April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

More documents

Recommendations

Info

April-June 26 Commentary India, China, and Bangladesh: The Contentious Politics of the Brahmaputra River Roomana Hukil Research Officer, IReS, IPCS The Brahmaputra River is one of the most significant confidence-building measures between India, China, and Bangladesh. Despite a well-functioned relationship between India and China in recent decades, the Brahmaputra River may pose new challenges to the continued supply of fresh water for both countries in the future. In addition, China's announcement, last month, of its plans to construct three hydropower dams – Dagu, Jiacha, and Jiexy along the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra basin, has raged anxiety in India and Bangladesh in terms of erosion, flood protective measures, and the potential ecological damage to the downstream regions. The article delves into a strategic-techno analysis of the issues festering around the proposed dam construction projects that may open a new front of contentious politics amongst the neighbours. It examines whether 'water rationality' will continue to govern the riparian relationship, and also reasons that in spite of no water sharing agreement between India and China, vis-à-vis only one water treaty between India and Bangladesh; coupled with the enormous potential of sharing the benefits, it is unlikely to envision the three countries agreeing to sign a portioned water resource development treaty in the near future. Fresh Strategic Insights: Issues and Steps The Brahmaputra River consolidated the water rights between all the riparian states pertaining to their water usage, and requirements in the growing region. In spite of there having being no official water sharing accord between India and China, the two countries manifest a paradigm to maintaining cordial water diplomacy in the present international scenario of water conflicts. Hitherto, the dilemma over future water supply regulations, amidst the issue of ecological upkeep, persists for both India and Bangladesh. China's vigorous push in favour of the hydropower base construction on the Brahmaputra or Yarlung Zangbo River (as known in China) is foreseen as an attempt to harm the downstream interests, particularly of Northeast India. The construction of the 100 meters Zangmu dam (510 MW project) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 2010, is an approximate case in point. The current proposed construction of the 124 metres Dagu dam, which has a 640 MW capacity, triggers a maximum impact on the downstream flows in India. Post the 'flurry of dam-building', China has tried to leverage its hydropower requirements in the north and central regions; however, India's Northeast, and neighbouring Bangladesh could face an undeniably reduced water supply, if not for acute water shortage. This is reasoned since the watercourse feeds on seven rivulets originating from the glaciers in the Tibetan plateau, hence damming the river upstream could result in the lower riparian regions facing an intense water division from these snow-fed rivulets during the summer months. While the run-of-the-river projects are, primarily, meant to store large volumes of water for generating power, fresh concerns were raised regarding the need for a scientifically designed drainage system all over the downstream region, complemented by extensive soil conservation, afforestation, and watershed management in the hilly areas of the Northeast region. An in-depth study of the climatic changes that cause erratic flooding patterns is urged so that proper ameliorative measures may be adopted. This, combined with regional flood early warning systems and flood moderation measures, along with well-planned erosion management, should encourage inter-state and regional cooperation. An earnest step would be for the international community and water boards to thwart any measures that are detrimental to the sustainability of the Brahmaputra. It is imperative to maintain the flow of water in the Brahmaputra River so that it can sustain the environment and water balance in India's Northeast, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, before dispersing into the Bay of Bengal. The Relationship Soufflé China's aggressive planning to provide for the energy and water needs of its 1.3 billion people at the expanse of its Asian counterparts is presumable. China's 26 other dam projects in the pipeline (also along the Brahmaputra River) specifies an 85 per cent decline in flows from China to India during the summer months. Even if the foreseen water depictions, such as an environmental imbalance, natural disasters, degraded fragile ecologies, and diversion of vital river resources were to be refuted, China could keep any riparian neighbour on good behaviour by acquiring the capability of using the Brahmaputra as a political instrument. Thus, the implications for setting up an International Brahmaputra River Water Tribunal for arriving at an international water treaty, or a preliminary initiative of a tripartite agreement between India, China, and Bangladesh to sustain passive relations in the region deem vital. But envisaging a portioned water resource development treaty between the three countries is unlikely, where issues related to trade, transit, land, roadway, and, water distribution first require a heads up between the three neighbouring states. China's growing strategic interests in Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and maritime security coupled by Tibet's invasion in the past, raise grave security concerns for India with its plan to divert waters of the Brahmaputra to north and central China. For India, the middle riparian between China and Bangladesh, marks a fine exemplar to understanding the water needs visà-vis water supplies, as it swings around both sides of the table. As a result, whether water rationality will continually govern riparian relations still remains a question mark.
Commentary Kargil: Echoes of Attacks against Minorities in Pakistan Zainab Akhter Research Officer, IReS, IPCS In Kargil, thousands of people took to the streets in February and participated in a protest rally against the killings of minorities across Pakistan (this time more specifically against the recent Hazara killings in Quetta). What are the reasons behind the sudden outburst of protests? Why the Sudden Outbursts? For a long time, there has been an anti-Shia campaign in Pakistan; in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime was strongly anti- Iranian and conducted programmes against the Iranian Hazara population in the country. Kargil is the only Shia dominated district of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Despite minor communal clashes between the Muslims and Buddhists in the region, Kargil remained peaceful in terms of social relations between the communities. Kargil was better known to the rest of India due to the Indo-Pak war, rather than any negative communal relationship or violence in the region. Recently, there has been a series of violent activities against the Shia community in Balochistan and also in Gilgit-Baltistan. The response in Kargil to the violence against the Shia community in Pakistan was a surprise. Responding to the call of the Imam Khomeini Memorial Trust Kargil, the people of the district held a massive protest against the recent Hazara killings in Pakistan. They gathered outside Jamia Masjid, shouting slogans against the targeting of a particular community in Pakistan. Earlier in 2012, they took to the streets in response to the killings of Shia-Baltis in Gilgit- Baltistan. The Kargil Students Union in Jammu and Delhi also organised similar protest rallies chanting anti-Pakistan slogans. Being a Shia dominated community, the sectarian killings elsewhere becomes more of an emotional issue for the people of Kargil. Additionally, Iran would not like Pakistan wielding a sectarian agenda to harass Kargilis; therefore the people of Kargil, through these huge protests, intend to send a message to Iran that they strongly condemn the killings of their brothers across Pakistan. Amidst anti-Pakistan slogans and placards, the protesters requested the Government of India to pressurise Pakistan to stop such target killings, and for banning these terrorist groups. The Iran Factor Iran's influence is prevalent in Kargil. Posters of Iranian leaders can be seen in most of the places, especially in the main market; and even a street in the market is named as Khomeini Chowk, after the Iranian leader. The region is forging strong bonds with Iran; besides the Shia factor, what have given an impetus to this trend are the regular visits of youth to Iran to get religious training. Unlike any other part of the State, developments in Shia dominated areas such as Iran and Iraq are keenly talked about here. Even a political novice could give a detailed analysis of the events in Iran-Iraq, and also the latest statements of Shia clerics. Locals point out that the 'cassette revolution', which refers to the lectures and speeches of the Imam, changed the lives and religious standard of Kargil after the revolution of 1979. Unlike most other parts of India, in Kargil, women, almost without exception, wear head coverings; liquor is only available illegally; and there are no movie theatres. Religion in Politics There are two schools of thought in the region, both of which are led by religious organisations: the Imam Khomeini Memorial Trust (IKMT) and the Islamia School Kargil (ISK). The ISK is backed by the National Conference and the IKMT by the Congress, and a strong rivalry is seen between them for political gains. The differences between the two schools of religious thought have magnified with their entering the realm of politics, which is indirectly dividing the society. The IKMT believes in the Islamic revolution initiated by Imam Khomeini and deems itself as the outcome of this revolution. It works towards the dissemination of Islamic teachings and elimination of un-Islamic traditions. It also runs a school called Mutahhari Public School where, along with the regular teachings, it imparts religious knowledge and its ideology to the future generation. On the other hand, the ISK also runs a school, Islamia School, where religious education is imparted too, but is considered slightly liberal compared to the IKMT. The religious and political divide between these two schools is taking a toll on the people of Kargil, and is leading to marked divisions in the society. The fact that one faction adheres to the IKMT, and the other to the ISK, is quite visible in the town now. In the whole process, the role, significance, and work of the Hill Development Council are overshadowed by the activities and influence of these groups. Even the divide between Leh and Kargil mostly arises due to religious differences. Although there are Muslims residing in minority in Leh and Zanskar Valley, such protests are not seen in these places. There is a negative impact of these demonstrations on the minorities of the region, as these massive protests are sometimes also used as a tool to show religious superiority. South Asia Plus 27
Page 1 and 2: South Asia Plus April-June 2013 Vol
Page 3 and 4: South Asia Plus April-June 2013 Lad
Page 5 and 6: Commentary Af-Pak Diary: Decoding H
Page 7 and 8: Commentary Pakistan: Combating the
Page 9 and 10: Commentary Water Conflicts in South
Page 11 and 12: Commentary India and Pakistan: Poli
Page 13 and 14: Commentary India and Pakistan: The
Page 15 and 16: Commentary J&K after Afzal Guru: Im
Page 17 and 18: Commentary Teesta Water Accord: Exp
Page 19 and 20: Commentary Review: India-Sri Lanka
Page 21 and 22: Commentary India and Pakistan: Is I
Page 23 and 24: Commentary Bangladesh: An Analysis
Page 25: Commentary Naxal Violence: Is the M
Page 29 and 30: Commentary Sri Lanka and the UNHRC
Page 31 and 32: Commentary Sri Lanka: Tamil Nadu an
Page 33 and 34: Commentary India, China & the Brahm
Page 35 and 36: A close look at the election patter
Page 37 and 38: international border villages. Most
Page 39 and 40: the growing realisation among defen

April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?