April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

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April-June 10 Commentary Naxal Violence: Expanding into India's Northeast? Bibhu Prasad Routray Visiting Fellow, IPCS Ever since contact between the Communist Party of India- Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and an insurgent group operating in India's northeast was first established in 2006, the Naxalites have pursued twin objectives in the region. Firstly, the Northeast has been used as a transit route to ferry arms and other ammunition from China. Secondly, the region has also figured in the geographical expansion strategy of the extremists. What has been their success in these two objectives? Are they relatively more successful in their first objective than the second? Why? For the CPI-Maoist, 2008 was a landmark year. In October that year, they issued a joint statement with the Manipur-based People's Liberation Army (PLA). Both reiterated their commitment to "consolidate the mutual understanding and friendship" and to "stand hand in hand to overthrow the common enemy". Intelligence agencies, however, maintain that the links between the two had been firmed up in 2006. Since then, and till 2011, the PLA assisted the Maoists in procuring Chinese arms and communication equipment via Myanmar. The PLA also provided training to the Maoists. A PLA leader, who had led a team of instructors to train Maoists in Jharkhand, was arrested in April 2012. While the PLA fulfilled the crucial logistic requirements of the Maoists, it was Assam, bordering West Bengal, which figured prominently in the expansion plan of the CPI-Maoist. Interestingly, the operational weakness of the most prominent insurgent group in the state - the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), served the Maoists' interests well. According to intelligence sources, the Maoists first attempted to court fringe Adivasi groups in Assam. However, they had to settle for the ULFA since most of the Adivasi groups were, and still are, in the process of negotiations with the state. Assam's Police database on 150 Maoist cadres in the state includes many former ULFA cadres. The willingness of the ULFA to play facilitator to Maoist strategies for the Northeast had become apparent in 2010. That year, ULFA Chief Paresh Baruah congratulated the Maoists for carrying out successful strikes on the security forces in Chhattisgarh's Dantewada. Again, in 2011, the ULFA extended its sympathy after senior Maoist leader Kishenji was killed in West Bengal. In May 2012, Baruah criticising the killing of four Maoist cadres in Assam, reiterated "We (the Maoists and the ULFA) may have different ideologies but we share a common quest. Our enemy is common and the Maoists have our complete moral support." Interestingly, however, official assessments carried out by New Delhi and Assam till mid-2012, differed significantly on the issue of ULFA and Maoist linkages. In June 2012, the then Home Minister P Chidambaram, responding to increasing talks about a nexus between the Maoists and the ULFA, reiterated that the central agencies have no proof of such a linkage. The Assam government, on the other hand, underlined the existence of such a nexus. In May 2012, the Assam Police declared to have created a database of 150 active Maoist cadres in Assam. A month later, Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi asserted, "Be it ULFA, be it NSCN-IM or be it (Manipur's) PLA, every one has close links with the Maoists. We have no doubt about that.” Contradicting the then Union Home Minister's statement, the Chief Minister went on to assert, "He (Chidambaram) may have his own sources, but I have my own." Subsequently, New Delhi fell in line and started supporting the Assam government's view point on the Maoists. In December 2012, Union Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh went to the extent of suggesting that the upper Assam districts- Dibrugarh and Tinsukia should be included in the list of Left Wing Extremism-affected districts. While the debate over the attempts of the Maoists to find a foothold in Assam and the rest of the Northeast is more or less settled, the extent of their actual presence continues to be a matter of speculation. It is apparent that the Assam government is inclined to portray an alarmist description woven around Maoist fundraising, recruitment and plans for violence. However, the fact remains that the expansionist quest of the CPI-Maoist in Assam is also a narrative of repeated setbacks and failures. In May 2012, for example, the four Maoists killed in Tinsukia district included the outfit's area commander Siddhartha Bargohain. Prior to that incident, over 60 Maoist cadres and over-ground workers had been arrested from several upper Assam districts. Recent media reports on 16 January 2013 indicated the arrest of Maoist central committee member Alok Bakshi in Visakhapatnam. Bakshi was in charge of the expansion plan of the Maoists in Assam. Therefore it can be reasonably concluded that, so far, the attempts by the Maoists to gain a foothold in the Northeast have been successfully dealt with. This reality on the ground, as well as the sufficient awareness generated so far on the Maoist activities provides added advantage to the security establishment in Assam and other Northeast states to checkmate future LWE endeavours in the region. The Northeast has a substantial central force presence. The police in these states too, have sufficient counter-insurgency experience. The dip in insurgency-related violence in the region in recent years, further allows the police to concentrate its efforts on Maoist activities in the future.
Commentary India and Pakistan: Political Fallouts and Larger Questions of the LoC Violations PR Chari Visiting Professor, IPCS The ceasefire existing since 2004 along the Line of Control (LoC), which divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan, was recently breached. The consequent firings leading to the death of soldiers from both countries' Armies is tragic and needless. A well-understood mechanism exists to defuse tensions through flag meetings between local commanders. Issues that cannot be settled at a local level are referred to higher levels for negotiation and resolution. The important point to note therefore, in the context of the recent violations, is that these established mechanisms clearly did not work leading to tensions at the national level. Why Do Border Violations Occur? The LoC is well delineated on the map and recognised either by physical features or boundary markers. A complex medley of factors is generally responsible for these breaches, with personality issues intervening. A newly posted officer might, for instance, wish to impress his senior officer as having “josh” (transliterated to mean enthusiasm and courage). A superior officer might wish to improve his regiment's position for its easier defence, by plugging an infiltration route or gaining higher ground. Naturally, the adversary understands these tactical manoeuvres and wishes to frustrate them; leading to frayed tempers, heightened instabilities and, if not defused, firings, casualties and greater tensions along the LoC. The Indian Army's standard explanation that border firings by Pakistan are intended to facilitate the infiltration of its jihadist elements has become passé, therefore, with the passage of time. Consider the facts of the present firings, killings and tensions in the Mendhar sector. The facts are murky, but it seems that a Pakistani soldier was killed in a small arms firing duel, and to deter the infiltration of militants in this area, the Indian Army constructed a bunker within the no-military-presence zone along the LoC. Pakistani protests were ignored, leading to the killing of two Indian soldiers on routine patrol duty in bad weather. What set this border incident apart from several others in the past was the barbaric beheading of one of these soldiers, which has greatly angered the Indian Army and people. The Pakistani explanation that jihadis operating in this area were responsible is questionable, since the LoC is heavily militarised on both sides. Such an assertion would imply they were moving around freely in this area, which seems problematic given the circumstances. Political Fallouts of the Violation The first political action of Pakistan's was to stop the crossborder movement of people, as also cross-border trade between the two parts of Kashmir. For its part, India held up the agreement negotiated for relaxing visa restrictions, which included senior citizens being permitted visas on arrival at the Wagah border, and also denied entry to Pakistani singers and sportspersons. The linkage of border incidents with greater contacts between the two nations displays the extreme fecklessness of both countries as they are discouraging the very constituencies that harbour vested interests in promoting normalcy in India-Pakistan relations. Fortunately, better sense has now prevailed, and New Delhi and Islamabad are taking steps to resume their interrupted dialogue. With the imminent withdrawal of the US and ISAF from Afghanistan in 2014, the need of the hour is for greater coordination between India and Pakistan to draw up a strategy for grappling with the post-2014 situation, rather than fritter away their energies in internecine strife. Does, therefore, preventing border incidents, evolving confidence-building measures (CBMs) and deepening Indian- Pakistani ties require an “uninterrupted and uninterruptable” dialogue between the two antagonists? An ideal solution, no doubt, but too deterministic to appreciate the political realities of Indo-Pak relations. Dialogue for the sake of dialogue, with little hope of fruitful results is hardly likely to commend itself to hard-headed political establishments. Witness the humdrum manner in which the inter-Korean dialogue has continued for years after the Korean War ended in 1954, and became a joke. Consequently, faith must be reposed in the desire of the two leaderships to normalise relations and proceed to address their internal challenges. Is Pakistani Soldiery Under the Control of its Military Leadership? Let's face it. Despite the growing inability of the Pakistani Army to provide for the country's national security, the Pakistani civilian leadership only provides the façade behind which the Pakistan Army actually calls the shots. The country presently faces four serious threats to internal security - domestic terrorism that has even targeted the GHQ in Rawalpindi, as well as naval and air bases; continuing losses in the FATA region to Taliban attacks; American drone attacks along the Af-Pak border emphasising the country's abbreviated sovereignty; and, secular strife that is tearing the fabric of Pakistan apart. In this milieu, opening a fifth front just does not make sense. A plausible reason for the barbaric beheading of the Indian soldier, therefore, could be the extreme frustration that currently afflicts Pakistani soldiers. Coming from a restricted recruitment base, family linkages are strong among them and discipline has to be strictly enforced from above. Is that discipline eroding? In other words, is Pakistani soldiery still under the control of the Pakistani military leadership? South Asia Plus 11
Page 1 and 2: South Asia Plus April-June 2013 Vol
Page 3 and 4: South Asia Plus April-June 2013 Lad
Page 5 and 6: Commentary Af-Pak Diary: Decoding H
Page 7 and 8: Commentary Pakistan: Combating the
Page 9: Commentary Water Conflicts in South
Page 13 and 14: Commentary India and Pakistan: The
Page 15 and 16: Commentary J&K after Afzal Guru: Im
Page 17 and 18: Commentary Teesta Water Accord: Exp
Page 19 and 20: Commentary Review: India-Sri Lanka
Page 21 and 22: Commentary India and Pakistan: Is I
Page 23 and 24: Commentary Bangladesh: An Analysis
Page 25 and 26: Commentary Naxal Violence: Is the M
Page 27 and 28: Commentary Kargil: Echoes of Attack
Page 29 and 30: Commentary Sri Lanka and the UNHRC
Page 31 and 32: Commentary Sri Lanka: Tamil Nadu an
Page 33 and 34: Commentary India, China & the Brahm
Page 35 and 36: A close look at the election patter
Page 37 and 38: international border villages. Most
Page 39 and 40: the growing realisation among defen

April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

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