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measures (institutional arrangements and safeguards), and should be investigated,
developed and incorporated in P&T.
A few suggestions have been made regarding proliferation resistant
features that could reduce the availability or accessibility of weapons usable
material by controlling the quality of the material concerned (e.g. isotopic
composition, radiological properties and chemical forms). For example, a partitioning
process could be so designed that it would only separate MAs from
HLW in a mixture with selected LLFPs. It could also be so designed that MAs
are not mutually separated. Products from such processes would not be
directly suitable for weapons purposes and would be self-protected by the high
levels of heat and radiation emissions. A strengthened FSV variant might be
applied as a confirmatory measure at such partitioning facilities, while
safeguards implementation would be needed only if and when pure materials
were produced.
Proliferation resistant features could also be incorporated in the designs
and operational modalities of the facilities to be used for P&T. These might
include built-in engineered barriers to prevent the diversion of the materials
concerned or an attempt to misuse the facility, providing a means to detect the
diversion or misuse at an early stage, or making modifications to the flowsheet
extremely difficult or impossible. Such facility designs might also stipulate strict
operational conditions and parameters; any deviation from such normal
conditions would cause serious safety or radiation risks.
3.5. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF PROLIFERATION CONTROL
The proliferation risks associated with the fuel cycle supporting the
nuclear power industry have been investigated and adequate safeguards
measures have been fully implemented. In the European Union the safeguards
authorities of Euratom and the IAEA carry out inspections and perform verification
measurements on key material. Safeguards measures are sufficiently
mature to provide assurance that nuclear material cannot be diverted without
being detected. In contrast, however, dedicated P&T technology is still at an
early stage of development. Consequently, proliferation resistance and
safeguardability are issues that need to be evaluated carefully.
Some aspects of MA P&T will be discussed in connection with proliferation
resistance and safeguardability assuming that the P&T activities will be
separated from the main nuclear power industry and carried out in dedicated
facilities, the aim of which is the reduction of the long lived waste inventory.
This option, called the ‘double strata’ approach, will be used as an example in
the discussion of the safeguards issues.
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