April-June 2013 - Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

April-June 22
Commentary
India's Northeast: The Threat of Islamist Militancy
Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman
Research Scholar, IIT Guwahati, Assam
The demonstration by Muslim advocacy groups, which
resulted in violent clashes in Mumbai's Azad Maidan on 11
August 2012, leaving 2 dead and over 65 injured, was held to
protest against the killings of Muslims in Kokrajhar (the intercommunity
clashes between Muslims and the Bodo
community) and in the Arakan state of Myanmar (the intercommunity
clashes between the Rohingya Muslims and the
Rakhine community). The linkage of these two separate intercommunity
clashes to a single protest march in Mumbai may
be symbolic, but the threat of the rise of Islamist militancy in
parts of Northeast India, and the larger international
neighbourhood encompassing Myanmar and Bangladesh, has
to be seen in context.
It has been well documented that Islamist militant groups and
networks have had links with insurgent groups in many states
of Northeast India, especially in Manipur, Assam and
Nagaland; and this had been oscillating between tactical
support in arms dealing, narcotics, illegal and fake currency
networks, and anti-government sabotage activities over the
past few decades. This trend, however, does not indicate by
itself the threat of Islamist militancy. While many
commentators have described the threat of the rise of Islamist
militancy in Northeast India as unfounded and being alarmist,
the ground conditions in the larger region cannot be ignored.
The People's United Liberation Front (PULF) has been
operating in parts of Manipur, Assam and Nagaland for the
past two decades, and has been splintered, as has been the
trend with many other insurgent organisations in Northeast
India. Though split into many smaller factions over time, it is
one of the major Islamist militant organisations currently
active in the region. Apart from this, the role and support of
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Bangladesh's
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) to many
insurgent organisations and networks in Northeast India, has
unabatedly continued. There is a sort of an ideological
vacuum in many of the 'home-grown' insurgent organisations
in Northeast India. They have suffered huge losses in tactical
and public legitimacy accounts in the past decade or so and
are not in a position to prevent the growth of Islamist
militancy in Northeast India, as to guard their own turf.
The entry points for Islamist militancy in Northeast India are
not hard to comprehend. The presence of a large 'illegal'
Muslim immigrant community in Assam, which has been a
source of perennial political activism, and was one of the
motivations behind the formation of the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA), became fertile ground for an entry
point to the Islamist militant groups. The political uncertainty
that has engulfed this migrant community over more than
four decades now, has made them vulnerable to such militant
influence, as a way to survive the political threat. Further
enhancing the political aspect of an ever-looming 'threat to
their survival' versus their responses to 'surviving the threat'
over the past decades; the instance of large-scale riots and
inter-community clashes in the past, such as the Nellie riots
and the recent instances in Udalguri in 2008 and Kokrajhar in
2012, have made the case for militant responses an usable
instrument in the evolving politics of the region.
The recent riots in Kokrajhar saw the use of sophisticated
weapons by the Bodo militant groups, who took advantage of
the situation. Stemming from the flawed surrender policy of
the Indian counter-insurgency establishment, there is a
possibility of these weapons finding their way into the hands
of the Muslim groups, by jihadi groups across the border. The
threat of the rise of militancy amongst the Muslims affected
by the Kokrajhar violence, was raised by the National
Commission for Minorities (NCM), in its report to the Assam
government after a field visit in the violence affected areas of
Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) areas in
August 2012. The overall political, economic, and living
conditions of the Muslim community in BTAD areas has been
described as a fertile ground for jihadi influence.
This brings into context the rise in militant activities amongst
the Rohingya Muslims in the larger region of Arakan state of
Myanmar, South Bangladesh, and parts of Tripura and
Mizoram. In the face of deportation by Border Guards Force
along the Bangladesh border, and political and ethnic clashes
in Myanmar, the links of Rohingya militant organisations with
Al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba have been substantiated in the
past. There have been reports of Rohingya Muslims trying to
make their way into Northeast India, and this seems not a
distant possibility, given the state of our borders and the
manner in which we treat our sensitive and 'peaceful states'
border, especially in Mizoram, Manipur and Tripura.
The government of India needs to brace itself to counter the
threat of Islamist militancy in the larger region through
proactive diplomacy and a better understanding of larger
issues and linkages. It should not be content in 'managing' the
home situation. The trends that are emerging cannot be
ignored for the lack of actual ground instances; rather, we
must prepare and remedy the conditions for such entry points
to Islamist militancy.