The Glencairn Uprising, 1653-54 Helen Baker Department of ...

In March, Lilburne’s confidence was strengthened by the success of his armies in
dispersing a meeting of 2000 Highlanders and his belief that the English defeat of the
Dutch would dishearten the rebels. 86 On 16 April he reported that the success of the
English fleet had checked the designs of the rebels and that the country was currently
in a peaceful state. Three days later he reported that he found a great inclination
among ordinary Scots to submit to the Government while the Highlanders’ posture
seemed only defensive in nature. However, he also warned Cromwell that England
had not provided the means to encourage other inhabitants of the country to cooperate.
87
The apparent tranquillity of April lulled Lilburne into a false sense of security. On 22
April, Kenneth Mackenzie, the 3 rd Earl of Seaforth, wrote to Charles II to declare that
there were a great number of subjects willing to die for the King, including himself. 88
Like many of the leading men in the Glencairn uprising, Seaforth had a background in
political dissent. His father had fought alongside Montrose. On 29 May, Seaforth
expressed his loyalty by carrying out the first overt act of rebellion. 89 With the help of
an agent of the King named Crawford, Seaforth captured a group of English sailors
who had landed on the island of Lewis from a privateer, The Fortune, under the
command of Captain Edwards.
Seaforth demanded that Edwards sacrifice his ship for use by the King’s men.
Edwards refused. The situation failed to escalate further – after some days of threats
and deliberations, the sailors were released. Lilburne had retaliated by imprisoning the
Tutor of Seaforth alongside other principal members of the Mackenzie clan,
recommending to Cromwell that their chief’s estates should be sequestered. A few
months later, Colonel Ralph Cobbett with several war frigates landed on the island
without resistance. Seaforth had, by this time, left Lewis for the mainland, leaving his
illegitimate brother in charge. The English forces maintained a presence on the island,
primarily because they suspected that the Dutch might send ships to the isles of Lewis
86 It is likely that English victories did upset Royalist morale. The importance of Dutch aid in achieving
success was viewed as paramount by the rebels and the English were aware of this belief. Mercurius
Politicus for March 3-10 contains a letter from Dalkeith written on 1 March suggesting that the naval
victories had halted the planned uprising. Firth, C.H. Scotland and the Commonwealth, pp.80, n.2 and
Dow, F.D. Cromwellian Scotland, p.88.
87 Firth, C.H. Scotland and the Commonwealth, pp.96, 122, 127.
88 Ibid., pp.127-128.