TRS435_web

egional and international security and stability, provides that transfers of
separated neptunium in quantities greater than 1 g should be controlled.
As a result of the increasing awareness of the proliferation potential of
neptunium and americium, and of emerging projects in peaceful nuclear
programmes that could lead to an increase in the available quantities of
separated neptunium and americium, the IAEA Director General provided a
report to the Board of Governors on “The Proliferation Potential of
Neptunium and Americium” in November 1998 [12].
During the Board’s discussion, a spectrum of views on the proliferation
risks of neptunium and americium was reflected by Member States. In
September 1999, after extensive deliberations, the Board agreed, as included in
the Chairman’s conclusion, that “the proliferation risk with regard to
neptunium is considerably lower than that with regard to uranium or
plutonium”; and the Board believed that “at present there is practically no
proliferation risk with regard to americium.” The Board endorsed the implementation
of monitoring schemes for neptunium and americium through which
the Secretariat could provide assurance that the quantities of separated
neptunium and americium in States with comprehensive safeguards
agreements (CSAs) remain insufficient to pose a proliferation risk and which
provide timely notification to the Board if this situation were to change [13].
Given the difference in the proliferation risks posed by neptunium and
americium, flowsheet verification (FSV) was introduced as an element of the
monitoring scheme to cover the acquisition path of separated neptunium from
indigenous production. FSV consists of the following: a set of confirmative
measures such as examination and verification of design information relevant
to neptunium; examination of relevant process records and monitoring of key
process parameters; measurement of randomly selected samples; application of
containment and surveillance measures; and use of environmental sampling
and analysis. These measures, if implemented at candidate facilities in CSA
States, would provide direct confirmation that these facilities are being
operated as declared with respect to the recovery or separation of neptunium.
It should be noted that FSV is basically a qualitative approach and does not
entail detailed material accountancy of neptunium.
Candidate facilities for the application of FSV include those that have an
actual or potential capability to separate appreciable amounts of neptunium,
including in reprocessing plants, MOX fuel fabrication facilities with plutonium
conversion operations and/or wet scrap recovery, conversion facilities involving
neptunium and HLLW vitrification facilities. Candidate facilities also include
large scale laboratory facilities engaged in R&D associated with developing
actinide partitioning technologies. The monitoring of such facilities would be
important because the equipment used and the experience gained in their
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