April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

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April-June 32 Commentary Bangladesh: Is it the Shahbagh Spring? Suvolaxmi Dutta Choudhury Research Scholar, JNU, New Delhi The present political upsurge in Bangladesh has brought the 150 million-strong nation to the throes of a revolution. Certain commentaries have compared Shahbagh, the seat of the uprising in Dhaka, to Tahrir Square. Is the Shahbagh upsurge heralding a 'South Asian Spring'? Does the movement manifest certain distinct resemblances with the recent happenings in the Arab world? From Genocide to the Spring: A Short History The Pakistani genocide during the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 had colluders (razakaar), who brutally resisted East Pakistan's independence. The International War Crimes Tribunal, established by the ruling Awami League government in 2010, is presently sealing the fate of those booked for war crimes. Crucially, the accused enjoy eminent positions in the Jamaat-e-Islami party, which in alliance with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), constitute the main opposition force. The leaderless upsurge erupted on 5 February 2013 shortly after the second of the convicts, Abdul Qaeder Mollah, was awarded a life-term instead of the popularly anticipated death sentence. Amnesty International's press release on 6 March 2013 reported a brutal counter to the movement since then. Hartaals are presently the order of the day. Shahbagh and Tahrir Square: Points of Convergence Shahbagh and Tahrir Square (the hallmark of the Arab Spring) find a commonality; the urban educated youth, without formal associations to any particular political organisation, have mobilised themselves through social media and mobile phones. The largely peaceful protests, in both contexts, have been organised sans any umbrella leadership. Bangladesh, much like the Arab world, is a post-colonial developing nation-state where the socio-economic development goals are moving sluggishly, and political instability and unemployment are worrisome for its people. One lurking question is left to be answered here: has this pent up frustration found a collective political expression in Shahbagh, as in the case of the Arab Spring (though Shahbagh does not have an anti-regime character). Also, what brings the two together is the search for a collective national identity through a popular uprising. For most post-colonial developing nation-states, a pivotal dilemma is left to be resolved: on what foundational principles should the nation-state's collective identity be constructed? Often, post-colonial nation-states are, thus, a breeding ground for bloody struggle between opposing political ideologies. While in Bangladesh secular-nationalist forces are trying to stage a come-back amidst increasing Islamisation, the Middle-East has just witnessed the reverse. Is it Shahbagh Spring? However, comparing the Shahbagh movement to the Arab Spring may sound a bit far-fetched since the fundamental reasons why the respective movements erupted are notably different: while the Arab Spring was a series of pro-reform, pro-democracy, and anti-regime movements, the upheaval at Shahbagh symbolises a cry for vindication, in the collective conscience and historical memory of a people, against wrongdoings during its tumultuous birth. Whether this political upheaval in Shahbagh is guided by revolutionary zeal or not is also not beyond contestation. The response of the Jamaat-BNP combine is that the movement is orchestrated just a little ahead of the elections by Awami political forces, who in the name of secularism, seek to destroy the massive economic and social clout held by the Jamaat. Though, the Jamaat's electoral influence is not spectacular in independent Bangladesh, the party holds the reins of crucial sectors of the country such as banking, education, healthcare, etc. This line of argument gains certain solid ground from the fact that the present upsurge has called for the boycott of the Jamaat affiliated Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited, which is the largest private banking network in the country. Tailpiece: A Cosy Liaison between the Jamaat and the Middle-East? A crucial international dimension of the Jamaat movement is the warm relationship it shares with certain Muslim countries, many in the prosperous Middle-East. The Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited, which is the lifeline of the Jamaat's funds, was established at the initiative of the Saudis and is associated with the Al Razee Bank of Saudi Arabia. Sixty per cent of the Bank's shares are held by the Saudis. The UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar also own shares of the Bank. The Saudibased Islamic NGO, Rabeta-al-Alam-al-Islami is also an important source of Jamaat's finances. The Kuwait Relief Fund and Al Nahiyan Trust of the UAE are other NGOs fattening Jamaat's kitty. Bangladesh also enjoys Saudi oil at a subsidised price, which might be jeopardised on the event of a crack-down on the Jamaat-e-Islami by the ruling Awami League, given the support enjoyed by the organisation in Saudi Arabia. A debate in Bangladesh's political circles has ensued about the banning of the Jammat. However, what is obvious here is that such a move would neither be able to surmount the outstanding socio-economic clout presently enjoyed by the organisation, nor would it deter it from continuing its alleged activities in the future. To conclude, though the upsurge in Bangladesh may not exactly fit the bill for being called the Shahbagh Spring, the unrest could have vital ramifications for present international politics at large.
Commentary India, China & the Brahmaputra: Riparian Rivalry Roomana Hukil Research Officer, IReS, IPCS China's proposed strategic interests behind the building of the run-of-the-river dams along the middle reaches of River Brahmaputra, provides insignificant data over the nature of the project in the future course of time. As the Indian government rests on the Chinese assurance of the unalterable status quo, the Assamese government has raised serious doubts on the Chinese prospects over the watercourse. In this regard, it is time for an establishment such as that of the Brahmaputra River Valley Authority (BRVA) to undertake effective scientific investigation with respect to both the lean flows of the river and the consequences of the dam constructions by the Chinese over the river. This article delves into assessing the potential factors that are leading China into building the multiple dams. It questions China's proposition vis-à-vis the mounting threats and assesses the establishment of a joint authoritative body to ensure the regulatory flow of the waters, in order to provide a timely scientific data of the cause and effects of the river. Potential Factors for China's Propaganda The Brahmaputra River in China (known as Yarlung Tsangpo) has been of significant strategic interest for the Chinese since the 19th century." With an average elevation of about 4000 metres, the river provides for the hydroelectricity power needs of the country. In addition, some areas within China have been experiencing their worst drought in at least 50 years. Therefore, it is believed that by diverting the river system via constructing the proposed dams, the river will provide for the growing needs of the country; prove to be a useful mechanism in flood control methods and serve the waterway navigational purposes of the country. China upholds the principle of 'Prior Appropriation', meaning that, as the first users of the river course, it must be granted the right of accessing the river without external interferences. This also marks a geo-strategic advantage for China to enforce its power structure in the South Asian region. For China, the building of the dams is merely a run-of-the-river project that will not hold the water of the lower riparian states. However, China's growing interests from the 'Tibet Three Gorges Dam', (one of the biggest dams in China) construction on the Pondo Water Control Project in 2008, which is expected to be completed in 2016, coupled with the 60 odd number of dams raises serious environmental and risk concerns for its downstream South Asian counterparts. Comprised of a reservoir and a power station, the projects are designed to irrigate millions of hectares of farmland and generate millions of kilowatt hours of electricity annually. India's Strategic Move The recent exchange of state visits over the Brahmaputra discourse by China and India on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit questions the efficacy of the state of affairs, pertaining to a change in the projected plans. While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh raised India's concerns over Beijing's plans to construct three dams across the Brahmaputra River, President Xi Jinping, as part of the decadal change of power structure in China, maintained that the dams are, merely, run-of-the-river projects and are innocuous. Since there is no definitive alignment of the nature of the projects merely being run-of-the-river, India's subsequent course of action should entail restructuring the Brahmaputra Board and replacing it with the Brahmaputra River Valley Authority (BRVA). There is an apprehension being expressed throughout the Asian regime who are demanding to know the quantity of water that the Chinese are planning to divert. Therefore, demanding a bilateral collaborative study between the two countries will help allay these fears. Since no flood mitigation measures are in place, there is an excessive amount of water in the river which is not contained in any reservoir. Further, China holds no water sharing agreement between any of its co-riparian neighbours and is continually propositioning new dam constructions with zero lateral negotiations over the effects of its plans. Considering relations at stake due to China's disposition, it is essential that the Brahmaputra River Valley Authority, if established, look into the present needs and evolving dynamics pertaining to irrigation, food security, climate change, flood preventive modules, hydroelectricity, ecology, etc. of the sub-regional arena. Notwithstanding pledges to take the bilateral relationship to a new level with a higher growth trajectory, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has sought a joint mechanism with China to assess the construction work on dams on the river. This will ensure a steady assessment of the work in progress vis-à-vis foresightedness in dam construction activities and will also safeguard Sino-Indo relations from getting muddled in the long run. By establishing a joint mechanism committee, the Indian government will be able to re-affirm its loose ties with the Northeast. Assam's vociferous claims to the central government over the issue have pushed the UPA into taking immediate action. However, the onus is still on India for looking at the tripartite aspects of the water-sharing discourse, as regards, its relations with Bangladesh loosely hanging despite weighty political ambitions being raised over the Teesta River. Presently, India needs to act swiftly over the Teesta discourse with Bangladesh whilst pushing for affirmative action over the Brahmaputra River with China in order to maintain a steady balance with its riparian counterparts in the region. South Asia Plus 33
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Page 5 and 6: Commentary Af-Pak Diary: Decoding H
Page 7 and 8: Commentary Pakistan: Combating the
Page 9 and 10: Commentary Water Conflicts in South
Page 11 and 12: Commentary India and Pakistan: Poli
Page 13 and 14: Commentary India and Pakistan: The
Page 15 and 16: Commentary J&K after Afzal Guru: Im
Page 17 and 18: Commentary Teesta Water Accord: Exp
Page 19 and 20: Commentary Review: India-Sri Lanka
Page 21 and 22: Commentary India and Pakistan: Is I
Page 23 and 24: Commentary Bangladesh: An Analysis
Page 25 and 26: Commentary Naxal Violence: Is the M
Page 27 and 28: Commentary Kargil: Echoes of Attack
Page 29 and 30: Commentary Sri Lanka and the UNHRC
Page 31: Commentary Sri Lanka: Tamil Nadu an
Page 35 and 36: A close look at the election patter
Page 37 and 38: international border villages. Most
Page 39 and 40: the growing realisation among defen

April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

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