Indeed, it is a well-calculated move. Rajapaksa knows that the 

legal fraternity is fragile and the opposition is weak and divided, as 

opposed to his own popularity in south Sri Lanka. Hence he was 

assured that the impeachment of the Chief Justice would not 

unleash a reaction on the lines of what was witnessed in Pakistan 

when its Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was sacked. 

Impeachment and International Criticism 

The impeachment process against Justice Bandaranayake, 

however, drew intense criticism from the local and international 

media, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the global 

community. The media has described the government's act as 

“frightening”, “predetermined”, “unfair”, and an “illegal attempt 

to ensure a servile judiciary”. The ICJ, in particular, criticized the Sri 

Lankan government by stating it did not 'adhere to fundamental 

principles of due process and fair trial'. The US State Department 

alleged that the impeachment raised 'serious questions about the 

separation of powers in Sri Lanka, which is a fundamental tenet of 

a healthy democracy'. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper 

openly stated that the impeachment process appeared to him 'to 

be highly politicized and lacking transparency and respect for the 

guarantees of due process and fair trial'. 

Critics have also warned that the sacking of the Chief Justice could 

trigger a constitutional crisis and may damage what remains of Sri 

Lanka's democracy. 

The Probability and Nature of Implications 

Is this a game changer in Sri Lankan politics? Considering the 

present situation in Sri Lanka, where President Rajapaksa enjoys 

unchallenged public popularity having learnt to manage the “bigpowers” 

tactically, the possible consequences of the 

impeachment appear few. 

Amongst the probable implications for Rajapaksa's government, 

the foremost may be disunity with the judiciary in due course, as 

they may need to heed to the regime or else face the music, 

perhaps even contributing to institutional putrefaction. On the 

contrary, the legal fraternity, particularly the senior judges minus 

the newly appointed Chief Justice, may also take a radical position 

on certain government policies when they come up for legal 

review. This might include the case of the impeachment of the 

Chief Justice, which may heighten the clash between the 

executive and the judiciary. 

Second, the international community may scale up their voices 

against Sri Lanka on the grounds of human rights violations etc., 

such as at the U.N. Human Rights Council when Sri Lanka's 

compliance with a US-sponsored resolution is considered again in 

March 2013. 

Third, with the next Commonwealth Heads of Government 

Meeting (CHOGM) scheduled for October 2013 in Sri Lanka, 

leaders of commonwealth nations may refuse to attend it or may 

seek a change in venue; Canada's blunt response to the 

impeachment being a case in point. 

Finally, the undermining of an independent judiciary and 

democracy with the sacking of the Chief Justice may perhaps have 

an impact on foreign investment in Sri Lanka. Concerns being 

raised by the US, the UK, Canada, the European Union, and the 

United Nations on these issues significantly flag the possibility. 

International scrutiny and embargos may send tough messages to 

President Rajapaksa who is keen to further Sri Lanka's image 

overseas to attract more investment, and to undo the controversy 

surrounding alleged war crimes. However, in the absence of 

sanctions being implemented on Sri Lanka, and no warnings 

being issued by the international community to its citizens on 

travelling to the island nation; as also with the continued support 

of the Chinese, the repercussions may not hurt the government 

although they may embarrass the Rajapaksas. Interestingly, the 

Rajapaksa had projected all their adversaries - from foreign 

powers to Gen. Fonseka and now Justice Bandaranayake - as the 

opponents of the State or the State's interests. Until there is a 

major disillusion among the Sinhalese either on the issue of 

increasing unemployment or price inflation, the Rajapaksas 

perhaps would enjoy absolute power and the country may not 

witness any significant game changing moment.

Commentary 

India and Pakistan: The Kargil Redux 

PR Chari 

Visiting Professor, IPCS 

Hardly has the dust settled on the Indo-Pak allegations and 

counter-allegations regarding the tragic death of two Indian 

and two Pakistani soldiers following cross border firings 

across the LOC, and the trade and transit between the two 

countries disrupted in consequence been restored than a new 

ghost has arisen from the grave to bedevil their relations all 

over again. 

Dawn (Karachi) has published a lengthy article extensively 

quoting Lt. Gen. (retd) Shahid Aziz, former Chief of General 

Staff in the Pakistan Army, detailing the Kargil operations in 

May-July 1999 that ended in ignominy and failure. The article 

itself is a curtain raiser for General Aziz's book that is expected 

to be released next week. Much of what the article purports 

would be detailed in the book and is widely known, but its 

value lies in the mea culpa tone adopted by frankly confessing 

to what was really happening in Pakistan at that juncture. 

There are some five critical points in this narrative that bear 

highlighting. 

First, Operation Badr as Rawalpindi code-named the Kargil 

intrusions was a closely knit conspiracy. It was confined, and 

this is documented in several other accounts, to just four 

military officials, viz. General Musharraf (Chief of the Pakistan 

Army), Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz (Chief of the General Staff), 

Lt. General Javed Hassan (Force Commander, Northern 

Areas), and Lt.Gen. Mahmud Ahmed (Commander 10 Corps). 

Amazingly, even the Director General Military Operations, Lt. 

Gen.Taugir Zia, was not informed. The question of 

enlightening the other two armed forces in Pakistan viz. its 

Navy and Air Force just did not arise in these unusual 

circumstances. 

Second, a lively controversy had arisen when Kargil occurred, 

which has continued thereafter, as to whether Nawaz Sharif, 

the civilian Prime Minister, knew about these operations. In 

other words, was he taken into confidence by General 

Musharraf, and to what extent? General Shahid Aziz believes 

that, “Mr. Sharif was not fully in the picture” and this choice of 

words is significant. The Indian Defense Minister at that time, 

George Fernandes, is on record stating that Nawaz Sharif was 

kept out of the picture. Several accounts have claimed that he 

was told about these operations but, perhaps, not provided 

any details. This interpretation is probably accurate, in that 

Sharif was given some sketchy information about the Kargil 

operations, but not explained its repercussions or their 

potential consequences or their political implications. 

Army. In fact, there was much derision everywhere with 

Pakistan's strenuous claims that mujahedeen were 

responsible for the Kargil intrusions. It was apparent that 

highly trained and acclimatised personnel were needed to 

survive and fight at those heights. taking into account the 

terrain here. 

Fourth, this account informs that Pakistan wished to interdict 

the Srinagar-Drass-Kargil-Leh road and cut off Indian logistical 

support to Siachen, forcing India to evacuate the area. Other 

accounts would suggest that several other motives were 

operating like regaining the territory lost to India after the 

1971 conflict in the Kargil sector, reinforcing militancy in the 

Kashmir Valley and Ladakh, and internationalising the 

Kashmir dispute. 

Fifth, General Shahid Aziz is quite right in holding that the 

Pakistani 'Gang of Four' had grievously miscalculated the 

likely Indian and international response to the Kargil 

intrusions. The belief that India would quietly acquiesce to the 

alienation of significant territory in Jammu and Kashmir was 

completely naive. Domestic imperatives would have forced 

New Delhi into a “not-an-inch-of-our-sacred-land-will-belost” 

posture leading to its violent reaction. And, the 

international community could hardly have looked on 

benignly while settled borders were infracted, lest it inspire 

other aberrant states and global anarchy. In the event, 

Pakistan was forced to withdraw its forces from across the LoC 

and face universal opprobrium for its feckless adventurism. 

A review of this sorry history only consolidates the impression 

that Pakistan is a permanent state of concern. Its rulers have 

no use for international norms, codes of conduct or civilised 

discourse with its neighbors. Following Kargil, Pakistan had 

instigated the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 

2001, encouraged the Mumbai attacks in November 2008, 

sheltered Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad until he was 

discovered and eliminated in May 2011. Earlier, A.Q.Khan was 

freely transferring nuclear technology across the world with 

official patronage. The latest revelations regarding the Kargil 

misadventure will only strengthen beliefs that Pakistan is an 

outlier in the international system. 

New Delhi will have only itself to blame if it fails to appreciate 

this reality. 

Third, this account negates the fiction promoted by Pakistan 

that the Kargil intrusions were conducted by militants and 

some elements of its Northern Light Infantry (NLI); indeed, it 

clarifies that, apart from the NLI, regular Pakistan Army troops 

were deployed. The NLI, too, was not a true para-military 

force, since it was operating under the control of the regular 

South Asia Plus 13


Commentary 

Naxal Violence: The Latehar Carnage and the Forgotten Lessons 



Ten jawans (nine from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) 

and one from the state's commando force 'Jharkhand 

Jaguars') were killed in an ambush carried out by the 

Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist), presumably 

led by Deo Kumar Singh aka Arvindji, in the Karmatiya forests 

in Latehar District, Jharkhand in January 2013. Unfortunately, 

four civilians were also killed in the process, helping the police 

to recover the bodies of the dead jawans in the ambush. 

Earlier, the CRPF and the 'Jharkhand Jaguars' had jointly 

launched 'Operation Samna' in December 2012, after learning 

about Arvindji's movement in the Karmatiya forests of the 

state, to try and capture him. 

In the aftermath of the Latehar operation, it was revealed that 

the Maoists had put the body of three CRPF jawans over 

landmines, and had implanted Improvised Explosive Devices 

(IEDs) in the abdomens of two other jawans to maximise the 

police causalities. 

This 'Body trap' strategy of the Maoists has never been 

witnessed before in the history of the Naxal Movement that 

began in 1967. However, if the police personnel were aware of 

the new tactics of the Maoists, as acknowledged by the Union 

Home Minister, Sushil Kumar Shinde, “They (Maoists) are 

employing new tactics…our forces are aware of it and have 

been very cautious while dealing with Maoists,” then it is high 

time the Security forces (SFs) should take a serious note of the 

lapses in their approach, especially when they are in hot 

pursuit of the rebels in a changing scenario. 

Problems in the counter-insurgency 

By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail. Time and again, 

the police personnel have easily ignored and quickly forgotten 

the loss of lives of their colleagues that have occurred due to 

the lapses in anti-Naxal operations. Similar kinds of attacks 

were conducted on the Jharkhand Armed Police (JAP), when 

13 personnel were killed by Maoists attacking an armoured 

vehicle in a forest of Garhwa District on 21 January 2012 by 

triggering a landmine blast. Again, three policemen, including 

an Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI), were killed when Maoists 

triggered a landmine blast in Latehar District on 1 February 

2012.Silimarly, there was another IED attack by the Maoists 

on a CRPF transport in Gadchiroli District, Maharashtra, on 27 

March 2012, that killed 12 and injured 28. It is high time that 

the SFs take a serious note of these lapses and reflect on the 

mistakes often repeated during anti-Naxal operations. 

Unfortunately, the jawans during 'Operation Samna' ignored 

the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), for engaging 

Maoists without anticipating their actual strength. The lack of 

adequate briefings and poor assessment in leading the anti- 

Naxal operation helped the Maoists to take on the brutal 

advantage. 

The Maoists had real-time information of CRPF troop 

movement, while the anti-Naxal forces' real-time information 

on location of the rebels were received only after they had left 

the place of halt. This clearly indicates the lapse of human 

intelligence, technical intelligence and coordination with the 

Intelligence Bureau. 

Further, the mobilisation of such a large contingent (500 

jawans, three CRPF companies and two companies of the 

'Jharkhand Jaguars') in anti-Naxal operations is not according 

to the SOPs while engaging a guerrilla force. A small, highly 

trained, disciplined and lightly equipped unit can help in swift 

mobility and enable them to launch a surprise attack on the 

guerrillas. 

Lastly, the use of civilians to recover the bodies of the dead 

policemen was against the anti-Naxal operation SOP, 

especially when the Union Government had asked the central 

paramilitary and state forces to take adequate measures 

during anti-Naxal operation in areas inhabited by population. 

The loss of four civilians could have been averted, had they 

would not have been engaged in the search operation. 

Lessons to be learnt 

The Maoists are down but not out, hence “the need for a 

review of tactics” and adequate briefings and information 

about the anti-Naxal operation should be conveyed. This is of 

utmost priority for the SFs fighting an invisible enemy in a 

hostile environment. 

The use of night vision equipments, unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAVs), ranging from small drones to long-range surveillance, 

should be brought into use in Naxal-affected areas, to help 

SFs, along with state police units, to detect mines and IEDs 

planted by the Maoists. 

The new tactic of the Maoists implanting IED in the body of 

the lifeless trooper is a lesson for the SFs from now on, that 

they will need to administer more caution in handling of 

bodies of those killed in Naxalite violence or by elephants or 

for that matter, any unclaimed body. 

Jharkhand has had a particularly poor record of fighting the 

Maoists, in a total of 169 fatalities- 133 civilians, 29 SFs and 

seven Maoists in 2012, as against 198 fatalities- 149 civilians, 

33 SFs and 16 Maoists in 2011. The amplification of capacities, 

no doubt will have partial impact, but largely the success will 

largely depend on coherent approach and strategy of the 

policymakers in their fortitude to fight the Naxal uprising.

Commentary 

J&K after Afzal Guru: Immediate Excuse and Inherent Problems 



Over the last few days, following the hanging of Afzal Guru, the 

Kashmir valley has been witnessing curfews and protests. While 

the Kashmir valley, especially Srinagar, is not new to protest 

politics and curfew governance, what is striking is its recurrence 

despite the drastic decline in militant violence during the last few 

years. 

What does the protest signify? Do the protesters identify 

themselves with Afzal Guru and the reasons that he was hung for, 

or are they using his execution as an excuse to express their 

dissatisfaction over what happened (to be more precise, what 

has not happened) during the last few years? 

What is the Problem? Afzal Guru's Execution or the Absence of 

Political Dialogue? 

Afzal Guru's execution should be seen more as the trigger, rather 

than the reason behind the protests that are being witnessed 

now. Given the history of how governments have dealt with 

Kashmir, both at the national and state levels, one is likely to 

conclude that, this time too, the government will use curfews, 

media censorship and the security forces to wear out the protest 

movement. This has been a time-tested strategy of the 

government: sit tight, do nothing politically, and let the security 

forces take the heat. 

Such a strategy has worked for the governments both in New 

Delhi and in J&K in the past. It may very well work again this time 

as well. But will this address the problem, or will it only increase 

the distance between the government and its subjects in 

Kashmir? Certainly, Afzal Guru is not the issue here. His hanging is 

a trigger for a larger problem. What is it? 

Fire Fighting as a Long Term Policy 

Subsequent governments, cutting across party lines both at the 

State and national levels, have uniformly followed a policy of 

doing nothing until the situation spirals to a point that illicits 

immediate damage control. How else can one explain the 

responses of subsequent governments? 

While it may be interesting and even frightening to find out the 

reasons for such a policy, what needs to be clearly understood is: 

this policy is not working and is not in the interest of the State. 

While the people suffer every day because the government 

considers inaction as the best form of action; the policy may tire 

the people out in the short term, but may not help the State in 

the long term. 

Round Tables and Interlocutions as a Ploy 

If fire fighting has become synonymous with the government's 

policy, what has really increased the distance between the 

government and the people are those specific political 

interventions that raised the expectations at the ground level; 

invariably leading to desperation as the government did not 

further pursue its own initiatives. 

What have been the results of those Round Table Conferences 

led by none other than the Prime Minister of India? Did he 

consider and seriously pursue the recommendations of those five 

groups initiated by him? 

Despite frustrations and negative sentiments from previous 

failures, different shades in J&K responded positively to the 

interlocutors led by Dr Radha Kumar and Mr Dileep Patgaonkar. 

The team took its job seriously, for it was tasked by the 

government to submit a report. After numerous visits and rounds 

of discussion, the team submitted its report. What has been the 

response thus far? 

If only the government had taken the above two initiatives 

seriously and addressed the basic political issue, there would 

have been no protests today in the Kashmir valley. But was that 

ever an objective of the government? In retrospect, it appears a 

ploy to be seen as doing something, for the ultimate objective has 

always been to do nothing. 

Governing Through Curfews and Measuring Peace Through 

Tourist Inflows 

In the absence of a clear vision and long term policy, 

governments use curfews and media gagging to address protests, 

instead of trying to address the basic problem at hand. 

It is really surprising that the government measures peace in 

terms of the absence of violence. The math is simple: if there are 

no terrorist attacks, the State is peaceful. Worse, another 

yardstick to measure peace is – the number of tourists. If there 

are more tourists, then obviously, the region must be peaceful. To 

crown this calculation further, if Bollywood visits the valley, the 

reasoning is elevated to a gospel – that peace has certainly 

returned to the valley. 

Since when did we start measuring peace by increasing tourist 

inflows and Bollywood visits? 

Abdicating the Responsibility to the Security Forces 

The governments – both at the State and national levels seem to 

have abdicated the responsibility of governance to the security 

forces. Despite problems and accusations of violations, the 

security forces – the state police, paramilitary and the military 

fulfilled their responsibilities of establishing law and order. 

Ideally, the political leadership should have taken the process 

further by ensuring governance through established democratic 

institutions. The failure of the panchayat system in J&K alone, will 

show where the problem is. Will this approach help political 

institutions retain their credibility in the long run? Should they 

not realise that this is not in their interest? 

To conclude, the problem is not the hanging of Afzal Guru. It is the 

absence of a sustained political process, and a collective failure of 

institutions both at the State and national levels. The irony is, the 

State remains aware of this and yet, does nothing about it. 

South Asia Plus 15


Commentary 

India's Northeast: Islamist Militancy in Assam? 

Bibhu Prasad Routray 

Visiting Fellow, IPCS 

On 6 April 2000, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, then Chief Minister 

of Assam presented a statement detailing the activities of the 

Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in the state legislative 

assembly. Its document titled, ISI Activities in Assam, was the 

first ever attempt by the Assam government to compile the 

strategy by Islamic militant outfits in Assam. Although the 

alarmist prediction of the document has largely been 

unfounded in subsequent years, it has served as a key 

reference material to periodically blow a mostly dormant 

threat out of proportion. 

In a nutshell, the document termed the growth of Islamist 

militancy as an ISI-initiative and went on to elaborate a sixpoint 

strategy of the Pakistani agency to provide support to 

local militant outfits; create new militant outfits along ethnic 

and communal lines; supply explosives and sophisticated 

arms to various terrorist groups; indulge in sabotage; promote 

fundamentalism and militancy among local Muslim youth; 

and promote communal tensions between Hindus and 

Muslims. 

A glance through some of the statements made by different 

ministers and police officials in Assam since the year 2000, 

provides a conflicting scenario regarding the potency of ISIpromoted 

Islamist militancy in the state. For example, on 10 

August 2004, the then Assam Home Minister Rockybul 

Hussain stated that his government did not have any direct 

evidence of ISI activities in the state. Interestingly, on the 

same day, Mr. Hussain filed another reply acknowledging the 

activities of various ISI-backed fundamentalist organisations 

in Assam. 

In the next two years, the Assam Police department sought to 

shift the blame from the ISI to the Bangladesh-based Jamatul 

Mujahideen. Speaking at an annual conference of Director 

Generals of Police (DGPs) and regional heads of various 

security agencies in Guwahati in November 2006, the then 

Assam DGP DN Dutt claimed that the "Afghanistan-trained 

rebel-led Jamatul Mujahideen" is not only controlling Islamic 

militant outfits in Bangladesh, but is also reaching out to other 

non-Islamist groups across the Northeast. In the same 

conference, the intelligence chief of Assam police, Khagen 

Sarma, indicated that "around 200 youths trained in 

Bangladesh by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and the JM 

have been arrested from different parts of Assam since 2001”. 

In July 2009, Rockybul Hussain, Assam's forest minister 

replying on behalf of Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi who held the 

Home portfolio, indulged in another round of panic 

mongering. He indicated that 182 cadres of only two Islamist 

groups - the Muslim United Liberation Tigers Front of Asom 

(MULTA) and the HuM are operating in Assam, with the 

former being more active. In August 2012, the Ministry of 

Home Affairs (MHA) in New Delhi, joining the chorus, 

identified 14 Islamic radical organisations who it stated were 

trying to ferment trouble in Assam. 

Truth and facts on the ground, amid such incongruous claims, 

remain a casualty. The fact remains that the Islamist militancy 

in Assam, in its entirety, has remained at best a fringe 

movement, failing to both attract cadres and also to upgrade 

the quality of arms in its possession. Attacks involving the 

outfits were few and far between, failing to parallel the tactics 

of both mainstream outfits such as the United Liberation 

Front of Asom (ULFA) and also the peripheral groupings of the 

Dimasas and Karbis. Throughout its existence, the activities of 

the Islamist militants remained confined to a couple of lower 

Assam districts, along the international border with 

Bangladesh. 

The arrests of cadres, mostly in situations which did not 

involve any armed encounters, thus, represented a persistent 

weakness in the movement and a lack in the commitment of 

foot soldiers, rather than any counter-insurgency successes 

for the state. As a senior serving Assam police official told the 

author in 2005, "It was very much possible to convince an 

Islamist cadre to surrender through an half hour persuasion". 

More importantly, the formation of political parties seeking to 

espouse the cause of the Muslims led to the swift closure of 

the narrow window for radical mobilisation, which could have 

contributed to the growth of these Islamists. The installation 

of the Awami League (AL) government in Bangladesh in 2008 

and its initiation of a range of steps to bring the activities of 

the North-eastern militants to a close, effectively sealed the 

fate of the Islamists in its entirety. 

It may be useful to locate the source of such alarmist 

projections in the attempts made by various agencies - both 

state and central - to bring the North-eastern Islamists under 

the broader global jihadi umbrella, and subsequently under 

the American radar, especially in a post-9/11 era. The state 

governments in the Northeast, the media, as well as select 

commentators, are willing players in the game for selfish 

motives. The sheer inconsistency in the assessment on 

Islamist militancy bears testimony to this. 

The issue of Islamist militancy also did not find a mention in 

the address of the Assam Governor in the two-day Conference 

of Governors convened by President Pranab Mukherjee in 

New Delhi on 11-12 February 2013. JB Patnaik chose to only 

highlight the growing influence of the anti-talk faction of the 

ULFA and the Maoist insurgency. However, as the trend 

demonstrates, this does not signify in any way, the end of 

doom-laden assertions on Islamist militancy in Assam.

Commentary 

Teesta Water Accord: Expectations for Indo-Bangladesh Water Diplomacy 

Roomana Hukil 


Recent talks of optimism over the Teesta accord by Indian 

Foreign Secretary, Ranjan Mathai and Minister of External 

Affairs, Salman Khurshid have defused a striking political 

assertion of bringing a cut to the impending decade-long 

water deal between both countries. With the cross-border 

exchange of premier visits nearing this year, a greater 

expectation garners public attention and raises the question 

of the underlying profound inadequacies. As technical data on 

the Dalia and Gazaldoba barrages on the Teesta River is 

presently examined in Kolkata, this article highlights the 

palpable expectations of both countries in regard to the 

Teesta water sharing arrangement. It simultaneously draws 

attention to the propelling shortfalls that surface as major 

bottlenecks in addressing these concerns given the 

histological accounts. What do the Indo-Bangla governments 

anticipate from each other in terms of sanctioning the Teesta 

river agreement? What are the impelling factors that provide 

rationale to their core essential position on the issue? 

Expectations 

In view of boosting its agricultural production and providing 

protection to the 21 million people who live along the river 

basin, Bangladesh expects an equitable 50 percent 

distribution of the remainder 25 percent portion with India 

over the Teesta River. Failing to fulfil this proportionate 

requirement, the recipients along the river basin will be worse 

affected. More so, the Dalia barrage that was constructed 

along the Teesta River, in an attempt to revive cultivable land 

during the dry season, has been adversely impinged upon. 

This is due to the erroneous construction of the Gazaldoba 

barrage by the upper riparian state on its part of the Teesta 

River. Ever since the Dalia barrage project has come to a point 

of closure, Bangladesh anticipates remedy as against the 

acute water shortage it faces in the downstream areas during 

the dry season, primarily the northwest. Amounting to a 

severe concern as it is amongst the utmost drought prone 

regions of Bangladesh during the lean season (January- 

February), the Teesta Barrage Project (TBP) case study 

suggests that the present flow in the Teesta River is extremely 

scarce to meet the present irrigation demands, as fluctuations 

in the river flow affect the provision of water in the TBP area. 

Hard Truths 

India and Bangladesh share 57 transboundary rivers but only 

have an agreement for one. Since 1974, Bangladesh has 

perceived India as having failed to deliver and act upon the 

promising 'big brother' it presupposes in the region. India 

substantiated the standpoint by violating the clauses of the 

Ganges Water treaty and supplies excess water during floods 

and a reduced amount during the dry season, which ultimately 

triggers draughts. Disagreements over Tipai Mukh dam, Teesta 

River, and river-linking projects for trade and transit add to the 

already situated tensions between the two countries. 

Post the UPA and All India Trinamool Congress fraction in 

2012, a prospect to recover Indo-Bangla relations was sought 

by putting a wrap to the Teesta accord. The recent Indian 

parliamentary delegation to Bangladesh asserts the centre's 

stance on the issue. On 10 February 2013, Indian Foreign 

Secretary, Ranjan Mathai pledged conclusive obligation over 

the Teesta ordeal, “We are unwavering in our commitment to 

reach a satisfactory conclusion within the shortest possible 

timeframe”. In addition, optimism was highlighted by the 

external affairs minister, Salman Khurshid, on sanctioning the 

deal, "the process was stalled post the prime minister's visit to 

Dhaka in September 2011. But this time we are quite keen to 

sign the Teesta water sharing treaty with Bangladesh at the 

earliest.” 

As is evident, the centre propagates West Bengal's consensus 

to instigate national directives. It is exigent to persuade the 

state government from giving in considering their reports and 

findings. According to the 2009 Kalyan Rudra report, the state 

of West Bengal receives less than 40 percent of the available 

utilisable surface water. More so, the reservoirs only meet 

2.44 per cent of the total demand for water (i.e. 5380 X 107 

cu.m) in the agricultural sector. West Bengal's major grief is 

that the delta which was once described as an area of 'excess' 

water in the colonial document, now suffers from acute 

dearth of water during the lean months. From the regional 

point of view, West Bengal's uncertainty is justified whether 

the proposed water sharing ratio will be able to meet the 

mounting demands of the region. In such a scenario, it is 

expected that both countries bend to the given situation and 

recognise that living with low flows in the region is an 

inevitable aspect. 

The Road Ahead 

Both Bangladesh and West Bengal recognise that dealing with 

their regional problems offhand is a significant impetus to 

allowing the water deal to kick off. West Bengal's Chief 

Minister, Mamata Banerjee made it clear at more than one 

occasion that her concerns hold in the greater interest of t 

state rather than admitting concern towards strengthening 

Indo-Bangladeshi ties. “National interests cannot paramount 

at the stake of West Bengal”, stated the Irrigation and 

Waterways Minister Rajib Banerjee of West Bengal. 

In the wake of fraying Indo-Bangla relations, the signing of the 

extradition treaty and a liberalised visa agreement does mark 

an effort towards improving bilateral relations between the 

two countries. However, at this juncture, it is expedient that 

Bangladesh continues cooperation till India re-adopts water 

diplomacy and refrains from acting as the 'stipulated' big 

brother in the region. 

South Asia Plus 17


Commentary 

Early Warning and Peace Alert: Transforming Rajouri & Poonch in J&K 



In the last two years, there has been a substantial 

transformation in the twin districts of Rajouri and Poonch 

along the LoC in J&K. Keeping in line with the decline of 

militancy across J&K, the districts have also witnessed a 

substantial drop in violence. The local population seems to be 

convinced that the era of militancy and violence is over in the 

two districts. The security forces – military, para-military, and 

the J&K Police have worked hard to bring the situation under 

control. 

Violence related to militancy has come down to zero in the 

two districts. There is a popular belief that things are looking 

up. In this regard, how does one consolidate the gains, and 

ensure peace prevails? 

The State should not take the situation for granted and 

measure peace in terms of the absence of violence. True, 

militancy related violence has come down to zero in the two 

districts, and there is hardly any presence of military or paramilitary 

forces on the streets. The road opening parties (ROPs) 

and restriction in travel have come down drastically. 

The State and civil society now have to work on the following 

four areas to convert the present situation into a positive 

peace – economic reconstruction, connectivity and tourism, 

better governance, and social harmony. 

The process of economic reconstruction is already visible. One 

can also observe the economic presence and expansion of the 

middle class in these two districts. Construction of new 

houses, small shops along the major and minor roads, more 

vehicles on the streets, and the crowding of market areas 

highlight the flow of money in the two districts. Is every class 

benefitting from this economic growth, or is it restricted to 

the middle and upper middle classes? 

Government schemes, individual entrepreneurship, and 

foreign remittances (especially in Mendhar and Surankote 

areas) have primarily lead to this economic growth. However, 

this growth is not widespread and does not cover every 

section; it is led by the middle and upper middle classes, and is 

presently limited to urban and semi-urban areas. True, 

Vodafone and Airtel have reached every corner of the two 

districts, with everyone having a mobile phone; but this 

should not be the only yardstick to measure peace and 

prosperity. 

Lack of awareness and ignorance ensure that government 

schemes are used more by the middle and upper middle 

classes. Even today, there are many Gujjars in rural areas, who 

cannot get a community certificate reflecting their Scheduled 

Tribe status, owing to a general lack in awareness, and the 

level of corruption. Individual entrepreneurship also 

demands certain basic skills, capacity, and funding support – 

all these aspects are not yet present in every segment of 

society. Foreign remittances especially from the Gulf, as 

mentioned earlier, only benefit a small section of a particular 

community in Medhar and Surankote regions. 

Though the government pervades throughout the two 

districts in terms of numerous institutions, what is missing is 

governance. Several developmental activities, especially in 

road construction, have been undertaken all over the two 

districts. However, the other departments and institutions are 

yet to make a visible impact at the ground level. In the state 

capitals and district headquarters, there are various schemes 

under different ministries and departments; though 

supported by substantial funds, these schemes are yet to be 

seen at the grassroots. There is a huge gap between what is 

available on paper in the district headquarters, and what 

actually gets materialised. This is not a question of just 

leakages; there is a complete disappearance! 

Undoubtedly, the gap is being used by middlemen - a 

substantial section that benefits from this loot. The biggest 

responsibility for the State is to ensure that this loot gets 

reduced. Even more importantly, the State has to be seen as 

responsible and accountable in the minds of the people. The 

majority do not trust the State; rather the predominant belief 

is the State aids only a section and allows corruption to 

prevail, because the entire government machinery is a party 

to this. 

The State will have to take measures to reduce the 

governance deficit, and also the trust deficit between the 

government and its people. While every department and 

sector needs to be activated, certain deserve special 

attention; education, health care, and rural development, 

being examples of this. Given the nature and extent of 

corruption, the J&K government and New Delhi may not be 

able to lead a revolution against corruption, but can at least 

make an earnest effort for clean governance in certain 

departments. 

Besides the above sectors, the government has to ensure that 

the institution of panchayat raj becomes fully functional. 

Unfortunately, there is a resistance from the elected political 

leadership and bureaucracy to devolve power to the 

panchayat institutions; this has sent a wrong signal to both the 

people and institutions of grass root democracy. 

After being embroiled for more than a decade with militancy 

and violence, today, there is an opening in the two districts. 

The State should seize this opportunity. If the State can ensure 

delivery in the above three sectors, along with ensuring 

effective panchayat raj institutions, it will go a long way in 

reducing the trust deficit between the governing and the 

governed.

Commentary 

Review: India-Sri Lanka Track-II Initiative 

Prof. V. Suryanarayan 

Former Director, Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras 

Recently, the Manipal Global Education of India and the 

Pathfinder Foundation of Sri Lanka took the initiative to form a 

joint study group and organize an informal dialogue to explore 

the ways and means of strengthening bilateral relations 

between India and Sri Lanka. The report of the joint study 

group was recently submitted to the National Security Advisor 

and the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India and 

Secretary to the President of Sri Lanka. 

The members of the joint study group comprised of Amb. 

Bernard Goonetilleke, Amb. Nihal Rodrigo, Amb 

H.M.G.S.Palihakkara, Amb. Dr. Vethody Kumaran Valsan, Dr. 

Rohan Perera and Dr. Inderjit Coomaraswamy from Sri Lanka, 

and Amb. A. Gopinathan, Sri Vijay Singh (former Union 

Defence Secretary), General Deepak Kapoor (former Chief of 

the Army), Shri Hormis Tharakan and Prof. V. Suryanarayan 

from India. 

The Indian team was appreciative of the fact that due to 

asymmetry in size, population, economic resources and 

military strength, it is natural for small neighbours like Sri Lanka 

to entertain misgivings about New Delhi's intentions and 

capabilities. The report of the study group has recommended 

“a structured, systematic and continuous dialogue based on 

mutual respect and sovereign equality between the two 

governments, so as to deal with issues that arise from time to 

time and remove any potential irritants”. 

The report has covered various facets of India-Sri Lanka 

relations – political and strategic issues, strengthening 

economic linkages, people-to-people contacts and the 

establishment of a joint mechanism for the management of 

marine resources in the Palk Bay. While it may not satisfy the 

extremist elements in either country, if the recommendations 

are implemented sincerely and expeditiously, it would go a 

long way towards laying the foundations of lasting friendship. 

Recommending all political parties, including minority and 

opposition groups, “to re-position themselves in relation to 

the post-LTTE realities”, the report urges that, “they should 

commit themselves to effective devolution through provinces 

down to grassroots level. They should keep in mind past 

experiences, without necessarily being constrained by 

them…They should initiate a structured dialogue and arrive at 

a political consensus on the ethnic issue”. It goes on to state 

that the impact of ethnic issues in bilateral relations must be 

addressed sensitively and that it is important to give effect to 

bilateral understandings and commitments in this regard. 

The Indian team was conscious that the ethnic issue, then, has 

domestic ramifications. The inordinate delay in holding the 

elections to the northern provincial council and reneging on 

the solemn commitments made to New Delhi on the 

implementation of the 13th amendment has resulted in ugly 

situations in Tamil Nadu. The demand that officers from the 

Sri Lankan armed forces should not be given training in 

defence establishments, attack on innocent pilgrims visiting 

places of religious worship and opposition to the participation 

of Sri Lankan delegates in the international conferences – all 

these are testaments as to how vested interests could exploit 

the situation for their own ends. 

On the issue of travails of fishermen in the Palk Bay region, the 

report has suggested the establishment of a two-tier joint 

mechanism for the conservation and sustainable 

management of fisheries and marine resources in the Palk Bay 

area. Annexure I of the report provides details of the joint 

mechanism. In order to minimize delays and expedite decision 

making, the first tier will consist of representatives of two 

governments. The second tier will be more broad-based. In 

addition to government representatives, fishermen's 

associations and specialists in marine ecology and other stake 

holders will be represented. The Indian team argued that the 

ongoing dialogue among the fishermen of two countries 

should be encouraged, because a solution from below has 

greater chances of success than one imposed by Colombo and 

New Delhi. 

The report has proposed a road map for enhancing economic 

co-operation between the two countries. The Institute of 

Policy Studies (IPS) in Colombo and the Research Information 

System for Developing Countries (RIS) in New Delhi should 

update and expand the RIS-Wider study and “provide a 

comprehensive projection of bilateral economic relations in 

their multifarious dimension over the next two decades”. It 

has also made specific suggestions for enhancing people-topeople 

cooperation, including measures such as visas on 

arrival, enhancing and streamlining the award of scholarships, 

encouraging the two-way traffic of artists and creative 

personnel and the greater flow of media representatives. 

The study group has called upon the two governments to pay 

immediate attention to implementing the recommendations 

contained in the report. The Indian team was of the firm view 

that the need of the hour is ethnic reconciliation and, as a first 

step, the positive recommendations of the LLRC should be 

implemented. Ethnic harmony would provide the backdrop 

for enhancing economic co-operation and people-to-people 

contacts. The traditionally close friendship between the 

peoples of the two countries can be strengthened only if a 

new political system, where multiple identities can co-exist 

harmoniously, can be built in Sri Lanka. 

South Asia Plus 19


Commentary 

Hyderabad Terror Attacks: Road-blocks in the National Counter-Terrorism 

Centre (NCTC) 

N Manoharan 


After the recent twin blasts in Hyderabad, there has been a 

new push towards setting up the National Counter-Terrorism 

Centre (NCTC). Earlier attempts to set up an overarching body 

to deal with counter-terrorism failed mainly because of 

opposition from states ruled by non-Congress parties. But is 

this the only obstacle? Are there other serious issues in 

making the NCTC fully functional? 

In 2009, Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram outlined his 

vision for “the broad architecture of a new security system 

that will serve the country today and in the foreseeable 

future.” His idea was to institute an umbrella body dedicated 

to counter terrorism along the lines of the American NCTC, 

with control over intelligence, operations and the 

investigation of all matters pertaining to terrorism. The 

NCTC's goals, according to Chidambaram, “will include 

preventing a terrorist attack, containing a terrorist attack, 

should one take place, and responding to a terrorist attack by 

inflicting pain upon the perpetrators”. 

The need for a body like the NCTC cannot be questioned. India 

is one of the worst affected countries by terrorism and, in 

recent times, it has witnessed more terrorist incidents than 

any other country in the world. India faces a wide spectrum of 

threats that range from militancy in Jammu & Kashmir, 

insurgency in the northeast, left-wing extremism in Central 

India, and jihadi terrorism threatening the hinterland of the 

country. Over and above the main forms of terrorism, other 

threats exist, such as illegal migration, drug-trafficking, the 

smuggling of counterfeit currencies, small arms proliferation, 

and cyber warfare. These are all varied forms of the kind of 

terrorism that India confronts today. Yet for all that, the 

country lacks a single overarching body dedicated to the cause 

of counter-terrorism. The time limit for constituting the NCTC 

was initially set for the end of 2010, but is yet to see the light of 

day. Only recently has the current Home Minister Sushilkumar 

Shinde indicated his readiness “to tweak controversial 

proposals to break the impasse.” 

To avoid replication, Chidambaram wanted all related 

agencies involved in counter-terrorism (although they are 

part of different ministries) like the Research and Analysis 

Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Joint Intelligence 

Committee (JIC), National Technical Research Organisation 

(NTRO), Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Aviation 

Research Centre (ARC), Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), Defence 

Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Bureau of Investigation 

(CBI), National Investigation Agency (NIA) to report to the 

proposed NCTC (under the Ministry of Home Affairs) on 

matters related to terrorism. However, there has been intense 

resistance to this “submission”. There is a pervasive fear that 

such an arrangement would lead to the over-centralisation of 

power in the Home Minister and the Ministry of Home Affairs 

emerging as a kind of “super ministry”. 

Although the above apprehension is farfetched, it is the 

responsibility of the Center to convey, in unambiguous terms, 

that the focus of the NCTC will be “terrorism only”. In this 

regard, it should be acknowledged that intelligence 

/investigation/security agencies have a far wider mandate 

than terrorism. Even on matters specifically related to 

terrorism, the methodology of working should be 

cooperation and coordination and not the subordination of 

one agency to the other. The final objective is to bring about 

synergy and cohesion in counter-terrorism efforts, by doing 

away with overlapping, duplications, bottlenecks and other 

unnecessary hurdles. To achieve this objective, it is enough if 

the NCTC functions as an umbrella organisation with 

representations from intelligence, investigation and security 

agencies. It should be in a position to integrate all instruments 

of national power, including diplomatic, economic, social, 

political, military, intelligence, and law enforcement to ensure 

a unity of effort. This integration should happen at central, 

state and local levels. In other words, the tentacles of the 

NCTC should penetrate deep down up to district levels instead 

of being another top-heavy organisation. 

The NCTC need not follow any international model – US, UK or 

European – but that which suits India's capabilities, and caters 

to the kind of threats the country faces. It has to be innovative 

and proactive in its approach rather than defensive and 

reactive. 'Prevention' and 'protection' should be the main 

watch words. For this, the Centre should constantly monitor 

terror/militant groups, their support network, sponsors, 

sanctuaries, modus operandi, threat potential, and 

leadership and make periodic threat assessments for policymakers. 

In this regard, it can effectively use the Crime and 

Criminal Tracking Network System (CCNTS), National 

Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), Central Monitoring System 

(CMS) and Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). 

Personnel for NCTC could be pooled from relevant 

intelligence, investigation and security agencies headed by 

the senior most experienced officer on rotation basis with 

simple command structure. In this way, turf wars could be 

avoided, with the potential and efficacy of the agencies 

maximised.

Commentary 

India and Pakistan: Is Islamabad's Strategy Changing on the LoC? 

J Jeganaathan 

Research Fellow, IPCS 

The recent tension on the Line of Control (LoC) between India 

and Pakistan signal the resumption of dormant tension in 

Indo-Pak relations and there is a growing concern that the 

relations are now back to square one. What could be the 

rationale for Pakistan for increasing the tension? Is Pakistan 

attempting to deflect the current domestic tensions, or there 

is a new plan - Kargil 2.0 in progress? What is the Pakistani 

army up to now? 

A recent intelligence report, based on the interception of 

satellite communication leaked to Indian media, reveals a 

detailed account of how the entire operation was planned and 

executed meticulously. It claimed that the Inter-Service 

Intelligence (ISI) planned the operation with the support of 

Lakshar-e-Toiba (LeT) cadres in order to felicitate their 

intrusion into the Indian Territory. For the first time, the 

names of the perpetrators were disclosed. 

Is Pakistan attempting to divert the Domestic Opinion? 

While Pakistan prepares for a transfer of power this year, its 

strategic direction remains quite ambiguous. At the domestic 

level, the struggle for power is at an all time high in all 

institutions. The tenure of the Prime Minister, who was 

ordered to be put under arrest, ends by March as does as the 

tenure of the Chief Justice (ending in September 2013) who 

ordered the arrest. The traditional rivalry between military 

and civilian authorities has further blurred the strategic 

direction in which Pakistan should be heading. Both the army 

chief and the President are also demitting their office this 

year. Political struggle, not only across the parties rather, 

between the army, judiciary and legislature, therefore, seems 

inevitable. At the same time the Pakistani army is in facesaving 

mode, in the aftermath of the Abbottabad incident. 

It is obvious that the recent skirmishes at LoC were a reflection 

of this domestic crisis that compelled the Pakistan 

establishment to revive its traditional hostility with India. 

Strategically, Pakistan is at a crossroads, confronting an 

unfavourable security environment. For instance, its 

conventional security policy of gaining 'strategic depth' 

towards the west has been circumscribed by the US presence 

in Afghanistan. And, its customary approach to seek a 

'strategic superiority' towards the east through Kashmir has 

been dormant since the 2003 ceasefire agreement with India. 

Moreover, there is a growing realisation within Pakistan today 

that most major challenges for its existence are emanating 

from the west in the form of Talibanisation. 

Or is there a larger strategy towards J&K? 

In order to assuage the domestic crisis and to restore the 

public faith in state machinery, Pakistan has been left with no 

option but to revive the perennial hostility with India by 

rekindling the Kashmir issue. The main reason, perhaps, could 

be the urge to retain its strategic significance or relevance to 

the US owing to the diminished scope of regaining strategic 

depth in Afghanistan. As part of this strategic shift, Pakistan 

raised the Kashmir issue in the last United Nations General 

Assembly (UNGA) general debate held in September 2012 

after a gap of four years. Since Pakistan has assumed the 

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) rotating presidency as 

a non-permanent member from January 2013, it is set to use 

this opportunity to bring back the Kashmir issue to the UN list 

of priorities. As a matter of fact, India had seconded Pakistan's 

candidature for this post, which is now proving inimical to its 

own interest. 

Nevertheless, Pakistan's intentions do not seem genuine in 

terms of finding a solution to the Kashmir issue. Rather, its 

actions are sparked by new geostrategic twists. The Indian 

domination of all the key heights of the Siachen glacier 

including the Saltoro Ridge threatens the 'old Silk Route' or 

the Karakoram Highway connecting Gilgit-Baltistan region of 

Pakistan occupied Kashmir to Kashgar, a city in the Xinjiang 

region of China. China has promised Pakistan to construct the 

logistical route from the Gilgit-Baltistan to Gwadar. It appears 

that Pakistan's objective in Kashmir has been reduced to 'only 

demilitarisation of Siachen by India' because of these new 

geostrategic compulsions as outlined above and the China 

factor, which sought to revive the 'old Silk Route' by building 

the Karakoram Highway. 

On the other hand, an unfriendly Afghanistan has obscured 

Pakistan's trade and economic interests in Central Asia, which 

has been then naturally pushed towards India. Although Indo- 

Pak trade relations, which have improved dramatically since 

2003, are seen as a potential area of mutual cooperation, 

Pakistan is cautious as well as anxious about the growing 

economic interdependency with India. Thus, the geoeconomic 

interests of Pakistan, driven by the dynamics of the 

geopolitical situation in the region, are inducing it to negotiate 

the demilitarisation of Siachen glacier with India, by hook or 

by crook. 

Even the K.Subhramanyam report on Kargil War observes that 

the 'Kargil Plan' of the Pakistani army was to force India to 

demilitarise Siachen by cutting off its supply routes. Lt.Gen. 

Paranaik has also averred that Kargil happened because of 

Siachen (note: India hardened its stand on Siachen in 1998). If 

that is true, then the recent incident at the LoC unveils 

Pakistan's 'Kargil Plan 2.0' as a result of India's reluctance to 

negotiate on Siachen. 

South Asia Plus 21


Commentary 

India's Northeast: The Threat of Islamist Militancy 

Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman 

Research Scholar, IIT Guwahati, Assam 

The demonstration by Muslim advocacy groups, which 

resulted in violent clashes in Mumbai's Azad Maidan on 11 

August 2012, leaving 2 dead and over 65 injured, was held to 

protest against the killings of Muslims in Kokrajhar (the intercommunity 

clashes between Muslims and the Bodo 

community) and in the Arakan state of Myanmar (the intercommunity 

clashes between the Rohingya Muslims and the 

Rakhine community). The linkage of these two separate intercommunity 

clashes to a single protest march in Mumbai may 

be symbolic, but the threat of the rise of Islamist militancy in 

parts of Northeast India, and the larger international 

neighbourhood encompassing Myanmar and Bangladesh, has 

to be seen in context. 

It has been well documented that Islamist militant groups and 

networks have had links with insurgent groups in many states 

of Northeast India, especially in Manipur, Assam and 

Nagaland; and this had been oscillating between tactical 

support in arms dealing, narcotics, illegal and fake currency 

networks, and anti-government sabotage activities over the 

past few decades. This trend, however, does not indicate by 

itself the threat of Islamist militancy. While many 

commentators have described the threat of the rise of Islamist 

militancy in Northeast India as unfounded and being alarmist, 

the ground conditions in the larger region cannot be ignored. 

The People's United Liberation Front (PULF) has been 

operating in parts of Manipur, Assam and Nagaland for the 

past two decades, and has been splintered, as has been the 

trend with many other insurgent organisations in Northeast 

India. Though split into many smaller factions over time, it is 

one of the major Islamist militant organisations currently 

active in the region. Apart from this, the role and support of 

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Bangladesh's 

Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) to many 

insurgent organisations and networks in Northeast India, has 

unabatedly continued. There is a sort of an ideological 

vacuum in many of the 'home-grown' insurgent organisations 

in Northeast India. They have suffered huge losses in tactical 

and public legitimacy accounts in the past decade or so and 

are not in a position to prevent the growth of Islamist 

militancy in Northeast India, as to guard their own turf. 

The entry points for Islamist militancy in Northeast India are 

not hard to comprehend. The presence of a large 'illegal' 

Muslim immigrant community in Assam, which has been a 

source of perennial political activism, and was one of the 

motivations behind the formation of the United Liberation 

Front of Asom (ULFA), became fertile ground for an entry 

point to the Islamist militant groups. The political uncertainty 

that has engulfed this migrant community over more than 

four decades now, has made them vulnerable to such militant 

influence, as a way to survive the political threat. Further 

enhancing the political aspect of an ever-looming 'threat to 

their survival' versus their responses to 'surviving the threat' 

over the past decades; the instance of large-scale riots and 

inter-community clashes in the past, such as the Nellie riots 

and the recent instances in Udalguri in 2008 and Kokrajhar in 

2012, have made the case for militant responses an usable 

instrument in the evolving politics of the region. 

The recent riots in Kokrajhar saw the use of sophisticated 

weapons by the Bodo militant groups, who took advantage of 

the situation. Stemming from the flawed surrender policy of 

the Indian counter-insurgency establishment, there is a 

possibility of these weapons finding their way into the hands 

of the Muslim groups, by jihadi groups across the border. The 

threat of the rise of militancy amongst the Muslims affected 

by the Kokrajhar violence, was raised by the National 

Commission for Minorities (NCM), in its report to the Assam 

government after a field visit in the violence affected areas of 

Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) areas in 

August 2012. The overall political, economic, and living 

conditions of the Muslim community in BTAD areas has been 

described as a fertile ground for jihadi influence. 

This brings into context the rise in militant activities amongst 

the Rohingya Muslims in the larger region of Arakan state of 

Myanmar, South Bangladesh, and parts of Tripura and 

Mizoram. In the face of deportation by Border Guards Force 

along the Bangladesh border, and political and ethnic clashes 

in Myanmar, the links of Rohingya militant organisations with 

Al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba have been substantiated in the 

past. There have been reports of Rohingya Muslims trying to 

make their way into Northeast India, and this seems not a 

distant possibility, given the state of our borders and the 

manner in which we treat our sensitive and 'peaceful states' 

border, especially in Mizoram, Manipur and Tripura. 

The government of India needs to brace itself to counter the 

threat of Islamist militancy in the larger region through 

proactive diplomacy and a better understanding of larger 

issues and linkages. It should not be content in 'managing' the 

home situation. The trends that are emerging cannot be 

ignored for the lack of actual ground instances; rather, we 

must prepare and remedy the conditions for such entry points 

to Islamist militancy.

Commentary 

Bangladesh: An Analysis of Pranab Mukherjee's Visit 

Harun ur Rashid 

Former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva 

President Pranab Mukherjee arrived in Dhaka on 3 March for 

a three-day visit to Bangladesh at the invitation of the 

President and Prime Minister of Bangladesh. Highly respected 

in Bangladesh for his modesty and affability, Mukherjee has 

close personal connections with the country, through his wife, 

who hails from the Sadar Upazilla of Narail. During his recent 

visit, President Mukherjee received an honorary doctorate 

degree at a Convocation of Dhaka University and visited the 

ancestral home of his in-laws in Bhadrabila village, Narail in 

Sadar sub-district. According to media reports from 

Bangladesh, Kanai Lal Ghosh, the president's brother-in-law, 

is currently residing at the ancestral home. 

Politically speaking, too, Mukherjee is no stranger to 

Bangladesh. During the 1971 War of Liberation, he was one of 

the main Indian political leaders who supported and assisted 

the provisional government of Bangladesh and the people of 

Bangladesh bear a debt of gratitude to him. Indeed, he 

received the 'Bangladesh Swadhinata Sammanona 

(Bangladesh Freedom Honour)' a state honour for his 

outstanding contribution to the Liberation War. The 

government of Bangladesh, led by the Bangladesh Awami 

League, first started honouring foreign allies for their 

contribution to the country's liberation war in 2011, when the 

government posthumously conferred the Bangladesh 

Swadhinata Sammanona upon former prime minister of India, 

the late Indira Gandhi. Her daughter-in-law and Congress 

President, Sonia Gandhi received the honour on her behalf on 

July 25, 2011. 

The majority of people in the smaller neighbouring countries 

in the vicinity around India perceive it to be the larger and 

more resourceful neighbour. There is both admiration and 

apprehension in these perceptions. Admiration is felt because 

this particular neighbour, having common bonds of history 

and geography, has been emerging as a global and a regional 

political and economic power. Apprehension emanates from a 

more strained scenario when these smaller neighbours are 

not sure of their position in a fluid geopolitical environment. 

Under such circumstances, an Indian presidential visit to any 

foreign country in the neighbouring vicinity is not only highly 

ceremonial but diplomatically symbolic. It goes without 

saying that no presidential visit can take place without the 

approval of the Indian government. Usually, a list of countries 

is prepared, to which the ceremonial visit of the Indian 

President will take place, taking into account India's national 

and regional interests. 

believe Bangladesh may consider seriously looking 

eastwards, and eventually form a cooperative institutional 

relationship with Myanmar, Thailand, and China, given the 

geopolitical shift of power towards the Asia-Pacific at the 

dawn of the twenty-first century. Domestically speaking, India 

also realizes that it needs Bangladesh because of its 

geographic location, especially because of the advantages 

that Bangladesh holds in terms of transit/trans-shipment of 

goods through the latter country to India's north-eastern 

states via West Bengal. 

In this context, relations between India and Bangladesh have 

been on the upswing ever since Sheikh Hasina took power in 

2009. Prime Minister Hasina visited New Delhi in January 

2010 and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was in 

Dhaka in September 2011. Dhaka moved quickly to address 

Delhi's concerns on cross-border terrorism and transit/transshipment 

to India's north-east, given the proper 

infrastructure in place for it. Transit on an experimental basis 

was provided to India by Bangladesh in 2011. However, the 

promises made by India, in return for Bangladesh's 

acquiescence on issues such as these, remain unfulfilled. 

Nevertheless, President Mukherjee's first foreign visit to 

Bangladesh demonstrates that the Indian government does 

indeed attach great importance to the existing cooperative 

relations with Bangladesh in various sectors. 

There is a saying that one can choose friends but not 

neighbours. As a regional power, however, India needs to 

cultivate good relationships with its neighbouring countries. If 

neighbouring countries, such as Bangladesh, Bhutan and 

Nepal, do not respond positively to India's overtures, it may 

be difficult for India to achieve its regional goals, while 

catering to its global ambitions. Bangladesh and India are 

neighbours and they cannot re-fashion geography. The two 

countries are destined to live next to each other. Given the 

desire to live together in cooperation, two countries may 

proceed with productive relations through unrelenting efforts 

in political, economic, social and environmental issues. 

India is aware that the geopolitical scene around South Asia 

and South East Asia is in a fluid state. Bangladesh not only 

shares borders with India, but also with reformist Myanmar 

and is also a near neighbour to China, Nepal and Bhutan. If 

India has strained relations with Bangladesh, some analysts 

South Asia Plus 23


Commentary 

Sri Lanka: Third UNHRC Resolution and India's Dilemma 

N Manoharan 


As Sri Lanka faces its third resolution at the UN Human Rights 

Council (UNHRC), India is once again caught in a dilemma. On 

the one hand, New Delhi does not wish to support an 

'intrusive' resolution against Colombo. At the same time, it 

wants Sri Lanka to take reconciliation and devolution 

seriously. Pressures from Tamil Nadu, in this regard, are 

difficult to ignore. 

Exactly a year ago, at the 19th session of the UNHRC, a USsponsored 

resolution was passed against the island state. 

Backed by 24 countries, including France, Norway and India, 

the resolution placed three requests to Sri Lanka: 

1. To 'implement the constructive recommendations made in 

the report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 

Commission' (LLRC), and to 'initiate credible and 

independent actions to ensure justice, equity, 

accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans'. 

2. To 'present a comprehensive action plan as expeditiously as 

possible, detailing the steps the Government has taken and 

will take to implement the LLRC recommendations, and also 

to address alleged violations of international law'. 

3. To 'accept advice and technical assistance from the Office of 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 

and relevant special procedures mandated by holders for 

implementing the above-mentioned steps … ' 

One year down the line, how far have these requests been 

taken forward by Sri Lanka? It would be prudent if the 

upcoming voting depends on the evaluation of the progress 

made, and a clear plan of action for the future. There are two 

aspects to the debate: one is fixing accountability for excesses 

committed by the Sri Lankan forces during 'Eelam War IV'; and 

the other is the way forward in the form of post-war 

reconciliation in the island. 

On the issue of accountability, the Army has appointed a Court 

of Inquiry as an initial fact-finding mission. The five-member 

body, in the first part of its report submitted on 15 February 

2013, concluded that the Army 'took all necessary 

precautions to avoid civilian casualties, and all those who 

came under the control of the Sri Lanka Army, including 

surrendered/captured LTTE cadres, were treated humanely 

observing the IHL [international humanitarian law] to the 

letter'. On the other hand, it blamed the LTTE for 'using 

civilians as Human Shields, summary executions of civilians 

who attempted to escape to army lines, forced conscription of 

children for combat purposes etc'. While there is no doubt on 

the LTTE's involvement, the Army's total denial of the killings is 

perplexing. According to the Report of the Secretary- 

General's Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in 

Sri Lanka submitted in November 2012, 'most casualties were 

caused by Government fire, and included attacks on UN 

premises, and hospitals'. Even if the UNs' report is discounted 

as an exaggeration, and a 50:50 ratio is taken between the 

LTTE and the Army, the latter would still be responsible for 

about 20,000 of the estimated 40,000 killings. Fresh video 

evidences of the killing of LTTE leader Prabhakaran's 12-yearold 

son, has made the task of the Sri Lankan delegation at the 

UNHRC a bit more difficult. The call, therefore, has been for an 

independent international enquiry. 

Some headway was made in the implementation of the LLRC 

recommendations, but the results on the ground are not 

encouraging. Colombo presented the National Action Plan in 

July 2012 listing out the implementation of recommendations 

according to Activity, Key Responsible Agency, Key 

Performance Indicator and Timeframe. A Task Force (headed 

by the Secretary to the President) was appointed to oversee 

the implementation of the Action Plan. But there were too 

many implementing agencies identified without clear-cut 

budget breakups. Surprisingly, Provincial Councils and other 

local bodies, which are closer to the people and which are in a 

better position to implement the recommendations, were 

totally left out. 

Though the US acknowledged 'some progress' in the LLRC 

implementation, some undemocratic acts like the 

impeachment of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court's Chief Justice, 

and the passage of the Divinugema Act (that encroached on 

Provincial Councils on development) turned the tables against 

the island state. Therefore Washington, which is once again 

sponsoring the resolution, has indicated that the new 

'resolution will ask the Government of Sri Lanka to follow 

through on its own commitments to its people, including 

implementing the constructive recommendations from the 

report by Sri Lanka's Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 

Commission'. 

India's stand is being keenly watched by fence-sitters at the 

UNHRC, before a decision on the voting is taken. With 

countries like China and Russia not being a part of the Council 

this year, India's influence is going to be important. Last year, 

as in 2009, though India voted for the resolution, it played a 

significant role in toning down the original draft making it 

more 'non-intrusive and non-judgmental'. This year, India has 

so far not divulged its stand on the resolution. However, New 

Delhi has advised Colombo to engage directly with 

Washington 'on the draft resolution, and aim for a mutually 

acceptable outcome'. A consensual resolution acceptable to 

all would be easier when it comes to implementation. Outside 

pressure has its own limitation and an expiry date.

Commentary 

Naxal Violence: Is the Maoist Base Slipping in Odisha? 



On 20 February 2013, 113 tribal activists shunned ties with 

the Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh (CMAS), said to be a frontal 

organization of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI- 

Maoist), and surrendered before Narayanpatna police in 

Koraput district. Since January this year alone, around 778 

CMAS activists of the Nachika Linga-led faction of CMAS in 

Narayanpatna, from 22 villages, have already dissociated 

themselves and expressed their desire to join the 

mainstream. The CMAS activists, who have left Linga, include 

62 from his own village, Bhaliaput. The surrendered activists 

made it clear that they should not be considered as 

sympathizers of the Maoists anymore. Is this event a sign of a 

greater trend at work in the region? What can this mean for 

the hold that the Maoist movement has in the area? 

The CMAS was formed by tribal leaders like Kendruka Arjun, 

Kondagiri Paidama, Nachika Linga, K. Singanna and 

Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) [CPI (ML)] Kanu 

Sanyal group activists like Srikant Mohanty and Gananath 

Patra, who pioneered and led the CMAS to prevent acquisition 

of tribal lands by non-tribals in Koraput district in 2006. It was 

a reincarnation of the banned Ryot Kuli Sangham [Peasant 

Labourers Association] of Parvatipuram in the district of 

Vizianagaram in Andhra Pradesh, which was founded in the 

year 1994. Subsequently, however, CMAS was divided into the 

Bandhugaon and Narayanpatna factions, due to differences in 

the use of violence. While Arjun preferred to lead the CMAS of 

Bandhugaon block through peaceful methods, Linga led the 

CMAS of Narayanpatna block, which provided logistic support 

and shelter to the Maoists. Apart from this, CMAS- 

Narayanpatna activists have also been providing information 

to the Naxalites, regarding the movement of security forces 

involved in anti-Maoist operation. 

In October 2006, about 180 acres of land were reclaimed by 

CMAS activists in Narayanpatna in Koraput district. They 

alleged that non-tribal people had fraudulently taken away 

tribal land in the past. Meanwhile, because of the forcible land 

occupation, Nachika Linga was sentenced to prison and 

charged with several cases including charges of being a Maoist. 

After he was acquitted of all charges in 2008, CMAS staged a 

massive rally of Ghenua Bahini (men wearing red shirts and 

armed with bows and arrows) and landless tribals. This was the 

final stroke, which led to the CMAS emerging in a militant form 

in Narayanpatna, vis-à-vis Bandhugaon, with about 3000 acres 

of land under its control. In subsequent years, CMAS 

strengthened its hold, encouraging tribal people to take control 

of the land, and Narayanpatna block turned into a stronghold 

of the Reds, and, later on, percolated to areas such as Kasinagar 

and Chandragiri in Gajapati and Sorada in the Ganjam district. 

Consequently, in November 2009, the CMAS-Narayanpatna, 

emboldened by the administration's tactlessness and the 

Maoists' support, attacked the Narayanpatna Police Station 

with about 300 of its activists, demanding the removal of 

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) jawans from the area, and 

an end to the combing operations against the Maoists. During 

the protest, two CMAS leaders were killed in Police firing. 

Intensified police action then led to the arrest of around 100 

CMAS cadres, including its convenor Gananath Patra. The CMAS 

retaliated with violent and non-violent protests. After a lull of 

few months, the CMAS-Narayanpatna began to regroup in April 

2010 with the help of the Maoists. Since then it served as a very 

useful purpose for the Maoists in stepping up their activities in 

the area and helping them to identify prospective cadres. 

The Maoists' influence was especially visible in the 

Narayanpatna block of Koraput district, when the CMAS 

activists abducted Laxmipur MLA Jhina Hikaka in March, 2012. 

In the aftermath of the hostage crisis, combing operations and 

patrolling was intensified in all Maoist-prone areas of the 

state and many of the CMAS activists were arrested, including 

Lingama Habika and Kameya Habika. However, the surrender 

of Nachika Chamara aka Samara, the body guard of Nachika 

Linga, on January 4, 2013, revealed that the Maoists were 

using the tribals as human shields to further their gains in the 

area. He also revealed that the Maoists killed the tribals, 

accusing them of being police informers, when they actually 

had no such links with the police. Moreover, he said, the 

promises of Maoists to cadre members that their families 

would be looked after once they got arrested, was a mere 

eyewash. The tribals had also started realizing that the Sangh 

was not coming to the rescue of families, as they had 

promised. To compound their problems, once they had been 

branded CMAS activists, they were failing to reap benefits of 

the Government's welfare schemes for the tribal poor. 

The surrender of Samara was followed by the surrender of 121 

CMAS activists on January 11, 12 and 13 respectively. Tribals 

deserting the CMAS have now become a veritable 

phenomenon in the area and the number of surrenders has 

started to swell in recent days. All the surrendered CMAS 

activists are voluntarily approaching the administration now 

want to avail benefits of developmental schemes of 

government. In the past, due to pressure of Maoists and 

CMAS they were not availing them. 

Earlier in 2009, when more than 60 CMAS activists had 

surrendered in Narayanpatna police station after the arrest of 

hundreds of their activists by the police, the trend did not 

continue as expected. Nevertheless, the numbers and volume 

of the present mass surrenders has certainly given a clear 

indication that the Maoist clout is losing its credibility among 

the people of Narayanpatna and if the tribals continue to snap 

their association with CMAS, it will help weaken existence of 

the Maoists in the region. 

South Asia Plus 25


Commentary 

India, China, and Bangladesh: The Contentious Politics of the Brahmaputra River 

Roomana Hukil 


The Brahmaputra River is one of the most significant 

confidence-building measures between India, China, and 

Bangladesh. Despite a well-functioned relationship between 

India and China in recent decades, the Brahmaputra River may 

pose new challenges to the continued supply of fresh water 

for both countries in the future. In addition, China's 

announcement, last month, of its plans to construct three 

hydropower dams – Dagu, Jiacha, and Jiexy along the middle 

reaches of the Brahmaputra basin, has raged anxiety in India 

and Bangladesh in terms of erosion, flood protective 

measures, and the potential ecological damage to the 

downstream regions. 

The article delves into a strategic-techno analysis of the issues 

festering around the proposed dam construction projects that 

may open a new front of contentious politics amongst the 

neighbours. It examines whether 'water rationality' will 

continue to govern the riparian relationship, and also reasons 

that in spite of no water sharing agreement between India and 

China, vis-à-vis only one water treaty between India and 

Bangladesh; coupled with the enormous potential of sharing 

the benefits, it is unlikely to envision the three countries 

agreeing to sign a portioned water resource development 

treaty in the near future. 

Fresh Strategic Insights: Issues and Steps 

The Brahmaputra River consolidated the water rights between 

all the riparian states pertaining to their water usage, and 

requirements in the growing region. In spite of there having 

being no official water sharing accord between India and 

China, the two countries manifest a paradigm to maintaining 

cordial water diplomacy in the present international scenario 

of water conflicts. Hitherto, the dilemma over future water 

supply regulations, amidst the issue of ecological upkeep, 

persists for both India and Bangladesh. 

China's vigorous push in favour of the hydropower base 

construction on the Brahmaputra or Yarlung Zangbo River (as 

known in China) is foreseen as an attempt to harm the 

downstream interests, particularly of Northeast India. The 

construction of the 100 meters Zangmu dam (510 MW project) 

in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 2010, is an 

approximate case in point. The current proposed construction 

of the 124 metres Dagu dam, which has a 640 MW capacity, 

triggers a maximum impact on the downstream flows in India. 

Post the 'flurry of dam-building', China has tried to leverage its 

hydropower requirements in the north and central regions; 

however, India's Northeast, and neighbouring Bangladesh 

could face an undeniably reduced water supply, if not for acute 

water shortage. This is reasoned since the watercourse feeds 

on seven rivulets originating from the glaciers in the Tibetan 

plateau, hence damming the river upstream could result in the 

lower riparian regions facing an intense water division from 

these snow-fed rivulets during the summer months. 

While the run-of-the-river projects are, primarily, meant to 

store large volumes of water for generating power, fresh 

concerns were raised regarding the need for a scientifically 

designed drainage system all over the downstream region, 

complemented by extensive soil conservation, afforestation, 

and watershed management in the hilly areas of the 

Northeast region. An in-depth study of the climatic changes 

that cause erratic flooding patterns is urged so that proper 

ameliorative measures may be adopted. This, combined with 

regional flood early warning systems and flood moderation 

measures, along with well-planned erosion management, 

should encourage inter-state and regional cooperation. An 

earnest step would be for the international community and 

water boards to thwart any measures that are detrimental to 

the sustainability of the Brahmaputra. It is imperative to 

maintain the flow of water in the Brahmaputra River so that it 

can sustain the environment and water balance in India's 

Northeast, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, before dispersing into 

the Bay of Bengal. 

The Relationship Soufflé 

China's aggressive planning to provide for the energy and 

water needs of its 1.3 billion people at the expanse of its Asian 

counterparts is presumable. China's 26 other dam projects in 

the pipeline (also along the Brahmaputra River) specifies an 

85 per cent decline in flows from China to India during the 

summer months. Even if the foreseen water depictions, such 

as an environmental imbalance, natural disasters, degraded 

fragile ecologies, and diversion of vital river resources were to 

be refuted, China could keep any riparian neighbour on good 

behaviour by acquiring the capability of using the 

Brahmaputra as a political instrument. 

Thus, the implications for setting up an International 

Brahmaputra River Water Tribunal for arriving at an 

international water treaty, or a preliminary initiative of a 

tripartite agreement between India, China, and Bangladesh to 

sustain passive relations in the region deem vital. But 

envisaging a portioned water resource development treaty 

between the three countries is unlikely, where issues related 

to trade, transit, land, roadway, and, water distribution first 

require a heads up between the three neighbouring states. 

China's growing strategic interests in Pakistan, Southeast Asia, 

and maritime security coupled by Tibet's invasion in the past, 

raise grave security concerns for India with its plan to divert 

waters of the Brahmaputra to north and central China. For 

India, the middle riparian between China and Bangladesh, 

marks a fine exemplar to understanding the water needs visà-vis 

water supplies, as it swings around both sides of the 

table. As a result, whether water rationality will continually 

govern riparian relations still remains a question mark.

Commentary 

Kargil: Echoes of Attacks against Minorities in Pakistan 

Zainab Akhter 


In Kargil, thousands of people took to the streets in February 

and participated in a protest rally against the killings of 

minorities across Pakistan (this time more specifically against 

the recent Hazara killings in Quetta). What are the reasons 

behind the sudden outburst of protests? 

Why the Sudden Outbursts? 

For a long time, there has been an anti-Shia campaign in 

Pakistan; in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime was strongly anti- 

Iranian and conducted programmes against the Iranian 

Hazara population in the country. 

Kargil is the only Shia dominated district of Ladakh in Jammu 

and Kashmir (J&K). Despite minor communal clashes between 

the Muslims and Buddhists in the region, Kargil remained 

peaceful in terms of social relations between the 

communities. Kargil was better known to the rest of India due 

to the Indo-Pak war, rather than any negative communal 

relationship or violence in the region. 

Recently, there has been a series of violent activities against 

the Shia community in Balochistan and also in Gilgit-Baltistan. 

The response in Kargil to the violence against the Shia 

community in Pakistan was a surprise. Responding to the call 

of the Imam Khomeini Memorial Trust Kargil, the people of 

the district held a massive protest against the recent Hazara 

killings in Pakistan. They gathered outside Jamia Masjid, 

shouting slogans against the targeting of a particular 

community in Pakistan. Earlier in 2012, they took to the 

streets in response to the killings of Shia-Baltis in Gilgit- 

Baltistan. The Kargil Students Union in Jammu and Delhi also 

organised similar protest rallies chanting anti-Pakistan 

slogans. 

Being a Shia dominated community, the sectarian killings 

elsewhere becomes more of an emotional issue for the 

people of Kargil. Additionally, Iran would not like Pakistan 

wielding a sectarian agenda to harass Kargilis; therefore the 

people of Kargil, through these huge protests, intend to send a 

message to Iran that they strongly condemn the killings of 

their brothers across Pakistan. Amidst anti-Pakistan slogans 

and placards, the protesters requested the Government of 

India to pressurise Pakistan to stop such target killings, and for 

banning these terrorist groups. 

The Iran Factor 

Iran's influence is prevalent in Kargil. Posters of Iranian leaders 

can be seen in most of the places, especially in the main 

market; and even a street in the market is named as Khomeini 

Chowk, after the Iranian leader. The region is forging strong 

bonds with Iran; besides the Shia factor, what have given an 

impetus to this trend are the regular visits of youth to Iran to 

get religious training. Unlike any other part of the State, 

developments in Shia dominated areas such as Iran and Iraq 

are keenly talked about here. Even a political novice could give 

a detailed analysis of the events in Iran-Iraq, and also the 

latest statements of Shia clerics. 

Locals point out that the 'cassette revolution', which refers to 

the lectures and speeches of the Imam, changed the lives and 

religious standard of Kargil after the revolution of 1979. Unlike 

most other parts of India, in Kargil, women, almost without 

exception, wear head coverings; liquor is only available 

illegally; and there are no movie theatres. 

Religion in Politics 

There are two schools of thought in the region, both of which 

are led by religious organisations: the Imam Khomeini 

Memorial Trust (IKMT) and the Islamia School Kargil (ISK). The 

ISK is backed by the National Conference and the IKMT by the 

Congress, and a strong rivalry is seen between them for 

political gains. The differences between the two schools of 

religious thought have magnified with their entering the 

realm of politics, which is indirectly dividing the society. The 

IKMT believes in the Islamic revolution initiated by Imam 

Khomeini and deems itself as the outcome of this revolution. 

It works towards the dissemination of Islamic teachings and 

elimination of un-Islamic traditions. It also runs a school called 

Mutahhari Public School where, along with the regular 

teachings, it imparts religious knowledge and its ideology to 

the future generation. On the other hand, the ISK also runs a 

school, Islamia School, where religious education is imparted 

too, but is considered slightly liberal compared to the IKMT. 

The religious and political divide between these two schools is 

taking a toll on the people of Kargil, and is leading to marked 

divisions in the society. The fact that one faction adheres to 

the IKMT, and the other to the ISK, is quite visible in the town 

now. In the whole process, the role, significance, and work of 

the Hill Development Council are overshadowed by the 

activities and influence of these groups. Even the divide 

between Leh and Kargil mostly arises due to religious 

differences. Although there are Muslims residing in minority 

in Leh and Zanskar Valley, such protests are not seen in these 

places. There is a negative impact of these demonstrations on 

the minorities of the region, as these massive protests are 

sometimes also used as a tool to show religious superiority. 

South Asia Plus 27


Commentary 

Kashmir: Protests and the Return of the Fidayeen 

Zainab Akhter 


Security was beefed up and put on high alert after the 13 

March 2013 Fidayeen attack. Disguised as cricket-playing 

youth, with lethal weapons hidden in their sports kits, at least 

two Fidayeen unleashed a brazen attack at a CRPF camp in 

Srinagar's Bemina. In a second strike ten days later, militants 

attacked a BSF vehicle at Nowgam killing a border guard and 

injuring two others. 

Do these attacks signify the return of the Fidayeen and the 

revival of armed militancy in the Valley? Has the hanging of 

Afzal Guru given an impetus to violence? 

The Comeback of the Fidayeen 

The Bemina attack is the most audacious one in the last three 

years. A curfew day was chosen to inflict maximum damage on 

the security forces. The attackers had surveyed the targeted 

place and chose a different modus operandi - disguised as 

youth playing cricket and abruptly started firing 

indiscriminately at the CRPF personals. Five army men and 

two militants were shot down and two other militants fled the 

scene. In the Nowgam incident militants travelling on 

motorcycles fired automatic weapons at a BSF vehicle injuring 

three army men. In the latest attack, a suspected militant shot 

a civilian and injured a CRPF personnel in Sopore town on 

Sunday. 

The Fear Factor 

The attacks have revived fears that militancy may return to the 

Valley. The youth of the Valley took to armed rebellion for the 

first time when Maqbool Bhatt (founder of JKLF) was hanged 

in Tihar Jail in 1984. In between, normalcy returned to the 

Valley. If the protests of this time are studied, be it in 2008 due 

to the Amaranath Land row or in 2010 due to killing of youths 

in the valley, it may be seen that protesters resorted to only 

stones and sticks while clashing with the army. 

Kashmir considers Afzal Guru as their leader of a stature close 

to Maqbool Bhatt and his hanging has once again brought 

back anger within the valley towards the Government of India 

especially among the youth. A hospital in GMC, Srinagar and 

the area near the Allama Iqbal library in Kashmir University 

are named after him as Afzal Guru Hospital and Afzal Guru 

Chowk respectively. He has been bestowed the title of 

Shaheed-e-Watan (martyr of the nation) and at Eidgah's 

Mazar-e-Shahuda (martyrs' graveyard) a grave yard for him 

with gravestone inscribed with a demand for the return of 

Guru's mortal remains has been put up just beside the other 

empty grave of Maqbool Bhatt. The separatist fractions of the 

valley have come together under the same banner to form an 

association called MMM (Mutahida Majlise Mashawrat) and 

their main demand from the Government of India is the return 

of the mortal remains of Mohmmad Afzal Guru and Maqbool, 

both buried in Tihar jail. The MMM has been instrumental in 

charting out protest calendars. There are days when separate 

protest calendars are being sorted out for men and women. 

Militant Strikes: Why Now? 

The valley of Kashmir has been on the boil since the hanging of 

Afzal Guru. Protests continue in the state demanding the 

return of Guru's body which is buried in the premises of Tihar 

jail. The hanging of Guru has given the militants a reason to 

make a comeback in the valley. Srinagar gives the militants 

publicity and they are able to draw the attention of the whole 

world. According to the Director General Police Ashok Prasad, 

the militants were desperate to strike in Srinagar. “Militants 

want to strike in Srinagar to gain publicity. Nobody comes to 

know about them when they strike in a far flung area. They 

want to strike in Srinagar to give an impression to people that 

militancy is alive,” he said. (CNS). 

Security has been beefed up in Srinagar in order to thwart any 

such attacks but whether this measure can actually thwart the 

said attacks is the question which lingers. While handling the 

protesters on the streets, security forces are ordered not to 

fire and are advised to use teargas and other less harmful 

methods to disperse the crowd. In the Bemina case, too, the 

army was caught unarmed and the attack took them by 

surprise. 

These attacks have reignited the debate of revocation of the 

AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act). Looking at the fast 

deteriorating security situation in Kashmir, one can say that 

AFSPA is here to stay for the time being or it may even be 

strengthened to meet up the security demands. Amid the 

protest calendars, life in Kashmir has come to a halt and the 

public has to face its brunt. It would be tragic if, in their 

frustration with the failures of the government, the youth 

were again to pick up arms. All that can be hoped for is that 

good sense will prevail and violent methods will be 

abandoned. If not it is predicted that this time the armed 

rebellion will be deadly.

Commentary 

Sri Lanka and the UNHRC Resolution: A Paper Tiger? 

J Jeganaathan 

Research Fellow, IPCS 

The 22nd regular session of the United Nations Human Rights 

Council (UNHRC) has successfully adopted a US-sponsored 

Resolution on “Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability 

in Sri Lanka” by a vote of 25 in favour, 13 against and 8 

abstentions. India voted in favour of the resolution for the 

second consecutive time. 

However, India's vote either in favour or against will hardly 

make any difference to the plight of Sri Lankan Tamils as the 

resolution will neither bind nor bite the Government of Sri 

Lanka (GoSL) on accountability to war crimes allegedly 

committed during the final phase of the war. Nevertheless, it 

had a ripple effect in Indian domestic politics when the DMK 

finally pulled out its support to the ruling United Progressive 

Alliance (UPA). This article will critically appraise the spirit 

and letter of the resolution and the impact of India's vote in 

favour of the resolution on Indo-Sri Lankan relations as well as 

its domestic constituency. 

The UNHRC Resolution 

By the Resolution A/HRC/22/L.1/Rev1 on promoting 

reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka, the Human 

Rights Council calls upon the GoSL to “conduct an 

independent and credible investigation into allegations of 

violations of international human rights law and international 

humanitarian law, as applicable; and requests the High 

Commissioner to present an oral update to the Council at its 

twenty-fourth session, and a comprehensive report followed 

by a discussion at the twenty-fifth session, on the 

implementation of the present resolution”. 

This resolution has nothing new, except a provision which 

urges the GoSL to formally respond to outstanding requests to 

provide “unfettered access” to special procedures mandate 

holders and rapporteurs on independence of judges and 

lawyers; international human rights defenders such as 

Amnesty International and international media to have an 

free and fair understanding of the ground reality in the wartorn 

regions. The remaining part of this two page resolution 

contains the same content of the previous resolution. 

Despite the political momentum built after the release of the 

new photograph that reveals the chilling details of the killing 

of the youngest son of the slain LTTE leader by the Sri Lankan 

armed forces, the resolution remains weak in letter and spirit. 

In sum, the resolution expresses its strong belief that the 

accountability and reconciliation in Sri Lanka can be promoted 

only by urging the GoSL to implement the constructive 

recommendations contained in the Lessons Learnt and 

Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) report without questioning 

the credibility and independency of the commission itself. 

Would it not be irony to request the perpetrators of the crime 

to provide justice to the victim? Is it not absurd to expect the 

felon to be accountable for the blatant violation of 

international law and human rights abuses? This resolution 

answers no. Instead of pushing forward the same agenda 

against the GoSL, why wouldn't the sponsors of the resolution 

put forward the observations and recommendations of the 

UN Secretary General's Panel of Experts Report – which is 

more credible and impartial? 

These are the questions which no one would want to 

contemplate because of the narrow political interest and 

game played over the plight and rights of Sri Lankan Tamils. 

Unless there is a concrete resolution based on the UN 

framework, reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka will 

remain a distant dream, the political drama at UNHRC on Sri 

Lanka will remain an annual fair and the resolution itself will 

remain merely a paper tiger. 

India's Vote 'Unfounded' 

India has voted against the GoSL for the second time at the 

UNHRC annual session. It has registered its discontent over 

the GoSL's progress towards a political solution to Tamils as 

enshrined in the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan 

Constitution, which clearly outlines the devolution of power. 

India has been urging the GoSL to work for a meaningful 

political solution to Tamils within the constitutional 

framework. But, the GoSL has been indifferent to India's 

official demand for this home-grown solution. Despite this 

deadlock, India-Sri Lanka relationship is thriving since the end 

of the war in 2009. 

Although it is widely believed that the Congress-led UPA 

government's decision to vote against Sri Lanka was to 

appease its domestic Tamil constituency especially its 

prodigal ally, DMK, it does not help to dispel India's dubious 

image among the Tamils or the Sinhalese. In fact, India earned 

wrath from both Tamils and Sinhalese, which is evident from 

the recent anti-government protests in Tamil Nadu and the 

anti-India sentiments expressed in Sri Lanka. India could have 

abstained from voting citing its limited scope of 

implementation of the resolution, thereby saving its own 

face. 

It seems that India's vote against Sri Lanka is a well-calculated 

strategy to protect the latter from the direct interference of 

western powers including the US, which claims stakes in the 

Indian Ocean region. By doing so, India has proved to the 

world that it stands by the international community, shares its 

human rights concern and supports the accountability of Sri 

Lanka. Therefore, India has emerged as an intermediary 

between the international community and Sri Lanka. This 

could be the logical rationale behind India's choice to vote for 

the feeble resolution. 

South Asia Plus 29


Commentary 

Naxal Violence: The Peoples' Liberation Front of India (PLFI) in Jharkhand 



The activities of the Peoples' Liberation Front of India (PLFI), a 

splinter group of the Communist party of India-Maoist (CPI- 

Maoist), have forced the state police to intensify operations 

against them in the Gumla district in Jharkhand. Though the 

state police have, on earlier occasions, launched offensives 

against Left-Wing Extremist (LWE) groups other than the CPI- 

Maoist, the current offensive in March 2013, recognizes the 

growing threat from PLFI. From Kamdara and Basia police 

station areas to Gumla, Palkot, Raidih, Ghaghra, Bishunpur 

and Sisai police stations in the district, PLFI cadres have 

stretched out their network and have been active in these 

areas. 

What is the PLFI? From where does its support emanate? Is 

the state police capable enough to contain this growing 

menace? 

About the PLFI: Strength and Areas of Operation 

The PLFI was formed in 2007 by Dinesh Gope and operated in 

areas around Ranchi. After the killing of his elder brother, 

Suresh Gope, in December 2003, Dinesh took charge and 

extended its area of operation. Later, in July 2007, Masi 

Charan Purty, a renegade of the CPI-Maoist, along with several 

of his followers joined Dinesh Gope and the PLFI. Though 

Purty was subsequently arrested, the PLFI grew under Gope's 

leadership. Other Maoist cadres who walked out of the parent 

outfit also joined the PLFI, which thus became a splinter group 

of the CPI-Maoist. 

Ever since, the PLFI has been wreaking havoc in Jharkhand's 

Ranchi, Khunti, Simdega, Gumla, Latehar, Chatra and Palamu, 

although the group claims to have extended its activities and 

influence all over the State. Along with six other splinter 

groups operating in Jharkhand, the PLFI have carried out more 

than half the terror strikes in the state, according to a study by 

the state police Special Branch. The group operates through 

several 'area commanders'. An assessment by the Jharkhand 

police puts the cadre strength of the outfit at 150 to 300. 

Extortion from contractors engaged in development projects 

constitutes the major source of income for the PLFI, and 

reportedly brings in INR 1.5 billion per year. Coal traders in 

districts including Latehar are also specifically targeted by the 

group. Mainly involved in criminal activities and extortion, the 

group collects funds by unleashing terror in the area. In the 

fight for supremacy in the region, the group has also engaged 

in clashes with the CPI-Maoist and other splinter Maoist 

outfits including the Jharkhand Liberation Tigers (JLT) in 

Jharkhand. 

groups in the State. Unlike the Maoists, the PLFI has no 

ideology and is only concerned with extortion and criminal 

activities. Hence, joining the PLFI is, and always has been, 

comparatively easy. As the main source of the PLFI's income 

comes from extortion and levies, it attracts a large number of 

unemployed youth, who are lured by the temptation of easy 

money. 

According to the Jharkhand Police, Maoist-related incidents 

decreased from 65-70 per cent in 2008-09 to 44 per cent in 

2012. In stark contrast, the violence perpetrated by the PLFI 

has gone up to 30 per cent from 14 per cent. “Where the 

Maoists are retreating, their rival groups are moving in to 

occupy the space left by them. All of them are purely criminal 

groups fighting over extortion and killing people if their 

demands are not met,” Inspector General (law and order), 

Jharkhand, S.N. Pradhan said. 

Strategy to Contain the PLFI 

As of 31 December 2011, the Police Population ratio 

(policemen per 100,000 population) of Jharkhand was 167, 

well above the national average of 137, but significantly below 

the level considered necessary to deal with the State's 

intricate problems of law and order, administration and 

security. However, in its diligent efforts to contain the PLFI, 

Jharkhand police launched an operation against the group in 

Khunti, Simdega and Gumla districts in October 2012. Over 20 

rebels were arrested and a huge cache of arms was seized. 

Despite this, the PLFI seems to be assertive and is now 

expanding its base by fanning out to new areas beyond the 

home turf. In the last four years, for instance, the PLFI has 

spread its tentacles to Raiboga, Birmitrapur and Hathibari 

police limits and its impact was also felt in Bisra police limits in 

Odisha and even in the tribal region of Jashpur in 

Chhattisgarh. 

The PLFI is not a bigger challenge than the Maoists, but as a 

group, it is definitely growing in strength, especially at the 

local level. The PLFI's menaces have grown too much over 

recent years to go unobserved any further, and the present 

police operations against the group are timely – though they 

are yet to yield the desired results. 

Ironically, the government has also been instrumental in 

sustaining PLFI during its initial days, using it to counter the 

CPI-Maoist. However, it appears that this strategy has 

backfired; today the PLFI has become one of the major terror

Commentary 

Sri Lanka: Tamil Nadu and India's Foreign Policy 

Prof. V. Suryanarayan 

Former Director, Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras 

There is a huge divide between Chennai and New Delhi on 

how both see Sri Lanka. What remains the primary problem in 

India's approach towards Sri Lanka, and why is there a divide 

within? 

Periphery and the Core: Problems of India's Foreign Policy 

Paradigm 

In a large country like India, relations with neighbouring 

countries will have their immediate fallout on contiguous 

Indian states. Thus, India-Pakistan relations will affect Jammu 

and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat; the India-Nepal 

equation will have its fallout on Bihar, Uttarakhand, Uttar 

Pradesh, Sikkim, and West Bengal; India-China relations will 

impinge upon Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, 

Uttarakhand, and Jammu and Kashmir; India-Bangladesh 

relations will have its fallout on West Bengal, Mizoram, 

Meghalaya, Tripura, and Assam; India-Bhutan relations will 

affect West Bengal, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, and Assam; 

India-Myanmar relations will have its fallout on Arunachal 

Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram; India-Sri Lanka 

relations will have its consequences on Tamil Nadu; and India- 

Maldives relations will spill over to the Minicoy islands. We 

have not yet evolved a political mechanism by which the 

interests of the contiguous Indian states are safeguarded while 

formulating and implementing the neighbourhood policy. 

In the days of one-party dominance, New Delhi very often 

followed a neighbourhood policy, which it considered to be in 

India's national interest, but which adversely affected the 

neighbouring Indian states. Two illustrations given below 

substantiate this point. In October 1964, New Delhi signed the 

Sirimavo-Shastri Pact, which converted the people of Indian 

origin in Sri Lanka into merchandise to be divided between the 

two countries; thousands of them were conferred Indian 

citizenship and repatriated to India. This inhuman agreement 

was severely criticised by Rajagopalachari, Krishna Menon, 

Kamaraj Nadar, Ramamurthy, and Annadurai. In the same 

way, New Delhi concluded the maritime boundary 

agreements with Sri Lanka In 1974 and 1976, which ceded the 

island of Kachchatheevu to Sri Lanka and bartered away the 

traditional fishing rights enjoyed by Indian fishermen. These 

agreements were opposed by the DMK government, but New 

Delhi went ahead. 

The Rise of Regional Parties 

With the end of one-party dominance and the formation of 

coalition governments, regional parties began to play a 

national role. They began to make their inputs into India's 

neighbourhood policy. Three examples prove this point. 

When Deve Gowda was Prime Minister and IK Gujral the 

Minister for External Affairs, India-Bangladesh relations 

forged ahead. Gujral was sensitive to the feelings in West 

Bengal and associated the West Bengal Government with the 

formulation of the India's Bangladesh policy, especially in the 

sharing of Ganges waters. Second, the inclusion of the 

Sethusamudram project in the manifesto of the UPA 

government was due to the persistent efforts made by the 

DMK Government headed by Karunanidhi. Third, India's Sri 

Lanka policy during the final stages of the Fourth Eelam War 

had the backing of its DMK ally. New Delhi permitted 

Karunanidhi to indulge in political gimmicks so that he could 

pose himself as the champion of the Overseas Tamils, but it 

should be stated that the DMK did not put any serious 

obstacles in the way of New Delhi pursuing its Sri Lanka policy. 

Current Developments in Tamil Nadu 

The tumultuous developments taking place in Tamil Nadu 

should be analysed within the above-mentioned context. 

Cutting across party lines, there is sympathy for the Sri Lankan 

Tamil cause. People are angry and bitter that innocent Tamil 

civilians were massacred during the last stages of the Fourth 

Eelam War. They also feel strongly that the Sri Lankan 

Government has gone back on the assurances about 

devolution of powers to the provinces. The spontaneous 

upsurge amongst the student community is a shining example 

of this righteous indignation. 

What vitiates the political scenario is the competitive nature 

of Tamil Nadu politics and the gimmicks performed by the two 

Dravidian parties in their desire for one-upmanship. In this 

competitive outbidding, Karunanidhi is on a weak wicket. He 

wants to atone for his past misdeeds; he has resurrected the 

Tamil Eelam Solidarity Organisation (TESO) and has called for 

Hartal in support of the Tamil cause. Jayalalitha is trying to 

extract maximum leverage from Karunanidhi's predicament. 

From being a sharp critic of the Tigers, today she is 

championing the cause of Tamil Eelam and is advocating a 

referendum among Sri Lankan Tamils in the island and the 

Tamil diaspora. She has injected politics into sports and has 

given the stamp of approval against the participation of Sri 

Lankan players in the Indian Premier League. She has 

suggested that the venue of CHOGM be shifted from Colombo 

to another country. She wants Mahinda Rajapaksa to be 

branded a war criminal and be tried in the International Court 

of Justice. She wants New Delhi to declare Sri Lanka an 

“unfriendly state” and has demanded the imposition of an 

economic embargo. All these statements have provided 

exciting fare to her fanatical followers within the state, as well 

as in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. 

But the tragedy is, all the above impractical suggestions will in 

no way bring about ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka. On the 

contrary, it will lead to the accentuation of ethnic tensions. 

Worse, India's relations with Sri Lanka, already subjected to 

severe strains, will further take a nose dive. 

South Asia Plus 31


Commentary 

Bangladesh: Is it the Shahbagh Spring? 

Suvolaxmi Dutta Choudhury 

Research Scholar, JNU, New Delhi 

The present political upsurge in Bangladesh has brought the 

150 million-strong nation to the throes of a revolution. Certain 

commentaries have compared Shahbagh, the seat of the 

uprising in Dhaka, to Tahrir Square. Is the Shahbagh upsurge 

heralding a 'South Asian Spring'? Does the movement 

manifest certain distinct resemblances with the recent 

happenings in the Arab world? 

From Genocide to the Spring: A Short History 

The Pakistani genocide during the Bangladesh Liberation War 

of 1971 had colluders (razakaar), who brutally resisted East 

Pakistan's independence. The International War Crimes 

Tribunal, established by the ruling Awami League government 

in 2010, is presently sealing the fate of those booked for war 

crimes. Crucially, the accused enjoy eminent positions in the 

Jamaat-e-Islami party, which in alliance with the Bangladesh 

National Party (BNP), constitute the main opposition force. 

The leaderless upsurge erupted on 5 February 2013 shortly 

after the second of the convicts, Abdul Qaeder Mollah, was 

awarded a life-term instead of the popularly anticipated 

death sentence. Amnesty International's press release on 6 

March 2013 reported a brutal counter to the movement since 

then. Hartaals are presently the order of the day. 

Shahbagh and Tahrir Square: Points of Convergence 

Shahbagh and Tahrir Square (the hallmark of the Arab Spring) 

find a commonality; the urban educated youth, without 

formal associations to any particular political organisation, 

have mobilised themselves through social media and mobile 

phones. The largely peaceful protests, in both contexts, have 

been organised sans any umbrella leadership. 

Bangladesh, much like the Arab world, is a post-colonial 

developing nation-state where the socio-economic 

development goals are moving sluggishly, and political 

instability and unemployment are worrisome for its people. 

One lurking question is left to be answered here: has this pent 

up frustration found a collective political expression in 

Shahbagh, as in the case of the Arab Spring (though Shahbagh 

does not have an anti-regime character). 

Also, what brings the two together is the search for a 

collective national identity through a popular uprising. For 

most post-colonial developing nation-states, a pivotal 

dilemma is left to be resolved: on what foundational 

principles should the nation-state's collective identity be 

constructed? Often, post-colonial nation-states are, thus, a 

breeding ground for bloody struggle between opposing 

political ideologies. While in Bangladesh secular-nationalist 

forces are trying to stage a come-back amidst increasing 

Islamisation, the Middle-East has just witnessed the reverse. 

Is it Shahbagh Spring? 

However, comparing the Shahbagh movement to the Arab 

Spring may sound a bit far-fetched since the fundamental 

reasons why the respective movements erupted are notably 

different: while the Arab Spring was a series of pro-reform, 

pro-democracy, and anti-regime movements, the upheaval at 

Shahbagh symbolises a cry for vindication, in the collective 

conscience and historical memory of a people, against wrongdoings 

during its tumultuous birth. 

Whether this political upheaval in Shahbagh is guided by 

revolutionary zeal or not is also not beyond contestation. The 

response of the Jamaat-BNP combine is that the movement is 

orchestrated just a little ahead of the elections by Awami 

political forces, who in the name of secularism, seek to 

destroy the massive economic and social clout held by the 

Jamaat. Though, the Jamaat's electoral influence is not 

spectacular in independent Bangladesh, the party holds the 

reins of crucial sectors of the country such as banking, 

education, healthcare, etc. This line of argument gains certain 

solid ground from the fact that the present upsurge has called 

for the boycott of the Jamaat affiliated Islami Bank 

Bangladesh Limited, which is the largest private banking 

network in the country. 

Tailpiece: A Cosy Liaison between the Jamaat and the 

Middle-East? 

A crucial international dimension of the Jamaat movement is 

the warm relationship it shares with certain Muslim countries, 

many in the prosperous Middle-East. The Islami Bank 

Bangladesh Limited, which is the lifeline of the Jamaat's 

funds, was established at the initiative of the Saudis and is 

associated with the Al Razee Bank of Saudi Arabia. Sixty per 

cent of the Bank's shares are held by the Saudis. The UAE, 

Kuwait, and Qatar also own shares of the Bank. The Saudibased 

Islamic NGO, Rabeta-al-Alam-al-Islami is also an 

important source of Jamaat's finances. The Kuwait Relief 

Fund and Al Nahiyan Trust of the UAE are other NGOs 

fattening Jamaat's kitty. 

Bangladesh also enjoys Saudi oil at a subsidised price, which 

might be jeopardised on the event of a crack-down on the 

Jamaat-e-Islami by the ruling Awami League, given the 

support enjoyed by the organisation in Saudi Arabia. A debate 

in Bangladesh's political circles has ensued about the banning 

of the Jammat. However, what is obvious here is that such a 

move would neither be able to surmount the outstanding 

socio-economic clout presently enjoyed by the organisation, 

nor would it deter it from continuing its alleged activities in 

the future. 

To conclude, though the upsurge in Bangladesh may not 

exactly fit the bill for being called the Shahbagh Spring, the 

unrest could have vital ramifications for present international 

politics at large.

Commentary 

India, China & the Brahmaputra: Riparian Rivalry 

Roomana Hukil 


China's proposed strategic interests behind the building of the 

run-of-the-river dams along the middle reaches of River 

Brahmaputra, provides insignificant data over the nature of 

the project in the future course of time. As the Indian 

government rests on the Chinese assurance of the unalterable 

status quo, the Assamese government has raised serious 

doubts on the Chinese prospects over the watercourse. 

In this regard, it is time for an establishment such as that of the 

Brahmaputra River Valley Authority (BRVA) to undertake 

effective scientific investigation with respect to both the lean 

flows of the river and the consequences of the dam 

constructions by the Chinese over the river. This article delves 

into assessing the potential factors that are leading China into 

building the multiple dams. It questions China's proposition 

vis-à-vis the mounting threats and assesses the establishment 

of a joint authoritative body to ensure the regulatory flow of 

the waters, in order to provide a timely scientific data of the 

cause and effects of the river. 

Potential Factors for China's Propaganda 

The Brahmaputra River in China (known as Yarlung Tsangpo) 

has been of significant strategic interest for the Chinese since 

the 19th century." With an average elevation of about 4000 

metres, the river provides for the hydroelectricity power 

needs of the country. In addition, some areas within China 

have been experiencing their worst drought in at least 50 

years. Therefore, it is believed that by diverting the river 

system via constructing the proposed dams, the river will 

provide for the growing needs of the country; prove to be a 

useful mechanism in flood control methods and serve the 

waterway navigational purposes of the country. 

China upholds the principle of 'Prior Appropriation', meaning 

that, as the first users of the river course, it must be granted 

the right of accessing the river without external interferences. 

This also marks a geo-strategic advantage for China to enforce 

its power structure in the South Asian region. For China, the 

building of the dams is merely a run-of-the-river project that 

will not hold the water of the lower riparian states. However, 

China's growing interests from the 'Tibet Three Gorges Dam', 

(one of the biggest dams in China) construction on the Pondo 

Water Control Project in 2008, which is expected to be 

completed in 2016, coupled with the 60 odd number of dams 

raises serious environmental and risk concerns for its 

downstream South Asian counterparts. Comprised of a 

reservoir and a power station, the projects are designed to 

irrigate millions of hectares of farmland and generate millions 

of kilowatt hours of electricity annually. 

India's Strategic Move 

The recent exchange of state visits over the Brahmaputra 

discourse by China and India on the sidelines of the BRICS 

Summit questions the efficacy of the state of affairs, 

pertaining to a change in the projected plans. While Prime 

Minister Manmohan Singh raised India's concerns over 

Beijing's plans to construct three dams across the 

Brahmaputra River, President Xi Jinping, as part of the decadal 

change of power structure in China, maintained that the dams 

are, merely, run-of-the-river projects and are innocuous. 

Since there is no definitive alignment of the nature of the 

projects merely being run-of-the-river, India's subsequent 

course of action should entail restructuring the Brahmaputra 

Board and replacing it with the Brahmaputra River Valley 

Authority (BRVA). There is an apprehension being expressed 

throughout the Asian regime who are demanding to know the 

quantity of water that the Chinese are planning to divert. 

Therefore, demanding a bilateral collaborative study between 

the two countries will help allay these fears. Since no flood 

mitigation measures are in place, there is an excessive 

amount of water in the river which is not contained in any 

reservoir. Further, China holds no water sharing agreement 

between any of its co-riparian neighbours and is continually 

propositioning new dam constructions with zero lateral 

negotiations over the effects of its plans. Considering 

relations at stake due to China's disposition, it is essential that 

the Brahmaputra River Valley Authority, if established, look 

into the present needs and evolving dynamics pertaining to 

irrigation, food security, climate change, flood preventive 

modules, hydroelectricity, ecology, etc. of the sub-regional 

arena. 

Notwithstanding pledges to take the bilateral relationship to a 

new level with a higher growth trajectory, Prime Minister 

Manmohan Singh has sought a joint mechanism with China to 

assess the construction work on dams on the river. This will 

ensure a steady assessment of the work in progress vis-à-vis 

foresightedness in dam construction activities and will also 

safeguard Sino-Indo relations from getting muddled in the 

long run. By establishing a joint mechanism committee, the 

Indian government will be able to re-affirm its loose ties with 

the Northeast. Assam's vociferous claims to the central 

government over the issue have pushed the UPA into taking 

immediate action. However, the onus is still on India for 

looking at the tripartite aspects of the water-sharing 

discourse, as regards, its relations with Bangladesh loosely 

hanging despite weighty political ambitions being raised over 

the Teesta River. Presently, India needs to act swiftly over the 

Teesta discourse with Bangladesh whilst pushing for 

affirmative action over the Brahmaputra River with China in 

order to maintain a steady balance with its riparian 

counterparts in the region. 

South Asia Plus 33


Seminar Report 

Ladakh 2013 - Economy, Society, Governance & Politics- New Issues, Young Voices 

Zainab Akhter 


D. Suba Chandran, Director, IPCS, New Delhi 

The workshop is primarily for scholars from both parts of 

Ladakh; to discuss new issues beyond tourism and high 

passes, which is why we have titled it as 'economy, society, 

governance and politics'. 

There is so much that we need to learn, and there is so much 

that they have to share with us. The idea is to get young voices to 

put forward and listen to the seniors on whether we are on the 

right track. I am grateful that we can get the seniors, who have 

enormous knowledge about the subject, as resource persons 

today. 

From an institutional perspective, a singular event is not the only 

agenda we have regarding Ladakh; rather, we want to make it a 

process so that a Ladakh research forum may be initiated 

sometime in the future, that will see the region on a much closer 

and regular basis. 

Nawang Rigzin Jora, Hon'ble Minister for Urban Development 

and Urban Local Bodies, J&K 

Ladakh has been known for several good things, as well as some 

bad things. The bad thing is people seem to have this notion that 

Ladakhis are perennial agitators, without going into the reasons 

of the agitations that are also resolved from time to time. There 

are plenty of good things about the region, be it the culture, 

people, or landscape. 

Ladakh, because of its geographical location, has peculiar 

problems. Until the early '70s, there was hardly any 

development. In some ways, we are grateful that the Chinese 

intrusion took place, since it brought us in focus. It turned the 

attention of the government of India to the fact that there is a 

region called Ladakh, which requires to be secured; where 

connectivity needs to be provided, and where the people need 

to be given access to basic facilities. 

In the aftermath of the 1962 war, things began to move in 

Ladakh. Connectivity was provided, and as a result of the war, 

the army was stationed there in large numbers. The army 

provided employment and economic opportunities. Culturally, 

the people of the region had a huge inferiority complex - houses 

built without incorporating the traditional Ladakhi style were 

called bungalows; it was only with the advent of tourism that the 

traditional Ladakhi style was integrated into the designs of 

buildings. 

Till the time the army is stationed in Ladakh, there is a need to 

make full use of the economic benefits it poses, and 

simultaneously, to also expose other viable opportunities. First it 

was the army that gave an impetus to the local economy; now, 

tourism provides a huge opportunity for diversifying this growth. 

We have a local population of approximately hundred and 

seventeen thousand; and for several years now, have annually 

garnered nearly two hundred thousand tourists, which implies 

one and a half tourists per capita. Dispersal tourism has started 

in the region with tourists exploring areas other than the 

established attractions. This dispersal to all parts of the region 

has, in turn, benefitted almost everyone in Ladakh. The concept 

of 'home-stay' tourism, now immensely popular across India, 

originally came from Ladakh. The system arose out of necessity, 

since the local infrastructure could not handle the large influx of 

tourists, which resulted in people resorting to live at local places. 

Besides this, we still need to maintain a huge emphasis on 

education, and understand why private schools with less 

qualified teachers do better than government schools. The 

reason is simple; in private schools, teachers are kept on a tight 

leash, while government schools have no such system in place. 

Ladakh must follow the example of the Kashmiri Pundit and Parsi 

communities. Although their number is less, they lay a lot of 

emphasis on education and consequently, get placed in higher 

positions across the government and private sectors. 

Tourism and the situational presence of the army in Ladakh 

present limited avenues for growth. Therefore, it is crucial for the 

region to grab every opportunity that comes its way, and to 

develop institutions that impart good education. In this context, 

students studying outside Ladakh have the added advantage of 

learn more from the exposure they get. They must bring this 

experience back to the region in order to help facilitate better 

development and growth of local public infrastructure and 

institutions. 

THEME I: Politics and Governance 

Tsewang Rigzin, Freelance Journalist and Councillor at Ladakh 

Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC), Leh 

The Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC), 

Leh, is a seventeen year-plus institution now. The people of 

Ladakh are somewhat satisfied with this political dispensation, 

as they consider it a government managed by their own people 

at their doorsteps. 

Before the Council was founded, all plans and policies for Ladakh 

used to be formulated by leaders and bureaucrats in Srinagar 

and Jammu; whodid not have much idea about the land, its life, 

culture and topography. Therefore, the Hill Council grant was a 

great step towards giving autonomy to the Ladakhis. 

However, there are various shortcomings in the functioning of 

the Hill Development Councils. Many Ladakhi leaders feel that 

the LAHDC Act needs to be reviewed to bring in necessary 

amendments that will further empower and strengthen the Hill 

Councils. Many subjects are still not clearly defined, as to 

whether they fall under the purview of the Hill Council or the 

State Government. Quite often, senior bureaucrats and even 

ministers of the State Government, still issue parallel instructions 

to government employees of all districts, including Leh and Kargil 

districts, without taking into account the authority of the Hill 

Councils. 

Fayaz Ahmad, M.Phil. Scholar at JNU; from Kargil

A close look at the election pattern in Kargil before the formation 

of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development reveals the close 

alliance between the political and religious elites. 

Religious institutions play a dual role during the elections; by 

firstly mobilising and determining the voting patterns in Kargil, 

and secondly, in providing legitimacy to the political elites. In the 

present context, with the formation of the Ladakh Autonomous 

Hill Development Kargil, the religious elite have not only limited 

themselves to the role of 'king makers', but have also begun to 

actively participate in the process by contesting the elections 

themselves. 

Muzaffar Hussain, Ph.D. Scholar at JNU; from Chushot (Leh) 

The everyday engagement of armed forces in Ladakh, and its 

interactions with the civilian population, shows the various ways 

in which the military has become an important institution in 

Ladakhi society. 

From the very onset, the military was involved in a range of 

activities, which affected the life of people both directly and 

indirectly. It affected the economy by emerging as a key 

consumer of domestic products. It also created job 

opportunities for people, and fulfilled civic needs by offering 

services related to health, transportation, and education. 

By fulfilling some of the basic requirements of the masses, the 

military filled the gaping holes in various areas of civic 

governance. Such involvement of the military was 

institutionalised in 2002 with the introduction of Operation 

Sadbhavna in Ladakh, which was earlier launched in certain 

areas of the military's Northern Command in 1998. 

Zainab Akhter, Research Officer at IPCS, New Delhi, and Ph.D. 

Scholar at JNU; from Zanskar (Kargil) 

Ladakh is of great strategic importance to India. There is a huge 

problem of connectivity; be it the issue of connecting the regions 

within Ladakh, or connecting it externally to countries with 

which it shares its borders. 

The people of Ladakh face many hardships during the harsh 

winter season, wherein the entire region remains inaccessible 

for more than six months. The NH1 connecting Srinagar to Kargil, 

and the Manali-Leh road, are the only connecting links (roads) 

between Ladakh and other parts of India, which remain blocked 

for six months owing to heavy snowfall. 

Although Leh is connected aerially and a private air service called 

Air Mantra was launched this year in an effort to connect Kargil 

to Jammu, the ground realties still remain the same. There are 

other alternative routes which can be explored as they have the 

potential to remain open the whole year round. 

Resource Person: SS Bloeria, Vice Chancellor, Central University 

of Jammu 

The LAHDC has played a vital role in bringing about development 

in the region. Although Kargil accepted the autonomous body a 

little later, it has nonetheless proven beneficial for the people. 

The army has also contributed to the positive development of 

the region, and has been able to open up schools and hospitals 

in order to bring about affirmative changes. Earlier, the region 

was totally inaccessible and people used to travel by foot or on 

horseback; but now, the situation has improved to a great 

extent. Despite this, a lot is yet to be done in order to improve 

connectivity in the region during the winter season. 

THEME II: Society and Culture 

Chimat Ladol, M.Phil. Scholar at JNU; from Changthang (Leh) 

There exists in Ladakh, a strong social structure which 

subordinates women. The social structure is further 

strengthened by cultural-religious norms which define, and 

reiterate what women are, and how they should behave. 

Women have to bear the brunt of tradition and culture, while 

the men-folk not only escape the responsibility of preserving the 

culture, but also define codes of conduct for women. 

Ladakhi women still do not consider the personal political, which 

then reflects the blanket cover over domestic violence. Women 

are disciplined to reiterate their identity not only by maledominated 

associations, but also by female-run organisations. 

Though the lead by women in field work is seen as a matter of 

pride by those claiming equality for women, one needs to look 

into how even after taking care of everything - from fields to 

households - the work done by women still remains inferior to 

men. 

There are two types of marriages in Ladakh, which Katherine Hay 

has talked about, magpa and bagma. In the magpa type of 

marriage, the male moves in with the wife's family, and is 

generally sympathised with by the people in the sense that the 

groom has to bear with the bride's family; while the latter 

bagma, is seen as acceptable and 'natural' no matter how much 

the bride suffers. 

Sumera Shafi, Ph.D. Scholar at JNU; from Leh 

In the pre-independence era, Ladakh boasted of a syncretised 

society with a composite culture. It was, therefore, common for 

people from the two religious communities to inter-marry and 

possess names such as Rigzin Ali, Namgial Musa, etc. There was 

an ideal sense of communal harmony, which has been eulogised 

by some scholars who often referred to it as the 'last Shangri-La'. 

It is true that Ladakh has been insulated from any sort of internal 

violence of the magnitude experienced in its neighbouring area 

of Kashmir. However, recent historical developments, especially 

the induction of Ladakh into the national boundaries of India in 

1947, and the influx of modernisation into the otherwise cut-off 

area, has led to substantial transformations. Since then, not only 

has there been an increased religiosity, but also an immense 

politicisation of religion, with the syncretised Ladakhi identity 

thus getting eclipsed by identities based on religious lines. 

The politicisation of religion in Ladakh has led to communal 

violence and identity politics, which has been detrimental to 

peace in the region. 

Fayaz Hussain, Ph.D. Scholar at Punjab University, Chandigarh; 

from Kargil 

The minority Buddhists claim that there was a monastery in 

ruins in Kargil town, near general hospital, which they wanted to 

renovate. However, the majority Muslims opposed this claim 

after which the place has been declared disputed by the 

authorities. 

The demand to be declared an union territory, and for an 

Autonomous Hill Development Council by the political leaders of 

Leh in the early nineties, without consulting the political and 

religious leaders of Kargil, created doubt and distrust in the 

minds of people in Kargil. 

Recently in 2012, tensions erupted in the Zanskar valley of Kargil 

South Asia Plus 35


district when 23 people belonging to Buddhist families from the 

Garba and Mon low castes, embraced Islam. Tensions between 

the two communities still continue in the valley, though on a low 

scale. 

Resource Person: Siddiq Wahid, Professor and Director, UNESCO 

Madanjeet Singh Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of 

Kashmir 

Both the communities in Ladakh have no choice but to co-exist 

with each other. The communal clashes are a result of external 

elements that are influencing their minds. In earlier times, there 

were no such issues, and people used to enjoy communal 

harmony; even marriages took place between the two 

communities. 

The most important thing, today, is to spread awareness about 

the importance of education in the whole region, and to change 

the education system. There is a need to use the local language 

as the medium of instruction in schools. 

THEME III: Education and Environment 

Samina Rehman, M.A. Scholar at JNU; from Leh 

Ideally, the main objective of education is the all-round 

development of a student; physically, mentally, and spiritually, to 

lead a quality life. In this regard, Ladakh is far from being ideal, as 

there are many loopholes in the education system that need 

immediate attention for the development of the society. 

The existing education system in Leh gives more importance on 

passing the exam rather than learning; this is one of the main 

causes of degradation in quality education. Some of the main 

issues regarding education in Ladakh, which need to be 

addressed, are: the medium of instruction, accessibility, 

infrastructure, lack of comprehensibility, teacher absentees, lack 

of constructive learning, negligence in government schools, the 

absence of proper teaching methods, and persistent negligence 

from the administration. 

Sonam Wangmo, Ph.D. Scholar at JNU; from Sham (Leh) 

If we look at water resources, the status of available ground water 

and springs, the impact of climate change is quite visible in Ladakh. 

Less snow fall in winters, and the drying up of springs due to 

changes in global temperatures has left people in severe hardship, 

resulting in the intense exploitation of ground water resources. 

Due to the lack of proper data on ground water, since no proper 

research has been carried out on the issue, these resources are 

mismanaged by locals; with the negligence of the government on 

such scarce resources making matters even worse. 

No awareness programmes have been introduced by the state, 

so far, to create awareness about the depleting status of ground 

water. Scientists all over the world are coming up with scientific 

methods, based on mitigation programmes, to resolve this 

threat to the environment. 

In the case of Ladakh, the issue becomes more challenging. 

Given the harsh climate, and high terrain of Ladakh, it is a 

naturally water-scarce region, hence known as the 'cold desert'. 

The snow water harvesting method should be adopted to 

conserve precipitation in the form of snow or rain. Artificial 

Glacier Recharge is another method to conserve water. 

Thupstan Angchuk, M.Phil. Scholar at JNU; from Stok (Leh) 

The impact of climate change is visible in Ladakh. One of the 

most disturbing changes, taking place due to climate change, is 

on the glaciers which sustain human society. Glaciers are an 

important source of water for farming, and storing water in the 

rainy season, thus acting as a 'store house'. Nevertheless, the 

increasing rate of global temperature is causing a substantial loss 

in the glacial volume and area. 

Huge glaciers are melting and fragmenting into smaller ones, 

while small glaciers are perishing without even being noticed. 

Almost all the villages in Ladakh are dependent on glaciers for 

both drinking as well as for farming; any imbalances in 

temperature can bring floods and water scarcity. Glacier Lake 

Outburst Flood (GLOF) is one of the recent and most 

unprecedented phenomena in Ladakh. As a matter of fact, 

sustainable use and water management has become one of the 

most challenging tasks for the people of Ladakh. 

Resource Person: Tashi Morup, Project Director, Ladakh Art & 

Media Organisation 

The various problems discussed are of immediate concern, and 

are burning issues that Ladakh is presently facing. Of course, we 

need to have a lot more discussions on a range of issues, but we 

also need to come out with solutions. 

When we talk about education in Ladakh, most people confuse 

education with language; it is only one part of education. 

Climate change is something that needs to be dealt with more 

critically, and in a very sensible manner. 

THEME IV: Media, Tourism, and Economy 

Rigzin Chosdon, Ph.D. Scholar at JNU; from Changthang (Leh) 

A study of the language, along with the study of religion, culture, 

and its people, led to serious academic studies on the 

demography, art, architecture, and politics of Ladakh. Interest 

shown by different scholars, especially western scholars, 

propounded a sense of recognition of one's own culture and 

identity. 

The changing scenario from the oral form of expression (of the 

past, in the form of stories) has been further developed, and the 

need to write and express is being continuously practiced by the 

new generation of Ladakh in the form of e-news, magazines, and 

newsletters. 

Gulzar Hussain, M.Phil. Scholar at JNU; from Kargil Town (Kargil) 

Kargil, despite being isolated from the rest of India for several 

months in a year, has managed to connect with the rest of the 

world through social networking sites. Social networking sites, 

and other internet features have brought a radical change in 

communication, especially among the youth. 

These exchanges of information through social networking sites 

have created a new wave of activism, particularly among the 

youth on a multiplicity of issues related to the region. 

Konchok Paldan, Ph.D. Scholar at JNU; from Changthang (Leh) 

Border villages always remain contested in many ways; likewise, 

Turtuk, situated on the impermeable border in the north-west of 

Ladakh, is also one of them. Turtuk was an integral part of 

Pakistan before 1971. It was in 1971 that this village became a 

part of independent India. 

There is a need of sufficient academic attention to understand 

the social reality of the people who settled in the national and

international border villages. Most of the scholars who worked 

on border villages, focused mainly on nationalism, transgression, 

and trans-cultural realities; but, borders which exclusively 

remain rigid and impermeable, have been least studied. 

If we look at the economic interests of the region, they do not 

want borders to open up. However, bitter memories of the 

partition that led to the division of hundreds of families, have led 

them to formally propose the opening up of the Turtuk-Khapulu 

route. Even the people settled along the border, are themselves 

ambiguous on the issue. 

Tashi Lundup, Ph.D. Scholar at JNU; from Sham (Leh) 

To understand various issues regarding tourism and culture in 

the context of Ladakh, the focus has to be maintained on three 

main points. Firstly, a brief historical background of the 

development of tourism in Ladakh needs to be understood. 

Secondly, an understanding of authenticity and commodification 

of culture in general, and religion in particular, needs to be 

developed. Finally, tourism and its impact on society must be 

analysed. 

Tourism has brought positive developments in the region; 

however, it has also simultaneously contributed in projecting the 

image of Ladakh as only being a much sought after tourist 

destination. This has consequently resulted in overshadowing 

the day to day issues affecting the Ladakhi people. 

Resource Person: Kavita Suri, Assistant Professor, Centre for 

Adult, Continuing Education & Extension, Jammu University 

People who visit Ladakh write about their experiences in the 

region on blogs, professional and personal websites. The region 

is also being publicised through social networking sites, print 

media, television etc. However, it is difficult to run a newspaper 

even in a place like Ladakh, despite it having a limited 

population, and the fact that everyone knows each other. 

There are not enough internet facilities, and one faces lots of 

problems in the process of circulating newspapers. In Turtuk, 

people have bitter memories of partition, and the locals claim to 

have more divided families across the border as compared to 

Kargil. According to them, each family has relatives across, and 

they have been demanding the reopening of Khapulu Road, 

which is just 200km from Turtuk. They have also been 

demanding the opening of a road from Turtuk to Kargil, which 

falls under India. The Indian Government should consider its 

opening for the benefit of this isolated region. 

Report Review 

India, Pakistan - Propelling Indus Water 'Terrorism' (IWT) 

Roomana Hukil 


Connecting the Drops: An Indus Basin Roadmap for Cross- 

Border Water Research, Data Sharing, Policy Coordination 

Indus Basin Working Group 

Stimson Center, SDPI, ORF 

26 February 2013 

The 67-page report is a well-documented analysis of the 

emerging challenges pertaining to the Indus Water Basin. 

Among the several recommendations highlighted in the 

report, the immediate focus is to prioritise investments and 

institutionalise regular upkeep of the canal infrastructure. The 

report laid significant emphasis on developing a digitalised 

online system of the Indus Basin to foster developing a 

regional network and intensified hydrological modelling 

capacities. Further prominence was laid on the need to 

conduct a joint research study evaluating the cumulative 

environmental impact of multiple dam constructions on an 

individual watercourse, and develop the technical know-how 

on the relationship between dam cascades, river basin 

hydrology, and climate change. It also impressed on the need 

to increase the knowledge base on monsoon variability trends 

to improve outcomes for rainfall-dependent agriculture, 

along with the use of multi-media tools to raise public 

awareness of climate change within India and Pakistan. 

Typifying the treaty itself, it also depends on the inflows of the 

Indus Water Basin, which in a larger perspective, affects 

climate change that further affects the river system. 

The report blames the lax implementation by India and 

Pakistan for its ineffectiveness stating that "both the countries 

are lax in their implementation (of the Indus Water Treaty). 

However, it fails to garner political laxity vis-à-vis its technical 

responses, and hinders to offer substantial politico remedies 

in adhering to the treaty. It also does not provide ground 

artefacts that should bind both the actors in times of 

observing strict adherence to the treaty. Alternately, the 

report should have featured the need for a change in the 

mind-sets of those who govern the management of the 

watercourse between both countries. Since the cryosphere 

(snow and glaciers) of the upper Indus Water Basin is rapidly 

altering, amounting to a rise in the surface air temperatures 

by 1.80 degrees celsius over the past five decades, this is 

doubling the global average temperature of the region. 

Understanding the dichotomy of the region, in terms of a 

change in the geo-strategic structures, urges for an imperative 

need which was found missing in the report. As warming 

temperatures and changing solid precipitation patterns are 

altering the duration, timing, and extent of seasonal snowcovered 

areas, measures to encapsulate a dialogue of trust 

between India and Pakistan are the need of the hour. 

Although the report did signify an institutionalised modest 

exchange of hydrological data between both countries for 

future exchanges of water supplies, and, more so, “to mitigate 

Pakistan's legitimate sensitivities”, it failed to reduce the 

trust-deficit between both the countries. It is of critical 

South Asia Plus 37


necessity for contributing to a shift in the timing of peak melt 

runoff, resulting in low river flows during the dry summer 

season when the demand for water in the lower riparian 

basins is at its peak. Additionally, the monitored glaciers 

depict a 17 percent loss in the Suru basin, 15 percent in 

Zanskar, 6 percent in Nubra, 16 percent in Spiti, 20 percent in 

Chandra, and 30 percent in Bhaga. 

The report enlists equipping third-party scientific agencies 

with satellite-based remote-sensing capacities to disseminate 

non-politicised, reliable, and timely hydrological data 

documenting glacial melt trends to water policymakers and 

the general public in both countries for greater transparency. 

However, it does not envisage capacities for dealing with 

disclaiming valedictions to third-party responses, marked as a 

popular trend even before the creation of the Indus Water 

Treaty (IWT) in 1960. The other missing links that the report 

could have thrown light upon is the establishing of a trade-off 

between environmental recommendations vis-à-vis 

developmental recommendations. More so, the report 

consistently addresses an effort towards establishing joint 

partnership and cross-border dialogue in terms of the various 

policy and research recommendations highlighted under 

Agriculture, Food Security, Energy, Economic Development, 

Climate Change, Environmental Pressures, Glaciology, 

Institutions, Governance, and Diplomacy. However, it offers 

insignificant insight as the same has been identified in the 

Indus Water Treaty. 

It could have also elaborated on issues related to governance 

rights, and the perennial influence it fosters over the 

watercourse. The Pakistani Army has a direct influence on 

mostly all issues related to Pakistan. It manages the rhetoric 

around water through proxies and allies, as it has its own vested 

interest in the resource. It controls a significant portion of the 

watercourse (i.e., 11.5 m/hec which amounts to 12 percent of 

its total share). The concept of hydro-connectivity and interdependence 

over the politico-technical discourse of the IWT, 

and factors connecting the catchment with the delta, are other 

aspects that are found inadequately dealt with in the report. 

Book Review 

Addressing the Psychosocial Paradigms of Terrorism 

Ashok Bhan 

Former Director General of Police, Jammu & Kashmir 

Countering Terrorism: Psychosocial Strategies 

Updesh Kumar and Manas K. Mandal (Eds.) 

New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2012 

Pp: 472 

Amidst the plethora of literature written across the globe on 

terrorism and counterterrorism, what difference does the 

present volume offer? Two things immediately come to mind - 

the treatment of the subject from perspectives other than the 

military and the wide canvas of theatres around the globe, which 

form the basis of research to understand terrorism and devise 

psychosocial strategies to counter and prevent it. The diverse 

geographic and cultural affiliations of the authors are the biggest 

strength of the text as it adds force to the arguments and 

content. The end product, thus, gives a balanced worldview and 

not a partisan subjective opinion of an individual researcher. 

The difference in treatment begins with an attempt to distinguish 

between terrorism and other forms of political violence based on 

their impact on society. While there is a broad consensus that 

terrorism (except for State sponsored attacks) is a deliberately 

undertaken act of violence for political goals, primarily aimed at 

unarmed civilians with the immediate motive to create fear; it is 

the psychological effect of terror that distinguishes it from war 

and guerrilla warfare. Acts of terrorism are dramatic and meant 

to attract publicity and create an atmosphere of alarm. Thus, 

there is a distinction between the small number of actual victims 

and the much larger target audience that could be spread over a 

vast area. The unprecedented rate of psychological causalities, 

even outside the contamination zone that bio-terrorism can 

cause, buttresses this difference. 

Terrorism has aptly been described as a tool of psychological 

warfare, whereby violence or the threat of violence is used as a 

means to bring about social, political, or religious change. To 

achieve this, the role played by the media voluntarily or through 

“programming” by terrorist outfits is discussed at length. The use 

of cyberspace by terrorists for information warfare, cyber 

planning and cyber terrorism, and the enormous potential of this 

tool in bypassing formal media in achieving publicity constitute 

an interesting part of the volume. 

The authors have brought out how diverse and intricate the 

phenomenon of terrorism is and have ascribed its root causes as 

issue-, situation-, and time- specific. The volume also helps 

understand differing psychosocial motivations and dynamics that 

operate in varying kinds of terrorist activities like supporting 

terror without self-engagement, non-suicidal acts and suicide 

terrorism. Despite the non-availability of first hand information 

to the researchers, the chapter on the behavioural profile of a 

terrorist helps understand some common characteristics 

amongst all terrorists. Similarly, the demise of terrorism and its 

re-emergence have been identified as areas needing more 

understanding through research. Counterterrorism can best be 

understood, argue the authors, by looking at specificities rather 

than generalising counterterrorism strategies. Combatting a 

wave of politically motivated international terrorism inspired by 

religious extremism and to a lesser extent by ultra-nationalist 

ideologies will, therefore, involve a battle of ideas, as well as deep 

seated political, economic, social, and cultural transformations of 

countries and regions afflicted by terrorism. A case is forcefully 

made out against the excessive use of military instruments alone, 

as it will always be found insufficient to deal with terrorism. That 

the book is edited by two eminent psychologists from India's 

Defence Institute of Psychological Research in itself is evidence of

the growing realisation among defence analysts of the futility of 

long drawn stand-alone military operations to end terrorism in 

any particular theatre. 

Two concepts in particular, among scores cited in the volume, will 

interest the readers in understanding why one takes recourse to 

violence. It is the situational and individual input variables that 

build the personality of an individual. The situational input 

variables may include provocation and frustration, whereas 

individual input variables are related to personality and biology. 

According to the social learning theory, an act of violence may 

seem personally and socially acceptable when considered 

serving a moral principle. Acts of violence and aggression will be 

readily learnt when a motivated-to-learn person observes others 

doing them. What is dangerous is that the recourse to violence, 

according to this, is taken not only by terrorists but also by those 

involved in planning and conducting counterterrorism strategies. 

They may change the moral value of killing to make it immune 

from self-censuring restraint. The “rogue” elements among the 

security forces may be victims of the theory as they find social 

acceptability for their immoral acts. This paradox, according to 

the authors, cannot possibly be solved even through giving 

socially tolerable labels such as “war on terror”, and will remain a 

challenge for democratic societies and countries that are 

expected to justify counter-violence, resulting in what is 

commonly referred to as human rights violations. 

The other is the assumption of the terror management theory, 

which stipulates that people are motivated by their latent fear of 

death and desire to transcend their inevitable demise. One way 

that allows people to deny their morality is by attaching the self 

to something larger than oneself, which will continue to exist long 

after their death. Thus, aggrieved people are able to find 

solidarity and hope for a better future in an organisation, often 

directed by a charismatic leader that uses a compelling ideology 

to elevate the struggle against the perceived oppressor to a 

“sacred” level that construes the killing of innocents as justified 

and even necessary. The example cited in this case, is the 

message of Osama bin Laden that America had ruthlessly 

belittled the Ummah and therefore, hostility towards America 

was a religious duty. The ideology used can be religious, secular 

and even atheistic but becomes increasingly sacred - and thus 

beyond question or rational debate. Groups advocating suicide 

killings portray the action as self-sacrifice to win Allah's favour 

and liberation from sins. However, the authors have been 

emphatic in asserting that religion is seldom the problem or a 

cause of terrorism. It is the religious fervour and dogma, which 

are often used to legitimise acts of terror. 

After elucidating on psychosocial issues, the second half of the 

compilation focuses on psychosocial avenues to counter 

terrorism. The most common counterterrorism strategy in vogue 

today is the withholding of political concessions, granting political 

concessions, or providing peaceful outlets for political change. 

This “strategic model” presupposes that terrorists are rational 

actors who attack civilians to achieve political ends, and is based 

on antiquated views of the classical model of organisational 

theory that members participate in an organisation to merely 

achieve its goals. It has been argued on the basis of theoretical 

and empirical evidences that terrorists are rational people and in 

conformity with the “natural systems model”, join organisations 

to achieve social solidarity and not their official political agenda. 

Therefore, terrorist organisations seek to prolong their existence 

even when doing so impedes its official goal. If terrorists attach 

utmost importance to the social benefits of using terrorism, a 

strong case has been made for a re-look at the current counter 

strategies based on reducing terrorism's political utility. 

For devising a counter strategy, the study of choice of targets by 

terrorists has been highlighted. This will not only allow hardening 

the targets according to their vulnerability, but also helps 

anticipate how terrorists will respond to situational interventions 

thus continually facilitating the renewal of counterterrorism 

agencies' defences. A sound suggestion emanates regarding the 

use of the Internet to counter terrorism propaganda through 

scholars and nongovernmental organisations. Strong legal 

measures towards cyber security, as laid out in the ITU's Global 

Strategic Report of 2008, have been recommended. The 

importance of ethical professional interrogation of terrorists as a 

sound counter terrorism strategy has been discussed at length. 

Seeking to attack the underlying ideology and the conditions that 

sustain violent Islamist terrorism in Indonesia through educating 

people is the theme of one particular chapter. The pesantren, 

largely rural based centres of exclusively Islamic education, have 

started teaching secular subjects and provide vocational training 

up to university level thanks to the 1989 Indonesian Education 

Law that equates madrasas and pesantren to “secular schools” 

who must employ the national curricula issued by the Ministries 

of National Education and Religious Affairs. The recent 

breakdown of order in states like Libya, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, 

and Yemen has created breeding grounds for terrorist groups to 

increase their influence. The Muslim Ummah is increasingly 

disturbed and politically radicalised, not so much by Al Qaedalike 

groups but by socio-political movements like the Muslim 

Brotherhood. The Indonesian example should serve as a model 

to prevent youth falling prey to extremism and violence. 

Recruitments by Islamist extremists will have to be checked, 

images of leaders reduced to obscurity, their narratives publicly 

falsified and citizens reached out to creatively communicate a 

positive narrative favouring progress, cooperation, and justice. 

The centre-stage spirituality needs to occupy, as an upholder of 

peace and non-violence, has been flagged in a number of papers. 

Most religions share core values of love and compassion. People 

have to be reminded of their religious compassionate teachings 

to reduce perceived hostility. The voice of hatred has to be 

muted. It has rightly been argued that spirituality will have to play 

a great constructive role in once again leading human history 

towards a new age of progress. 

The compendium is a must read for those entrusted with the task 

of formulating policies to prevent terrorism and to devise 

counterterrorism strategies. It will be equally useful for those 

involved in counterterrorism operations. The military option is 

easy to launch, but its deleterious effects are well recognised. 

Therefore, societies will have to choose the right mix of 

instruments, including psychosocial prescriptions, if spiralling 

violence initiated by acts of terror followed by counterterror 

violence by the state is to be checked. It is the psychosocial 

effects that make terrorism “tick” and therefore, the key 

challenge lies in understanding and counteracting these 

psychosocial consequences. 

Readers unfamiliar with psychosocial theories and terminology 

may struggle slightly in understanding certain concepts 

enumerated in the volume. However, due credit must be given to 

the authors for relating various concepts to field examples, 

making the narrative easy to understand and an extremely useful 

addition to the literature available on countering terrorism. 

South Asia Plus 39

Centre for Internal and Regional Security (IReS) 

The Centre for Internal and Regional Security (IReS) was inaugurated on 2 March 2012 by the National Security Advisor, Mr Shiv Shankar Menon during 

the Sixth Annual Armed Conflicts Conference at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. India and its extended neighbourhood is a region undergoing 

turmoil since the past many years. Now, due to significant political and security-related changes, the region is in a phase of transition. The IReS centre at the 

IPCS aims to study such transition. Through its programmes and events, the IReS aims to facilitate dialogue on traditional and non-traditional security 

challenges facing the region by engaging the academia, policy-makers, international organisations and young scholars. 

Some of the major programmes and projects under the IReS identify the most pressing themes in India and its extended neighbourhood and work towards 

arriving at a coherent, comprehensive and practical framework to find solutions to them. The Centre has inaugurated a new programme on Non-Traditional 

Security on 15 May 2012 with the focus of this year being on Water Conflicts in South Asia. Under the focus area, this programme intends to undertake study 

on one internal water conflict (between any two states of India) and one external water conflict (between any two countries of the region). The keynote 

address during the inauguration was given by Mr. B.G. Verghese. 

The CONTRIBUTORS 

D Suba Chandran N. Manoharan PR Chari Bibhu Prasad Routray 

Ashok Bhan Harun ur Rashid Prof. V. Suryanarayan M Mayilvaganan 

J Jeganaathan Zainab Akhter Roomana Hukil Deepak Kumar Nayak 

Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman Sander R Aarten Suvolaxmi Dutta Choudhury 

Armed Conflicts in South Asia (ACSA) 

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies has been extensively and consistently monitoring South Asian conflicts since 2006. In this regard, the 

institute has been publishing an Annual since 2007. 

Previous Publications of ACSA

April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

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