April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

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April-June 22 Commentary India's Northeast: The Threat of Islamist Militancy Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman Research Scholar, IIT Guwahati, Assam The demonstration by Muslim advocacy groups, which resulted in violent clashes in Mumbai's Azad Maidan on 11 August 2012, leaving 2 dead and over 65 injured, was held to protest against the killings of Muslims in Kokrajhar (the intercommunity clashes between Muslims and the Bodo community) and in the Arakan state of Myanmar (the intercommunity clashes between the Rohingya Muslims and the Rakhine community). The linkage of these two separate intercommunity clashes to a single protest march in Mumbai may be symbolic, but the threat of the rise of Islamist militancy in parts of Northeast India, and the larger international neighbourhood encompassing Myanmar and Bangladesh, has to be seen in context. It has been well documented that Islamist militant groups and networks have had links with insurgent groups in many states of Northeast India, especially in Manipur, Assam and Nagaland; and this had been oscillating between tactical support in arms dealing, narcotics, illegal and fake currency networks, and anti-government sabotage activities over the past few decades. This trend, however, does not indicate by itself the threat of Islamist militancy. While many commentators have described the threat of the rise of Islamist militancy in Northeast India as unfounded and being alarmist, the ground conditions in the larger region cannot be ignored. The People's United Liberation Front (PULF) has been operating in parts of Manipur, Assam and Nagaland for the past two decades, and has been splintered, as has been the trend with many other insurgent organisations in Northeast India. Though split into many smaller factions over time, it is one of the major Islamist militant organisations currently active in the region. Apart from this, the role and support of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Bangladesh's Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) to many insurgent organisations and networks in Northeast India, has unabatedly continued. There is a sort of an ideological vacuum in many of the 'home-grown' insurgent organisations in Northeast India. They have suffered huge losses in tactical and public legitimacy accounts in the past decade or so and are not in a position to prevent the growth of Islamist militancy in Northeast India, as to guard their own turf. The entry points for Islamist militancy in Northeast India are not hard to comprehend. The presence of a large 'illegal' Muslim immigrant community in Assam, which has been a source of perennial political activism, and was one of the motivations behind the formation of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), became fertile ground for an entry point to the Islamist militant groups. The political uncertainty that has engulfed this migrant community over more than four decades now, has made them vulnerable to such militant influence, as a way to survive the political threat. Further enhancing the political aspect of an ever-looming 'threat to their survival' versus their responses to 'surviving the threat' over the past decades; the instance of large-scale riots and inter-community clashes in the past, such as the Nellie riots and the recent instances in Udalguri in 2008 and Kokrajhar in 2012, have made the case for militant responses an usable instrument in the evolving politics of the region. The recent riots in Kokrajhar saw the use of sophisticated weapons by the Bodo militant groups, who took advantage of the situation. Stemming from the flawed surrender policy of the Indian counter-insurgency establishment, there is a possibility of these weapons finding their way into the hands of the Muslim groups, by jihadi groups across the border. The threat of the rise of militancy amongst the Muslims affected by the Kokrajhar violence, was raised by the National Commission for Minorities (NCM), in its report to the Assam government after a field visit in the violence affected areas of Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) areas in August 2012. The overall political, economic, and living conditions of the Muslim community in BTAD areas has been described as a fertile ground for jihadi influence. This brings into context the rise in militant activities amongst the Rohingya Muslims in the larger region of Arakan state of Myanmar, South Bangladesh, and parts of Tripura and Mizoram. In the face of deportation by Border Guards Force along the Bangladesh border, and political and ethnic clashes in Myanmar, the links of Rohingya militant organisations with Al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba have been substantiated in the past. There have been reports of Rohingya Muslims trying to make their way into Northeast India, and this seems not a distant possibility, given the state of our borders and the manner in which we treat our sensitive and 'peaceful states' border, especially in Mizoram, Manipur and Tripura. The government of India needs to brace itself to counter the threat of Islamist militancy in the larger region through proactive diplomacy and a better understanding of larger issues and linkages. It should not be content in 'managing' the home situation. The trends that are emerging cannot be ignored for the lack of actual ground instances; rather, we must prepare and remedy the conditions for such entry points to Islamist militancy.
Commentary Bangladesh: An Analysis of Pranab Mukherjee's Visit Harun ur Rashid Former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva President Pranab Mukherjee arrived in Dhaka on 3 March for a three-day visit to Bangladesh at the invitation of the President and Prime Minister of Bangladesh. Highly respected in Bangladesh for his modesty and affability, Mukherjee has close personal connections with the country, through his wife, who hails from the Sadar Upazilla of Narail. During his recent visit, President Mukherjee received an honorary doctorate degree at a Convocation of Dhaka University and visited the ancestral home of his in-laws in Bhadrabila village, Narail in Sadar sub-district. According to media reports from Bangladesh, Kanai Lal Ghosh, the president's brother-in-law, is currently residing at the ancestral home. Politically speaking, too, Mukherjee is no stranger to Bangladesh. During the 1971 War of Liberation, he was one of the main Indian political leaders who supported and assisted the provisional government of Bangladesh and the people of Bangladesh bear a debt of gratitude to him. Indeed, he received the 'Bangladesh Swadhinata Sammanona (Bangladesh Freedom Honour)' a state honour for his outstanding contribution to the Liberation War. The government of Bangladesh, led by the Bangladesh Awami League, first started honouring foreign allies for their contribution to the country's liberation war in 2011, when the government posthumously conferred the Bangladesh Swadhinata Sammanona upon former prime minister of India, the late Indira Gandhi. Her daughter-in-law and Congress President, Sonia Gandhi received the honour on her behalf on July 25, 2011. The majority of people in the smaller neighbouring countries in the vicinity around India perceive it to be the larger and more resourceful neighbour. There is both admiration and apprehension in these perceptions. Admiration is felt because this particular neighbour, having common bonds of history and geography, has been emerging as a global and a regional political and economic power. Apprehension emanates from a more strained scenario when these smaller neighbours are not sure of their position in a fluid geopolitical environment. Under such circumstances, an Indian presidential visit to any foreign country in the neighbouring vicinity is not only highly ceremonial but diplomatically symbolic. It goes without saying that no presidential visit can take place without the approval of the Indian government. Usually, a list of countries is prepared, to which the ceremonial visit of the Indian President will take place, taking into account India's national and regional interests. believe Bangladesh may consider seriously looking eastwards, and eventually form a cooperative institutional relationship with Myanmar, Thailand, and China, given the geopolitical shift of power towards the Asia-Pacific at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Domestically speaking, India also realizes that it needs Bangladesh because of its geographic location, especially because of the advantages that Bangladesh holds in terms of transit/trans-shipment of goods through the latter country to India's north-eastern states via West Bengal. In this context, relations between India and Bangladesh have been on the upswing ever since Sheikh Hasina took power in 2009. Prime Minister Hasina visited New Delhi in January 2010 and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was in Dhaka in September 2011. Dhaka moved quickly to address Delhi's concerns on cross-border terrorism and transit/transshipment to India's north-east, given the proper infrastructure in place for it. Transit on an experimental basis was provided to India by Bangladesh in 2011. However, the promises made by India, in return for Bangladesh's acquiescence on issues such as these, remain unfulfilled. Nevertheless, President Mukherjee's first foreign visit to Bangladesh demonstrates that the Indian government does indeed attach great importance to the existing cooperative relations with Bangladesh in various sectors. There is a saying that one can choose friends but not neighbours. As a regional power, however, India needs to cultivate good relationships with its neighbouring countries. If neighbouring countries, such as Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, do not respond positively to India's overtures, it may be difficult for India to achieve its regional goals, while catering to its global ambitions. Bangladesh and India are neighbours and they cannot re-fashion geography. The two countries are destined to live next to each other. Given the desire to live together in cooperation, two countries may proceed with productive relations through unrelenting efforts in political, economic, social and environmental issues. India is aware that the geopolitical scene around South Asia and South East Asia is in a fluid state. Bangladesh not only shares borders with India, but also with reformist Myanmar and is also a near neighbour to China, Nepal and Bhutan. If India has strained relations with Bangladesh, some analysts South Asia Plus 23
Page 1 and 2: South Asia Plus April-June 2013 Vol
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Page 5 and 6: Commentary Af-Pak Diary: Decoding H
Page 7 and 8: Commentary Pakistan: Combating the
Page 9 and 10: Commentary Water Conflicts in South
Page 11 and 12: Commentary India and Pakistan: Poli
Page 13 and 14: Commentary India and Pakistan: The
Page 15 and 16: Commentary J&K after Afzal Guru: Im
Page 17 and 18: Commentary Teesta Water Accord: Exp
Page 19 and 20: Commentary Review: India-Sri Lanka
Page 21: Commentary India and Pakistan: Is I
Page 25 and 26: Commentary Naxal Violence: Is the M
Page 27 and 28: Commentary Kargil: Echoes of Attack
Page 29 and 30: Commentary Sri Lanka and the UNHRC
Page 31 and 32: Commentary Sri Lanka: Tamil Nadu an
Page 33 and 34: Commentary India, China & the Brahm
Page 35 and 36: A close look at the election patter
Page 37 and 38: international border villages. Most
Page 39 and 40: the growing realisation among defen

April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

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