April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

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April-June 30 Commentary Naxal Violence: The Peoples' Liberation Front of India (PLFI) in Jharkhand Deepak Kumar Nayak Research Officer, IReS, IPCS The activities of the Peoples' Liberation Front of India (PLFI), a splinter group of the Communist party of India-Maoist (CPI- Maoist), have forced the state police to intensify operations against them in the Gumla district in Jharkhand. Though the state police have, on earlier occasions, launched offensives against Left-Wing Extremist (LWE) groups other than the CPI- Maoist, the current offensive in March 2013, recognizes the growing threat from PLFI. From Kamdara and Basia police station areas to Gumla, Palkot, Raidih, Ghaghra, Bishunpur and Sisai police stations in the district, PLFI cadres have stretched out their network and have been active in these areas. What is the PLFI? From where does its support emanate? Is the state police capable enough to contain this growing menace? About the PLFI: Strength and Areas of Operation The PLFI was formed in 2007 by Dinesh Gope and operated in areas around Ranchi. After the killing of his elder brother, Suresh Gope, in December 2003, Dinesh took charge and extended its area of operation. Later, in July 2007, Masi Charan Purty, a renegade of the CPI-Maoist, along with several of his followers joined Dinesh Gope and the PLFI. Though Purty was subsequently arrested, the PLFI grew under Gope's leadership. Other Maoist cadres who walked out of the parent outfit also joined the PLFI, which thus became a splinter group of the CPI-Maoist. Ever since, the PLFI has been wreaking havoc in Jharkhand's Ranchi, Khunti, Simdega, Gumla, Latehar, Chatra and Palamu, although the group claims to have extended its activities and influence all over the State. Along with six other splinter groups operating in Jharkhand, the PLFI have carried out more than half the terror strikes in the state, according to a study by the state police Special Branch. The group operates through several 'area commanders'. An assessment by the Jharkhand police puts the cadre strength of the outfit at 150 to 300. Extortion from contractors engaged in development projects constitutes the major source of income for the PLFI, and reportedly brings in INR 1.5 billion per year. Coal traders in districts including Latehar are also specifically targeted by the group. Mainly involved in criminal activities and extortion, the group collects funds by unleashing terror in the area. In the fight for supremacy in the region, the group has also engaged in clashes with the CPI-Maoist and other splinter Maoist outfits including the Jharkhand Liberation Tigers (JLT) in Jharkhand. groups in the State. Unlike the Maoists, the PLFI has no ideology and is only concerned with extortion and criminal activities. Hence, joining the PLFI is, and always has been, comparatively easy. As the main source of the PLFI's income comes from extortion and levies, it attracts a large number of unemployed youth, who are lured by the temptation of easy money. According to the Jharkhand Police, Maoist-related incidents decreased from 65-70 per cent in 2008-09 to 44 per cent in 2012. In stark contrast, the violence perpetrated by the PLFI has gone up to 30 per cent from 14 per cent. “Where the Maoists are retreating, their rival groups are moving in to occupy the space left by them. All of them are purely criminal groups fighting over extortion and killing people if their demands are not met,” Inspector General (law and order), Jharkhand, S.N. Pradhan said. Strategy to Contain the PLFI As of 31 December 2011, the Police Population ratio (policemen per 100,000 population) of Jharkhand was 167, well above the national average of 137, but significantly below the level considered necessary to deal with the State's intricate problems of law and order, administration and security. However, in its diligent efforts to contain the PLFI, Jharkhand police launched an operation against the group in Khunti, Simdega and Gumla districts in October 2012. Over 20 rebels were arrested and a huge cache of arms was seized. Despite this, the PLFI seems to be assertive and is now expanding its base by fanning out to new areas beyond the home turf. In the last four years, for instance, the PLFI has spread its tentacles to Raiboga, Birmitrapur and Hathibari police limits and its impact was also felt in Bisra police limits in Odisha and even in the tribal region of Jashpur in Chhattisgarh. The PLFI is not a bigger challenge than the Maoists, but as a group, it is definitely growing in strength, especially at the local level. The PLFI's menaces have grown too much over recent years to go unobserved any further, and the present police operations against the group are timely – though they are yet to yield the desired results. Ironically, the government has also been instrumental in sustaining PLFI during its initial days, using it to counter the CPI-Maoist. However, it appears that this strategy has backfired; today the PLFI has become one of the major terror
Commentary Sri Lanka: Tamil Nadu and India's Foreign Policy Prof. V. Suryanarayan Former Director, Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras There is a huge divide between Chennai and New Delhi on how both see Sri Lanka. What remains the primary problem in India's approach towards Sri Lanka, and why is there a divide within? Periphery and the Core: Problems of India's Foreign Policy Paradigm In a large country like India, relations with neighbouring countries will have their immediate fallout on contiguous Indian states. Thus, India-Pakistan relations will affect Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat; the India-Nepal equation will have its fallout on Bihar, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, and West Bengal; India-China relations will impinge upon Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Jammu and Kashmir; India-Bangladesh relations will have its fallout on West Bengal, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Assam; India-Bhutan relations will affect West Bengal, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, and Assam; India-Myanmar relations will have its fallout on Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram; India-Sri Lanka relations will have its consequences on Tamil Nadu; and India- Maldives relations will spill over to the Minicoy islands. We have not yet evolved a political mechanism by which the interests of the contiguous Indian states are safeguarded while formulating and implementing the neighbourhood policy. In the days of one-party dominance, New Delhi very often followed a neighbourhood policy, which it considered to be in India's national interest, but which adversely affected the neighbouring Indian states. Two illustrations given below substantiate this point. In October 1964, New Delhi signed the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact, which converted the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka into merchandise to be divided between the two countries; thousands of them were conferred Indian citizenship and repatriated to India. This inhuman agreement was severely criticised by Rajagopalachari, Krishna Menon, Kamaraj Nadar, Ramamurthy, and Annadurai. In the same way, New Delhi concluded the maritime boundary agreements with Sri Lanka In 1974 and 1976, which ceded the island of Kachchatheevu to Sri Lanka and bartered away the traditional fishing rights enjoyed by Indian fishermen. These agreements were opposed by the DMK government, but New Delhi went ahead. The Rise of Regional Parties With the end of one-party dominance and the formation of coalition governments, regional parties began to play a national role. They began to make their inputs into India's neighbourhood policy. Three examples prove this point. When Deve Gowda was Prime Minister and IK Gujral the Minister for External Affairs, India-Bangladesh relations forged ahead. Gujral was sensitive to the feelings in West Bengal and associated the West Bengal Government with the formulation of the India's Bangladesh policy, especially in the sharing of Ganges waters. Second, the inclusion of the Sethusamudram project in the manifesto of the UPA government was due to the persistent efforts made by the DMK Government headed by Karunanidhi. Third, India's Sri Lanka policy during the final stages of the Fourth Eelam War had the backing of its DMK ally. New Delhi permitted Karunanidhi to indulge in political gimmicks so that he could pose himself as the champion of the Overseas Tamils, but it should be stated that the DMK did not put any serious obstacles in the way of New Delhi pursuing its Sri Lanka policy. Current Developments in Tamil Nadu The tumultuous developments taking place in Tamil Nadu should be analysed within the above-mentioned context. Cutting across party lines, there is sympathy for the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. People are angry and bitter that innocent Tamil civilians were massacred during the last stages of the Fourth Eelam War. They also feel strongly that the Sri Lankan Government has gone back on the assurances about devolution of powers to the provinces. The spontaneous upsurge amongst the student community is a shining example of this righteous indignation. What vitiates the political scenario is the competitive nature of Tamil Nadu politics and the gimmicks performed by the two Dravidian parties in their desire for one-upmanship. In this competitive outbidding, Karunanidhi is on a weak wicket. He wants to atone for his past misdeeds; he has resurrected the Tamil Eelam Solidarity Organisation (TESO) and has called for Hartal in support of the Tamil cause. Jayalalitha is trying to extract maximum leverage from Karunanidhi's predicament. From being a sharp critic of the Tigers, today she is championing the cause of Tamil Eelam and is advocating a referendum among Sri Lankan Tamils in the island and the Tamil diaspora. She has injected politics into sports and has given the stamp of approval against the participation of Sri Lankan players in the Indian Premier League. She has suggested that the venue of CHOGM be shifted from Colombo to another country. She wants Mahinda Rajapaksa to be branded a war criminal and be tried in the International Court of Justice. She wants New Delhi to declare Sri Lanka an “unfriendly state” and has demanded the imposition of an economic embargo. All these statements have provided exciting fare to her fanatical followers within the state, as well as in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. But the tragedy is, all the above impractical suggestions will in no way bring about ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka. On the contrary, it will lead to the accentuation of ethnic tensions. Worse, India's relations with Sri Lanka, already subjected to severe strains, will further take a nose dive. South Asia Plus 31
Page 1 and 2: South Asia Plus April-June 2013 Vol
Page 3 and 4: South Asia Plus April-June 2013 Lad
Page 5 and 6: Commentary Af-Pak Diary: Decoding H
Page 7 and 8: Commentary Pakistan: Combating the
Page 9 and 10: Commentary Water Conflicts in South
Page 11 and 12: Commentary India and Pakistan: Poli
Page 13 and 14: Commentary India and Pakistan: The
Page 15 and 16: Commentary J&K after Afzal Guru: Im
Page 17 and 18: Commentary Teesta Water Accord: Exp
Page 19 and 20: Commentary Review: India-Sri Lanka
Page 21 and 22: Commentary India and Pakistan: Is I
Page 23 and 24: Commentary Bangladesh: An Analysis
Page 25 and 26: Commentary Naxal Violence: Is the M
Page 27 and 28: Commentary Kargil: Echoes of Attack
Page 29: Commentary Sri Lanka and the UNHRC
Page 33 and 34: Commentary India, China & the Brahm
Page 35 and 36: A close look at the election patter
Page 37 and 38: international border villages. Most
Page 39 and 40: the growing realisation among defen

April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

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