April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
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Commentary<br />
J&K after Afzal Guru: Immediate Excuse <strong>and</strong> Inherent Problems<br />
D Suba Ch<strong>and</strong>ran<br />
Director, IPCS<br />
Over the last few days, following the hanging <strong>of</strong> Afzal Guru, the<br />
Kashmir valley has been witnessing curfews <strong>and</strong> protests. While<br />
the Kashmir valley, especially Srinagar, is not new to protest<br />
politics <strong>and</strong> curfew governance, what is striking is its recurrence<br />
despite the drastic decline in militant violence during the last few<br />
years.<br />
What does the protest signify? Do the protesters identify<br />
themselves with Afzal Guru <strong>and</strong> the reasons that he was hung for,<br />
or are they using his execution as an excuse to express their<br />
dissatisfaction over what happened (to be more precise, what<br />
has not happened) during the last few years?<br />
What is the Problem? Afzal Guru's Execution or the Absence <strong>of</strong><br />
Political Dialogue?<br />
Afzal Guru's execution should be seen more as the trigger, rather<br />
than the reason behind the protests that are being witnessed<br />
now. Given the history <strong>of</strong> how governments have dealt with<br />
Kashmir, both at the national <strong>and</strong> state levels, one is likely to<br />
conclude that, this time too, the government will use curfews,<br />
media censorship <strong>and</strong> the security forces to wear out the protest<br />
movement. This has been a time-tested strategy <strong>of</strong> the<br />
government: sit tight, do nothing politically, <strong>and</strong> let the security<br />
forces take the heat.<br />
Such a strategy has worked for the governments both in New<br />
Delhi <strong>and</strong> in J&K in the past. It may very well work again this time<br />
as well. But will this address the problem, or will it only increase<br />
the distance between the government <strong>and</strong> its subjects in<br />
Kashmir? Certainly, Afzal Guru is not the issue here. His hanging is<br />
a trigger for a larger problem. What is it?<br />
Fire Fighting as a Long Term Policy<br />
Subsequent governments, cutting across party lines both at the<br />
State <strong>and</strong> national levels, have uniformly followed a policy <strong>of</strong><br />
doing nothing until the situation spirals to a point that illicits<br />
immediate damage control. How else can one explain the<br />
responses <strong>of</strong> subsequent governments?<br />
While it may be interesting <strong>and</strong> even frightening to find out the<br />
reasons for such a policy, what needs to be clearly understood is:<br />
this policy is not working <strong>and</strong> is not in the interest <strong>of</strong> the State.<br />
While the people suffer every day because the government<br />
considers inaction as the best form <strong>of</strong> action; the policy may tire<br />
the people out in the short term, but may not help the State in<br />
the long term.<br />
Round Tables <strong>and</strong> Interlocutions as a Ploy<br />
If fire fighting has become synonymous with the government's<br />
policy, what has really increased the distance between the<br />
government <strong>and</strong> the people are those specific political<br />
interventions that raised the expectations at the ground level;<br />
invariably leading to desperation as the government did not<br />
further pursue its own initiatives.<br />
What have been the results <strong>of</strong> those Round Table Conferences<br />
led by none other than the Prime Minister <strong>of</strong> India? Did he<br />
consider <strong>and</strong> seriously pursue the recommendations <strong>of</strong> those five<br />
groups initiated by him?<br />
Despite frustrations <strong>and</strong> negative sentiments from previous<br />
failures, different shades in J&K responded positively to the<br />
interlocutors led by Dr Radha Kumar <strong>and</strong> Mr Dileep Patgaonkar.<br />
The team took its job seriously, for it was tasked by the<br />
government to submit a report. After numerous visits <strong>and</strong> rounds<br />
<strong>of</strong> discussion, the team submitted its report. What has been the<br />
response thus far?<br />
If only the government had taken the above two initiatives<br />
seriously <strong>and</strong> addressed the basic political issue, there would<br />
have been no protests today in the Kashmir valley. But was that<br />
ever an objective <strong>of</strong> the government? In retrospect, it appears a<br />
ploy to be seen as doing something, for the ultimate objective has<br />
always been to do nothing.<br />
Governing Through Curfews <strong>and</strong> Measuring <strong>Peace</strong> Through<br />
Tourist Inflows<br />
In the absence <strong>of</strong> a clear vision <strong>and</strong> long term policy,<br />
governments use curfews <strong>and</strong> media gagging to address protests,<br />
instead <strong>of</strong> trying to address the basic problem at h<strong>and</strong>.<br />
It is really surprising that the government measures peace in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> the absence <strong>of</strong> violence. The math is simple: if there are<br />
no terrorist attacks, the State is peaceful. Worse, another<br />
yardstick to measure peace is – the number <strong>of</strong> tourists. If there<br />
are more tourists, then obviously, the region must be peaceful. To<br />
crown this calculation further, if Bollywood visits the valley, the<br />
reasoning is elevated to a gospel – that peace has certainly<br />
returned to the valley.<br />
Since when did we start measuring peace by increasing tourist<br />
inflows <strong>and</strong> Bollywood visits?<br />
Abdicating the Responsibility to the Security Forces<br />
The governments – both at the State <strong>and</strong> national levels seem to<br />
have abdicated the responsibility <strong>of</strong> governance to the security<br />
forces. Despite problems <strong>and</strong> accusations <strong>of</strong> violations, the<br />
security forces – the state police, paramilitary <strong>and</strong> the military<br />
fulfilled their responsibilities <strong>of</strong> establishing law <strong>and</strong> order.<br />
Ideally, the political leadership should have taken the process<br />
further by ensuring governance through established democratic<br />
institutions. The failure <strong>of</strong> the panchayat system in J&K alone, will<br />
show where the problem is. Will this approach help political<br />
institutions retain their credibility in the long run? Should they<br />
not realise that this is not in their interest?<br />
To conclude, the problem is not the hanging <strong>of</strong> Afzal Guru. It is the<br />
absence <strong>of</strong> a sustained political process, <strong>and</strong> a collective failure <strong>of</strong><br />
institutions both at the State <strong>and</strong> national levels. The irony is, the<br />
State remains aware <strong>of</strong> this <strong>and</strong> yet, does nothing about it.<br />
South Asia Plus 15