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ICISS report - International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect

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69<br />

8. THE RESPONSIBILITY<br />

TO PROTECT: THE<br />

WAY FORWARD<br />

FROM ANALYSIS TO ACTION<br />

8.1 This <strong>report</strong> has been about compelling human need, about populations at risk of<br />

slaughter, ethnic cleansing and starvation. It has been about <strong>the</strong> responsibility of sovereign<br />

states <strong>to</strong> protect <strong>the</strong>ir own people from such harm – and about <strong>the</strong> need <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> larger<br />

international community <strong>to</strong> exercise that responsibility if states are unwilling or unable <strong>to</strong><br />

do so <strong>the</strong>mselves.<br />

8.2 Past debates on intervention have tended <strong>to</strong> proceed as if intervention and state<br />

sovereignty were inherently contradic<strong>to</strong>ry and irreconcilable concepts – with support <strong>for</strong><br />

one necessarily coming at <strong>the</strong> expense of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. But in <strong>the</strong> course of our consultations<br />

this Commission has found less tension between <strong>the</strong>se principles than we expected. We<br />

found broad willingness <strong>to</strong> accept <strong>the</strong> idea that <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>to</strong> protect its people from<br />

killing and o<strong>the</strong>r grave harm was <strong>the</strong> most basic and fundamental of all <strong>the</strong> responsibilities<br />

that sovereignty imposes – and that if a state cannot or will not protect its people from such<br />

harm, <strong>the</strong>n coercive intervention <strong>for</strong> human protection purposes, including ultimately<br />

military intervention, by o<strong>the</strong>rs in <strong>the</strong> international community may be warranted in<br />

extreme cases. We found broad support, in o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> core principle identified in<br />

this <strong>report</strong>, <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>to</strong> protect.<br />

8.3 The most strongly expressed concerns that <strong>the</strong> Commission did hear in <strong>the</strong> course<br />

of our year-long consultations around <strong>the</strong> world went essentially <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> political and<br />

operational consequences of reconciling <strong>the</strong> principle of shared responsibility with that of<br />

non-intervention. These concerns were of three different kinds. They might be described,<br />

respectively, as concerns about process, about priorities, and about delivery, with a crosscutting<br />

concern about competent assessment of <strong>the</strong> need <strong>to</strong> act.<br />

8.4 As <strong>to</strong> process, <strong>the</strong> main concern was <strong>to</strong> ensure that when protective action is taken, and<br />

in particular when <strong>the</strong>re is military intervention <strong>for</strong> human protection purposes, it is undertaken<br />

in a way that rein<strong>for</strong>ces <strong>the</strong> collective responsibility of <strong>the</strong> international community<br />

<strong>to</strong> address such issues, ra<strong>the</strong>r than allowing opportunities and excuses <strong>for</strong> unilateral action.<br />

The Commission has sought <strong>to</strong> address <strong>the</strong>se concerns by focusing, above all, on <strong>the</strong> central<br />

role and responsibility of <strong>the</strong> United Nations Security Council <strong>to</strong> take whatever action is<br />

needed. We have made some suggestions as <strong>to</strong> what should happen if <strong>the</strong> Security Council<br />

will not act but <strong>the</strong> task, as we have seen it, has been not <strong>to</strong> find alternatives <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> Security<br />

Council as a source of authority, but <strong>to</strong> make it work much better than it has.<br />

8.5 As <strong>to</strong> priorities, <strong>the</strong> main concern was that attention in past debates and policy making<br />

had focused overwhelmingly on reaction <strong>to</strong> catastrophe – and in particular reaction by<br />

military intervention – ra<strong>the</strong>r than trying <strong>to</strong> ensure that <strong>the</strong> catastrophe did not happen<br />

in <strong>the</strong> first place. The Commission has tried <strong>to</strong> redress this imbalance by emphasizing over<br />

and again <strong>the</strong> integral importance of prevention in <strong>the</strong> intervention debate, and also by<br />

pointing out <strong>the</strong> need <strong>for</strong> a major focus on post-conflict peace building issues whenever

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