ICISS report - International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect

The Responsibility to Protect 64
populations in the countries of a coalition. The media coverage of civilian suffering as a
result of sanctions in Iraq or of airstrikes in Serbia is a new element in determining military
as well as political strategies.
7.37 Therefore, operational planning for an operation to protect should contain a fairly
detailed sub-concept for public information. Proper conduct of an appropriate public information
campaign is not only critical to maintaining public support for an intervention but
also to maintaining the cohesion of the coalition. The difficulty in designing this concept
will be to reconcile the requirements of accurate, comprehensive and fast information with
the necessities of operational security. The cohesion of the intervening coalition and the
desirability of eroding to the extent possible the support the opposing leader may enjoy
with his or her own people or with allies, are of crucial importance. In these circumstances,
there should be no doubt that in contrast to war or enforcement operations information
will have priority over operational security, although the chances to achieve surprises will
thus be further reduced.
FOLLOWING UP MILITARY INTERVENTION
Transfer of Authority
7.38 The main mission of military forces in post-intervention operations is to provide the
safe environment necessary for the restoration of good governance and the rule of law.
Additionally military forces may have to assist in reconstruction in areas which are too
dangerous for non-military personnel to enter. The conduct of such operations means often
that the forces will increasingly have to do what under normal circumstances police would
do, at least initially. In addition, the forces have to be prepared to enforce compliance and,
if necessary, to defend the country.
7.39 These tasks are more complex and cover a wider range than combat operations
normally do. The chain of command will be increasingly blurred since civilian authorities
will often take the lead on the ground. There is a need for clear-cut responsibilities and
a transition of responsibility from the military authorities to the civilian authorities, as soon
as possible after hostilities have ceased. While it may be necessary for a short period
immediately after hostilities have ceased for the military commander to assume complete
administrative authority, the transition to civilian authority should take place with
minimum delay. The usual process will be the appointment by the UN of a Special
Representative of the Secretary-General, and the transfer of military authority to that Special
Representative, with full local authority restored following elections and the withdrawal of
foreign military forces.
Peacekeeping and Peace Building
7.40 To see an intervention through means as well that the intervening side has to be
prepared to remain engaged during the post-intervention phase as long as necessary in order
to achieve self-sustained stability. Coalitions or nations act irresponsibly if they intervene
without the will to restore peace and stability, and to sustain a post-intervention operation
for as long as necessary to do so.
7.41 Past experience demonstrates that, if the internal security challenge is not handled
early, “old” habits and structures will prevail and undermine other efforts to enhance postconflict
peace building. The immediate aftermath of any civil war spawns organized crime,
revenge attacks, arms proliferation, looting and theft. UN civilian police officers deployed