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WTO: World Trade Report 2010 - World Trade Organization

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world trade report <strong>2010</strong><br />

tariff would be optimal because it would decrease the<br />

rate of resource extraction and reduce habitat loss.<br />

However, in the second case the effect of a tariff is<br />

ambiguous because it affects habitat conservation both<br />

through reducing resource extraction and expanding<br />

other economic activities.<br />

If habitat is affected adversely by the conversion<br />

of resources to other uses, environmental<br />

standards and eco-label schemes could efficiently<br />

address the problem.<br />

While mandatory environmental standards set quality<br />

conditions to be adhered to by each producer, an ecolabel<br />

is a certification scheme that provides information<br />

to consumers, helping them to identify environmentfriendly<br />

products. An eco-label can only achieve its<br />

objective if consumers hold preferences for<br />

environmental amenities. In that circumstance, eco-label<br />

schemes may be able to achieve similar environmental<br />

goals to those of environmental standards. Moreover, in<br />

situations where governments cannot impose an<br />

environmental standard on foreign firms, an eco-label<br />

scheme is the most efficient policy to implement.<br />

The political economy of trade policy in<br />

natural resource sectors<br />

The socially optimal rate of resource extraction<br />

may be hard to obtain when trade and conservation<br />

policies are influenced by special interest groups.<br />

The effect of trade opening on resource extraction<br />

in this context is ambiguous.<br />

National resource abundance and<br />

regional integration<br />

A two-way relationship exists between natural<br />

resources and regional integration. Regional<br />

integration affects resource-rich and resourcescarce<br />

countries differently. These effects, in turn,<br />

shape the incentives for these countries to engage<br />

in regional integration.<br />

The integration of two resource-abundant countries<br />

with low tariffs and non-tariff barriers on natural<br />

resources, and similar production structures with limited<br />

manufacturing activity, is likely to lead to limited trade<br />

creation and potentially large trade diversion effects.<br />

On the other hand, regional integration may enable a<br />

resource-abundant country to diversify its production<br />

and export structure by relaxing the constraints it faces<br />

in developing a manufacturing sector.<br />

Regional integration may assuage concerns about overexploitation<br />

of natural resources and other potential<br />

negative consequences of international trade on the<br />

environment as provisions on natural resource<br />

management are sometimes included in regional and<br />

bilateral free trade agreements.<br />

See page 112.<br />

A number of studies point to the possibility that the rate<br />

of resource utilization may be greater than the socially<br />

optimal rate because of poor governance or lobbying<br />

activities. This is particularly true in countries where<br />

institutional checks and balances on government<br />

activity are weak.<br />

<strong>Trade</strong> openness affects both incentives to lobby the<br />

government and the quality of institutions in which<br />

policy-makers operate. While the effect on lobbying is<br />

ambiguous, recent studies highlight a positive effect of<br />

trade on institutional quality and hence on efficient<br />

resource utilization.<br />

In the presence of lobbying activities, international<br />

transfers are the most appropriate policy to<br />

address negative cross-border effects associated<br />

with the excessive extraction of resources.<br />

By inducing the exporting government to increase<br />

resource stocks, international transfers such as debtfor-nature<br />

swaps are the first-best policy to improve<br />

management of a natural resource whose depletion<br />

creates negative cross-border effects ignored by the<br />

market (externalities). A trade sanction may have exactly<br />

the opposite effect as it hurts the politically organized<br />

resource sector.<br />

14

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