April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

April-June 20
Commentary
Hyderabad Terror Attacks: Road-blocks in the National Counter-Terrorism
Centre (NCTC)
N Manoharan
Vivekananda International Foundation
After the recent twin blasts in Hyderabad, there has been a
new push towards setting up the National Counter-Terrorism
Centre (NCTC). Earlier attempts to set up an overarching body
to deal with counter-terrorism failed mainly because of
opposition from states ruled by non-Congress parties. But is
this the only obstacle? Are there other serious issues in
making the NCTC fully functional?
In 2009, Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram outlined his
vision for “the broad architecture of a new security system
that will serve the country today and in the foreseeable
future.” His idea was to institute an umbrella body dedicated
to counter terrorism along the lines of the American NCTC,
with control over intelligence, operations and the
investigation of all matters pertaining to terrorism. The
NCTC's goals, according to Chidambaram, “will include
preventing a terrorist attack, containing a terrorist attack,
should one take place, and responding to a terrorist attack by
inflicting pain upon the perpetrators”.
The need for a body like the NCTC cannot be questioned. India
is one of the worst affected countries by terrorism and, in
recent times, it has witnessed more terrorist incidents than
any other country in the world. India faces a wide spectrum of
threats that range from militancy in Jammu & Kashmir,
insurgency in the northeast, left-wing extremism in Central
India, and jihadi terrorism threatening the hinterland of the
country. Over and above the main forms of terrorism, other
threats exist, such as illegal migration, drug-trafficking, the
smuggling of counterfeit currencies, small arms proliferation,
and cyber warfare. These are all varied forms of the kind of
terrorism that India confronts today. Yet for all that, the
country lacks a single overarching body dedicated to the cause
of counter-terrorism. The time limit for constituting the NCTC
was initially set for the end of 2010, but is yet to see the light of
day. Only recently has the current Home Minister Sushilkumar
Shinde indicated his readiness “to tweak controversial
proposals to break the impasse.”
To avoid replication, Chidambaram wanted all related
agencies involved in counter-terrorism (although they are
part of different ministries) like the Research and Analysis
Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC), National Technical Research Organisation
(NTRO), Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Aviation
Research Centre (ARC), Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), Defence
Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI), National Investigation Agency (NIA) to report to the
proposed NCTC (under the Ministry of Home Affairs) on
matters related to terrorism. However, there has been intense
resistance to this “submission”. There is a pervasive fear that
such an arrangement would lead to the over-centralisation of
power in the Home Minister and the Ministry of Home Affairs
emerging as a kind of “super ministry”.
Although the above apprehension is farfetched, it is the
responsibility of the Center to convey, in unambiguous terms,
that the focus of the NCTC will be “terrorism only”. In this
regard, it should be acknowledged that intelligence
/investigation/security agencies have a far wider mandate
than terrorism. Even on matters specifically related to
terrorism, the methodology of working should be
cooperation and coordination and not the subordination of
one agency to the other. The final objective is to bring about
synergy and cohesion in counter-terrorism efforts, by doing
away with overlapping, duplications, bottlenecks and other
unnecessary hurdles. To achieve this objective, it is enough if
the NCTC functions as an umbrella organisation with
representations from intelligence, investigation and security
agencies. It should be in a position to integrate all instruments
of national power, including diplomatic, economic, social,
political, military, intelligence, and law enforcement to ensure
a unity of effort. This integration should happen at central,
state and local levels. In other words, the tentacles of the
NCTC should penetrate deep down up to district levels instead
of being another top-heavy organisation.
The NCTC need not follow any international model – US, UK or
European – but that which suits India's capabilities, and caters
to the kind of threats the country faces. It has to be innovative
and proactive in its approach rather than defensive and
reactive. 'Prevention' and 'protection' should be the main
watch words. For this, the Centre should constantly monitor
terror/militant groups, their support network, sponsors,
sanctuaries, modus operandi, threat potential, and
leadership and make periodic threat assessments for policymakers.
In this regard, it can effectively use the Crime and
Criminal Tracking Network System (CCNTS), National
Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), Central Monitoring System
(CMS) and Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).
Personnel for NCTC could be pooled from relevant
intelligence, investigation and security agencies headed by
the senior most experienced officer on rotation basis with
simple command structure. In this way, turf wars could be
avoided, with the potential and efficacy of the agencies
maximised.