April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

April-June 26
Commentary
India, China, and Bangladesh: The Contentious Politics of the Brahmaputra River
Roomana Hukil
Research Officer, IReS, IPCS
The Brahmaputra River is one of the most significant
confidence-building measures between India, China, and
Bangladesh. Despite a well-functioned relationship between
India and China in recent decades, the Brahmaputra River may
pose new challenges to the continued supply of fresh water
for both countries in the future. In addition, China's
announcement, last month, of its plans to construct three
hydropower dams – Dagu, Jiacha, and Jiexy along the middle
reaches of the Brahmaputra basin, has raged anxiety in India
and Bangladesh in terms of erosion, flood protective
measures, and the potential ecological damage to the
downstream regions.
The article delves into a strategic-techno analysis of the issues
festering around the proposed dam construction projects that
may open a new front of contentious politics amongst the
neighbours. It examines whether 'water rationality' will
continue to govern the riparian relationship, and also reasons
that in spite of no water sharing agreement between India and
China, vis-à-vis only one water treaty between India and
Bangladesh; coupled with the enormous potential of sharing
the benefits, it is unlikely to envision the three countries
agreeing to sign a portioned water resource development
treaty in the near future.
Fresh Strategic Insights: Issues and Steps
The Brahmaputra River consolidated the water rights between
all the riparian states pertaining to their water usage, and
requirements in the growing region. In spite of there having
being no official water sharing accord between India and
China, the two countries manifest a paradigm to maintaining
cordial water diplomacy in the present international scenario
of water conflicts. Hitherto, the dilemma over future water
supply regulations, amidst the issue of ecological upkeep,
persists for both India and Bangladesh.
China's vigorous push in favour of the hydropower base
construction on the Brahmaputra or Yarlung Zangbo River (as
known in China) is foreseen as an attempt to harm the
downstream interests, particularly of Northeast India. The
construction of the 100 meters Zangmu dam (510 MW project)
in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 2010, is an
approximate case in point. The current proposed construction
of the 124 metres Dagu dam, which has a 640 MW capacity,
triggers a maximum impact on the downstream flows in India.
Post the 'flurry of dam-building', China has tried to leverage its
hydropower requirements in the north and central regions;
however, India's Northeast, and neighbouring Bangladesh
could face an undeniably reduced water supply, if not for acute
water shortage. This is reasoned since the watercourse feeds
on seven rivulets originating from the glaciers in the Tibetan
plateau, hence damming the river upstream could result in the
lower riparian regions facing an intense water division from
these snow-fed rivulets during the summer months.
While the run-of-the-river projects are, primarily, meant to
store large volumes of water for generating power, fresh
concerns were raised regarding the need for a scientifically
designed drainage system all over the downstream region,
complemented by extensive soil conservation, afforestation,
and watershed management in the hilly areas of the
Northeast region. An in-depth study of the climatic changes
that cause erratic flooding patterns is urged so that proper
ameliorative measures may be adopted. This, combined with
regional flood early warning systems and flood moderation
measures, along with well-planned erosion management,
should encourage inter-state and regional cooperation. An
earnest step would be for the international community and
water boards to thwart any measures that are detrimental to
the sustainability of the Brahmaputra. It is imperative to
maintain the flow of water in the Brahmaputra River so that it
can sustain the environment and water balance in India's
Northeast, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, before dispersing into
the Bay of Bengal.
The Relationship Soufflé
China's aggressive planning to provide for the energy and
water needs of its 1.3 billion people at the expanse of its Asian
counterparts is presumable. China's 26 other dam projects in
the pipeline (also along the Brahmaputra River) specifies an
85 per cent decline in flows from China to India during the
summer months. Even if the foreseen water depictions, such
as an environmental imbalance, natural disasters, degraded
fragile ecologies, and diversion of vital river resources were to
be refuted, China could keep any riparian neighbour on good
behaviour by acquiring the capability of using the
Brahmaputra as a political instrument.
Thus, the implications for setting up an International
Brahmaputra River Water Tribunal for arriving at an
international water treaty, or a preliminary initiative of a
tripartite agreement between India, China, and Bangladesh to
sustain passive relations in the region deem vital. But
envisaging a portioned water resource development treaty
between the three countries is unlikely, where issues related
to trade, transit, land, roadway, and, water distribution first
require a heads up between the three neighbouring states.
China's growing strategic interests in Pakistan, Southeast Asia,
and maritime security coupled by Tibet's invasion in the past,
raise grave security concerns for India with its plan to divert
waters of the Brahmaputra to north and central China. For
India, the middle riparian between China and Bangladesh,
marks a fine exemplar to understanding the water needs visà-vis
water supplies, as it swings around both sides of the
table. As a result, whether water rationality will continually
govern riparian relations still remains a question mark.